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ON P:R6'c:Ib'b'uR:fu.' ;:.": ".· '·.: " :

cedure. The plan contemplates separate volumes on the

following special topics: — Trial Practice, Code Pleading,

Common Law Pleading, Equity Pleading and Practice,

THE

SERIE.

Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Appellate Practice.

These books are to be prepared as separate and inde-

pendent treatments of the subjects to which they relate.

Each branch of procedure has its o^vn subject-matter and

its independent problems, and no advantage would result

from erasing the lines which mark its boundaries. But

while this is so, it is nevertheless important to observe that

an adequate conception of any one of these branches can

be formed only by keeping constantly in mind the scope

and function of procedure as a whole. In a very true and

fundamental sense procedure is single and indivisible. Its
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aim is to furnish a mechanism for litigation, to supply a

means and method for applying the law in the solution of

legal controversies. One purpose runs through it all.

Pleadings are drawn to present issues for trial; trials are

had to determine issues raised by the pleadings. What the

trial demands the pleadings must give. One is the counter-

part of the other. Only in view of the trial are the plead-

ings intelligible ; only by reference to the pleadings can the

scope and course of the trial l)e determined. And as for

the relation between procedure in nisi priiis and in appellate

courts, the former is moulded to meet tlie requirements of

the latter and the latter is leased strictly upon the founda-

tion laid by the former. Thus ))leading, in its various forms,

trial practice, and apjiellate practice may be correctly

viewed as component parts of a highly developed system

designed to enable parties to successfully resort to courts

of law for the redress of grievan:^os. Together they furnish

a complete mechanism for the administration of the law.

(Hi)

740019

The present volume, on Trial Practice, is the first of a
series of a e-books which the editor hopes to prepare for
the use of law students, covering the broad subject of Procedure. The plan contemplates separate volumes on the
following special topics :-Trial Practice, Code Pleading,
Common Law Pleading, Equity Pleading and Practice,
Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Appellate Practice.
These books are to be prepared as separate and ind pendent treatments of the subjects to which they relate.
Each branch of procedure has its own subject-matter and
its independent problems, and no advantacre would result
from erasing the lines which mark its boundaries. But
while this is so, it is neverthel ss important to ob erve that
an adequate conception of any one of these branches can
be formed only by keeping con tantly in mind the scope
and fun tion of procedure as a whole. In a very true and
fundamental sense procedure is single and indivisible. Its
aim is to furnish a mechanism for liticration, to supply a
means and method for applying the law in the solution of
legal controversies. One purpose runs through it all.
Pleading are drawn to present i sues for trial; trials are
had to det rmine issues rai. ed by the pleadincrs. What the
trial demand the pleadings mu t give. One is the counterpart of tb other. Only in vi w of th trial nr the pleadings int lligible · only b. r f r ence to tbe I l a lino·s can the
cope and our e of the trial h d termin L And as for
the r lation betw en pro edur in nisi priu an 1 ju appellate
rourt , th form r i mould d to meet th r quir ment of
the latt r and the latt r i hn s l trictly upon the foundation lai by th f rm r. Thn pl a ling· in i various forms,
trial prarti , anl a11 llat 1racti
m·y b correctly
1 a.
m onent part f a hi hl~ d ' 101 ed system
1 ig11 1 t
na ble l arti . t . n e full. r
rt to court
flaw f r tb r r
of Ti nn . Tocr th r they furni h
a rom1J t m hani m for the dministration of the law.
(iii)
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the use of law students, covering the broad subject of Pro-
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• •3Pi5i0^4^)D'ijCTORY Note.

•/•'■in the present series of easJQ^bo.oks upon procedure it

is .proposecljto: deyeloj> the snbj&c't, so far as possible, in

this; B'lloa'^/'dajj :CohipK4}Vn§i,Y^ way. Each branch will be

treated sejiarately, and its technical details will be fully

and carefully exhibited, but at the same time it will be the

definite aim to make each volume disclose its place and

])ur])ose as an integral part of an articulated system. In

this way, if at all, may procedure be shown in its true

character, as a logically developed and practically efficient

means for accomplishing a very important end, instead

of a mass of arbitrary and technical rules. No method

Arill work well in the hands of those who lack an adequate

perspective and who fail to take a comprehensive view of

its scope and purpose. If the law schools are to turn out

men able to meet the exacting demands of a critical and

sorely-tried public, they must spare no effort to develop

in their students a thorough, rational and enlightened ap-
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preciation of the true function and the basic principles of

procedure. The series here proposed is an effort to sup-

ply material to meet this need.

Edson R. Sunderland.

University of Michigan.
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the pre ent series of ~a·s:~ bo.oks upon procedure it
"·"· i' FF p .. ed; ~~ ~eyel9P. P;.e sµbS~·f, so far as possible, in
thi : ~·~. ·t?.·~r:~ '$1 :G9P1P~"l;l~R·~~Y~ way. Ea.c h branch will be
r at 1 l ara t ly, and its technical details will be fully
an 1 'ar fully exhibit d but at the same time it will be the
1 finit , im t make each volume disc.lose its place and
] lll'J
a an int oTal part of an articulated system. In
thi ,,·a.· if at all, may procedure be shown in its true
bar~ t r, a. a locrically developed and practically efficient
rn an, f r a complishing a very important end, instead
of a ma
of arbitrary and technical rules. No method
·will wor1~ w 11 in the hands of those who lack an adequate
p r . l ti' and who fail to take a comprehensive view of
it, op and purpo e. If the law schools are to turn out
m n able to meet the exacting demands of a critical and
, r ly-tri d public, they must spare no effort to develop
i th ir tu nts a thorough, rational and enlightened ap1 r iation of the true function and the basic principles of
pro
ur . The s ries here proposed is an effort to supply mat rial to m t this need.
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND.
Univ r ity of Michigan.
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The teaching of Practice has been neglected to a surpris-

ing degree in American law schools. The subject is one
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of immense importance to the profession, as all lavN^yers
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,
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understand. And yet, in fitting men to practice law the

schools have seldom accorded it a prominent place in the

curriculum. It is probable that in no profession do the

technicalities of practice lAaj so large a part as in the

PREFACE.

law. Indeed, court procedure has really become a public

problem in which the laity, who suffer from its abuses,

are beginning to take a vigorous and aggressive interest.

A subject of such vital concern to both the public and the

profession should be worthy of a careful and discriminat-

ing study.

For many years the Law Department of the University

of Michigan has offered an exceptionally large amount

of work in Practice, and this has tended to increase from

year to year as the methods have become better systema-

tized. This work has consisted of two branches, class-
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room work in the principles of Practice and a practical

application of these principles in the Practice Court. The

former has proved particularly troublesome because there

were no suitable books available for classroom use. Vari-

ous general texts on Practice have been employed, and re-

cently the work has been conducted as a research course,

questions being prepared and handed to the students to be

answered by reference to the statutes, digests, reports and

text-books in the library. But neither the text-book nor

the library method proved entirely satisfactor}^ Eacli

tended to emphasize the rules of practice as such, instead

of developing the reasons underlying them. In a law school

largely devoted to the case system of instruction, it finally

became clear that a case-book in Practice was an urgent

necessity. This book has been prepared to meet that need.

A comparative study of the decisions on Practice in the

(V)

The teachin (}' of Practice has been neglected to a surprising deg-r e in American law schools. Th ubject i one
of imm n e importance to the profe sion, as all la·w yers
understand. And yet, in fitting m n to practice law the
schools have seldom accorded it a prominent place in the
rurri ulum. It is probable that in no I rof ion do the
technicalities of practice play so lar()'e a part as in the
law. Indeed, court procedure has r ally become a public
problem in which the laity, who suffer from its abu es,
are beo·inning to take a vi(J'orou and ag()'ressive intere t.
A subject of such vital concern to both the public and the
profes ion should be worthy of a careful and discriminating study.
For many years the Law Department of the Univer ity
of Michi()'an has offered an exceptionally la.r()'e amount
of work in Practic , and this ha t nded to increa e from
year to year as the methods have b com better y tematized. This work has consi ted of two bran he cla room work in the principles of Practice and a practical
application of these principles in the Pra tice Court. The
former ha proved particularly troublesome b cau ther
were no suitable books available for las r oom u e. Various general texts on Practice have been employed, and rrently the work ha been condu ted as a r esearch cour ,
questions being r pared and handed to th tudent to he
answered by reference to the statute , dL:e t , report and
text-books in the library. But neith r the text-book nor
the librar. method prov d entirel
ati fa tory. Ea h
tended to empha. iz th rul of ra ti a u h in t a l
of develo ing the r a n und erlyino· th em. In a law h 1
largely d vot d to the a
y tern of in tru tion. it finallv
became clear that a ca -b k in Pra ti ' a an urg i;
necessity. Thi book ha b n prepar d to m et that n 1.
A comparative study of the decisions on Practice in th
(v)
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•
.'rJifferent States will readily' tJispose of the commonly ac-

'ccj)4;iid fallac.v.tlmt.Ri^aGtica is'-.jJrimarily a local subject,

to'fbe^istLVpi'S!:^^}^ taU^J^t*'^?,?' matter of local education in

preparation for admission to a local bar. In truth, the

principles of trial practice are largely of general applica-

tion. The variations found in different jurisdictions are

most of them on minor points. The major problems, in-

volving the correlation of functions between judge, jury,

attorney, party and witness, are always the same, wher-

ever the jury system is in use. And the solution of these

problems of trial practice has followed closely parallel

lines in the different American jurisdictions. In every

instance there were the same elements to work with, the

same results to be reached, and the previous experience

of other courts was at the disposal of each. Logic and

experiment led along the line of least resistance, and re-

sulted in the building up of a systematic and well-ordered

body of principles which, if administered with intelligence

and conscience, are, in the main, admirably adapted to meet
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the requirements of modern courts of justice.

The present volume is intended to develop and disclose

the rational basis for the main principles of practice em-

ployed in the trial of civil actions at law. Recourse has

l)een had to the whole body of American case law, and the

choice of cases has been determined by the clearness with

which the court has shown a logical justification for the de-

cision made. By this means it is hoped that the book will

lielp the student to analyze and understand the methods

l)y which courts solve problems of practice, to appreciate

the comparative value, importance and bearing of the dif-

ferent elements involved, and to form sound notions of the

underlying ])rinciples goveniing the complex field of mod-

ern court procedure.

The cases have been very freely edited, and everything

not gei-mane to the subject for which the case was chosen

has been omitted. Questions of procedure are usually

raised in connection with questions relating to the sub-

stantive law, so that few opinions can be advantageously

used in toto in a work of this kind. It is believed, how-

ever, tliat the facts of the various cases have never been
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PREFACE.
Preface. ^**

cut so far as to impair their value. The great advantage

of cases over text-books as educational instruments lies in

the presentation of facts out of which the court, by a lo.gi-

cal process of demonstration which it develops and exhibits

before the reader, is able to derive its legal conclusions.

Cases with facts eliminated are usually of little more value

than the abstract discussions of the text-books, and great

care has therefore been taken to preserve them in every in-

stance where the legal principles involved depend in any

material degree upon the nature of the facts.

While Evidence is essentially a branch of Trial Prac-

tice, it has been entirely excluded from the present volume,

for the obvious reason that it is everywhere recognized

as of sufficient importance and difficulty to warrant an in-

dependent treatment.

Edson R. Sunderland.

University of Michigan,

Ann Arbor,
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the presentation of facts out of which the court, by a logical process of demonstration which it develops and exhibits
before th reader, is able to derive its legal conclusions.
Cases with facts eliminated a.re usually of little more value
than the abstract discussions of the text-book , and great
care has therefore been taken to preserve them in every instance where the legal principles involved depend in any
material degree upon the nature of the facts.
While Evidence is essentially a branch of Trial Practice, it has been entirely excluded from the present volume,
for the obvious reason that it is everywhere recognized
as of sufficient importance and difficulty to warrant an independent treatment.
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University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor,
September, 1912.
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CHAPTER I.

WRITS OF SUMMONS.

CHAPTER I.

Section 1. What is Process.

BEOOKS V. NEVADA NICKEL SYNDICATE.

Supreme Court of Nevada, 1898,

WRITS OF SUMMONS.

24 Nevada, 311,

By the Court, Massey, J. :

The first objection made to the validity of the judgment,

based upon defects appearing in the judgment roll, is that

SECTION

no summons was ever issued in the action — that the paper

1.

w HAT IS PRO CESS.

purporting to be a summons is void for the reason that it

runs in the name of "The People of the State of Nevada."

Section 13, article VI of the constitution requires that the

BROOKS V. NEVADA NICKEL SYNDICATE.

style of all process shall be "The State of Nevada." Is a

Supreme Court of Nevada, 1898.

summons issued under our law a process within the mean-

ing of the provision of said article?

24 Nevada, 311.

Under our practice act, which has been in force since

1869, provision is made for the issuance of summons to be

signed by the attorney for the plaintiif, or by the clerk,
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and, when issued by the clerk, requiring that it shall be

By the Court,

fines the contents of the same. There is nothing in the act

requiring the summons to run in any particular form. It

has never been treated as a process within the meaning of

our constitution either by the legislature or the courts, and,

while there is conflict of authority upon a similar question,

under constitutions and statutes similar to our own, in

other states, we are disposed to hold that a summons is not

a process, within the meaning of our constitution.

Upon this point we quote from a decision of the Supreme

Court of Colorado, in which it says: "As to the first point

raised — that the summons is such a process as may be is-

sued in the name of the people of Colorado — we are strong-

T. p.— 1

MASSEY,

J.:

• • • • • * • • • •

under the seal of the court. The same act specifically de-

The first objection made to the validity of the judgment,
based upon defect appearing in the judgment roll, is that
no summon was ever is ued in the action-that the paper
i urporting to be a ummon i void for the reason that it
runs in the name of ''The People of the State of Nevada.''
ection 13, article VI of the constitution requires that the
. tyle of all process shall be ''The State of Nevada.'' Is a
ummons issued under our law a process within the meanin o· of the provision of aid article~
Under our practice act, which bas been in force since
1869, provi ion is made for the is uance of summons to be
signed by the attorney for the plaintiff, or by the clerk,
and, when i ued by the clerk, requiring that it shall be
under the seal of the court. The same act specifically defines the contents of the same. There is nothing in the act
requiring the ummons to run in any particular form. It
has never been treated as a process within the m aning of
our con titution eith r by the legislature or the courts and
while there i conflict of authority upon a similar que tion
under con titution and tatute
imilar to our own, in
other state , we are di o d to hold that a summon i not
a proce
within the meaning of our con titution.
Upon tbi point w quot from a d cision of the upreme
Court of olorado, in which it ay : ''
to the first point
rai d-that the summons is su h a proce s as may be i u d in the name of the people of Colorado-we are strono-T. P.-1

[Chap. 1

TRIAL PRAOTI 'E

2 Trial Practice [Chap. 1

ly inclined to follow the conclusion of the Supreme Court

of Florida in Gilmer v. Bird, 15 Fla. 411. In this case the

identical question here presented is discussed at some

length — that is, 'that the summons, as authorized by the

code, is a "process", within the meaning of the constitu-

tional provisions which require the style of all process to

be the "State of Florida"; that the summons had no such

style; that this was essential to the validity of thb judg-

ment, there having been no appearance.' And the court

said: 'But is the notice given by an attorney of the insti-

tution of a suit, in a form similar to a summons, but not

issuing out of a court, a "process" within the meaning of

the constitution? Baron Comyn, in giving the definition

of the term "process" says it imports the writs which

issue out of any court to bring the party to answer, or for

doing execution. There is no definition of "process" given

by any accepted authority, which implies that any writ or

method by which a suit is commenced is necessarily "pro-
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cess." A party is entitled to notice and to a hearing under

the constitution before he can be affected, but it is nowhere

declared or required that that notice shall be only a writ

issuing out of a court.' " {Comet Consolidated M. Co. v.

Frost, 25 Pac. (Col.) 506; Hamia v. Russel, 12 Minn. 80;

Bailey v. Williams, 6 Or. 71; Nichols v. The Planh Road

Co., 4 G. Greene, 44.)

Section 2. Designation of Court and Parties.

EGGLESTON V. WATTAWA.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 1902.

117 Iowa, 676.

Action on a judgment recovered by default in the cir-

r'uit court of South Dakota in and for Brule county. De-

fendant denmrred on tlie ground tliat the summons in the

action on which the judgment was recovered was not suffici-

ent to give the court jurisdiction. The trial court sustained

this demurrer, and, on phiintiff's election to stand on his

1 inclined to follow the conclusion of the Supreme Court

of Florida in Gilnier v . Bird, 15 Fla. 411. In this case the
identical question here presented is di cussed at some
length-that is, 'that the summons, as authorized by the
ode, is a "proces ", within the meaning of the constitutional provisions which require the style of all process to
be the ''State of Florida''; that the summons had no such
. tyle; that this was es ential to the validity of thb judgment, ther:e having been no appearance.' And the court
aid: 'But is the notice given by an attorney of the institution of a suit, in a form similar to a summon , but not
issuing out of a court, a "proce ·s" within the meaning of
the constitution~ Baron Comyn, in giving the deflni.tion
of the term ''process'' says it imports the writs which
i .·. ue out of any court to bring the party to answer, or for
loing execution. There is no definition of ''process'' given
by any accepted authority, which implies that any writ or
method by which a suit is commenced is necessarily "process.'' A party is entitled to notice and to a hearing under
the constitution before he can be affected, but it is nowhere
declared or required that that notice shall be only a writ
i uing out of a court.' " (Comet Consolidated M. Co. v.
Frost, 25 Pac. (Col.) 506; Hanna v. Ru sel, 12 Minn. 80;
Bailey v. liVilliams, 6 Or. 71; Nichols v. The Plank Road
Co., 4 G. Greene, 44.)

• • * * • * * * * •

SECTION

2.

DESIGNATION OF

EGGL

1

Co

RT AND PARTIES.

TON V. WATTA W .

Supreme Court of Iowa.

1902.

117 Iowa, 6'76.

A ti n on a judgm nt recover d by def a ult in the cirr·ui c urt f ~ nth ak ta in and for Brul ounty. Def'f'nd · nt mnrr d n th ()'round that th umm n in the
a ·ti n
whi ·h th jud m nt was r ov r d w not su!Iicig i v th
urt juri li ti
The trial court ustained
: . urr r, an 1,
1 in tiff' 1 cti n to tand on hi.
i

Sec. 2]
Sec. 2] Writs of Summons 3

petition, rendered judgment for defendant, from whicli

plaintiff appeals. — Affirmed.

McClain, J. — Although the action on which the judg

ment was rendered in South Dakota was entitled in the

circuit court, the summons required defendant "to answer

the complaint of N. W. Eggleston, plaintiff, wliich will be

filed in the office of the clerk of the district court within

and for said Brule county, at Chamberlain, Brule Co., S.

D., and to serve a copy of your answer to the said com-

plaint on the subscriber at the office in the city of Cham-

berlain, S. D., in said county and state, within thirty days

after the service of this summons, exclusive oi the day of

service, or the plaintiff will apply to the court for the re-

lief demanded in the complaint, besides costs." This sum-

mons was served on January 9, 1892. The complaint on

which judgment was rendered by the circuit court of Brule

county was not filed until December 9, 1892, and judgment

by default was entered on that day. The provisions of the
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statutes of South Dakota, set out by plaintiff in his petition,

provide, with reference to the summons, that it shall re-

quire defendant ' * to answer the complaint and serve a copy

of his answer on the person whose name is subscribed to the

summons, at a place within the state to be therein specified,

in which there is a postoffice, within 30 days after the ser-

vice of the summons, exclusive of the day of service." It

is evident that under such statutory provision the sum-

mons in question was fatally defective in not correctly nam-

ing the court in which the complaint would be filed. The

statutes of the state do not, so far as made to appear in

this record, specifically require that the court in which the

defendant is to appear shall be named, but certainly that is

essential to such a notice as would be sufficient to consti-

tute due process of law. Moreover, it is required by the

statutes of that state, if a copy of the complaint is not

served with the summons, that "the summons must state

where the complaint is or will be filed." The summons in

question did not state that essential fact, for no complaint

was ever filed in the "district court." There was in fact

no such court then in existence, the "district court" as

known under the territorial government, having been re-

placed by the "circuit court" by the provisions of the con-

stitution under which the state was admitted. This change

"\VRIT

OF

UM.M"ON8

petition, rendered judgment for defendant, from which
plaintiff appeal .-Affinned.
McCLAIN, J.-Although the action on which the judo·
ment was rendered in outh Dakota wa
ntitl d in the
·circuit court, the ummon r quired defendant ''to an w 1·
the complaint of N. 'vV. E 0 ·gle ton, plaintiff, whi h will be
filed in the office of the 1 rk of the di tri t court within
and for aid Brul ounty, at Chamberlain, Brule Co., S.
D., and to serve a copy of your answer to the said complaint on the subscriber at the office in the city of Chamberlain, S. D., in aid c unty and state, within thirty day
after the service of thi ummon , exclusive of the da of
ervice, or the plaintiff will ar ply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint, be ide co t . '' Thi ummons was served on January 9, 1892. Th om plaint on
which judgment wa rendered by the circuit court of Brule
county wa not filed until December 9 189:... and judgment
by default was entered on that da . The pro i ions of the
statute of South Dakota, set out by plaintiff in his petition,
pro ide, with reference to the summons, that it shall require defendant ''to an wer the complaint and erve a cop}
of bis an wer on the per on who e name is ub crib d to the
summons, at a place within the tate to be therein pecified,
in which there i a po toffice within 30 days after the service of the summon , exclu i e of the day of service." It
is evident that under such . tatutory provi ion the ummon in que tion wa fatall defective in not corre tly naming the court in which the complaint would be fil . The
statutes of the state do not, o far as made to appear in
this record, specifically require that the court in whi h the
defendant is to appear shall be named, but certainl that i
es ential to uch a notice a would be ufficient to con titute due proce of law. ~1oreover it i r quired by the
tatut
of that state if a cop of the comr laint is not
served with the ummon that ''the um on mu t tate
where the complaint i r ill e filed.' The ummon in
question did not tat that
ential fa t for no rn1 laint
was e er filed in th ' i trict ourt.' There wa in f ct
no such court then in xi t n
the di trict court a.
known under th t rritorial O'OYernm nt ha in b en r .
placed b the ' ir ui t ourt ' b the pro Yi ion of the onitution under whi h th tate wa admitted. Thi change
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of courts is pleaded in the case by plaintiff as an ex-

cuse for the mistaken description, but the fact remains

that defendant was not notified that the complaint would

be filed in the circuit court, in which the judgment was

rendered, but was advised that it would be filed in another

court, which in fact did not exist. Under such circum-

stances we think defendant was justified in assuming

that no valid judgment could be rendered against him. The

circuit court acquired no jurisdiction, and the judgment

on which this action is based was therefore void. See, as

bearing in general on the question, Lyon v. Vanatta, 35

Iowa 521. Other questions are argued, but, as they involve

the construction of statutes of another state, their decision

would be of no advantage to anyone.

The demurrer was rightly sustained, and the judgment

is affirmed.

LYMAN V. MILTON.

Supreme Court of California. 1872,
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44 California, 630.

By the Court, Belcher, J.:

The plaintiff seeks by this action to enforce the execution

of a resulting trust.

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 1

of courts is pleaded in the case by plaintiff as an excuse for the mistaken description, but the fact remains
that defendant was not notified that the complaint would
be filed in the circuit court, in which the judgment was
rendered, but was advised that it would be filed in another
court, which in fact did not exist. Under such circumstances we think defendant was justified in assuming
that no valid judgment could be rendered against him. The
circuit court acquired no jurisdiction, and the judgment
on which this action is based was therefore void. See, as
bearing in general on the question, Lyon v. Vanatta, 35
Iowa 521. Other questions are argued, but, a.s they involve
the construction of st<J. tutes of another state, their decision
would be of no advantage to anyone.
The demurrer was rightly sustained, and the judgment
is affirmed.

The complaint names as defendants, Martha Ellen Mil-

ton, administratrix of the estate of Daniel Milton, deceased,

Martha Ellen Milton, and Ida May Milton. It alleges the

death of Daniel Milton, leaving him surviving as his only

heirs at law his widow, Martha Ellen Milton, and his daugh-

ter, Ida May Milton, an infant of about the age of three

years, and that Martha Ellen Milton had been duly ap-

pointed the administratrix of his estate.

LYMAN V. MILTON.

Upon the complaint a summons was issued, entitled: '*W.

Lyman, plaintiff, v. M. E. Milton {administratrix, etc.) et

Supreme Court of California.

1872.

al., defrjidants." It was addressed to *'M. E. Milton, ad-

ministratrix et al., defendants," the name of Ida May Mil-

ton nowhere appearing in it. This summons was served

44 California., 630.

upon both defendants, and afterwards, upon application of

By the Court, BELCHER, J.:
The plaintiff seeks by this action to enforce the execution
of a re ulting trust.
The complaint names as defendants, Martha Ellen Milt n, ad ini tratrix of the state of Da:r:iel Milton, deceased,
Martha 1 llen Milton, and Ida May Milton. It alle e the
ath of Daniel Milton, leaving him surviving as his only
b irs at law hi wjdow, Martha 111 n Milton, and his daughLr, Ida May Milton, an infant of about the age of three
y ars, and that Martha 1 11 n Milton had been duly app int
th a mini tratrix of his stat .
nth · mplaint a su mons was i u d, entitled: "W.
Lym a plaintiff', v. M. 1. Milton ( adniini tratri , tc.) et
({l., d f r>11dants." It a addre d to "M. ~ . Milt n, adrni ni tratrix t al.,
f ndants," the name of Ida May Milt n
wh r
ring in it. This summons was s rved
11
n th d
dant , and ft rwards, upon a plication of

Sec. 2]
Sec. 2] Writs of Summons 5

the plaintiff, the adult defendant was appointed the guard-

ian ad litem of the infant defendant. The said Martha El-

len accepted the trust of guardian ad litem, and, thereupon,

before filing answer, or otherwise appearing, appeared in

court by counsel, stating to the court that she appeared on

behalf of said infant for the purpose only of moving to

quash the summons. The court refused to permit such an

appearance, and refused to recognize counsel, or hear any-

thing they might have to say on behalf of the infant, unless

they entered an unqualified appearance for the general pur-

pose of defense. Having duly entered an exception to this

ruling, counsel then, in obedience thereto, stated without

qualification that they appeared on behalf of all the de-

fendants. Thereupon they submitted a written motion on

the part of the said infant and her guardian, that the sum-

mons be quashed on the ground, among others, that the

same is radically defective in not stating the parties to the

action. The court overruled this motion and the defendants
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excepted.

Afterwards, upon answers filed in behalf of each defend-

ant, the case was tried by the court and judgment entered

in favor of the plaintiff.

The statute (Practice Act, Sec. 24) provides that "the

summons shall state the parties to the action, the Court in

which it is brought, the county in which the complaint is

filed, the cause and general nature of the action, and re

quire the defendant to appear and answer the complaint

within the time mentioned in the next section after the

service of the summons, exclusive of the day of service, or

that judgment by default will be taken against him accord-

ing to the prayer of the complaint, briefly stating the sum

of money or other relief demanded in the complaint."

It is manifest that the summons in this case did not state

the parties to the action. M. E. Milton, in her representa-

tive capacity of administratrix, was but one of three parties

defendant. The words ''et al.," in the connection in which

they are used, are of no significance. They indicate, at

most that there are still other parties who are not named.

Without them, so far as a compliance with the statute is

concerned, the summons would have been as complete as

with them.

Is a summons, in which one defendant onlv is named,

WRITS OF SUMMONS

5

the plaintiff, the adult defendant was appointed the guardian ad titem of the infant defendant. The said ·Martha Ellen accepted the tru t of guardian ad litem, and, th reupon,
before filing an wer, or otherwise app arin<>" appeared in
court by counsel, stating to the court that he a1 peared on
behalf of said infant for the purpose only of m ving to
quash the summons. The court refu ed to permit such an
appearance, and refu ed to recognize coun el, or hea,r anything they might have to say on behalf of the infant, unle s
they entered an unqualified appearance for the <>"eneral purpose of defen e. Having duly entered an ex ption to thi.
ruling, counsel then, in obedience thereto, stated without
qualification that they ap1 eared on behalf of all the defendants. Thereupon they submitted a written motion on
the part of the said infant and her guardian that the summons be quashed on the round, among others, that the
same is radically defective in not stating the parties to the
action. The court overruled this motion and the defendant
excepted.
Afterwards, upon answers filed in behalf of each defendant, the case was tried by the court and judgment entered
in favor of the plaintiff.
The statute (Practice Act, Sec. 24) provides that "the
summon shall state the parties to the action, the Court in
which it is brought, the county in which the complaint is
filed, the cause and general nature of the action, and re
quire the defendant to appear and an wer th complaint
within the time mentioned in the next e tion after the
service of the summons, exclu ive of the day of ervice, or
that judgment by default will be taken again t him according to the prayer of the complaint, briefl tating the sum
of money or other relief demanded in ihe complaint. ''
It is manifest that the ummons in this ca e di not stat
the parties to the action. M. E. 11ilton in her representative capacity of admini tratrix, wa but one of thre partie.defendant. The words '' t al. '' in the connection in which
in icate, at
they are u ed, ar of n . io-nificanc . Th
most that there are till oth er I arties who are not named.
Without them, so far a a om lian e with the statute i
concerned, the summon would have been as complete a.
with them.
Is a summon , in whirh one d fendant only i nam d.

6
6 Trial Practice [Chap. 1

when in fact there are several defendants to the action, a

good summons to the defendants not named in it? Must

one who is served with a summons to which he does not

appear to be a party take notice at his peril that he is

really a party to the action? To hold so we must hold that

the section of the statute referred to is only directory in

its requirements. But if it be directory and not manda-

tory, why may the summons not omit to state the court in

which the action is brought, or the county in which the

complaint is filed, or the cause and general nature of the

action, or the time within which the defendant is required

to appear, or the amount of money or other relief de-

manded in the complaint, or all of them together, and still

be held good? All of these things are stated in the com-

plaint, except the time within which the defendant must

appear, and that is a matter regulated by law, which every

one is presumed to know. If notice only is required, the

])arty has that when he sees a copy of the complaint and
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liimself named in it as a defendant. And yet no one would

contend that a summons which omitted to state the several

matters required by the statute could be held good.

The summons is the process by which parties defend-

ant are brought into Court, so as to give the Court juris-

diction of their persons. Its form is prescribed by law;

and whatever the form may be it must be observed, at least

substantially. It may be that a summons under our system

is required to state more than is necessary for the informa-

tion of the defendant ; that a copy of the complaint served

by the Sheriff or the attorney would have been all that is

needful. If that be so it is a matter for the legislature and

not for the Courts. We entertain no doubt that a sum-

mons must contain all that is required by the statute,

whether deemed needful or not, and, among other things,

must state the parties to the action.

It may be that when the defendant moved to quash the

summons for insufficiency the Court might have entertained

u counter motion to have it amended by inserting the omit

ted names of the defendants, and, on its being so amended,

might have denied the original motion.

In Polack v. Hunt, 2 Cal. 193, it was held that the

court had power to amend the summons so as to make

it conform to the law, when it operated no hardship or

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. l

when in fact there are everal defendants to the action, a
ood summons to the defendants not named in it T Must
0
one who is served with a summons to which he does not
appear to be a party take notice at his peril tha;t he is
r eally a party to the action' To hold so we must hold that
'-he section of the statute referred to is only directory in
it r equirements. But if it be directory and not mandatory, why may the summons not omit to state the court in
wh ich the action is brought, or the county in which the
omplaint is filed, or the cause and general nature of the
a tion, or the time within which the defendant is required
to appear, or the amount of money or other relief demand ed in the complaint, or all of them together, and still
be held good' All of these things are stated in the complaint, except the time within which the defendant must
appear, and that is a matter regulated by law, which every
one is presumed to know. If notice only is required, the
party has that when he sees a copy of the complaint and
Jijmself named in it as a defendant. And yet no one would
contend that a summons which omitted to state the several
matters required by the statute could be held good.
The summons is the process by which parties defendant are brought into Court, so as to give the Court jurisdiction of their persons. Its form is pre cribed by law;
and what ever the form may be it must be observed, at least
: ub t antially. It may be that a summon under our system
i r equired to state more than is n ece sar y for the inf ormation of the defendant; that a copy of the complaint served
by th
heriff or the attorn y would have been all that is
n dful. If that be so it is a matter for the 1 gi lature and
n t for the Courts. We entertain no doubt that a summ n mu t contain all that is required y the statute.
\ h ther de m d needful or not, and, amono- other things,
mu t state the parties to the action.
t may be that when the d f ndant moved to quash the
n
f r in Cfi i n y the Court might have entertain d
a
tion to have it am n ed by in erting the omitna
f th d f ndant., and, on its being so amended ,
migh t h v d ni th
r iginal motion.
In P la k . llunt, ,.., al. 193, it was held that tJw
w r t am nd the summons so as to makr
" urt b
i L conform to th law, wh n it operated no hardship or
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surprise to the defendants. No such counter motion,

however, was made in this case, and we cannot pass up-

on that question.

A defendant has a right to appear for the purpose of

moving to dismiss a defective summons, and it is error

in the Court to refuse him that privilege. Nor does the

fact that he afterwards appears and answers waive his.

right or cure the error. {Deidesheimer v. Brown, 8 Cal.

339; Gray v. Haives, id. 569.)

For the error named the judgment must be reversed

and cause remanded for further proceedings, and it is so

ordered.^

iln Saddler v. Smith, (1907) 54 Fla. 671, 45 So. 718, the court said;

"Where there are several parties defendant it would not be suificient to give

the name of one defendant in the tody of the subpoena or copy, followed by

the words et al. Lyman v. Milton, 44 Cal. 630. And so we have held that

WRITS OF SUMMONS

7

urpnse to the defendants. No such counter motion ,
however, was made in this case, and we cannot pass upon that question.
A defendant has a right to appear for the purpose of
moving to dismiss a defective summon , and it is error
in the Court to refuse him that privil ge. Nor does th
fact that he afterwards appears and answer waive his.
right or cure the error. (Deidesheinier v. Broi n, 8 Cal.
339; Gray v. Hawes, id. 569.)
For the error named the judgment must be reversed
and cause remanded for further proceedings, and it is o
ordered. 1

in a writ of error or appeal, all parties thereto must be named and cannot

be included in the words et al. * * * While the words et al. are incapable of
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standing in the place of the names of parties required by law to be stated

in a subpoena or writ of error, they may be used in endorsing the title of

the cause on the copy of subpoena where there is no statute or rule requiring

the names of the parties to be indorsed thereon. ' '

Section 3. Designation of Time for Appearance.

LAWYER LAND COMPANY V. STEEL.

Supreme Court of Washington. 1906.

41 Washington, 411,

Hadley, J. —

1 In Saddler v. Smith, (1907) 54 Fla. 671, 45 So. 718, the court said;
''Where there are several partie defendan t it "'ould not be . ufficient to give
the name of one defendant in the body of the subpoena or copy, followed by
the words et al. Lyman v. Milton, 44 Cal. 630. And so we h ave held that
in a writ of error or appeal, all parties thereto mu t be namecl and cannot
be included in the words et al. * * * While the words et al. are incapable of
standing in the place of the names of parties required by law to be stated
in a subpoena or writ of error, they may be used in endorsing the title of
the ea.use on the copy of subpoena where there is no tatute or rule requiring
tbe names of the parties to be indorsed thereon.''

**********

This appeal is from an order quashing a summons and

the service thereof. The essential part of the summons

reads as follows:

"You and each of you are hereby summoned to appear

within twenty days after the service of this summons, ex-

clusive of the day of service, if served within the state

of Washington, and within sixty days if served out of

SECTION

3.

DESIGNATION OF TIME FOR APPEARANCE.

the state of Washington, and defend the above entitled

action in the court aforesaid, and answer the complaint

of the plaintiff and serve a copy of your answer on the

LAWYER LAND COMPANY V. STEEL.

Supreme Court of W a hington. 1906.
41 Washington, 411.
HADLEY,

J.-

• • • • • • • • • •

This appeal is from an order quashing a ummons and
the service thereof. The e ential part of the summon
r ads as follows:
"You and each of you are hereby summoned to appear
within twenty days after the ervice of this summons, exlusive of the day of ervic if served within the state
of Washington, and within ixty d ys if served out of
the state of W a hington, and d f nd the above entitled
action in the court afore aid, and answer the complaint
of the plaintiff and serve a copy of your answer on the.

8
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person whose name is subscribed to this summons at Spo-

kane, Spokane county, state of Washington, and in case

of your failure so to do, judgment will be rendered

against you according to the demand of the complaint

which will be filed with the clerk of said court, a copy of

which is herewith served upon you."

The summons and complaint were personally served up-

on respondents in the state of North Carolina. The

affidavit of service is in all respects regular and sufficient.

Bal. Code, Section 4879, provides as follows:

"Personal service on the defendant out of the state shall

be equivalent to service by publication, and the summons

upon the defendant out of the state shall contain the same as

personal summons within the state except it shall require

the defendant to appear and answer within sixty days after

Fuch personal service out of the state."

It is argued by respondents, and such seems to have been

the view of the superior court, that inasmuch as the sum-
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mons was so drawn that it contemplated that a service

might be made either within or without the state, it is

fatally defective. It is contended that the duty was upon

appellant in advance to determine whether service was

to be made within or without the state, and that the sum-

mons should have been drawn with reference to one or the

other only. It seems to us that the essential inquiry is,

Was the summons by its terms confusing or misleading to

respondents? We cannot see that it was. It plainly told

them that, if they were served without the state, they were

required to appear within sixty days. That portion re-

lating to service within the state became mere surplusage

in view of the service that was made, and it was so mani-

festly such that it was in no sense confusing. We there-

fore think the court erred in quashing the summons and

its service. Under the above statute, the service was equiv-

alent to service by publication.

The judgment quashing the summons and service is

therefore reversed, and the cause remanded, with instruc-

tions to vacate that part of the order appealed from and

proceed with the action,^

^ Return Dny. Tn C1ont,'h v. MrDoiialrl, (1877) 18 Kan. 114, the statute

required that the summons should be served and returned by the officer with-
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person who e name is subscribed to this summons at Spokane, Spokane county, state of W a hington, and in case
of your failure so to do, judgment will be rendered
ao·ain t you according to the demand of the complaint
which will be filed with the clerk of said court, a copy of
vhich is herewith served upon you."
The summons and complaint were personally served upon re pondents in the tate of North Carolina. The
affidavit of service is in all respects regular and sufficient.
Bal. Code, Section 4879, provides as follows:
"Personal service on the defendant out of the state shall
he equivalent to service by publication, and the summons
upon the defendant out of the state shall contain the same as
personal summons within the state except it shall require
the defendant to appear and answer within sixty days after
.·nch per onal service out of the state.''
It is argued by respondents, and such seems to have been
the view of the superior court, that ina much as the summons was so drawn that it contemplated that a service
mjght be made either within or without the state, it is
fatally defective. It is contended that the duty was upon
appellant in advance to determine whether service was
t be made within or without the state, and that the sumn n hould have been drawn with reference to one or the
other only. It eems to us that the es ential inquiry is,
Was the ummons by its terms confu ing or misleading to
r . pondent ~ We cannot see that it was. It plainly told
th m that, if they w re served without the state, they were
r 1uir d to appear within sixty day . That portion rel Lin · to rvice within the state became mere surplusage
i vi w of the service that was made, and it was so manif . tl
u h that it was in no s n confu ing. We there£ r think the court erred in quashing the summons and
it. , r i . Under the above statute, the service was equiv] nt to ervice by publication.
T

• • • • • • • • • •
Th ju ]o-m nt qua hin the summons and service is
r f r r v r . d, an th cau e remanded, with in truci n: t
c·( t th at p, rt f the order appealed from and
proc·c cl with th(> arti n. 1
t

1 Tlc/11rn /Jr111.
Tn ( 'ln 11
r quir d lhat the su mni 11

'11

v.

frD011alrl (l 877) 18 Kan. 114, the statute
u ~ rved and returned by the officer with-

~ho11 ld

ec. 4]
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in ten days from its date. The sumnione .vas in fact made returnable In six

days, and was served on the day before the return day. The court said:

"Now a suninioii.s of tliis kind wo think is never void. It might l)e voidable

however, if the oilier slioiild take the whole tiir.e (ten days) given him by

law within which to .serve it uj>on the defendant, for in that case the time

given to the defendant withiri which to answer or demur would be shortened.

But V hen tJ'C olficcr serves the summons before the return day thereof, as in

this case, we do not think that either the summons or the service is either

void, or voidable. In such a case the defendant has lost nothing. He has

his full twenty days after the return day of the summons within which to

answer or demur, and that is all that the law gives him in any case. It is

the time of the officer, and not that of the kfeudant, that is shortened, by

makinir the return of the summons less th:.i, !(_ti days from its date."

Where the retarn d:iy and ajijearance day arc the same, as in some states,

9
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in ten days from its date. The summons ;\·as in fact made returnable in six
days and was served on the dny
for' tl e return day. The court said:
''Now a sm11r.io11 of this kind \ o think is never void. It might be voidable
hOWt!\'er, if the ofn er s}1ould take t!:Je whole tiT!:e (ten daj'S) given him by
Jaw within which to ervc it upon the JcfcnCl:Lnt, for in tJ.::i.t C!lse the time
given to the defendant withi!t which to an wer or demur wouH Le shortened.
But v hen t!•c officer crv U:e umm011s before the return clay thereof, as in
thi ca c, we •lo I!ot think that either the summons or the service is either
void, or voidable. In such a ca e the defendant has lo t no hing. He has
his fnll twenty 1lnys after the return day of the summons within whirh to
answer or demur, and that is all that the l::tw gives him in any case. It iA
the time of the officer and llot thut of the ~efendant, that is hortened, by
makin~~ the return of the summons le!is tb;11 , te n ·1ays frorn its date."
Wncrc tbe return a~y a11J ap earance day nrt the same, as in sooe states,
the argument just quoted would of course not apply.
See, also, Morris v. llealy Lumber Co., (1903) 33 Wah. 451. 74 Pac. 662.

the argument just quoted would of course not apply.

See, also, Morris v. Uealy Lumber Co., (1903) 33 Wash. 451. 74 Pac. 662.

Section 4. Desckiption of Cause of Action.

BEWICK V. MUIR.
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Supreme Court of California. 1890.

83 California, 368.

Sharpstein, J, This was an action to foreclose a num-

SECTION

4.

DESCRIPTION OF CAUSE OF ACTION.

ber of liens npon a mine for labor and materials under the

BEWICK V. :MUIR.

act of 1880. There were forty-five plaintiffs, each claim-

ing a separate lien. Judgment was given for the plaintiffs,

and two of the defendants appealed.

1. The summons is sufficient. It states the nature of

Supreme Court of California.

1890.

the action in general terms, and this is all the statute re-

83 California) 368.

quires. It is apparent from the statements of the summons

that the action in which it was issued was to recover money

and to foreclose liens. This is the general nature of the

action. It is unnecesary to state whether the right to the

money sought to be recovered accrued from work and la-

bor, or from goods sold and delivered, or to state the kind

of lion, or on what property the lien attached. All these

things appear in the complaint on file, of which filing he

is notified by the summons, and if he is not notified he is

bound in law to know it. He is bound to know that a com-

plaint has been filed; for otherwise a summons could not

issue. It makes no difference that a copy of the com-

plaint is not served on the party moving. The above is in

accordance with the dictum in Lyman v. Milton, 44 Cal. 631.

J. This wa an action to foreclose a num.
ber of lien upon a mine for labor and materials under the
act of 1 0. rh re were fort; -five plaintiff , each claiming a separate lien. Judgment was given for the plaintiff
an two of the defendant appealed.
1. The ummon i suf'ficient. It state the nature of
the action in general term , and this is all the statute require . It is apparent from the statement of the summon
that the action in which it wa is ued was to recover mone
and to f oreclo e lien . This is the general nature of the
action. It is unnece ary to tate whether the rio-ht to the
money ought to be recovered accrued from work and labor or from goods sold and delivered or to tate the kind
of Ji n, or on what prop rt the lien attached. All these
thi 0 • appear in the complaint on file of which filing he
i notifi d by the summon , and if he i not notified he is
bound in law to know it. H i bound to know that a comlaint ha be n fil ; f r otherwi e a ummons could not
i ue. It mak
no iff rence that a co
of the comlaint i not n d on the arty mo ing. The above is in
accordanc with the dictum in Lyman v. Milton, 44 Cal. 631.
SHARPSTEIN)

].')

3.0 Trial Pbactice [Cbap. 1

The summons states what the statute requires and all thai

is needful. The cases decided in Lyman v. Milton, supra,

as also in Ward v. Ward, 59 Cal. 141, were different from

this, and, as said above, there is a compliance with the

dictum in the former case and with the statute. Why re-

quire that to be inserted in the summons which must ap-

pear in the complaint ? Our practice is cumbersome enough

without its being made more so by judicial decision. We

cannot understand how it can be said that the summons

does not contain '*a statement of the nature of the action

in general terms." The Code of Civil Procedure provides

(which is equivalent to a command to all of the courts of

the state) that all of its provisions are to be liberally con-

strued, with a view to effect its objects and promote jus-

tice. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 4.) The objects of the require-

ments of the statute as to what the summons shall contain

are carried out by serving it with a general statement which

is specialized in the complaint, and it is injustice to turn a

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

party out of court or reverse a judgment on a view of the

summons merely technical, when the summons points to

the complaint where the particular statement is made, and

if a copy of the complaint is not served on the moving-

party, he knows where to j&nd it. When the motion was

made at the bar of the court, the complaint was no doubt

within reach, or it could have been procured in a moment.

King v. Blood, 41 Cal. 316, is precisely in point, and treats

the question as it is here, as a perusal will at once show.

The court did right in denying the motion.

[Reversed on other grounds.]

TRIAL PRACTICE
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Th summons stat what the statute requires and all th~ L
i n edful. The a
d cided in Lyman v. ll1ilton, supra,
a al o in Hard v. Ward, 59 Cal. 141, were cliff rent from
thi and, a
aid above, there is a compliance with the
dictwn in the former a e and with the ta tute. Why require that to be in erted in the ummon:s which mu t appear in the complaint 1 Our practice i cumbersome enough
without its being made more so by judicial decision. We
cannot understand how it can be said that the summons
does not contain ''a statement of the nature of the action
in general terms.'' The ode of Civil Procedure provide
(which is equivalent to a command to all of the courts of
the tate) that all of its provisions are to be liberally contrued, with a view to effect it object and promote ju tice. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 4.) The objects of the requirements of the statute as to what the summons shall contain
are carried out by serving it with a general statement which
is peciali ed in the complaint, and it is injustice to turn a
party out of court or reverse a judgment on a view of the
ummon merely technical, when the ummons points to
the complaint where the particular statement i made, and
if a copy of the complaint is not served on the movin ·
party, he knows where to find it. When the motion wa
made at the bar of the court, the complaint was no doubt
-nithin reach, or it could have b en procured in a moment.
J(ing v. Blood, 41 Cal. 316, i. preci ly in point, and treat
the question as it is here, as a peru al will at once show.
The court did right in den ino- the motion.

• • • • * * * * • •
[Reversed on other grounds.]

Sec. 5]
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Section 5. Signature, Teste and Seal.

SECTION

5.

SIGNATURE, TESTE AND SEAL.

LOWE V. MOERIS.

LOWE V.

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1853,

13 Georgia, 147,

~1:0RRIS.

Motion to dismiss writ of error.

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1853.

Lumpkin, J., concurring.

Is a writ of error a nullity without a seal?

13 Georgia, 147.

My first impression was, that this defect was fatal. Up-

on reflection, my final conclusion is, the other way. * * *

**********

Lord Coke defines a seal to be, wax with an impression,

:Motion to dismis writ of error.

* * * * * * * • • •

(3 Inst. 169.) " Sigillum" says he, "est certa impressa,

quia cera sine impressione non est sigillum." And this has

been adopted as the Common Law definition of a seal.

Perk. 129, 134, Bra. tit. Faits. 17, 30. 2 Leon. 21. But it is

a curious fact that there is neither an Act of Parliament

nor an adjudged case, up to Lord Coke's day, to bind the

courts as to what constitutes a seal. His opinion was prob-
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ably founded on the practice of the country in his day.

New York, and most of the States North, have held that

a seal is an impression upon wax, wafer or some other

tenacious substance, capable of being impressed. 5 John.

Rep. 239, 2 Caine's Rep. 262. 21 Pick. Rep. 417. But in

Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the Southern and Western

States generally, the impression upon wax has been dis-

used, and a circular, oval, or square mark, opposite the

name of the signer, is held to have the same effect as a seal,

the shape of it being altogether indifferent. It is usually

written with a pen, sometimes printed. 2 Serg. d Raivle,

503. 1 Ball. 63. 1 Watts, 322, 2 Halst. 272.

The truth is, that this who^e sul)ject, like many others,

is founded on the usage of the times, and of the country.

A scroll is just as good as an impression on wax, wafer, or

parchment, by metal, engraved with the arms of a prince,

potentate, or private person. Both are now utterly worth-

less, and the only wonder is, that all technical distinctions

growing out of the use of seals, such as the Statute of Lim-

itations, plea to the consideration, etc., are not at once uni-

LUMPKIN,

J., concurring.

Is a writ of error a nullity without a seaH
My first impression was, that this defect was fatal. Upon reflection, my final conclusion is, the other way. * •

.

* * * * * * * * * *
Lord Coke defines a seal to be, wax with an impre ion,
(3 Inst. 169.) "Sigillum" says he, "est certa impre sa,
qi(,ia cera sine impressione non est sigillum. '' And thi ha
een adopted as the Common Law definition of a eal.
Perk. 129, 134, Bro. tit. Faits. 17, 30. 2 Leon. 21. But it i
a curiou fact that there is neither an Act of Parliament
nor an adjudged case, up to Lord Coke's day, to bind the
ourts as to what constitutes a seal. His opinion was probably founded on the practice of the country in his day.
New York, and most of the States North, have held that
a seal is an impres ion upon wax, wafer or some other
tenaciou sub tance, capable of being impre s d. 5 John.
Rep. 239 2 Caine's Rep. 262. 21 Pick. R ep. 417. But in
Pennsylvania, New J er ey, and tbe Southern and We tern
tates generally, the impre ion upon wax ha been di used, and a circular, oval, or quare mark oppo ite the
name of the iO'ner, i held to have the am effect a a eal,
the hape of it being alto,°'ether in ifferent. It i u ually
written with a pen, sometime printed. 2 Berg. & Rawle,
503. 1 Dall. 63. 1 Watts, 3~2, Hal t. 27 _,,
The truth i that thi who 0 • ubject like any other
i found d on th u a 0 of the time and of the country.
A scroll i ju t a
od a an impr ion on wax waf r or
parchm nt y metal n r ve with the arm f a I rjnc ,
otentat or ri' at I er. on.
oth are now utterl w rth1
nnd th onl. -r wond r i that all te hnical di tjn ti n
.o-rowino- out of the u of €al
uch a the tatute of Limlta ti n. , plen to th~
. iii ration. tc. are not at on e uni..J

1
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versally abolished. The only reason ever urged at this,

day, why a seal should give greater evidence and dignity to

writing is, that it evidences greater deliberation, and there-

fore should impart greater solemnity to instruments. Prac-

tically we know that the art of printing has done away with

this argument. For not only are all official and most in-

dividual deeds, with the seals appended, printed previ-

ously, and filled up at the time of their execution, but even

merchants and business men are adopting the same prac-

tice, as it respects their notes.

Once the seal was everything, and the signature was

nothing. Now the very reverse is true: the signature is

everything, and the seal nothing. * * *

So long as seals distinguished identity, there was pro-

priety in preserving them. And as a striking illustration

see the signatures and seals to the death warrant of Charles

the First, as late as January, 16-1:8. They are 49 in num-

ber, and no two of them alike. But to recognize the wav-
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ing, oval circumflex of a pen, with those mystic letters to the

uninitiated, L. S. imprisoned in its serpentine folds, as

equipotent with the coats of arms taken from the devices

engraven on the shields of knights and noblemen; shades

of Eustace, Roger de Beaumont, and Geoffry Gifford, what

a desecration! The reason of the usage has ceased; let the

custom be dispensed with altogether.

**********

With these desultory remarks I am content to leave the

law, learning and logic of the case to my brother Warner,

to whom it legitimately belongs, and who, I have no doubt,

will do ample justice to the argument, and with whom I

concur, in retaining the writ of error.^

iThe entire opinion, only a small part of wLich is ^iven liere, is replete

with Avit and learning, and a reading of it will afTi)rd both entertainment and

profit.

TRIAL PRACTICE
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versally abolished. The only reason ever urged at thi
day, why a seal should give greater eYidence and dignity to l
writing is, that it evidences greater deliberation, and therefore should impart greater solemnity to instruments. Practically we know that the art of printing has done away with
this argument. For not only are all official and mo t individual deeds, with the seal appended, printed previously, and filled up at the time of their execution, but even
merchants and bu iness men are adopting the sam practice, as it respects their notes.
Once the seal was everything, and the signature was
nothing. Now the very reverse is true: the signature is
everything, and the seal nothing. * * *
So long as seals distinguished identity, there was propriety in preserving them. And as a striking illustration
see tho signatures and seals to the death warrant of Charles
the First, as late as January, 1648. They are 49 in number, and no two of them alike. But to recognize the waving, oval circumflex of a pen, with those mystic letters to the
uninitiated, L. S. imprisoned in its serpentine folds, as
equipotent with the coats of arms taken from the d vice
engraven on the shields of knights and no bl men; shad s
of Eustace, Roger de Beaumont, and Geoffry Gifford, what
a desecration ! The reason of the usage has cea ·ed; let the
custom be dispensed with altogether.

* • * • * • * • * *

With these desultory remarks I am cont nt to leave th
law, learning and logic of the ca e to my brother TVarner,
to whom it legitimat ly belono- , and who, I have no doubt,
will do ample justice to the argument, and with w born I
concur, in retaining th writ of error. 1
1 The entire opinion, only '1. srn:ill part of wL i h i · gin~ n }1ere, is replete
with wit and l~rning, nnd a reading cf it will afford both entertainment and
profit.
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CHOATE V. SPENCER.

Supreme Court of Montana. 1893.

CHOATE V. SPENCER.

13 Montana, 127.

Action to annul sheriff's deed. Defendants' demurrer

Supreme Court of Montana.

1893.

to the complaint was sustained by Henry, J. Reversed.

Pemberton, C. J.

**********

The appellant insists that the summons issued out of the

district court of the fourth judicial district of the territory

of Montana, in and for Choteau county, on the seventeenth

day of June, 1888, in the suit of Jere Sullivan against this

appellant, was absolutely void, because it was not authenti-

13 Montana, 127.

Action to annul sheriff's deed. Defendants' demurrer
to the complaint was sustained by HENRY, J. Reversed.
PEMBERTON, C. J.

cated by the seal of the said court. If this contention is cor-

rect, the district court never acquired jurisdiction of this

appellant, who was defendant in that suit, by the issuance

and service of such summons ; and any judgment said court

may have entered in said cause, as well as the execution

issued for the enforcement of such judgment, and all other
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proceedings thereunder, including the levy thereof on the

property of appellant, and the sale and execution and

delivery of the sheriff's deed complained of, would neces-

sarily be null and void. *****

At common law, a writ issuing from a court having a

seal, in order to be considered authentic or of any value,

must be attested by the seal of the court from which it is

issued. The laws of this state provide that the district

courts shall have a seal (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 527) and

that the clerk of the court shall keep the seal (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 528). And section 68 of the Code of Civil Pro-

cedure requires that the summons must be issued under

the seal of the court. So that, under our statutes, there is

no departure from the common law rule requiring such

writs to be authenticated by the seal of the court from

which they issue. The appellant has cited a number of

authorities holding the common law doctrine that such

writs must be authenticated by the seal of the court from

which they are issued in order to give them validity, and

without which they would be void. The principal case re-

lied upon by appellant in support of his contention

that the summons under discussion was void for want of

The appellant insists that the summons issued out of the
district court of the fourth judicial district of the territory
of Montana, in and for Choteau county, on the eventeenth
day of June, 1888, in the suit of Jere Sullivan against this
appellant, was absolutely void, because it was not authenticated by the seal of the said court. If this contention is correct, the di trict court never acquired jurisdiction of this
appellant, who was defendant in that uit, by the issuance
and service of such summons; and any judgment said court
may have entered in said cau e, as well as the execution
is ued for th e enforcement of such judgment, and all other
proceeding thereunder, including the levy thereof on the
property of appellant, and the sale and execution and
delivery of the heriff 's deed complained of, would neces·arily be null and void. * * * * *
At common law, a writ issuing from a court having a
seal, in ord r to be considered authentic or of any value,
must be atte ted by the seal of the court from which it i
i ued. The laws of this state provide that the district
courts shall have a seal (Code lJiv. Proc. Sec. 527) and
that the clerk of the court shall keep the seal (Code Civ.
Proc. Sec. 528). And section 68 of the Code f Civil Procedure r equire that the summons must be i ued und r
the eal of the court. So that, under our statutes, there i
no eparture from the common law rule requiring u h
writs to be auth nti ated by the eal of th court from
which th y i . u . The appellant ha cited a number of
authoritie holdi ng the co mon law doctrine that uch
writ mu t e auth nticat d by th
al of the court from
whi h th y ar i,. ued in order to o-i
them validity and
without which th y would b 'oi . The prin ipal ca e relied upon by a pellant in upport of his contention
that th ummons under dis cu ion was oid for want of

14
M Teial Pkactice [Chap. 1

the seal of the court is Insurance Co. v. Hallock, 6 Wall.

556. This ease went to the supreme court of the United

States, from Indiana, and involved the validity of a deed

executed and delivered by a sheriff to real estate, under an

order of sale, under a statute of that state. The statute re-

quired the order of sale to be issued under the seal of the

court. The seal was omitted from the order of sale. In

delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Miller, says :

*'If the paper here called an 'order of sale' is to be treated

as a writ of execution or fieri facias issued to the sheriff,

or as a process of any kind issued from the court, which

the law required to be issued under the seal of the court,

there can be no question that it was void, and conferred no

authority upon the officer to sell the land. The authorities

are uniform that all process issuing from a court which by

law authenticates such process with its seal is void if is-

sued without a seal. Counsel for plaintiffs in error have

not cited a single case to the contrary, nor have our own re-
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searches discovered one. We have decided in this court

that a writ of error is void for want of a seal, though the

clerk had returned the transcript in obedience to the writ.

We have held that a bill of exceptions must be under the

seal of the judge." This was a collateral attack made upon

the deed executed by the sheriff, under the order of sale

from which the seal had been omitted. Counsel for the

respondents contend that the case just cited is not control-

ling, and claim that the Indiana courts have declined to

follow the rule therein asserted, and cite a number of Indi-

ana cases in support of their position. From an examina-

tion of the Indiana cases cited by respondents we are of

opinion that the departure from the rule asserted in

Insurance Co. v. Hallock, 6 Wall. 556, has been occasioned

by the legislation in Indiana since the decision in 6 Wall.

556. In support of this view, we quote from State v. Davis,

73 Ind. 360, this case being cited by respondents. In this

case the court say: "It is undoubtedly true, as appellees

insist, that at common law a writ issuing from a court

nmst, in order to be entitled to be considered as regular and

authentic, be attested by the seal of the court from whicli

it issued. {Williams v. Vanneter, 19 111. 293; State v.

Flemming, 66 Me. 142; 22 Am. Rep. 552; Wheaton r.

Thompson, 20 Minn. 196; Reeder v. Murray, 3 Ark. 450.)
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the seal of the court is Insurance Co. v. Hallock, 6 Wall.
556. This case went to the supreme court of the United
States, from Indiana, and involved the validity of a deed
executed and delivered by a sheriff to real estate, under an
order of sale, under a statute of that state. The statute required the order of sale to be issued under the seal of the
court. The seal was omitted from the order of sale. In
delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Miller, says:
''If the paper here called an 'order of sale' is to be treated
as a writ of execution or fieri f acias issued to the sheriff,
or as a process of any kind issued from the court, which
the law required to be issued under the seal of the court,
there can be no question that it was void, and conferred no
authority upon the officer to sell the land. The authorities
are uniform that all process issuing from a court which by
law authenticates such process with its seal is void if issued without a seal. Counsel for plaintiffs in error have
not cited a single case to the contrary, nor have our own researches discovered one. We have decided in this court
that a writ of error is void for want of a seal, though the
clerk had returned the transcript in obedience to the writ.
We have held that a bill of exceptions must be under the
seal of the judge.'' This was a collateral attack made upon
the deed executed by the sheriff, under the order of sale
from which the seal had been omitted. Counsel for the
respondents contend that the case just cited is not controlling, and claim that the Indiana courts have declined to
follow the rule therein asserted, and cite a numb r of Indiana cases in support of their 1 o ition. From an examination of the Indiana cases cit
by re pondents we are of
opinion that the departure from the rule asserted in
Insurance Co. v. Hallock, 6 Wall. 556, ha been occa ioned
by the legislation in Indiana since the d ci ion in 6 Wall.
556. In upport of this view, w quote from State v. Davi
73 Ind. 360, this case b ing cit
by respondent . In thi
ca tl e court say: "It is uncl ubtedly true, as appellee.
in i t, that at c m n law a writ i suing from a court
mu. t, in ord r to be ntitl d to be con idered as r gular and
utb nti , be att t
by th s al of the court fr m whicl1
it i ·ue .
(TVilliam v. Vanneter, 1 Ill. 2. ; State v .
Fl ?1Mning, 6 11 . 4,.J; 22 Am. R p. 55 .. ; J11heaton 'I ' .
T·hompson, 20 Minn. 1 6; Reeder v. Murray, 3 Ark. 450.)
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The case of Insurance Co. v. Hallock, 6 Wall. 55G, does de-

cide that an order of sale issued by a court of this state was

void because not attested by the seal of the court. It has

also been held by this court that, where there is no statute

to the contrary, a writ or record must be attested by the

seal of the court from which it comes. (Jones v. Frost, 42

Ind. 543; Hinton v. Brown, 1 Blackf. 429; San ford v. Sin-

ton, 34 Ind. 539.) The older cases did hold that a writ

lacking the seal of the court was absolutely void, but there

is much conflict upon this point among the modern cases,

many of them holding that such a writ is not void but mere-

ly voidable. Our court long since held that such a writ was

not void. It is true, as argued by appellees, that a sum-

mons so clearly defective as to be insufficient to confer juris-

diction cannot, after judgment, be so amended as to give

jurisdiction. If a summons without a seal be conceded to

be void, then there can be no amendment, for it is axiomatic

that a void thing can not be amended. The liberal provis-
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ions of our statute respecting the summons would take

such writs from under the old common-law rule, even if it

were conceded that it is the rule which must be adopted

respecting other writs. The provisions of the code upon

this subject are contained in article IV., and the provision

which directly bears upon this point is found in section 37,

and is as follows: 'No summons or the service shall be

set aside or be adjudged insufficient where there is sufficient

substance about either to inform the party on whom it may

be served that there is an action instituted against him in

court.' " It must appear as conclusive that the court in

this case would have held the summons void but for the

statute of Indiana, quoted in their opinion. This case

seems to us to be strong authority for holding that, but for

the statute of Indiana in relation to the essentials of a

summons, that court would have held to the doctrine con-

tained in 6 Wall. 55G, to-wit, that such writs, without the

seal of the court from which they issued, are void.

**********

The appellant further contends that, at the time of the

issuance and service of the summons under discussion, Mon-

tana was one of the Territories of the United States, and

for this reason the opinion of the supreme court of the

United States in 6 Wall. 556, is decisive of the question as

ec. 5]
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The ase of Insura uce Co. v. Hallo k} 6 Wall. 5G do deide that an ord r of. ale i. ued b: a court f thi tate wa8
void cau e n t att t d b. the eal of th court. It ha
a]so been held by thi court that where there i no , tatute
to the contrar , a writ or re ord mu '"'t be atte ted by the
eal of the court from which it comes. (Jones v . Frost, 42
Ind. 543; Hinton v. Broicn, 1 Blackf. 429; Sanford v . Sinton, 34 Ind. 539.) The older ca es did hold that a writ
lacking the seal of the court was absolutely vojd, but there
is much conflict upon this point among the mod rn cases,
many of them holding that uch a writ is not void but merely voidable. Our court long since held that uch a writ was
not void. It is true, a argued by appellee , that a ummons so clearly defective as to be insufficient to confer juri diction cannot, after judgment, be so amended as to give
jurisdiction. If a summons without a seal be conceded to
be void, then there can be no amendment for it is axiomatic
that a void thing can not be amended. The liberal provisions of our stat ute re pecting the summons would take
such writs from under the old common-law rule, even if it
were conceded that it is the rule which must be adopted
re pecting other writs. The provi ions of the code upon
this subject are contained in article IV., and the provi ion
which directly bears upon thi point is found in section 37,
and is as follows: 'No summons or the service hall be
.'et aside or be adjudged in ufficient where there is sufficient
ub tance about either to inform the party on whom it may
be served that there is an action instituted against him in
court.' '' It must appear as conclusive that the court in
this case would have held the summons void but for the
statute of Indiana, quoted in their opinion. This case
ems to us to be strong authority for holding that, but for
the tatute of Indiana in relation to the e sentials of a
ummon , that court would have held to the doctrine contained in 6 Wall. 556, to-wit, that uch writ , without the
seal of the court from which they i ued, are void.

* * * * * * * * * *
The appellant further contends that, at the time of the
i uance and er ice of the ummon under di cu sion, Montana was one of the T rritorie of the United tat , and
f r thi · rea on the opinion of the supreme court of the
United States in 6 Wall. 556, is deci ive of the que tion as
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to the validity of said summons, and controlling upon

this court in the determination of this question ; and relies

upon the authority and reasoning in Sullivan v. City of

Helena, 10 Mont. 134. We are of opinion that this posi-

tion is unassailable, our statute being, in effect, the same

as that of Indiana at the time of the rendition of the opin-

ion in 6 Wall. 556. This reasoning and holding do not in

our opinion, contravene section 119 of our Code of Civil

Procedure, which provides that "the court shall in every

stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the

pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the sub-

stantial rights of the parties; and no judgment shall be re-

versed or affected by reason of such error or defect." This

section presupposes an action pending, of which the court

has acquired proper jurisdiction, and we are not passing up-

on the powers of the court under such circumstances. We

hold in the case at bar that the summons — the jurisdic-

tional writ — under the law and decisions in force and con-
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trolling in this jurisdiction at the time of its issuance was

void, because not issued under the seal of the court. If

this case involved a defective process, issued subsequent

to summons, and the acquiring of jurisdiction by the court

thereunder, then the contention of respondents that such

defect or irregularity could be amended or disregarded

might be urged with great force. Judgment reversed and

cause remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrer.

Reversed.^

Harwood, J. and DeWitt, J., concur.

iWliere the requisites of a summons or other writ are prescribed by consti-

tution or statute, it is frequently held that such constitutional or statutory

requirements are mandatory, that the writ is void without all of them, and

that the want of any one cannot be supplied by amendment. Gordon v. Bod-

well, (1898) 59 Kan. 51, 51 Pac. 906; Sharman v. Huot, (1898) 20 Mont.

555, 52 Pac. 558.
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to the validity of said summons, and controlling upon
this court in the determination of this question; and relie,
upon the authority and reasoning in Sullivan v. City of
Helena, 10 Mont. 134. We are of opinion that this position is unassailable, our statute being, in effect, the same
as that of Indiana at the time of the rendition of the opinion in 6 Wall. 556. This reasoning and holding do not in
our opinion, contravene section 119 of our Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that "the court shall in every
stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the
pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the parties; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.'' This
section presupposes an action pending, of which the court
bas acquired proper jurisdiction, and we are not passing upon the powers of the court under such circumstances. We
hold in the case at bar that the summons-the jurisdictional writ-under the law and decisions in force and controlling in this jurisdiction at the time of its issuance was
void, because not issued under the seal of the court. If
this case involved a defective process, issued subsequent
to summons, and the acquiring of jurisdiction by the court
thereunder, then the contention of respondents that such
defect or irregularity could be amended or disregarded
might be urged with great force. Judgment reverse<l and
cause remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrer.
Reversed. 1
HARWOOD, J. and DEWITT, J., concur.
lWhere the requisites of a summons or other writ are prescribed by constitution or statute, it is frequently held that such constitutional or statuto·1·y
requirements are mandatory, that the writ is void without all of them, and
that the wan t of any one cannot be supplied by amendment. Gordon v. Bodwell, (1898) 59 Kan. 51, 51 Pac. 906 i Sharman v. Huot, (1898) 20 Mont.
555, 52 Pac. 558.
·
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AMBLER V. LEACH.

AMBLER V. LEACH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1879.

15 West Virginia, 677.

At the fall term, 1869, an office-judgment was confirmed

by the circuit court of Wood county in favor of James M.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

1879.

Stephenson, Thompson Leach and K. B. Stephenson, part-

15 West Virginia, 677.

ners under the firm name and style of Stephenson, Leach

& Co., against John Council and J. G. Blackford for $310.-

49, with interest from September 25, 1869, till paid, and

costs of suit. * * * Tiie summons, by which this suit

was commenced, was as follows:

''State of West Virginia.

"To the Sheriff of Wood County, Greeting:

''We command you that you summon John Council and

J. Gr. Blackford to appear before the judge of our circuit

court for W^ood county at rules, to be held in the clerk's

office of said court, on the first Monday in August next, to

answer James M. Stephenson, Thompson Leach and K. B.
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Stephenson, partners under the name and style of Steph-

enson, Leach & Co., of a plea of debt for $301.75, damages

$20.00. And have then and there this writ.

"Witness, William H. Hatcher, clerk of our said circuit

court, at the court house of said county, the day

of and in the year of the State."

* * * At the time this judgment was rendered J. G.

IMackford owned several parcels of land in said county,

and also a considerable amount of personal property. On

the 23rd day of February, 1876, he conveyed all his prop-

erty, real and personal, to B. Mason Ambler, trustee, for

the jDayment of all his debts ratably. This conveyance was

duly recorded the same day, October 12, 1878, that this

trustee instituted this suit.

In his bill he states all the above facts, filing with it a

copy of the record in this common law suit, a copy of this

execution and return thereon and an abstract of this judg-

ment from said judgment lien docket. He alleges in his

bill that this judgment was a mere nullity, as the summons,

which was the commencement of the suit, was not dated

and was not signed by the clerk. But says that it being

T. P.— 2

At the fall term, 1869, an office-judgment was confirmed
by the circuit court of Wood county in favor of James M.
Stephenson, Thompson Leach and l{. B. Stephenson, partners under the firm name and style of Stephen on, Leach
& Co., against John Connell and J. G. Blackford for $310.49, with interest from September 25, 1869, till paid, and
costs of suit. * * * The summons, by which this suit
wa commenced, was as follows:
''State of West Virginia.
"To the Sheriff of Wood Coimty, Greeting :
''We command you that you summon John Connell an<l
J. G. Blackford to appear before the' judge of our circuit
court for Wood county at rules, to be held in the clerk's
office of said court, on the first Monday in August next, to
answer James M. Stephenson, Thompson Leach and K. B.
tephenson, partners under the name and style of Stephen on, Leach & Co., of a plea of debt for $301.75, damage.
$20.00. And have then and there this writ.
"Witne s, William H. Hatcher, clerk of our said circuit
court, at the court house of said county, the . . . . . . day
of . . . . . . and in the . . . . . . year of the State."
* * * At the time this judgment was rendered J. G.
Blackford owned everal parcels of land in said county,
and also a considerable amount of personal property. On
the 23rd day of February, 1876, he conveyed all his proprty, real and personal, to B. Mason Ambler, trustee, for
the payment of all his debts ratably. This conveyance wa
duly recorded the same day, October 12, 1878, that thi.
tru te in tituted this suit.
In his bill he tates all the above fact , filing with it a
01 of the record in this common law suit, a copy of thi
execution and return thereon and an ab tract of this judgment from aid judO'ment lien docket. He alleges in his
ill that thi ju o·m nt was a mere nullity, as the ummon
which was the comm ncement of the suit, was not dated
and wa not io·ned y the clerk. But say that it heino·
'I'. P.-2
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claimed to be a valid judgment, and being on the judgment

lien docket, it is a cloud on the real estate conveyed to

him as trustee, and prevents his selling to advantage tlif

real estate conveyed by said deed, as he is thereby author-

ized and directed to do. * * * The two Stephensons

being dead, the bill makes Okey Johnson, their several

executor, Thompson Leach, J, G. Blackford and John Con-

nell defendants, and asks the court to declare said judg-

ment null and void. * * * The court by its final decree

* * * dismissed the bill and decreed that the plaintiff

pay to said defendants their costs in said suit expended.

From this decree the plaintiff, B, M. Ambler, on March

22, 1879, obtained from this court an appeal and super-

sedeas.

Green, President, delivered the opinion of the court:

The first question presented by this record is : Was the

judgment of the circuit court of the fall term, 1869, null

and void, because the summons in the suit in which such

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

judgment was rendered was blank as to its date, and be-

cause it was not signed by the clerk or his deputy? The

appellant's counsel claims that it is absolutely void, and

should be so pronounced by this Court ; while the appellees

claim that it was only voidable by plea in abatement, or

motion to quash it in the original suit, or at furthest by

having the judgment set aside by a motion by the defend-

ants before the circuit court which rendered it, or, if it

refused, by a writ of error after such refusal and a revers-

al of this judgment by this Court; and these steps not hav-

ing been taken, this judgment is valid, and a lien on the

real estate of the defendant, Blackford, superior to the

lien created by said deed of trust.

* * * In some of the States their constitutions or laws

require that process shall be signed by the clerk of the court,

and sealed with the seal of the court, and as the sealing as

well as signing is clearly intended for the like purpose, of

autlienticating the process, the decision as to the effect

of omitting to attach the seal of the court I regard as bear-

ing directly on the question under discussion in this case.

In Maine, where the process has to be under the seal of the

'!0urt, it was decided that a writ returnable to the Supreme

Judicial Court, wliirli ought to have had the seal of that

claimed to be a valid judgment, and being on the judgment
lien docket, it is a cloud on the real estate conveyed to
him as trustee, and prevents his selling to advantage tlH·
real e tate convey d by said deed, as he is thereby authorized and directed to do. * * * The two Stephensons
being dead the bill make Okey Johnson, their several
xecutor, Thompson Leach, J. G. Blackford and John Connell defendants, and a k the court to declare said judgment null and void. * * * The court by its final decree
* * * dismis ed the bill and decreed that the plaintiff
pay to aid defendants their costs in said uit expended.
From this decree the plaintiff, B. M. Ambler, on March
~2, 1879, obtained from this court an appeal and supersedeas.
GREEN, President, delivered the opinion of the court:
The first question presented by this record is: Was the
judgment of the circuit court of the fall term, 1869, null
and void, because the summons in the suit in which such
judgment was rend red was blank as to its date, and beause it was not igned by the clerk or his deputy? The
appellant's coun el clai s that it is absolutely void, and
.. hould be so pronounced by this Court; while the appellee
claim that it wa only voidable by plea in abatement, or
motion to quash it in the original suit, or at furthest by
having the judgment et a ide by a motion by the defend' nt before the circuit court which r ndered it, or, if it
refu e , by a writ of error after uch r fu al and a rever · 1 of thi ju gment by thi C urt; and the e teps not ha ving been taken, thi jud ·ment is valid, and a lien on the
r al e tate of the d fend nt, Bla kford, uperior to tho
lien creat d by said deed of trust.

• • • • • * • • • •

• • In om of th tat , th ir on titutions or laws
hall b si 0 ·n d by th 1 rk of the court,
al of th court, n a the aling as
w 11 a. , ignin<Y i
ar] int n d f r th lik purpo e, of
m1tli nifratinn th
r
.._, the d i ion a to th eff t
f mittin 0 · t
tta ·h th
a l of th
nrt I r ar as b arin cr lir f'tl
n th JU ti n und r di. u i n in tbi cas .
n f ainr ' 11 r th
r ·
ha. t b nnd r th
al f tlw
upr m
1·011ri, it' a .· ] <'j<1 th t aw it r tur abl t tb
Tn<liri< I ) urt, ·hir11 11p;hi to hflv hnd th , Rl f tlrnt
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Court attached to it, but did not have, was to be quashed

on motion of the defendant, though made at a term long

subsequent to the term at which the writ was returnable.

The court say: ''Upon the whole we regard the seal as a

matter of su])stance, and the process, being an original

ivrit, not amendable. We regret that the defect was not

pointed out at an earlier stage of the proceedings; but we

are not satisfied that it is now too late to take the objection.

We do not abate the proceedings so much for the sake of

the defendants, as because the plaintiff has departed from

a substantial requirement of law of a public nature, in

bringing his action." It is obvious that the court did not

regard this process as absolutely null and void, but as a

voidable process; but the defect being a substantial one.

the defendant was not confined to the term at which pro-

cess was returnable to make his motion to quash this pro-

cess, but was allowed to do so long afterwards. Still if he

had permitted a judgment to be entered by default, the
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court would doubtless have held this judgment valid. All

they did decide was, that at any time pending the case he

might avoid this process ; but unless avoided, it was good.

That it was not a mere nullity and absolutely void is

shown by the case of Sawyer v. Baker, 3 Greenl. (8 Me.)

29, where the court held that an execution issued without

the seal of the court, which the law required, was not ab-

solutely void, but might be afterwards amended. And

this decision is approved in the case of Bailey v. Smith, 3

Fairfield, (12 Me.) 196. So in Massachusetts. Upon a plea

in abatement to a writ, that the seal of the court was not

attached, the court held the plea good and refused to per-

mit the writ to be amended by attaching the seal. Hall v.

Jones, 9 Pick. 446. But in New York in the case of Pepron

et al., V. Jenkins, Coleman & Caine's cases 60, on a motion

to quash a writ, because not signed by the clerk, the court

permitted the writ to be amended by the clerk's then sign-

ing it. Both these cases evidently treat the writ as not

void, but as voidable only. And in the People v. Dunning,

1 Wend. 16, the court expressly decide that an execution,

to which the seal of the court was not attached as the law

requires, was not void or a nullity, but only voidable, and

the sureties of a sheriff were held liable for money collected

under such an execution. In the case of Stayton v. New-
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ourt atta hed to it, but did not have, was to be quashe
on motion of tb d f ndant, thou ·h made at a t rm long
ub. equ nt to th t rm at which th~ writ wa returnable.
The court ay:
U on the whole we r gar the eal as a
matt r of ul1 tan
an the proce
l ing an oriO'inal
writ not am ndabl . We re Tet that th e def t wa not
point d out at an earlier . tage of the proceeding · but we
are not ati :fi d that it i now too late to take the objection.
W do not a at the proceeding o much for th ake of
the def ndant a b au e the plaintiff ha departed from
a ub tantial r quir ment of law of a public na ure in
brin ·ing hi a tion.
It i obviou that the court did not
reo·ard thi proce a a olu tely null and void but as a
voi lable proce · but the defect being a ub tantial one.
the defendant wa not confined to the term at which proc
was returnable to make hi motion to qua h thi proce
but wa allowed to do o long afterward .
till if he
had permitted a jud m nt to be entered by d fault, the
court would doubtle have held this judgment valid. All
they did decide wa , that at any time pending the case he
mi ·ht avoid thi proce ; but unle avoided it wa good.
That it was not a mere nullity and ab olutely void i.
shown by the ca e of aivyer v. Baker, 3 Greenl. ( l\ie.)
29 where the court hel that an execution i ued without
the eal of the court which the law required wa not abolutely 'oid, but mi ·ht l e aft rward. amended. An
thi deci ion i appro ed in the ca e of Bailey v. mith, 3
Fairfield, (L, Me.) 196.
o in l\Ias achu etts. Upon a plea
in abatement to a writ that the eal of the court was not
attached, the court h ld the plea O'Ood and refu ed to p rmit the writ to be am nd d by attaching the eal. Hall v.
Jon es, 9 Pick. 446. But in New York in the ca e of Pepron
et al., v. Jen kin , oleman & aine' ca.;; 60 on a motion
to qua h a writ becau. e not i ed by the 1 rk the court
p rmitted th writ to b amen 1 by the lerk then i ·nin it.
oth th e ca e e id ntly treat the writ a not
void ut a voida I nl.'".
n in the P eople v. Dunning
1 Wend. 16, the court xpr 1., decid that an execution
to which the al of the court wa not atta hed a th law
requires wa not oi or a nullity but onl. voi abl , an
the sur tie of a sheriff were held liable for money coll te
under uch an execution. In the case of tayton v.
w-
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comer, 1 Eng. (Ark.) 451, there was a judgment by default

on a writ to which the seal of the court was not attached.

Upon writ of error this judgment was reversed. We could

not from this infer that the writ was a mere nullity, but

rather the reverse, that it was voidable, and was avoided

by the defendants obtaining a writ of error. But Oldham,

Judge, in delivering the opinion of the court, used very

strong language to show that the writ was a mere nullity.

He says, ''this writ totally fails to confer any jurisdiction

over the person of the appellant. The writ being unsealed

is a mere nullity, and as such imposes no legal obligation

upon the appellant to appear and defend against the ac-

tion. The judgment by default is therefore erroneous and

ought to be reversed." This language is so specific that

it is obvious that the court intended to hold that a writ to

which the seal of the court was not attached, was an abso-

lute nullity, unless confirmed by the defendant's appear-

ance. And that a judgment by default based on it would
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also be null and void, even had it not been reversed by the

Appellate Court.

**********

In Parson v. Sweft, 32 N. H. 88, the court decided that,

though the Constitution of New Hampshire expressly pro-

vides that ''all writs shall bear the teste of the chief jus-

tice of the court," yet a writ not bearing this teste was not

void, but only voidable by motion to quash made at the

Ijroper time in the progress of the suit. The court say:

"The Constitution of this State, article 87, provides that

all writs issuing out of the clerk's office in any court of
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co11ier, 1 Eng. (Ark.) 451, there was a judgment by default
on a writ to which the seal of the court was not attached.
Upon writ of error this judgment was reversed. We cou:d
not from this infer that the writ was a mere nullity, but
rather the reverse, that it was voidable, and was avoided
by the defendants obtaining a writ of error. But Oldham,
Judge, in delivering the opinion of the court, used very
strong language to show that the writ was a mere nullity.
He says, ''this writ totally fails to confer any jurisdiction
over the person of the appellant. The writ being unsealed
is a mere nullity, and as such imposes no legal obligation
upon the appellant to appear and defend against the action. The judgment by default is therefore erroneous and
ought to be reversed.'' This language is so specific that
it is obvious that the court intended to hold that a writ to
which the seal of the court was not attached, was an absolute nullity, unless confirmed by the defendant's appearance. And that a judgment by default based on it would
also be null and void, even had it not been reversed by the
Appellate Court.

• • • • • • • • * *

law, shall be in the name of the State of New Hampshire,

shall be under the seal of the court whence they issue, and

bear teste of the chief, first or senior justice of the court,

and shall be signed by the clerk of said court, yet a writ

which issues without the proper teste is not in terms de-

clared by the Constitution to be void, and wo think it is

not to be held so by construction. In the same article of

the Constitution writs are required to be signed by the

clerk ; but a writ is not void because it wants the signature

of the clerk; and the objection will be overruled, if not

seasona))ly made. LoveU v. Sahin, 15 N. IT. 37. In Massa-

chusetts, upon tlie construction of a similar provision of

their Constitution, it has been decided that the want of ?

In Parson v. Swett, 32 N. H. 88, the court decided ·that,
though the Constitution of New Hamp hire expressly provides that ''all writs shall bear the teste of the chief justice of the court,'' yet a writ not bearing this teste was not
void, but only voidable by motion to qua h made at the
vroper time in the progre s of the suit. The court say:
"The Constitution of this State, article 7, provide tbat
all writs is ·uing out of the clerk's offir in any court of
law, shall be in the name of the Stat of New Hamp hire,
shall be under the seal of the court wh nc th y is u , and
ear teste of the chief, :first or senior ju tice of the court,
and shall be si ned by the cl rk of said cour t, yet a writ
which i ue without the proper te te is not in t rm delar d y t e on titution to be void, an w think it i
n t t b h ld so by onstruction. In the same arti le f
th
i n titution writ
are r quir d to be ign d by the
ut a writ i. not void b cau it want the io·nature
f t
l rk; an the objecti n will
o rrul d, if not
'"' L u .••~unal ly mad .
Lo ell v. Sabin, 15 N. . 37. In Mas a·hu. it., up
th
n tr tion of a jmi1 ar rovi ion of
th ir on titution, it has b en
jd d th t th wan t of !:I
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propor iesfe is mere matter of form, and must be taken ad-

vantage of by seasonable objection; otherwise it will be

held to be waived. Ripley v. Warren, 2 Pick. 592. In this

ease the want of a proper teste did not make the writ void.

If a motion to quash had been seasonably made, the writ

might have been amended; for it was not void, and the

court had jurisdiction. It was so decided in Bcyuolds v.

Donnell, not reported. The ordinary process of the court

never in fact bears the actual signature of the chief justice,

but his name is printed into the blank writs before they

are delivered out of the clerk's office. The teste of a writ

is therefore in practice a mere matter of form."

Yet in HiitcJiins v. Edson, 1 N. H. 139, a sheriff was

held not liable for the escape of a prisoner, whom he held

in custody, because the execution under which he held him

was not under seal, and the court say: "A writ not under

seal is not process warranted by law. The Constitution

in our opinion has rendered a seal essential to the validity
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of all our writs; and no officer can justify anything done

under a writ of execution not under seal. It is no better

warrant for arrest than a piece of blank paper." Comment-

ing on this case the court in Parson v. Sivett, 32 N. H, 89,

say: ''The general language used in that case might tend

to the conclusion that writs of mesne, as well as final, pro-

cess were void, unless under the seal of the court. It is ob-

vious, however, that there is an important distinction be-

tween the two kinds of writs, because to a writ of final pro-

cess the defendant has no opportunity to object, by plea or

motion that it wants a seal or other constitutional requisite.

It may perhaps be found, when a case shall arise which

presents the question, that the doctrine of Hidchins and

Edson ought not to be extended beyond the point expressly

decided. Foote v. Knowles, 4 Mete. 586; Brewer v. Lihhey,

13 Mete. 175 ; People v. Dunning, 1 Wend. 17 ; Jackson v.

Broivn, 4 Cow. 550."

There has been in the State of Arkansas a very large

number of decisions as to the effect upon a judgment of the

writ being defective in almost all sorts of ways. The de-

cisions at first were quite strong, or the language used in

them strong, to indicate that for many of these defects the

judgments would be void. These cases were all reviewed
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prop r t te is mere matt r of form, and must be taken advanta · of by ea onable objection; otherwise it will be
h ld to be waived. Ripley . TV arren, ..., Pi k. 59-. In this
ea e the want of a pro er teste did not mak th writ void.
lf a motion to qua h had been seasonably mad , the writ
miO'ht have been amended; for it was not void, and the
<'Ourt had juri diction. It was so decided in Reynolds v.
Donn ll, not reported. The ordinary proce s of the court
never in fact bears the actual signature of the chief justice,
lmt his name is printed into the blank writs before they
are delivered out of the clerk's office. The te te of a writ
is therefore in practice a mere matter of form."
Yet in Hidchins v. Ed on, 1 N. H. 139, a sheriff was·
held not liable for the escape of a prisoner, whom he held
in custody, because the execution under which he held him
was not under seal, and the court say: ''A writ not under
'eal is not process warranted by law. The Constitution
in our opinion has rendered a seal essential to the validity
of all our writs; and no officer can justify anything done
under a writ of execution not under seal. It is no better
warrant for arrest than a piece of blank paper.'' Commenting on this case the court in Parson v. Swett, 32 N. H. 89,
ay: ''The general language used in that case might tend
to the conclusion that writ of 11iesne, as well as final, process were void, unle sun er the eal of the court. It is obvious, however, that there is an important distinction between the two kinds of writ , because to a writ of final process the defendant ha no opportunity to object, by plea or
motion that it want a eal or other constitutional requi ite.
It may perhaps be found, when a ca e shall arise which
presents the question, that the doctrine of Hiitchins a11d
Ed on ought not to be extended beyond the point expres ly
decided. Foote v. J{noi les, 4 Mete. 586; Br wer . Libbey
13 J\1etc. 175; People v. Dimning, 1 Wend. 17; Jackson v.
Brown, 4 ow. 550."
There ha b n in th
tate of Arkan as a very large
numb r of de i ion a to the ff ct upon a ju ·ment of the
writ being def ctive in almo t all sort of wa. . The dei ion at first were quit strong, or the lanO'UaO'e used in
them trong to indicat that for many of these defects the
judgments would be void. Th e ca es were all reviewed
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however in Mitchell v. Conley, 8 Eng. 414, and the court on

full review of them then held an original summons not run

ning in the name of tlie State is not void, but amendable, and

may be amended after plea in abatement filed. In Rodcl.

surv. V. Thompson d Barnes, 22 Ark. 363, the court held a

writ of summons is not void for want of the official seal

of the clerk. It is voidable only and may be amended on

application to the court; but if no application to amend

has been made, the defect is ground for a reversal of judg-

ment by default. The court say: ''It has been the practice

of this court to reverse judgments by default in cases where

the summons were without the official seal of the clerk, and

such writs were treated as void. But in Mitchell v. Con-

ley, 13 Ark. 418, the court upon review of its previous de-

cisions held that they were not void for such defects, but

voidable, and the court below possessed the power to amend

them on application. Here no application was made to

amend; and the defect in the writ is cause of reversal."
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The authorities we have cited show that the decided

weight of authorit}^ is against holding a writ absolutely

void, because not signed by the clerk, or not having the seal

of the court attached to it, or not being properly attached,

or for not running in the name of the State, even where

these things, or any of them, are required in the Constitu-

tion; but such defects in a writ render it only voidable.

In some States it is held that these things, or most of them,

are so much a matter of form, that no advantage can be

taken of them except by a plea in abatement, or by a mo-

tion to quash made at the proper time. Others hold that

while none of these defects render a writ void, or the judg-

ment based on it a nullity; yet they, or some of them, are

such defects of substance that the writ can be avoided

by motions to quash, though not made promptly, and where

on such a defective writ, at least where some of these de-

fects exist, a judgment by default is obtained against the

defendant, it will be ;feversed on writ of error. But no

decision, which I have been able to find, holds in a collateral

proceeding that such a judgment is a nullity. It is true, as

we have seen, that some of the judges use very strong lan-

guage, from which we m.ight infer, that in their opinion a

judgment by default based on a wi-it in which some of these

defects existed was an absolute nullitv; but we are liable
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however in llf itchell v. Conley, 8 Eng. 414, and the court on
full review of them then held an original summons not rm1
ning in the name of the State is not void, but amendable, and
may be amended after plea in abatement filed . In Rodd.
urv. v. Thompson & Barnes, 22 Ark. 363, the court held a
writ of summons is not void for want of the official seal
of the clerk. It is voidab]e only and may be amended on
application to the court; but if no application to amend
ha been made, the defect is ground for a reversal of judgment by default. The court say: ''It has been the practice
of thi court to reverse judgments by default 1n cases where
the summons were without the official seal of the clerk, and
such writs were treated as void. But in 111itchell v. Conley, 13 Ark. 418, the court upon review of its previous decisions held that they were not void for such defects, but
voidable, and the court below possessed the power to amend
them on application. Here no application was made to
amend; and the defect in the writ is cause of reversal."
The authorities we have cited show that the decided
weight of authority is against holding a writ absolutely
void, because not signed by the clerk, or not having the sea1
of the court attached to it, or not being properly attached,
or for not running in the name of the State, even wher these things, or any of them, are required in the Constitution; but such defects in a writ render it only voidable.
In some States it is held that these things, or most of them,
are so much a matter of form, that no advantage can be
taken of them except by a plea in abatement, or by a motion to qua h mad at tl1c roper time. Others hold that
while non of th se d f ts r nder a writ void, or the judo·m nt hase 1 on it a nullity; yet they, or some of th m, ar
su h d fc t of substance that the writ can be avoided
l m t] n to qua h, thouo·h ot made promr tly, and where
n .'U h a d f ·tiv writ, at 1 a t wh re ome of the e def t. ,'i t, a ju Jo-m nt 1 y d fault is obtained against the·
f :n lent, it ill b ;r v r d on writ of error. But no
<l ·.· i n, w11i ·h I hav b n abl to fin , hold jn a collateral
pr c 1ing th t . u h a judgm nt is a nnllit r. It is true, as
w h v .·e n, that . om
f th ju o· . u . v ry trono- lan1-i l g J' fr
11i ·h w
ight inf r that in th ir I inion n
jmlg1 rnt hy ·fault hn s<•<l on "rii in , hi h .
of the
<l •f t · xi"t 1 wa. an al> ·olut' nurnt)' ; l ut w are liabl
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to mistake their views, as in none of the cases, we have

seen, were they called upon to decide more than that the

judgment might be reversed, or the writ quashed on mo-

tion in the same suit; and it is obvious that this might

properly be done, though the judgment was not a mere

nullity.

In this case the defendants in the common law suit had

a summons regularly served on them by the sheriff, which

on its face showed it came from the clerk's office, though

not signed by the clerk. It was served on the 2nd. dav

of August, 1869, and required them to appear at a speci-

fied time to answer the plaintiff's demand. It is true the

summons was not dated, but the law required that a writ

should be returned in not exceeding ninety days. The

defendants knew therefore that this writ had been issued

at sometime within the preceding ninety days, and could

not therefore have supposed it was issued in some pre-

ceding year, as has been suggested, and must therefore
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have known at what specific time they were required to

appear and answer. They also knew in what court to an-

swer from the face of the writ, and at what particular

time to answer. It does seem to me therefore that such a

writ ought not to be regarded as an absolute nullity. It

was no doubt very defective and might have been properly

quashed; but as it really gave with reasonable certainty

all the information to the defendants that a regular and

perfect writ would have done, it cannot justly be regarded

as a nullity.

For these reasons the decree of the circuit court of Octo-

ber 28, 1878, * * * dismissing the plaintiff's bill at his

costs, must be affirmed. * * *

Decree affirmed.

'
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to mistak their view , a in none of the cases, we ha e
. een, were th y called upon to decide more than that the
judgment might be rever ed, or the writ qua hed on m0.
tion in the same uit; and it is obvious that this might
properly be done, though the judgm nt was not a mere
nullity.

* * * * * * * * * *
In this case the def ndant in the common law suit had
a ummons reo·ularly sen ed on them by the sheriff, which
on its face howed it came from the clerk's office, though
not signed by the clerk. It wa served on the 2nd. da"
of August, 1 69, and required them to appear at a specifi d time to an wer the plaintiff's demand. It is true th ,
. ummons was not dated, but the law required that a writ
hould be returned in not exc eding ninety days. The
defendants knew therefore that this writ had been i uerl
at ometime within the I receding ninety days, and could
not therefore have supposed it was issued in some pr ·
ceding year, as has been uggested, and must therefor
have known at what specific time they were required to
appear and answer. They al o knew in what court to anwer from the face of the writ, and at what particular
time to an wer. It doe eem to me therefore that such a
writ ought not to be r garded as an absolute nullity. It
was no doubt very defective and might have been properly
quashed; but as it really gave with rea onable certainty
all the information to the defendants that a regular and
perfect writ would have done, it cannot justly be regarded
as a nullity.

* * * * * * * * * *
For the e rea ons the decree of the circuit court of October 2 , 1878, · * * dismi ing the plaintiff's bill at hi·
cost , must be affirmed. • • •
Decree affirmed.
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SECTION 6. INDORSEMENT OF AMOUNT CLAIMED.

ELMEN V. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY

RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Nebraska. 1905.

75 Nebraska, 37.

ELMEN V. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUIN Y
RAILROAD COl\1P ANY.

Letton, C. This action was brought by George P. El-

Suprenie Court of Nebraska. 1905.

men, as administrator of the estate of Robert Stewart,

deceased, to recover damages for the widow and next of

75 Nebraska, 37.

kin on account of the death of his intestate, which lie al-

leges was caused by the negligence of the defendant rail

road while the deceased was working in its Havelock shops.

* * * * On July 17, 1901, one day before the time limited

by the statute for the beginning of an action for death

by wrongful act, a petition was filed in this action and a

summons issued. The praecipe for the summons did not

ask for the indorsement of any amount for which judg-

ment would be taken if the defendant did not appear, nor

did the summons which was issued have either upon its face
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or indorsed thereupon any amount for which judgment

would be taken in such case. This summons was duly served

upon the defendant and returned. No appearance wa**

made and no default was entered. On February 10, 1902,

the plaintiff filed a motion requesting to be permitted to

amend the praecipe so as to show the amount for whicli

plaintiff would take judgment, in case of default, to be

$5,000, that the clerk be directed to amend the original

summons by indorsing that amount upon it, and that an

alias summons be issued, with that amount indorsed, re-

quiring the defendant to answer on or before March 17,

1902, and that the amended summons, a copy of the mo-

tion and order allowing it, and the alias summons, be

served upon the defendant the same as an original sum-

mons. The court, by an ex parte order, sustained the mo-

tion. * * *

* * * We have repeatedly held that no judgment can be

rendered in excess of the amount indorsed upon the sum-

mons in case of default in an action where the only relief

sought is a money judgment. Croivell v. Galloway, 3 Neb.

215; Roggencamp v. Moore, 9 Neb. 105; Co-operative Stove

· LETT

C. This action was brought by Georo·e P . E lmen, as admini trator of the estate of Robert Stewart,
deceased, to recover dama es for the widow and next of
kin on account of the death of his inte tate, which he al leges was caused by the negligence of the defendant rail road while the deceased was working in its Havelock shop . .
* * * * On July 17, 1901, one day before the time limite 1
by the statute for the beginning of an action for death
by wrongful act, a petition wa filed in this action and a
ummons is ued. The praecipe for the summon did not
a k for the indor ement of any amount for which jud ...:ment would be taken if the defendant did not appear, nor
did the summons which was issued have either upon it fac
or indor ed thereupon any amount for which judgment
would be taken in uch case. This ummons was duly served
upon th def ndant and returned. No appearan e wa'-'
made and no default wa ent red. On February 10, 190~,
the plaintiff filed a motion r questin · to be p rmitt
to
amend the praeci1 e so a to bow the amount for whi 11
plaintiff would take ju g nt, in a
of d fault, to 1
$ ,000, that th clerk b lir t
to amend th ori~dna l
ummon by i dor ing that amount
on it, and tbat an
alia
ummon be i ued, with that
ount indor ], r the d f n ant to an w r on or befor Mar h 17
that the am nded ummon , a opy of th m rd r allow· rw i , an th a1ia
ummon , 1
th
f ndant th
a an ori ·in 1 umcourt, by an e parte ord r u tain d th m N,

h 1d that n
in x .
am unt. ind r
umr
f l f ult in an a ti n wh r:i th only r li f
.' lwht i a m n
ju 1gm nt. Croi ll v. Galloway,
5; Roggencamp v. "f.1 oor ,, . N . 1 ; Co-operative tove

Sec. 6]
Sec. 6] Writs of Summons 25

Co. V. Grimes, 9 Neb. 123; Forbes v. Bringe, 32 Neb. 757,

The plaintiff in error contends that the amendments to the

summons and praecipe, which were permitted by the court,

relate back to the time of the issuance and service of the

original summons, and that therefore the action was begun

within the two year period, while the position of the rail-

road company is that, since no judgment could have been

rendered for any amount whatever upon the summons as

it was when issued and served, an amendment which gave

to the writ a force and effect of which it was entirely devoid

was in effect the beginning of a new action, and that, in such

case, if the bar of the statute had fallen, it could not over-

ride the same. We have been cited to no cases directly in

point in either this or any other jurisdiction. This court

has held that a motion to amend an affidavit for attachment

may be sustained, even though a motion is pending to quash

the writ on account of the very defect which it is sought to

cure by amendment. Struthers v. McDowell, 5 Neb. 491;
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Rathman v. Peycke, 37 Neb. 384; Moline, Milburn <& Stod-

dard Co. V. Curtis, 38 Neb. 520; Dohry v. Western Mfg.

Co. 57 Neb. 228. In such cases the amendment relates

back to the issuance of the writ of attachment. The gen-

eral rule is that irregular or voidable process may be

amended, but that void process is incapable of amend-

ment. The reasons are obvious. A void writ is not a

writ, and an amendment which would give such a writ

force and effect would call the process into being at the

time of the so-called amendment. The courts of other states

have not been uniform in their holdings as to the effect

of the failure to include an ad damnum clause in a sum-

mons or to indorse upon the back of the writ the amount

claimed, where required by statute. See Campbell v. Chaf-

fee, 6 Fla. 724:;Kagay v. Trustees, 68 111. 75; State v. Hood,

6 Blackf. (Ind.) *260. In Ohio, in such a case, it was held

by an inferior court that such a summons could be amended,

but unless appearance were made the amendment would

have to be served. Williams v. Hamlin, 1 Handy 95.

While in another such court in the same state it was held

that a judgment rendered upon the service of a writ with

no amount indorsed was erroneous, but not void, and there-

fore valid and subsisting, since not directly attacked, Gil-

lett V. Miller, 12 Ohio C. C. 214.

WRITS OF SUMMONS

Co. v. Grimes, 9 Neb. 123; Forbes v. Bringe, 32 Neb. 757.
The plaintiff in error contend that the amen ments to the
ummon and praecipe which were per itte by the court,
relate back to th ti me of the issuanc and rvice of the
original ummon , and that therefore the action wa begun
within the two year period, while the po ition of the railroad company is that, since no judgment could have been
rendered for any amount whatever upon the ummons as
it was when i sued and served, an amendment which gave
to the writ a force and effect of which it was entirely devoid
was in effect the beginning of a new action, anil that, in such
ca , if the bar of th tatute had fall en, it could not override the ame. We have been cited to no cas
irectly in
point in either thi or any other juri diction. This court
has held that a motion to amend an affidavit for attachment
may be u tained, even though a motion i pending to quash
the writ on account of the very defect which it i ought to
cure by amendment. Struthers v. ~1 cDowell, 5 Neb. 491;
Rath11ian v. Peycke, 37 Neb. 384; Moline, Milburn d!; Stoddard Co. v. Curtis, 3 Neb. 520; Dobry v. TVestern Mfg.
o. 57 Neb. 228. In such ca es the amendment relates
back to the i uance of the writ of attachment. The genral rule is that irr o-ular or voidable proce s may be
amended, but that void proce s is incapable of amendment. The rea on are obviou . A void writ i not a
writ, and an amendment which would give such a writ
force and effect would call the proce s into b ing at the
time of the so-call d am ndment. The courts of other states
have not been uniform in their holdino- as to the effect
of the failure to include an acl daninwn clau e in a ummon or to indor upon the back of the writ the amount
laim 1 where required by statute.
ee Campbell v. Chaffee, 6 Fla. 724; Kagay v. Tru . tees, 68 Ill. 75; tate v. Hood,
Blackf. (Ind.) · - 0. In hjo, in uch a a e, it was held
b~ an inferior court that , uch a ummon could be amended,
but unl
a
, ran
w r made the amendment woul
have to be erY
Williams v. Hamlin, 1 Handy 95.
While in anoth r u h ourt in the ame tate it wa held
that a judo-ment r n 1 r cl u1 n the ervice f a writ with
wa rron ous but not voi , and thereno amount indor
fore valid and ub i tin
ince not directly attacked. Gil-

lett v. Miller, 12 Ohio

. C. 214.

26
26 Trial Practice [Chap. 1

If the first position is correct the latter is wrong. Tho

holdings are clearly irreconcilable. This court, however,

in an early case, pointed out the proper procedure and in-

dicated the effect of such an amendment. In Watson v.

McCartney, 1 Neb. 131, the action was to enforce a ven-

dor's lien upon certain lands. The summons was indorsed

with the notice required in cases where a judgment for

money only is sought. The defendants did not appear,

and the indorsement was by leave of court amended so as

to conform to the nature of the action, and judgment was

rendered accordingly. In that case as in this both the

praecipe and the summons were defective as to indorse-

ment. In the opinion Judge Lake says :

''So well am I satisfied that this amendment was irregu-

lar and unwarranted, that I have not undertaken to look

into the cases relating to amendments cited by counsel for

the defendant in error. Although cases might be found

to support such a proceeding I should deem it unwise, in
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the settlement of the practice which is to govern in the

courts of this state, to conform to precedents of that char-

acter. ***** jjad the defendants appeared, the

amendment might have been made by order of the court.

The office of the notice indorsed on the summons is to

advise the defendant of the amount claimed. He then is

at liberty to consent or resist. ***** tj^^ plain-

tiff's course was to take judgment for the amount indicated

in the notice, with interest from April 1, 1897. If he

desired a further or greater recovery, he should have ob-

tained leave and issued another summons, such as was

proper in the case." See also Reliance Trust Co. v. Ather-

ton, 67 Neb. 305; Atchison, T. S S. F. Ry. Cc. v. Nicholls.

8 Colo. 188, 6 Pac. 512.

In the instant case the summons was issued in all re-

spects in conformity with the praecipe which was filed, and

in conformity with law. It is not a case where an error

has been made by a clerk of the court or other officer.

In such a case, as, for instance, where an error has been

made in the date of the return day of the summons or

the answer day, we have permitted amendments to be

made, and such amendments relate back to the time of the

issuance of the summons. Barker Co. v. Central West In-

vestment Co. 75 Neb. 43. The court, in such case, has

TRIAL PRACTICE
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If the first po ition is correct the latter is wrong. Tho
holdings are clearly irreconcilable. This court, however,
in an early case, pointed out the proper procedure and indicated the effect of such an amendment. In Watson v.
McCartney, 1 Neb. 131, the action wa to enforce a vendor's lien upon certain lands. The summons was indorsed
with the notice required in cases where a judgment for
money only is sought. The defendants did not appear,
and the indorsement was by leave of court amended so a.
to conform to the nature of the action, and judgment was
rendered accordingly. In that case as in this both the
praecipe and the summons were defective as to indorsement. In the opinion Judge LAKE says:
''So well am I satisfied that this amendment was irregular and unwarranted, that I have not undertaken to look
into the ca es relating to amendments cited by counsel for
the defendant in error. Although ca es might be found
to support such a proceeding I should deem it unwise, in
the settlement of the practice which is to govern in the
courts of this state, to conform to precedents of that character. ~ * * * * Had the defendants appeared, the
amendment might have been made by order of the court.
The office of the notice indorsed on the ummons is to
advise the defendant of the amount claimed. He then i
at liberty to consent or re ist. * * * * * The plaintiff's course was to take judgment for the amount indicat ]
in the notice, with intere t from April 1, 1897. If he
desired a further or greater recovery, he should have ob'
tained leave and i sued another
summon , such as wa8
proper in the case."
al o R liance Trust Co. v. Atherton, 67 Neb. 305; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Cc. v. Nicholls.
8 Colo. 18 , 6 Pac. 512.
In the instant ca e th
ummons wa i sued in all r spects in conformity with the praecip
hich was filed, and
in conf r ity with law. It i not a ca e where an error
has b n made by a clerk of the court or other officer.
In su b a a , as, for in tan e, wh re an error has been
mad i th
te of the return day of the summons or
t
an w r day, w h ve p rmitt d amendments to be
m d , an su b am ndm nt r 1 t back to th time of the
i . a c of th umm n . Barker Co. v. Central West Investment Co. 75 Neb. 43. The court, in such case, ha

See. G]
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y^ower to prosprve the riglits of tlie defendants by grant-

ing such additional time to plead as may be necessary.

In such cases, the defendant is fully advised of the nature

of the judgment which is sought to be rendered against

him, and the only prejudice which he can suffer is being

deprived of the necessary time in which to prepare his de-

fense. The case here, however, is different. Upon its

face the summons was valid, but it failed in anjnvise to

apprise the defendant of any money demand against it.

No sum is mentioned either on the face or upon the

back of the writ. This being the case, an amendment to

the praecipe which directs the clerk to indorse a sum of

money upon the writ, and an indorsemnt of the same

upon the summons, the defendant not being in court, in-

jects into the caF.e a liability upon the defendant to which

he was not subject when the writ was issued, and the

effect as to him is the same as the amendment of a peti-

tion by setting forth a new cause of action, or the issu-
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ance of an alias summons. The defendant may have been,

and evidently was, perfectly satisfied to let judgment go

against him upon the process as it was first issued, but, when

the same was made valid and effectual to charge him with

a money judgment, it was the same as beginning a new

action, and he had the right to the time prescribed by

law for his answer after the indorsement.

It is a significant fact that the plaintiff did not rely upon

the amended praecipe and summons to bring the defendant

into court, but procured the issuance and service of a new

summons, fixing the answer day at a future date. Taking

this fact into consideration, we conclude that the action was

begun so far as the liability for the amount indorsed upon

the summons is concerned, at the time the amendment was

made and the new summons issued. If during the interval

between the issuance of the summons and its amendment,

or the issuance of the new summons, the bar of the statute

of limitations has fallen, it cannot be removed by an

amendment or a new summons which virtually begins the

action. Since the bar of the statute had fallen at the time of

the amendment and the issuance of the new summons, no

right of action existed, and the judgment of the district

court is correct.

27

power to pr n·e the right of the
fend uts by o-rantin · uch a ditional time to lead a
ay be nece sary.
In ucb a s, the defendant is fully advi ed of the nature
of the judgment which is souo-ht to be rendered against
him, and the only prejudice whi b he can suffer i~ being
deprived of the nece ary time in which to prepare his defen e. The ca e here, however, is different. Upon it~
face the summons was alid, but it faileo in anywise to
Pl ri e the defendant of any money demand against it.
o um is mentioned either on the face or upon the
back of the writ. This being the ca e, an amendment to
the praecipe which directs the clerk to indor e a sum of
mone upon the writ, and an indorsemnt of the --ame
upon the summons, the defendant not being in court, inject into the caF.e a liability upon the defendant to which
lie wa not uLject when the writ was is ued, and the
effect as to him i the same as the amendment of a petition by setting forth a new cause of action, or the is uan e of an alia summons. The defendant ma. have been
and e idently was perfectly ati :fied to let judgment go
against him upon the process as it was :first is 'ued, but, when
the ame was made alid and effectual to charge him with
a Tuoney judgment, it was the same a beginning a new
action, and he had the right to the time prescribed by
law for hi an wer after the indor ement.
It is a ·igni:ficant fact that the plaintiff did not rely upon
the amended praecipe and ummons to bring the defendant
into court, but procured the issuance and ervice of a new
ummon :fixing the an wer day at a future date. Taking
thi fact into consideration, we conclude that the action was
begun so far as the liability for the amount indorsed upon
the summon i cone rned, at the time the amendment was
made and the new summon i ued. If during the interval
b tween the is uance of the summons and it amendment
r the i uance of the new ummon , the bar of the statute
of limitation ha fallen, it cannot be removed by an
mendm nt or a new ummon which virtually begins the
tion.
ince the bar of th tatut bad fallen at the time of
th amendment an the i uance of the new ummon no
ri o-ht of action exi t d, and the judgm nt of the district
court i correct.
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We recommend that the judgment of the district court

be affirmed.

Ames and Oldham, CO., concur.

By the court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing

opinion, the judgment of the district court is

A-ffirmed.^

iln Lawton v. Nicholas, (1903) 12 Okla. 550, 73 Pac. 262, it was held

(tyllabus by the court): "A Bummons in an action for the recovery of
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We recommend that the judgment of the district court
be affirmed.
AMES and OLDHAM, CC., concur.
By the court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing
opinion, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed. 1

money only should have endorsed thereon the amount for which judgment

will be rendered if the defendant fails to appear. Summons without such en-

dorsement is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the person and of the

subject matter, and the judgment rendered thereon is not void, but voidable

only, and execution to enforce such judgment cannot be enjoined." Follow-

ing ELansas cases.

Section 7. Alias Writs.

PARSONS V. HILL.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia, 1900.

IIn Lawton v. Nicholas, (1903) 12 Okla. 550, 73 Pac. 262, it was held
(eyilabus by the court): ''A summons in an action for the recovery of
money only should have endorsed thereon the amount for which judgment
will be rendered if the defendant fails to appear. Summons without such endorsement is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the person and of the
subject matter, and the judgment rendered thereon is not void, but voidable
only, and execution to enforce such judgment cannot be enjoined.'' l!,ollowing KaDBas cases.

15 Appeal Cases, 532.
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Mr. Justice Morris delivered the opinion of the Court:

This cause comes here by special appeal; and the ques-

tion involved in it is one of considerable importance in

the practice of the law in this District under existing con-

ditions.

On November 2, 1896, the appellant, Joseph H. Parsons,

as plaintiff, instituted a suit at common law against the

SECTION

7.

ALIAS

wRITS.

appellee, Alice S. Hill, as defendant, in the Supreme Court

of the District of Columbia, by filing a declaration in as-

PARSONS V. HILL.

sumpsit to recover from the appellee the sum of ten thous-

and dollars which he claimed to be due to him for profes-

sional services rendered to the appellee and another per-

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia, 1900.

son in the matter of the location of some land scrip. This

claim was set forth with sufficient minuteness in a bill of

15 Appeal Cases, 532.

particulars annexed to the declaration, which itself was in

the common counts, but which, from the record before us,

does not appear to have been supported by any affidavit;

and, of course, no affidavit was required, except for the

purpose of a summary judgment, if one should be sought.

Mr. Justice MoRRIS delivered the opinion of the Court:
This cause comes here by special appeal; and the question involved in it is one of considerable importance in
the practice of the law in this District under existing conditions.
On November 2, 1896, the appellant, Joseph H. Parsons,
as plaintiff, instituted a suit at common law against the
appellee, Alic S. Hill, as defendant, in the Supreme Court
of th Di 'tri t of Columbia, by filing a d claration in as. ump. it to re ·over from the appell e the sum of ten thousand dollars hich he claimed to be due to him for profes.-ional · rvi · ,, r nd red to the appellee and another perin th matter of the location of som land scrip. Thi
laim was . t forth with suffici nt minut nes in a bill of
rti ular: ann xed t tbe declaration, which itself was in
th om n unt , but which, from the r cord fore us,
do s not app ar to ha' b n upr ort d by any affi avit;
n , of urs , n am
it wa r quired, .,rcept for the
purp s of a umm ry judgmc t, if one should be sought.

ec. 7]
Sec. 7] Writs of Summons 29

On the same day on wliieh the declaration was filed, a

summons was issued out of the office of the clerk of the

court, in the form prescribed by the rules of the court, re-

quiring the defendant to appear in court on or before the

twentieth day after service of the writ, to answer the plain-

tiff's suit, and to show cause why the plaintiff should not

have judgment for his cause of action. This summons,

with a copy of the declaration, according to the rules and

practice of the court, was placed in the hands of the mar-

shal for seryice, and was by him returned to the clerk's

office on November 25, 1896, with the indorsement thereon

that the defendant could not be found. It is understood

that she was absent from the District at the time, and out

of the jurisdiction.

Nothing further was done for nearly two years. On Oc-

tober 11, 1898, a second summons was issued ; and this was

served on the same day on the defendant, and was returned

by the marshal into the clerk's office with the indorsement
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thereon: "Served copies of the declaration, notice to plead,

affidavit, and this summons on the defendant this 11th. day

of October, 1898." * * *

***** Qjj November 2, 1898, the defendant, by

her attorneys, moved to vacate the second or alias sum-

mons issued and returned in the cause, on the ground, a^

alleged, "that the same was improvidently issued, since

the original summons issued in the said cause was not

legally and duly continued, and that therefore there has

been a discontinuance of the said cause." This motion was

allowed by the court, and the second or alias summons was

accordingly vacated.

Thereupon the plaintiff, by his attorneys, moved tlie

court to direct the clerk to enter upon the docket continu-

ances from the date of the original summons. This mo-

tion was denied. Then the plaintiff moved for a judgment

against the defendant for want of a duly verified plea. This

motion also was denied. The plaintiff next moved for a

judgment by default; but this motion likewise was denied.

**********

***** The error, if any there was, consisted in the

order to vacate the second, or what is called the alias

summons in the case, or else in the refusal of the court

to direct the entry of continuances as preliminary to the

\VRTT
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29

On the same day on ' hi h the declaration wa filed, a
summon
a ~ i. sued out of the office of th
lerk of the
ourt, in the form pr ribed by the rul
f th court, r equiring the def ndant to appear in court n r ef ore the
twentieth da after rvi e of the writ, to an. r the plaintiff's uit, and to show au why the I lain iff hould not
have jud ·ment for hi cau, e of action. This ummon.,
with a copy of the d claration, according to the rul s and
practice of the court, wa placed in the ban
of the mar, hal for service, and was by him returned to the clerk' ..
office on Nov mber 25, 1896, with the indor ernent thereon
that the defendant could not be found. It i under tood
that she was ab ent from the Di trict at th time, and out
of the juri. diction.
Nothing further was done for nearly two y ar . On October 11, 1898, a second summons was is ued; and thi wa.
erved on the same day on the defendant, and was returned
by the mar hal into the clerk's offic with the indor. ement
thereon: ''Served copie of the declaration, notice to plead
affidavit, and this summon on the defendant this 11th. day
of October, 1898. '' * * *
* * * * * On Nov mber 2, 1898, th defendant, b.
her attorneys, moved to vacate the econd or alias summons issued and returned in the ca use, on the ground, a'
alleged, ''that the same was improvid ntly i. sued, since
the original summon i . u d in the said cau e was not
legally and duly continued and that ther fore there ha'"'
been a di. continuance of the aid cau e. '' This motion wa,
allowed by the court, and the econd or alias summons wa '
accordingly vacated.
Thereupon the plaintiff by his attorney , moved th
court to direct the clerk to nter upon the dock t continuan es from the date of the original ummon . Thi motion a denied. 'fh n h plaintiff moved for a judgm nt
a()'ain t th def ndant for want of a ul. r v rified plea. Thi
m tion aL wa d ni d. Th plaintiff n xt mo' d for a
judgment y d fault; but thi motion lik wi
a d nie 1.

*• * * .· * * * * *
• • * * • The error if any tl'l re was, consi ted in the
order to vacate th
summons in th a
to direct the entry f

on , or what is call
the alia .
r 1 in the refusal of the court
ontinuances as pr liminary to the
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issue of a second or alias writ. And it was from either one

or both of these orders that the appeal should have been

sought.

Yet, under the special circumstances of the present case,

it does not seem to us that the ends of justice or any good

purpose would be subserved by our refusal in this appeal to

consider the true and substantial question in controversy

between the parties. * * *

That question is, whether, when a declaration in a suit

at common law has been filed and a writ of summons has

been issued under it in pursuance of the existing rules of

the Suf)reme Court of the District of Columbia, and a re-

turn has been made upon that writ that the defendant can-

not be found, either by reason of absence from the juris-

diction or for some other cause, and no further proceeding

is had in the case, no further writs issued and no contin-

uances entered, until nearly two years afterwards, when a

second or alias writ of summons is issued and actually

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

served upon the defendant, the suit has become abated or

discontinued, and the plaintiff is compelled to have recourse

to a new suit, if he would further prosecute his cause of

action?

Counsel in this case, with admirable ingenuity and in-

cisive logic, have gone to the very foundations of the com-

mon law on the subject of writs, and of continuances, and

especially of proceedings under the old original writ, where-

with, under the ancient English practice, suits in the Court

of Common Pleas were always begun. * * *

We do not think that it is necessary to follow counsel

very far in their discussion of the practice under the old

common law. The original writ, by which all civil suits in

the Court of Common Pleas in England were formerly com-

menced, with its incidents of summons, attachment, dis-

fringas, distress infinite, and outlawry, was never in force

in this country, either during the colonial period or since

our Declaration of Independence. While our ancestors

brought with them from England not only the substantive

law of that country, so far as it was suited to their circum-

stances, but also their law of civil procedure, there was

never any place in our system for tlie original writ. From

the very beginning we proceeded upon a radically differ-

ent theory of jurisprudence in that regard. In England,
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issue of a second or alias writ. And it was from either one
or both of the e orders that the appeal should have been
ought.
Yet, under the special circum tances of the present case,
it does not seem to us that the ends of justice or any good
purpose would be subserved by our refusal in this appeal to
consider the true and substantial question in controversy
between the parties. * * *
That que tion is, whether, when a declaration in a suit
at common law has been filed and a writ of summons has
been issned under it in pursuance of the existing rules of
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and a return has been made upon that writ that the defendant cannot be found, either by reason of absence from the jurisdiction or for some other cause, and no further proceeding
is had in the case, no further writs issued and no continuances entered, until nearly two years afterwards, when a
second or alias writ of summons is issued and actually
erved upon the defendant, the suit has become abated or
discontinued, and the plaintiff is compelled to have recourse
to a new suit, if he would further prosecute his cause of
action~

Counsel in this case, with admirable ingenuity and incisive logic, have gone to the very foundations of the common law on the subject of writs, and of continuances, and
e pecially of proceedings under the old original writ, wherewith, under the ancient English practi e, suits in the Court
of Common Pleas were always beo·un. * * *
We do not think that it i neces ary to follow coun el
very far in their di cu sion of the practice under the old
ommon law. The orjginal writ, by which al] ivil uits in
th
ourt f Common Pleas in England w re formerly comr 1 n ed,
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the sovereign was the source of all authority, and the courts

were his courts, and had no right to proceed in any cause

without his authority and permission. It was the princi-

pal function of the original writ to give that permission.

With us, on the contrary, the judicial power has always in

fact been an independent co-ordinate branch of govern-

ment; and the Constitutions adopted after the Declaration

of Independence only recognized and emphasized that fact.

It never required any special license or authority from

any executive, by way of original writ or otherwise, to ex-

ercise its functions. The proceedings in England under

the original writ are, therefore, no safe criterion for us

in our practice.

In our practice, a simple writ of summons, or a capias

ad respondendum, a form of proceeding derived to us, from

the English King's Bench, was the usual mode for the

commencement of suits; and these two, which were in form

executive, and not judicial writs, although actually issued
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by the courts, took the place of the old original writ. But in

neither practice was it sought to have, or was it supposed

that there could properly be, any pleadings whatever, until

both parties, the defendant as well as the plaintiff, were

in court; and the plaintiff's cause of action, although in the

summons or capias, and in the memorandum or praecipe

given to the clerk of the court, as the preliminary to the

issue of the process, it was to a certain extent indicated,

was never formerly stated in the shape of a declaration

until after the appearance of the defendant in court in

response to the summons or capias.

But a very radical departure from ancient usage, and

from the former usage of our own jurisdiction, was ef-

fected, when, by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1863,

Chap. 91 (12 Stat. 762), the Supreme Court of the District

of Columbia was established, with power given to it in the

act of its creation " to establish such rules as it might

deem necessary for the regulation of the practice of the

several courts organized by the act, and from time to time

to revise and alter sucli rules;" and when, soon after its

organization, it accordingly promulgated new rules of

pleading and practice to be observed in the conduct of legal

proceedings thereafter to bo instituted in that court. The

radical character of these rules with reference to the ante
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cedent practice is well recognized by counsel in the state-

ment advanced in argument, that if their validity had been

properly tested in due time after their promulgation, thoy

would not have stood the ordeal of judicial scrutiny. But

this argument is not further insisted on than in the

point made in the brief of counsel for the appellee, that

rules of court cannot be permitted to contravene common

right. With reference to this, however, it is sufficient to

say here that ordinarily there can be no such thing as a

common right in the retention of existing rules of plead-

ing and practice. Courts have made these, and courts

may unmake them, especially under legislative authority

given for the pur^Dose. Alterations in the code of civil

procedure must be assumed to have been made, as they are

no doubt always intended to be made, for the better admin-

istration of the substantive law, and not to impair individ-

ual right. Certainly the change in the civil procedure of the

District of Columbia effected by tlie promulgation of the
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rules of the Supreme Court of the District in 1863, being in

line with the general modification of the ancient practice

before and afterwards effected in other parts of our

country, and now, it is believed, become universal through-

out the United States, can not well be said to be antagon-

istic to common right, when the common sentiment every-

where has demanded the change.

**********

Under these rules, as thus modified, it has become the

settled practice for the marshal to make return of all writs

of summons placed in his hands for service at or before the

('X})iration of twenty days. If he makes actual service of

the writ, he returns it forthwith with the indorsement that

he has so served it. If the defendant cannot be found,

the marshal holds the writ for twenty days and then re-

turns it into the clerk's office, with the indorsement thereon

that the defendant is ''not to be found." In either case

Ihe writ by the return becomes functus officio. In the

•3vent tliat it has not been served, it cannot be taken out
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again for actual service — a new writ or alias must be re-

sortcf] to for tluit ])nr))Ose. Now, the question is presented

A'hetiier, under the rules of the Supreme Court of the Dis-
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keep a suit alive and to prevent a discontinuance, succes-

sive ^^'Tits of summons without intermission must be is-

sued until actual service is had upon the defendant, each

successive writ to bear teste and to be issued on the date

of the return of its predecessor into the office of the clerk

of the court.

It is not apparent to us what good puriK)se is to be sub-

served by the continuous and uninterrupted issue of writs

of summons in periods of twenty days, when they cannot

be actually served, and it is perfectly well known to the

plaintiff that they cannot be served, on account of the ab-

sence of the defendant from the jurisdiction or for some

other sufficient cause. A rule of practice that would re-

quire such continuous issue of process might well become

an intolerable burden, in consequence of the utterly useless

trouble and the unnecessary costs to which the parties might

be put, and which would be of no possible benefit to anyone.

Such process might have to be continued for years, with
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the result merely of incumbering the clerk's dockets and the

records of the courts with entries of conspicuous inutility.

When a defendant has gone out of the jurisdiction within

the period allowed for suit by the Statute of Limitations,

and a plaintiff thereafter has brought his suit in due time,

in order to prevent the accruing of the bar of the statute,

as he is undoubtedly entitled to do, there would be neither

justice nor sense in requiring him to have writs constantly

issued periodically until the defendant returns. The time

of such return being indefinite, the result upon litigation

would be prohibitory. "Wlien the plaintiff is a trustee,

executor, administrator, guardian, or something of the kind,

and sues in his representative or fiduciary capacity, and it

is not only his right, but perhaps his duty to sue, which

he may not avoid without grave responsibility, a very grave

burden is placed upon him, and a very great impediment is

interposed to his assertion of just right, if he is compelled

at the same time to incur the penalty of indefinite and

interminable costs before the defendant is actually served

with process. We cannot think that the law requires any-

thing so unreasonable.

**********

Undoubtedly, as opposed to the useless incumbrance of

unserved and unser^^able writs and the risk of liability for
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of ummons in p rio
of twenty day , when th y cannot
he actually erved, and it is perfectly w ll known to the
plaintiff that they annot be served, on ar ount of the abence of the def ndant from the juri, diction or for some
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indefinite and unascertainable costs on the one side, there

is the danger on the other side that, if snits were permitted

for a long time to lie dormant by the failure to have notice

given to defendants when such notice could well be given,

these latter might be greatly and wrongfully prejudiced

by being brought into court long after the subject matter

of controversy has passed out of their minds, when perliaps

witnesses are dead and testimony lost, and yet the Statute

of Limitations might not be available as a defense. * * *

**********

The suing out of successive writs of summons at inter-

N'als of twenty days, each writ to bear teste as of the date

the only mode that can be pointed out, to effect the actual

continuance of process in the present case. But in the rules

of the Supreme Court of the District we find no requirement

for any such continuance. Those rules, in fact, are entirely
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silent on the subject; and we are apparently remitted to the

])ractice of the common law. But the common law fur-

nishes no guide, and, in our opinion, no analogy even, for

the determination of such a case as the present. As we

have seen, the practice under the original writ in England

affords no analogy; and, as we think has been sufficiently

shown, a requirement for the continuous issue of suc-

cessive writs, when those writs cannot be served, is un-

reasonable. We are advised that the usage under the rules

of the Supreme Court of the District for upwards of thirty-

live years, that is, practically during the whole period of its

existence, has been to the reverse of the contention that a

continuous issue of successive writs is necessary in order to

keep a cause alive, when the first writ has been returned

without actual service on the defendant. * * * On the

contrary the ])ractice has been quite the reverse — namely,

that after the return of the first writ that the defendant can-

not be found, no second or cdias writ is required, until actual

service can be had. And that this has been the practice, we

understand to be conceded, at all events not to be denied

by the appellee; and it seems to be sufficiently established.

It may Ix; that this ])ra('tice or usage is justly amenable

to the criticism that it does not conform to the rigid rule

of continuity and to the doctrine of continuances as applied
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of the return of its predecessor into the clerk's office by the

marshal, is the only mode pointed out to us, and apparently
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iu the old common law. But we think that the radical

change in the law of procedure effected by the rules of

the Supreme Court of the District had the effect of dispens-

ing with the requirement of actual continuances in tlie mat-

ter of the service of original process to bring a defendant

before the court, after one writ had been issued and re-

turned without effect; and that, at the utmost, all that

could reasonably be required in such a case would be the

entry of fictitious continuances on the record to be made

whenever a writ could be actually issued mth effect, in

accordance with what is understood to have been the prac-

tice of the English courts in analogous cases. The making

of fictitious entries, however, is not appropriate in our

American practice ; and it is understood that in the cases

in which they are authorized in England, they are wholly

dispensed wn^th and are unnecessaiy in our legal procedure.

We are not to be understood to be holding that the law

in regard to continuances is not yet in force. On the con-
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trary, we regard it as yet fully in force in many cases ; and

it has been so held. Gait v. Todd, 5 App. D. C. 350 ; Crum-

haugli V. Otterhack, 20 D. C. 434; Thompson v. Beveridge,

3 Mackey, 170. But wherever it has been held that continu-

ance is necessary, actual continuance is meant. There is no

place in our system for the entry of fictitious continuances.

Nicholls V. Fearson, 2 Cranch C. C. Rep. 526 ; Banli v. Brent,

2 Cranch C. C. Rep. 538; Baker v. French, 2 Cranch C. C.

Rep. 539; Thompson v. Beveridge, 3 Mackey, 170.

But the usage which we regard as* having become a rule

of practice under the code of rules promulgated by the

Supreme Court of the District, has its limitations. That

usage has already been stated to be, that when, upon a

declaration at common law, filed in that court, a writ of

summons has been issued, and has been duly returned by

the marshal with the return that the defendant cannot be

found, no further writs are required to be issued in order

to keep the suit alive, until the defendant can actually be

found and a writ can actually be ser\'ed upon him. But

it follows that, when the defendant can be found and the

writ can actually be served upon him, it then becomes ne-

cessary' to follow up the proceeding by the issue of a writ

to be actually served; and if the plaintiff fails to have a
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in the old common law. But we think that the radical
change in the law of procedure effected by the rule of
the Supreme Court of the District had the effect of di pen ing with the requirement of actual continuances in the matter of the service of original pro ss to bring a defendant
before the court, after one -writ had been i ued and returned without effect; and that, at the utmost, all that
could reasonably be r uired in uch a ca e would be the
entry of :fictitious continuances on the record to be made
whenever a writ could be actually issued with effect, in
accordance ' ith what i understood to have been the practice of the English courts in analogous ca e . The making
of fictitious entries, however, is not appropriate in our
American practice; and it is understood that in the ca. es
in which they are authorized in England, they are wholly
dispensed with and are unnece. ary in our legal I rocedure.
We are not to be under tood to be hol ing that the law
in regard to continuances is not yet in forc e. On the contrary, we regard it a yet fully in force in many ca e ; and
it has b en o held. Galt v. Todd, 5 App. . C. 350 · Crumba1igh Y. Ott erback, . . 0 D. C. 43±; Thom p on v. B ei·e ridg e,
:3 11ackey, 170. But wh rever it has been held that continuance is necessary, actual continuance i meant. There is no
place in our system for the entry of :fictitiou continuance .
Nicholls v. Pearson, 2 ran h C. C. Rep. 526; Bank v. Brent,
2 ranch C. C. Rep. 53 ; Baker v. French 2 Cranch C.
Rep. 539; Thompson v. Beveridge, 3 :Mackey, 170.
But the usage which we regard a~ having become a rule
of practice under the code of rules promulgated b. the
Supreme Court of the District, has its limitations. That
usacre has already been stated to be, that wh n, upon a
declaration at common law, filed in that court, a ' rit of
summons has be n is ued, and ha been duly returned b.
the mar hal with the return that the defen lant cannot b
found, no further writ are required to b i u d in or r
to keep the suit ali e until the f n lant can actuall v b
found and a writ an actually be n ed upon him. But
it follows that, when th d f nd nt an b found an the
writ can actu lly be erved u n him, it then becom n ce ary to follow up he pro e din · by th i u of a writ
to be actually served; and if the plaintiff fails to ha e a

6
36 Trial Practice. [Chap. 1

writ issued in due time for such actual sei-vice, he incurs

the risk of having his suit discontinued.

It is open to a defendant, when service of process has

been improperly and unduly delayed, to show, upon a mo-

tion to vacate the writ, when it has actually been issued,

that there has been discontinuance in consequence of fail-

ure to have it issued in due time. The writ will be pre-

sumed to have been duly issued and duly served, until the

contrary is shown; but actual discontinuance of the suit

may be made to appear, upon affidavit or otherwise to the

satisfaction of the court. And when such actual discon-

tinuance has been made to appear, the court may properly

vacate the writ which has been served upon the defendant,

and discontinue the cause, and remit the plaintiff to a new

action, if he chooses to avail himself of it.

**********

Suits at common law, which have been duly commenced

by tlie filing of a declaration and the issue of process
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thereunder, cannot thereafter be permitted to remain indefi-

nitely within the control of the plaintiff alone. The suit

should be effectively prosecuted in good faith, or dismissed.

Due diligence in such prosecution is an essential require-

ment on the part of the plaintiff. If that due diligence is

wanting, effect should be given to the rule of law that works

a discontinuance of the suit. But under the code of pro-

cedure of the Supreme Court of the District, that ques-

tion of due diligence is a question of fact to be shown to

the court by the proper proof. This was not done in the

present case ; and we think that it was error to vacate the

writ without such proof.

The cause will be remanded to the Supreme Court of the

District of Columbia, with din^ctions to vacate or rescind

the order vacating the alias writ of summons issued in the

cause, and to vacate all the orders and proceedings had in

the cause subsequent thereto; and with directions further

to pemiit the defendant to renew her motion to vacate said

alias writ, if slie so desires.^

1 In Johnson v. Mead (1885) 58 Mich. 70, the court said: "An examina-

tion of the authorities will show that the continuance roll for a long time

came to he ni^^.irdod very much as a matter of form, although it is said in

Bonie cases, if the ol)ject is to prevent the statute of limitations from run-

ning, a strict compliance should Ixi shown. We have no statute upon the

suhject, but the effect of continuing the suit by the successive issuing of writs

has always been regarded as an arrest of the running of the statute when

TRJ.AL PRACTICE.

[Chap.1

writ issued in due time for such actual service, he incurs
the risk of having his suit discontinued.
It is open to a defendant, when service of process has
been improperly and unduly delayed, to show, upon a motion to va ate the writ, when it has actually been issued,
that th r has been dis ontinuanc.e in consequence of failure to have it issued in due time. The writ will be presum l to have been duly issued and duly served, until the
contrar. is shown; but actual discontinuance of the suit
may b made to appear, upon affidavit or otherwise to the
ati fa tion of the court. And when such actual discontinuanc has been made to appear, the court inay properly
vacat the writ which has been served upon the defendant,
and 1i ontinue the cause, and remit the plaintiff to a new
a tion, if be cboo es to avail himself of it.

*

*

* * * * * * * *

uit at ommon law, which have been duly commenced
y th filino· of a dedaration and the issue of process
th r und r, cannot thereafter be permitted to remain indefinit 1. witbjn the control of the plaintiff alone. The suit
, h uld be effectively prosecuted in good faith, or dismissed.
u dili ·ence in such prosecution is an essential requirem nt on the part of the plaintiff. If that due diligence is
wantin°· eff ct should be given to the rule of law that works
a i continuanc of the suit. But under the code of pror dur of the upreme Court of the District, that question f due ili n e is a question of fact to be sho-'rn to
li C'Ourt by the I roper proof. This was not done in the
J>r : nt ca:e; and w think that it was error to vacate the
writ wi h ut u h roof.
rrh . ('(lU, will be remanded to the Supreme Court of the
i:tric·t f C lumbia, with directions to vacate or rescind
11P
r<l ·r c atino- th alias writ of summons issued in the
c·a11.' ;, etnd t va t all th orders and proceedings had in
tlie ·m1 : . ul . qu nt th r t ; and with directions further
1< p ·nni t th <1 f •ndant to r new h r motion to vacate said
alin. \\rit if.'h .·o 1 ·ir .1
1 Tn .l<ihn;on v.
fad (18 85) 58 Mich. 70, the court said : "An examinall r 11 <11 t lir; a11thorili s will show that the continuance roll for a long time
<'fllll" t 11 111.: r wn rclc-d v ry much as a matter of form, a ltho ugh it is said in
fH>l11" r•a ros, lf h ohj
t is t pr v nt the statute of limitations from run-

11 In , a 1:1lrlr.t omplian
should
shown. We have no statute upon the
subj <'l, but th rr r-t f ntinui11g the suit by the success ive issuing of writs
has a l wnyi; 1J n regard d as an arr st of the running of the statute when

Sec. 7]
Sec. 7] Wkits of Summons 37

done in good faith with the intent of prosecuting the suit. Plowell v. Shepard,

48 Mich. 472 * * *In this case the record shows the longest interval between

the filing of one writ and the issuing of the other was two days; and inasmuch

as the return and filing of the one was precedent to the issuing of the other,

we Bee nothing unreasonable in the time taken for issuing the pluries writ.

It must be regarded as sufficiently regular to save the running of the statute
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against the plaintiff 's claim. ' '

WRITS OF S u .M:MONs

37

done in good faith with the intent of prosecuting the suit. Ho n-ell v. Shepar <l,
48 Mich. 472 * * *In tbis case the record hows the longest interval betweeu
the filing of one writ and th e issuing of the other was t wo days ; a n l inasm uch
as the return and filing of the one was precedent to the issuin cr of the other ,
we see nothing unreasonable in the time t aken for issuing the pl uries writ.
It must be regarded as sufficiently regular to save the running of the sta t ut e
against the plaintiff's claim.''

CHAPTER 11.

SERVICE AND RETURN OF SUMMONS.

Section 1. Personal Service.

McKENZIE V. BOYNTON.

CHAPTER II.

Supreme Court of North Dakota. 1910.

19 North Dakota, 531,

FiSK, J.

SERVICE AND RETURN OF SUMMONS.

When the owner of the property is a resident of this state

the statute requires personal service to be made on him

of the notice of the expiration of time for redemption.

SECTION
It is respondent's contention, and the trial court so held,

1.

PERSON AL SERVICE.

that the stipulated facts fail to show a compliance witli

Mcl{ENZIE V. BOYNTON.

the statute in this respect. In this we think they are cor-

rect. It is not contended by appellant that personal service

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

of such notice was in fact made ; the contention merely be-

ing that the stipulated facts show the equivalent of per-

1910.

sonal service. In this they are in error. The delivery by

19 North Dakota, 531.

the sheriff of a copy of such notice to W. J. Freede, an

employee at the Sheridan House, falls far short of personal

FrsK, J .
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service upon McKenzie. For all that is contained in the

alleged proof of such service McKenzie may have been

• * * * * * * * * •

actually in his room in said hotel at the time the Sheriff

left with said employee the copy of the notice. The personal

service required by the statute must, we think, be made in

the manner of making personal service of a summons as pro-

vided by section 6888. Kev. Codes 1905. That section so

far as applicable, r(>ads as follows: "The summons shall be

served by delivering a copy thereof as follows; ***** (7]

III all other cases, to the defendant personally, and if the

df'feiidant cannot conveniently be found, by leaving a copv

tlierc'of nt liis dwelliTig house in the presence of one or more

of his family over the age of fourteen years; or if the de

fondant resides in the family of another, with one of the

88

When the owner of the property is a resident of this state
the tatute requires personal service to be made on him
of the notice of the expiration of time for redemption.
It i r pondent 's cont ention, and the trial court so held,
that the stipulated facts fail to show a compliance wjth
the tatute in this r espect. In this we think they are corr ct. It is not contended by appellant that personal servl.ce
of u h notic wa in fact made; the contention merely bein o· that the tipulated f acts show the equivalent of per. nal . rvice. In thi th y are in error. The delivery by
th
h riff of a copy of such notice to W. J. Free de~ an
ploy at the , h rjdan House fall s far short of personal
rv1
upon :i\fcKrnzie. For all that is confajned in the
a1l g >cl roof of n h
rvi e :i\1cl( nzie may have been
a tua1ly in hi. ro m in , aid hot ] at the time the Sheriff
le ft with . aid mployr t1w copy of the notic . The personal
· rvir reriuir 1 1 y th tatute mu. t, w think, be made i n
lt(' mann r of making prr. onal , n irP of a . nmmon. as proi<1Pd l y . rti on 6<. 8. Rev. ,od s J 905. That sec tion so
fnr a npplirah1 , n a , R. foJlow. : "Th snmmon. hall lw
' f•n·Clcl h~1 <l<'liw~ rin .o- a opy th ,r of a follow ; * * * ** (7 )
In nll otli<'r <'a ·e. to the d f nJant pr ona ll ., and if thr
dPf<·rnlant c·~ nnot <'<rnv0n1 ntly h found by ] a vino· a op\'
l1<·rr•flf' ~it hi · cl n·1li11g· hon . in tl1 pr . n e of on , or mm·p
fJf hi f'mnily O\'c•r 111 ng·0 of f nrte n y ar. ; r if th d
I' ·nd:int re>. ic!P. in tl1 • fami ly f anoth r, with one of tlw
:

1

38

SERVICE AND RETURN OF SUMMONS

Sec. 1] Service and Retuen of Summons 39

members of the family in which he resides over the ago

(if fourteen years. Service made in any of the modes pro-

vided in this section shall be taken and held to be personal

service. * * *" Plaintiff had no family nor was he resid-

ing in the family of another within the meaning of the

statute. His residence was at a public hotel; hence the

service which, under the statute, would be valid and bind-

ing on him could be made only by delivering to him per-

sonally the notice required. For like reasons the attempted

substituted service by registered mail, even if the proof

thereof was complete, is utterly unavailing. As said by this

court in Bank v. Holmes, 12 N. D. 38, 94 N. W. 764; '^The

term 'personal service' has a fixed and definite meaning in

law. It is service by delivery of the writ to the defendant

personally.^ Other modes of service may be given the force

of such service by legislative enactment. But the use of the

words 'personal service,' unqualified, in a statute means

actual service by delivering to the person, and not to a
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proxy"— citing Hohhy v. Bunch, 83 Ga. 1, 10 S. E. 113, 20

Am. St. Rep. 301. See also 19 Encyc. PI. & Pr. 613, 630 et

seq. ; 32 Cyc. 448, 457, and cases cited. See also R. I. Hos-

pital Trust Co. V. Keencij, 1 N. D. 411, 48 N. W. 341. * * *

lln the absence of any statutory provision on the subject, it was held in

Ball V. Shattuck, (1855) 16 111. 299, that personal service must be by reading

the writ to the defendant. Delivery of a copy is not sufficient. Law v

Grommes, (1895) 158 111. 492, 41 N."E. 1080.

KROTTER & CO. V. NORTON.

Supreme Court of Nebraska. 1909,

84 Nebraska, 137.

Epperson, C.

Plaintiff instituted an action in equity to foreclose a

39

memb r of the family in which he r sid
o'er the age
nf fourt en years. S ryjc mad in an> of the modes pro' ided in thi ection shall be tak n and h ld to b personal
·ervice. * * * '' Plaintiff had no family nor wa he re iding in the family of another within th meaning of the
·tatute. His residence was at a public hotel; hence the
ervice which, under the statute, would b valid and binding on him could be made only by deli ring to him peronally the notice required. For like rea on the attempted
ubstituted service by regi tered mail, even if the proof
thereof wa complete, is utterly unavailing. As said by this
court in Bank v. Holnies, 12 N. D. 38, 94 N. W. 764; "The
term 'personal sen ice' has a fixed and definite meaning in
law. It is service by delivery of the writ to the defendant
personally. 1 Other mode of ervice may be given the force
f such ser ice by legi lative enactment. But the u e of the
words 'personal service,' unqualified in a tatute mean
actual service by deli v ring to the person, and not to a
proxy' ' -citing Hob by v. Bimch, 83 Ga. 1, 10 S. E. 113, 20
m. St. Rep. 301. See also 19 Encyc. PL & Pr. 613, 630 et
eq.; 32 ye. 4±8, 457, and case cited. See al o R. I. Hospital Trust Co. v. Ke n y , 1 N. D. 411, 48 N. W. 341. * * *

* * * * * * * * * *

'■battel mortgage given by the defendant, G. W. Norton, to

])laintiff upon a frame dwelling house and frame barn situ-

ate on land in the possession of mortgagor under a five

year lease. The mortgagor and his wife were made de-

fendants, and a summons was issued in which they were

1In the abi>enre of any statutory provi ion on the ubject, it was held in
Ball v. hattu ck, (1 55 ) 16 111. 299, that per onal service mu t be by readin r,
the writ to the defendant. Delfrery of a copy is not sufficient. Law v.
Grommes, (1 95) 158 Ill. 492, 41 . E. 1080.

KROTTER & CO. V. N RTON.

Sitpre-w11e Court of Nebraska. 1909.
84 N ebras'1 a, 137.
EPPERSON,

c.

Plaintiff in tituted an action in equity to foreclose a
1·1ia tt 1 mort 0 ·a <Ye giYen by th
f ndant G. W. Norton to
1 laintiff up n a frame d llin°· hou e and frame barn situate on Ian in the po
ion f mort a or und r a fiye
year lea
The morto·a()' r and hi wif were made d fendants and a summon w s i u d in which they were

40
40 Tkial Peactice [Chap. 2

named as '*G. W. Norton and wife, Mrs. G. W. Norton."

The return of the sheriff showed personal service. * *

* * * Still later and upon default of defendants, the court

rendered a decree of foreclosure, and directed a sale of the

mortgaged property for the satisfaction of plaintiff's debt.

After the sheriff had sold the property, but before confirma-

tion, the defendants filed an application to set aside the

sale,^ * * *

Objection is made that there was no personal service of

summons upon Mrs. Norton. It appears from the testi-

mony of the sheriff that the summons was not served by

the actual delivery of a copy thereof into the hand of Mrs.

Norton, but such service is not necessary to constitute per-

sonal service. According to Mrs. Norton's own testimony,

we are convinced that there was personal service of the

summons upon her. At the time of the service of the

summons and the notice of application for injunction, she

testified that the sheriff came to their home and into the
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room where she and her husband were; that the sheriff

read the papers aloud, both the notice and the summons, in

the presence of both defendants ; that she heard them read ;

that the sheriff handed the two papers to her husband,

saying one of them was for the husl)and and one for the

wife ; that she knew that there was a paper left there for her,

and that she was named therein as the wife of George W.

Norton. At the time Mrs. Norton told the sheriff that she did

not know what he summoned her for; that she did not sign

any papers, nor have any dealings with the plaintiff. Her

testimony is corroborated by her husband, also by the

sheriff, except the latter testified that he laid the papers in-

tended for Mrs. Norton upon the table, at which she was

employed all the time he was there, attending to the break-

fast dishes. As we view it, it is immaterial whether the

sheriff laid the papers intended for Mrs. Norton upon the

table or handed them to her husband. Whichever it was, it

was done in Mrs. Norton's presence, with full knowledge

on her part that one of the copies of each paper was in-

tended for her. She so understood it, and was as fully in-

formed as tliough the sheriff had actually delivered the

papers into her own hands. This is clearly distinguishable

1 Thi'^ was ajijiarc'iitly (jratitefl, though the report does not expressly say so,

and the appeal was taken from this order.

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 2

named a "G. W. Norton and wife, Mrs. G. vV. Norton."
The return of the sheriff showed personal service. * *
* * * Still later and upon default of def end ants, the court
rendered a decree of foreclosure, and directed a sale of the
mortgaged property for the satisfaction of plaintiff's debt.
After the sheriff had sold the property, but before confirmation, the defendants :filed an application to set aside the
ale.1 * * *
Obj ection is made that there was no personal service of
, ummons upon Mrs. Norton. It appears from the testimony of the sheriff that the summons was not served by
the actual delivery of a copy thereof into the hand of Mrs.
Norton, but such service is not necessary to constitute personal , ervice. According to Mrs. Norton's own testimony,
we are convinced that there was personal service of the
ummons upon her. At the time of the service of tbe
ummons and the notice of application for injunction, she
testified that the sheriff came to their home and into the
room where she and her husband were; that the sheriff
read the papers aloud, both the notice and the summons, in
the presence of both defendants; that she heard them read;
that the sheriff handed the two papers to her husLand,
ayino· one of them was for the husband and one for the
wife ; that she knew that there was a paper left tlrnre for he"!',
and that she was named ther ein as the wife of George W.
Norton. At the time Mr . . N ortor. told the sheriff that she did
not know what he summoned her for; that she did not sign
any papers, nor have any dealing. with the plaintiff. Her
t timony i corroborated by her hu band, also by the
.-b riff, except the latter te tin ed that he laid the papers int n cd for )\{rs. Norton upon the table, at which she was
employ d all the time he was th re, att ndinO' to the breakf .. t cli . h s. As we view it, it is imm t rial whether the
.. h riff laid th papers int nd d for Mr . Norton upon the
t l or hand
th m to her husband. Whichever it was, it
WH.' <lon
in l\frs. Norton 's pr nc , with full knowl dge
m h ·r part th t on of th copi s of ach paper wa int• d cl for h r. Rh so under t d it, nd wa as .fully inf rmrrl . th ugh th sh riff had actually d li v red the
p. JWr, in1 h r wu hand.. Thi is 1 rly istinO'uishable
1 Thic.: \HIA apparN11ly grn1Jf cl, though the report does not expressly say so
and th appeal was tak n f1 om thit:1 order.
'

Se . lJ
Sec. Ij Service and Retubn of Summons 41

from Holliday v. Brown, 33 Neb. 657, in which it appears

that the wife was not present, and knew nothing of the at-

tempted service of the summons upon her. If the actual

delivery into the hand of a defendant is necessary to consti-

tute personal service, one might effectively and forever

avoid service of process by refusing to disclose her true

name, and by refusing to take a copy of a summons into her

hands.

**********

We recommend that the judgment of the district court be

bER\'l E AND .RETURN OF SUMMONS

41

from Holliday v. Brown, 33 Neb. 657, in which it appears
that the wife was not present, and knew nothing of the attempted service of the summon upon her. If the actual
delivery into the hand of a defendant is nee sary to con titute personal service, one might effectively and forever
avoid ervice of process by refusing to disclose her true
name, and by refu ing to take a copy of a summons into her
hands.

reversed.

By the Court: For the reasons given in the foregoing

opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed and

this cause remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed.

BOGGS V. INTER-AMERICAN MINING AND SMELT-

ING COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland. 1907.
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105 Maryland, 371.

ScHMucKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

We recommend that the judgment of the district court be
rever ed.
By the Court: For the rea ons given in the foregoing
opinion. thP judgment of the di ~ trict court is reversed and
this cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed.

The first of the cross appeals in this case is by William

R. Boggs, the plaintiff below, from an order of the Super-

ior Court of Baltimore City striking out upon terms a

final judgment theretofore rendered in his favor against

the Inter- American Mining and Smelting Company. * * *

Tliie Mining Company was incorporated in the District

of Columbia, but for some time prior to March 7th, 1906,

its office, where its records were kept and from which its

general business was transacted was in the Calvert Build-

BOGGS V. INTER-AMERICAN MINING AND SMELTING COJ\1PANY.

ing in Baltimore, and during that time H. C. Turnbull, Jr.,

who did business in Baltimore City and resided in Balti-

more County, was president of the corporation. During

Court of Appeals of Maryland. 1907.

the time that the company was thus located in Baltimore

105 Maryland, 371.

City, its president, purporting to act in its behalf, em-

ployed the plaintiff, Boggs, as a mining engineer at a sal-

ary of $200 per month and personal and traveling expenses.

J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
The first of the cross appeals in this case is by William
R. Boggs, the plaintiff below, from an order of the Superior ourt of Baltimore City striking out upon terms a
final judgment ther tofore rendered in his favor against
the Inter-American ]\fining and Smelting Company. * * •
The Mining Company was incorporated in the Di trict
of olumbia, but for some time prior to March 7th, 19-06,
it office where its r ecords were kept and from which its
general bu. iness was transacted was in the Calvert Building in Baltimore, and during that time H. C. Turnbull, Jr.,
who did bu in s in Baltimore City and re ided in Balti·
more ou ty, wa pr ident of the corporation. During
the time that th company wa thu located in Baltimore
ity it pre ident, ur orting to act in its behalf, employed th plaintiff, Bog()'s, as a mining engineer at a salar of $200 p r month and p rsonal and traveling expense. .
SCHMUCKER,

42

42 Trial Practice [Chap. '2

On Ma}^ 28th, 1906, Boggs sued the company in the Su-

perior Court to recover his salary and expenses for Octo-

ber, November, and December, 1905, and January, 1906,

amounting in the aggregate to $1,188. The suit was brought

under and in conformity to the Rule Day Acts in force in

Baltimore City, and the defendant having been returned

summoned, and having failed to appear to the action or

plead, judgment by default was entered against it on June

27th, 1906. On the same day the judgment by default was

duly extended for $1,188 and costs.

***** P. M. Gober, a deputy sheriff of Baltimore

City, then testified that having been directed to serve the

writ in the case upon Mr. Turnbull he went over to the

Calvert Building and asked Turnbull if he was one of the

officers of the company, and he replied that he was not, but

had formerly been its president. To the best of witness'

recollection Turnbull said that he knew the plaintiff Boggs

and would like to see him get what was due him. The
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deputy reported this interview to the sheriff, who told him

to serve the writ on Turnbull, as he was one of the directors

and the deputy went back to do it but Turnbull shut the door

in his face and would not let him serve it. The deputy fur-

ther swore that he explained his object to Mr. Turnbull and

the latter saw the writ, and said he was doing what he

could to get Mr. Boggs righted in the matter, or something

to that effect. He, the deputy, did not read the writ to Mr.

Turnbull, but he explained it to him and Turnbull looked

at the writ.

Thatcher Bell, another deputy sheriff, testified that he

was told by the sheriff to go over to the Calvert Building

and serve the writ on Mr. Turnbull, that Gober had not

been able to get a service. Witness went over to Turn-

hull's office with the copies ready to serve and said to

Turnbull, '*! have a paper to serve on you." Turnbull

said, "I know what you have," and started to go out. Wit-

ness reached for Turnbull with the copies and when the

latter kept running, he commenced to read them, but Turn-

bull got into the next room and slammed the door. Witness

then laid the copies on the table and returned to the sher-

iff's office. He left the copies of the narr., notice to plead,

anil wi'il in this case on the table in Turnbull's office. Mr.

TRIAL PRACTICE

n Ma r 28th, 1906, Boo·gs ued the compan y in the Sup rior ourt to re over hi
alary and expen se for October, November, and December, 1905, a nd January, 1906,
amountino· in the aggregate to $1,183. The suit was hrought
under an in conformity to the Rul Day Acts in force in
Baltimore Cjty, and the d fendant having b en returned
ummoned, and ha ing failed to app ar to the action or
lead judgment by default was entered again t it on June
27th, 1906. On the ame day the judgment by default was
July extended for $1,188 and costs.
* * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * P. M. Gober, a deputy sheriff of Baltimore
ity, then testified that ha Ying been directed to serve the
writ in the case upon J\1r. 'rurn bull be went over to the
Calvert Building and asked Turnbull if he was one of the
officers of the company, and he replied that he was not, but
had formerly been its pre ident. To the best of witness'
r collection Turnbull said that he knew the plaintiff Boggs
and would like to see him get what was due him . The
de uty r eported thi interview to the sheriff, who told him
to erve the writ on Turnbull, as he was one of the directors
and th deputy went back to do it but Turnbull shut the door
in his face and would not let him serve it. The deputy further swore that he explained his object to Mr. Turnbull and
the latter saw the writ, and said he was doing wl1at he
__ ould to O'et Mr. Boggs righted in the matter, or something
to that effect. He, the deputy, did not read the writ to Mr.
Turnbull, but he explain d it to him and Turnbull looked
at the writ.
Thatcher Bell, another d l uty sheriff, testified that be
was told by the sheriff to go ver to the Calvert Building
and s rve the writ on Mr. Turnbull, that Gober ban not
h n abl t g t a
rYi . Wi tne · went over to 'l'urnpi . r a y to s rve and aid to
hnll '. m with the
'J 11 rn lm11 " h v a pa r to . rv on you." Tur o bull
.- ~lid
kn
hat u liav , "and tarted to go out. V\ it·li
f r rrurnlmll ith tb copie and when the
In Pr k pt running h
mm n d to read them, but Turn1rn11 . tint th n xt r man la m d the door. Witness
I hf'n hi 1 th
n th tabl and r turn d to the heri ff
fTic .
1 ft the opie of the narr., notice to pl tad,
1111'1 w ri L in tbi
a e
th table in Turnbull' office. Mr.
7

Sec. 1]
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TurnbuU was put on the stand and his account then given

of the vists of the two deputy sheriffs to him substantially

corrofDorated tlieir testimony except he denied that he

said to the deputy Bell that he knew what he had or that

he (TurnbuU) saw or looked at the writ. There was also

evidence tending to show that Mr. TurnbuU never reported

the service of the writ on him to the company or took any

steps himself looking to a defense of the action, and that

the motion had been promptly made by the company when

it learned of the suit and judgment.

Assuming that TurnbuU was a proper person upon whom

SERVI E A- D RETURN O.F :::; Ul\IMONS

Turnbull wa put on the tand and his account then given
of the vi t of the two deputy heriff to him substantial!
corroborated th eir te timony except he denied that be
said to the deputy Bell that he knew what he bad or that
be (Turnbull) aw or looked at the writ. 'Ihere was al o
evidence tending to how that 11:r. Turnbull never reported
the rvice of the writ on him to the cornpa11y or took any
step himself looking to a defense of the action, and that
the motion had been promptl. made by the company when
it learned of the suit and judgment.
As urning that Turnb1-:.ll was a proper person upon whom
to sen e the writ and other papers, we are indi posed
to consume much time in di cu sing the ufficiency of the
ser ice. It is appare11t from the ff\ idence that Turnbull
was fully informed a to the in ti tu ti on of the uit by Boggs
again t the company and the desire of the heriff to summon the company J y erving the papers on him a one of
its director and knew that the deputy was about to make
that ervice when he attempted to elude him and evade the
service by running out of the room and lamming the
door in the officer's face. Neither be nor the company
he represented, if he did rep re ent it for the purpose of the
service, can be permitted to set up uch a state of facts in
support of the motion to strike out the judgment. He
might as well have remained in his office and put his finger
in bi ear while the deputy read the writ to him, and then
claim to be without information as to its contents or purpo e. Defendants ha e frequent!
ought to evade or defeat er ice of proce s upon them by flight or refusal to
accept the pro es handed them by the serving officer
but the courts have held u h effort futile. Davison v.
Baker, 24 How. Prac. 42 ; Slaught v. Robbins, 13 N. J. L.
349; Borden v. Borden, 63 Wi;:;. 377; Baker v. Carrecton, 3~
:Me. 334.
The laws of this state do not pre cribe preci ely bow a
ummon
hall be erved upon an individual defendant.
The ervice mu t b a per onal one, 2 Poe, Pl ading and
Practice, e tion 6..., but the heriff i not required to read
the writ to the defendant although it is usual for him to
read it or explain it natur and 1 ave a copy of it witli
tbe per on er ed. Sec . 40 to 41:. of Art. 2 of the ode
provide for ervice of proce s upon corporations.
1

to serve the writ and other papers, we are indisposed

to consume much time in discussing the sufficiency of the

service. It is apparent from the evidence that TurnbuU

was fully informed as to the institution of the suit by Boggs

against the company and the desire of the sheriff to sum-

mon the company b}- serving the papers on him as one of

its directors and knew that the deputy was about to make
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that service when he attempted to elude him and evade the

service by running out of the room and slamming the

door in the officer's face. Neither he nor the company

he represented, if he did represent it for the purpose of the

service, can be permitted to set up such a state of facts in

support of the motion to strike out the judgment. He

might as well have remained in his office and put his fingers

in his ears while the deputy read the writ to him, and then

claim to be without information as to its contents or pur-

pose. Defendants have frequently sought to evade or de-

feat service of process upon them by flight or refusal to

accept the process handed them by the serving officer

but the courts have held such efforts futile. Davison v.

Baker, 24 How. Prac. 42; Slaught v. Bobbins, 13 N. J. L.

349 ; Borden v. Borden, 63 Wis. 377; Baker v. Carrecton, 32

Me. 334.

The laws of this state do not prescribe precisely how a

summons shall be served upon an individual defendant.

The service must be a personal one, 2 Poe, Pleading and

Practice, section 62, but the sheriff is not required to read

the writ to the defendant, although it is usual for him to

read it or explain its nature and leave a copy of it with

the person served. Sees. 409 to 412 of Art. 23 of the Code

provide for service of process upon corporations.

43
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***** The court below in our opinion acquired juris-

diction over the defendant in this suit by the service of the

process upon its resident director, Mr. TurnbuU.

Order striking out the judgment reversed with costs.

Section 2. Substituted Service.

BARWICK V. ROUSE.

Supreme Court of Florida. 1907.

53 Florida, 643.

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. :2

• * * * * * * * * *
• • * * * The court below in our opinion acquired jurisdiction over the defendant in this suit by the service of the
process upon its resident director, Mr. Turnbull.

* * * * * * * * * *
Order striking out the judgment reversed with costs.

Cockrell, J. : The action is in assumpsit on promissory

notes and the return of the sheriff upon the summons ad re-

spondendum is as follows: "The within summons came to

hand this 21st day of February, 1906, J. W. Smith, sheriff,

and executed on the 22nd. day of February, 1906, by de-

livering a true copy on Mrs. Melvina Barwick, the wife of

the within named Jnraes M. Barwick, this 24th day of Feb-

ruary, 1906. J. W. Smith, Sheriff of said Wakulla couniy,

SECTION

2.

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE.

Fla." The summons was returnable March 5, 1906, on

which day a default for want of appearance was entered,

BARWICK: V. ROUSE.
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reciting that service was had February 24th. On the April

rules, no alias summons having been issued, a judgment

Supreme Court of Florida. 1907.

final was entered reciting that the defendant had failed to

appear at the March rules, and had further failed to plead,

answer, or demur.

53 Florida, 643.

The question, therefore, is, does the return of the sheriff

show sufficient service upon James M. Barwick, to bring

him into court in invituni, there being no amendment or

offer to amend the return and tliere being nothing in iiie

return of a voluntary appearance? Aa ancillary thereto

it may be asked if the defects are such as to avail upon this

appeal.

Undoubtedly if the actual date of the service on Mrs.

Barwick was the 24th day of February, as recited by the

clerk, it was too late for the return day of the summons, it

CocKRELL, J.: The action is in assumpsit on promissory
notes and the return of the sh eriff upon the summons ad respond endurn is as fol lows: '' Tbe within summons came to
hand thi 21 t day of February, 1906, J. W. Smith, sheriff,
and executed on the 22nd. day of February, 1906, by delivering a true copy on Mr . Melvina Barwick, the wife of
the within named James M. Barwick this 24-tb day of February, 1906. J. W. ~mith, Sheriff of said Wakulla county,
Fla." The summoTls was returnable March 5, 1906, on
which day a default for want of appearance was ent red,
re iti.ng that ervic wa. had -1 ebruary 24th. On the April
rul , no alias umrnons havino- been i sued, a judgm nt
final was nter d r CJ.tino· that the d fendant had fail d to
a r> ar at th March :rul , and had further failed to plea ,
answ r, or d mur.
rrh qu . t1 on, th er for ' i ' do s th . return of the he riff
. h w , uffi i nt s rvic upon Jam
J\,J. Barwi k, to bring
hj
into ourt in invilum, th r h in g no am ndment or
ff r to a nd th rrturn an th r b .m g nothinO' in tr1 ·
r turn f a volu t ry p earan ~ As an illary th reto
it a.vb ~ · .. k if the d f t ar uch as to avail upon this
app al.
n<l nbt dly if the a tu 1 dat of the servi e n Mr .
' n if'k wa.· tb . 24th ay of F bruary. as r i.ted by the
·l rk, it wa. t lat for th r turn day of th ummons, it

Sec. 2]
Sec. 2] Service and Retuex of Summons 45

not being '' served at least ten (10) days before the rule

day." This, however, is not a fair construction of the

language; it is evident that the service was made on the

22nd., while the return was endorsed on the 24th.

The serious defect, however, is in the statement of the

manner and place of service. The statute, Revised Sta-

tutes of 1892, section 1015, provides that "service of the

original writ or summons shall be effected by reading the

writ or summons to the person to be served or by delivering

him a copy thereof or leaving such copy at his usual place

of abode with some person of the family above fifteen

years of age, and informing such person of the contents

thereof." A cursory inspection of the return will disclose

several particulars wherein this statute was not complie^^

with. Service was not made upon the person to be served,

but a copy was delivered to his wife ; where such copy was

delivered does not appear; non constat the sheriff may

have met her in Georgia, where she was living apart from
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her husband, and not "at his usual place of abode in Wak-

ulla county, Florida, with some person of his family above

fifteen years of age." It does not necessarily follow that

because Mrs. Melvina Barwick is the wife of James M. Bar-

wick that she is a member of his family at his usual place of

abode and above fifteen years of age. Again, when an-

other than the defendant himself is served, the law is not

satisfied by merely delivering a true copy of the writ. It is

further required that such other person be informed of the

contents tliereof. This provision is not mere idle words,

but is founded wisely, and must be given effect.

We do not intend to hold that every criticism we have

made upon this return is separtely to be taken as a decision

that the defect pointed out would necessarily render the

judgment void upon collateral attack, but there is a duty

upon those charged with the entry of judgments before a

clerk to see that there has been at least substantial com-

pliance with the statute necessary to bring the defendant

into court. We do hold that the return here is fatally de-

fective and that tlie judgment based thereon will be set

aside.

The defendant lias, however, subjected himself to tlie

jurisdiction of the court by prosecuting this writ of error,

and further process is as to him unnecessary.

SERVICE AND RETURN OF SUMMONS
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not being "served at least ten (10) days before the rule
day.'' This, however, is not a fair construction of the
language; it i evident that the service wa made on the
2_nd., while the return wa endorsed on the 24th.
The serious defect, however, is in the tatement of the
rnanu r and place of service. The statute, Revi ed Statute of 1 92, ection 1015, provide that 'service of the
original writ or ummons shall be effected by reading the
writ or summons to the person to be served or by delivering
him a copy thereof or leaving such copy at hi usual place
of abode with some person of the family above :fifteen
years of age, and informing uch per on of tbe content
thereof.'' A cursory in pection of the return will di close
. everal particulars wherein this tatute was not complie~
with.
en ice was not mad e upon the per on to be served
but a copy wa delivered to his wife; where such copy was
d livered doe not appear; non cou ·tat the heriff may
have met her in Georgia, where he wa living apart from
her bu band, and not ' at bi u ual place of abode in W akulla county, Florida, with om per ·on of hi family abo e
fifteen years of age. '' It doe not necessarily follow that
becau e Mr . "ThfehTina Barwick i the wife of James M. Barwick that be i a member of bi family at hi u ual place of
abode and above .fifteen year of age. Again, when another than the defendant him elf i erved, the law is D 'Jt
atisfied by merely delivering a true copy of the writ. It i
furtb r r quired that such other person be informed of the
ntent thereof. This provi ion is not mere idle words,
hut i founded wi el , and mu t be given effect.
\V do not int nd to hold that every criticism we hav
mad u1 on thi return i epartely to be taken a a decision
that th defect pointed out w uld nece arily render th
jud ·m nt void upon ollat ral attack but there is a dutJ
u1 on tho
charg d with the ntry of judgments before a
c..:l rk to
that there ha been at lea t ub tantial com1 lianc with th
tatut nece ary to bring th defendant
into court. \V do hold that the return here i fatally def ctiv and that th judgment ba ed thereon ill be s t
a id .
Th d fendant ha how 'Tr, u j t d him. elf t
h,
juri diction of th court by pro ecuting this writ of error,
and further proce s is as to him unne essary.
1

46
46 Trial I^ractice , [Chap. 2

The other assignments will not be considered.

The judgment is reversed.

Shackleford, C. J., and Whitfield, J., concur.

Taylor, Hooker, and Parkhill, J J., concur in the opin

ion.

Section 3. Constructive Service.

[Chap.

TRIAL PRACTICE

~

The other assignments will not be considered.
The judgment is reversed.
SHACKLEFORD, C. J., and ·WHITFIELD, J., concur.
TAYLOR, HocKER, and PARKHILL, J J., concur in the opin
ion.

HARNESS V. CRAVENS.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1894.

126 Missouri, 233.

The plaintiff lived in Barton county; had lived there

some seventeen years, having previously lived in Newton

county five years or more on a farm, all in cultivation. That

farm consisted of a piece of ground, to-wit: The south-

SECTION

west quarter of the northeast quarter, and the west half

3.

CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE.

of the southeast quarter, less ten acres off the west side

HARNESS V. ORA VENS.

thereof (seventy acres) all in section 7, township 24, range

29. The portion in litigation is the seventy acres, which

Supr eme CoiJtrt of Missouri.

has a house and orchard on it.

1894.
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**********

126 Missouri, 233.

In March, 1889, Harness paid the taxes on the land for

the year 1888, and took a recipt therefor, from Gracy, the

collector in the tax suit controversy, and when in the col-

lector's office on that occasion, Harness says he "called

for all the taxes against the land." That suit was begui»

September 14, 1889, and was for the taxes on the lana lor

the year 1886, a duly certified tax bill accompanying the

petition, which alleged defendant to be a non-resident of

the state. An affidavit as to non-residency was also made.

On the filing of the petition a summons was issued, and

the sheriff having returned non est on the writ, publication

was made, etc. Judgment was rendered in the suit thus insti-

tuted, July 11, 1891. Execution was issued August 24, 1891,

and on September 24 next thereafter a sale of the land in

controversy occurred, at which the defendant became the

purchaser at the i»vir'f of twenty-five dollars.

The plaintiff lived in Barton county; had lived there
some seventeen years, having previously lived in Newton
county five years or more on a farm, all in cultivation. That
farm consisted of a piece of ground, to-wit: The southwest quarter of the northeast quarter, and the west half
of the southeast quarter, less ten acres off the west side
thereof (seventy acres) all in section 7, township 24, range
29. The portion in litigation is the seventy acres, which
has a hou e and orchard on it.
* * * * * * * * * •
In March, 1 9, Harness paid the taxes on the land for
the year 1888, and took a recipt the ref or, from Gracy, the
collector in the tax suit controver y, and when in the collector's offic on that occasion, Harness says he ''called
for all the taxe again t t.be land.'' That suit was begu.v
September 14, 188 , and wa for the tax on the lana rur
th y ar 1 6, a duly certified tax bill accompanying the
petiti n, whi h all g d def ndant to be a non-resident of
the tate. An affida it a to non-r idency was al o made.
n the filin of th petition a ummons wa i ued, and
the h riff havjn returned non est on the writ, publication
wa
a e, t . Judgm nt a r nd r din the uit thus instiiut <l, July , 91. Ex uti n wa is u d Auo-u t 24, 1 91,
·md n ~
t mb r ~4 next th reaft r a ale of the land in
c· ntrov r y
r d, at hich the defendant be ame the
pur ·baser at th <' 11ri N· of t w<>ntv-fi v
llars.
1

• • • • • • • • • •

~ec.
Sec. 3] Seevice and Return of Summons 47

On hearing of the sale of his land, plaintiff applied to

defendant for permission to redeem it, but defendant re-

fused to do so, whereupon plaintiff instituted the present

proceeding, in January, 1892, to cancel the sheriff's deed

made to defendant as aforesaid, as a cloud on plaintiff's

title and for other and further relief.

**********

Sherwood, J. — 1. As appears from the record in this

cause, the plaintiff herein, the defendant in the back tax

suit, was proceeded against as a non-resident of the state.

The petition alleged his non-residence and so did the ac-

companying affidavit. But, instead of taking out an order

of publication before the clerk in vacation as authorized by

section 2022, Revised Statutes, 1889, a summons was issued

to Harness returnable to the next November term. That

summons was returned non est, October 25, 1889. This

non est return was followed by an order of publication

based on that return, and then judgment by default took
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place at the May term, 1891, followed by a sale and sher-

iff's deed to defendant Cravens, September 24, 1891.

As will be seen by sections 2013 and 2023, Revised Stat-

utes, 1889, a summons in such cases is only authorized to

issue against a resident defendant. And it is provided in

section 2024 that when summons has been properly issued

and return of non est made thereon, then the court, being

first satisfied that the defendant cannot be found, makes

an order of publication as required in section 2022. Of

course such an order of publication made in the circum-

stances mentioned would recite, among otL things, the

issuance of the summons, and the fact that the defendant

could not he found, etc. ; because the court could not make

this class of publication unless "in conjunction with the

return," and it must be "founded thereon." State ex rel.

V. Finn, 87 Mo. 310.^

iThe statutes involved are as follows: "Sec 2022. Orders of Publication.

— In suits in partition, divorce, attachment, suits for the foreclosure of

mortgages and deeds of trust, and for the enforcement of mechanics' liens,

and all other liens against either real or personal property, and in all actions

at law or in equity, which have for their immediate object the enforcement

or establishment of any lawful right, claim or demand to or against any real

or personal property within the jurisdiction of the court, if the plaintiff or

other person for him shall all(?ge in his petition, or at the time of filing the

same, or at any time thereafter shall file an affidavit stating, that part or all

of the defendants are not residents of the state, or is a corporation of another

state, kingdom or country, and cannot be served in this stat« in the manner

Sj

SERVICE AND RET

RN OF
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On hearing of tbe sale of his land, plaintiff ap1 lied t
Jefendant for permi sion to redeem it but defendant refu ed to do so, whereupon plaintiff in tituted the present
proceeding, in January, 189:2, to cancel the sheriff's deed
made to defendant as aforesaid, as a cloud on plaintiff'
title and for other and further relief.

* • * * * * * * • •
SHERVi oon, J.-1.
As appears from the r eco rd in this
ause, the plaintiff herein, the defendant in the back tax
uit, was proceeded again t as a non-resident of the state.
The petition alleged his non-residence and so did the accompanying affidavit. But, in tead of taking out an order
of publication before the clerk in vacation as authorized o.'
ection 2022, Revised Statutes, 1889, a summons was issued
to Harness returnable to the next November term. That
ummons was returned non est, October 25, 1889. Thi .
non est return was followed by an order of publication
ba ed on that return, and then judgment by def a ult took
place at the May term, 1891, followed by a sale and sheriff's deed to def endant raven , SeptembP-r 24, 1891.
A will be seen by section 2013 and 2023, Revised Statutes, 1889, a ummons in such ca e is only authorized to
i ue against a resident defendant. And it is provided in
. P.ction 2024 that when summon has been properly issued
and return of non est made thereon, then the court, being
fir t satisfied that the defendant cannot be found, makes
an order of publication as required in section 2022. Of
cour e such an order of publication made in the circumstances mentioned would r ecite, among ot1
things, the
i uance of the summon , and the fact that the defendant
could not be found, etc.; because the court could not make
this class of publication unle ''in conjunction with the
return, '' and it mu t be ' 'founded thereon.' ' State ex rel.
v. Finn, 87 Mo. 310. 1
''Sec 2022. Orders of Publication.
1 The tatutes involved are as follows:
-In suits in partition, divorce, attachm nt, suits for the foreclo ure of
mortgages and deed of tru t and for the enforcement of mechanics' lien ,
and all other liens again t either real or per onal property and in all action
at law or in equi y, which have for their immediate object the enforeement
or e~ tabli bment of any 1awfu1 right, claim or demand to or against any real
or per onal property within the juri. diction of the court, if the plaintiff or
other person for him shall all~ge in hi p tition, or at t he time of filing the
same or at any time thereafter shall file an affidavit stating, that part or all
of the <lefendants are not residents of the tate, or i a corporation of anoth r
state, kingdom or country, and cannot be served in this state in the manner

48
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So that here we have presented a defendant sued as a

'lon-resideni , summons issued against him as a resident,

and publication issued against him as a resident who could

not he found. In short, the order of publication was a clear

departure from the allegations of the petition and affidavit.

The issuance of the summons was, therefore, unwarranted

by the statute, and the publication, being based thereon,

necessarily partook of the writ's inceptional infirmity, and

this is so, because, in the language of Mr. Justice Field,

"the court is not authorized to exert its power in that way."

Windsor v. McVeagh, 93 U. S. 283.

This doctrine is abundantly established, that, where a

mode of securing jurisdiction differing from that of the

common law is prescribed by statute, nothing less than a

rigid and exact compliance with the statute is an indispen-

sable requisite to obtaining jurisdiction, 1 Elliott's Gen.

Prac, sec. 247. Thus in Granger v. Judge, 4:4: Mich. 384,

Campbell, J., says :
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''Where cases and proceedings are not according to the

usual course, and are special in their character, they are

held void on slighter grounds than regular suits, because

the courts have not the same power over their records to

correct them. So, where there has been no personal service

within the jurisdiction, the doctrine prevails that proceed-

ings not conforming to tlie statutes are void. But this is

on the ground that there has been no service whatever,

and the party, therefore, has not been notified, in any pro-

per way, of anything. The purpose of the statutory

prescribed in this chapter, or have absconded or absented themselves from their

usual place of abode in this state, or that they have concealed themselves so

that the ordinary j)rocess of law can not be served upon them, the court in

which said suit is brought, or in vacation the clerk thereof, shall make an

order directed to the non-residents or absentees, notifying them of the com-

mencement of the suit, and stating briefly the object and general nature of

the iietition, and, in suits in partition, describing the property sought to be

partitioned, and requiring such defendant or defendants to appear on a day

to be named therein and answer the petition, or that the petition will be

taken as coiifcF^ed. If in any case there shall not he sufficient time to make

jHiblication to the first tei-m, the order shall be made returnable to the next

term thorenfter, thnt will allow sufficient time for such publication.

' ' Sec. 202.3. Process against resident defendajits.— If in such case, part or

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 2

So that here we have presented a defendant sued as a
•wn-res-ident, summons issued against him as a resident,
:md publication issued against him as a resident who could
not be found. In short, the order of publication was a clear
<leparture from the allegations of the petition and affidavit.
The issuance of the summons was, therefore, unwarranted
by the statute, and the publication, being based thereon,
nece sarily partook of the writ's inceptional infirmity, and
this is so, because, in the language of Mr. Justice FIELD,
''the court is not authorized to exert its power in that way.''
Windsor v. McVeagh, 93 U.S. 283.
This doctrine is abundantly established, that, where a
mode of securing jurisdiction differing from that of the·
common law is prescribed by statute, nothing less than a
rigid and exact compliance with the statute is an indispensable requisite to obtaining jurisdiction, 1 Elliott's Gen.
Prac., sec. 24 7. Thus in Granger v. Judge, 44 Mich. 384,
CAMPBELL, J., says:
''Where cases and proceedings are not according to the
u ual course, and are special in their character, they arP
held void on slighter grounds than regular suits, becarn:;e
the courts have not the same power over their records to
correct them. So, where there has been no personal service
within the jurisdiction, the doctrine prevails that proceedings not conforming to the statutes are void. But this is
on the ground that there has been no service whatever,
and the party, therefore, has not been notified, in any prover way, of anything. The purpose of the statutory

the defendants are residents of the state, process shall be issued against them

afl in other cases.

"Hec. 2024. Pvblication to issiie on return of non est. — When, in any of

the caHCB cont;iine<l in section 2022, summons ^hall be issued against any de-

fendant, and the sheriff to whom it is directed shall make return that the

defendnnt or dffcndants cannot be found, the court, being first satisfied that

process cannot be served, shall make an order as is required in said section."

prescribed in this chapter, or have absconded or absented themselves from their
n ual p lace of abode in this tate, ·or that they have concealed themselves so
that th e orclinary process of law can not be i:erved upon them, the court in
which sa id suit i s brought, or in vacation th clerk thereof, hall make an
orcler directed to the non -residents or ab nt cs, notifyino- them of the comm nc m n t of th e suit, and stating briefly the object and general nature of
t h petitio n, anr1, in uits in partition, d scribin g the property ought to be
iart i ion d, an<l requiTin g nch def en lant or 1 f ndant to appear on a day
lo b named th rein ancl answer the petition or that the petition will be
tak n as 0 11f . i' r1. If in any ca e th r shall not be sufficient time to make
puhlir·ntion to t1'r fi rst t rm, the ord r sbal1 be made returnable to the next
!Prm therPn f ter , that will allo w sum ient time for uch publication.
''. '<>r. 202~ . Process against resident defendants.- If in such case, part or
th rl< fpnrlants aro r ·i<l nts of the state, proce s shall be i sued againc:it them
;1R in oth r cas s.
' ' . r. 2024. P11blication to issue on return of non est.-When, in any of
th C:Hies COntnin cl in R t ion 2022, Summon s chall be issued against any de·
fPnrlan t nn rl th . r-h r i fT to whom it is clir t d shall mak r turn tbflt the
dP f nrfa nt r d<' f ndnnts an:not o found, the court, being fir t s:ttisfled that
procoes r an not J,> s rved, sh·ll make an order as is required in said section."
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methods is to furnish means from which notice may pos-

sibly or probably be obtained. But, as a court acting ouc-

side of its jurisdiction is not recognized as entitled to obed-

ience, the special statutory methods stand entirely on then-

own regularity, and, if not regular, cannot be said to have

been conducted under the statutes. The distinction is obvi-

ous and is not imaginary."

In a case which arose in Alabama, Brickell, C. J., ob-

serves: "The statute not only defines the cases in which the

court may take jurisdiction of non-resident or absent de-

fendants, but it appoints and orders the mode of proceed-

ing against them, and declares the effect of the decree ren-

dered, if they do not appear and defend. The jurisdiction

and authority, like all jurisdiction and authority derived

from, and depending upon statute, must be taken a'nd ac-

cepted with all the limitations and restrictions the statute

creating it may impose. These restrictions and limita-

tions the courts are bound to observe; they cannot be dis-
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l^ensed with, however much they may seem to embarass, or

however unnecessary they- may seem to be in the adminis-

tration of justice in particular cases. The statute is in de-

rogation of the common law, is an essential departure from

the forms and modes a court of equit}" pursues ordinarily,

and must be strictly construed. Proceedings under it must

be closely watched, or it may become an instrument for the

infliction of irreparable wrongs upon defendants to whom

notice is imputed bv construction." Sayre v. Land Co., 73

Ala. 85.

On this point. Wade says: "As this manner of serving

process depends for its validity more upon its strict con-

formity to the statute by which it is authorized than upon

any inherent probability of its couve^'ing intelligence of

the impending suit to the party whose rights are to be

affected, the fact tliat it has actually come to the knowledge

of defendant cannot be shov;n to supply any material devia-

tion in the publi(;atioii fi'om what the statute ])rescribes.

The statute, being in derogation of common law, is always

strictly construed," Law of Notice (2 Ed.) sec. 1030.

This is the vrell settled doctrine of this court, as shown

in numerous instances. Thus, in Sfeicart v. Stringer, 41

Mo. 400, it was ruled that where the statute provides for

constructive service of process, the terms and conditions

T. P.— 4

SERYI E AXD RETURN OF Su 1M0Ns

49

methods i to furni h means from which notice may possibly or probably be obtained. But a a curt a ·trno· oucside of its juri diction is not recognized as entitled to obedience, th . . 1 cia l . tatutory methods tand ntirely on tl1e1r
own regularity, and, if not regular, cannot b aid to have
been conducted under the tatute . The di tinction is obviou and i not imao·inary. ''
In a ca e which aro in Alabama, BRICKELL, C. J., ob" erve : 'The st atute not only defines the cases in which the
court ma} take jur i di ·tion of non-resident or ab ent defendants, but it apr oint and orders the mode of proc eding a ain t them and declar the effect of the 1 cree r nclered, if they do not app ar and defend. The jurisdiction
and authorit , like all juri diction and authority derived
from, and depending upon statute, mu t be taken and accepted with all the limjtations and re trictions the statnte
creating it may impo e. 'Ihese re trictions and limitations t he' court are bound to ob erve; they cannot be dis1)en ed with, howeYer much th . may eem to embaras or
howeYer unnece ary the - may se m to be in the admini tration of ju tice in particular case . The tatute is in derogation of the common law, i an e sential departure from
the form and mode a court of equity pur ues ordinarily
and mu. t be , trictly con ·trued. Proceeding und er it mu. t
be clo ely watched or it may become an in trument for the
infli tion of irr parable wrong upon defendant to whom
notice i imputed by con truction." ayre Y. Land Co ., 7:~
.\.la. 85.
On thi point \\ad ay : ''_A tbi manner of erving
proce depend. for it ' alidity or up on it: ._trict conformity to th , tatute by whj h it i. authorize 1 than upon
any inh r ent prohability of it. o ,-eyino· intelli ·ence of
the impendino· uit to th 1 art~- wh . e right"' are to b
affected the fa t that i t li : a hrnll_\' ome tu th - knowl dg
of def ndant •annot L ho ':n t u1 pl)- an>- mat rial deviation in th l ul Ji ation frurn wl at tl
·t atute 1 re. ril ::;.
1 he tatute b ino· in
ro ·c. tion of c rnmon I· w, i. alwa.:'-;
:-1tri tly n trn , 'Law f ro tice (:? 8d.)
. 1 · 0.
Thi i ~ th \\e1l ettl 1 1 etri n of thi onrt a hown
in numeron in tan , . Tl u. in 't eu;a rt v. t ringer 41
Jio . 400, it wa ruled that wher the tatut I ro-vi
for
con tructiv · rn
of proce
th terms and condition
T. P .-4
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prescribed for such service must be strictly complied with.

A striking exemplification of this principle is afforded

by ScheJl v. Leland, 45 Mo. 289. There, the statute, 2 Wag-

ner's Stat., p. 1008, sec. 13, was the same as section 2022,

supra. There, the plaintiff, seeking to enforce a mechanic's

lien, filed his petition and had summons issued in the ord-

inary way, which was returned non est, Thereupon he

made affidavit before the clerk in vacation, of the defend-

ant's non-residency, who, on such affidavit, r-.-^ued an order

of publication which was followed by a judgment. Speak-

ing of this proceeding and of its insiiffjeiency, Wagner, J.,

observed: ''The order can only be made by strictly com-

plying with the statute; for. in all cases where constructive

notice is substituted for actual notice, strict compliance is

required. The section contemplates and directs that the

facts which authorize the publication shall be either stated

in the petition, or an affidavit embodying them shall be filed

at the commencement of the suit. This was not done in
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this case, and, therefore, no order was allowable in vaca

tion under the foregoing section. The fifteenth section of

the same act enacts that when, in any of the cases contained

in the thirteenth section, summons shall be issued against

any defendant, and the sheriff to whom it is directed shall

make return that the defendant or defendants cannot be

found, the court, being first satisfied that process cannot

be served, shall make an order as required in the thirteenth

section. But this section gives no countenance to the pro-

ceeding in the case at bar. It does not authorize an order

of publication in vacation at all, but intends that it shall be

made by the court at the regular return term. I conclude,

therefore, that the publication was a nullity."

It will be noticed that the principal difference between

the case just instanced and the one at bar, is that there

the summons was issued first, returned non est and fol-

lowed by the affidavit and publication, while here, the affi-

davit was made first, followed by the unauthorized issuance

of the summons, return thereon, etc.

In Quigley v. Bank, 80 Mo. 289, an order of publication

was held invalid because the affidavit against unknown

parties, under the ])rovisions of section 3499, now section

2027, was sworn to by the attorney for plaintiff, instead of

by the plaintiff himself, that section requiring that the

TRIAL PRACTICE
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prescribed for such service must be strictly complied with.
A striking exemplification of this principle is afforded
by Schell v. Leland, 45 Mo. 289. There, the statute, 2 Wagner's Stat., p. 1008, sec. 13, was the same as section 2022,
supra. There, the plaintiff, seeking to enforce a mechanic's
lien, filed his petition and had summons issued in the ordinary way, which was returned non est, Thereupon he
made affidavit before the clerk in vacation, of the defendant's non-residency, who, on such affidavit, i ~ued an order
of publication which was followed by a judgment. Speaking of this proceeding and of its in~uffieiency, WAGNER, J.,
observed: "The order can only be mad~ by strictly complying with the statute; for. in all cases where constructive ·
notice is substituted for adual notice, strict compliance is
required. The section contemplates and directs that the
facts which authorize the publication shall be either stated
in the petition, or an affidavit embodying them shall be :filed
at the commencement of the suit. This was not done in
this case, and, therefore, no order was allowable in vaca
tion under the foregoing section. The fifteenth section of
the same act enacts that when, in any of the ca es containeo
in the thirteenth section, summons shall be issued against
any defendant, and the sheriff to whom it is directed shall
make return that the defendant or defendants cannot be
found, the court, being first satisfied that process cannot
be served, shall make an order as required in the thirteenth
section. But this section gives no countenance to the proceeding in the case at bar. It does not authorize an ord _)r
of publication in vacation at all, but intend that it shall be
made by the court at the regular return term. I conclude,
the ref ore, that the publication was a nullity.''
It will be noticed that the prin ipal difference between
tb
ase ju t in tan ed and the on at bar, is that there
th u mon wa i sued fir t, return d non est and foll w
y th affi avit and publication, whil here, the affiit wa.
de fir t, follow d by the unauthorized is uance
f th : ummon. , r urn ther on, etc.
n Qtii.r;ley . Bank, 0 Mo. _89, an order of pubJication
w s b 1 invali b au e th affidavit against unknown
arti . , urnl _l r th } r ision of se tion 3499, now ecti n
_J:!.7 \a. . rn t
y th attorney fr phlintjff, in. ta of
by th plaintiff him lf Lhat
ti n r quiring that the
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plaintiff should make the oath, therein differing from sec-

tion 2022, where the oath may be made by the ''plaintiff or

some person for him," which difference was in that case

pointed out.

So in State ex rel. v. Staley, 76 Mo. 158, where the peti-

tion did not set forth the interests of the unknown parties,

nor did the order of publication do so, as required by

section 2027, it was ruled that, in consequence, no jurisdic-

tion was acquired over such unknown parties.

In Charles v. Morrow, 99 Mo. 638, a similar ruling was

made in similar circumstances on the same section of the

statute last aforesaid, and the principle was there reiter-

ated that, "In all cases where constructive or substituted

service is had in lieu of that which is personal, there must

be a strict compliance with statutory provisions and condi-

tions."

The more recent case of Wilson v. Railroad, 108 Mo. 588,

confirms the views on this subject heretofore expressed
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in other cases: "Mere notice of service, not according to

law, brings no one into court, nor does mere knowledge on

the part of the party notified, of the pending proceedings

have any more valid effect. P olivine's Appeal, 31 Conn.

381; Smith Merc. Law, 322."

**********

It cannot be doubted that the lower court would have

been justified in disregarding the issuance and return of the

summons, and in proceeding to order publication on the

allegation of non-residency; this it did not do; its whole

action was based on the writ and its return, which course

was wholly unsanctioned by the statute. On the contrary,

right in the teeth of the allegations of non-residency con-

tained both in the petition and affidavit, the trial court

made an order of publication adapted alone to the case

of a resident who cannot be found.

It will not do to say that the unauthorized order of

publication would be just at likely to apprise the then de-

fendant of the suit against him as if he had been proceeded

against according to the specific method prescribed by law,

because if this were all that is required, then a printed

circular or letter sent out by the clerk would answer the

end and accomplish the purpose just as well. The test is,

was the method used in the given instance the one pre-
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plaintiff should make the oath, therein differing from section 2022, where the oath may be made by the ''plaintiff or
some person for him," which difference was in that case
pointed out.
So in State ex rel. v. Staley, 76 Mo. 158, where the petition did not et forth the intere ts of the unknown parties,
nor did the order of I ublication do o, as required by
section 2027, it wa rul d that, in con equence, no jurisdiction was acquired ov r uch unknown parties.
In Charles v. Morrow, 9 Mo. 638, a imilar ruling was
made in similar cir cum '"' tance on the ame section of the
tatute la t afore aid, and the principle was there reiterated that, ''In all ca e where constructi e or sub tituted
service is had in lieu of that which i per onal, there must
be a strict compliance with tatutory provisions and conditions.''
The more recent ca e of fVilson v. Railroad, 108 Mo. 588,
ubject heretofore expressed
confirms the view on thi
in other case : '' :M r notice of service, not according to
law, bring no one into court nor doe mere knowledge on
the part of the party notified, of the pending proceeding
have any more valid ffect. Poti ine's Appeal, 31 Conn.
381; Smith Mere. Law, 322. ''
* * * * * * * * * •
It cannot be doubted that the lower court would have
been ju tified in di regarding the i uance and return of the
ummon , and in proceeding to order publication on the
allegation of non-residency ; this it did not do; its whol
action was ba ed on the writ and its return, which course
was wholly un auctioned by the statute. On the contrary,
right in the teeth of the allegation of non-residency contained both in the petition anq affidaYit, the trial court
made an ord r of publication adapted alone to the ca e
of a resident who cannot be found.
It will not do to ay that the unauthorized order of
publication would be jit. t at likely to appri e the then defendant of the suit again t him, a if he had bee·n proceed rd
against according to the pecific method prescribed by la 1 ,
because if this were all that i required then a print d
circular or letter sent out by the clerk would answer the
end and ac omplish the urpose just as well. The test is
wa th met]iod u ed in the given in tance the one pre-
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scribed by the statute? If the answer is in the negative,

that answer, without more, condemns the method employed,

and announces its nullity. Whether that method actually

notified the party, is of no importance whatever. The end

of the law has been attained when, and only when, its

forms have been observed. Wade on the Law of JSotice,

and Brown on Jurisdiction, supra.

Of course, if the order of publication, by reason of the

facts aforesaid, is to be deemed invalid, then the judg-

ment grounded thereon must share the same fate and fall

with it. And the writ of summons and the order of publi-

cation being part of the record, are competent witnesses of

that judgment's invalidity, and by them it can be im-

peached collaterally. Laney v. Garhee, 105 Mo. 355, and

cases cited; Russell v. Grant, 122 Mo. 161.

Since the judgment thus rendered must be regarded as

null, of course the defendant acquired no title in conse-

quence of the sale which occurred under the execution
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which issued on the judgment. 1 Freem. on Judgments, sec-

tion 117. On this ground alone, the decree should be af-

firmed.

[Gantt, p. J., filed a dissenting opinion.]

D'AUTREMONT V. ANDERSON IRON CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. 1908,

104 Minnesota, 165.

Browk, J.

Proceedings to register title to real property under the

Torrens system of land transfer. Respondent Gaylord had

judgment confirming an asserted interest in the land, and

applicants appealed.

The sole question involved is whether the court acquired
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scribed by the statute? If the answer is in the negative,
that an~wer, without more, condemns the method employed,
and announces its nullity. Whether that method actually
notified the party, is of no importance whatever. The end
of the law has been attained when, and only when, its
forms have been observed. Wade on the Law of Notice,
and Brown on Jurisdiction, supra.
Of course, .if the order of publication, by reason of the
facts aforesaid, is to be deemed invalid, then the judgment grounded thereon must share the same fate and fall
with it. And the writ of summons and the order of publication being part of the record, are competent witnesses of
that judgment's invalidity, and by them it can be impeached collaterally. Laney v. Garbee, 105 Mo. 355, and
cases cited; Russell v. Grant, 122 :Mo. 161.
Since the judgment thus rendered must be regarded as
null, of cour e the defendant acquired no title in consequence of the sale which occurred under the execution
which issued on the judgment. 1 Freem. on Judgments, section 117. On this ground alone, the decree should be affirmed.
[GANTT, P. J., filed a dissenting opinion.]

.iurisdiction of George W. Leslie in the partition suit * * *

The summons in that action was served by publication, and,

as already mentioned, designated "George H. Leslie" as

defendant. It is the contention of appellant that the error

in the name, the use of the initial "H" instead of "W",

D'AUTREMONT V. ANDERSON IRON CO.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.

1908.

104 JJ1innesota, 165.

J.
P ro edings to regi. t r title to real property under the
rr rr n. y. t m of land tran fer. Respondent Gaylord had
j nrl g-mrnt onfir ming an asserted intere t in the land, and
'lppli ·ants appealed.
B ROWN

I

* * * * • • • • * •
lt<> . o1 qu sti n involved i whether the court acquired
,; nri .. cliciion f
orge W. Le lie in the partition uit * * *
rr h . mnmon . 1n that tion was serv d by publi ation, and,
a · n lr 0~Hl .v m0nti on 1
. ignated "G orO' I . Le Ii " as
J f n nt. i i. th
nt ntion of app llant that the error
in th n· P, th u
f th initial " " in t ad of "W",
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was an irregularity not going to the jurisdiction of the

court; while respondent contends that the error was fatal,

and the publication of the summons conferred no jurisdic-

tion upon the court to adjudicate the rights of "George W.

Leslie." ***** ^^d we have for consideration the ques-

tion whether the publication of the summons in the form

stated was a valid service thereof upon "George W. Les-

lie," the real party in interest.

As a general rule the common law recogTiizes but one

Christian name, and failure in judicial or other pro-

ceedings in giving the name of the party to state his mid-

dle name, or the initial thereof as commonly used, is not

fatal to their validity. But the rule, like most rules of

judicial procedure, is not without exceptions. Steivart v.

Colter, 31 Minn. 385, 18 N. W. 98; State v. Biggins, 60

Minn. 1, 61 N. W. 816, 27 L. R. A. 74, 51 Am. St. 490. It

had its origin during the early times in England, when a

person had but one name, and that his Christian name.
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His further identification was indicated by some designated

physical characteristic, place of residence, or deed of valor

or virtue. Even since the adoption of the system of fam-

ily names, the first or Christian name has been held by the

courts of England as the true name, in legal proceedings,

for the designation of persons ; the middle name or the in-

itial thereof, being regarded as wholly unimportant. The

rule has been followed and applied in j)roceedings both

judicial and extrajudicial in this country, with occasional

exceptions based upon special circumstances.

In all proceedings where an error in the name may be

corrected by appropriate application to the court, or the

particular person may be identified by extrinsic evidence, a

mistake in the name appearing in the proceeding or writing

involved is not ordinarily fatal to its validity. Our stat-

utes, as do the statutes of nearly all the states of this

country, provide for the correction of mistakes in the names

of parties in judicial proceedings. R. L. 1905, Sec. 4157;

Casper v. Klippen, 61 Minn. 353, 63 N. W. 737, 52 Am. St.

604; Kenyan v. Semon, 43 Minn. 180, 45 N. W. 10. In re-

spect to similar mistakes in conveyances of land, mort-

gages, contracts, or statutory proceedings for the fore-

closure of mortgages, the rules of evidence permit the full

and complete identification of parties misnamed by error
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was an irregularity not going to the juri diction of the
court; while r pondent contend that the error wa fatal,
and the publication of the ummon conferred no juri diction upon the ourt to adjudicate the rights of '' Geor<Ye W.
Leslie.'' * * * * * And we have for con ideration the question whether the publication of the ummon in the form
tated wa a valid service thereof upon ''George W. Leslie,'' the real party in intere t.
As a general rule the common law recognizes hut one
Chri tian name, and failure in judicial or other proceeding in giving the name of the party to tate bi middle name, or the initial thereof a commonly u ed, i not
fatal to their validity. But the rule, like mo t rules of
judicial procedure, is not without exception . Stewart v.
Colter, 31 Minn. 385, 18 N. W. 98; State v. Higgins, 60
:Minn. 1, 61 N. W. 16, 27 L. R. A. ,. . ±, 51 Am. St. 490. It
had its origin during the early time in England when a
per on had but one name, and that his Chri tian name.
His further identification wa indicated by ome de ignated
phy ical chara teri tic, place of re id nee, or deed of valor
or virtue. Even ince the adoption of the sy tern of family name , the first or Chri tian name ha been held by the
court of England a the true name, in legal proceeding ,
for the designation of per on. ; the middle name or the initial thereof, being regarded a wholly unimportant. The
rule has been followed and applied in proceeding both
judicial and extrajudicial in this country, with occa ional
exception ba ed u1 on pecial circum tance .
In all proceeding where an error in the name may be
corr cted by ap1 ropriate application to the court, or the
particular per on ma be identified by extrin ic evid nee, a
mi take in the name appearing in the proceeding or writing
invol ed i not ordinarily fatal to its validity. Our tatute , a do th . tatutes of nearly all the tate of this
country provide for the correction of mistakes in the names
of I arties in judicial proceeding . R. L. 1905, S c. 4157;
a. p r '. J{lippen, 61 :Minn. , 5 , 63 N. W. 737 5:.., Am. t.
±; K nyon . Semon, 43 finn. 1 0, 45 N. W. 10. In repect to imilar mi take in on eyances of land, mortgao·
contracts, or statut ry proceedings for the fore1 ure of morto-ages, the rul of eYid n e permit the full
and compl te identification of arti mi named by error
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or mistake. Massillon E. S T. Co. v. Holdridge, 68 Minn.

393, 71 N. W. 399 ; Ansley v. Green, 82 Ga. 181, 7 S. E. 921.

Of course, to authorize such amendments in judicial pro-

ceedings, the court must have jurisdiction of the parties and

afford them an opportunity to be heard, and in other pro-

ceedings those interested in the subject-matter must also be

before the court, with opportunity to be heard on the

question of identity.

It has often been held that the failure in any proceed-

ing, judicial or otherwise, to include the initial of the mid-

dle name is unimportant, and not fatal to its validity.

Cleveland v. Peirce, 34 Ind. App. 188, 72 N. E. 604; State v.

Hughes, 31 Tenn. 261; King v. Clarke, 7 Mo. 269. The

rule has been declared otherwise, however, where a wrong

initial is used, particularly in deeds or other instruments

affecting the title to land. A^nbs v. Chicago, St. P. M. S 0.

Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 266, 46 N. W. 321; Burford v. McCue,

53 Pa. St. 427. And there has been a tendency in some of
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the courts to break away from the old rule, and to hold the

full true name of all parties essential in all proceedings.

Parker v. Parker, 146 Mass. 321, 15 N. E. 902; Com. v.

Buckley, 145 Mass. 181, 13 N. E. 368; Button v. Simmons,

65 Me. 583, 20 Am. Rep. 729 ; Ming v. Gwatkin, 6 Rand. (Va.)

551; Boiven v. Mulford, 10 N. J. L. 230. In most states it

is held, in both civil and criminal actions, that an omission

or the use of a wrong initial does not affect the jurisdiction of

the court, where the right party is actually served with

process and brought into court. Casper v. Klippen, 61 Minn.

353, 63 N. W. 737, 52 Am. St. 604; 14 Enc. PI. & Pr. 301, and

cases cited.

There is reason and sound sense in that view of the law

In such case the right party is actually served, and the

error may be corrected without prejudice to any of his

rights. Only an extremely technical view sustains the

position that in such cases the error is fatal. Casper v.

Klippen, supra, overruling Atwood v. Laridis, 22 Minn. 558,

But should the same liberal view be taken where the de

fendant is only constructively served witli summons, as in

the case at bar, by publication? We tliink not.

The reasons for disregarding the error wliere tliere i ;

personal service u])()n Hie I'ight ]iarty do not ai>ply where

the only ser\ice is by 2)ublication against a non-resident of
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or mistake. Massillon E. & T. Co. v.1 Holdridge, 68 1finn.
:393, 71 N. W. 399; Ansley v. Green, 82 Ga. 181, 7 S. E. 921.
f course, to authorize such amendments in judicial proceeding , the court must have jurisdic ion of the parties and
afford them an opportunity to be heard, and in other proceedings those interested in the subject-matter must also be
before the court, with opportunity to be heard on the
question of identity.
It has often been held that the failure in any proceeding, judicial or otherwise, to include the initial of the middle name is unimportant, and not fatal to its validity.
Cleveland v . P eirce, 34 Ind. App. 188, 72 N. E. 604; State v .
Hughes, 31 Tenn. 261; J(ing v. Clarke, 7 Mo. 269. Tlw
rule has been declared otherwise, however, where a wrong
initial is used, particularly in deeds or other instruments
affecting the title to land. Ambs v. Chicago, St . P. M. & 0.
Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 266, 46 N. W. 321; Burford v. McCue,
53 Pa. St. 427. And there has been a tendency in some of
the courts to break away from the old rule, and to hold the
full true name of all parties essential in all proceedings.
Parker v. Parker, 146 Mass. 321, 15 N. E. 902 ; Com. Y.
Buckley, 145 Mass. 181, 13 N. E. 368; Dutton v. Sinimon ,
65 Me. 583, 20 Am. Rep. 729; Ming v. Gwat'1 in, 6 Rand. (Va.)
551; Bowen v. Mulford, 10 N. J. L. 230. In most states it
i h ld, in both civil and criminal actions, that an omission
or the use of a wrong initial does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court, where the right party is actually served with
proce s and brouO'ht into court. Casper v. J(lippen, 61 Minn.
35 , 63 N. W. 737, 52 Am. St. 604; 14 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 301, and
a
cited.
Th re i. rea on and ound s n e in that 'iew of the law
In su h cas the rio·ht I arty is actually erved, and th<'
rr r may b
orr t d without pr ju ic to any of hi ~
rjght. . Only an rtremely te hnical view ustains th (I
J . iti n that in such a s th
rror is fatal. Casper Y.
J1 lipp en, supra, ov rrulinO' Atwood v. Landi , 22 Minn. 55 .
>Ut . h u11 th
ame liberal vi w b tah n h r th de
f'c•nc1an i. nl} C' n tru tiY 1y , rv ] -n·it h . urnmon , a 111
h
: < t 1 ar hy 1 uhli ation ~ \f\T think not.
h re .'011.' f 1' cli , l' ';2)\r lin th
IT r
h r th r I .
pc•r. rnn I ·pn·i •(> 11po11 t ])(\ rio·bt pc rt. r do n t a1 ly wh J'(•
th lll , ,'(I'\ ic· \ i: by publi ·ati ll ':'l ain t non-r id nt r
1
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tlie state. In a case of that kind tlie true name of the party

becomes of especial importance. It is well known that there

are numerous persons having the same christian and sur-

name, but with a different middle name, such aa John 0.

Johnson, John A. Johnson, and John M. Johnson, James A.

Green and James E. Green, and they are each identified and

distinguished by the initial of the middle name. It would

be intolerable in the practical affairs of life if persons by

the name of Johnson, Green, or Brown, or even the numer-

ous Jones family, should be required to take notice of

every action brought by the publication of summons iu

which a part of his name appeared as the party defend-

ant. No personal service is made in such cases, and that the

real defendant has knowledge of the pendency of the action

is an inference of tha law only, and the use of a wrong

initial is naturally misleading and likely to result to his

prejudice. The statute authorizing this form of process is

in derogation of the common law, and the mode prescribed
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must be strictly pursued. Reno, Non-residents, Sec. 190;

Gilmore v. Lampman, 86 Minn. 493, 90 N. W. 1113, 91 Am.

St. 376 ; Duxhury v. Dalile, 78 Minn. 427, 81 N. W. 198, 79

Am. St. 408. This method of acquiring jurisdiction and

adjudicating the rights of parties constitutes due pro-

cess of law only when the statutes providing therefor have

been fully and completely complied with. Corson v. Shoe-

maker, 55 Minn. 386, 388, 57 N. W. 134; Clary v. O'Shea,

72 Minn. 105, 75 N. W. 115, 71 Am. St. 485.

Some of the courts have held that the use of a wrong

initial, or other error in defendant's name, not coming

within the rule of idem sonans, where the summons is

served by publication, is not a compliance with the statute,

and is fatal to the jurisdiction of the court. 66 Cent. Law. J.

338; 14 Enc. PI. & Pr. 302, and cases cited in note; Cleve-

land V. Peirce, 34 Ind. App. 188, 72, N. E. 604; State v.

Hughes, 31 Tenn. 261 ; King v. Clarke, 7 Mo. 269 ; Fanning

V. Krapfl, 61 Iowa 417, 14 N. W. 727, 16 N. W. 293 ; Enewold

V. Olsen, 39 Neb. 59, 57 N. W. 765, 22 L. R. A. 573, 42 Am.

St. 557; Skelton v. Sackett, 91 Mo. 377, 3 S. W. 874; Free-

man V. Hawkins, 77 Tex. 499, 14 S. W. 364, 19 Am. St. 769;

Fitzgerald v. Salentine, 51 Mass. 436; Parker v. Parker,

146 Mass. 320, 15 N. E. 902; Davis v. Steeps, 87 Wis. 472,

58 N. W. 769, 23 L. R. A. 818, 41 Am. St. 51; 1 Black on
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the tate. In a ca e of that kind the true name of the party
becomes of e pecial importance. It is well known that there
are numerous per ons having the same chri tian and surname, but with a different middle name, such a~ John 0.
John on, John A. John on, and John l\1. John on, James A.
Green and Jam es E. Gr en, and they are each identified and
distingui hed by the initial of the middle name. It would
be intolerable in the practical affairs of life if persons by
the name of Johnson, Gr en, or Brown, or even the numerous Jones family, should be required to take notice of
e ery action brougllt b the publication of ummon in
which a part of his name appeared as the party defendant. No personal service is made in uch cases, and that the
real defendant ha knowled;e of the pendency of the action
is an inference of th2 law only, and the u e of a wrong
initial is naturally mi leading and likely to re ult to hi
prejudice. The tatute authorizing this form of process i
in derogation of the common law, and the mode prescribed
mu t be strictly pursued. Reno, Non-residents, Sec. 190;
Gilniore v. Lanipman, 86 Minn. 493, 90 N. W. 1113, 91 Am.
St. 376; Dux bury v. Dahle, 78 1finn. 427, 81 N. W. 19 , 79
Am. St. 408. This method of acquiring juri diction and
adjudicating the right of parties con titutes due process of law only when the tatutes providing therefor have
been fully and completely complied with. Corson v. Shoemaker, 55 Minn. 3 6, 38 , 57 N. W. 134; Clary v. O'Shea,
72 Minn. 105, 75 N. W. 115, 71 Am. St. 485.
Some of the courts have held that the use of a wrong
initial, or other error in defendant's name, not cominO'
within the rule of idem onans, where the ummons i
ser ed by publication, i not a compliance with the statut ,
and i fatal to the jurisdiction of the court. 66 Cent. Law. J.
33 ; 14 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 302, and cases cited in note; Cleveland . Peirce, 34 Ind. App. 18 , 72, N. E. 60±; State v.
Hughes, 31 Tenn. 261; King v. Clarke, 7 Mo. 269; Fanning
v. J(rapfi, 61Iowa417, 14 N. . 727, 16 N. W. 293; Enewold
v. OZ ll 9 Neb. 59 57 N.
. 7 5, 22 L. R. A. 573, 42 Am.
t. 557 · kelton v. ack tt, 91 l\Io. 377, 3 . W. 874; Freeman v. Hawkins, 77 T ex. 499 14 S. W. 36±, 19 m. St. 769;
Fitzgerald v. Balentine, 51 l\ as . 436; Parker v. Parker,
14 ~ a .· . . : ~O 1
'· 90:_; Da i·i v. teep
7 Wi . 472.
- N. \\ . ,...
. ... . 1
1 Am. t. -1 · 1 Bla k n

56
56 Tkial Practice / [Chap. 2

Judgments, Sec. 232. The cases just cited are not all pre-

cisely in point, but they are analogous, and bear out the

claim that a service by publication, (where there is a sub-

stantial error in the name of the defendant, confers no

jurisdiction on the court. We are not prepared to say that

the mere omission of the middle narne, or the initial thereof,

would wholly nullifj^ the proceedings; but where, as in this

case, there is an attempt to give the full name of the de-

fendant, and a wrong initial is used, it must, in view of

the very common practice of identifying particular in-

dividuals by adding their middle name, be held that the

error is misleading, and likely to result in prejudice to

those who may perchance notice the same as published in

the newspaper. It would be straining the rule requiring a

strict observance of the statute permitting service of

process in this manner to hold an error so likely to mislead

and prejudice an irregularity only.

As bearing upon the question of jurisdiction, numerous in-
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stances are reported in the books where errors and defects of

far less significance than the one here presented have been

held to wholly vitiate a judgment based upon this form of

constructive service. In Barber v. Morris, 37 Minn. 194, 33

N. W. 559, 5 Am. St. 836, and Brown v. St. Paul £ N. P. Eij.

Co., 38 Minn. 506, 38 N. W. 698, judgments were held void

on collateral attack for the failure of the plaintiff to file his

affidavit for publication within the time prescribed by

statute. In the first of these cases the affidavit was not filed

until the day of the entry of judgment. In tho second case,

a condemnation proceeding, the affidavit was not filed until

after tlie summons had been published. An affidavit filed

two days after the first publication was held insufficient in

Murphy v. Lyons, 19 Neb. 689, 28 N. W. 328. If the affi-

davit be technically, in point of substance, not in compli-

ance with the statute, a judgment rendered on service by

publication is void. Carrico v. Tarivater, 103 Ind, 86, 2 N.

E. 227, where the affidavit fails to show that the action is

one in which service by publication is authorized; Harris

v. Claflin, 36 Kan. 543, 13 Pac. 830; Nelson v. Roundtree,

23 Wis. 367; Forhes v. Hyde, 31 Cal. 342. Insufficiently

specific as to due diligence in ascertaining the residence of

the defendant. Little v. Chambers, 27 Iowa, 522. In Illi-

nois the statute requires the issuing and return of process

TRIAL

p RACTICE

[Chap.

~

Judgm ents, Sec. 232. The cases just1cited are not all precisely in point, but they are analog~u , and bear out the
claim that a service by publication, where there is a substantial error in the name of the def end ant, confers no
jurisdiction on the court. We are not prepared to say that
the mere omission of the middle name, or the initial thereof,
would wholly nullify the proceedinQ's; but where, as in this
case, there is an attempt to give the full name of the defendant, and a wrong initial is used, it mu t, in view of
the very common practice of identifying particular individual by adding their middle name, be held that the
error i misleading, and likely to result in prejudice to
those who may perchance notice the same as published in
the newspaper. It would be straining the rule requiring a
strict observance of the statute permitting servi 'e of
process in this manner to hold an error so likely to mi lead
and prejudice an irregularity only.
As bearing upon the que stion of jurisdiction, numerous instances are reported in the books where errors and defects of
far less significance tlmn the one here presented have been
held to wholly vitiate a judO'ment based upon this form of
constructive service. In Barber v. lJlo1-ris, 37 Minn. 194, 33
N. W. 559, 5 Am. St. 36, and Brown v. St. Paul cf; N. P. Ry.
Co., 38 Minn. 506, 38 N. W. 698, judgments were held void
on collateral attack for the failure of the plaintiff to file bis
affidavit for publication within the time I rescribed by
tatute. In the fir t of the e ca es th e affidavit was not filed
until the day of th e ntry of judrrmcmt. In th -2 second a e,
a condemnation pro e ding, tl1 aff avit w not filed until
ft r tli summon had b n J nbli . . h d. An affidavit filed
two day after the fir t publication was held in ufficient in
Murphy v. Lyon , 19 N b. 6 9, _8 N. W. 28. If the affia vit be techni ally, in point of ub tance, not in complian with the tatut , a judgm nt r ndered on ervice by
pul li ·ati n is
id. Carrico v. Tari 1ater, 103 Ind. 86, 2 N.
. 2""' 7, where th affidavit fail to how that tbe action i
n in whi h rvi c by publi ati n i. authorized ; Harris
v. 'laflill,
an. 5-1-? 1. Pa . •) ; N el. on v. Roundtree,
2' Wi . .. 7; Forues v. Ilyde, 3
al. , 2. In uffici ntly
. p C'ifi a t du diliffc•n in a. ·ertaining the residence of
th
f nda t. Littl v. Chamb r , 27 Iowa, 5~2. In Illinojs the statut requir the i uing and return of proc~ss
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"not found" before publication, and a judgment rendered

upon such service without the return was held void in Chick-

ering v. Failes, 26 111. 507, and also in Firebaugh v. Hall, 63

111. 81. If the affidavit be not made by all the plaintiffs,

where two or more join in bringing the action, the judg-

ment rendered is void. Kane v. Rock River Canal Co.,

15 Wis. 179; Mecklem v. Blake, 19 Wis. 397. And also

where the sheriff fails in observance of the statutory re-

quirement to continue in an effort to find the defendant in

the state pending publication. Israel v. Arthur, 7 Colo. 5,

1 Pac. 438; Kennedy v. Lamb, 182 N. Y. 228, 74 N. E. 834,

108 Am. St. 800. And where the summons is defectively

addressed to the defendant. Durst v. Ernst, 45 Misc. 627,

91 N. Y. Supp. 13. See also, Van Fleet, Collateral Attack,

sections 331, 348 ; 6 Current Law, 1090, and cases cited.

There is a conflict in the adjudicated cases upon the ques-

tion whether defects of the nature of those here mentioned

are jurisdictional. Many courts hold to the doctrine that
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a judgment rendered in the face of such defects is not ren-

dered absolutely void, but irregular, and that the irregu-

larity may be corrected by motion. But the two Minne-

sota cases above referred to settle the rule in this state, and

are in harmony with the general principle that to confer

jurisdiction in cases of this kind the statutes must be strict-

ly complied with. 1 Black, Judg. Sec. 232.

But we need not pursue this subject. Reference is made

to it only to emphasize the importance given by many

courts to errors and defects in the proceedings leading up

to the service of summons by publication. The affidavit of

publication in such cases is not filed, nor required to be

filed, for the information of the defendant. He receives no

benefit therefrom by way of notice of the suit or otherwise,

nor by the sheriff's certificate of "Not foimd," nor from

the order for publication, where an order is required; and

if a judgment rendered on service by publication is void for

want of jurisdiction, for errors in these respects, and in

others pointed out in the decisions referred to, for a

stronger reason should the error of misnaming defend-

ant be fatal, where the error does not come within the rule

of idem sonans, and is such as is likely to mislead and re-

sult in his prejudice.

In A7tibs v. Chicago, St. P. M. £ 0. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 266,
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"not found" befor publication, and a judcrment rendered
upon such service without the return wa held void in Chickering v . Failes, 26 Ill. 507, and also in Firebaugh v . Hall, 63
IJI. 81. If the affida it be not mad by all the plaintiffs,
where two or more join in bringing the action, the judgment rendered is void. Kane v. Rock River Canal Co.,
15 Wis. 179; }_l,f eckle11i v. Blali e, 19 Wi . 397. And al o
where the heriff fail in ob ervance of the tatutory requirement to continue in an effort to find the defendant in
the tate pending publication. Isra el v. Arthur, 7 Colo. 5,
1 Pac. 4 8 ; K ennedy v. Lamb 1 ... N. Y. :22 , 74 N. E. 834
108 Am. St. 800. And wh re the ummons i defectively
addres ed to the defendant. Durst v. Ernst, 45 :Misc. 627,
91 N. Y. upp. 13. See al o, Van Fleet Collateral Attack
sections 331, 34 ; 6 Current Law, 1090, and ca e cited.
There is a conflict in the adjudicated ca es upon the que tion whether defect of the nature of those here mentione l
are jurisdictional. 1\ifany courts hold to the doctrine that
a judgment rendered in the face of such defects is not rendered ab olutel void, but irregular, and that the irregularity may be corrected by motion. But the two Minneota ca es above referred to ettle the rule in this tate, and
are in harmony with the general principle that to confer
jurisdiction in case of this kind the statutes mu t be strictly complied with. 1 Black, Judg. Sec. 232.
But we need not r ur ue thi subject. Reference is made
to it only to emphasize the importance given b r many
courts to errors and defects in the proceedings leading u1
to the service of ummons by publication. The affida it of
publication in u.ch cases is not filed, nor required to be
filed, for the information of the defendant. He receives no
benefit therefrom by way of notice of the suit or otherwi e
nor by the sheriff's certificate of "Not found," nor from
the order for publication, where an order is required; and
if a judgment rendered on ervice by publication is void for
want of jurisdiction, for errors in these re pects, and in
others pointed out in the decisions referred to, for a
stronger rea on hould the rror of misnaming defen ant be fatal, wh re th error doe n t come within the rule
of idem sonan and is uch a is likely to mislead and r sult in his prejudice.
In Ambs v. Chicago, St. P. JJ!. dJ 0. Ry. Co., 44 1.finn. 266.
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46 N. W. 321, it appeared that the land there in question

was at one time conveyed to '^ William H. Brown," and the

chain of title disclosed a subsequent conveyance from "Wil-

liam B. Brown." The court there held, Judge Dickinson

writing the opinion, that there was no presumption that the

two Browns were one and the same person. If that be

sound as to private writings, and we have no reason to

question the decision, it follows naturally that the same

rule should be applied to a judicial proceeding like that at

bar, and, if so, we have no right to assume that "George W.

Leslie" and "George H. Leslie" are one and the same

person.

It is urged by appellant that inasmuch as, in cases

where the summons in an action is served by publication,

the defendant, may, upon good cause shown, which has been

construed as an answer stating a defense, come in and de-

fend the action within a year after notice of its entry, the

court should be more liberal in the consideration of errors
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of the character of those here involved, citing Qiiarle v.

Abbet, 102 Ind. 233, 1 N. E. 476, 52 Am. Rep. 662. But we

are not persuaded by this argument. If the error in the

name is jurisdictional, as we hold, judgment entered is void,

and to adopt the contention of appellant would result in

compelling a defendant in a particular case to waive the

want of jurisdiction in the court to enter judgment against

him, and to come to this state and litigate the cause on its

merits. This the court has no right to do. The law provid-

ing for the manner of acquiring jurisdiction over non-resi-

dents is plain, and should not be ignored, even in a case of

apparent hardship. We are sustained in this view by the

Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Granger v. Judge,

44 Mich. 384, 6 N. W. 848, where the court speaking through

Justice Campbell, said, "Where cases and proceedings are

not according to the usual course, and are special in their

character, they are held void on slighter grounds than reg-

nhxr suits, because the courts have not the same power over

their records to correct them. So where there has been no

personal service within the jurisdiction, the doctrine pre-

vails that proceedings not conforming to the statutes are

void. But this is on the ground that there has been no ser-

vice whatever, and the party therefore has not been notified

in any proper way of anything."

-±6 N. W. 321, it appeared that the land there in question
was at one time conveyed to ''William H. Brown,'' and the
chain of title disclosed a subsequent conveyance from' 'William B. Brown.'' The court there held, JUDGE DICKINSON
writing the opinion, that there was no presumption that the
two Browns were one and the same per on. If that be
sound as to private writing , and we have no reason to
question the decision, it follows naturally that the same
rule should be applied to a judicial proceeding like that at
bar, and, if so, we have no right to assume that ''George W.
Leslie'' and ''George I-I. Leslie'' are one and the same
person.
It is urged by appellant that inasmuch as, in cases
where the summons in an action is served by publication,
the defendant, may, upon good cause shown, which has been
construed as an an wer stating a defense, come in and defend the action within a year after notice of its entry, the
court should be more liberal in the consideration of errors
of the character of those here involved, citing Quarle v .
.Abbet, 102 Ind. 233, 1 N. E. 476, 52 Am. Rep. 662. But we
are not per uaded by this argument. If the error in the
name is juri dictional, as we hold, judgment entered is void,
and to adopt the contention of appellant would result in
ompelling a defendant in a particular case to waive the
want of jurisdiction in the court to enter judgment against
him, and to come to thi state and litigate the cause on its
m rit . Thi the court ha no right to do. The law providing for the manner of acquirino- juri diction over non-resints is plain, and hould not be ignored, ven in a case of
ap1 arent hard hip. We ar · u tain d in thi view by the
upreme ourt of J\1ichigan in the cas of Granger v. Judge,
4.J. Mich. 84, 6 N. W. 848, wh re the ourt speaking through
I E
AMPBELL,
i , '' vVh r ca es and proceedings are
t ac · r<lin o· to th u ual cour e, and ar special in their
r·l1 r t r, th y are h 1 voi on sliO'hter grounds than regi_l], r ,·uit. , 1
u th court have not the am power over
o wh r there ha been no
lh ir r · rd to rr t th
p r.· n, 1 . r i
itl1in th juri i tion, the doctrine prevail. · t11a
r
i g. not conf ormin<Y to the tatutes are
Y i . But thi i
n the gr uncl that ther has b n no seri · · \ hat v r, nd th
arty therefore h s not been notified
any r
r w y f anything.''
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Counsel called attention to the case of Illinois v. Hasen-

winkle, 232 111. 224, 83 N. E. 815. While the court in that

case in the course of the opinion said that the use of a

wrong initial of the middle name of a non-resident defend-

ant in condemnation proceedings would not necessarily

render the judgment therein void, the real ground of the

decision there made was that the defendant, so erroneous-

ly named, had permitted the judgment to remain unques-

tioned for over fifty years during which time the railroad

f'ompany had occupied the premises granted by the judg-

ment as its right of way.

We therefore hold, in harmony with the views of the

learned trial court, that the publication of the summons in

the partition suit directed to "George H. Leslie" did not

confer jurisdiction upon the court to adjudicate the rights

of ** George W. Leslie."

Judgmen t affirmed.

NELSON y. THE CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY
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RAILROAD CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1907.

225 Illinois, 197.

Mr, Justice Hand delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellant, Lars R. Nelson, on the 21st day of April,

1906, filed a praecipe in the office of the clerk of the Circuit
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ounsel called attention to the ca e of Illinois v. Hasenwinkle, 232 Ill. 224, 83 N. E. 815. \Vhile the court in tbat
asc in the cour. e of the opinion aid that the u e of a
wrong initial of the micidle name of a non-re ident defendant in condemnation proceeding would not neces arily
render the judgment therein void, the real ground of the
decision there made wa that the defendant, so erroneously named, had permitted the judgment to remain unquestioned for over fifty years during which t1me the railroad
rompany had occupied the premises granted by the judgment as its right of way.
We therefore hold, in harmony with the views of tbe
learned trial court, that the publication of the summons in
the partition suit directed to ''George H. Leslie'' did not
confer jurisdiction upon the court to adjudicate the rights
of ''George W. Leslie.''
J itdgment affirmed.

Court of Kane county for a summons in an action on the

case against the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway

Company, an Iowa corporation, and the Chicago, Burling-

ton & Quincy Railroad Company, an Illinois corporation.

A summons was issued against both companies and deliv-

ered to the sheriff of said county to serve, which summons

was returned by said sheriff not served as to the railroad

company, because the president or any other of the officers

or agents of said railroad company with whom the statute

NELSON V. THE CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY
RAILROAD CO.

provides a copy of the summons may be left to effect ser-

vice of process on the company, could not be found by him

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1907.

in said county. The praecipe and summons were then

225 Illinois, 197.

l\1:R. J-csTI CE HA n delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant, Lars R. Nelson, on the 21st day of April,
1 06, :filed a praecipe in the office of the clerk of the Circuit
ourt of I(ane count for a summons in an action on the
case again t th
hicao·o, Burlin ·ton, & Quincy Railway
ompany, an Iowa corr oration, and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad ompan , an Il1inoi corporation.
A ummon wa is ued ao·ain t both companies and deliv~
red to the heriff of aid ounty to , rve, which ummon
wa returned by aid heriff not , rY d as to the railroad
ompan , becau th I re. ident or an>y other of the offi er
or agent of aid railroad o 1 an.\' with whom the statute
provide, a copy of the , umm n ma3~
left to effect .. erYic of pro e on th om1 any coul n t be foun by him
un!Y· Th praecipe an
ummons were then
in aid
T
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amended and the case discontinued as to the railway com-

pany, and the railroad company was served with process

by publication and mail, as in chancery cases, as is au-

thorized by paragraph 5 of the Practice Act, (Kurd's Stat.

1905, Chap. 110), and a declaration was filed against the

railroad company.

* * * * The railroad company entered a special ap-

pearance and moved to quash the service of process had

upon it by publication and mail, which motion was sus-

tained, and the appellant electing to stand by the service of

j)rocess and refusing to proceed further, the court dis-

missed the suit, and the appellant has prosecuted this ap-

peal.

It is * * * contended by the railroad company that

* * * * if service of process by publication and mail is

authorized by said paragraph 5 upon a defendant railroad

company that has its principal office in this state in a suit

where a judgment in personam is sought against the rail-
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road company, the statute is unconstitutional and void, as

such service of process, it is said, does not constitute due

process of law.

The law provides for two methods of service of process ;

the one actual and the other constructive. Actual service

of process is made by reading the original process to the

defendant or by delivering to him a copy thereof ; and con-

structive service of process, which is a substituted service of

process, is made by leaving a copy of the process at the de-

fendant's residence when he is absent, or by posting or

publishing notice of the pendency of the suit, and mailing

a copy of the notice posted or published to the defendant,

if his postoffice address is known. It is held that the ser-

vice of process, either actual or constructive, upon a non-

resident defendant outside the limits of the state where

the action or proceeding is pending will not authorize the

rendition of a personal judgment or decree against a de-

fendant, but that such service of process is sufficient upon

which to base a decree changing the marital status in a

proceeding for divorce, or a judgment or decree disposing

of property situated within the jurisdiction of the court

wherein the action or proceeding is pending. It is also

lield that each state may determine for itself in what

[ hap. :!

amended and the case discontinued as to the railway company, and the railroad company was served with proce s
by publication and mail, as in chancery cases, a is authorized by paragraph 5 of the Practice Act, (Hurd 's Stat.
1905, Chap. 110), and a declaration was filed against the
railroad company.
* * * * The railroad company entered a special appearance and moved to quash the service of process ·1 ad
upon it by publication and mail, which motion was sustained, and the appellant electing to stand by the service of
process and refusing to proceed further, the court ili smissed the suit, and the appellant has prosecuted this appeal.
It is * * * contended by the railroad company that
* * * * if service of process by publication and mail is
authorized by said paragraph 5 upon a defendant railroad
company that has its principal office in this state in a suit
where a judgment in p ersonam is sought against the railroad company, the statute is uncon titutional and void, as
such service of process, it is said, does not constitute due
proce of law.
* * * * * * * * * *
The law provides for two method of service of process;
the one actual and the other constructive. Actual service
of process is made by reading the original proce s to the
def n ]ant or by delivering to him a copy thereof; and contru tive service of process, which is a substituted service of
pro es , i made by leaving a copy of the process at the defendant' r e idence when he is absent, or by posting or
publi. bin()' notice of th pendency of the uit, and mailing
a 01 ~ of the notice po ted or publi hed to the defendant,
if hi . p . toffice addre i known. It i held that the erYi
f I ro .· , ither a tual or con tructive, upon a nonr : idc•nt c1 fendant out id the limits of the state where
hP adion r pr c ding is pending will not authorize th
r n<1ition f a p •r onal jud()'ment or decre again t a def 11<1 a nt, hut that , uch rvice of process i ufficient upon
wl1i c·]1 t h . a d r
h angirw th marital tatus in a
l>l'ON• •clin g f J' di
l'<' , l'
jndgm nt r d l' e ispo ino·
<Jf pr pc•rt : ihrnt 1 within th juri diction of th court
wl1 ·rc·in th· a ti n or proc din()' i. r ndinO'. It j al o
lic·l<l 1liuL <aC']1 : tat m y
t rmine for its lf in what
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method process may be served upon its citizens within its

own boundaries, and while such legislation will have no

force outside the state, service of process within the state

in the manner pointed out in the statute regulating- the

method of obtaining such constructive service of process,

if the method of service of process provided for is such as to

amount to due process of law, as these terms are used in the

State and Federal constitutions, will be sufficient to author-

ize the courts of the State within whose jurisdiction the

service of process is had to pronounce a personal judgment

or decree against a defendant so served with process, al-

though cases may arise in practice upon such constructive

service of process where a personal judgment or decree

might be obtained against a defendant without such defend-

ant having received actual notice of the pendency of the ac-

tion prior to judgment or decree. Constructive service of

process, it is said, is authorized in a certain class of cases,

such as when the defendant has gone out of the State, or
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when he cannot be found, or when he conceals himself so

that process cannot be served upon him, as the result of

necessity — that is, such constructive service of process is

substituted for actual service of process when actual service

of process cannot be had upon a defendant. In this case

actual service could not be had upon the defendant although

the suit was properly brought in the court from which the

process was issued and the defendant was a resident of, and

was in the State, and the question here is narrowed to this :

Can the legislature provide a constructive or substituted

service of process by publication and mail, in lieu of actual

service of process, in a case where the process cannot be

actually served upon the defendant in the county where the

statute expressly authorizes the suit to be commenced,

although the defendant resides and is in the State?

The case of Bimeler v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536, was an ac-

tion of debt upon a judgment rendered by the Court of

Common Pleas of Stark county, in the State of Ohio,

against Welch and Dawson. There was service of process

upon Dawson only, and he pleaded nul tiel record and that

he was not personally served with process. The record

showed personal service upon Welch and service on Daw

son by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence, ana

the rendition of a judgment by default against both de-
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method proce s may be erved upon its citizen within its
own boundarie , and while uch legislation will have no
force out ·ide the state, service of proce s within tbe tate
in the mann r pointed out in the statute regulating the
method of obt ining uch on ·tructive service of proce s,
if the method of service of proc
provided for is such as to
amount to due proces of law, as these term ar u e in the
State and Federal con titutions, will be ufficient to authorize the courts of the tate within whose juri diction the
,'ervice of proc ss is had to pronounce a personal judgment
or decree again t a def ndant so served with proces , although ca e ma~T arise in practice upon ucb constructive
ervice of proce where a per onal judgment or decree
might be obtain d again t a defendant without uch defendant having received actual notice of the pendency of the acbon prior to' judgment or decree. Constructive ser ice of
process, it is aid, is authorized in a certain cla s of cases,
uch as when the defendant has gone out of the State, or
when he cannot be found, or when he conceal him elf so
that proce s cannot be erved upon him, as the re ult of
nece sity-that i , such con tructive ervic of process is
, ub tituted for actual service of process when actual service
of proce s cannot be had upon a defendant. In this ca e
actual service could not be had upon the def ndant although
the suit wa properly brought in the court from which the
proces wa i sued and the defendant was a re ident of, and
was in th State, and the qu tion here i narrowed to this:
Can the 1 °·i lature provide a constructive or substituted
service of process by publication and mail, in lieu of actual
ervice of proce , in a ca. e where the proces cannot be
actually erved upon th defendant in the count. where the
, tatut ex1 r ly authoriz s the uit to be commence l,
and is in the State~
althouo·h the defendant r si
The a of Bimeler v. Dm son 4
am. 5 6 was an a tion of d bt upon a judgm nt rendered by the ourt of
ommon Pl a of Stark county, in the tate of Obi .
against Welch and Daw on. Th re wa en ice of proce s
upon Daw on only and h pl ad d nul tiel record and that
he was not p r onall3 en d with proce . The rec 1· 1
. bowed per onal rvic upon Wel b and serv] on Da\\. on by leaving a cop, of the summon at hi r . i ence an
the renditioI! of a judgment by default again t both de-

.
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fendants. The trial court held that for want of personal

service upon Dawson the judgment was not evidence of in-

debtedness against him, and rendered judgment in his

favor. Upon an appeal to this court the judgment was re-

versed, and in an opinion prepared by Justice Treat, on

l)age 542, it was said: "The laws of the several states pro-

vide different modes of bringing parties into court. In

some states personal service of process is required, while in

other states that mode is not indispensable, but a part}-

may be required to appear and defend an action on notice

by iniblication or by the leaving of process at his residence.

It is doubtless competent for each state to adopt its own

regulations in this respect, which will be binding and

obligatory on its own citizens. "We can not doubt the right

or power of the State of Ohio to provide that the kind of

service which it appears was made in this case shall be

sufficient to authorize its courts to take jurisdiction of the

person of a defendant and proceed to hear the case and
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render judgment. A judgment thus rendered against one

of its citizens would be binding and conclusive on him,

for owing allegiance to the State, he is bound by its law

and amenable to its judicial tribunals. That State, how-

ever, cannot in that way get jurisdiction over the people

of other States. Its laws can only operate within its own

territory and on its own citizens. They cannot be made

to operate extra-territorially, or on the citizens of other

States unless they go voluntarily^ within its limits."

And in Welch v. Sykes, 3 Gilm. 197, on page 201, it was

said: "It is competent for each State to prescribe the

mode for bringing parties before its courts. Although its

regulations in this respect can have no extra-territorial

operation, tliey are nevertheless binding on its own citi-

zens."

In iS^nilJi V. Smith, 17 111. 482, on page 484, it was said : " A

State may nnd()u])tedly provide for bringing its own citizens

or subjects before its tribunals by constructive notice, which

may not in all cases come to the actual knowledge of the

party; still tlie presumption is that he has actual notice, or

might liave such notice by the exercise of proper care and

diligence."

W'liat is du<' jirocess of law in all instances is not easilv
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i '11 ant . The trial court held that for want of per onal
rvi

u1 on Daw on th judo·ment wa . . not evidence of ind bt dn
a~=;ain t him, and render d judgment in hi
f-1 y r .
p n an appeal to thi court the judgment was reY r
, and in an 01 inion prepared by J USTICE TREAT, on
54:.. it wa ai : 'The laws of the several states prodiff r nt mod
of bringing partie into court. In
t t p 1 onal ervice of proce s is r equired, while in
th r tat
that mode i not indi pen able, but a party
m· y be r quired to ar pear and defend an action on notice
l :.T 1 ublication or b the lea\ ing of process at his re sidence.
i doubtle c mp tent for each state to adopt its own
r ·ulations in thi respect, which will be binding and
lio·atory on it own citizen . We can not doubt the right
r 1 w r of the tate of Ohio to proYide that the kind of
. rYi whi h it app ar wa made in this case shall be
·uffi i nt to authorize it court to take jurisdiction of the
l r on f a defendant and proce d to hear the case and
r
r ju o·ment. A jud o-ment thu rendered against one
f its citizen would be binding and conclusive on him,
f r owinO' all 0 ·ian e to the tat he is bound by its law
a d am nahl to it judicial tribunals. That State, how Y r, cannot in that way get jurisdiction over the peopl
f ther ta tes. It. law can only operate within its own
rritor and on it own citizen . They cannot be made
I r t
xtra-territoriall3, or on the citizen of oth r
• 't t . unl .-:> tb
O'O vol ntarily within it limit . ''
n i ff' r>lclt Y. yke , 3 Gilm. 1 7, on pao·e ~01, it wa ·
• < i 1:
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m1 tent f r each tat to re rib th
m cl f r ln·in ing 1 arti b fore it our
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defined, but as applied to this case it clearly means pro-

ceeding according to the course of the common law, and the

common law has from time immemorial required that a de-

fendant be personally notified of the pendency of an action,

if he was within the jurisdiction of the court and could

be found, before judgment or decree was rendered against

him. The common law, however, never required actual

service of process in all cases, but has always provided for

a constructive service of process when actual service there-

of could not be had, such as the leaving of a copy of the sum-

mons at the defendant's residence, and latterly a posting or

publishing of notice of the pendency of the suit or proceed-

ing, when the defendant was out of the State or upon due

inquiry could not be found, or when he concealed himself

so that process could not be served upon him.

In Bardwell v. Anderson, 9 L. R. A. 152, the Supreme

Court of Minnesota said (p. 154) : "We think that from

the earliest period of English jurisprudence down to the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

present, as well as in the jurisprudence of the United

States derived from that of England, it has always been

considered a cardinal and fundamental princiiDle that in

actions in personam proceeding according to the course of

the common law, personal service (or its equivalent as by

leaving a copy at his usual place of abode), of the writ,

process or summons must be made on all defendants resi-

dent and to be found within the jurisdiction of the court. We

do not mean that the term 'proceeding according to the

course of the common law,' as used in the books, is to be

understood as meaning, necessarily and always, personal or

actual service of process, for although service by publication

is of modern origin, there has always been some mode by

which jurisdiction has been obtained at common law by

something amounting to or equivalent to constructive ser-

vice, where the defendant could not be found and served

personally ; but what we do mean to assert is, that the right

to resort to such constructive or substituted service in j^er-

sonal actions proceeding according to the course of the com-

mon law rests upon the necessities of the case, and has al-

ways been limited and restricted to cases where personal

service could not be made because the defendant was a non-

resident, or had absconded, or had concealed himself for

the purpose of avoiding service. As showing what means
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defined, but a a plied to this case it clearly means pro•eeding accor ing to the cour e of the common law, and the
om on law has from time immemorial required that a defendant be per onall notified of the pendency of an action,
if he wa within the jurisdiction of the court and could
be found, before judgment or decree was rendered again t
him. The common law however, never required actual
erYice of proce in all ca e but has always provided for
a con tructive ervi e of proce when actual service thereof could not be had uch a the leaving of a cop of the summon at the defendant's re idence, and latterly a posting or
publi hing of notice of the pendenc of the uit or proceeding, when the defendant was out of the State or upon due
inquiry could not be found, or when he concealed himself
o that proce could not be erved upon him.
In Bardi ell v. Ander on, 9 L. R. A. 152 the Supreme
Court of l'ifinne ota said (p. 15±): ''We think that from
the earlie t period of Engli h juri prudence down to the
pre ent a well a in the juri prudence of the United
State derived from that of Eno·land it ha always been
con idered a cardinal and flmdamental principle that in
action in per onam proceeding according to the cour e of
the common law personal service (or it equi alent as by
leaving a copy at hi u ual place of a.bode) of the writ
proce or summon must be made on all defendants resident and to be found within the juri diction of the court. We
do not mean that the term 'proceeding ac ording to the
course of the common law,' a used in the book , is to be
tmder tood a meaning nece arily and alwa s, personal or
actual er' ice of proce for although service b publication
is of m dern origin th re has always been some mode by
whi h juri dicti n ha been o tained at common law b
omet in · amountino- to or equi alent to constructive service, wher he d fendant could not be found a:µd erved
per onally; but what we do mean to a sert is, that the right
to r ort to uch con tr-uctive or u tituted service in peronal a tion pro din · accor ing to the course of the common law r t up n the nece iti of the ca e, an ha alwa b en li it
and r tri te to ca es where per onal
er i could not b made b au the d fendant was a nonre id nt or bad ab conded or ha concealed him If for
the pur o e of avoidin · ern .
howing what mean
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were resorted to as amounting or equivalent to constructive

service, and how strictly it was limited to cases of necessity

by both courts of common law and courts of chancery, ref-

erence need only be had to 3 Blackstone's Com. 283, 444."

While the authorities are not in entire harmony upon

the subject, the Illinois cases and the greater weight of

authority clearly establish, we think, the proposition that

a personal judgment in an action at law may be rendered

against a defendant residing in and who is in the State

where the suit or proceeding is pending, who has been

notified of the pendency of the suit by constructive service

of process, where it appears actual service of process could

not be had upon the defendant, if the constructive service

provided for was required ^^ be had in such manner that

the reasonable probabilitie re that the defendant would

receive notice of the pendiu^ action or proceeding before

judgment or decree was rendered against him.

**********
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Reversed and remanded.^

1 In Bardwell v. Collins, (1890) 44 Minn. 97, 46 N. W. 315, quoted above

in Nelson v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., the statute author-

ized service of summons by publication, in actions to foreclose mortgages, as to

all parties to the action against whom no personal judgment was sought. The

court held (1) thjit such actions were not «i rem but in personam, since they

determined the rights and equities of the parties interested in the mortgaged

[Chap. 2
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were r orted to a amounting or equivalent to constructive
rYice and how trictly it was limited to cases of necessity
by both courts of common law and courts of chancery, refer n e n ed onls be had to 3 Blackstone's Com. 283, 444."
hile th authorities are not in entire harmony upon
the ubj t the Illinois cases and the greater weight of
authority cl arly establi h, we think, the proposition that
a per onal judgment in an action at law may be rendered
a ain t a defendant residing in and who is in the State
wh re the ·uit or proceeding is pending, who has been
notified of the pendency of the suit by constructive service
of proce , where it appears actual service of process could
not be had upon the defendant, if the con tructive service
pro ided for was required tL\ be had in such manner that
the rea onable probabilitie
re that the defendant would
receive notice of the pend1L 6 action or proceeding before
ju gment or decree was rendered again t him.

*

premises; (2) that such actions were strictly judicial in character, proceeding

~

* * * * * * * *
Reversed and remanded. 1

according to the due course of the common law; (3) that it is a cardinal

principle of "due process of law" that in actions in personam proceeding ac-

cording to the course of the common law, jiersonal service of process must be

had uj)on defendants resident and to be found within the jurisdiction of the

court; (4) the statute is uuconstitutionfil in so far as it attempts to authorize

service by mere publication upon resident defendants capable of being per-

sonally served.

KENNEDY V. LAMB.

Court of Appeals of New York. 1905

182 Neiu York, 228.

Vann, J. The purchasers at the sale in this action,

whicli was bronglit to partition lands in the borough of

]*rooklyii. rcfiisod to complete their purchase upon the

groiiiid that the title was defective. By an order, made at

1

In Bardwell v. Collins, (1890) 44 Minn. 97, 46 N. W. 315, quoted above

in N elson v . hicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., the tatute author·
i z cl er vi e of ummons by publication, in actions to foreclose mortgages, as to
all part ies to the action against whom no personal judgment was sought. The
omt b l r1 (1) that • uch actions were not in r em but in personam ince they

determ in c1 the rights and equities of the parties intere ted in the mortgaged
pr m i e ; ( 2) that such actions were strictly judicial in haracter, proceeding
acconliug to th e due cour e of the common law; (3) that it i a ardinal
pr i1iriple of ' ' due proces of law ' that in a ction in personam proceeding acor11 ing to the cour. e of the common law, p r ~ onal service of process must be
b a <l upo n rl fenclant r id nt and to b found within tb jnri t1iction of the
court; ( 4) th e tatute is un constitutional in i:o far a it att mpt to authorize
rvir by mere publication upon resident defendants capable of being pert.onally ser ved.

KENN 1 DY V. LAMB.

Court of Appeals of New York.
182

\

~

ork, 228.
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Special Term and affirmed by the Appellate Division, they

were directed to comply with the terms of sale and they now

appeal to this court for relief from what they consider an

unlawful command. They claim that the court which ren-

dered the judgment in partition did not acquire jurisdic-

tion of several persons, each a necessary party defendant,

because they were not personally served with process and

the effort to serve them by publication was void, owing to

a vital defect in the affidavits upon which the order to pub-

lish was made.

From the affidavits presented to the justice who granted

the order of publication, one made by the plaintiff and the

other by his attorney, it appeared that six of the defendants

resided in the State of New Jersey, four at Jersey City and

two at Plainfield. The only attempt to show compliance

with the command of the statute in reference to ^^due dili-

gence to make personal service of the summons" was an

allegation in the affidavit of the attorney that ''the plain-
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tiff will be unable with due diligence to make personal ser-

vice of the summons within the State as appears by the

affidavit of Peter J. Kennedy hereto annexed." The affi-

davit thus referred to contains nothing whatever upon the

subject of diligence, discloses no effort to serve the sum-

mons in this state, and gives no reason for not making the

effort, aside from the bare fact of non-residence. It does

not appear that the summons had been issued or that it was

placed in the hands of anyone for service upon the defend-

ants named, and for aught that appears they could have

been served in this state without difficulty. They were

nephews and nieces of the plaintiff and had visited and

corresponded with him "for several years past," as he

stated in his affidavit. He did not state how recently they

had visited him, when he last heard from them, nor where

he himself resided. Four of them lived just across the state

line and two of them but a short distance therefrom. All

may have been engaged in business in the State of Xew

York and in daily attendance there for that purpose, as is

the case with so many residents of the State of New Jersey.

The affidavit did not state that they were not in New York

or that they were actually in New Jprsey when the affiant

swore to it.

Aj> «rder may be made for service by publication upon a

. p.— 5 -
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~pe ial Term and affirmed by the Appellate Di i ion, they
were directed to com1 ly with the terms of sale and they now
a1 p al to thi ourt for relief from what they con ider an
pnlawful command. They claim that the court which rendered the judgment in partition did not acquire jurisdiction of everal persons, each a nece ary part defendant
because they were not personall
erY d with proce and
the effort to erve them b publication was void, owing to
a vital defect in the affidavit upon which the order to publi h wa made.
From the affida it pre ented to the ju tice who granted
the order of publication one made by the plaintiff and the
other by hi attorney, it appeared that six of th defendant
re ided in the tate of New J er ey, four at J er ey ity and
two at Plainfield. The only attempt to show compliance
with the command of the tatute in reference to 'due diligence to make per onal ervice of the summons'' was an
allegation in the affida Yit of the attorney that "the plaintiff will be unable with due diligence to make per onal service of the ummon within the State a appear by the
affidavit of Peter J. Kennedy hereto annexed.'' The affia it thus referred to contain nothing whate er upon the
ubject of diligence, di clo es no effort to erve the ummons in thi tate, and gi e no rea on for not making th
effort, aside from the bare fact of non-re idence. It doe
not appear that the ummons had been i ued or that it wa
placed in the hand of anyone for service upon the defendants named, and for aught that appears they could haYe
been erved in this state without difficulty. They were
nephew and niece of the- plaintiff and had \ i ited and
corre ponded with him ''for ever al years pa t, '' a he
tated in hi affidavit. He did not tate how rec ntly they
had vi ited him, when he la t heard from them nor where
be him elf re ided. Four of them lived ju ta ro the tate
line and two of them but a hort di tance th r from. All
may have been enga d in busine in the tat of X ew
York and in daily att ndance there for that purpo e a. i
th ca e with so many re ident of the tate of New Jer y.
The affidavit did not tat that they w re not in New York
or that they were actually in New .T er ey when the affiant
swore to it.
AJJ order may be made for service by publication upon a

. P.-5 -
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defendant who is a non-resident of the state, provided ''the

plaintitf has been or will be unable with due diligence to

make personal service" within the state. (Code Civ. Pro.

Sections 438, 439.) The bare fact of non-residence is not

enough to authorize the order, for the plaintiff must also

show due diligence to make personal service, or state facts

tending to show why personal service cannot be made. The

statute now in force differs from the one which formerly

governed the subject when some of the cases cited were

decided, in that the latter authorized service by publication

when the person to be served could not "after due diligence

be found within the State." (Code of Pro. Section 135.)

The old statute was satisfied with due diligence to find the

defendant, while the present statute requires either due

effort to serve, or sufficient reasons for not making the

effort.

In the case now before us there was no attempt to make

personal service and no reason was given for not trying to
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serve personally, except the fact of non-residence. Even if

residence in a distant state or in a foreign country permits

the inference that the person to be served cannot be found

in this State, residence in an adjoining state, just across the

line, with no evidence that the non-resident is not in busi-

ness in this state, or that he does not sojourn here, and no

explanation whatever for not trying to serve him here, is

not sufficient. As was said by this court in Carleton v.

Carleton, (85 N. Y. 313, 315): "It is a well known fact

that many persons who are residents of one state have

places of business and transact such business in a state

different from that in which their residence is located.

They are frequently in the latter state, and pass most of

their time there. Such persons could be readily found in

the state where they do business if due diligence was used

for that purpose and non-residence, of itself, does not nec-

essarily show that they cannot be found within the state, or

raise a presumption that due diligence has been used, or

that it was not required."

In a latel- case it was said: "Where the proof of non-

rosi donee is clear and conclusive, and that the defendant is

living out of the state and in a distant state, there may be

strong reasons for holding that proof of diligence is not

required;" and as it appeared that the defendant resided

TRIAL PRACTICE
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d fendant who i a non-resident of the state, provided "the
i laintif-f ha been or will be unable with due diligence to
make I er onal ervice" within the state. (Code Civ. Pro.

ection 438, 439.) The bare fact of non-residence is not
nough to authorize the order, for the plaintiff must also
how due diligence to make personal service, or state facts
t nding to show why personal service can.n ot be made. The
tatute now in force differs from the one which formerly
governed the subject when some of the cases cited were
decided, in that the latter authorized service by publication
when the person to be served could not ''after due diligence
he found within tbe State.'' (Code of Pro. Section 135.)
The old statute was sati fied with due diligence to find the
defendant, while the pre ent statute requires either due
effort to serve, or sufficient reasons for not making the
ffort.
In the case now before us there was no attempt to make
per onal service and no reason was given for not trying to
erve personally, except the fact of non-residence. Even if
r idence in a distant state or in a foreign country permits
the inference that the person to be served cannot be found
in this State, re idence in an adjoining state, just across the
lin e, with no evidence that the non-re ident is not in busin
in this state, or that he does not sojourn here, and no
xplanation whatever for not trying to serve him here, is
not sufficient. As was said by this court in Carleton v.
arleton, ( 85 N. Y. 313, 315) : ''It is a well known fact
that many persons who are re idents of one state have
places of busine and transact such l:m in s in a state
iff rent from that in which tb ir residence is located.
Th y ar fr qu ntly in th latter tat , and pass mot:t of
h ir time there.
uch persons coul 1 be readily found in
th tate where they do busine s if due djlio· n was u cd
f'or that pur o. e nd non-re idenc , f its lf, does not nee""' rily. h w tliat th y cannot be found within the state, or
rai . a r .·um ti n that du diligence has be n u J, or
that it' a.· n tr )<] uir d."
In a 1f Pr ·a.· it wa aid : "Wh re the roof of nonr · ·i I P11 ·, i . l r and c n lu. ive, and that the defendant is
Ji v irw out f th<·. · at
n in a di tant state, there may be
:t rorw rf' . ns f r h l ing that roof of diligence is uot
r·qu1r ;" n
.'it
ared that the defendant resided
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in Maryland, and that the summons, which had been duly

issued and some effort made to serve it, could not be served

owing to that fact, the affidavit was held sufficient. {Ken

nedy v. Neiv York Life Ins. <& Trust Co., 101 N. Y. 487).

In McCracken v. Flanagan, (127 N. Y. 493), it appeared

that a summons had been issued against the defendant and

''that defendant is a non-resident of this state, nor can be

found therein, but has a place of residence at Matewan, in

the state of New Jersey." After a careful review of the

leading cases it was held that the affidavit, which was made

when section 135 of the Code of Procedure was in force, was

insufficient to give jurisdiction. The court said: "Some

degree of diligence must be exercised to find the party, and

what is a due degree depends upon circumstances surround-

ing each case, and the simple averments in the affidavit that

the defendant is a non-resident and cannot be found within

the state are not alone sufficient to support an order for

the service of a summons by publication. Those facts do
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not imply that any diligence has been exercised to find and

serve the defendant personally with process. It needs no

argument to show that the averment in the affidavit that

the defendant cannot be found in the state does not tend to

prove the exercise of due diligence to find the defendant,

for the statute in question not onlj^ requires that it be stated

in the affidavit that the defendant cannot be found, but ex-

pressly requires the averment that he cannot be found after

due diligence."

In Belmont v. Cornen, (82 N. Y. 256), the order was sus-

tained upon proof of non-residence, followed by an aver-

ment that the summons had been issued to the sheriff of

the county where the premises, covered by the mortgage

sought to be foreclosed, were situated; that the sheriff

"had used due diligence to find the defendants and after

such due diligence and inquiry they could not be found with-

in said county or state."

In C router v. Crouter, (133 N. Y. 55) an affidavit was

held sufficient which stated the non-residence of the defend-

ants ; that they had no place of business in this state ; that

plaintiff believed that a summons could not, with due

diligence, be served personally within the state and that he

had present knowledge of defendants' movements, and was

satisfied that they frequent no place in the state.

ERVI E A~ ' D RETURN OF

8

MMONS

67

in JYlaryland, and that the summons, which had been duly
issued and some effort made to erve it, could not be ser eJ
owing to that fact, the atndavit was held sufficient. (Ken
nedy v. New York Li/ e Ins. & Trust Co., 101 N. Y. 487).
In McCracken v. Flanagan, (127 N. Y. 493), it appeareJ
that a ummons had been i ued again t the defendant and
''that defendant is a non-re ident of this state, nor can be
found therein, but has a place of residence at :Matewan, in
the state of New J er ey." After a careful review of the
leading cases it was held that the affidavit, which was made
when section 135 of the Code of Procedure was in force, was
insufficient to give juri diction. The court said : ''Some
degree of diligence must be exercised to find the I arty, and
what is a due degree depend upon circum. tanres surround ing each ca e, and the simple averment in the affidavit that
the defendant is a non-re ident and cannot be found within
the tate are not alone suffici nt to u1 port an order for
the service of a summons by I ublication. Tho e facts do
not imply that any diligence has been exerci ed to find and
erve the defendant per onally with proc s . It needs no
argument to show that the averment in the affidavit tha t
the defendant cannot be found in the state doe not tend to
prove the exerci e of due dilibence to find the defendant
for the tatute in que tion not only require that it be stated
in the affidavit that the defendant cannot be found, but expre ly requires the averm nt that he cannot be found after
due diligence.''
In Belmont v. Cornen, (82 N. Y. 256), the order was su tained upon proof of non-re idence, follow d by an averment that th ummons had been issu d to the heriff of
the county where the premise , covered bv the mortgag
ought to be foreclos d, were ituated; that the sheriff
''had u ·ed due diligence to find the defen lant and after
uch du diligence and inquiry they coul not be found within said ounty or stat . ''
In router v. Crouter, (1
N. Y. 55) an affidavit wa
h Id uffi i nt which tat d tb non-re id nc of the defendant ; that th y had no pla of bu in
in thi tate; that
plaintiff b Ii v d that a ·u mon could not with du
diligen 1 e erved per onally within the tate and that h
bad pr nt knowledge of f ndant 'mov
ts, and wa
satisfied that they frequent no place in the state.

us
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In Fetes v. Vohner, (28 N. Y. St. Kep. 317), the court said :

** Though a non-resident, the defendant may be at the time

temporarily in the state to the knowledge of the plaintitf,

and within easy reach of personal service of the summons.

No such proof was made by the plaintiff in this case. The

affidavit of his attorney, upon which the order was pro-

cured, states only that the action has been commenced, that

a summons has been issued, and that the two defendants

named are non-residents of the state and that they reside at

Marion, Washington County, Iowa. The affidavit was, in

this respect, plainly insufficient and the county judge was

without jurisdiction to grant the order,"

While any evidence having a legal tendency to show com-

pliance with the statute, even if inconclusive, would war-

rant the exercise of judgment and thus confer jurisdiction

to make the order, in this case there was no evidence as to

the use of diligence, or to excuse the omission of effort to

serve in this state. Even if a judge reached a wrong con-
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clusion upon the facts presented, so that his order would be

set aside on direct attack by motion to vacate, still if he

had some legal evidence to act upon, the order would be

protected from collateral attack after the entry of judg-

ment. There was no evidence presented to the justice who

made the order now before us which authorized him to act

judicially or to decide that the plaintiff would be unable

with due diligence to make personal service in this state.

An affiant who simply repeats the words of a statute merely

states his opinion upon a proposition to be proved. Proof

requires that facts be stated from which the conclusion

sought may be logically drawn. We find no case in this

court and no well considered case in any court which sus-

tains an order founded simply on proof of non-residence

in an adjoining state with no effort n de to find or serve,

and no reason given why such effort if made would be use-

less.

Tlie purchasers were entitled to a marketable title, free

from reasonable doubt and they were justified in refusing

to cotiiplete their purchase because the affidavits upon which

the order of publication was based were insufficient to con-

fer jurisdiction.

The order of the Appellate Division, as well as that of

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 2

n Fetes v.} olmer, (~ N. Y. St. Rep. 317), the court said:

Though a non-re id nt, the d fendant may be at the time
mporarily in the tate to the knowledge of the plaintiff,
an, within ea reach of personal service of the summons.
o u h proof wa made by the plaintiff in this case. The
ffi la it of hi attorney, upon which the order wa procur
tat . only that the action has been commenced, that
a umrnon ha been i ued, and that the two defendant
nam 1 ar non-re idents of the tate and that they reside at
Marion, \Va binO'ton ounty, Iowa. The affidavit was, in
thi , r 1J ct, plainly insufficient and the county judge wa
without juri diction to grant the order.''
hil any evidence ha\ ing a legal tendency to how complian with the tatute, even if inconclusive, would warrant the xerci e of judgment and thus confer juri diction
to mak the order in thi ca e there was no evid nee as to
th u e of diligence, or to excu e the omi ion of effort to
· rY in thi tate. Even if a judge reached a wrong conch i n u1 on the facts presented, so that his order would be
. t a id on direct attack by motion to vacate, still if he
had ·om lco'al evidence to act upon, the order would be
vr t t cl from collateral attack after the entry of jud0'111 nt. Th r wa no evidence pre ented to the ju tice who
ma 1 tl1 order now b fore u whi h authorized him to act
ju i ·ially or to d ci 1 that the plaintiff would b unable
with u dilio· n e to mak per onal ervice in thi tat .
. .\n afJiant who impl. r eat the words of a tatute mer ly
tat .. " hi pinion upon a propo ition to be pro d. Proof
that fa t be stated from which the con lu. ion
r b loO'ically drawn.
We find no case in thi
<'onrt ·
n w 11 on id r
a e in any court whi h su ta in · an r 1 r f un
imp] r on roof of non-r i
in an ac1joinino- tat with no ffort n 1 to find or · rve,
nnd 110 r ·· n giv why u h ff rt if made would b u I ·. : .
'I IH· p11r('lia . r.
r
ntitl d t
f'rorn n :1 . onahl d uht nd th
t111·0111pl<'le1li irpu·ha. l

arketable titl fr e
ju ti:fi d in r fu~ jnoaffid vits up n whi h
were in uffici nt to cona

11 1" orrl ·r of pul li ·ation w , ba
l'r·r j11ri di(· i< n.
'I hr r] r f h
ivi ion, as well a
p 11 t

that of
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the Special Terin should bo reversed and the motion denied,

with costs in all courts.

CuLLEN, Ch. J., Gray, O'Brien, Bartlett, PTaight and

Werner, JJ., concur.

Order Reversed.

Section 4. Place of Service.

SERVICE A.. D BET R~~ OF

Su:111.:vro ...-

the p cial Term hould be rever ed and the motion denied,
with co t in all courts.
ULLEN, Ch. J . RAY, 0 'BRIEN, BARTLETT, HAIGHT and
W ERNER, J J., concur.
Order Reversed.

WALLACE V. UNITED ELECTRIC COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 1905,

211 Pennsylvania State, 473.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Brown, April 17, 1905.

The first prayer of appellant's bill is for full dis-

covery. * * *

A decree for discovery is a personal one to be enforced

against the person decreed to make it ; and, if the appellee

S ECTION

4.

P LACE OF SERVICE.

was properly brought within the jurisdiction of the court

below personally, a decree that it make discovery could be

WALLACE V. UNITED ELECTRIC COMPANY.

enforced against it personally by the appellant as his first

move to obtain the ultimate relief asked for. In view of

S upreme Court of P ennsylvania. 1905.
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this, the proceeding must, as was held by the learned judge

below, be regarded as in personam as to the appellee ; and

tlie question whether the Act of April 6, 1859, P. L., 387,

211 Pennsylvania State, 473.

even if it does authorize extra-territorial service of process

from a court of this state, is effectual to acquire jurisdic-

tion over the person of a defendant residing and served in

another state, is not an open one.

Before the passage of that act, Chief Justice Gibson, in

discussing the attempt to acquire jurisdiction over the per-

son of the defendant by the extra-territorial service of pro-

cess, said in Steel v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447: "Jurisdiction

or the person or property of an alien is founded on its

presence or situs within the territory. Without this pres-

ence or situs, an exercise of jurisdiction is an act of usurpa-

tion. An owner of property who sends it abroad subjects it

to the regulations in force at the place as he would subject

his person by going there. The jurisdiction of either springs

Opinion by MR. J STICE BROWN, April 17, 1905.
The fir t prayer of appellant's bill is for full di cover y. * * *
A decree for discover. is a per sonal one to be enforced
a ·ain t the person decreed to make it; and if the appellee
wa properly brought within the jurisdiction of the court
1 el ow p r onally a lecree that it make di co very could be
enf ar ced again t it per on ally by the appellant a his first
move to obtain the ultimate relief a ked for . In view of
this, the proceeding mu t, as was held by the learned judge
b low, be regarded as in personam a to the appellee; and
the que tion whether the Act of April 6 1859, P. L., 3 7
even if it does authorize extra-territorial service of proce.
from a court of this state, i effectual to acquire juri diction over .the person of a def ndant re iding and serYed in
another tate, i not an open one.
Before the pa age of that act, Chief Ju tice Gib on in
<li cu :-'ing th attempt to acquire juri. di tion O\,.er th peron of the defendant by the extra-territorial en'ic of proaid in t eel v. mith 7 W. & . 4-±7 : ' Juri diction
of the per on or I roperty of an alien is founded on it
I re ence or itu within th t rritory. Without thi pre nee or itu an exer i e of juri diction i an act of u urpation. An owner of property who end it abroa ubj cts it
to the r o-ulation in force at the place as h woul ubject
hi p r on by going th r
h juri diction of either prings
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from the voluntary performance of an act, of whose conse-

quences he is bound to take notice. But a foreigner may

choose to subject his property, reserving his person; and it

is clear that jurisdiction of property does not draw after

it jurisdiction of the owner's person; consequently, there

can be no rightful action by the tribunals on the foundation

of jurisdiction acquired by the attachment of property,

which reaches beyond the property itself. ******

What, then, is the right of a state to exercise authority over

the persons of those who belong to another jurisdiction, and

who have, perhaps, not been out of the boundaries of it!

'The sovereignty united to domain,' says Vattel, 'estab-

lishes the jurisdiction of the nation over its territories or

the countries which belong to it. It is its province, or that

of its sovereign, to exercise justice in all places under its

jurisdiction, or the country which belongs to it; to take

cognizance of the crimes committed and the differences that

arise in the country.' 'On the other hand,' adds Mr. Jus-
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tice Stoey (Confl. Ch. 14, §539), no sovereignty can ex-

tend its process beyond its own territorial limits, to sub-

ject other persons or property to its judicial decisions.

Every exertion of authority beyond these limits is a mere

nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property

in other tribunals.' And for this he cites Picquet v. Swan

(5 Mason, 35-42). Not to multiply authorities on a point

so plain, it will be sufficient to add the name of Mr. Burge

(1 Confl. 1), who says it is a fundamental principle, essen-

tial to the sovereignty of every independent state, that no

municipal law, whatever its nature or object, should, pro-

prio vigore, extend beyond the territory of the state by

which it has been established.' And again (3 Burge Confl.

1044), 'that the authority of every judicial tribunal, and

the obligation to obey it, are circumscribed by the limits of

the territory in which it is established.' Such is the familiar,

reasonable and just principle of the law of nations; and it

is scarce sujiposable that the framers of the constitution

designed to abrogate it between states which were to re-

main as independent of each other, for all but national pur-

poses, as they wore before the revolution. Certainly it was

not intended to legitimate an assumption of extra-terri-

torial jurisdiction which would confound all distinctive

I)rinciples of separate sovereignty; and there evidentl\^
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from the voluntary performance of an act, of whose consequences he is bound to take notice. But a foreigner may
hoose to ubject his property, reserving his person; and it
is lear that jurisdiction of property does not draw after
it juri diction of the owner's person; consequently, there
an be no rightful action by the tribunals on the foundation
of jurisdiction acquired by the attachment of property,
which r aches beyond the property itself. * * * * * *
What, then, i the right of a state to exercise authority over
the persons of those who belong to another jurisdiction, and
who have, perhaps, not been out of the boundaries of it~
'The sovereignty united to domain,' says Vattel, 'establi h the juri diction of the nation over its territories or
the countries which belong to it. It is its province, or that
of it overeign, to exercise ju tice in all places under its
jurisdiction, or the country which belongs to it; to take
ognizance of the crimes committed and the differences that
ari e in the country.' 'On the other hand,' adds Mr. J ustice STORY ( Confi. Ch. 14, ~ 539), no sovereignty can extend it process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject other persons or property to its judicial decisions.
Every exertion of authority beyond these limits is a mere
nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property
in oth r tribunals.' And for this he cites Picquet v. Swan
(5 Ma on, 35-42). Not to multiply authorities on a point
o plain, it will be ufficient to add the name of Mr. Burge
(1 onfl. 1), who says it is a fundamental principle, es ential to the ov r iO"nty of every independent state, that no
muni 11 al law, whatever its nature or object, should, proprio vi O"Ol' , ext nd b yond. the territory of the state by
hi h it ha b en establi h d.' And again ( 3 Burge Confi.
1 44) 'that the authority of v ry judicial tribunal, and
th bli 0 ·ati n to b y it, are circum ribed by the limit of
th t rritory i whi hit i e tablished.' uch i the familiar,
n·a. n l l an 1 ju t prin ipl of the law of nation ; and it
i.· .· ·ar · . upp . ab] that th framers of the con tituti n
n tate which w re to r dc:i ,, Nl t abrog t it b t
main ,' i]l(lc>p n nt f a h oth r, for all but national purJ>O ( . a. th ·y w •r0 h f r th r volution. Certainly it wa:;
n i jn n<lp 1 t l •.a-iti at an a
m tion of extra-t rri·
t ri· I j11ri .. di ·Lion · 11i ·h wou]
onf un all distin tivt
pr in ·ir l s f .
rat . ov r ignty; and there evid ntlJ
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was such an assumption in the proceedings under consider-

ation," Speaking of the act of 1859, under which the court

made the order for the extra-territorial service of process

upon the appellee, Sharswood, J., in Coleman's Appeal, 75

Pa. 441, in stating that it has not been the policy of our

.jurisprudence to bring non-residents within the jurisdiction

of our courts, unless in very special cases, said: ''In pro-

ceeding against them for torts, even property belonging to

them cannot be reached by process, and in cases of contract

nothing but the property can be affected unless the defend-

ant voluntarily appear and submit to the jurisdiction. We

may congratulate ourselves that such has been the policy,

for nothing can be more unjust than to drag a man thou-

sands of miles, perhaps from a distant state, and in effect

compel him to appear and defend under the penalty of a

judgment or decree against him pro confesso. The act of

1859 ought, therefore, to receive a construction in harmony

with this policy. There exists no good reason why courts
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of equity should be invested with a more enlarged jurisdic-

tion against non-residents than courts of law." This was

followed by the case of Scott v. Noble, 72 Pa. 115, in which

we held that Noble was not bound by process directed to be

served upon him by the supreme judicial court of Massa-

chusetts outside the state, though he had accepted service

of the writ in the state of Pennsylvania. By the Act of

March 13, 1815, P. L. 150, regulating proceedings in di-

vorce, the act provides for service upon the respondent

"wherever found," but in Ralston' s Appeal, 93 Pa. 133,

we said of that act: "It declares 'upon due proof at the

return of the said subpoena that the same shall have been

served personally on the said party wherever found, or that

a copy had been given to him or her fifteen days before the

return of the same,' a divorce may be decreed. It is con-

tended in case the libellee in divorce is not found within

the bailiwick of the sheriff, the latter may, under this act,

depute some person to make the service in another state.

If a legal service could thus be made in Delaware it can be

in California. Such cannot be a true construction of the

statute. The language 'wherever found' cannot be so con-

strued as to give to a court of this state extra-territorial

power to bring within its jurisdiction the person of a citi-

zen and resident of another state. The property found

71

\\a uch an a sumption in the proceedings under consideration." ipeaking of the act of 1859, under which the court
made the order for the extra-territorial ervi e of proce
upon the appellee, SHARswoon, J., in Col em,an's Appeal, 75
Pa. 441 in stating that it ha not been the policy of our
juri prudence to bring non-residents within the juri diction
of our court , unless in very pecial ca es, said : ''In proceeding again t them for tort , e-' en property belonging to
them cannot be reached by proce s, and in ca es of contract
nothing but the I roperty can be affected unle s the defendant voluntarily a1 pear and ubmit to the jurisdiction. We
may congratulate our elve that such has been the policy,
for nothing can be more unju t than to drag a man thouands of mile , perhaps from a distant tate, and in effect
ompel him to appear and defend under the penalty of a
judgment or decree again t him pro confes o. The act of
1859 ought, therefore, to receive a on truction in harmony
with thi policy. There exi t no good rea on why courts
of equity hould be in e ted with a more enlarged jurisdiction against non-re ident than courts of law." This was
followed by the ca e of Scott v. Noble, 72 Pa. 115, in which
we held that Noble was not bound by process directed to be
er ed upon him by the upreme judicial court of Mas achusetts outside the state, though he had accepted service
of the writ in the tate of Penn ylvania. By the Act of
March 13, 1815, P. L. 150, regulating proceedings in divorce, the act provides for ervice upon the re pondent
"wherever found," but in Ralston's App eal, 93 Pa. 133,
we said of that act: "It declares 'upon due proof at the
return of the said ubpoena that the same ball ha e been
served per onally on the said party wherever found, or that
a copy had been given to him or her fifteen da before the
return of the ame,' a divorce may be decreed. It is contended in ca e the libellee in divorce is not found within
the bailiwick of the heriff the latter may, under this act,
depute om p r on to make the serYice in another state.
If a legal rvice could tbu be made in Delaware it can be
in California. Such cannot be a true con truction of the
"tatute. The language 'wherever found' cannot be so contrued as to give to a ourt of thi state extra-territorial
power to bring within it jurL iction the per on of a citizen and re ident of another tate. The property found
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within this state of a non-resident may be reached and

charged and sold in the enforcement of a debt resting on a

contract without an}^ personal service on the debtor. In

the case of an ordinary debt, the person of a non-resident

defendant not fonnd within the state cannot be reached by

any process issued by a court of common law. In cases

where the language of the statute would seem to give extra-

territorial power this court has denied its exercise. Thus

the 16th section of the Act of 13th June, 1836, relating to

the removal of paupers, authorizes them to be removed 'at

the expense of the district to the city, district or place

where he was last legalty settled, whether in or out of

Pennsylvania.' It has, however, been held the provision

for a removal into another state is of no force or effect:

Overseers of Limestone v. Overseers of Ohillisqiiaque, 6

Norris 294. The first section of the Act of 6th April, 1859,

authorizes any court of this commonwealth having equity

jurisdiction, in any suit in equity instituted therein con-
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cerning property within the jurisdiction of the said court,

to order and direct that any subpoena or other process to

be had in such suit be served on any defendant therein

'then residing or being out of the jurisdiction of said court

wherever he, she or they may reside or be found.' It fur-

ther provides for the proof of service both within and with-

out the limits of the United States. It was held in Cole-

man's Appeal, 75 Pa. 41, that process thus issued in this

state and served in another state on a resident thereof

could not give jurisdiction of the person thus served." In

the federal courts the same view is entertained. By a

statute of the state of Oregon provision was made for ser-

vice upon a non-resident by publication. In Pennoyer v.

Neff, 95 U. S. 714, it appeared that judgment had been

entered against Neff on process which the plaintiff un-

dertook to have served upon him extra-territorially, by

I)ublication, in conformity to the statute. Judgment was

entered in the proceeding against him, and, in holding that

he was not bound by it, through Mr. Justice Field, it was

said: ''Where the entire object of the action is to deter-

mine the personal rights and obligations of the defendants,

that is, where the suit is merely in personam, constructive

service in this form upon a non-resident is ineffectual for

any j^urpose. Process from the tribunals of one state can-
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within thi tate of a non-resident may be reached and
charged and sold in the enforcement of a debt resting on a
ontract without any personal service on the debtor. I n
the ca e of an ordinary debt, the person of a non-resident
defendant not found within the state cannot be reached by
any process issued by a court of common law. In case .·
where the language of the statute would seem to give extrat rritorial power this court has denied its exercise. Thu :~
the 16th section of the Act of 13th June, 1836, relating t o
the removal of paupers, authorizes them to be removed 'at
the expen e of the district to the cit1, district or plac
where he was last legally settled, whether in or out of
Penn ylvania. ' It has, however, been held the provision
for a r moval into another Rtate is of no force or effect :
Over eers of Limestone v. Overseers of Chillisquaque, 6
Norri ... 9.J. The first section of the Act of 6th April, 1859,
authorizes any court of this commonwealth having equity
juris iction, in any suit in equity instituted . therein cone rnin
roperty within the jurisdiction of the said court,
to ord r and direct that any subpoena or other process to
be had in such suit be served on any defendant therein
'then re idin · or being out of the jurisdiction of said cour t
wh r v r he, he or they may reside or be found. ' It furth r rovide for the proof of service both within and without the limit of the United States. It was held in Cole1nan' s Appeal, 75 Pa. 41, that process thus i sued in thi
tat an
rved in another state on a resident thereof
coul not giY juri di tion of the p rson thus served.'' In
th f d ral court the sam vi w i ent rtained. By a
tatute of th tate of Oreo-on rovi ion was made for servi upon a non-re ident by publication. In Pennoyer v .
N e!J, 5 U. . 714, it appeared that judo·ment had been
nt r d again t Neff on proc ss which the plaintiff un1 ri k to have served upon him e ·tra-territorially, by
pnl li · ti n, in conformity to th statut . Judg nt was
nirrC'<] i the pr eding again t him, and, in holding that
h \ a.· not houn 1 by it, through J\!fr. Ju tice FIELD, it was
.· id: " Vh r th ntir obj t of the a tion is to deterin th
r : nc l ri ghts an 1 0 ]io-ations of th d f ndants,
th·1 i : , ' Ii r t11 , .·nit i. m r ly in er. onam, on tructiv
: Pr\'i<· ' in thi : form u1
a non-r i nt i in ff tual for
a y pur1J s .
ro ·c·: from t e tri unals of one state can-
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not run into another state, and summon parties there domi-

ciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings

against them." In the Circuit Court of the United States,

for the western district of this state, in the case of McHenry

V. New York P. & 0. B. R. Co., 25 Fed. Repr. 65, the Court

of Common Pleas of Westmoreland county had made an

order of service on aliens in pursuance of the act of 1851),

but it was said by the Circuit Court: *'It is, indeed, true

that pursuant to an order of the Court of Common Pleas,

claimed to be authorized by the Pennsylvania Act of April

6, 1859, P. L. 387, process has been served on those defend-

ants in England, where they reside, but, clearly, such extra-

territorial service was ineffectual to bring them within the

jurisdiction of the court or make them parties to the suit:

'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714."

The service upon the appellee was ineffectual to bring it

into this jurisdiction, and the order of the court below set-

ting it aside was properly made. That order is now affirmed
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and this appeal dismissed at the costs of appellant.

BARRY V. WACHOSKY.

Supreme Court of Nebraska. 1899.

57 Nebraska, 534.

Ragan, C.

James M. Barry, J. M. Brannan, and C. D. Ryan, made

their promissory note for $500 and delivered the same to

one D. F. Clarke. The note was payable to Clarke only. It
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not run into another state, and ummon parties there domiiled to leave its territory and re pond to proceedings
against them." In the Circuit Court of the United States,
for the western di trict of this state, in the ca e of McHenry
v. New York P. & 0. R. R. Co., 25 Fed. Repr. 65, the Court
of Common Pleas of We tmoreland county had made an
order of service on aliens in pursuance of the act of 1859,
but it was said by the Circuit Court : ''It is, indeed, true
that pursuant to an order of the Court of Common Pleas:
claimed to be authorized by the Pennsylvania Act of April
6, 1859, P. L. 387, process has been served on those defendants in England, where they reside, but, clearly, such extraterritorial service was ineffectu al to bring them within the
jurisdiction of the court or make them parties to the suit:
Pennoyer v. N elf, 95 U. S. 714."
The service upon the appellee was ineffectual to bring it
into this jurisdiction, and the order of the court below setting it aside was properly made. That order is now affirmed
and this appeal dismis sed at the costs of appellant.

was non-negotiable. Before the note matured Clarke seems

to have sold it to Michael Wachosky. At any rate he wrote

his name across the back of the note, and over that he re-

cited in writing that he guaranteed the payment of the

note, and delivered it to Wachosky. The latter, in the coun-

ty court of Douglas county, brought a suit against Clarke,

BARRY V. W ACHOSKY.

Barry, Brannan, and Ryan and set out in his petition the

execution and deliver}^ of the note by the makers thereof to

Clarke, and then that Clarke wrote his name on the back

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

of the note, and wrote over his name his contract guaran-

1899.

57 Nebraska, 534.
RAGAN,

C.

James M. Barry, J. M. Brannan, and C. D. Ryan, made
their promissory note for $500 and delivered the ame to
one D. F. Clarke. The note was payable to Clarke only. It
wa non-negotiable. Before the note matured Clarke seems
to have sold it to Michael Wachosky. At an ' rate he wrote
his name aero s the back of the note, and over that he recited in writinO' that h guaranteed the payment of the
note and delivered it to Wacho k.. The latter, in the county court of Dougla county, brought a suit against Clarke,
Barry, Brannan and yan and et out in his petition the
exe ution and delivery of the not b r the makers thereof to
larke, and then that Clarke wrote his name on the back
of the note, and wrote over his name his contract guaran.
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teeing the payment of the note, and delivered it to him,

Wachosky. Clarke resided and was summoned in Douglas

count5\ The makers of the note were found and summoned

in Dakota county. The makers of the note on being

brought into the county court, appeared specially and ob-

jected to the jurisdiction of the court over them, upon the

grounds that they were found and summoned in Dakota

county, where they resided, and that Clarke was summoned

in Douglas county. This objection of the makers to the

jurisdiction of the county court over them was by it over-

ruled. The makers of the note then answered to the merits

of Wachosky 's petition, and interposed as a defense to the

court's jurisdiction the fact that they were residents of and

found and summoned only in Dakota county. Wachosky, by

a reply to this answer, admitted that the makers were found

and summoned only in Dakota county. Wachosky had a

verdict and judgment in the county court, and the makers

prosecuted a petition in error to the district court to re-
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verse that judgment. The district court affirmed the judg-

ment of the county court, and its judgment is now before

us on a petition in error.

**********

Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides,

in substance, that every action not otherwise specifically

provided for must be brought in the county in which the

defendant, or some one of the defendants, resides or may be

summoned. Section 65 of the Code provides that when an

action is rightly brought in any county a summons may be

issued to another county against any one or more of the

defendants at the plaintiff's request. Now Clarke was

made a defendant to this action, and he was served with

a summons in Douglas county, and therefore it was proper

to summon the other defendants to the action in Dakota

county, if the action was riglitly brought against Clarke in

Douglas county. The test for determining whether an ac-

tion be rightly brought in one county against the defendant

found, and served therein, so that the other defendants may

l)e served in a foreign county is whether the defendant

served in the county in which the action is brought is a

bona fide defendant to that action — whether his interest in

the action and in the result thereof is adverse to that of the

plaintiff. [Banna v. Emerson, 45 Neb. 708, and cases there
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teeing the payment of the note, and delivered it to him,
larke resided and was summoned in Douglas
W acho ky.
county. Tb maker of the note were f ounJ and summoned
in Dakota county. The makers of the note on being
brought into the county court, appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of the court over them, upon the
grounds that they were found and summoned in Dakota
county, where they resided, and that Clarke was summoned
in Douglas county. This objection of the makers to the
jurisdiction of the county court over them was by it overruled. The makers of the note then answered to the merits
of W achosky 's petition, and interposed as a defense to the
court's jurisdiction the fact that they were residents of and
found and summoned only in Dakota county. Wachosky, by
a reply to this answer, admitted that the makers were found
and ummoned only in Dakota county. W achosky had a
verdict and judgment in the county court, and the makers
prosecuted a petition in error to the district court to rever. e that judgment. The district court affirmed the judgment of the county court, and its judgment is now before
u on a petition in error.
• * * * * • • • • •
ection 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides,
in ubstance, that every action not otherwise specifically
provided for must be brought in the county in which the
defendant, or some one of the defendants, resides or may be
summoned. Section 65 of the Code provides that when an
action is rightly brought in any county a summons may be
issued to another county against any one or more of the
efen ants at the plaintiff' reque t. Now Clarke was
mad a def ndant to thi ·action, and he was served with
a ummon in Dou 0 ·]as ounty, and therefore it was proper
to ummo the other d fondant to the action in Dakota
county, if th a tion wa rio-htly brouO'ht against larke in
ougl . ounty. The t . t for d termining whether an acti n b ri 0 ·hil br ught in on county ao· inst the def ndant
f urnl, and .· rv d th r in, so that the other defendants may
11
•
for i n ounty i whether the defendant
u ty in which th action is brought is a
/J()11a fide d f n ant t th t a ti n-wheth r hi int r t in
t li c r· i n n in th r ult th r of i adv r
to that of the
plaintiff. (Hanna v. Emerson, 45 N b. 708, and case there
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cited; Miller v. Meeker, 54 Neb. 452.) Pearson v. Kansas

Mfg. Co., 14 Neb. 211, is no longer regarded as sound, but

has in effect long been overruled. So that, looking at this

action as a suit upon the promissory note executed by the

plaintiffs in error to Clarke, we have the question, Did

Clarke, by assigning this note to Wachosky become liable

upon the note? We think not. The note was non-negotiable.

It was merely a chose in action. It was assignable, and

when assigned by Clarke, the payee, his assignee, Wach-

osky, could maintain an action upon it in his own name, and

to this action Clarke was not a necessary party. (Code of

Civil Procedure, sec. 30.) Clarke, by assigning this note to

Wachosky, did not become liable to him or his assignee on

the note, and therefore, viewing this action as a suit upon

the note, Clarke was not interested in the result of that

action adversely to Wachosky, and therefore the action was

not rightly brought on the note in Douglas county and

the court had no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs in error.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Of course, if the payee of a negotiable promissory note

writes his name across the back thereof, without more, and

delivers it to a third party, the law will write over that

signature the promise on the part of such payee that, if the

holder thereof presents it to the maker when due for pay-

ment, and it be dishonored, and he be given due notice

thereof, he will pay the note to the holder. But the payee

of a non-negotiable note who sells it, writes his name across

the back thereof, and delivers it to the vendee, without

more, does not thereby become liable upon the note. His

assignment and delivery of the note simply amounts to a

quit claim upon his part of his interest in the note to his

vendee. Such a payee of such a non-negotiable note may,

of course, make himself liable to his assignee for the pay-

ment of the said note by a writing evidencing such a con-

tract over his signature. But in that case such a contract

would be a separate and independent one from the contract

evidenced by the note and would not affect the makers of

the note nor their liability; nor enable the holder of the

note to unite in one action the makers and the payee. In

the case at bar Clarke did write over his signature on this

note a guaranty of pajTuent, and by so doing he became

liable to Wachosky as a guarantor of this note. But the

makers of the note were not parties to the contract of

SERVI E AND RET

RN OF

~UMM ONS

75

cited; Miller v. Meeker, 54 Neb. 452.) P earson v. Kansas
"Jr!fg. Co., 14 Neb. 211, is no longer regarded a ound, but
ha in effect long been overruled. So that, looking at thi
action as a uit upon the promis ory note executed by the
plaintiffs in error to larke, we have the que tion, Djd
1
larke, by assigning thi note to Wachosky become liable
upon the note~ We think not. The note was non-negotiable.
It was merely a cho e in action. It was a ignable, and
when assigned by Clarke, the payee, his assignee, Wacho ky, could maintain an action upon it in his own name, and
to this action Clarke was not a nece sary party. ( ode of
Civil Procedure, sec. 30.) Clarke, by a igning this note to
W achosky, did not become liable to him or his a ignee on
the note, and therefore, viewing thi action as a suit upon
the note, Clarke wa not intere ted in the r e ult of that
action adversely to Wacho ky, and therefore the action was
not rightly brought on the note in Douglas county and
the court had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff in error.
Of cour e, if the payee of a negotiable promi ory note
writes hi name aero the back thereof, without more, and
delivers it to a third party, the law will write over that
signature the promise on the part of uch payee that, if the
holder thereof pre ents it to the maker when due for payment, and it be dishonored, and he be given due notice
thereof, he will pay the note to the holder. But the payee
of a non-negotiable note who sells it, writes his name across
the back thereof, and delivers it to the vendee, without
more, does not thereby become liable upon the note. Hi,..,
assignment and delivery of the note simply amount to a
quit claim upon his part of his intere t in the not to hi
vendee. Such a payee of such a non-negotiable note may,
of course, make himself liable to bi a ignee for the payment of the aid note by a writing evidencing u h a contract over his signature. But in tbat ca e uch a contract
would be a eparate and independent one from the contract
evidenced by the note and would not affect the maker of
the note nor their liability; nor nable the hold r of the
note to unite in one action the makers and the paye . In
the ca e at bar Clarke id write o er his ignature on tbi
note a guaranty of payment, and by so doing he became
liable to Wacho ky a a guarantor of tbi note.
ut the
maker of the note were not parties to the contract of
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guaranty. The contract of guaranty was Clarke's con-

tract, and a senarate and independent contract from the con-

tract made by plaintiffs in error. Clarke was not, and is not,

liable to Wachosky on the note. The makers of the note

are not liable to Wachosky on Clarke's guaranty. There-

fore, if we regard this as a suit upon the note, Clarke was

not a proper party thereto, and the court had no jurisdic-

tion over the plaintiffs in error. It we regard it as a suit

upon the guaranty, Clarke was the only proper party there-

to and the court had no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs in

error. Wachosky has, perhaps, two causes of action. One

cause of action is on the note and against the makers there-

of. The other cause of action is against Clarke on his

guaranty of pajTuent. These two causes of action cannot be

united, for the obvious reason that each one does not affect

all the parties to the action. {Mowery v. Mast, 9 Neb. 445 ;

Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 88.) The judgment of the dis-

trict court is reversed and the action, so far as it affects the
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plaintiffs in error, is dismissed.

Reversed and dismissed.

Section 5. Keturn of Service.

JONES V. BIBB BRICK COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1904.

120 Georgia, 321. ^*

Motion to set aside judgment. Before Judge Hodges.

City Court of Macon. October 17, 1903. [Judgment set

aside. Plaintiff excepted.]

**********

Lamar, J. A summons of garnishment directed to the
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guaranty. The contract of guaranty was Clarke's contract, and a eparate and independent contract from the contract made by plaintiffs in error. Clarke was not, and is not,
li ble to W acho ky on the note. The makers of the note
ar not liable to ~ achosky on Clarke's guaranty. Theref r , if we regard this .a a suit upon the note, Clarke was
not a proper party thereto, and the court had no jurisdiction o er th plaintiffs in error. It we regard it as a suit
u on the guaranty, larke was the only proper party thereto and the ourt had no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs in
rror. Wacbo ky has, perhaps, two causes of action. One
au e of action i on the note and against the makers thereof. The other cause of action is against Clarke on bis
guaranty of payment. These two causes of action cannot be
united, for the obviou reason that eacb. Qne does not affect
all the parties to the action. (Mowery v. Mast, 9 Neb. 445;
de of i il Proce lure, sec. 88.) The judgment of the distri t court i rever ed and the action, so far as it affects the
plaintiffs in error, is dismissed.
Reversed and dismissed.

Bibb Brick Company was served, August 23, 1902, the re-

turn of tho officer showing that he had served the summons

on "Bibb Brick Co., by handing the same to John T.

Moore, its secretary and treasurer." * * * The motion to

sot tliis judgment aside is verified by Moore, and does not

deny tliat he was in charge of the office or of the business

SECTION

5.

RETURN OF SERVICE.

JONES V. BIBB BRICK COMP ANY.

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1904.
120 Georgia, 321.

a icl judgm nt.
ef ore J udo-e HonaEs.
aeon. October 17, 1903. [Judgment set
ept cl.]

LA f n .J.
summons f garni. hm nt direct d to the
J,ibl1 Bric·k Colllpany wa. , rv <l, Augu t 23, 1902, the reur of' th orti ·er . howin ,. that b ha s rved the ummon
<u
J ~i lib l>rirk 1 ., l>. h ndinO' the same to J obn T.
1oon, it. . · Tctary and tr a:ur r . " * * • The motion to
. ·t thi. judum nt a.·id i.
rifi cl y M ore, an doe not
a ·n that h . was in charge r the m or of th bu ·in
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of the company in the county. * * * We are therefore to

deal with a case in which the return of the officer, who had

made good service, was incomplete and defective in its

failure to allege that Moore, "secretary and treasurer,"

was "in r-hnt-g'e of the office or business*' oi the garnishee

at the time the summons was handed to him in person.

i-7. Process and service are essential. But the return,

being only evidence of what the officer has done in serving,

the writ, is not jurisdictional. Still it is manifest that a

court ought not to proceed without having a legal return of

record to show that its process had been actually served,

and that it had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant. If there is an entire absence of a return, or if

the return made is void because showing service on the

wrong person, or at a time, place, or in a manner not pro-

vided by law, the court cannot proceed. Callaway v.

Douglasville College, 99 Ga. 623. If, however, the fact of

service appears, and the officer's return is irregular or in-
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complete, it should not be treated as no evidence, but rather

as furnishing defective proof of the fact of service. The

irregularity may be cured by an amendment which does

not make or state a new fact, but merely supplies an omis-

sion in the statement as to an existing fact. Where there

has been valid service and no return, the deficiency may be

supplied before taking further steps in the cause. If there

has been service and a voidable or defective return, it may

be amended even after judgment, so as to save that which

has been done under service valid in fact but incompletely

reported to the court. For in its last analysis it is the

fact of service, rather than the proof thereof by the return,

which is of vital importance. Ordinarily service is either

good or bad. But process and return existing in writing

may vary between void, voidable, and perfect. If either is

void, the judgment predicated solely thereon is a nullity.

Where process and return are not void, some classes of de-

fects therein are cured by judgment. For many things are

sufficient to prevent a judgTaent from being rendered which

would be insufficient to set aside a judgment actually ren-

dered. Hence the Civil Code, section 5365, declares that

"a judgment cannot be arrested or set aside for any defect

in the pleadings or record that is aided by verdict, or

amendable as matter of form." This right to amend a
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of the company in the county. • • • We are therefo re to
deal with a case in which the return of the officer, wbo han
made good ervice, wa~ incomplete ~nd defective in it :
failure to allege that Moore, ''secretary and +.real::ur~r '
was ''in h~ T'ge <:f ::!::e office Gr business>' OI the garni het
at the time the summons was handed to him in per on.
1-7. Process and service are essential. But the return
being only evidence of what the officer has done in ervin&
the writ, is not jurisdictional. Still it is manife t that a
court ought not to proceed without having a legal return of
record to show that its process had been actuall
erved
and that it had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. If there is an entire absence of a return, or if
the return made is void because showing service on the
wrong person, or at a time, place, or in a manner not pro·
vided by law, the court cannot proceed. Callaway
Douglasville College, 99 Ga. 6... 3. If, however, the fact of
service appears and the officer's return is irregular or incomplete, it should not be treated as no evidence, but rather
as furnishing defective proof of the fact of ser ice. Th
irregularity ma be cured by an amendment which doe
not make or tate a new fact, but merely supplie an omi sion in the tatement as to an existing fact. Where there
has been valid service and no return, the deficiency may be
supplied before taking further tep in the cause. If there
has been ser ice and a voidable or defective return, it may
be amended even after judgment, so as to save that which
has been done under service alid in fact but incompletely
reported to the ourt. For in its last anal sis it is the
fact of service, rather than the proof thereof by the return:
which is of vital importance. Ordinarily service is either
good or bad. But proce s and return existing in writing
may vary between void, voidable, and perfect. If either i
void the judgment predicated solely thereon i a nullity.
Where proce and return are not void, some cla e of defe t th rein are ured by jud ment. For many thing are
sufficient to I rev nt a judgment from b ing rend red whi h
would be in uffici nt to s t a ide a jud 0 ·ment actually render . Hen e th
ivil od
e tion 5 6'"' declare that
''a judgment cannot be arrested or et a ide for any efect
in the pleading or record that i aided by verdict or
amendable as matter of form." This right to amend a
(I
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"return" so as to make it conform to the facts is allowed

on general principles and by our statute. If the officer is

in commission and liable on his bond, he may make this

amendment voluntarily. Civil Code, section 5116. If he

is dead or out of commission, or refuses to make the return

which the facts require, then the amendment may be ordered

by the court nunc pro tunc. * * *

* * * * In Hargis v. E. T. Va. S Ga. Ry. Co., 90 Ga. 42,

the return was attacked before judgment; there was no

offer to amend, and no proof that the agent was in charge,

or that service upon him would have bound the company.

The court therefore properly declined to enter judgment

against the garnishee. In Southern Ry. Co. v. Hagan, 103

Ga. 564, the original record shows that the process was

void, and the garnishee attacked the judgment not on the

ground that the return was defective but because it had

never been served with a summons of garnishment. But

none of these cases determine what would have been the
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effect of valid process and perfect service, with an incom-

plete or defective return where the judgment rendered

thereon was attacked and the motion to set aside and evi-

dence thereunder showed valid service in fact. Such was

the case of Third National Bank v. McCullough, 108 Ga.

249, where the service was perfect, but the return failed to

recite that Hawkins, president, was in charge ; and yet the

judgment against the garnishee by default was allowed to

stand, there being no allegation in the attack thereon that

Hawkins was not in fact the agent of the bank, in charge

of its affairs in the county. In support of this ruling the

court cited Sou. Ex. Co. v. Skipper, 85 Ga. 565, determined

under a statute where service upon an agent was only al-

lowed when the president of the garnishee company resided

out of the State. The return was silent as to the residence

of the president, and yet after service upon the local agent

alone the default judgment was held sufficient, the court

saying, tliat "in rendering judgment based on the service

its sufficiency was adjudicated at least in an incidental

way." Tlie same principle was involved in Holbrook v.

Evansville Co., 114 Ga. 2, where the return did not follow

the language of the statute, and was therefore not perfect

in its ver))iage.

Under the autliorities, therefore, it is evident that the
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' return" o a t o make it conform to the facts is allowed
n general principle and by our statute. If the officer is
in commi ·ion and liable on his bond, he may make this
· m ndment voluntarily. Civil Code, section 5116. If he
i d ad or out of commi ion, or refuses to make the return
which the facts require, then the amendment may be ordered
by the court nunc pro tune. * * *
* * * * I n Hargis v. E . T . Va . & Ga. Ry. Co., 90 Ga. 42,
the return was attacked before judgment; there was no
offer to amend, and no proof that t he agent was in charge,
or that ·er ice upon him would have bound the company .
The court therefore properly declined to enter judgment
again t the garni hee. In Southern Ry. Co. v. Hagan, 103
Ga. 56±, the original record shows tha t the process wa
void, and the garni hee attacked the judgment not on the
ground that the return was defective but because it had
ne er been served with a summons of garnishment. But
none of these ca
determine what would have been the
ffect of valid proc ss and perfect service, with an incomplete or defective return where t he judgment rendered
ther on was attacked and the motion to set aside and evidence tbereund r bowed valid service in fact. Such was
the case of Third National BanA v. McCull ough, 108 Ga .
..A9, where the ervice was perfect, but the return failed to
r cite that Hawkin , president, was in charge ; a nd yet the
ju gm nt again t the garni bee by default was allowed to
.. tan , there b ing no allegati on in t he a ttack ther eon that
II wkin wa not in fact the agent of the bank, in charge
f it affair in the county. In u port of this ruling the
rt ·ited ou. E x . Co . v. Skipper, 5 Ga. 565, det ermined
u d r a t tute wh re service upon an agent was only all w d wh n the re id nt of the garni bee comp any resided
ui f th
tat . The r turn wa il nt a t o the re idence
f tl1 · pr ·i nt, an y t after rvi u on t he local agent
al n · th
•fault ju ·m nt wa h Id ufficient, the court
.H. ' inrr that' in r ncl rino· ju gm t ba ed on the ervice
· t. . ulliei ·nry wa
ju i at d at 1 a t in an incidental
wa:.'
'I Ii(• :,
prin i 1 wa. inv Iv d in II olb rook v.
/~ 1 r111. ill
'o., 4
. 2, where the retur n did not follow
th; I all ua ,. of the 8iatul , and was therefore n ot perfect
i rt if v ·rlii, p; .
nd ·r th • auth riti " h r fore, it is evident that the
0
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defective return might have been amended to conform to

the facts, and that such amendment when made vrould have

related back so as to make the record complete and the

judgment perfect. But it may be claimed that here the

defect was never cured, since no amendment was ever

made. None was necessary. Whatever may be the rule in

ordinary cases, both the allegations and the silence of this

motion make it certain that the garnishee had been duly

served.

Judgment reversed. All the justices concur.

SMOOT V. JUDD.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1904.

184 Missouri, 508.

Marshall, J. — This is a bill in equity to set aside a judg-

ment of the circuit court of Barton county rendered on
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d fe ti"· r turn micrht have been am n 1 d to conform to
the fact , and that . uch amendm nt wh n ma le would have
r lated back o a to mak the r ecord ornpl t and th
judgment I erfe t. But it may be ~laimed that here the
defect wa never cur
·m · no amendm nt wa ever
made. None was nee ary. \ Vhatever may be the rule in
ordinary ca es, both th e allegations and the il nee of this
motion make it certain that the garnishee had been duly
served.
• • • • • • * * * •
J udgnient reversed. All the ju tices concur.

September 18, 1891, in favor of G. S. Judd and against Ella

G. Smoot and Samuel N. Smoot, and the execution issued

thereunder, and the sheriff's deed to certain land in that
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county made to said Judd as purchaser at such execution

sale. * * *

Ella G. Smoot and Samuel N. Smoot are and at all times

hereinafter mentioned were husband and wife, Mrs. Smoot

SMOOT V. JUDD.

owned lots 4, 5, and 6, in Jasper, Missouri, but it does rot

appear whether it was her separate estate or only a legal

Supreme Court of

~Missouri.

1904.

estate. Being such owner, she and her husband, on April

15, 1887, executed and delivered to G. S. Judd their promis-

sory note for $683.61, payable one day after date. * * * The

184 111issouri, 508.

debt was not paid, and on July 28, 1891, the debt being then

over four years past due, Judd instituted suit in the Barton

Circuit Court against Mr. and Mrs. Smoot. The petition

did not describe the defendants as husband and wife. A

summons was regularly issued, and was returned by the

sheriff as having been served personally upon both Mr. and

Mrs. Smoot. * * * The case was allowed to go by default,

MARSHALL, J.-This is a bill in equity to set a ide a judgment of the circuit court of Barton county rendered on
Se1 tember 18, 1891, in favor of G. S. Judd and against Ella
G. moot and Samuel N. moot and the execution issued
thereunder, and the heriff 's deed to certain land in that
county made to said Judd as purchaser at such execution
ale. * * *

* • * * * * • * * •

Ella G. Smoot and Samuel N. Smoot are and at all times
h reinafter mentioned were hu band and wife. Mrs. Smoot
owned lot 4, 5, and 6 in J a per, :Missouri, but it doe Pot
app ar whether it wa h r
parate estate or only a legal
e tat . Being such owner, sh and her hu band on April
15, 1 7 executed and deliv red to G. S. Judd their promis. r ~ note for $6 3.61, pa ,.able on day after date. * * * The
debt was not aid and n July 2 1891, the debt beino- then
over four year pa t due, Judd in tituted suit in the Barton
Circuit ourt against Mr. and Mrs. Smoot. The etition
di not describe the d f ndant as hu band and wife. A
ummons was regularly i u d a d wa r turn d by the
sh riff as having been served per onall upon both :Mr. and
Mrs. moot. "' • * The case wa llowed to go by default,
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and on September 18, 1891, a personal judgment was ren-

dered against Mr. and Mrs. Smoot, for $925.13. On the

3rd. of February, 1891, Mrs. Smoot 's brother, Peter A.

Gordon, died leaving certain land in Barton county, and

Mrs. Smoot inherited an undivided one-fourth interest

therein. On January 20, 1892, an execution was issued on

said judgment and was levied on Mrs. Smoot 's interest in

the land. * * * The land was then sold on March 10, 1892,

and Judd became the purchaser of Mrs. Smoot 's interest

therein for $510.00, and received a sheriff's deed therefor.

The matter stood thus until October 30, 1893, when, the

time for redemption having expired and the Smoots having

done nothing, Judd instituted a suit for the partition of

the land. * * * On April 14, 1894, a decree in partition was

rendered and on September 3, 1894, the land was sold under

that decree, and the defendants Brand and Jackson became

the purchasers and received the sheriff's deeds therefor,

entered into possession and have remained in possession
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ever since. It is conceded that at some time, the date is

not disclosed by the record, Mrs. Smoot sued the sheriff on

his official bond, for $3,000 damages, for the loss of her

land, by the sale under said personal judgment, alleging

that his return upon the summons that he had served it

upon her personally was false, and that upon a trial of that

case she recovered a judgment for nominal damages.

On August 18, 1895, Mrs. Smoot instituted this suit in

equity. The petition alleges nearly all the facts herein-

before set out, and predicates a right to recover upon the

falsitv of the sheriff's return aforesaid. The nction was

brought against Judd, Brand, Jackson, and Mr. Smoot.

Judd and Smoot though personally served made default,

and the action is defended by Brand and Jackson, the pur-

chasers of the property at the partition sale. * * *

I.

At some time, not definitely stated, the plaintiff sued the

sheriff for damages for false return, and recovered a

judgment. Tf tliat action was instituted before this suit

was begun, it would clearly be a bar to this suit, for even if

it should be conceded that the plaintiff was entitled to both

remedies, the election to take one, would preclude a right
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and on September 18, 1891, a personal judgment was rendered against Mr. and Mrs. Smoot, for $925.13. On the
rd. of February, 1891, Mrs. Smoot 's brother, Peter A.
Gordon, died leaving certain land in Barton county, and
Mrs. Smoot inherited an undivided one-fourth interest
therein. On January 20, 1892, an execution was issued on
said judgment and was levied on Mrs. Smoot 's interest in
the land. * * * The land was then sold on March 10, 1892,
and Judd became the purchaser of Mrs. Smoot 's interest
th rein for $510.00, and received a sheriff's deed therefor.
The matter stood thus until October 30, 1893, when, the
time for redemption having expired and the Smoots having
done nothing, Judd instituted a suit for the partition of
the land. * * * On April 14, 1894, a decree in partition was
rendered and on September 3, 1894, the land was sold under
that decree, and the defendants Brand and Jackson became
the purcha ers and received the sheriff's deeds therefor,
entered into possession and have remained in possession
ever ince. It is conceded that at some time, the date is
not di closed by the record, Mrs. Smoot sued the sheriff on
his official bond, for $3,000 damag·es for the loss of her
land, by the sale under said personal judgment, alle ·ing
that his return upon the summons that he had served it
upon h r personally was false, and that upon a trial of that
ase . he r covered a judgment for nominal damages.
On Augn t 18, 1895, Mrs. Smoot instituted this suit in
quity. The petition alleges nearly all the facts hereinbefor set out, and predicates a right to recover upon the
fal itv f th sheriff's return aforesaid. The action was
br ngl1t a o-ain. t Judd, Brand, Jackson, and Mr. Smoot .
.Judr1 an~ Smoot though -per onally erved made default,
and th a tion is def nded by Brand and J ackson, the pureh · r of the property at the partition ale. * * *

• • • * * • • * * *
I.

At omp tim0 n t d flnit ly stat d, the plaintiff sued the
. h riff for <lmnag · f r fal e r turu, and recovered a
: ud 0 ·mN1 t.
f lie t
iion was instituted b for this uit
"
1J ·rim, 11 i; 111 rl arly b a bar t thi uit, for even if
it .' 11 Jlllcl h onr <1
that th plaintiff wa ntitl d to both
r
i . , th
l tion to take n , would preclude a right
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thereafter to pursue the other. [Nanson v. Jacob, 93 Mo.

1. c. 345; Nalle v. Thompson, 173 Mo. 1. c. 616.) In any

event, without regard to which action was begun first, it now

appears that the plaintiff prosecuted her suit against the

sheriff to a final and successful result. This being true,

whatever wrong or loss she suffered in consequence of thr

alleged false return of the sheriff, has been compensated

for, and she has obtained satisfaction therefor. So that

even if it could be conceded that her remedy was double,

her wrong and loss was single and she could have only one

satisfaction, and having received that in the other action,

she is no longer entitled to pursue this remedy. {Rivers v.

Blom, 163 Mo. 1. c. U8:Bank v. Bank, 130 Mo. 1. c. 168.)

But, as hereinafter pointed out, I am of opinion that

her remedy was confined to an action on the sheriff's bond,

for false return, and that she cannot maintain a suit in

equity to set aside the judgment or its consequences, because

of the falsity of the sheriff's return showing personal ser-

n.
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vice on her.

When the case was here on former appeal, it was held

that while the adjudications in this State had held that a

sheriff's return is conclusive, except in an action against

the sheriff for a false return, still in some other jurisdic-

tions, a bill in equity would lie to set aside a judgment, by

default, based upon a false return of the sheriff showing

service of the summons upon the defendant, and accord-

ingly it was then held that the return of the sheriff was
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thereafter to pursue the other. Cl>i anson v. Jacob, 93 Mo.
I. c. 345; Nalle v. Thompson, 173 1\1o. 1. c. 616.) In any
event, without regard to which action was begun :first, it no\\
appears that the plaintiff pro ecuted her suit again t th
heriff to a final and successful result. Thi being true.
whatever wrong or loss she suffered in consequence of th r
alleged false return of the sheriff, has been compensate
for, and she has obtained satisfaction therefor. So that
even if it could be conceded that her remedy wa double,
her wrong and loss was single and she could have only one
satisfaction, and having received that in the other action
she is no longer entitled to pursue this remedy. (Rivers v.
Blom, 163 110. 1. c. 448; Bank v . Bank, 130 Mo. 1. c. 168.)
:But, as hereinafter pointed out, I am of opinion that
her remedy was confined to an action on the sheriff's bond,
for false return, and that she cannot maintain a suit in
equity to set a ide the judgment or its con equences, becau e
of the falsity of the sheriff's return showing personal service on her.

not conclusive, and that this action would lie. {Smoot

II.

V. Judd, 161 Mo. 673.)

With the greatest respect for the learned judge who

wrote that opinion and for the equally learned judges who

concurred in it, I am constrained to say, I think it does

not announce the true rule of law in this State, and that it

should be overruled.

Ever since the decision of this court in Hallowell v. Page,

24 Mo. 590, the law has been uniformly declared in this

State to be that ''the return of a sheriff on process, reg-

ular on its face, and showing the fact and mode of service,

is conclusive upon the parties to the suit. Its truth can

T. p.— 6

When the case was here on former appeal, it was held
that while the adjudications in this State had held that a
sheriff's return i conclusive, except in an action against
the sheriff for a fal e return, still in some other jurisdiction , a bill in equity would lie to et aside a judgment by
default, based upon a false return of the sheriff showing
ervice of the summons upon the defendant, and accordin()'ly it was then held that the return of the sheriff wa
not conclusive, and that this action would lie. (Smoot
v . Jitdd, 161 Mo. 673.)
With the greate t respect for the learned judge who
wrote that opinion and for the equally learned judges who
ncurred in it I am con trained to say I think it doe
not announ e the true rule of law in thi State and that it
hould be overruled.
er ince the decision of this court in Hallo well v. Pag e
24 110. 590 the law ha be n uniformly declared in thi
tate to be that "the r eturn of a sheriff on proce s, regular on it fac and howin the fact and mode of ervic
i
conclu ive upon the partie to the suit. Its truth can'
T. P.-6
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be controverted only in a direct action against the sheriff

for false return." * * *

In Steivart v. Stringer, 41 Mo. 1. c. 404, Wagner, J. ^id:

' ' The courts of some of the States have held that a sheriff's

return is merely prima facie evidence of the facts therein

stated; but the law is firmly settled in this State that a

defendant cannot controvert the truth of the sheriff's re-

turn. If the return of a sheriff to a process is regular on

its face, it is conclusive upon the parties to the suit, and

the remed}^ for the party injured is an action against the

sheriff for a false return."

But it is said that, in all the cases cited, the attack upon

the sheriff's return was made in the original case, either

before or after judgment and that while it was held that

the sheriff's return was conclusive upon the parties in the

original case, it was not held that such a return could not

be attacked by a direct proceeding in equity, and upon

former appeal it was pointed out that in Alabama, Ten-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

nessee, Kansas, Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado and Illi-

nois, it is held that a false return of the sheriff can be

attacked and set aside by a direct proceeding in equity.

iVccordingly it was held upon former appeal of this case

that the alleged false return of the sheriff in the original

r-ase of Jiidd v. Smoot could be attacked and set aside in

this suit in equity.

This raises the question whether or not a return of a

sheriff can be attacked and, if found to be false, a judg-

ment at law by default founded thereon, can be set aside

in a direct proceeding in equity.

Gw\Tine on Sheriffs, page 473, thus states the law: *'It

is a well settled principle of the English law, that the sher-

iff's return is not traversable, and the court will not try

on afTidavits, whether the return of a sheriff to a writ is

false, even though a strong case is made out, showing

fraud and collusion, but the party must resort to his

remedy by an action against the sheriff for a false return.

In Conneftif'ut, the return of the sheriff on a mesne pro

cess is held to be only prima facie evidence, but even ir

that State, he cannot falsify it by his own evidence. In

most, and y)robably all of tlie other States in the United

States, llie rule is established, that as botweon parties to

the suit, in whidi the icturn is made, and privies, and the

be controverted only in a direct action against the sheriff
for false return. " * * *
In Stewart v. Stringer, 41 Mo. 1. c. 404, W AGNER, J . .Aid:
· The courts of some of the States have held that a sheriff's
r turn is merely prima facie evidence of the facts therein
~ tated; but the law is firmly settled in this State that a
c1efendant cannot controvert the truth of the sheriff's re' urn. If the return of a sheriff to a process is regular on
it face, it is conclusive upon the parties to the suit, and
the r medy for the party injured is an action against the
heriff for a false return.''
But it is said that, in all the cases cited, the attack upon
the sheriff's return was made in the original case, either
before or after judgment and that while it was held that
the sheriff's return was conclusive upon the p arties in the
riginal case, it was not held that such a r eturn could not
be attacked by a direct proceeding in equity, and upon
former appeal it was pointed out that in Alabama, Tennessee, Kansas, Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado and Illinois, it i held tbat a fal e return of the sheriff can be
attacked and set aside by a direct proceeding in equity.
ccordingly it was held upon former appeal of this case
that the all ged f al e return of the sheriff in the original
rase of Judd v. Srnoot could be attacked and set aside in
this suit in equity.
This raises the question whether or not a return of a
. heriff an b atta k d and, if found to be false, a judgment at law by d fault founded thereon, can be set a sid('"
in a direct proc edinO' in equity.
Gwyn e on heriff , paO' 47 , thu tates the law : "It
i. a w 11 s ttl d prin ·ipl of th Enc:;lj h law, that the sheriff's r turn i. n t trav r abl , and the court will not try
on amda it. wh t]1 r the return of a sh riff to a writ fr
f 1.
v n tl1011gh a tronO' as is made out, showing
f'r n 1 ancl ro1ln. ion ut the party mu t r sort t o his
r
cly y c n di n gain t the h riff for a fal e return.
fn C n djf'n , he n turn of th h riff on a mesne pr o
c· "s i: h l l t 1 only prima f ri
vid nee, but even fr
t • tnic hP rrmnot fal sify it by hi own evid,-mc . In
:1 nnrl pr l1al1l. c 11 f tl10 oth r tat s in the Unit i1
·' ·it .· thP nil i. rRtnhli .·11 <l, that as h tw00n parties to
t e suit, in whi<'h th rrturn i rnacl and rivi
and the
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officer, except when the latter is charged in a direct pro

ceeding against him for a false return, the sheritf's re-

turn is conclusive and cannot be impeached. A party or

privy may not aver the falsity of a return made by the

proper officer, without a direct proceeding against the offi-

cer, even in chancery."

Walker v. Bobbins, 14 How. (U. S.) 584, was an injunc-

tion to restrain the enforcement of a judgment, based upon

a marshal's return of personal service, and which the

deputy marshal who served the process testified was false.

The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking

through Mr. Justice Catron, said: "Assuming the fact to

be that Walker was not served with process, and that the

marshal's return is false, can the bill, in this event, be

maintained? The respondents did no act that connects

tliem with the false return; it was the sole act of the

marshal, through his deputy, for whi^^h he was responsible

to the complainant, Walker, for any damages that were
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sustained by him in consequence of a false return. This is

free from controversy; still the marshal's responsibility

does not settle the question made by the bill, which is, in

general terms, whether a court of equity has jurisdiction

to regulate proceedings, and to afford relief at law, where

there has been abuse, in the various details arising on exe-

cution of process, original, mesne and final. If a court o'

chancery can be called on to correct one abuse, so it

may correct another; and in effect, to vacate judgments,

where the tribunal rendering the same would refuse re-

lief, either on motion, or on a proceeding by audita querela,

where this mode of redress is in use. In cases of false

returns affecting the defendant, where the plaintiff at law

is not in fault, redress can only be had in the court of

law where the record was made, and if relief cannot

be had there, the party injured must seek his relief against

the marshal." Accordingly equitable relief was denied.

**********

Hunter v. Stoneburner, 92 111. 75, was a bill in equity to

set aside a judgment in partition and a sale thereunder,

on the ground that the plaintiff had not been served with

process, and for other reasons. The sheriff's return was

personal service. The plaintiff succeeded in the lower

court and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court

ERVI

E

AND RETURN

OF

SUM MONS

83

officer, except when the latter is charged in a direct proceeding again t him for a false return, the sheriff's return is conclu ive R.nd cannot be impeached. A party or
privy may not aver the falsity of a return made by tlw
proper officer, without a direct proceeding against the officer, even in chancery.''
Walker v. Robbin , 14 How. (U. S.) 584, was an injunction to restrain the enfo1 cement of a judgment, based upon
a marshal's return of personal service, and which the
deputy marshal who erved the process testified was false.
The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
through Mr. Justice ATRON, said: "Assuming the fact to
ue that W aJl:er was not served with process, and that the
marshal's return is fal e, ran the bill, in this event, be
maintained~
The re I ondents did no act that connectg
them with th8 fal e return; it was the sole act of the
marshal, through his deputy, for which he was responsible
to the complainant, Walker, for any damages that were
sustained by him in con equence of a false return. This is
free from controversy; still the marshal's responsibility
does not settle the que ti on made by the bill, which is, in
general terms, whether a court of equity has jurisdiction
to regulate proceedings, and to afford relief at law, where
there has been abu e in the various details arising on exe·ution of process, ori()'inal, me ne and final. If a court o'
hancery can be call d on to correct one abuse, so it
may correct another; and in effect, to vacate judgments,
where the tribunal rendering the same would refuse relief, either on motion, or on a proceeding by audita querela,
where thi mode of redress is in use. In ca e of fal ·e
returns affecting the defendant , where the plaintiff at la tf
is not in fault, redress can only be had in the court of
law where the record wa made, and if relief cannot
be had there, the party injured mu t seek his relief again t
the marshal.'' Accordin()'ly equitable relief wa denied.

•

~

• • * • • • • •

Hunter v. Stoneburner 92 Ill. 75, was a bill in equity to
set aside a judgment in artition and a ale thereunder.
on the ground that th laintiff had not been served with
process, and for oth r r , ons. The sheriff's return wa.R
personal service. Tl
laintiff succeeded in the low r
t:ourt and the d f ndant appealed. The Supreme Court
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of Illinois said: ''It, then, appearing that appellee was

served with process, he must be bound by the officer's re-

turn. It is in rare cases only that the return of the officer

can be contradicted, except in a direct proceeding by suit

against the officer for false return. In all other cases,

almost without exception, the return is held to be conclu-

sive. An exception to the rule is where some other por-

tion of the record in the same case contradicts the return,

but it cannot be done by evidence dehors the record." Ac-

cordingly the decree of the lower court was reversed.

Stewart v. Stewart, 27 W. Va. 167, was a bill in equity

to set aside a judgment at law, and the question arose on

a motion for rehearing by a defendant who had made de-

fault that the sheriff's return was false. The relief was

denied, the Supreme Court saying: " * * * We see no rea-

son for departing from the rule of the common law. If

it is thought wise to permit the return of a sheriff on

mesne or final process in any case, where the suit is not
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against him and his sureties for a false return, to be con-

tradicted, the Legislature should furnish the remedy. We

think the rule of the common law was founded in wisdom.

Others besides the defendant to the suit are interested,

that the return of the sheriff should be regarded as abso-

lutely true. Rights of property would suffer under any

other rule, and there is sufficient protection against fals'

returns of sheriffs in the right of action directly against

him and his sureties. If this rule is rigidly adhered to,

sheriffs will be much more careful, and the rights of the

citizens much better preserved, than if his returns either in

mesne or final process could be contradicted. The only

benefit, that could be given to the petitioner, would come

tliroiigli permitting her to contradict the sheriff's return,

that she was served with process in the suit. lie had no

authority to serve the process as such officer outside of

the State. If he had done so, such correction would entirely

liave destroyed his return. As we said in Bowyer v.

Knapp, 15 W. Va. 291, we do not mean to decide, whether

under our statute the return of the sheriff on process may

not be contradicted })y plea in abatement filed in the suit

at the proper time. The court was justified in decreeing

that the bill should be taken for confessed upon the return
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of Tilinois said: "It, then, appearing that appellee was
erved with process, he must be bound by the officer's return. It is in rare cases only that the return of the officer
an be contradicted, except in a direct proceeding by suit
again t the officer for false return. In all other cases,
almost without exception, the return is held to be concluive. An exception to the rule is where some other portion of the record in the same case contradicts the return,
but it cannot be done by evidence. dehors the record.'' Accordingly the decree of the lower court was reversed.
* * * * * * * * * *
Stewart v. St ewart, 27 W. Va. 167, was a bill in equity
to set aside a judgment at law, and the question arose on
a motion for rehearing by a defendant who had made def a ult that the sheriff's return was false. The relief was
denied, the Supreme Court saying : '' * * * We see no reason for departing from the rule of the common law. If
it is thought wise to permit the return of a sheriff on
me ne or final process in any case, where the suit is not
acrain t him and his sureties for a false return, to be con tradicted, the Legislature should furnish the remedy. We
think the rule of the common law was founded in wisdom
Jth r be ides the defendant to the suit are interested ,
that th return of the sheriff should be regarded as absolutely tru . Rights of property would suffer under any
her rule and there is sufficient protection against fal ~r
r turn of heriffs in the right of action directly against
him n bi ur ti s. If this rule i rigidly adhered to,
:h riff will e much more careful, and the rights of the
·i liz n, mu h better pr served, than if his returns either in
m n
r fin 1 pro
could be contradicted.
The only
lwnrfit that could b criven to the petitioner, would come
t11r 11.<rl1 l rmitting h r to contradict the sheriff 's return,
t liat . li ' .. rv
with process in the suit. He had no
a1itlinrii) i .· rv th I roce s as such officer out ide of
t 11 • , 'taiP. f h h
don so uch correction would ntirely
IHI\'(• dc• ,' lr y a hi.
r turn. As we said in Bowyer v.
K11app, 1
, . 1, w do not mean to decide, whether
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r .·t, tnt th r turn of th heriff on proce s may
not 1
n r, dic·t
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in abat m nt filed in the suit
j t 1li
r l •r tim . rrh
urt wa ju tified in deer eing
lit· i th l ill ·h uld b tak n f r nf
d upon the return
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of the sheriff. The petition was properly dismissed."

**********

Thomas v. Ireland, 88 Ky. 581, was a suit in equity to

enjoin the enforcement of a judgment at law on the ground

that the sheriff's return was false and that there was in

fact no service. The court said: "It is well settled by

this court that where the plaintitf acts in good faith in

obtaining a judgment upon the return of the sheriff, en

dorsed upon the summons, that it was executed on the

defendant, though in fact it was not, the return is conclu-

sive as between the plaintiff and defendant. The sta-

bility of judgments require this rule; otherwise, judgments

settling the rights of parties and giving remedies for the

enforcement of these rights could never be regarded as

permanent, but would be liable to be set aside, and the

rights settled thereby be reopened, when the facts, not only

appertaining to the service of the summons, but the merits

of the controversy, had been forgotten or rendered un-
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availing by reason of the death of the parties or witnesses.

Of course, if the plaintiff induces the sheriff to make a re-

turn that he had served the summons, when he had not,

whereby the plaintiff is enabled to obtain judgment against

the defendant, the chancellor would not hesitate to set the

judgment aside, upon the ground that it was fraudulently

obtained. Also, if he knew the sheriff had made a false

return and took judgment against the defendant, notwith-

standing, he would be regarded as an aider and abettor of

the fraud, and the chancellor would set aside the judgment.

But as long as the plaintiff is an innocent party, no false

return of the sheriff, though procured by one of the de-

fendants, and that defendant the husband of the wronged

defendant (which is exactly the case here if what the sheriff

says as to the first return is true), will justify setting aside

the judgment as against the plaintiff. His protection lies

in the fact that he is an innocent party. When the plaintiff

is an innocent party the sheriff and his coadjutor, if he has

one, are the wrongdoers, and the wronged party may have

an action against them, or either, for damages commensu-

rate to the injury he has sustained growing out of the

wrongful act. Also as the sheriff is tne wrongaoer ana p^

a party to the judgment, the proceeding to impeach his re-

turn is collateral; and it is well settled that his re-
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The petition was properly dismissed.''

* * * * * * * * * *
Thomas v. Ireland, 88 Ky. 581, wa a uit in equity to
enjoin the enforcement of a judgment at law on the oTound
that the sheriff' return wa faL e and that there was in
fact no service. The court said: "It is well settled by
this court that where the plaintiff acts in good faith in
obtaining a judgment upon the return of the sheriff, en
dorsed upon the summon , that it was executed on the
defendant, though in fact it was not, the return i concluive as between the plaintiff and defendant. The stability of judgments require thi rule; otherwi e, ju lgment
settling the rights of partie and gi' ing remedie for the
enforcement of these rio-hts could never be regarded a
permanent, but would be liable to be et a ide, and the
rights settled thereh' be reo1 ened when the fact not only
appertaining to the sen i e of the tlmmon , but the merit
of the controver y had been forgotten or rendered unavailing by rea. on of the death of the parties or witne se .
Of cour e, if the plain tiff induces the sheriff to make a return that he had erved the summons when he had not
whereb the plaintiff is enabled to obtain judoment again t
the defendant the chancellor would not he itate to et the
judgment aside upon the ground that it wa fraudulently
obtained. Also, if be knew the sheriff had made a fal e
return and took judgment again t the defendant, notwithtanding, he would be reo-arded as an aider and abettor of
the fraud, and the chancellor would et a ide the judgment.
But a long as the plaintiff i an innocent party, no f al e
return of the h riff thouO'h procured by one of the defendants and that defendant the husband of the wronged
defendant (which i exactly the ca e here if what the heriff
say as to the first return i true), will ju tify etting a ide
the judoment a a O'ain t the plaintiff. Hi protection lie
in the fact that he is an innocent party. When the plaintiff
is an innocent party th heriff and hi coadjutor if he has
one, are the wron · oer and the wronged part. may have
an action ao-ain t them or either for damao-e commen urate to the injur. h has u tained ~rowing out of the
wrongful act. Al o as tb berjff i the wrongaoer ana :u-..
a party to the judgm nt the proceedinO' to imp ach his return is collateral; and it i well settled that his re-
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turn cannot be impeached in a collateral proceedins: for the

purpose of setting aside or of getting rid of a judgment au-

thorized by such a return."

The petition in that case alleged that the husband of the

plaintiff had induced the sheriff to return the summons as

personally served on his wife, the plaintiff in that action,

so as to conceal from her the fact that there was danger of

her land being sold.

Numerically, the State courts outside of Missouri ap-

pear to be equally divided upon the subject, but the Su-

preme Court of the United States and the English courts

have always adhered to the rule that the officer's return is

TRIAL PRACT!C])

[Chap. :2

turn cannot be impeached in a collateral proceeding for th e
purpose of setting aside or of getting rid of a judgment authorized by such a return.''
The petition in that case alleged that the husband of the
plaintiff had induced the sheriff to return the summons as
personally served on his wife, the plaintiff in that action,
so as to conceal from her the fact that there was danger of
her land being 8old.

• • • • • • * * * •

conclusive upon the parties to the suit and cannot be at-

tacked even in equity, except where the plaintiff in the

judgment has aided or abetted in the false return.

**********

Upon principle and for practical purposes this is the

better and wiser rule, and has become too deeply imbedded
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in the jurisprudence of this State, and the rights of too

many purchasers at sheriff's sales have become fixed upon

the faith of the rule, to permit it now to be changed. For

it must be apparent that if judgments, and rights acquired

under them by third persons, can afterwards be upset by a

suit in equity, no one would risk money by buying at an

execution sale, or, at best, would discount the risk by giving

only a small proportion of the true value of the property.

This would result in injury to the debtor and creditor

both, for the debtor's lands would not sell for their true

value, and the creditor would not realize on his claim in

full. But in addition to this consideration, such a rule

would offer a premium to a defendant to make default, let

judgment go against him, let his land be sold, and a third

party buy it, and thus have his debt paid, and then sue in

cfiviity to set aside the deed and recover his land by dis-

proving the sheriff's return. Thus his debt would be paid,

his creditor would be satisfied, the debtor would recover his

land, and the only sufferer would be the purchaser at the

judicial sale. Under such a rule, judicial sales would not

amount to much when the people once understood the risks

inr-iirred. Tliis is exMftly the status of the case at bar. For

tliese reasons I think this case was improperly decided on

Numerically, the State courts outside of Missouri appear to be equally divided upon the subject, but the Supreme Court of the United States an~ the English courts
have always adhered to the rule that the officer's return is
conclusive upon the parties to the suit and cannot be attacked even in equity, except where the plaintiff in the
judgment has aided or abetted in the false return.

* * * • * * * * * *
Upon principle and for practical purposes this is the
better and wiser rule, and has become too deeply imbedded
in the jurisprudence of this State, and the rights of too
many purchasers at sheriff's sales have become fixed upon
the faith of the rule, to permit it now to be changed. For
it mu t be apparent that if judgments, and rights acquired
und r them by third persons, can afterwards be upset by a
suit in equity, no one would risk money by buying at an
x ution ale, or, at best, would discount the risk by giving
only a mall proportion of the true value of the property.
This would result in injury to the debtor and creditor
l th, for th d btor 's lands would not sell for their true
v lue, and th er ditor would not realize on his claim in
full.
ut in addition to thi consideration, such a rule
w uld off r a premium to a defendant to make default, let
jurlrr nt g again. t him, ] t hi land be sold, and a third
rty I y it, and thus have hi debt paid, and then sue in
N1uity t
t
id th de d and recover his land by di pr ing th . h riff's return. Thu. hi debt would be paid,
lii · ·r '11t r w ul b sati fied, th
btor would recover hi
1~ nrl an l th
nly . uff r r would be th pur ha er at the
judi ·i< l .'a] .
n ler u h a rnl , judi ial a] would not
amount t n 11 h wlic•n th I ropl
n understoo th risk.
in ·urr d. r1 hi.' i.' P .·n dl~· th) tatu .' of th a
t bar. For
1Ii
r 'a.:on · I thiuk tl1i .. ·a wa. impro1 rly d ridfld on
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former appeal and that the former decision should be over-
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Robinson, C. J., concurs; Brace, J., concurs in para-

concurs in toto; Gantt and Fox, J. J,, concur in the result

for the reasons expressed in the separate opinion of Fox, J. ;

Valliant, J., dissents in an opinion filed by him.

CROSBY V. FARMER.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. 1888.

39 Minnesota, 305.

87

former appeal and that the former decision should be overruled.

ruled.

graphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 12 and 13, and in the result ; Burgess, J.,

'
s UMMONS

C. J., concurs; BRACE, J., concurs in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 12 and 13, and in the re ult; BURGESS, J.,
concurs in toto; GANTT and Fox, J. J., concur in the result
for the reasons expressed in the· separate opinion of Fox, J.;
VALLIANT, J., dissents in an opinion filed by him.
RoBINSON,

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order of the municipal

court of St. Paul, setting aside a judgment by default.

Mitchell, J. Judgment- by default was rendered

against defendant in the municipal court of St. Paul, upon

the return of a police officer that he had served the sum-

mons upon defendant in the city of St. Paul, Ramsey

county, by leaving a copy at his last usual abode, with a

person of suitable age and discretion then resident therein.

CROSBY V. FARMER.
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Subsequently the judgment was vacated,' on motion of

defendant made on affidavits showing that he was not and

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

1888.

never had been a resident of Ramsey county, but at the

time of the alleged service was and ever since has been a

resident of Steele county. The plaintiff presented no

39 Minnesota, 305.

counter-affidavits, but relied on the conclusiveness of the

officer's return, — contending that it could not be impeached ;

that, if false, defendant's only remedy was by action

against the officer.

This question has never been squarely decided by this

court, — at least as to a return on original process. * * *

* * * The rule of the English common law is that, as

between the parties to the process or their privies, a sher-

iff's return is conclusive, and that the court will not try the

truth of it on motion to set aside the proceedings, or allow

any averment against it to be taken in pleading; that, if

false, the only remedy is against the sheriff by action.

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order of the municipal
court of St. Paul, setting aside a judgment by default.
MITCHELL, J.
Judgment · by default was rendered
against defendant in the municipal court of St. Paul, upon
the return of a police officer that he had served the ummons upon defendant in the city of St. Paul, Ramsey
county, by leaving a opy at his last usual abode, with a
person of suitable age and discretion then resident therein.
Subsequently the judgment was vacated; on motion of
defendant made on affidavit showing that he was not and
never had been a resident of Ramsey county, but at the
time of the alleged service was and ever since has been a
resident of Steele county. The plaintiff presented no
counter-affidavits, but relied on the conclusiveness of the
officer's return,-contending that it could not be impeache ·
that, if false, defendant's only remedy was by action
against the officer.
This question has never been squarely decided by thi
court,-at least as to a return on original process. • • •
• • * The rule of the Engli h common law is that a
between the partie to the proce s or their privies, a sheriff'& return is conclusiv and that the court will not try the
truth of it on motion to et a ide the proceedino-s, or allow
any av rm nt against it to be taken in pleading; that, if
false, th only r m dy i. ao·ain t th e heriff by a i n.
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Com. Dig. tit. ''Eetorn" F 2 and G. The reason usually

given for the rule is that it is necessary to secure the rights

of the parties, and give validity and effect to the acts of

ministerial officers. In England, process could only be

served by the sheriff, who was the only ministerial officer

known to the courts for that purpose. Moreover, under the

common law practice which obtained there, it was almost

impossible for judgment to be rendered against a party

without actual personal notice to him. Under such a sys-

tem, the rule might be convenient, and without much danger

of working injustice.

But, under the practice which obtains in this and other

states, most of the old safeguards have been removed ; and

the necessity for modifying the rule, and adapting it to the

changed condition of the law, has been often felt and fre-

quently acted upon, especially in the case of original

process by which the court acquires jurisdiction. In the

district court a summons may be served by any person not
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a party to the action, and his affidavit of service is placed

virtually on the same footing as the return of the sheriff.

In the municipal court of St. Paul the summons may be

served by any policeman. The remedy by action for false

return, under such a system, would often be inadequate or

wholly fruitless. Again, the manner of service has been in

other respects so materially changed that actual personal

service is unnecessary, and the officer making service must

often return as to facts not within his personal knowl-

edge, but in the determination of which he must frequently

rely upon information received from others. For example,

service may be made by leaving a copy of the summons at

the house of defendant's usual abode, with a person of

suitable age and discretion then resident therein. In

case of corporations service may be made, not oniy on

certain specified general officers, but also, in certain cases,

upon a managing or general agent, or even upon an acting

ticket or freight agent. In case of minors under 14

years, the service must be both on the minor personally,

and also upon his father, mother, or guardian, or, if none,

upon tlie person having the care or control of the minor, or

with whom he resides, or by whom he is employed. How can

a slifriff determine where a man resides, or who resides

with him, or who is the ticket or freight agent of a railway
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om. Dig. tit. '' Retorn '' F 2 and G. The reason usually
given for the rule is that it i necessary to secure the rights
of the parties, and give validity and effect to the acts of
mini terial officers. In England, process could only be
erved by the heriff, who was the only ministerial officer
known to the courts for that purpose. ~1oreover, under the
common law practice which obtained there, it was almo t
impo ible for judgment to be rendered against a party
without actual per on.al notice to him. Under such a sy tern, the rule might be convenient, and without much danger
of working injustice.
But, under the practice which obtains in this and other
tates, most of the old afeguards have been removed; and
the neces ity for modifying the rule, and adapting it to the
changed condition of the law, has been often felt and frequently acted upon, especially in the case of original
proce by which the court acquires jurisdiction. In the
di trict court a summons may be served by any person not
a party to the action, and his affidavit of service is placed
virtually on the same footing as the return of the sheriff.
In the municipal court of St. Paul the summons may be
.· r-ved by any policeman. The remedy by action for fal se
r turn, under uch a system, would often be inadequate or
wholly fruitles . Again, the manner of service has been in
ther r pects so materially changed that actual personal
. rvic i unnece ar. ", and the officer making service mu t
oft n return as to facts not within his personal knowl•c1o· , but in the determination of which he must frequentl~1
r 1: up n information r ceived from others. For example,
e>rvic may b ma le by leaving a copy of the ummons at
th hou e of defendant's u sual abode, with a person of
.·ui table age and di. ere ti on then re ident therein. In
·a e f corporation
r ice may be made, not only on
<· rta in . cifi d ·
ral officers, but al o, in certain ca e ,
11p n a rnana ·inO' or gen ral aO'ent, or ven u1 on an acting
ieket or freight g nt. In ca e of minors under 14
:r·ar. t11 • . rvic mu. t b both n t
in r per anally,
·11Hl ell ·' npon hi· fnther, mother, or guardian, or, if non
upon tl1G p ·r ·on havi11g th0 care r control of the minor, or
with wltom h r :i<le:, or by w horn h i m loyed. How an
a . ltPri fT <1 t rmin wl1 r a man r i 1 , r who resi
with him, r who i.· thr ticket or freig?t agent of a railway
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company, or who has the care or control of a minor, or by

whom he is employed, except upon information? And why

should his return as to these facts be conclusive? If the'^

officer makes a mistake, why should the defendant be com-

pelled to allow the judgment against him to stand, and re-

sort to his suit against the officer, instead of being per-

mitted to apply in a direct proceeding in the action to set

aside the false return! We can see no good reason why

the plaintiff should have a sum of money to which he is

not entitled, and the officer be compelled to pay the de-

fendant a like sum for making what may have been an

honest mistake. If somebody must suffer loss for the mis-

take, it is right it should fall on him who made it; but, if

discovered in time to prevent loss to anyone, why should

not the mistake be corrected on motion! There are very

good reasons why the return of a ministerial officer should

be held conclusive in all collateral proceedings, but we can

see none, either upon principle or considerations of policy,
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why it may not be impeached for falsity in direct proceed-

ings in the action; assuming always, of course, that no

rights of third parties have intervened. Any evils or in-

convenience which can possibly arise from permitting this

to be done would, in our judgment, be greatly outweighed

by the injustice that would often result from prohibiting it.

The general tendency, especially in states having a Code

practice like ours, is to allow the return to be impeached

by an affidavit, on motion or other direct proceedings to

vacate. Bond v. Wilson, 8 Kan. 228; Walker v. Lutz, 14

Neb. 274, (15 N. W. Eep. 352) ; Wendell v. Mugridge, 19 N.

H. 109; Carr v. Commercial Bank, 16 Wis. 52; Stout v.

Sioux City d Pacific Ry. Co., 3 McCrary, 1, (8 Fed. Rep.

794) ; Van Rensselaer v. Cliadivick, 7 How. Prac. 297; Wal-

lis V. Lott, 15 How. Prac. 567 ; Watson v. Watson, 6 Conn.

334; Rowe v. Table Mt. Water Co., 10 Cal. 442.

Some of the cases seem to make a distinction between

mesne and final process and the original process, like a

summons, by which the court acquires jurisdiction of the

defendant. We confess that we cannot see at present why

there should be any such distinction ; but, without deciding

that question, we are of opinion that, upon a motion madr

in the action to vacate a judgment by default on the ground
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company, or who has the care or control of a minor, or by
whom he is emplo3 ed, except upon information~ And wh
should his return as to these facts be conclu ive ~ If t he
officer makes a mistake, why should the defendant be compelled to allow the judgment again t him to tand, and reor t to his suit again t the officer, instead of being permitted to apply in a direct proceeding in the action to set
a ide the fal e return~ We can see no good reason why
the plaintiff should have a um of money to which he i
not ent itled and the officer be compelled to pay the defendant a like um for making what may have been an
honest mistake. If somebody must suffer lo s for the mistake, it is right it should fall on him who made it; but, if
discovered in time to prevent loss to anyone, why should
not the mistake be corrected on motion~ There are ver good reasons why the return of a ministerial officer should
be held conclu ive in all collateral proceedings, but we can
see n one, either upon principle or considerations of polic ,
why it may not be impeached for falsity in direct proceedings in the action; as urning always, of cour e, that n o
rights of third parties have intervened. Any evils or inconvenience which can possibly arise from permitting this
to be done would, in our judgment, be greatly outweighed
by the injustice that would often result from prohibiting it.
The general tendency, especially in states having a Code
p r actice like ours, is to allow the return to be impeached
by an affidavit on motion or other direct proceedings to
vacate. Bond v. Wilson 8 Kan. 228 · Walker v. Lutz, 14
Neb. 274, (15 N. W. Rep. 352); Wendell v. "ftfugridge, 19 N.
H. 109; Carr v. Co11iniercial Bank, 16 Wis. 52; Stout -v.
Sioux City db Pacific Ry. Co., 3 11:cCrary, 1, (8 Fed. Rep.
794) ; Van Ren sselaer v. Chadwick, 7 How. Prac. 297 ; Wallis v. Lott, 15 How. Prac. 567; Watson v. Watson, 6 Conn.
334; Roi e v. Table JI t. Water Co., 10 Cal. 442.
Some of the cases seem to make a di tinction between
mesne and final proce and the original process, like a
ummons, by which the court acquires jurisdiction of th
defendant.
e confes that we cannot see at present wb:·
there shoul be any uch i tinction; but, without decidin°·
that question, we are of opinion that upon a motion ma _
in t he action to vacate a judgment by default on the ground
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of no service of the summons, the return of the officer may

be impeached by affidavits, as was done in this case.

Order affirmed.^

TRI AL PRACTICE

[G"hap. 2

f no ervice of the summons, the return of the officer may
be impeached by affidavits, as was done in this case.
0 rder affirmed. 1

iConclusiveness of Sheriff's Betnrn. There is a great diversity of judicial

ot)inion upon this subject, and a close inquiry into the various rules and their

limitations -would be of little value here. The cases given above illustrate the

antagonistic views which lead to the extreme positions on each side of the

question. Between these there are numberless gradations. The following

quotations will illustrate the extent and variety of the considerations which

control the decisions upon this subject.

Kochman v. O'Neill, (1903) 202 ill. 110, 66 N. E. 1047: "A sound public

policy, the security of litigants and the stability of legal proceedings demand

that the return of the sworn officer shall not be set aside or impeached except

upon satisfactory evidence. Every presumption in favor of the return is

indulged, and it will not be set aside upon the uncorroborated testimony of the

party upon whom service purports to have been made. (Davis v. Dresback, 81

111. 393.) Justice, however, requires that the rules shall not be so strict as to

prevent all relief against a return which is untrue through fraud, accident
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or mistake, and if it is clear from the evidence that the defendant has not

been served the judgment should be set aside. ' ' Similar statement in West-

man V. Carlson, (1910) 86 Nebr. 847, 126 N. W. 515.

Waterbury National Bank v. Eeed, (1907) 231 111. 246, 83 N. E. 188: "It

is, however, the law of this state that when a judgment of a court of general

jurisdiction recites that there was actual service of process upon the defend-

ant in apt time and there is nothing in the record to contradict such record

or return, the finding or return cannot, at law, be impeached by evidence

dehors the record, (Rust v. Frothingham, Buese, 331; Barnet v. Wolf, 70 111.

76; Zepp v. Hager, id. 223; Harris v. Lester, 80 id. 307; Hunter v. Stone-

burner, 92 id. 75;) although in a proper case a false return may be set aside

in equity; (Owens v. Ranstead, 22 111. 161; Hickey v. Stone, 60 id. 458;) and it

may be questioned before judgment by plea in abatement, (Mineral Point

Railroad Co. v. Keep, 22 111. 9; Holloway v. Freeman, id. 197; Sibert v. Thorp,

77 id. 43; Ryan v. Lander, 89 id. 554; Union National Bank of Chicago v!

First National Bank, 90 id. 56; Chicago Sectional Electric Underground Co. v.

('ongdon Brake-Shoe Manf. Co., Ill id. 309); or in case of default entered

ni.on such return, on motion promptly made, the same may be set aside

(Brown v. Brown, 59 111. 315.)"

Meyer v. Wilson, (1906) 166 Ind. 651, 76 N. E. 748: "If, however, the

pjocess was not served by the officer, and false return was procured by the

fraudulent acts of the plaintiff, or by a conspiracy between him and the

o.Ti^tr, the same is not conclusive."

Hilt V. Heimberger, (1908) 235 111. 235, 85 N. E. 304: "Where rights of

third persons have been acquired in good faith, the return of an officer show-

ing the service of summons cannot be contradicted, but as against parties ac-

quiring rights Mith notice of the facts the return is not conclusive."

Schott V. Linscott, (1909) 80 Kan. 536, 103 Pac. 997: "As to the fact

of service, the general rule is that as between the parties to an action the

return of the sheriff is conclusive; but if his return is of a fact not within

his personal knowledge but dependent upon information received from others,

a party is not jtrecluded from an inquiry into the facts on which jurisdiction de-

pends. " Snme rule stated in Krutz v, Isaacs, (1901) 25 Wash. 566, 66 Pac.

141.

Lofke v. Locke, (1894) 18 R. I. 716, 30 Atl. 422: Motion to set aside decree

and roinstiite the case for trial on the ground that defendant had no notice of

the [lending thereof. "While it is true that an officer's return upon a writ

is conclusive and cannot be controverted incidentally by motion or plea ex-

cept in cases especially provided for by statute, Angell v. Bowler, 3 R. I. 77,

yet, as \inder section 2 of chapter 26 of the Judiciary Act, the court has

control over its decrees for the period of six months after the entry thereof,

and ' may, for caus« shown, set aside the same and reinstate the ease, or

1Conclusive11ess of Sheriff's Ret'ltrn. There is a great diver sity of judicial
opinion upon this subject, and a close inquiry into the various r ules and their
limitations would be of little value here. The cases given above illustrate the
antagoni tic views which lead to the extreme positions _on each side of ~he
question. Between these there are numbe1:Iess gradat ions.. The . follow~ng
quotations will illustrate the extent and variety of the cons1der at10ns which
control the decisions upon this subject.
Kochman v. 0 ' Neill, (1903) 202 Ill. 110 1 66 N . E . 1047 : "A sound public
policy, the security of litigants and the stability of legal p ro ceedings demand
that the return of the sworn officer shall not be set aside or impeached except
upon satisfactory evidence. Every pre umption in fav or of t he return is
indulged, and it will not be set asiJe upon the uncorroborated testimony of the
party upon whom service purports to have been made.
(Davis v. Dresback, 81
Ill. 393. ) Justice, however, requires that the rules shall not be so strict as to
prevent all relief again t a return which is untrue through fraud, accident
or mi, take, and if it is clear from the evidence that t he def endant has not
been served the judgment shoul<l be set aside.'' Similar statement in Westman v. arl on, (1910) 86 Nebr. 847, 126 N. W. 515.
. Waterbury National Ba?k v. Reed, (1907) 231 Ill. 246, 83 N. E . 188: ''It
~ , ?o~e~er, the_ law of this state that when a judgment of a court of general
JUns_d1ction :ec1tes that the.re was. act~1al service of process upon the defen <lant rn apt time and there is nothrng rn the record to contr adict such record
or return, the finding or return cannot, at law, be impeached by evidence
deho~s the record, (~ust v. Frothill:gham, Buese, 33~; Barnet v. Wolf, 70 Ill.
7fi; Zepp ~· H..ager, id. 223; . Harns v. Lester, 80 id. 307; H unter v. Stone?nrner. 92 id. r5;) although rn a proper case a false return may be et aside
rn equity; (O~·ens v. Ranste3;d, 22 Ill. 161; Hickey v. Stone, 60 id. 458; ) a nd it
ma;r be que, boned before Judgment by plea in abatement, (Mineral P oint
~a1~road . o. v. Keep, 22 Ill. 9; ~olloway v. ~reeman? id. 197; Sibert v. Thorp,
r~ id. 43? Ryan v. Lan~er, 89 id .. 554; Um_on
ationa~ Bank of Chicago v.
~irst National Bank, 90 id. 56; Ch1ca&'o Sectional Electric Underground Co. v.
l ongdon Brake- hoe Manf .. Co., 111 id. 309); or in case of default entered
nnon uch return on motion promptly made, the same may be et aside
(Brown v. Brown, 59 Ill. 315.) ''
·
:Yfe er v. Wilson, (1906) 166 Ind. G51, 76 N. E. 748: "If, however, the
p1 ocess was not , erved by ~be_ officer, and false ~·eturn was procured by the
fra11du1 nt a ts of the plamtiff, or by a conspiracy between him and the
o!P r the sam is not conclusive.''
Hilt v. Heim erger, (1908) 235 Ill. 235, 85 N. E. 304: "Where rights of
tbir<l per. ons have been acquired in good faith, the return of an officer showing th s r\'i e of summons cannot be contradicted, but as again t par ties ac']lliring rights with noti e of the fact the r turn i not conclusive. ''
Schott v. Lin~ ott, (1909) 0 Kan. 536, 103 Pac. 997: "As t o t he fa ct
of i; rvice, the g n ral rule is that as b twe n th parties t o an action the
r turn of the ~h riff is con lu ive · but if bis return is of a fact not within
hi!i p r-o al know] <lge bnt d p nd nt upon information received fr om others,
n party is not pr lud d from an inquiry into the facts on which jurisdiction deJ1Pn1L. '' , ·1m ru]
tated in rutz v. I aacs, (1901) 25 Wa h. 566, G6 Pac.
141.
Lo<'kf· v. Lorke, (1894) 18 R. J. 716 30 At1. 422: Motion to set aside decree
un1l rc>in tatC' h · ra i; for trial on th gronnd that def ndant had no notice of
t Ii f l'nrli ng thC'r of. "Whil it i tru that an offi er 's return upon a writ
c·rHIC'l1 1 i\ , arnl cannot be ontrov rted incid ntally by motion or plea expt i 11 C"lH'- <' f. f ·N·ia lly pr virl rl for hy tatnt , Ang 11 v. Bowl r, 3 R. I. 77,
yPt, as 11ndf'T !i rtion 2 of rhnpt r 26 of the Judiciary Act , t he court has
Nrntrol O\f'r it~ d<'rr R for th p riod of six months after the entry thereof,
;111 d 'may, for cau
shown, set aside the same and reinstate the ease, or
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make new entry and take other proceedings, with proper notice to the parties,

with or without terms, as it may by general rule or s]iecial order direct,' it is

clearly within the power of the court to grant the relief asked for in this

ease without any infringement of the rule above stated, and without any rc-

ilection upon the officer who served the writ. ' '

Michels v. Stork, (1883) 52 Mich. 260, 17 N. W. 833. This case contains
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make new entry and take other proceedings, v.ith p ro r notice to the parties,
""ith or without ter m , as it may by g neral r ule or Jiecial order direct, ' it is
clearly with in the power of the court to gr a nt the relief a ked for in this
ca e without any infring ment of the rule abo,·e tated, and without any reflection upon the officer who erved the writ. ''
Michels v. Stork, ( 1883) 52 Mich. 260, 17 N. W. 833. This case eontains
an extended review of the authorities on this question in an opinion by Justicie
'ooley.

an extended review of the authorities on this question in an opinion by Justios

Oooley.

Section 6. Privilege from Service.

PARKER V. MARCO.

Court of Appeals of New York. 1893,

136 New York, 585.

Maynard, J. The defendant is a resident of South Car-

SECTION

6.

PRIVILEGE FROM SERVIOB.

olina and an action had been brought there against him in

the Federal Circuit Court, by the plaintiff, who is a resi-

dent of this state. On April 6, 1892, the defendant came

PARKER V. MARCO.

to the city of New York at the instance of the plaintiff to

attend an examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses be-

Court of .Appeals of New York. 1893.
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fore a notary public, which by the agreement of the counsel

for the respective parties had been set down for that date.

The plaintiff procured the defendant's assent to the examin-

136 New Yark, 585.

ation upon the statement that he desired to be in readiness

to try the cause at the ensuing April Circuit, to be held at

the city of Charleston. When the time for taking the testi-

mony arrived the defendant was informed by plaintiff's

counsel that he had abandoned his intention to take the evi-

dence as proposed, for the reason that on account of sick-

ness in his, the counsel's family, the plaintiff would not be

prepared to go to trial at the April Circuit, and he expected

to be able to produce his witnesses in court when the trial

should take place at a subsequent term. It was then late

in the afternoon and the defendant returned to his hotel

and remained over night, and the next morning started for

liis home in South Carolina. He was intercepted at the

ferry by a process server, who served him with a summons

in this action brought by the plaintiff in the supreme Court

of this state for the same cause of action at issue in the

Federal Court in South Carolina. The defendant had no

MAYNARD, J. The defendant is a re ident of South Carolina and an action had been brought there against him in
the Federal Circuit Court, by the plaintiff, who is a resident of this state. On April 6, 1892, the defendant came
to the city of New York at the instance of the plaintiff to
attend an examination of the plaintiff and hi witnesses before a notary public, which by the agreement of the counsel
for the re spective parties had been set down for that date.
The plaintiff procured the defendant's assent to the examination upon the statement that he desired to be in readiness
to try the can e at the en uing April Circuit, to be held at
the city of harleston. When the time for taking the testimony arrived the defendant was informed by plaintiff's
ounsel that he had abandoned his intention to take the evidence as propo ed for the reason that on account of sickness in hi , the conn el 's family, the plaintiff would not be
prepared to go to trial at the April Circuit, and he expected
to be able to produce hi witnesses in court when the trial
. hould take place at a sub equent term. It was then late
in the afternoon and the def endant returned to his hotel
and remained o er night, and the next morning started for
his home in South ar olina . He wa intercepted at the
f rry by a proc s.
r ver who sen ed him with a summon
in this action brou <Yht by th plaintiff in the supreme Court
f thi tat f r i11
cau of acti n at issue in the
F dexal ourt in
a r olina. The defendant had Ill~
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business in New York except that which related to the pro-

posed examination. The defendant has appealed from an

order of the General Term, reversing an order of the Spe-

cial Term, which set aside the service of the summons upon

the ground that, when served, he was privileged from

service.

Under Section 863 of the Revised Statutes of the United

States the plaintiff had an absolute right to take the testi-

mony of his witnesses in this state to be used upon the

trial of the action in South Carolina upon giving reason-

able notice to the defendant. The compulsory character of

the proceeding was not affected by the waiver of notice

and the fixing of the time by the agreement of parties.

{Plimpton V. Winslotv, 9 Fed. R. 365.) The same section

provides that a person may be required to appear and

testify before the notary in the same manner as witnesses

in open court, and section 915 of our own Code authorizes

any state judge to issue a subpoena to compel the attend-
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ance of a witness in such a case. In the trial of the action

the notary thus becomes the arm of the court, and, as was

held In re Rindskopf (24 Fed. R. 542) represents the court

pro hac vice.

The privilege of a suitor or witness to be exempt from

service of process while without the jurisdiction of his res-

idence for the purpose of attending court in an action to

which he is a party or in which he is to be sworn as a wit-

ness is a very ancient one. (Year Book 13, Hen. IV., I. B.

Viner's Abr. "Privilege.")

It has always been held to extend to every proceeding of

a judicial nature taken in or emanating from a duly con-

stituted tribunal which directly relates to the trial of the

issues involved. It is not simply a personal privilege, but

it is also the privilege of the court, and is deemed neces-

sary for the maintenance of its authority and dignity and

in order to promote the due and eflicient administration of

justice. (Person v. Grier, QQ N. Y. 124; Mattheivs v. Tufts,

87 id. 568.) At common law a writ of privilege or protec-

tion would be granted to the party or witness by the court

in which the action was pending, which would be respected

l)y all other courts. We cannot find that the power to issue

Huch a writ has been abrogated by legislation, and it doubt-

less exists, and the writ may still be granted by courts

TRIAL PRACTICE
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bu ine in New York except that which related to the prol o ed examination. The defendant has appealed from an
order of the General Term, reversing an order of the Special Term, which set aside the service of the summons upon
the ground that, when served, he was privileged from
erv1ce.
Under Section 863 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States the plaintiff had an absolute right to take the testimony of his witnesses in this state to be used upon the
trial of the action in South Carolina upon giving reasonable notice to the defendant. The compulsory character of
the proceeding was not affected by the waiver of notice
and the fixing of the time by the agreement of parties.
(Plinipton v. lVinslow) 9 Fed. R. 365.) The same section
provides that a p rson may be requjred to appear and
testify before the notary in the same manner as witnesses
in open court, and section 915 of our own Code authorizes
any state judge to issue a subpoena to compel the attendance of a witness in such a case. In the trial of the action
the notary thus becomes the arm of the court, and, as was
held In re Rindskopf (24 Fed. R . 542) represents the court
pro hac vice.
The privilege of a suitor or witness to be exempt from
ervice of process while without the jurisdiction of bis residence for the purpose of attending court in an action to
which he is a party or in which he is to be sworn as a witn s i a v ry ancient one. (Year Book 13, Hen. IV., I. B.
\ iner's Abr. "Privilege.")
t ha always been held to extend to every proceeding of
a ju i ial nature taken in or emanating from a duly con:titut d tribunal which directly relates to the trial of the
i.- .. u s in volved. It is not simply a personal privilege, but
it i: al: the privilege of the court, and i deemed neces:ar ' for th maintenance of its authority and dignity and
i 11 order to promot tbe due and efficient admini tration of
.iu:ti<'<. ( Pr>rso11 v. Grier) 66 N. Y. LA; Matthews v. Tuft ,
'7 icl. 5 .) At common law a writ of privilege or protect ion wonld b • grant tl to th party or witne
by the court
in which th artion wa. pending, which would b re pected
h. all th r r nrts. \V •annot find that th power to issue
lH·h n wrjt h<l. · br0n abroo-atc 1 by 1 gislation, and it doubt·
le ·s exist·, and th · ' rit m, y . till be granted by courts
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possessing a common law jurisdiction; but while the grant-

ing of the writ is proper, it is not necessary for the enjoy-

ment of the privilege, and the only office which it can per-

form is to afford "convenient and authentic notice to those

about to do what would be a violation of the privilege, and

to set it forth and command due respect to it." {Bridges

V. Sheldon, 7 Fed. R. 4-1:.) The tendency has been not to re-

strict but to enlarge the right of privilege so as to alford

full protection to parties and witnesses from all forms of

civil process during their attendance at court and for a

reasonable time in going and returning. {Lamed v. Grif-

fin, 12 Fed. Rep. 592.)

Hearings before arbitrators, legislative committees, reg-

isters and commissioners in bankruptcy, and examiners and

( ommissioners to take depositions, have all been declared to

je embraced within the scope of its application. (Bacon's

Abr. "Privilege"; Sand ford v. Chase, 3 Cow. 381; Mat-

thews V. Tufts, supra; Hollender v. Hall, 18 Civ. Pro. 394;

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

19 id. 292; Thorp v. Adams, id. 351; Bridges v. Sheldon;

Plimpton V. Winslow; and Lamed v. Griffin, supra.) It has

even been extended to a suitor returning from an appoint-

ment with his solicitor for the purpose of inspecting a paper

in his adversary's possession in preparation for an examin-

ation before a master, {Sidgier v. Birch, 9 Ves. 69) and

while attending at the registrar's office with his solicitor, to

settle the terms of a decree {Neivton v. Askeiv, 6 Hare, 319) ;

and while attending from another state to hear an argu-

ment in his own case in the Court of Appeals {Pell's case,

1 Rich. L. 197.) No good reason can be perceived why the

privilege should not be extended to a party appearing

upon the examination of his adversary's witnesses, where

the testimony is taken pursuant to the authority of law,

and can be read upon the trial with the same force and

effect as if it had been taken in open court. It is a

proceeding in the cause, which materially affects his rights,

and the necessity for his attendance is quite as urgent as

it would be if the examination was had at the trial. But

we do not think that the question of the necessity of his

presence is material. It is the right of the party, as wpU

as his privilege, to be present whenever evidence is to be

taken in the action, which may be used for the purpose of

affecting its final determination. It is essentially a part
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possessing a common law jurisdiction; but while the granting of the writ is proper, it is not necessary for the enjoyment of the privilege, and the only office which it can perform is to afford ''convenient and authentic notice to tho e
about to do what would be a violation of the privilege, and
to set it forth and command due re pect to it." (Bridges
v . Sheldon, 7 Fed. R. 44.) The tendency has been not to restrict but to enlarge the right of privilege so a to afford
full protection to parties and witne se from all forms of
civil process during their attendance at court and for a
reasonable time in going and returning. (Larn ed v. Griffin, 12 Fed. Rep. 592.)
Hearings before arbitrators, legislative committees, regi : ~ters and commissioners in bankruptcy, and examiners and
< ommissioners to take depositions, have all been declared to
i)e embraced within the scope of its application. (Bacon's
Abr. "Privilege"; Sandford v. Chase, 3 Cow. 381; Matthews v. Tuft, upra; Hollender v . Hall, 18 Civ. Pro. 394;
19 id. 292; Thorp v. Adams, id. 351; Bridges v . Sheldon;
Plimpton v. Winslow; and Larned v. Griffin, siipra.) It has
even been extended to a suitor returning from an appointment with his solicitor for the purpose of in pecting a paper
in his adversary's possession in preparation for an examination before a master, (Sidgier v . Birch, 9 Ves. 69) and
while attending at the registrar's office with his solicitor, to
ettle the terms of a decree (Newton v . Askew, 6 Hare, 319) ;
and while attending from another tate to hear an argu- •
ment in hi own ca e in the Court of Appeals (Pell's case,
1 Rich. L. 197.) No good reason can be perceived why the
privilege hould not be extended to a party appearing
upon the examination of hi adversar 's witnes es where
the te timony is taken pur uant to the authority of law,
and can be read upon the trial with the same force and
effect as if it bad been taken in open court. It is a
proceedin · in the cau e, which materially affect hi riO'ht ,
and the nece ity for hi attendance i quite a urgent a
it would be if the examination wa had at the trial. But
we do not think that the que tion of the necessity of hi
pre n e i mat rial. It i th ricrht of the party a. well
as his privilege, to be pre ent whenever evidence is to be
taken in the action which ma. b u ed for th urpo e of
affecting its final det rmination. It is e sentiall. a part
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of the trial, and should be so regarded so far as it may be

necessary for the protection of the suitor. There have

l)een many analogous cases in the Federal Courts where

the right to the privilege has been upheld. In Bridges v.

Sheldon, (supra), the action was pending in the U. S. Cir-

cuit for Vermont. A reference had been ordered to a

master to take and state an account. The master on

motion of the plaintiff had made an order for the taking of

a deposition before a commissioner in the state of Iowa.

The defendant, while attending before the commissioner in

Iowa, was served with process in a suit brought by the plain-

tiff for the same cause of action as in the Federal court.

Judge Wheeler, in very strong terms, condemned the pro-

cedure, and held that the defendant was absolutely priv-

ileged from service, and that the conduct of the plaintiff in

causing such service to be made was a contempt of court,

and could be punished as such. It seems that in such a case

a party has a two-fold remedy. He may move in the court,
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whose privilege has been violated, to punish the party in

that court who has been guilty of such violation, or he may

move in the court out of which the process has been im-

properly issued to vacate it, and the motion will be granted.

**********

It may be assumed that the plaintiff acted in entire good

faith, and that his procedure was not a device to secure the

presence of the defendant within the territorial jurisdic-

tion of the courts of this state. In the view we take of the

privilege of the defendant, the plaintiff's motive is of no

importance.

The order of the General Term should be reversed, and

the order of the Special Term affirmed, with costs.

All concur except Gray, J., dissenting.

Order reversed.

[Chap. 2
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the trial, and should be so regarded so f ar as it may be
uccessary for the protection of the suitor. There have
1 een many analogous cases in the Feder al Courts where
the right to the privilege has been upheld. In Bridges v.
heldon, (supra ), the action was pending in the U. S. Ciruit for Vermont. A reference had been ordered to a
master to take and state an account. The master on
motion of the plaintiff had made an order f or the taking of
a deposition before a commissioner in the state of Iowa.
The def ndant, while attending before the commissioner in
Iowa, was served with process in a suit brought by the plaintiff for the same cau e of action as in t he Federal court.
Judge WHEELER, in very strong terms, condemned the produre, and held that the defendant was absolutely privileged from service, and that the conduct of the plaintiff in
cau ing such service to be made was a contempt of court,
and could be punished as such. It seems that in such a case
a party bas a two-fold remedy. He may move in the court,
whose privilege has been violated, to punish the party in
that court who has been guilty of such violation, or he may
move in the court out of which the process has been improperly issued to vacate it, and the motion will be granted.

• • • • • * * * • •

It may be assumed that the plaintiff acted in entire good
faith, and tliat hi procedure was not a device to secure the
l resence of the defendant within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts of thi., state. In the view we take of the
rivilege of the defendant, the plaintiff's motive is of no
importance.
The ord r of the General Term should be reversed, and
th rd r f the Special Term affirmed, with costs.
All co cur except GRAY, J., dissenting.
Order reversed.
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GREENLEAF Y. PEOPLE'S BANK OF BUFFALO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina. 1903.

GREENLEAF V. PEOPLE'S BANK OF BUFFALO.

133 North Carolina, 292.

Clark, C. J., concurring. The defendant Morey was

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

1903.

served with summons in this case while at a hotel in this

State. He contends that because he was a lawyer, resident

in another State, and was attending court in this State as

133 North Carolina, 292.

counsel in a cause therein pending, the service should be

struck out. The proposition is a novel one in a land where

equality before the law is the ruling principle and where

special privilege to any class of our citizens is not only not

recognized by law but is prohibited by the Constitution.

A careful examination shows no ground for the alleged ex-

emj^tion of lawyers from service of summons. There is no

precedent in England to sustain the proposition, and none

in this country save a single case, a very recent one — Hoff-

man V. Circuit Judge, 113 Michigan, 109 ; 38 L. R. A. 663 ;

67 Am. St. Rep., 458 — which holds that a lawyer, resident
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in the same State, is privileged from service of a summons

while attending the Supreme Court of the State or going

or returning therefrom, but none of the authorities cited in

that opinion sustain its conclusion. The reason given in

the opinion is that while by statute in that State the pro-

hibition of the arrest of counsel in a civil suit is restricted

to the actual sitting of a court at which he is engaged, that

this does not repeal the common-law exemption of counsel

from service of summons. But, on the other hand, the most

eminent lawyer which that State (Michigan) has produced.

Judge Cooley, in a note to his work on Constitutional Limi-

tations (5th Ed.), p. 161, says: "Exemption from arrest

is not violated by the service of citation or declaration in

civil cases." Besides, there was at common law no exemp-

tion of lawyers from service of process other than arrest,

and the reason for the latter was that it would be an in-

jury to clients whose cause had been prepared for trial by

such coansel to suddenly deprive them of his services, but

service of a summons does not have that effect.

In Bobbins v. Lincoln, 27 Fed. Rep., 342 (United States

Circuit Court for Illinois), it is well said: "Inasmuch as

CLARK, C. J., concurring. The defendant Morey was
~erved with summons in this case while at a hotel in thi.
State. He contends that because he was a lawyer, resident
in another State, and was attending court in this State as
counsel in a cause therein pending, the service should be
truck out. The propo ition i a novel one in a land wher
quality before the law i the ruling principle and where
.·pecial privilege to any clas of our citizens is not only not
recognized by law but i prohibited by the Constitution.
careful examination bow no ground for the alleged exemption of lawyers from service of ummon . There is no
precedent in England to u tain the proposition, and none
in this country saYe a single ca e, a very recent one-Hoffrnan v. Circuit Judge, 113 Michigan, 109; 38 L. R. A. 663;
67 Am. St. Rep., 458-which hold that a lawyer, resident
in the ame State, is privileged from Bervice of a summon.
while attending the Supreme Court of the State or goin ·
or returning therefrom, but none of the authorities cited in
that opinion sustain its conclu ion. The rea on given in
the opinion is that while by statute in that tate the prohibition of the arrest of counsel in a civil suit is re tricted
to the actual sitting of a court at which be i engaged, that
thi doe not repeal the common-law exemption of counsel
from serYice of summons. But, on the other band, the mo t
minent lawyer which that State (:Michigan) ha produced
Judge ooley in a note to bis work on Con titutional Limitations (5th Ed.), p. 161, ay : ''Exemption from arre t
i not iolated b the ervice of citation or declaration in
ivil cases.
B i s, there wa at common law no exemption of lawyer from service of process other than < ~ rrest,
nd the r a on f r th latt r wa that it would be an injury to clients who "'e cau e bad b en prepared for trial by
:uch co·a.n 1 to u u nly e riv th m f his service
ut
.;ervice f a umm n d
n t ha' e that effe t.
In Robbins v. Lincoln, _7
d. Re . · 42 (United tat ~
ircuit Co:µrt for Illinoi ) , it is well said: ''Ina much a
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resident attorneys may be served with summons while in

attendance upon court, an attorney from another State has

no greater privilege. " This is exactly in point here. It is

well known that no lawyer in this State has ever in its his-

tory been privileged, or contended even that he was priv-

ileged, from service of summons while attending court. If

he were, as the Constitution, Art. IV., sec. 22, now provides

that "the courts are always open," no lawyer or judge

could ever be served with summons. In England, Black-

stone says (3 Bl. Com., 289), that lawyers could not be ar-

rested on civil process while in attendance upon court, but

could be served with a bill, without arrest, which was equiv-

alent to service of a summons. The same is stated in 8

Bacon's Abr. ''Privilege" B., with the modification that if

an attorney is sued with another (as in this case), "he is

not privileged from arrest, even though it is during his

attendance in court," the evident reason being to prevent

class discrimination. The exemption of lawyers from ar-
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rest, it seems, has now been repealed in England. In this

State the English privilege of exemption of lawyers from

arrest has never been recognized. It is well known that

one of the most distinguished lawyers and judges of this

State, whose portrait now hangs on the walls of this cham-

ber, was arrested and imprisoned for debt, and long pre-

vented from attending upon court. This barbarous pro-

ceeding of imprisonment for debt, handed down from the

common law, should have been repealed long before it was,

but while it was in force our predecessors applied it im-

partially, and the bench did not hold their own members or

their profession exempt. There was not at common law,

and has not been in this State, any exemption of any one

from service of summons, and the exemption from arrest

under our statute is conferred only upon witnesses and

jurors. Tlie Code, sees. 13G7 and 1735. And even wit-

nesses and jurors are not exempted from service of sum-

mons, since such service would not deprive the court of

their presence. There is no reason why lawyers should be

privileged from either arrest or service of summons any

more than other oHicers of the court, as sheriffs, clerks,

criers and the like, and the legislative power has therefore

seen fit to make the exemption apply only to witnesses and

TRIAL PRACTICE
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resident attorneys may be served with summons while in
attendance upon court, an attorney from another State has
no greater privilege.'' This is exactly in point here. It is
well known that no lawyer in this State has ever in its history been privileged, or cont ended even that he was privileged, from service of summons while attending court. If
he were, as the Constitution, Art. IV., sec. 22, now provides
that "the courts are always open," no lawyer or judge
could ever be served with summons. In England, Blackstone says ( 3 BL Com., 289), that lawyers could not be arrested on civil process while in attendance upon court, but
could be served with a bill, without arrest, which was equivalent to service of a summon . The same is stated in
Bacon's Ahr. "Privilege" B., with the modification that if
an attorney is sued with another (as in this case), ''he i
not privileged from arrest, even though it is during his
attendance in court,'' the evident reason being to prevent
clas discrimination. The exemption of lawyers from arrest, it seems, bas now been repealed in England. In this
tate the English privilege of exemption of lawyers from
arrest has never been recognized. It is well known that
one of the most distinguished lawyers and judges of this
tate, whose portrait now hangs on the walls of this chamb r, was arrested and imprisoned for debt, and long preented from attending upon court. This barbarous proceeding of imprisonment for debt, handed down from th
mmon law, should have been re1 ealed long before it was,
but while it was in force our predecessors applied it imrtially, and the bench did not hold their own members or
their prof ssion exempt. There was not at common law,
nd has ot b n in thi State, any exemption of any on
fr
ervi e of summons, and the exemption from arrest
nnr1 r our . tatute is conferred only upon witnesses and
jur r . 'I he ode, s c . 1 67 and 1735. And even wita
jurors are not exempted from service of sumUC' h . rvice would not deprive the court of
tl1 .j r rP. n . Th er i no r a on why lawy r should b
pri il er ·d from itb r · rre t or s rvice of summons any
111 r • thu
th r of'fi er of the court, as sheriffs, clerk ,
f·ric·r .· nc] th lik , and th 1 o-islative power ha therefor
, <· ~ n fit to make th :x mption apply only to witnesses and
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jurors, and, as to them, to make the exemption extend to

freedom from arrest only.

As to non-residents, in Cooper v. Wyman, 122 N. C, 784,

this Court held that non-resident witnesses and suitors

coming into this State solely for the purpose of litigation

were exempt from service while here for that purpose only.

This was put upon the ground of necessitv, because the

State could not compel their presence, and that since no

one else could fill their functions it was in the interest of

justice to give them "a safe conduct." But this reasoning

has not obtained in some States, notably Illinois, which

holds that neither are exempt from service of summons.

Greer v. Young, 120 111. 184, citing authorities. In Nichols

V. Goodlieart, 5 111. App., 574, it was held that a defendant

involuntarily in the State, by virtue of criminal process, is

not exempt from service of summons, citing Williams v.

Bacon, 10 Wend. (N. Y.), 636. Other States hold that the

rule is restricted to witnesses only. Shearman v. Gunlatch,
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37 Minn., 118. Other States extend the exemption to

parties also, since they have become competent as witnesses

{Mitchell v. Huron, 53 Michigan, 541), and our State has

adopted that rule, but restricts the exemption to those two

— "non-resident witnesses and parties." An exhaustive

brief of all the authorities, showing that the privilege ex-

tends only to non-resident witnesses and parties, will be

found in the notes (eighteen pages) to Mullen v. Sanborn,

25 L. R. A., 721-738. No court whatever has in any case

extended the exemption to non-resident lawyers. The

nearest approach to it is Trust Co. v. Railroad, 74 Fed,

Rep., 442, in which a subpoena served upon non-resident

counsel, which prevented his returning home and attending

to business he had left unprovided for, was set aside. That

case is not sustained by any previous authority, and evi-

dently rests more upon the ground stated therein, that the

non-resident subpoenaed was president of a railway com-

pany, than because he was also a lawyer, but, if sound, it

is very far from sustaining an alleged exemption from ser-

vice of summons, which did not prevent Morey from re-

turning home and adjusting his business, for the trial of

his case is for a subsequent term.

The United States Constitution, Art. I, sec. 6, prohibits

the arrest of a member of the House of Representatives or
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juror and, a to them, to make the exemption extend to
freedom from arre t only.
As to non-re idents, in Cooper v. Wyman, 122 N. C., 784,
thi
ourt held that non-resident witnesses and suitors
coming into this State solely for the purpo e of litigation
were ex em t from service while here for th at purpo e only.
This wa put upon the ground of nee . itv hecau. e the
• tate could not compel their presence, and that since no
on el e could fill their functions it wa in the intere t of
ju tice to ive them "a afe conduct." But thi r ea onino·
ba not obtained in ome tate , notably Illinoi which
holds that neither are exempt from service of ummon .
Greer v. Young, 120 Ill. 184 citing authorities. In Nichols
v. Goodheart, 5 Ill. App., 57 4, it was held that a defendant
involuntarily in the State, by virtue of criminal proce s, i
not exempt from service of ummon citing Williams v.
Bacon, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 636. Other tates hold that the
rule is re tricted to witn e only. Shearma;n v. Gunlatch,
37 Minn. 118. Other tates extend the exemption to
partie al o, ince they have become comp tent as witnes e
(Mitchell v. Huron, 53 MichiO'an, 541), and our State ha
adopted that rule, but restricts the exemption to those two
-"non-re ident witne ses and partie . " An exhau tive
brief of all the authorities, bowing that the privilege extend only to non-re ident witne es and parties, will be
found in the notes (eighteen pages) to Mull en v. Sanborn,
25 L . R . A. 721-738. No court whatever ha in any case
extended the exemption to non-re ident lawyer . The
nearest approach to it is Trust Co . v . Railroad, 74 Fed.
Rep. 442, in which a subpoena served upon non-re ident
coun el~ which prevented his returning home and attending
t.o bu ine he had left unprovided for, wa et a ide. That
ca e is not ustained by any previou authorit , and evidently re t more upon the ground stated therein that the
non-re ident subpoenaed wa president of a railwa. company, than because he was al o a lawyer, but if ound it
i very far from u taining an alleged exemption from serv ic of ummon which did not prevent Morey from rehom and adju ting hi bu ine , for the trial of
hi. ca i for a ub quent term.
The Unit d State
on titution, Art. I, sec. 6 prohibit
the arre t of a member of the House of Representatives or
T. P.-7 -

98
98 Teial Peacticb [Chap. 2

a Senator during the session, except for treason, felony

and breach of the peace. There is a similar provision as

to the members of the Legislature in Nebraska. The nu-

merous and uniform authorities that such privilege from

arrest does not exempt from service of process without

arrest are collected in a very recent and able opinion (1903)

in Berlet v. Weary, 93 N. W., 238 (Neb.) ; 60 L. R. A., 609;

and in Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn., 542 ; 23 L. R. A., 632 ;

Gentry v. Griffith, 27 Tex., 461. For a stronger reason this

is so where, as in most States as well as in this, lawyers are

not exempt even from arrest. In Lyall v. Goodivin, 4 Mc-

Lean, 29, a service of a summons from a United States

Court upon a judge of the State Supreme Court, in his own

court and while actually on duty, was set aside because

being a supposed indignity to the court and interference

with its business. Even if this can be sustained and ex-

tended to counsel, neither the dignity of the court nor the

despatch of business in this case could be interfered with
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by the service of summons upon Morey at the hotel.

Nor, in the nature of things, is there any reason why a

non-resident lawyer, coming here for a consideration in the

pursuit of his profession, should be exempt from the ser-

vice of summons any more than a non-resident physician

or minister or a member of any other calling. The plain-

tiff sues for services rendered to the defendants in this

State at their request. If Morey is exempt from service

because here in the exercise of his profession, a ''commer-

cial tourist" is by the same right exempt from being

served with summons in an action for a hotel bill incurred

while prosecuting his calling. Indeed, his ground for ex-

emption would be more plausible, for he is engaged in

interstate commerce and the lawyer is not. Service of

summons upon neither will interfere with the dignity of

the courts or their despatch of business. Our State extends

no preference to non-resident lawyers over those living

liere. The Code, sees. 18 and 19; Manning v. Railroad, 122

N. C, p. 828.

As far back as 1769 (10 George III., ch. 50), England

f)assed a statute confirming the ruling of Sir Orlando

Bridgeman in Benyon v. Evelyn Tr., 14 Car., 2 C. B. Roll,

over a century before (1661), and cited in Knoivles' Case,

12 Mod., at p. 64 (1694), that the privilege which members
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a enator during the ession, except for treason, felony
and breach of the peace. There is a similar provision as
to the members of the Legislature in Nebraska. The numerou and uniform authorities that such privilege from
arrest does not exempt from service of process without
arrest are collected in a very recent and able opinion ( 1903)
in Berlet v. Weary, 93 N. W., 238 (Neb.); 60 L. R. A., 609;
and in Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn., 542; 23 L. R. A., 63~ ;
Gentry v. Griffith, 27 Tex., 461. For a stronger reason this
i o where, as in most States as well as in this, lawyers are
not exempt even from arrest. In Lyall v. Goodwin, 4 McLean, 29, a service of a summons from a United States
ourt upon a judge of the State Supreme Court, in his own
court and while actually on duty, was set aside because
b ing a supposed indig11ity to the court and interference
with its business. Even if this can be sustained and ext nded to counsel, neither the dignity of the court nor the
de patch of busines in this case could be interfered with
by the service of summons upon Morey at the hotel.
Nor, in the nature of things, is there any reason why a
non-re ident lawyer, coming here for a consideration in the
pur uit of his profession, should be exempt from the service of summon any more than a non-resident phy ician
or mini ter or a member of any other calling. The plaintiff sues for services rendered to the defendants in this
tate at their request. If Morey is exempt from service
b au e here in the exercise of his profession, a "commercial tourist'' is by the same right exempt from being
rved with ummons in an action for a hotel bill incurred
whil pro cutino· his calling. Indeed, his ground for exm ti on would be mor plau ibl , for b is engarred in
int r state comm re and the lawyer i not. Service of
. u mon up n n ither will int rf re with the dignity of
h
urt. or th ir
patch of bu in s. Our State extends
r f r n e to non-r ident lawy r over those livinO'
h
c . 1 and 19; Manning v. Railroad, 122
1769 (] 0 G rge III., ch. 50), England
on.fir in()' t e ruling of Sir Orlando
n j
~nyon v. Evelyn Tr., 14 ar., 2 C. B. Roll,
ntury h f re (16 1), a d cit d in Knowles' Case,
., at p. 64 (16. 4), that the privil ge which members
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of Parliament enjoyed of being exempt from arrest did not

exempt them from being sued or from service of ordinary

process without arrest. The privilege was deemed too in-

vidious a class privilege even for that age and country, and

the claim was denied by Parliament itself and the conten-

tion put at rest. Cassidey v. Stewart, 2 Man. & Gr. 437. It

is not for an American court to reverse the process and

hold that because lawyers were formerly privileged from

arrest during attendance upon court, therefore, they are

exempt from being sued and being served with a sum-

mons. By the census of 1900 there were 114,703 practicing

lawyers in the United States, of whom 1,263 were in North

Carolina. If, during all these years, lawj^ers had possessed

the privilege of exemption from the service of summons,

assuredly more than one case could be found to assert it.

If it had been so asserted it would have been promptly re-

pealed by statute, seeing that the Parliament in England

passed an act denying a similar claim that its own mem-
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bers were exempt from service of summons because priv-

ileged from arrest, and that members and Senators in Con-

gress are not privileged from service of summons, though

expressly exempted from arrest on civil process by the Con-

stitution. Even the former privilege of lawyers from ar-

rest has been modified in some States and expressly re-

pealed in others, and in others still, as in North Carolina,

it has never been recognized or acknowledged.

Equally unfounded is the claim that service upon the

other defendant, the officer of a corporation {Jester v.

Steam Packet Co., 131 N. C, 54), was invalid because made

when he was attending a sale of land under a decree of

court. Such sale may, like other acts, come before a court

for review, but the sale itself is not a judicial proceeding,

and no exemption from service of process extends to it.

Such exemptions are restricted to non-resident witnesses

and parties, and are permitted, not on their own account

or for their own benefit, but for the benefit of the court in

obtaining evidence at a trial, when the court cannot compel

the presence of those who can testify to facts in issue in

the litigation. This can have no application to the attend

ance of a party at a sale, under a decree in the cause, for

his own convenience or benefit.

In the days of Privilege, under the rule of Ecclesiastics

SERVICE AND RET RN OF
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of Parliament enjoyed of being exempt from arre t did no t
exempt them from b ing sued or from service of ordinary
process without arre t. The privilege wa deemed too invidious a class privilege even for that age and country, and
the claim was denied by Parliament itself and the contention put at rest. Ca id ey v. Stewart, 2 Man. & G. 437. It
is not for an American court to reverse the process and
hold that because lawyers were formerly pri ileged from
arrest during attendance upon court, therefore, they are
exempt from being sued and being served with a summons. By the cen u of 1900 there were 114 703 practicing
lawyers in the United States, of whom 1,263 were in North
Carolina. If, during all these years lawyer had po e ed
the privilege of exemption from the en·ice of summon ,
assuredly more than one ca e could be found to a sert it.
If it had been so a serted it would have been promptly r pealed by statute, seeing that the Parliament in England
passed an act denying a imilar claim that its own mem bers were exempt from service of summons becau e pri ileged from arre t and that member and Senators in Congress are not privileged from service of summons, thou L
expressly exempted from arrest on civil process by the Contitution. Even the former privilege of lawyers from arrest has been modified in some States and expressly r e pealed in others, and in others still, a in Nor th Carolina ,
it bas never been recognized or acknowledged.
Equally unfounded is the claim that service upon the
other defendant, the officer of a corporation (Jester Y.
Steam Packet Co., 131 N. 0., 54), was invalid because made
when he was attending a ale of land under a decree of
court. Such ale may, like other acts, come before a court
for review, but the ale it elf i not a judicial proceeding
and no exemption from service of proces extends to it.
Such x mptions are re tricted to non-re ident witnesse.
and parti
and are permitted not on th eir own account
or for their own b nefit, but for the b n fit of the court in
obtaining e idence at a trial, when the court cannot compel
the pre nee of those who an te tify to fact in i ue in
the litigation. Thi can ha\·e no appli ation to the atten ·
ance of a party at a al un er a decree in the cau e for
his own convenience or benefit.
In the days of Privil ge under the rule of Eccle iastics
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· n England, they held their own profession exempt from

'q England, they held their own profession exempt from

the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and set apart certain

places where all men were exempt from service of process

under the * 'Privilege of Sanctuary." The last remnant of

such class privileges was repealed. 21 James I. Judges

have never claimed for the legal profession or the courts

any similar exemption, either as to persons or places. With

lawyers for judges, justice knows neither class nor caste,

and admits no special privileges, and for its administra-

tion "every place is a temple and all seasons summer."

The judgment setting aside the service of summons must

])e reversed.
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Douglas, J., concurs in the above concurring opinion.

the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and set apart certain
places where all men were exempt from service of process
under the "Privilege of Sanctuary." The last remnant of
uch class privileges was repealed. 21 James I. Judges
have never claimed for the legal profession or the courts
any similar exemption, either as to persons or places. With
lawyers for judges, justice knows neither class nor caste,
and admits no special privileges, and for its administration ''every place is a temple and all seasons summer.''
The judgment setting aside the service of summons must
he reversed.
Do GLAS, J., concurs in the above concurring opinion.

CHAPTER III.

APPEARANCE.

Section 1. What Constitutes a Special Appeakance.

BELKNAP V. CHARLTON.

Supreme Court of Oregon. 1893,

25 Oregon, 41.

CHAPTER III.

This action was commenced by H. A. Belknap, H. P.

Belknap and S. I. Belknap, partners, in the Circuit Court

APPEARANCE.

for Crook county against C. M. and Mamie Charlton, resi-

dents of Morrow county, to recover the sum of sixty-one

dollars and twenty cents upon an account for goods, wares,

SECTION 1. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SPECIAL .APPEARANCE.

and merchandise sold and delivered, and for services ren-

dered. A writ of attachment was duly issued and served

BELKNAP V. CHARLTON.

in Crook county by attaching in the hands of one J. F.

Moore certain moneys belonging to the defendants, but

Supre11ie Court of Oregon. 1893.

the summons in the action was not served on the defend-

ants. Some three months after the action was commenced,

and the writ of attachment had been served, the defendants

25 Oregon, 41.

appeared specially by their attorney for the purpose of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

.applying to the court to discharge the attachment because

the action had been commenced in the wrong county, and

because no service had been made upon them, which motion

l)eing overruled, judgment was rendered against them by

default. They now appeal, claiming that such appearance,

being special, gave the court no jurisdiction to render a

judgment against them. Reversed.

Opinion by Me. Justice Bean.

1. It is admitted that the voluntary appearance of a

defendant in an action is equivalent to the service of a

summons, and waives all defects in the process (Code, §

(52), but the contention for defendant is that no appear-

ance, except as provided in section 530 of the Code, — that

is, either by answer, demurrer, or giving plaintiff written

notice, — can be deemed an appearance within the meaning of

101

This action was commenced by H. A. Belknap, H. P.
Belknap and S. I. Belknap, partners in the Circuit Court
for Crook county again t C. J\f. and J\1amie Charlton, re iclents of Morrow county, to reco er the sum of ixty-one
lollars and twenty cents upon an account for goods, wares
c nd merchandi e sold and delivered, and for services renered. A writ of attachment was duly issued and ser e<l
in Crook county by attaching in the hands of one J. F.
:Moore certain moneys belonging to the defendants, but
the summons in the action was not served on the defendants. Some three months after the action was commenced,
and the writ of attachment had been served, the defendant
appeared pecially by their attorney for the purpose of
applying to the court to discharge the attachment becau e
i 1i action had been commenced in the wrong county, and
1 au e no service had been made upon them, which motion
b ing overruled, judgment was rendered against them by
efault. They now app eal, claiming that such appearance,
being pecial, ga e the court no juri diction to render a
judgment against them. Rever ed.
pinion by J\1R. J STICE BEAN.
1. It is admitted that the voluntary appearance of a
fendant in an action i equivalent to the service of a
·11mmon and waives all <l f ct in the process (Code §
)'.?) , but the contention f r 1 fendant is that no appearance, except a proYided in . ection 530 of the Code,-tha t
i. either by an wer demurrer or giving plaintiff writt n
notice,-can be deemed an a1 pearance within the meaning of

101
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section 62 of our Code. Section 530 provides, that a defend-

ant appears in an action wiien lie answers, demurs, or gives

plaintiff written notice of his appearance, and until he does

so appear he shall not be entitled to be heard, or be served

with notice of subsequent proceedings in such action or suit,

or in any proceeding pertaining thereto, except the giving of

an undertaking in the provisional remedies of arrest, at-

tachment, or the delivery of personal property. The ar-

rangement of this section in the Code under the title of

"Notices and Service and Filing of Papers," as well as its

language, indicates clearly that its only purpose is to define

what shall constitute such an appearance in an action as

will entitle the defendant to be heard, as a matter of right,

and entitle him to the service of notice of motions and sub-

sequent proceedings in the action required by law to be

served : Bank v. Rogers, 12 Minn., 529 ; Grant v. Schmidt,

22 Minn., 1. It was not, we think, intended to define a

voluntary appearance within the meaning of section 62,
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and has no bearing upon the question of jurisdiction. A

defendant may appear and submit himself to the jurisdic-

tion of the court in many ways, without either answering,

demurring, or giving i^laintiff written notice of his appear-

ance. He may do this by appearing in person, or by attor-

ney in open court, by attacking the complaint by motion, or

by an application for a continuance, and in many other

ways which will readily suggest themselves to one familiar

with the course of judicial proceedings. But before he is

entitled, as a matter of right, to be heard in the action, or

in any proceedings pertaining thereto, or to be served with

notice, he must appear in one of the ways provided in sec-

tion 530. The question before us, therefore, must be deter-

mined without reference to that section, which, as we con-

ceive, has no bearing upon tlie question as to whether a

special appearance for the purpose of applying for the dis-

charge of an attachment is a submission to the jurisdiction

of the court so as to authorize it to proceed to judgment in

the action without the service of summons.

2. It is claimed by the plaintiffs that while a defendant

may appear specially to object to the jurisdiction of the

court over him on account of the illegal service of process,

(Kinkade v. Myers, 17 Or. 470, 21 Pac. Bep. 557), he must

keep out of court for every other purpose, and that any
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section 62 of our Code. Section 530 provides, that a defendant appears in an action when he answers, demurs, or gives
plaintiff written notice of his appearance, and until he does
o appear he shall not be entitled to be heard, or be served
with notice of subsequent proceedings in such action or suit,
or in any proceeding pertaining thereto, except the giving of
an undertaking in the provisional remedies of arrest, attachment, or the delivery of personal property. The arrangement of this section in the Code under the title of
'Notices and Sen ice and Filing of Papers," as well as its
language, indicates clearly that its only purpose is to define
what shall constitute such an appearance in an action a
will entitle the defendant to be heard, as a matter of right,
and entitle him to the service of notice of motions and subsequent proceedings in the action required by law to be
served: Bank v. Rogers, 12 Minn., 529; Grant v. Schmidt,
22 Minn., 1. It was not, we think, intended to define a
voluntary appearance within the meaning of section 62,
and has no bearing upon the question of jurisdiction. A
defendant may appear and submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court in many ways, without either answering,
demurring, or giving plaintiff written notice of his appearance. He may do this by appearing in person, or by attorney in open court, by attacking the complaint by motion, or
by an application for a continuance, and in many other
ways which will readily suggest themselves to one familiar
with the course of judicial proceedings. But before he is
ntitled, as a matter of right, to be beard in the action, or
in any proceedings pertaining thereto, or to be sen ~d with
notice, he must appear in one of the ways provided in section 53 . The question before u s, ther fore, mu t be determined without reference to that section, which, as we cone i , ha no b aring upon the question as to whether a
ial app aranc for the purpo e of applying for the dis·h r
f an atta hment i a ubmi ion to th juri diction
of th
irt so a to authoriz it to proceed to judgment in
th
·ti n with ut th s rvi e of summons.
t i. laim d 1y th
laintiff that whil a d f ndant
ay app ar sp ri l1y to object to the jurisdiction of the
c urt v r him n a ount of the illegal s rvi e of process,
(11 inliad e v. My rs, 7 r. 470, 21 Pac. R p. 557), he must
k
out of c urt f r v ry th r purpose, and that any
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appearance which calls into action the power of the court

Tor any purpose except to decide upon its own jurisdiction.

is a general appearance, and waives all defects in the ser

vice of process, and many authorities are cited to sustain

this position. The principle to be extracted from the de-

cisions on this subject is, that where the defendant appears

and asks some relief which can be granted only on the

hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of the cause and

the person, it is a submission to the jurisdiction of the

court as completely as if he had been regularly served with

process, whether such an appearance by its terms be limited

to a special purpose or not: Coad v. Coad, 41 Wis. 26;

Blackburn v. Siveet, 38 Wis., 578; Pry v. Hannibal S St.

Jo. R. R. Co., 73 Mo., 126; Sargent v. Flaid, 90 Ind., 501;

Layne v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 35 W. Va. 438, 14 S. E. Rep.

123; Handy v. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St., 366; Bucklin v. Strick-

ler, 32 Neb., 602, 49 N. W. Rep., 371; Burdette v. C organ,

26 Kansas, 102; Aidtman & Taylor Co. v. Steinan, 8 Neb.,
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109. This seems to be a reasonable rule, and one which

will adequately protect the rights of the parties, and it de-

termines the effect of defendant's appearance from the

nature of the relief which he seeks to obtain. If he asks

the court to adjudicate upon some question affecting the

merits of the controversy, or for some relief which pre-

supposes jurisdiction of the person, and which can be

granted only after jurisdiction is acquired, he will be

deemed to have made a general appearance, and to have

submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and can-

not, by any act of his, limit his appearance to a special

purpose. But, if granting the relief asked would be con-

sistent with a want of jurisdiction over the person, he may

appear for a special purpose without submitting himself to

the jurisdiction of the court for any other purpose. It has

consequently been held that an attachment and the action

out of which it issues, are so inseparately connected that

the defendant cannot appear and question the validity of

the attachment by a traverse of the facts alleged in the

affidavit, or by contesting the truth of the grounds upon

which it issued, without submitting himself to the jurisdic-

tion of the court in the action, because by so doing the

court is called upon to entertain and determine questions

which can be considered only after jurisdiction has at-

APPEARANCE

10.

appearance which calls into action the power of the court
fo r any purpose except to decide upon its own jurisdiction.
i a general appearance, and waives all defects in the ser
vice of proce s and many authorities are cited to ustain
this position. The principle to be extracted from the deci ions on this ubject is, that where the defendant appears
and asks some relief which can be granted only on the
hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of the cause and
the person, it is a submis ion to the jurisdiction of the
court as completely a if he had been regularly served witb
process, whether such an appearance by its terms be limited
to a special purpose or not: Coad v. Coad, 41 Wi . 26;
Blackburn v. Sweet, 38 Wi . 578; Pry v. Hannibal & St.
Jo. R. R. Co., 73 l\1o. 1_6; argent v. Flaid, 90 Ind., 501 ·
Layne v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 35 W. \ a. 43 , 14 S. E. Rep.
123; Ha ndy v. Ins. Co., 37 hio St., 366; Bucklin v. Strickler, 32 Neb., 602, 49 N.
. Rep., 371 · Burdette v. Corgan
26 Kansas, 102; A itlt11ian & Taylor Co. v. Ste,i nan, 8 Neb.,
109. This seems to be a rea onable rule, and one which
will adequately protect the right of the parties, and it determines the effect of defendant's appearance from the
nature of the relief which he eeks to obtain. If he asks
the court to adjudicate upon ome question affecting the
merits of the contro' er y, or for some relief which preuppose jurisdiction of the person, and which can be
oTanted only after juri diction is acquired, he will be
deemed to have made a general appearance, and to have
ubmitted him elf to the juri diction of the court, and cannot, by any act of his, limit his appearance to a special
l urpo e. But, if granting the relief asked would be conistent with a want of juri diction over the per on he may
a pear for a special purpo e without submitting himself to
the juri diction of the court for any other purpose. It ha
on equently been held that an attachment and the action
out of which it i ue , are so inseparately connected that
the defendant cannot appear and question the validity of
the attachment by a tra er of the facts alleged in the
ffidavit, or by conte ting th truth of the grounds upon
which it i sued, without n mitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court in the a tion becau e by so doing the
ourt i called upon to nt rtain and determine question
which can be considered only after jurisdiction has at-
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taclied: Greenivell v. Greenwell, 26 Kan. 530; Bury v.

Conklin, 23 Kan., 460; Wood v. Young, 38 Iowa, 102; Dun-

can V. Wkkliife, 4 Met. (Ky.) 118. But where a defendant

appears, and without questioning the merits of the action,

or the truth of the grounds upon which the attachment

issued, moves to discharge the attachment for want of the

jurisdictional facts to sustain it, he asks no relief the grant-

ing of which would be inconsistent with an entire want of

jurisdiction over the person, and hence does not appear in

the action so as to authorize the court to proceed to judg-

ment against him : Drake, Attach. § 112 ; Glidden v. Pack-

ard, 28 Cal., 649; Johnson v. Buell, 26 111., QQ; Bonner v.

Brown, 10 La. Ann. 334.

Now, in the case at bar, the appearance of the defend-

ants was not for the purpose of contesting the truth of the

grounds upon which the attachment issued, or the merits

of the action, but to vacate the attachment for the reason,

as appears from the affidavit accompanying the motion,
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that the action had been commenced in the wrong county,

and that it was a great injustice and wrong to them to have

their property thus held under an attachment when there

was no means of obtaining jurisdiction over their persons.

This appearance was, therefore, not for the purpose of sub-

mitting to the jurisdiction of the court, or asking it to

entertain or determine any question which could only be

considered after jurisdiction had attached, but it was for

the sole purpose of objecting to the validity of the attach-

ment for irregularities in the proceedings, the granting of

which would have been entirely consistent with the claim

that the court had no jurisdiction of the person. By their

motion to discharge the attachment for the reason stated,

the defendants appeared for no purpose incompatible with

the supposition that the court had acquired no jurisdiction

over them on account of a want of service of the sum-

mons, and we therefore think there was no waiver of pro-

cess. Nothing less than the express language of a statute,

or the necessary implication therefrom, or the overbearing

weight of autliority, will justify a court in holding that a

defendant in an action commenced in the wrong county, in

violation of section 44 of the Code, could not appear and

apply for the discharge of an attachment against his prop-

erty, for irregularities, without being required to submit
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tached: Greenwell v. Greenwell, 26 l{an. 530; Bury v.
Conklin, 23 Kan., 460 ; liVood v. Young, 38 Iowa, 102; Duncan v. TVickliff e, 4 l\!et. (I\::y.) 118. But where a defendant
appears, and without que tioning the merits of the action,
or the truth of the grounds upon which the attachment
issued, moves to discharge the attachment for want of the
jurisdictional facts to sustain it, he a. ks no relief the granting of which would be inconsistent with an entire want of
jurisdiction over the person, and hence does not appear in
the action so as to authorize the court to proceed to judo·_
ment against him: Drake, Attach. § 112; Glidden v. Packard, 28 Cal., 649 ; Johnson v. Buell, 26 Ill., 66; Bonner v.
Brown, 10 La. Ann. 334.
Now, in the case at bar, the appearance of the defendants was not for the purpose of contesting the truth of the
grounds upon which the attachment issued, or the merits
of the action, but to vacate the attachment for the reason,
as appears from the affidavit accompanying the motion,
that the action bad been commenced in the wrong county,
and that it was a great injustice and wrong to them to have
their property thus held under an attachment when there
wa no means of obtaining jurisdiction over their person .
This apr earance was, therefore, not for the purpose of submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, or asking it to
ent rtain or determine any question which could only be
onsid red after juri diction had attached, but it was for
the sole purpo e of objecting to the validity of the attachment for irr gularities in the proceedings, the granting of
which would have been ntirely consistent with the claim
that the court had no jurisdiction of the person. By their
motion to 1i charge the attachment for the r as on stated,
th <l f ndant ap1 eared for no purpose incompatible with
th . u po ition that the court had acquired no juri diction
rvice of the sumv r th m on account of a want of
ons, and w tb r f r think th re wa no waiver of proc· . . .
othin<r l . , than the xpress languaae of a statute,
or th n C'C .... ry implication th r from, or the ov rb aring
·i ,·ht of uthorit, , ill ju. tify a court in h olding t11at a
<l f Pn<lnnt in an adion ornm n d in the wrono· county, in
i lat ion of :P ·ti on 44 of th
ode, could not ap1 ar and
a1 pl 'fnr tlie <li .· ·hnrg f c: n atta hm t ao·ain t hi proprty, for irn·gnlaritili.', without being requir d to submit
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himself to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of

the entire action; and it is not material in such case,

whether the motion happened to be well founded or not,

but the question is, did it go to the merits, or was it based

upon some technical grounds supposed to be sufficient to

render the attachment invalid. If a defendant may not

thus appear and resist what he supposes to be a wrongful

attachment without subjecting his person to the jurisdic-

tion of the court, he must either suffer his property to be

held under a pretended attachment for an indefinite time,

or waive a statutory right to be sued in the county where

he resides or may be found. This the law will not exact or

require.

4. It was suggested that the remedy of the defendants

in such case is by motion to dismiss the action for want of

jurisdiction, but such a motion would be unavailing. The

court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and an action is

commenced by filing the complaint, and there is no pro-
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vision of the law authorizing it to be dismissed because the

summons has not been served: Code, <§ § 51, 59. It follows,

therefore, that the action of the court below in entering

judgment against the defendants without service of process

upon them was unauthorized, and the judgment must be

reversed.

Reversed.

FULTON V. EAMSEY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1910.

67 West Virginia, 321.

PoFFENBAEGER, J. The solo qucstlou iu this cause, name-

ly, whether Joseph Eamsey, Jr., George J. Gould, and Will-

iam E. Guy, non-resident defendants, proceeded against by

order of publication, appeared herein, in the court below,

by attorneys, so as to enable that court to render a personal

decree against them, grows out of the operations of what

is styled in an agreement, and popularly known, as "the
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.him elf to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of
the entire action; and it is not material in such case,
whether the motion happened to be well founded or not,
but the question is, did it go to the merits, or was it based
upon some technical grounds supposed to be sufficient to
render the attachment invalid. If a defendant may not
thu appear and resi t what he suppo es to be a wrongful
attachment without subjecting his per on to the jurisdiction of the court, he must either suffer his property to be
held under a pretended attachment for an indefinite time,
or waive a statutory right to be sued in the county where
he resides or may be found. This the law will not exact or
require.
4. It was suggested that the remedy of the defendants
in such case is by motion to di mi s the action for want of
juri diction, but such a motion would be unavailing. The
court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and an action is
commenced by :filing the complaint, and there is no provision of the law authorizing it to be dismis ed becau e the
summons has not been erved: Code, § § 51, 59. It follows,
therefore, that the action of the court below in entering
judgment again t the defendants without service of process
upon them was unauthorized, and the judgment must be
reversed.
Reversed.

Little Kanawha Syndicate," which agreement is dated De-

FULTON V. RAMSEY.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1910.
67 West Virginia, 321.

PoFFENBARGER, J. The sole question in this cause, nameh Ramey, Jr., George J. Gould, and Willly, whether Jo
iam E. Guy, non-re ident defendant , proceeded against by
order of ublication, appeared herein, in the court below,
by attorneys, o as to enable that court to render a personal
d ere a()'ain t th m grow out of the operations of what
is styl d in an agr ement, and popularly known, as ''the
Little Kanawha Syndicate," which agreement is dated De-
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cember 2, 1901, and was signed by said Ramsey, Gould, Guy,

and others.

That syndicate seems to have been formed for the pur-

pose of purchasing the Little Kanawha Railroad, large

areas of coal lands, and other properties in this state. * * *

In anticipation of the launching of this enterprise, Mr.

Edward D. Fulton had acquired an option on the Little

Kanawha Railroad as well as the title to, and options upon,

large areas of coal and coal lands and other property in

the counties of Braxton, Gilmer, and Lewis. Under certain

agreements, and with intent to dispose of the same to the

syndicate, he assigned the option on the railroad, at the op-

tion price, and assigned his coal and coal land options, and

conveyed his coal and coal lands, at certain prices named

in the assignments and deeds, to the St. Louis Union Trust

Company, to hold as trustee for the syndicate. For some

reason, the syndicate concluded to abandon its plan and sell

all its property. Accordingly, it failed to carry out its con-
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temjDlated arrangements with Fulton, and he brought this

suit, in the Circuit Court of Braxton county, to compel

specific performance of his alleged contract with the syndi-

cate. * * *

On the 1st day of December, 1908, the following order,

relied upon by Fulton as showing a general appearance,

was entered: ''This day R. W. McMichael and John B.

Morrison, attorneys practicing in this court, appeared and

asked the court to permit them to appear specially for

Joseph Ramsey, Jr., George J. Gould, and William E. Guy,

as managers of the Little Kanawha Syndicate, and ask a

continuance of this cause for thirty or sixty days to enable

them to prepare their defense, or to determine whether

they would desire to appear generally, and stating that

they did not desire to appear generally for said parties at

this time, but that they desired to move the court to con-

tinue the cause without appearance otlier than specially for

the purposes of the continuance. The plaintiff, by his

counsel, resisted the said motion to continue the hearing,

and thereupon said counsel for said defendants Ramsey,

Gould, and Guy, announced that it was their desire to with-

draw and not appear to the case, and thereupon counsel for

plaintiff, and while said counsel for defendants were pres-

ent, asked that the cause be submitted for hearing and ac-
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cember 2, 1901, and was igned by said Ramsey, Gould, Guy,
and others.
That syndicate seems to have been fonne d for the purpose of purchasing the Little Kanawha Railroad, large
areas of coal lands, and other properties in this state. * * *
In anticipation of the launching of this enterprise, Mr.
Edward D. Fulton had acquired an option on the Little
Kanawha Railroad as well as the title to, and options upon,
large areas of coal and coal lands and other property in
the counties of Braxton, Gilmer, and Lewis. Under certain
agreements, and with intent to dispose of the same to the
syndicate, he assigned the option on the railroad, at the option price, and assigned his coal and coal land options, and
conveyed his coal and coal land , at certain prices named
in the assignments and deeds, to the St. Louis Union Trust
Company, to hold as trustee for the syndicate. For some
reason, the syndicate concluded to abandon its plan and sell
all its property. Accordingly, it failed to carry out its contemplated arrangements with Fulton, and he brought this
suit, in the Circuit Court of Braxton county, to compel
specific performance of his alleged contract with the syndicate. * * *
On the 1st day of December, 1908, the following order,
relied upon by Fulton as showing a general appearance,
was entered: ''This day R . W. McMichael and John B.
Morrison, attorneys practicing in this court, appeared and
asked the court to permit them to appear specially for
Joseph Ramsey, Jr., George J. Gould, and William E. Guy,
as managers of the Little I{anawha Syndicate, and ask a
continuance of this cause for thirty or sixty days to enable
them to prepare their defense, or to determine whether
they would desire to appear O'enerally, and stating that
they did not de ire to appear generally for said parties at
thi time, but that they desired to move the court to continu the au. e without appearance other than specially for
tJ1c purpo. e of the continuance. Th plaintiff, by his
un . 1, r i ted the aid m ti on to continue the hearin
, nd th r pon aid coun 1 for aid defendants Ram ey,
G u ld, ncl Guy, announ ed that it was their de ire to withrlr
an not a p ar to the ca , and thereupon counsel for
plc in ii ff n whi1 . aid counsel for defendant wer pres11 t a k
that the cause be submitted for hearing and ac-

o"
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cordingly the said cause was submitted for hearing." * • *

**********

We think the order was nothing more than an inquiry,

addressed to the court, for information as to what could

be done by way of obtaining a postponement of action in

the cause, without submitting to the jurisdiction of the

court for all purposes, or a conditional, not an absolute and

unqualified, motion for a continuance. The motion, as re-

corded, if it can be regarded as a motion, signified a desire

for a continuance, if it could be had without a waiver of

service of process upon the defendants, but distinctly de-

clared unwillingness to ask or take a continuance, if it in-

volved such a waiver. It does not say in express terms

that a motion to continue was made. On the contrary, it

says McMichael and Morrison asked the court to per-

mit them to appear specially for their clients and ask a

continuance, to enable them to determine whether they

would desire to appear generally, and stated that they did
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not desire to appear generally at that time. It then says

counsel for plaintiff resisted "said motion to continue."

That means the motion or request made. It was not in

terms a motion, and, read in the light of the protest, sub-

mitted along with it, it cannot be regarded as anything

more, in substance and effect, than an offer to move for a

continuance, if it could be done without waiving process,

accompanied by a declaration of intent not to move at

all, if such action involved waiver, and an immediate dec-

laration of determination not to say or do anything more,

after having been informed that a motion for a continu-

ance, so made and described upon the record, would be in

law a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

We apprehend no dissent from the pro^DOsition that the

establishment of the jurisdiction of a court, whether over

the person or the subject matter, must be affirmatively

shown by the record. Groves v. Grant County Court, 42

W. Va., 587, 600, 26 S. E. 460. Something must be done to

confer it. Jurisdiction of the person may be acquired by

implication, arising out of some act done, or by direct and

positive acknowledgement thereof; but in either event it

should clearly appear. It ought to be reasonably free from

uncertainty and doubt. A favorite statement of the rule,

respecting the acquisition of jurisdiction by implication or
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* * * * • * * * * *
We think the order was nothing more than an inquiry,
addressed to the court, for information as to what could
be done by way of obtaining a postponement of action in
the cause, without submitting to the jurisdiction of the
court for all purpo es, or a conditional, not an absolute and
unqualified, motion for a continuance. The motion, as recorded, if it can be regarded as a motion, signified a desire
for a continuance, if it could be had without a waiver of
service of process upon the defendants, but distinctly declared unwillingness to ask or take a continuance, if it involved such a waiver. It does not say in express terms
that a motion to continue was made. On the contrary, it
says McMichael and Morrison asked the court to permit them to appear specially for their client and a k a
continuance, to enable them to determine whether they
would desire to appear generally, and stated that they did
not desire to appear g enerally at that time. It then ays
counsel for plaintiff resi ted '' aid motion to continue.''
That means the motion or request made. It was not in
terms a motion and, read in the light of the protest, submitted along with it, it cannot be regarded as anything
more, in substance and effect, than an offer to move for a
continuance, if it could be done without waiving process,
accompanied by a declaration of intent not to move at
all, if such action involved waiver, and an immediate declaration of determination not to say or do anything more,
after having been informed that a motion for a continuance, so made and de scribed upon the record, would be in
law a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
We apprehend no dis ent from the propo ition that the
establi hment of the juri diction of a court, whether over
the person or the subject matter, mu t be affirmatively
shown by the record. Groves v. G1 an t Coun ty Court, 42
W. Va., 587, 600, 26 . E. 460. Something mu t be done to
confer it. Juri diction of the per on may be acquired by
implication, ari ing out of ome act done, or by direct and
positive acknowl dgement th r eof; but in eith r event it
hould cl arly a pear. It ought to b rea onably fr ee from
uncertainty and doubt. A fa vorite tatement of th rule
r specting the acqui ition of jurisdiction by implicati n r
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waiver, is this: "By appearance to the action in any case,

for any other purpose than to take advantage of the de-

fective execution, or non-execution, of process, a defendant

places himself precisely in the situation in which he would

be if process were executed upon him, and he thereby

waives all objection to the defective execution or non-execu-

tion of process upon him." State v. Coal Co., 49 W. Va.

143, 38 S. E. 539; Lumber Co. v. Lance, 50 W. Va. 640, 41

S. E. 128; Layne v. Railroad Co., 35 W. Va. 438, 14 S. E.

123; Blankenship v. Railivay Co., 43 W. Va. 135, 27 S. E.

355; Mahany v. Kephart, 15 W. Va. 609; Bank v. Bank, 3

W. Va. 386. This is a declaration of a general principle,

to be read in the light of the facts and circumstances under

which it is applied, in seeking its true meaning. Some at-

tention must also be paid to its terms. It must be an ap-

pearance for a purpose in the cause, not one merely col-

lateral' to it. In this state, litigants have put themselves

within this rule, for the most part, by asking or accepting
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some sort of relief in the cause, consistent with the hypothe-

sis of a submission and inconsistent with any other view,

such as a continuance. No instance can be found in which

a party has been held to have impliedly bound himself to

submission, without having asked or received some relief in

the cause or participated in some step taken therein. Mere

presence in the court room when the case is called, or ex-

amination of the papers in it filed in the clerk's office, is not

enough. Nor could a conversation with plaintiff's counsel

or the judge of the court, about the case, be regarded as an

appearance. No decision goes that far. Under this text in

3 Cyc. 504, ''Any action on the part of defendant, except to

object to the jurisdiction, which recognizes the case as in

court, will amount to a general appearance," a long list of

decisions is cited, but, in every one of them, something was

done in the cause — some affirmative act was done to delay,

speed, or defend the cause. In every instance the conduct,

deemed a waiver, amounted to more than a mere inquiry or

conversation about it. The test, according to a late decision

of the Federal Supreme Court {Merchant's Heat & Light

Co. V. Cloiv S Sons, 204 U. S. 286, 27 Sup. Ct. 285), is

whether the defendant became an actor in the cause. The

instances of the assumption of the role of actor in a suit

disclosed by the federal decisions, are such as the taking
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waiver, is this: "By appearance to the action in any ca e,
for any other purpose than to take advantage of the defective execution, or non-execution, of process, a defendant
places himself precisely in the situation in which he would
be if process were executed upon him, and he thereby
waives all objection to the defective execution or non-execution of process upon him.'' State v. Coal Co., 49 W. Va.
143, 38 S. E. 539; Litmber Co. v. Lance, 50 vV. Va. 640, 41
S. E. 128; Layne v. Railroad Co., 35 W. Va. 438, 14 S. E.
123; Blankenship v. Railway Co., 43 W. Va. 135, 27 S. E.
355·; Mahany v. J( ephart, 15 W. Va. 609; Bank v. Bank, 3
W. Va. 386. This is a declaration of a general principle,
to be read in the light of the facts and circumstances under
which it is applied, in seeking its true meaning. Some attention must also be paid to its terms. It must be an appearance for a purpo e in the cau e, not one merely collateral to it. In thi state, litigant have put themselves
within this rule, for the most part, by asking or accepting
ome sort of relief in the cause, consistent with the hypothesis of a ubmission and incon istent with any other view,
uch a a continuance. No instance can be found in which
a party has been held to have impliedly bound himself to
ubmission, without having asked or received some relief in
the cau e or partici1 ated in ome step taken therein. Mere
presence in tbe court room when the case is called, or examination of the papers in it filed in the clerk's office, is not
enough. Nor could a conversation with plaintiff's counsel
or the judge of the court, about the case, be regarded as an
appearance. No deci ion goes that far. Under this text in
3 ye. 504, ''Any action on ·the part of defendant, except to
obj t to the juri diction, which r cognizes the case as in
court, will amount to a general appearance,'' a long list of
de i i n is cited, but, in every one of them, som thing was
don in th cau e-some affirmative act was done to delay,
p
, or d f nd th au e. In e ry i tance the conduct,
d m a wai r, am unt d to mor than a mer inquiry or
ti n ab ut it. The t t, a cordin to a lat d ci ion
ral upr me Court (!.1 erchant' s Heat & Light
'low & ons, _04 U. . ..., 6, 27 Sup. t .... 85) i
r ih ef n ant b a
an ctor in the cause. The
in t
of the a sum iio of the role of actor in a uit
disclo d y the f deral d i. ions, are such a tb taking
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of a continuance; filing a demurrer to plaintiff's pleadings,

without limiting it to the question of jurisdiction; filing a

plea of intervention, pleading to issue or to the merits in

the first instance ; or filing sets-off, counter-claims, or notices

of recoupment. Broad as is this doctrine of waiver, it does

not cover all acts done by a defendant. He may talk even

to the court about the merits of the cause without subject-

ing himself to it. In Citizens' Saving £ Trust Co. v. Rail-

road Co., 205 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 425, argument upon the

merits of the cause was indulged in, at the hearing upon

the sufficiency of the pleas to the jurisdiction, and this was

relied upon as constituting a general appearance; but Mr.

Justice Haelan, speaking for the court, said: "This is too

harsh an interpretation of what occurred in the court be-

low. There was no motion for the dismissal of the bill for

want of equity. The discussion of the merits was per-

mitted or invited by the court in order that it might be in-

formed on that question in the event it concluded to con-
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sider the merits along with the question of the sufficiency

of the pleas to the jurisdiction. We are satisfied that the

defendants did not intend to waive the benefit of their qual-

ified appearance at the time of filing the pleas to the juris-

diction." * * * In Fairhank S Co. v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry.

Co., 54 Fed. 420, 4 C. C. A. 403, 38 L. R. A. 271, the court

held as follows: ""Where a defendant appears specially

for the purpose of moving to quash the return on the sum-

mons, the fact that, in such motion, it also prays judgment

whether it should be compelled to plead, for the reason that

it is a non-resident corporation, does not constitute a

waiver of the objection to the service." These precedents

amply sustain the view that something substantially bene-

ficial to the defendant or detrimental to the plaintiff, re-

lating to or affecting the progress of the cause, asked, done,

or accepted by the former, is essential to the establishment

of a waiver of process or service thereof. There must be

something more than a mere pretext for the claim of juris-

diction over him. He must either enter an appearance, ask

some relief in the cause, accept some benefit as a step there-

in or do something from which the necessary implication of

submission to the jurisdiction of the court over his person

arises. "The principle to be extracted from the decisions

on the subject as to when a special appearance is converted
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of a continuance; filing a demurrer to plaintiff's pleadings,
without limiting it to the question of juri diction ; filing a
plea of intervention, pleading to issue or to the merits in
the first instance; or filing ets-off, counter-claims, or notice
of recoupment. Broad as is this doctrine of waiver, it doe
not cover all acts done by a defendant. He may talk even
to the court about the merits of the cau e without subjecting himself to it. In Citizens' Saving & Trust Co. v . Railroad Co., 205 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 425, argument upon the
merits of the cause was indulged in, at the hearing upon
the sufficiency of the pleas to the jurisdiction, and this was
relied upon as constituting a general appearance; but JYir.
Justice HARLA , speaking for the court, said : ''This is too
harsh an interpretation of what occurred in the court below. There was no motion for the dismi al of the bill for
want of equity. The discussion of the merit · was permitted or invited bv the court in order that it might be informed on that question in the event it concluded to conider the merit along with the question of the sufficienc
of the plea to the juri diction. We are sati fied that the
defendants did not intend to wai' e the benefit of their qualified appearance at the time of filing the plea to the jurisdiction." * * * In Fairbank & Co . v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry.
Co., 54 Fed. 420 4 C. C. A. 403, 38 L. R. A. 271, the court
held as follow : 'Where a defendant appears specially
for the purpo e of moving to qua h the return on the summons, the fact that, in such motion, it also prays judgment
whether it should be compelled to plead, for the reason that
it is a non-re ident corporation, does not con titute a
waiver of the objection to the service.'' These precedent
amply su tain the view that omething sub tantially beneficial to the defendant or detrimental to the plaintiff, relating to or affecting the progress of the cau. e asked, done
or accepted by the former, is e sential to the e tablishment
of a waiver of proce s or ser ice thereof. There must be
:omething more than a mere pretext for the claim of jurisdiction over him. He mu t either enter an appearance, a k
ome relief in the cau e accept ome benefit a a tep therein or do somethino· from wbich the nece ar} implication of
ubmission to the juri diction of the court over hi per on
arises. ''The principle to be extracted from the decision
on the subject .9- to when a special appearance is converte
7
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into a general one is that, where the defendant appears and

asks some relief which can only be granted on the hypothe-

sis that the court has jurisdiction of the cause and the

person, it is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court

as completely as if he had been regularly served with pro-

cess, whether such an appearance, by its terms, be limited

to a special purpose or not." 2 Ency. PI. & Pr. 625. ''The

expression 'for any purpose connected with the cause,' how-

ever, is not to be taken as wholly unrestricted in meaning.

The appearance must have some relation to the merits of

the controversy, and the purpose must be to invoke some

action on the part of the court having direct bearing in

some way upon the question of the judgment or decree

proper to be entered." Bank v. Knox, 133 Iowa, 443, 446,

109 N. W. 201. The general principle, upon which we rely,

was applied by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in

Loivrie v. Castle, 198 Mass. 82, 83 N. E. 1118, under circum-

stances even more unfavorable to the defendant than those
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presented here. The non-resident defendant in that case,

within 10 days after the return day of the writ, applied to

the court for an extension of the time within which he could

appear, in order that he might decide whether to waive the

lack of proper service and voluntarily appear, or to insist

upon his rights as a non-resident, and the court allowed

such extension. After the expiration of the 10 days, but

within the period of the extension allowed, he moved to dis-

miss the action, stating in his motion that he appeared only

for the purpose of moving a dismissal, and the motion was

sustained. The appellate court held it to be within the in-

herent power of the trial court to grant such an extension,

without prejudice to the right to except to the jurisdiction,

and affirmed the judgment of dismissal. In delivering the

opinion of the court, Hammond, Judge, said: "It is to be

borne in mind that this is not a case where a defendant,

upon whom process has been duly served, and who, there-

for, is within the jurisdiction of the court and liable to de-

fault if he does not seasonably appear, asks for delay. It is

a case where a non-resident defendant who, for lack of

service upon him, is not within the jurisdiction and cannot

be brought within it, fearing lest the court may regard the

service sufficient and default him, comes into court, and

says, in substance, that he is in doubt whether to waive

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 3

into a general one is that, where the defendant appears and
asks some relief which can only be granted on the hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of the cause and the
person, it is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court
as completely as if he had been regularly served with process, whether such an appearance, by its terms, be limited
to a special purpose or not.'' 2 Ency. PL & Pr. 625. ''The
expression' for any purpose connected with the cause,' however, is not to be taken as wholly unrestricted in meaning.
The appearance must have some relation to the merits of
the controversy, and the purpose must be to invoke some
action on the part of the court having direct bearing in
some way upon the question of the judgment or decree
proper to be entered." Bank v. Knox, 133 Iowa, 443, 446,
109 N. W. 201. The general principle, upon which we rely,
was applied by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
Lowrie v. Castle, 198 Mass. 82, 83 N. E. 1118, under circumstances even more unfavorable to the defendant than those
presented here. The non-resident defendant in that case,
within 10 days after the return day of the writ, applied to
the court for an extension of the time within which he could
appear, in order that he might decide whether to waive the
lack of proper service and voluntarily appear, or to insist
upon his rights as a non-resident, and the court allowed
such extension. After the expiration of the 10 days, but
within the period of the extension allowed, he moved to dismiss the action, stating in his motion that he appeared only
for the purpose of moving a dismissal, and the motion was
sustained. The appellate court held it to be within the inherent power of the trial court to grant such an extension,
without prejudice to the right to except to the jurisdiction,
and affirmed the judgment of dismissal. In delivering the
opinion of the court, HAMMOND, Judge, said: "It is to be
borne in mind that this is not a case where a defendant,
upon whom process has been duly served, and who, therefor, is within the juri diction of the court and liable to default if h do not s asonably appear, asks for delay. It is
a ase wb r a non-re ident defendant who, for lack of
. rvic u on him, i not within the jurisdiction and cannot
be br ught within it, f ari o- 1 st the court may regard the
rvi
·ufJi i nt and d fault him, com s into court, and
a , i
ub tan , that h is in doubt whether to waive
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proper service and voluntarily appear, or to insist upon liii^

rights as a non-resident, and ask for time to decide. Cer-

tainly it is a part of the inherent power in a court to set a

time within which the non-resident must make up his mind

and act accordingly, and that was all the court did. The

motions for dismissal were properly before the court."

Against this express decision of a reputable and able court,

under a state of facts less favorable to the defendant than

those presented here, and other decisions, showing that

something substantial must be asked or done by the defend-

ant, relating to or affecting the merits of the cause, we

have nothing but a generalization, founded upon, and, there-

for, to be interpreted by, facts falling far short of those

disclosed here, for the proposition that [a defendant, who

makes] ^ a mere offer to move for a continuance provided it

can be done without a waiver of service, accompanied by

his declaration of intention not to appear generally nor to

ask or take such continuance, if it involved such waiver,
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and signification of his desire and determination to with-

draw the request, for nothing but a request had been made,

on being informed that such a motion would be a general

appearance, is bound thereby. We feel amply justified,

upon authority as well as upon reason and principle, in

withholding our assent to it, and saying such action

did not constitute a general appearance. * * *

Affirmed.

[Beannon and Williams, J. J., dissent.]

1 There appears to be a misprint in the published opinion, which is here

sought to be corrected bj introducing the words inclosed in brackets.
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proper ser ice and voluntarily appear, or to insist upon his
rights as a non-re ident, and a k for time to decide. Certainly it is a part of the inherent power in a court to set a
time within which the non-re ident mu t make up his mind
and act accordingly, and that wa all the court did. The
motions for dismis al were properly before the court.''
gainst thi express deci ion of a reputable and able court,
under a state of facts less favorable to the defendant than
those presented here, and other decision , showing that
something substantial must be asked or done by the defendant, relating to or affecting the merits of the cause, we
have nothing but a g eneralization, founded upon, and, therefor, to be interpreted by, facts falling far ho rt of those
disclosed here, for the propo ition that [a defendant, w·l 10
makes]1 a mere offer to move for a continuance provided it
can be done without a waiver of service, accompanied by
his declaration of intention not to appear generally nor to
a k or take uch continuance, if it involved such waiver,
and signification of hi desire and determination to withdraw the request, for nothing but a request had been made,
on being informed that such a motion would be a general
appearance, is bound thereb . We feel amply justified,
upon authority as well as upon reason and principle, in
withholding our assent to it, and saying such action
did not constitute a general appearance. * * *
Affirmed.
[BRANNON and WILLIAMS, J. J., dissent.]
1 There appears to be a misprint in the published opinion, which ii here
sought to be corrected by introducing the words inclosed in brackets.
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Section 2. Manner of Making Special Appearance.

SECTION 2.

MANNER

OF

MAKING SPECIAL APPEARANCE.

WALL V. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO EAILWAY

COMPANY.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh

Circuit. 1899.

WALL V. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY
COMPANY.

87 Circuit Court of Appeals, 129,

BuNN, District Judge. * * * The summons issued by the

Superior Court of Cook county was returned with an in-

dorsement of service as follows:

United States Circuit Court of .Appeals, Seventh
Circuit. 1899.

"Served this writ on the within-named Chesapeake &

Ohio Railway Company, a corporation, by delivering a copy

thereof to U, L. Truitt, the northwestern passenger agent

37 Circuit Court of .Appeals, 129.

of said corporation, this 12th day of April, 1898. The

president of said corporation not found in my county.

"James Pease, Sheriff.

"By B. Gilbert, Deputy."

After this return was made, and the declaration filed, the

defendant proceeded to remove the case to the United
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States Circuit Court for the northern district of Illinois,

and, when so removed, entered its special appearance for

the purpose of moving to set aside the return of the sum-

mons on the ground that U. L. Truitt, the person on whom

it was served, was not the defendant's agent, or a person on

whom proper service of summons could be made. The

motion to set aside was founded upon the affidavits of

Ulysses L. Truitt and H. W. Fuller, the general passenger

agent of the defendant, setting forth that at the time of

the service Truitt was jn the employ of the defendant com-

pany for the purpose of influencing persons who might be

desirous of travelling from Chicago and vicinity to points

east of Cincinnati and Lexington to patronize those rail-

way lines loading out of Chicago that made connections with

defendant's road at Cincinnati and Lexington; that Truitt

had no other connection with the defendant, and had no

power or autliority from said defendant, either express or

implied, to make any contract or rates for transportation

over the railway of the defendant, and that his authority

was strictly limited to conveying information concerning

BuNN, District Judge. * * * The summons issued by the
Superior Court of Cook county was returned with an indorsement of service as follows:
''Served this writ on the within-named Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway Company, a corporation, by delivering a copy
thereof to U. L. Truitt, the northwestern passenger agent
of said corporation, this 12th day of April, 1898. The
president of said corporation not found in my rounty.
"JAMES PEASE, Sheriff.
"By B. Gilbert, Deputy."
After this return was made, and the declaratior1 filed, tbP.
defendant proceeded to remove the case to the United
tates Circuit Court for the northern district of Illinois,
and, when so removed, entered its special appearance for
the purpose of moving to set aside the return of the summons on the ground that U. L. Truitt, the person on whom
it was served, was not the defendant's agent, or a person on
whom proper service of summons could be made. The
'.notion to set aside was founded upon the affidavits of
Ulysses L. Truitt and I-I. .W. Fuller, the general passenger
ag nt of the defendant, setting forth that at the time of
the ser vice Truitt was j.n the employ of the defendant company fo r th e purpo e of influencing persons who might be
d . irou of t r avelling from Chicago and vicinity to points
a t f in inn ati and Lexington to patronize those railway lin 1 a ing out of hicao·o that made connections with
f n ]ant', road at incinnati and Lexington; that Truitt
ha n
ther onnection with the defendant, and had no
ow r or utl1ority fro m said def ndant, either express or
im }j d to D ake any CO tract or rates for transportation
~v r ih r il way of the defendant, and that his authority
was strictly li ited to conveying information concernmg
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existing rates as established by the officials of the defend-

ant company, and concerning the connections and time

made and facilities possessed by the defendant in and about

its passenger traffic, and had no other authority whatevei- ;

♦hat the defendant was a resident of the state of Virginia,

having its principal office at Eichmond, in that state, and

was not operating any railway in said county of Cook, and

had no place of business therein. Upon these affidavits (no

counter affidavits being filed) the court below, by its order,

set aside the service of the summons, to which ruling the

plaintiff duly excepted. *****

The contention is that the practice adopted to get rid of

the service by motion to quash and set aside was irregular

and unjustified in law, and that, instead of proceeding by

motion, the defendant should have filed a plea in abatement,

and had a trial of the question by a jury. This is an im-

portant and radical contention, and the ground upon which

it is sought to support it is that it is the practice in such
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cases recognized and established by the Supreme Court of

the state of Illinois. That court first made such a ruling in

Railicay Co. v. Keep, 22 111. 9, and has in numerous de-

cisions since adhered to it, and it is contended that this

court should follow the state practice. But this contention

cannot be supported, either upon reason or authority.

Under these decisions, it is evident that the law vests a

reasonable discretion in the federal courts to judge in any

f^iven case how far they will feel bound to follow the prac-

tice or decisions of the state courts. There can be no doubt

that the rule upon this question of practice prevailing in

the Illinois state courts is contrary to the general rule on

the subject in this country, as well as in England. There is

no more reason for requiring a plea in abatement and a

jury trial to test the question of a sufficient service of a

summons than there would l)e to require the same proceed-

ing, including a jurj^ trial, in ail cases where now a motion

is held to be the proper remedy. The constitutional right

to a jury trial obtains whenever there is any question at

issue involving the life, liberty, or property of the citizen.

But a motion to quash a service of summons, or any other

process or order, for insufficiency in the service, involves

no such substantial right. The setting aside of service
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existing rate as e tablished by the officials of the defen ant company and concerning the connections and time
made and faciliti es po sessed by the defendant in and about
its passenger traffic and had no other authority what ";er;
+hat the defendant was a resident of the state of Virginia,
having it principal offi e at Richmond, in that state, and
was not operating any railwa in said county of Cook, and
had no place of bu ine s therein. Upon these affidavit (no
counter affidavit being filed) the court below by it order,
set aside the service of the summons, to which ruling tb
plaintiff duly excepted. * * * * *
The contention i that the practice adopted to get rid of
the service by motion to quash and set aside was irregular
and unjustified in law, and that, in tead of proceeding by
motion, the defendant hould have filed a plea in abatement
and bad a trial of the que tion by a jury. Thi · i an important and radical contention and the ground upon which
it is sought to support it is that it is the practice in such
ca es recognized and e tablished by the Supreme ourt of
the state of Illinois. That court first made such a ruling in
R ailway Co. v. [(_ eep, 22 Ill. 9, and has in numerous deci ions ince adhered to it, and it is contenued that thi
court hould follow the tate practice. But this contention
cannot be upported, either upon r ason or authority.
* * * * * * * * * *
Under the e deci ion , it is evident that the law vest a
reasonable di er tion in the federal courts to judge in an)·
given ca e how far they will feel boun to follow the practice or deci ion of the ta te court . There can 1 e no doubt
that the rule upon tbi question of practice prevailing in
the Illinoi tate court i contrary to the o·eneral rule on
the ubj ct in this country a · \\ ell ·:i. in England. There i .
no more r a on f or requiring a plea in al atement and a
jury trial to t . t the qu ~tion of a uffi ient service of a
"'ummon than th re \\'Onl 1 I t r quire the . ame procee 1in()' includino· a jury trial ID all ca.· s 1Vh r now a motion
i. held to b th prop r r me 1)-.
h con titntional ri-:i·ht
to a jury trial ol tain "' wh en ,. r th ·r i any question · t
1 u in'i· 1vin<» th life lib rty or i roperty· of th citize11
>Ut a motion t que-. b a . rvic of . ummon
or ai1y oth r
l roe
or or er for in uffi i n y in the n i e involve-,
no uch ub tantial ri 0 ht. Th
etting aside of er ice
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does not affect the writ or the status of the action in court.

Another service can be made, and the action proceed. If

the original process were exhausted, a new summons could

be issued. If the objection were to the writ itself, a plea

in abatement would be the proper remedy, the office of

which is to give the plaintiff a better writ. 1 Chitty PI.

446-457. But here the plaintiff still has his writ.

The order only sets aside the service, as being un-

warranted and insufficient in law. No substantial right

is affected by the decision. There are many matters pend-

ing in the progress of a case which are daily determined

upon motion that are much more important in affecting

substantial rights than a motion to set aside an irregular

service of process. Take, for instance, the motion for a

new trial upon newly discovered evidence after the plaintiff

has recovered a substantial verdict. The court, in its dis-

cretion, may set aside the verdict upon a motion. Whether

the plaintiff will ever be able to obtain another is uncertain,
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and yet no one would think of objecting to trying such a

question before the court upon motion supported and op-

posed by affidavits.

The practice in the United States Circuit Court for this

circuit was fairly well established by precedent when this

action was begun. So that if the defendant had resorted

to a plea in abatement, instead of making a motion, he

would have subjected himself to the criticism that he was

departing from the usual practice adopted in such cases.

In Fairhank & Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. S T. P. Ry. Co.,

supra, [9 U. S. App. 212, 4 C. C. A. 403, 54 Fed. 420] a sim-

ilar motion was made and heard before Judge Blodgett at

the circuit without question as to the propriety of the prac-

tice, and an order made quashing the service. Judge Blod-

gett delivered an opinion, holding the service insufficient,

which was affirmed by this court, where no question was

made as to the proper practice being by motion. In Ameri-

can Cereal Co. v. Eli Pettljohn Cereal Co., 70 Fed. 276, the

same practice was adopted, and the service set aside upon

motion; Judge Showalter delivering an opinion justifying

the practice, and giving good and sufficient reason for it,

as follows :

"Tlie determining consideration is that the matter at

issue, however it may result, will not end the suit. If

does not affect the writ or the status of the action in court.
Another service can be made, and the action proceed. If
the original process were exhausted, a new summons could
be issued. If the objection were to the writ itself, a plea
in abatement would be the proper remedy, the office of
which is to give the plaintiff a better writ. 1 Chitty Pl.
446-457.
But here the plaintiff still has his writ.
The order only sets aside the service, as being unwarranted and insufficient in law. No substantial right
is affected by the decision. There are many matters pending in the progress of a case which are daily determined
upon motion that are much more important in affecting
substantial rights than a motion to set aside an irregular
service of process. Take, for instance, the motion for a
new trial upon newly discovered evidence after the plaintiff
has recovered a substantial verdict. The court, in its discretion, may set aside the verdict upon a motion. Whether
the plaintiff will ever be able to obtain another is uncertain,
and yet no one would think of objecting to trying such a
question before the court upon motion supported and opposed by affidavits.
The practice in the United States Circuit Court for this
circuit was fairly well established by precedent when this
action was begun. So that if the defendant had resorted
to a plea in abatement, instead of making a motion, he
would have subjected himself to the criticism that he was
d parting from the usual practice adopted in such cases.
In Fairbank db Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. db T. P. Ry. Co.,
supra, [9 U. S. App. 212, 4 O. C. A. 403, 54 Fed. 420] a similar motion was made and h ard before Judge Blodgett at
the circuit without question as to the propriety of the practic , an an order made qua bing the service. Judge Blodtt
liv r d an opinion, holding the service in ufficient,
whi h wa affirm d by this court, where no question was
ma a to the proper practice b ing by motion. In A merian Ger al Co. v. Eli Pett,i john Cereal Co., 70 Fed. 276, the
r ti e w s adopt , and the service set aside upon
; . dg
howalter d livering an opinion justifyin()'
pr ti
and giving go d and ufficient reason for it,
a. f llows:
'I Ii cl Pt r inin ron. i r tion i that the m. tter at
i
u , h w v r it may r sult, will not nd the suit. If
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found against the defendant, tlie defendant is in court and

must plead ; if in favor of the defendant, the return of the

writ is vacated or quashed, and the suit remains pending;

whereas a plea, either in abatement or in bar, if made out

by proofs, puts an end to the proceeding. The view that a

motion to be determined upon affidavits is the proper prac-

tice in such cases is sustained by English decisions," —

citing Hemp v. Warren, 2 Dowl. (N. S.) 758; Preston v.

Lamont, 1 Exch. Div. 361.

In the last of the above-named English cases, Amphlett,

B., in a concurring opinion, gives the reason for having

the question of service determined summarily upon mo-

tion, instead of by plea, as follows :

''The decision of the judge at chambers can be contested

on appeal, and, if necessary, in the house of lords. There

is convenience in this, because it is a speedy and inexpen-

sive mode of determining that question before any expense

is incurred upon the merits of the action, whereas, if the
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question may be raised by plea, all the expenses of the ac-

tion may be thrown away * * * Convenience and jus-

tice, I think, require that this question should not be the

subject of a plea."

In the state courts in this country, while some question

has been made as to the conclusiveness of the sheriff's

return, it has generally been held, that it is only prima

facie true, and that the truth or falsity of the return may

be determined upon motion supported by affidavit. The

rule in England at the common law was that the sheriff's

return was conclusive and could not be disputed, and the

defendant's only remedy was by an action against the

sheriff for a false return. But in this country, where we

have so many different codes of practice, and so many

kinds of substituted service, such a rule would be incon-

venient, unjust, and impracticable. Upon examination of

a great many American cases, we believe the general rule

in this country, with some dissenting cases like those in

Illinois, to be this: That the sheriff's return stands in the

first instance as the affidavit of the sheriff, but is subject

to be disputed by affidavits on the part of the defendant

showing to the satisfaction of the court, upon motion to

quash, that the return is not true in point of fact, or, as in

the case at bar, is insufficient in law. Carr v. Bank, 16 Wis.
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found against the defendant, the defendant is in court and
must plead; if in favor of the defendant, the return of the
writ is vacated or qua hed, and the suit remains pending;
whereas a plea, either in abatement or in bar, if made out
by proofs, puts an end to the proceeding. The view that a
motion to be determined upon affidavits is the proper praetice in such cases is u tained by Engli h decisions,''citing Hemp v. Warr en, 2 Dowl. (N. S.) 758; Preston v.
Lamont, 1 Exch. Div. 361.
In the last of the above-named English cases, Amphlett,
B., in a concurring opinion, gives the reason for having
the question of service determined ummarily upon motion, instead of by plea, as follows:
''The decision of the judge at chambers can be contested
on appeal, and, if nece ary, in the hou e of lords. There
is convenience in thi , becau e it is a speedy and inexpensive mode of determining that question before any expense
is incurred upon the merits of the action, whereas, if the
question may be rai ed by plea, all the expenses of the action may be thrown away * * * Convenience and justice, I think, require that this question should not be the
subject of a plea."
In the state courts in this country, while some question
has been made as to the conclusi venes of the sheriff's
return, it has generally been held, that it is only prima
facie true, and that the truth or falsity of the return may
be determined upon motion supported by affidavit. The
rule in England at the common law was that the sheriff's
return was conclu ive and could not be di puted, and the
defendant's only remedy wa by an action against the
sheriff for a fal e return. But in thi country, where we
have so many different ode of practice, and o many
kinds of sub tituted sen i e uch a rule would be inconvenient, unju t, and impra tic a bl . Upon examination of
a great many Am rican ca es we belie-v e the general rule
in thi country, with
m
i nting a e like tho e in
Illinoi , to be thi : That the heriff 's return tands in the
fir t in tance as the affida it of the sheriff, ut is subject
to be disputed by affidavits on the part of the defendant
showing to the · sati fa tion of the court, upon motion to
quash, that the return i not true in point of fact, or, as in
the ca eat b!lr, i in uffi ient in law. Carr v. Bank, 16 Wis.
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50; Bond v. Wilson, 8 Kan. 228; Crosby v. Fanner, 39

Minn. 305, 40 N. W. 71; Walker v. Lutz, 14 Neb. 274, 15 N.

W. 352 ; Wendell v. Mugridge, 19 N. H. 109 ; Stout v. i^aiZ-

roa^ Co., 3 McCrary 1, 8 Fed. 794; Van Rensselaer v. Chad-

luick, 7 How. Prac. 297; Wallis v. Lo^^, 15 How. Prac. 567;

Watson V. Watson, 6 Conn. 334; i^oi(;e v. Water Co., 10

Cal. 442. In this case the sheriff returned that he had

made service upon U. L. Truitt, Northwestern passenger

agent of the defendant. If this return had been true, the

service would have been good. But it is very clear from

the affidavits filed that it was not true. Truitt was not

Northwestern passenger agent of the com^Dany, or any

other agent, but a mere employe for a certain purpose.

The sheriff was mistaken, and there was no need to resort

to the clumsy method of a plea in abatement and a trial

by jury to ascertain this fact.

It has been suggested that, allowing the practice by mo-

tion to be correct and preferable, still, in analogy to the
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practice under a plea in abatement of giving the plaintiff

a better writ, the defendant should state in his affidavits

on whom the summons may be properly served, or, if there

be no such person in the district, to state that fact. No

authority is cited for such a rule, and we have searched

in vain for a precedent to warrant it. * * * There is no

suggestion in any of the adjudicated cases that this doc-

trine has any application to a motion to set aside service.

It only applies to a plea in abatement where the objection

is to the writ itself. * * * The judgment of the circuit

court is affirmed.

[Dissenting opinion filed by Woods, Circuit Judge.]

GREER V. YOUNG.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1887,

i 120 Illinois, 184.

Mr. Justice Mulkey delivered the opinion of the Court :

Robert C. Greer, on the 23rd of July, 1884, commenced an

action of assumpsit in the Superior Court of Cook county,
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50; Bnnd v. Wilson, 8 l(an. 228; Crosby v. Fanner, 39
Minn. 305, 40 N. W. 71; Walker v. Lutz, 14 Neb. 274, 15 N.
W. 352; vVendell V. JJ1ugridge, 19 N. H. 109; Stout v. Railroad Co ., 3 McCrary 1, 8 Fed. 794; Van Rensselaer v. Chadwick, 7 How. Prac. 297 ; Wallis v. Lott, 15 How. Prac. 567;
Watson v. Watson , 6 Conn. 334; Rowe v. Water Co., 10
Cal. 442. In this case the sheriff returned that he had
made service upon U. L. Truitt, Northwestern passenger
agent of the defendant. If this return had been true, the
service would have been good. But it is very clear from
the affidavits filed that it was not true. Truitt was not
Northwestern pass nger agent of the company, or any
other agent, but a mere employe · for a certain purpose.
The sheriff was mistaken, and there was no need to resort
to the clumsy method of a plea in abatement and a trial
by jury to ascertain this fact.
It has been suggested that, allowing the practice by motion to be correct and preferable, still, in analogy to the
practice under a plea in abatement of giving the plaintiff
a better writ, the defendant should state in his affidavits
on whom the summons may be properly served, or, if there
be no such person in the district, to state that fact. No
authority is cited for such a rule, and we have searched
in vain for a precedent to warrant it. * * * There is no
, uggestion in any of the adjudicated cases that this doctrine has any application to a motion to set aside service.
It only applies to a plea in abatement where the objection
is to the writ it elf. * * * The judgment of the circuit
court i affirmed.
[Dis enting opinion filed by Woons, Circuit Judge.]

GREER V. YOUNG.
Supreme Court of Illinois. 1887.
~ ·

:MR. ,J

120 Illinois, 184.

M LTrnY d livered the opinion of the Court:
b rt
r r, n the 2 rd of July, 1884, comm need an
a Li n f a . . i psit in tb
uperior Court of Cook county,
TI 'E
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against George Young. A summons in the usual form,

returnable on the first Monday of the following month, was

served on the defendant, and due return thereof made by

the sheriff of Cook county, on the same day. On the 4th

of August, 1884, the plaintiff filed in the cause a declara-

tion in the usual form, containing the common counts only.

On the 18th of the same month, the defendant filed, by his

attorneys a special appearance in the case, "for the pur-

pose, only, of moving to quash the writ of summons, and

dismiss the suit." On the 19th of the same month the de-

fendant filed a written motion in the cause, "to quash the

service of the writ of summons," for the reason, as is al-

leged in the motion, "that the defendant is a non-resident

of the State of Illinois, and at the time of said service was

within the jurisdiction of this court for the purpose of at-

tending legal proceedings, and for no other purpose." This

motion was supported by an affidavit of the defendant,

showing, in substance, that both the plaintiff and the de-
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fendant were residents of Missouri; that the plaintiff,

prior to the commencement of the present suit, had brought

an action against the defendant, in the circuit court of

Lafayette county, in the State of Missouri, "for the identi-

cal cause of action for which this suit is brought," and

that said former suit was still pending and undetermined

in the State of Missouri; that in defending said last men-

tioned suit, it became necessary to take depositions in Chi-

cago, and that, under the instructions of his attorneys, he

went to Chicago for the sole purpose of assisting his said

attorneys in taking said depositions; that shortly after

the taking of the same, and while in the office of his at-

torneys, consulting with them as to the probable effect of

the depositions, the sheriff made service of the summons

upon him in the present case.

Upon consideration of the facts set forth in the affidavit,

the Superior Court sustained the motion to quash the ser-

vice, and entered an order dismissing the suit, which was

affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District. The

case is brought here by plaintiff in error on a certificate

of the Appellate Court, and a reversal of the judgment

of affirmance is asked on a number of grounds.

It is first contended, that as the defence was of a dilatory

character, it should have been made at the verv earliest
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against George Young. A ummons in the usual form ,
returnable on the fir t ~1onday of the following month, wa
erv d on the defendant, and due return thereof made by
the sheriff of Cook county, on the same day. On the 4th
of August, 1884, the plaintiff filed in the cause a declaration in the usual form, containing the common count only.
On the 18th of the ame month, the defendant filed, by hi
attorneys a pecial appearance in the case, "for the purl ose, only, of moving to quash the writ of summons, and
dismi the suit.'' On the 19th of the same month the defendant filed a written motion in the cause, ''to quash the
ser vice of the writ of summons,'' for the reason, as is alleged in the motion, ''that the defendant is a non-resident
of the State of Illinoi. , and at the time of aid service wa.·
within the jurisdiction of thi court for the purpose of attending legal proceedings, and for no other purpose.'' Thi
motion wa supported by an affidavit of the defendant,
bowing, in substance, that both the plaintiff and the defendant were residents of Mis ouri; that the plaintiff,
prior to the commencement of the pre ent uit, had brought
an action again t the defendant, in the circuit court of
Lafay tte count , in the State of Mi souri, ''for the identical cau e of action for which thi suit is brought," and
that said former uit was till pending and undetermined
in the State of Mi ouri; that in defending aid last mentioned suit, it became neces ary to take depo sitions in Chiago, and that, under the instructions of hi attorneys, he
went to Chicago for the sole purpose of as i ting his said
attorney in taking aid depo itions; that shortly after
the taking of the ame, and while in the office of his attorney , consulting with them as to the probable effect of
the depo ition , the heriff made service of the summon
upon him in the pre ent case.
Upon consideration of the facts set forth in the affidavit,
the uperior Court u tained the motion to qua h the service, and entered an order di missing the uit which wa
affirm l by the Appellate Court for the Fir t Di trict. Th
a e i brou 0 ·ht here by plaintiff in error on a certificate
of th App llate Court, and a rever al of the judgment
of affirmance is asked on a number of grounds.
It i fir t contended, that as the def nee was of a dilatory
character it should have b en made at the very earliest

118
118 Trial Peactice [Chap. 3

opportunity, which it is claimed was not done. Of the cor-

rectness of the rule of law suggested there can be no ques-

tion; but whether the motion was made at the earliest op-

portunity, is a question of fact, that may be materially

affected by the rules of the court where the action was

pending, of which this court can not take judicial notice,

and as all presumptions are to be indulged in favor of the

correctness of the rulings of that court, in the absence of

anything to the contrary, we are not fully prepared to say

that the motion was not made in time, though it must be

confessed the objection is not without force. However

this may be, we prefer to place our decision upon other

grounds.

The most important question in the case, is whether the

circumstances shown, even if properly pleaded in due time,

warranted the court in setting aside the service of the pro-

cess and dismissing the suit. There is clearly no ground

for the claim that the plaintiff or his counsel had any
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agency in inducing the defendant to leave Missouri and go

to Chicago, for the purpose of having process served on

him in the latter place, — in other words, it is not claimed,

nor is there any ground for the claim, that service of pro-

cess upon the defendant was obtained by any artifice,

trick, or fraud, on the part of the plaintiff, his counsel, or

any one else acting in his interest. The question then

arises, can one who voluntarily leaves his own State, and

comes to this, for the purpose of taking depositions before

a notary, be lawfully served, by reading, with civil process,

while here on such business?

The fact that the plaintiff had sued the defendant in Mis-

souri, on the same cause of action, we do not regard as hav-

ing any bearing on the question, as it is the settled law in

this State, tliat the pendency of a suit in another State can

not be pleaded in abatement of a suit brought here on the

same cause of action. {McJilton v. Love, 13 111. 486; Allen

V. Watt, 69 id. 655.) But even where the pendency of a suit

in a sister State can be made available as a defence at all

it must, by all the authorities, be formally pleaded in abate-

ment, which was not done here. Tlie riglit of the plaintiff

then, to sue the defendant here, was the same as that of

any one else having a claim against him. The ruling of

the court, therefore, must be rested entirely upon the privi-
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opportunity, which it i claimed was not done. Of the orrectne of the rule of law suggested there can be no question; but whether the motion was made at the earliest opportunity, is a que tion of fact, that may be materially
affected by the rules of the court where the action was
pending, of which this court can not take judicial notice,
and as all presumptions are to be indulged in favor of the
correctness of the rulings of that court, in the absence of
anything to the contrary, we are not fully prepared to say
that the motion was not made in time, though it must be
confessed the obj ection is not without force. However
this may be, we prefer to place our decision upon other
grounds.
The most important question in the case, is whether the
circumstances shown, even if properly pleaded in due time,
warranted the court in setting aside the service of the process and dismis sing the suit. There is clearly no ground
for the claim that the plaintiff or his counsel had any
agency in inducing the defendant to leave :Missouri and go
to Chicago, for the purpo e of having process served on
him in the latter place,-in other words, it is not claimed,
nor is there any ground for the claim, that service of proces upon the defendant was obtained by ·any artifice,
trick, or fraud, on the part of the plaintiff, his coun el, or
any one else acting in bis interest. The question then
ari e , can one who voluntarily leaves his own State, and
om es to this, for the purpose of taking depositions before
notary, be lawfully served, by reading, with civil process.
wbile here on uch business~
The fact that th plaintiff had sued the defendant in Mis. uri, on the . am ca u e of action, we do not regard as havin any bearino- on th question, a it i the settled law in
this tate, that th p ndency of a uit in another State can
n t e pl ad d in abat m nt of a suit brou ·ht here on th
:am rau
f artion. (McJilton v. Love, 1 Ill. 486; Allen
"· Walt, 69 id. 655.) But v n wb re the pend ncy of a suit
in a i. t r tate can be mad available a a d f nee at all
it n . t, hy all th authoritie , b f rrnal]) plead din abatent, wl j h wa. not d
h r . The rii-,ht of the plaintiff
th n t sur h 1 fen fan t h re, w
th
am a that of
an v onr Pl . <' 11 <\'in~ a 1aim aO'ai n. t him. The rulino- of
Lli ·ourt, iii ·r 'f r , mu. t be r . ted ntir 1 upon the privi-
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lege or immunity which the common law has, from a very

early period, extended to parties and witnesses in a lawsuit

while attending court, including going and coming. This

rule is found in all the text books, and, in most of the cases

we have examined, is expressly limited to cases of arrest

on civil process. 1 Tidd, (1st Am. ed.) 174; 3 Blackstone,

side page 289; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sees. 316, 317; 2

Bouvier's Law Die. 284.

The rule as laid down in the above works, is fully sus-

tained by an almost unbroken current of authority, as is

fully shown by the following cases : Meckius v. Smith, 1 H.

Blac. 635; Kinder v. Williams, 4 Term Rep. 378; Arding v.

Floiver, 8 id. 534; Spence v. Bert, 3 East, 89; Blore v.

Booth, 3 Ves. 350 ; Ex parte Hawkins, 4 id. 691 ; Ex parte

King, 7 id. 313 ; Sidgier v. Birch, 9 id. 69 ; Ex parte Jackson,

15 id. 117.

The above authorities are also valuable as throwing light

upon the procedure or practice in cases of this kind. The
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arrest of a party to a suit, by civil process, being regarded

as a breach of the defendant's privilege, the usual course

was to appear in the cause in which the arrest was made,

and procure a rule against the plaintiff and his attorney to

show cause why the defendant should not be discharged

out of custody by reason of his alleged privilege, upon his

filing common bail. The rule to show cause was always

supported by affidavit setting up the fact of the arrest, and

attendant circumstances. On the hearing, the rule, depend-

ing upon the proofs, was either made absolute or dis-

charged. If the former, the defendant, upon filing common

or nominal bail, was discharged, and if he had given special

bail, the bail bond was ordered to be surrendered and can-

celled. Nevertheless, the defendant was in court, and was

bound to answer the action.

While, as we have just seen, the exemption, by the gen-

eral current of authority, applies only to arrests, yet in

some of the States, notably New York, it has been extended

to cases of service by summons, merely, particularly where

the defendant is a non-resident. {Person v. Grier, 66 N .Y.

124; Mathews v. Tufts, 87 id. 568.) No sufficient reason is

perceived for departing from the general current of au-

thority on this subject, merely because some two or throe

of the States have, through perhaps a spirit of comity, more
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or immunity which the common law has, from a very
arly period, extended to parties and witnesses in a lawsuit
while attending court, including going and coming. This
rule is found in all the text books, and, in most of the case
we have examined, i e:xpre ·sly limited to cases of arrest
on civil process. 1 Tidd, (1st Am. ed.) 174; 3 Blackstone,
side page 289; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, secs. 316, 317 · ""'
Bouvier's Law Die. 284.
'
The rule as laid down in the above works, is fully sustained by an almost unbroken current of authority, as i
fully shown by the following cases: ]1 eckius v. Smith, 1 H.
Blac. 635; Kinder v. Willianis, 4 Term Rep. 378; Arding v.
Flower, 8 id. 534; Sp ence v. Bert, 3 East, 89; More v.
Booth, 3 Ves. 350; Ex parte Hawkins, 4 id. 691; Ex parte
King, 7 id. 313; Sidgier v. Birch, 9 id. 69; Ex parte Jackson,
15 id. 117.
The above authorities are also valuable as throwing light
upon the procedure or practice in cases of this kind. Th
arrest of a party to a suit, by civil process, being regarded
as a breach of the defendant's privilege, the usual course
was to appear in the ca use in which the arrest was made,
and procure a rule against the plaintiff and his attorney to
show cause why the defendant should not be discharged
out of custody by rea on of his alleged privilege, upon his
filing cornrnon bail. The rule to show cause was alway
upported by affidavit setting up the fact of the arrest, and
attendant circum tances. On the hearing, the rule, depending upon the proof , was either made ab olute or di charged. If the former, the defendant, upon filing common
ot nominal bail, was di charO'ed, and if he had given special
bail, the bail bond was ordered to be surrendered and cancelled. N evertheles , the defendant was in court, and wa ·
bound to an wer the action.
While, as we have ju t een, the exemption, by the general current of authority, applies only to arre ts, yet in
ome of the State , notably N w York, it ha been extende]
to case of service by ummons, merely, particularly wher
the def ndant is a non-r id nt. (Person v. Grier, 66 N .Y.
124; Mathews v. Tufts, 7 id. 568.) No sufficient reason is
p r eiv d for departin from the O' n ral curr nt of auth rity on thi uhj t rn r 1. be au
m two r thre
of the tates ave, through perhaps a pirit of comity, more
T
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than anything else seen proper to do so. The mere service of

a summons upon a non-resident, when in another State for

the purpose of taking depositions to be used in an action

to which he is a party in his own State, imposes no greater

hardship upon him than to be served with process out of

his own State when attending to any other kind of business.

In either case, he is usually afforded ample time to prepare

his defence, if he has any. Parties thus circumstanced

have no difficulty in getting a temporary postponement or

continuance of the causes, when necessary to the attain-

ment of justice, or to avert any serious loss or inconven-

ience. It is clear that such a case does not come within the

reasons of the rule as laid down in the authorities above

cited.

But outside of this consideration, it is essential that the

party invoking the protection of the rule should come pre-

pared to show that he is clearly within it. The rule, as well

as the principle on which it is founded, is thus expressed
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by Tidd, supra: "The parties to a suit, and their witness-

es, are, for the sake of public justice, protected from arrest

in coming to, attending upon and returning from the court,

— or, as it is usually termed, eundo morando et redeundo."

The term "court," within the meaning of the rule, has

received a very liberal construction. Greenleaf, in section

317, above referred to, thus summarizes the result of the

authorities on this subject: "This privilege is granted in

all cases where the attendance of the party or witness is

given in any matter pending before a lawful tribunal having

jurisdiction of the cause. Thus, it has been extended to a

party attending on an arbitration under a rule of court;

or on the execution of a writ of inquiry; to a bankrupt and

witnesses attending before the commissioners, on notice;

and to a witness attending before a magistrate to give his

deposition, under an order of court."

To the last instance, given by the author may be added

the case of a party, or his witnesses, appearing before a

master to give or take testimony, which would fall within

the same principle. Where a master, magistrate or other

person takes evidence in a cause, under an order of the

court wherein the cause is pending, such officer or other

person is the mere instrument of the court, and is subject

to its orders. In legal effect, such evidence is taken be-

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 3

than anything else seen proper to do so. The mere service of
a summons upon a non-resident, when in another State f or
the purpose of taking depo itions to be u sed in an action
to which he is a party in his own State, imposes no greater
hardship upon him than to be served with process out of
his own State when attending to any other kind of business.
In either ca e, he is usually afforded ample time to prepare
his defence, if he has any. Parties thus circumstanced
have no difficulty in getting a temporary postponement or
continuance of the causes, when necessary to the attain-'
ment of justice, or to avert any serious loss or inconvenience. It is clear that such a ca e does not come within the
reason of the rule as laid down in the authorities _above
cited.
But out ide of this consideration, it is essential that the
party invoking the protection of the rule should come prepared to show that he is clearly within it. The rule, as well
as the principle on which it is founded, is thus expressed
by Tidd, supra : "The parti s to a suit, and their witnes es, are, for the sake of public justice, protected from arrest
in coming to, attending upon and returning from the court,
-or, as it i usually termed, eim do morando et redeundo."
The term ''court,'' within the meaning of the rule, has
received a very liberal con truction. Greenleaf, in section
:117, above referred to thu summarizes the result of the
authoritie on thi subject : ''This privilege is granted in
all ca es where the attendance of the party or witness i
gi en in any matter pending before a lawfiil tribunal havin,q
jiJ-ri diction of the caitse. rrhus, it ha been extended to a
party att nding on an arbitration under a rule of court;
r on the execution of a writ of inquiry; to a bankrupt and
witn ss s att ndinrr before th commi ioners, on notice;
an to witn . attending bef or a magi trate to give his
d p i ti n, under an ord r of court.''
To the la t in ·tance, giv n by the author may be added
th
f a arty, or hi witn e , a PI earing before a
:i r to gi
r t k t timony, hi h would fall within
ih
i1 1 . '' h r a ma t r, magistrate or other
JJ
n
in a cau . , und r an order of the
c·
u . i p nding, such officer or other
p r on i · the m r i trn ni f the court, and is subject
t it
r 1 rs. In l gal effe t, uch evidence is taken be1
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fore the court. But a notary public, when taking deposi-

tions in one State to be used in a suit pending in another,

can in no sense be regarded as an instrument or agency of

the court wherein such suit is pending. Neither the notary,

nor any of the parties appearing before him, are answer-

able to the court for anything said or done while there, the

vvhole matter being outside of its jurisdiction. Not so with

a master, magistrate or other person taking evidence under

an order of the court within its jurisdiction. In such case,

all parties appearing before him for such purpose, if wil-

fully guilty of any improper conduct, might summarily

be attached, brought before the court, and punished as for

a contempt in its presence. In taking the depositions, the

notary performed purely ministerial functions. He could

decide no questions or determine any matter affecting the

rights of the parties to the suit, nor was he, as we have just

seen, connected with any court or other tribunal having

the power to do so. Hence he could in no sense, in the lan-
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guage of Greenleaf, be said to have ''jurisdiction of the

cause," and therefore he does not fall within the category

of any of the tribunals contemplated by the rule in ques-

tion.

Looking at the action of the trial court from another

point of view, we do not think it in harmony with the de-

cisions of this court. The case was disposed of upon a sim-

ple motion to quash the service. The writ, the service and

return, as they appear of record, were in strict conformity

with law, but it was sought to assail the validity of the

service on account of certain matters alleged to exist dehors

the record, and set forth by wa.y of affidavit. This we do

not think can be done. Had the defendant been arrested,

and it was desired to raise the question of privilege for the

purpose of obtaining his discharge, then, in conformity with

the well settled practice in such cases, a rule nisi should have

been taken against the plaintiff, as heretofore indicated, and

the question would then properly have been heard on affi-

davit, as was done in this case. But no such case as the one

suggested was before the court. There was simply an attack

upon the service, founded upon extrinsic facts. Whatever

may be the pi^ctice in States where the code system pre-

vails, it is clear the course pursued was not proper. Here,

the common law practice prevails generally, except in so far
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fore the court. But a notary public, when taking depositions in one State to be used in a uit pending in another,
can in no en e be regarded as an instrument or agency of
the court wherein such uit is pending. Neither the notary,
nor any of the parties appearing before him, are answerable to the court for anything aid or done while there, the
whole matter being out ide of its jurisdiction. Not so with
a master, magistrate or other per on taking evidence under
an order of the court within its jurisdiction. In such case,
all parties appearing before him for such purpose, if wilfully guilty of any improper conduct, might summarily
be attached, brought before the court, and puni hed as for
a contempt in its pre nee. In taking the depositions, the
notary performed purely ministerial functions. He could
decide no question or determine any matter affecting the
rights of the partie to the uit, nor was he, as we have just
een, connected with any court or other tribunal having
the power to do so. Hence he could in no ense, in the language of Greenleaf, be aid to have ''jurisdiction of the
a use,'' and therefore he does not fall within the category
of any of the tribunals contemplated by the rule in question.
Looking at the action of the trial court from another
point of view, we do not think it in harmony with the decisions of this court. The ca e was disposed of upon a simple motion to quash the ervice. The writ, the service and
return, as they appear of record, were in strict conformity
with law, but it wa sought to assail the validity of the
:~ rvice on account of certain matters alleged to exi t dehors
the record, and set forth by way of affidavit. This we do
not think can he done. Had the defendant been arrested,
and it was desired to raise the question of privile ·e for the
I urpo e of obtaining his discharge, then, in conformity with
the well settled practi in uch cases, a rule ni i should have
been taken against th plaintiff, as heretofore indicated, and
the que tion would then properly have been heard on affidavit, as wa done in thi a e. But no such case as the one
. u a-ge t d was before the ourt. T ere was simply an attack
upon the ervic foun
u on extrin i fact . Whatever
may be the pt-a tice in Stat where the od sy tern prevails, it is cl ar the ours pur ued was not roper. Here,
the common _law practi e prevails generally, except in so far
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as it has been modified by legislative enactment, or per-

haps, in some instances, by long and uniform custom; but

we are aware of no change in the practice, by legislation or

otherwise, so far as the procedure in cases of this kind is

concerned. The rule, as recognized here in repeated decis-

ions, and which is in strict accord with the common law

practice, is, that any defect in the writ, its service or re-

turn, which is apparent from an inspection of the record,

may properly be taken advantage of by motion, but where

the objection is founded upon extrinsic facts the matter

must be pleaded in abatement, so that an issue may be

made thereon, and tried, if desired, by a jury, like any

other issue of fact. If the plaintiff is successful upon such

issue, the judgment is quod recuperet. It is therefore to

him a valuable right to have the issue thus made up and

tried. To permit the defendant to try an issue of this kind

on affidavit, as was done, gives him a decided advantage, for

if he fails, his motion would be simply overruled, and he

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

would still have a right to a trial on the merits. To permit

a party to thus speculate on the chance of succeeding on a

purely technical ground, without incurring any risk, and

without any compensation to the plaintiff in case of failure,

is contrary to the spirit of the common law, and is in direct

conflict with the decisions of this court. Holloivay v. Free-

man, 22 111. 197 ; McNah v. Bennett, QQ id. 157 ; Union Na-

tional Bank v. First National Bank, 90 id. 56; Rubel v.

Beaver Falls Cutlery Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 282 ; Holton v. Daly,

106 111. 131; Hearsay v. Bradbury, 9 Mass. 96; Bean v.

Parker, 17 id. 601; Guild v. Richarson, 6 Pick. 368; Char-

lotte V. Webb, 7 Vt. 48; Lilkird v. Lillard, 5 B. Mon. 340.

For the reasons stated, the judgments of the courts be-

low are reversed, and the cause remanded to the Superior

Court of Cook county, for further proceedings in conform-

ity with the views here expressed.

Judgment reversed.

as it has been modified by legislative enactment, or perhaps, in some instances, by long and uniform custom; but
we are aware of no change in the practice, by legislation or
otherwise, so far as the procedure in cases of this kind is
concerned. The rule, as recognized here in repeated decisions, and which is in strict accord with the common law
practice, is, that any defect in the writ, its service or return, which is apparent from an inspection of the record,
may properly be taken advantage of by motion, but where
the objection is founded upon extrinsic facts the matter
must be pleaded in abatement, so that an issue may be
. made thereon, and tried, if desired, by a jury, like any
other issue of fact. If the plaintiff is successful upon such
issue, the judgment is quad recuperet . It is therefore to
him a valuable right to have the issue thus made up and
tried. To permit the defendant to try an issue of this kind
on affidavit, as was done, gives him a decided advantage, for
if be fails, his motion would be simply overruled, and be
would still have a right to a trial on the merits. To permit
a party to thus speculate on the chance of succeeding on a
purely technical ground, without incurring any risk, and
without any compensation to the plaintiff in case of failure
is contrary to the spirit of the common law, and is in direc!
conflict with the decisions of this court. Holloway v. Fre man, 22 Ill. 197; "111cNab v. Bennett, 66 id. 157; Union Na tional Bank v. First National Bank, 90 id. 56; Rubel v.
Beaver Falls Cutlery Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 282; Holton v. Daly,
106 Ill. 131; Hearsay v. Bradbury, 9 Mas . 96; Bean v.
Parker, 17 id. 601; Guild v. Richarson, 6 Pick. 368; Char··
latte v. Webb, 7 Vt. 48; Lil7'ard v. Lillard, 5 B. Mon. 340.
F r the rea on stated, the judgm nts of the courts below are reversed, and the cause remanded to the Superior
•ourt of Cook county, for further proceedings in conformity with the views here expressed.
Judgment reversed.
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wAIVER OF SPECIAL APPEARANCE.

NEOSHO VALLEY INVESTMENT CO. V. CORNELL.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1899,

NEOSHO VALLEY INVESTMENT CO. V. CORNELL.

60 Kansas, 282.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Smith, J. :

On January 15, 1897, judgment was rendered in the dis-

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1899.

trict court of Bourbon county in favor of plaintiffs below,

Carrie A. Cornell and others, against the Neosho Valley In-

60 J(ansas, 282.

vestment Company, for the sum of $5665, with interest at

the rate of ten per cent, per annum and costs, declaring the

same to be a first lien upon certain real estate located in

said county, and directing foreclosure. Upon the summons

in the cause was indorsed the following return:

''Received this summons May 17, 1896; executed it by de-

livering to the Neosho Valley Investment Company, by de-

livering a true and certified copy of the within summons to

L. M. Bedell, its cashier and treasurer; the president or

other chief officer not found in mv countv. May 19, 1896.
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'M. W. Bennett,

''Sheriff Labette County, Kansas."

The judgment was rendered by default, the investment

company making no appearance. On April 19, 1897, the

investment company filed its petition for a new trial of the

foreclosure case, under section 606 of chapter 95, General

Statutes of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1889, §4671), wherein it at-

tacked the service of summons in the cause, and alleged

that L. M. Bedell, mentioned in the return of the sheriff,

was not during the month of May, 1896, nor had he ever

l)een, the cashier of the company, and that the vice-presi-

dent, secretary and treasurer of the company, during the

month of May, 1896, had resided in the city of Chetopa, in

Labette county, Kansas.

Coupled with this attack on the service was an allegation

in the petition for a new trial in substance as follows : * *

that the judgment was taken in fraud of the rights of the

company. * * * *

[Proceedings under this petition for a new trial were

apparently dropped, and when the sheriff was about to sell

The opinion of the court was delivered by SMITH, J.:
On January 15, 1897, judgment was rendered in the district court of Bourbon county in favor of plaintiffs below,
arrie A. Cornell and others, against the Neosho Valley Investment Company, for the sum of $5665, with intere t at
the rate of ten per cent. per annum and co ts declaring the
. ame to be a first lien upon certain real estate located in
aid county, and directing foreclosure. Upon the summons
in the cau e was indorsed the following return:
"Received this summon May 17, 1896; executed it by delivering to the Neosho Valley Investment Company, by delivering a true and certified copy of the within summons to
L. 11. Bedell, its cashier and treasurer; the president or
other chief officer not found in my county. 11ay 19, 1896.
"J. W. Bennett,
"Sheriff Labette County, Kansas."
The judO'ment was rendered by default, the investment
compan making no appearance. On April 19, 1897, the
inve tment company filed its petition for a new trial of the
foreclosure ca e, under section 606 of chapter 95, General
Statute of 1 97 (Gen. Stat. 1889, ~ 4671), wherein it attacked the ervice of summons in the ca use, and alleged
that L. M:. Bedell, mentioned in the return of the sheriff,
was not during the month of May, 1896, nor had he ever
b en, th ca bier of the company, and that the vice-president, ecretary and trea urer of the company, during the
month of }.1av, 1 96, had re ided in the city of Chetopa in
Labette county Kan as.
Coupled with thi atta k on the rvice was an allegation
in the petition for a new trial in ub tance as follows: * •
that the jud went wa taken in fraud of the rights of the
r m pan y. * * • *
[Proceeding under thi petition for a new trial were
, ppar ntly dro ped an when the h riff was about to sell

J_4
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(he land upon which the judgment was a lien, this action

was commenced by a petition alleging the same facts as

the petition for a new trial, an injunction being prayed for.

Trial was had and judgment went against the company.]^

Our view of this case renders it unnecessary to consider

the questions raised on the sufficiency of the service of the

summons. That question has been put past our considera-

tion by the act of the plaintiff in error. In the petition

for a new trial the investment company was not content

with an attack upon the service of summons only, but sought

to impeach the validity of the judgment on other grounds

not jurisdictional in character. This appeal to the court

for relief against the judgment, for reasons other than that

the court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the person of

the party defendant, involved the admission that the judg-

ment was valid, and the plaintiff in error by this act treated

it as such. In one paragraph of the petition for a new

trial it is alleged that the court was without jurisdiction by
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reason of a fatal defect in the service. In another para-

graph the judgment is attacked on the ground that there

was no consider.ation for the note sued on, etc.

In Adolph Cohen v. C. B. Trowbridge, 6 Kan. 385, it is

held that the filing of a motion to set aside a judgment,

based partly on lack of jurisdiction and partly on error in

the judgment itself, is a general appearance. (2 Encycl.

PI. & Pr. 632). Where a party voluntarily appears in court

it is unnecessary to inquire what, if any, process has been

served upon him. {Carr v. Catlin, 13 Kan. 393.) In Meix-

ell V. Kirkpatrick, 29 Kan. 679, a party filed a demurrer to

the petition upon several grounds, some jurisdictional and

some not, claiming that the court had no jurisdiction of the

person of tlie defendant, that the petition did not state facts

constituting any cause of action, and that several causes

of action were improperly joined. This demurrer was sus-

tained on the ground that several causes of action were im-

])roperly joined. Justice Brewer, speaking for the court,

said :

"When served with the summons he (the defendant) ap-

peared and filed a demurrer, which, while it alleged a lack

of jurisdiction, presented also a number of other defenses,

and defenses on the merits. Such plea, by the prior adju

iMatter within brackets is a condensation by the editor.
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the land upon which the judgment was a: lien, this action
was commenced by a petition alleging the same facts as
the petition for a new trial, an injunction being prayed for.
Trial was had and judgment went against the company.]1
Our view of this case renders it unnecessary to consider
the questions raised on the sufficiency of the service of the
.·ummons. That question has been put past our consideration by the act of the plaintiff in error. In the petition
for a new trial the investment company was not cont ent
with an attack upon the service of summons only, but sought
to impeach the validity of the judgment on other grounds
not jurisdictional in character. This appeal to the court
for relief against the judgment, for reasons other than that
the court failed to obtain juri diction over the person of
the party defendant, involved the admission that the judgment was valid, and the plaintiff in error by this act treated
it as such. In one paragraph of the petition for a new
trial it is alleged that the court was without jurisdiction by
reason of a fatal def ect in the service. In another paraoTaph the judgment is attacked on the ground that there
was no consideration for the note sued on, etc.
In Adolph Coh en v. C. B. Trowb1'idge, 6 l{an. 385, it is
held that the filing of a motion to set aside a judgment,
based partly on lack of jurisdiction and partly on error in
the judgment itself, is a general appearance. (2 Encycl.
Pl. & Pr. 632). Where a party voluntarily appears in court
it is unnecessary to inquire what, if any, process ha been
. erved upon him. (Ca rr v. Catlin, 13 Kan. 393.) In Mei.x;ell v. J(irkpatrick, '.Z9 l{an. 679, a party filed a demurrer to
the petition u1 on s veral grounds, some juri dictional and
: ome not, claiming that the court had no juri diction of the
I r son of the defendant, that the petition did not state fact
eon titut in any au of action, and that several cau e
of acti n w r e improp rly joined. This demurrer was su l in d n th oTound that several causes of action were impr p rly j oin . Justice Brewer, speaking for the court,
:aid:
" h n . r v d with the summons he (the defendant) ap1 a
d and 61
a 1 murr r, which, while it alleged a lack
of j ri. c1i ti n, r . cnt d lso a number of other defen s,
an d if ·n : .· n th r m rit .
u h pl a, by the prior adju
!Matter within brackets is a condensation by the editor.
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dications of this court, was equivalent to an appearance. A

party who denies the jurisdiction of a court over his person

must first present this single question. He may not min-

gle with his plea to the jurisdiction other pleas which con-

cede jurisdiction, and thereafter insist that there was error

in overruling his plea to the jurisdiction. As heretofore

stated, the defendant by his demurrer raised a number of

questions other than those which were jurisdictional, and

invoked the judgment of the court thereon. By such other

]ileas he submitted himself and his rights to the jurisdic-

tion of the court, and can no longer be heard to say that

it had no jurisdiction."

The plaintiff in error earnestly contends that this peti-

tion for a new trial, being filed after judgment, cannot be

construed into an entry of appearance in the cause, for the

reason that the judgment was originally based upon void

service and was wholly inoperative to affect any rights or

]3roperty of the defendant below. This contention cannot
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be sustained under the authorities. The case of Life Asso-

ciation V. Lemke, 40 Kan. 142, 19 Pac. 337, is substantially

similar in its facts to the case at bar. There, after judg-

ment, defendant filed a motion on jurisdictional and non-

jurisdictional grounds to set the judgment aside, and it was

held that he entered a general appearance to the action.

The latest expression of this court is found in Frazier v.

Douglass, 57 Kan. 809, 48 Pac. 36. Douglass was served

with a summons, which he alleged to be void, and moved

the court so to rule. Coupled with this motion was a sworn

statement, in which he alleged ''that he is the owner in

fee, and has the valid title to the land described in the said

plaintiff's petition filed in said cause, and is in the peace-

able and rightful possession of the same, and that said

plaintiff has no right or title thereto or to its possession ;

and further says that the said land is of great value, to-

wit, of the value of $3000." In the opinion in that case it

is stated:

"As will be readily seen, the plaintiff [defendant] sets up

matters which were non-jurisdictional and had no bearing

upon the motion he had made. ^Vliere a defendant alleges

and submits to the court matters that are non-jurisdictional

he recognizes the general jurisdiction of the court and

waives all irregularities which may have intervened in
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dications of thi court, was equivalent to an appearance. A.
1 art who denie the juri diction of a court over hi person
mu t fir t pre ent this single que tion. He ma , not min, ·le with bi plea to the juri diction otb r plea which con'ede juri diction, and ther after insi t that there was error
in overruling hi plea to the juri diction. A heretofore
. tated, the defendant by bis demurrer rai ed a number of
question other than tho e which were juri dictional, and
in\ oked the judgment of the court thereon. By such other
pleas he submitted him elf and his right to the jurisdiction of the court, and can no longer be heard to say that
it had no juri diction."
The plaintiff in error earne. tly contends that this petition for a new trial, being filed after judgment cannot be
onstrued into an entry of appearance in the cau e, for th
rea on that the judgment wa originally based upon void
service and wa wholl. inoperative to affect any rights or
property of the defendant below. This contention cannot
he ustained under the authoritie . The ca e of L ife Association v. Lemke 40 Kan. J.:L_, 19 Pac. 337, is sub tantially
. imilar in its facts to the ca e at bar. There, after judcrment, defendant filed a motion on juri dictional and nonjuri dictional ground to set the judo·ment a ide, and it wa
held that he entered a general appearance to the action.
The latest expression of thi court is found in Frazier v.
Douglas , 57 Kan. 809, 48 Pac. 36. Douglass was served
with· a summons, which he alleged to be void and moved
the court o to rule. Coupled with thi motion was a sworn
tatement, in which he alleged "that he is the owner in
fee and ha the valid title to the land de cribed in the said
plaintiff' petition filed in aid cau e and i in the peaceable and rightful po e ion of the ame, and that said
plaintiff ha no right or title thereto or to its possession·
and furth r a3 s that the aid land i of o·reat value, towit, of th ·value of $3000." In the opinion in that ca e it
j stated:
''A will be readily seen, the plaintiff [defendant] sets up
matter whi h w re non-juri ictional and had no bearin ·
upon the motion he had ma . Wher a defendant alle 0 ·
and submits t the court matt r that are non-juri dictiona]
he recognize the er neral juri diction of the court an 1
waives all _irregularitie which may have intervened in
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bringing him into court. Whatever may have been the pur-

pose of the defendant in alleging these matters, it is clear

that they do not relate to the question of service or of juris-

diction. Although not entirely formal, the averments relate

to the merits of the controversy, and amount to a complete

answer to the allegations of the petition. When the defend-

ant set up matters and submitted questions which were not

jurisdictional, he submitted himself and his rights to the

jurisdiction of the court, and he cannot be heard to say

that it had no jurisdiction."

For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the district

court will be affirmed.

LOUISVILLE HOME TELEPHONE CO. V. BEELER'S

ADM'X.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1907,

125 Kentucky, 366.

Opinion of the Court by Special Judge Clay — Reversing.
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bringing him into court. Whatever may have been the purpose of the defendant in alleging these matters, it is clear
that they do not relate to the question of service or of jurisdiction. Although not entirely formal, the averments relate
to the merits of the controversy, and amount to a complete
answer to the allegations of the petition. When the defendant set up matters and submitted questions which were not
jurisdictional, he submitted himself and his rights to the
jurisdiction of the court, and he cannot be heard to say
that it had no jurisdiction."
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the district
court will be affirmed.

This action was instituted by Maggie Beeler, administra-
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trix of her deceased husband, E. C. Beeler, against the

Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company and the

Louisville Home Telephone Company, to recover damages

for the death of her husband, which occurred in Louisville,

Jefferson county, Ky., and which is alleged to have re-

sulted from the joint negligence of the two companies. In

addition to the allegations of negligence, the petition states

that decedent was a resident of Bullitt county, and that

LOUISVILLE HOME TELEPHONE CO. V. BEELER'S
ADM'X.

each of the defendants was a common carrier, and passed

into Bullitt county. Summons was served upon the Home

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1907.

Telephone Company by delivering a true copy thereof to

its president, and also by delivering copies to parties who

were stated in the return to be agents of said company, re-

125 Kentucky, 366.

siding in Bullitt county. * * * Xhe defendant Louisville

Home Teleplione Company filed an answer in three para-

graphs. In the first paragraph defendant raised the ques-

tion of jurisdiction by setting forth that its residence was

in Jefferson county, that it did not have any office or

Opinion of the Court by SPECIAL JuDGE CLAY-Reversing.
This action was instituted by Maggie Beeler, administratrix of her deceased husband, E. C. Beeler, against the
umberland Telephone & Telegraph Company aud the
Louisville Home Telephone Company, to recover damages
for the death of her husband, which occurred in Louisville,
Jefferson county, Ky., and which is alleged to have reulted from the joint negligence of the two companies. In
a dition to the allegations of negligence, the petition states
that deced nt wa a resident of Bullitt county, and that
ach of the defendants was a common carrier, and passed
int Bullitt county. Summons was served upon the Home
T ] b n
omp ny by delivering a true copy thereof to
it r . id nt, and al o by d livering copi s to parties who
tat in the return to be agents of said company, re.· i c1 i n0 in u11itt county. '*' * * The def ndant Louisville
lI
Tel hone ompany :filed an answer in three paragr h . In the :fir t para raph d f ndant rai d the questi n f juri. i ·tion y tting forth that it re idence was
l
Jeff rs n county, that it did not have any office or
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agent in Bullitt county, and that it did not pass into said

county. In the second and third paragraphs defendant,

without waiving its objection to the jurisdiction of the

court, pleaded to the merits of the case. * * *

[The Bullitt Circuit Court held that the plea to the merits

was a waiver of the plea to the jurisdiction ; a trial was had,

and verdict and judgment were rendered against the

Home Telephone Company. From an order overruling its

motion for a new trial the Company appeals.]^

At the outset there is presented for our consideration

the question, did the Bullitt circuit court have jurisdiction

of the appellant, Louisville Home Telephone Company?

In passing upon this point, we should first discuss the ques-

tion whether or not appellant entered its appearance by fil-

ing its answer both to the jurisdiction and to the mer-

its. * * *

Among the cases relied upon by appellee is the case of

City of Covington v. Limerick, 107 Ky. 680, 19 Ky. Law
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Rep. 330, 39 S. W. 836, in which the court, after holding

that the circuit court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant, added the following: "But, in

addition to the plea of jurisdiction, the answer of the de-

fendant goes to the merits of the controversy, and is a

waiver of any objection to the jurisdiction over the person

of the defendant. This is the common law doctrine, and

was held to be the law in this State in the case of Baker

v. L. £ N. R. R. Co., 4 Bush 623."

In the case of Baker v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 4 Bush 623, we

find, however, that the defendant first answered to the

merits without suggesting any objection to the jurisdiction,

and trial was then had, resulting in a verdict which was set

aside and a new trial ordered. Next came a hung jury.

About a year and a half thereafter the defendant at-

tempted to plead to the jurisdiction of the court. The

court very properly held that its appearance had been en-

tered long before.

In the case of Guenther & Bros. v. American Steel Hoop

Company, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 795, 116 Ky. 419, 76 S. W. 480,

the question involved was the construction and validity of

subsection 6 of section 51 of the Code, authorizing service

upon the agent of a non-resident doing business in this

iThe matter inclosed in brackets has been condensed by the editor.
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agent in Bullitt county, and that it did not pass into said
county. In the eeond and third paragraphs defendant,
without waiving its objection to the juri diction of the
court, pleaded to the merits of the case. * * *
[The Bullitt ircuit ourt held that the plea to the merit.
was a waiver of the plea to the jurisdiction; a trial was had,
and verdict and judgment were rendered against the
Home Telephone Company. From an order overruling its
motion for a new trial the Company appeals.]1
At the outset there is presented for our con ideration
the question, did the Bullitt circuit court have jurisdiction
of the appellant, Louisville Home Telephone Company~
In pas ing upon this point, we should first di ' CU s the que tion whether or not appellant entered its appearance by filing its answer both to the jurisdiction and to the merits. * * *
Among the ca es relied upon by appellee is the case of
City of Covington v. Limerick, 107 I\::y. 680, 19 Ky. Law
Rep. 330, 39 S. W. 836, in which the court, after holding
that the circuit court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, added the following: ''But, in
addition to the plea of jurisdiction, the answer of the defendant goes to the merits of the controversy, and is a
waiver of any objection to the jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. This is the common law doctrine, and
was held to be the law in this State in the case of Baker
. L. & N. R. R. Co., 4 Bush 623."
In the case of Baker v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 4 Bush 623, w
find, however, that the defendant fir t answered to the
merits without suggesting any objection to the jurisdiction,
and trial was then had, resulting in a verdict whi h was set
aside and a new trial ordered. Next came a hung jury.
About a year and a half thereafter the defendant attempted to plead to the jurisdiction of the court. The
court very properly held that its appearance had been entered long before.
In the ca e of Gitenther & Bros. v. American Steel Hoop
Company, _5 I{y. Law R . 795, 116 Ky. 419, 76 . W. 480
th que tion in olv d wa the con tru tion and alidity of
subse ti n 6 of
tion 51 f the ode, authorizing ervic
upon the agent of a non-r id nt doing busin
in thi
1 The

matter inclosed in bracket bas been condensed by the editor.
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State. In that case the motion to quash the process was

overruled. The defendant did not follow the practice adop-

ted by appellant in the case under consideration. He did

not file an answer as provided by section 118 of the Civil

Code; but, along with the denial of other facts, simply put

in issue the allegation of the petition that he was a non-

resident of the State. Under the circumstances this court

Jield that, having gone into the merits of the case as he did

by his answer, he had entered his appearance to the action.

**********

In favor of the view that a defendant who files an answer

to the jurisdiction, and in the same answer, without waiving

the question of jurisdiction, pleads to the merits, does not

thereby enter his appearance, we find the following cases:

First, the case of Meguiar v. Rudy, 7 Bush 432, in which

a demurrer, as in the case at bar, to the jurisdiction of the

court was first filed, but overruled because the defect did

not appear on the face of the petition. The defendant then
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filed an answer in which he first pleaded to the jurisdiction

of the court, and then pleaded to the merits, including a

counterclaim. The circuit court tried the case on all the

issues raised and came to the conclusion that it had no

jurisdiction over the person of defendant. Judgment was

then entered in his favor, and, upon appeal to this court,

the judgment was affirmed.

Now, in the case under consideration, defense could not

be made by demurrer to the jurisdiction because the peti-

tion stated facts sufficient to show jurisdiction. Nor could

defense be made by motion to quash the summons, because,

if the court had jurisdiction at all, the summons had been

served upon the proper officer, the president of the corpo-

ration. Under the circumstances, therefore, the only kind

of a defense that could be made by appellant, Louisville

Home Telephone Company, was by answer. This method

is provided for by section 118, which is as follows: *'A

party may, by an answer or other proper pleading, make

any of the objections mentioned in section 92, the existence

of which is not shown by the pleadings of his adversary; a

faihue so to do is a waiver of any of said objections ex-

cept that to the jurisdiction of the court of the subject of

the action." An answer heing the only kind of defensive
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State. In that case the motion to quash the process was
overruled. The defendant did not follow the practice adopted by appellant in the case under consideration. He did
not :file an answer as provided by section 118 of the Civil
Code; but, along with the denial of other facts, simply put
in issue the allegation of the petition that he was a nonresident of the State. Under the circumstances this court
held that, having gone into the merits of the case as he did
by his answer, he had entered his appearance to the action.

• * * * * * * * * *
In favor of the view that a defendant who :files an answer
to the jurisdiction, and in the same answer, without waiving
the question of jurisdiction, pleads to the merits, does not
thereby enter his appearance, we :find the following cases:
First, the case of M egi£icir v. Rudy, 7 Bush 432, in which
a demurrer, as in the case at bar, to the jurisdiction of the
court was :first :filed, but overruled because the defect did
not appear on the face of the petition. The defendant then
filed an answer in whic1 he :first pleaded to the jurisdiction
of the court, and the:i pleaded to the merits, including a
counterclaim. The circuit court tried the case on all the
issues raised and came to the conclusion that it had no
jurisdiction over the person of defendant. Judgment was
then entered in his favor, and, upon appeal to this court,
the judgment was affirmed.

* * * * * * * * * *
Now, in the case under consideration, defense could not
be made by demurrer to the jurisdiction be"ause the petition tat d fact sufficient to how juri diction. Nor could
def nse be made by motion to qua b the summons, because,
if th court had jurisdiction at all, the summons had been
. rved upon the proper officer, the pr sident of the corporat i o . Und r the cir cum tan e , ther for , the only kind
ri f a pf n e that could be made by appellant, Loui ville
II m T 1 phon
ompany, was by answer. This method
rovid d for by s ti on 1 8, which is as follows: ''A
party may by
an w r or oth r prop r pleading, make
an
f th o1 j tions
ntion d in
tion 92, th existence
of l ich is n t Rl1own hy tli pleading" of hi adver ary; a
f ailnr<' . t do i a waiv r of any of said obje tions exc· pt that t th juri. 1i tion f th ourt of th subject of
th a · j n. '' An an · r. l ei o- th only kind of defensive

ec. 3]
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pleading that could be filed, the question arises, what sort

of an answer should be filed? Should a party be required

to file first an answer to the jurisdiction, and afterwards an

answer to the merits, or should he have the right to file

■^'Oth at the same time? There is certainly no authority in

the Code for filing one answer and then another answer :

any answer subsequent to the original answer must be an

amended answer. While in every case, no doubt, the trial

court would permit an answer to the merits to be filed after

an answer to the jurisdiction had been passed upon, yet

the right to file an amended answer has always been held to

be a matter within the sound discretion of the court. That

being the case, would it not be the better practice to join

all defenses in the same answer? There is certainly noth-

ing in section 118 to the contrary. All that that section

requires is that the party shall not answer to the merits

without first making objection to the jurisdiction of the

court. This view is not without authority to sustain it.
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Maxwell on Code Pleading, p. 394, speaks as follews: "At-

common law pleas must be pleaded in their order; that is,

dilatory pleas must be made and disposed of before a plea

in bar could be determined. Under the code, however, all

the defenses which a defendant may have are to be pleaded

at one time, and in one answer. Therefore, matter in abate

ment may be joined with a plea to the merits."

**********

The New York court of appeals has taken the same view.

In Siveet v. Tuttle, 14 N. Y. 465, we have the following:

''The first question is whether a defendant along with other

defenses may set up in his answer the non-joinder of other

parties who ought to have been sued with him. Under the

former practice the non-joinder of defendants could be

pleaded only in abatement, and could not be joined with a

plea in bar; but, under the Code, there is no classification

of answers or defenses corresponding with the distinction

between pleas in abatement and in bar. The distinction

is entirely gone, with the system to which it belongs. The

defendant now answers but once, and he ma}^ set forth as

manv defenses as he thinks he has, but must state them

separately* * * * * "

And in the case of Little v. Harrington, 71 Mo. 390, we

T. P— ^ '
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} leading that oul be filed, the que tion ari e , what sort
of an answer should be file ~ Should a party be required
to file first an an wer to the jurisdiction, and afterwards an
c1nswer to the merit or hould he have the right to fil
hoth at the same time~ There i certainly no authority in
the Code for filing one an w r and then another answer;
any answer ub equ nt to the original an w r mu t be an
amended answ r . Whil in every case, no doubt, the trial
r nrt would permit an answer to the merits to be filed after
an answer to the juri diction had been passed upon, yet
the right to file an amended answer has always been held to
be a matter within the ound di cretion of the court. That
b ing the case, would it not be the better practice to join
all defenses in the ame an wer. There is certainlv nothing in section 118 to the contrary. All that that section
requires is that the party hall not answer to the merit
without fir t making obj ction to the juri diction of the
court. This view is not without authority to sustain it.
J'vfaxwell on Code Pleading, p. 394, speak as follews : ''Atcommon law pleas must be pleaded in their order; that is,
dilatory pleas must be made and dispo ed of before a plea
jn bar could be determined. Under the code, however, all
the defen e which a defendant may have ar to be pleaded
at one time, and in one an wer. Therefore, matter in abate
ment may be joined with a plea to the merits.''
* * * * * * * * * *
The New York court of appeals has taken the same view.
In Sweet v. Tuttle, 14 N. Y. 465, we have the following:
''The first que tion is whether a defendant alon()' with other
d fen e may et up in hi answer the non-joinder of other
partie who ought to have been ued with him. Under the
former practice the non-joinder of defendant could be
pleaded onl in abat ment, and could not b joined with a
plea in bar ; but, un }er the Code there is no la ifica ti on
of answers or def en e corr ponding with the di tinction
b tween plea in abat ment and in bar. The i tinction
i ntirely gone with he y t m to which it belono· . Tb
d fendant now an w r but nee and he may et forth a:
manv d f n e a h think he bas, but mu t state them
epa.rately * * * * * ''

* * * * * * * * * *
And in the case of Little v. Harrington, 71 Mo. 390, we
T. P-9 -
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find the following: ''It is evident from these statutory pro-

visions that only one answer is contemplated, and this to

contain whatever defense or defenses the defendant may

have, thus dispensing with the common law rule that a

plea in bar waives all dilatory pleas or pleas not going to

the merits."

And the same court, in the case of Johnson v. Detrick,

152 Mo. 243, 53 S. W. 891, says: "A plea to the jurisdic-

tion, even when coupled with a plea to the merits, is permis-

sible under our Code; and the latter plea does not, as at

common law, waive the former."

In view of the foregoing authorities, * * we have reached

the conclusion that a defendant may in one answer plead

both to the jurisdiction and to the merits. It necessarily

follows that a plea to the merits that recites that the de-

fendant does not waive his objection to the jurisdiction of

the court is not a waiver of the plea of the jurisdiction.

We, therefore, hold that appellant's answer did not enter
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its appearance to this action. * * *

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial

consistent with this opinion.

LINTON V. HEYE.

Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1903.

69 Nebraska, 450.

Albert, C. This is an action to quiet the title to several

tracts of land, each plaintiff asserting title to a separate

tract. * * * Service on the defendants was had by publica-

tion. They appeared specially and objected to the jurisdic-

tion of the court over their persons, on the grounds that the

affidavit for service by publication and the notice, published

in pursuance thereof, were defective in certain particulars,
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find the following: ''It i evident from these statutory provi ions that only one answer is contemplated, and this to
contain whatever defense or defenses the defendant may
have, thus dispensing with the common law rule that a
plea in bar waives all dilatory pleas or pleas not going to
the merits.''
And the same court, in the case of Johnson v. Detrick,
152 Mo. 243, 53 S. W. 891, says: ''A plea to the jurisdiction, even when coupled with a plea to the merits, is permi. sible under our Code; and the latter plea does not, as at
C'ommon law, waive the former.''
In view of the foregoing authorities, * * we have reached
the conclusion that a defendant may in one answer plea(!
both to the jurisdiction and to the merits. It necessarily
f llows that a plea to the merits that recites that the def ndant does not waive his objection to the jurisdiction of
the court is not a waiver of the plea of the jurisdiction.
We, therefore, hold that appellant's answer did not enter
it appearance to thi action. * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial
consistent with this opinion.

and that such notice was not published for the period re-

quired by law. The objections were overruled, and the de-

fendants answered.

[In their answer defendants again objected to the juris-

LINTON V. HEYE.
Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1903.
69 Nebraska, 450.

C. Thi is an action to quiet the title to several
tracts of land, ach I laintiff a s rting titl to a separat
tract. * * *
rvice o the defendants was had by publication. They a I ared pecially and obj cted to the jurisdictio of the court over t eir per ons, on the ()'rounds that the
ffi vit f r s rvi by publication and the notice, publi hed
in pur. uan e th reof, w re defective in c rtain particular ,
c n
that uch noti e wa not publi hed for the period rel ir by law. T e o j ctions were overruled, and the def n ant answ r d.
[In their an w r d f ndants again objected to the jurisALBERT,
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diction of the court, and also pleaded a counterclaim.]^

* * * A trial to the court resulted in a finding and decree

for the plaintiffs. The defendants prosecute error.

It is first urged that the court had no jurisdiction over

the defendants. The general rule, settled by a long line

of authorities, is, that if a defendant intends to rely on a

want of jurisdiction over his person, he must appear, if

at all, for the sole purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction

of the court. If he appear for another purpose, such ap-

pearance is general, and a waiver of all defects in the orig-

inal process, and an acknowledgment of the complete juris-

diction of the court in the action. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.

Bobbins, 59 Neb. 170 ; Omaha Loan & Trust Co. v. Knight,

50 Neb. 342; Leake v. Gallogly, 34 Neb. 857; South Omaha

Nat. Bank v. Fanners S Merchants Nat. Bank, 4:5 Neb. 29;

Dryfus v. Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co., 43 Neb. 233;

Hurlburt v. Palmer, 39 Neb. 158, 173. An exception to this

rule is, that,, where the lack of jurisdiction does not appear
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on the face of the record, the defendant may unite a plea

to the jurisdiction with his other defenses to the action,

without waiving his rights to insist on the lack of jurisdic-

tion of the court. Hurlburt v. Palmer, supra. But, we think,

such exception must be limited to cases where the plea to

the jurisdiction is joined only with such defenses as go to

defeat a recovery by the plaintiff, and should not be ex-

tended to cases where, as in this case, such plea is joined

with a cross petition, or counter-claim, which necessitates

1 trial on the merits of the issues tendered by the peti-

tion. Such pleading, though denominated an answer, con-

tains all the essential elements of a petition or complaint,

and might be made the basis of an independent action and

decree against the plaintiffs. It puts it beyond the lawful

power of the court to dispose of the case, by a finding on

t!ie issues tendered by the plea to the jurisdiction, and

compels an adjudication on the merits. The defendants,

having thus compelled an adjudication on the merits, can

not now be heard to question the authority of the court

whose jurisdiction they thus invoked.

**********

By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing

iThe portion in brackets has been condensed by the editor.
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diction of the court, and also pleaded a counter.claim.]1
* * * * * * * * * *
• • • A trial to the court resulted in a finding and decree
for the plaintiffs. Th defendants pros cute error.
It is fir t urged that tbe court had no juri diction over
the defendants. The g neral rule, settled by a long line
of authorities, is, that if a defendant intends to rely on a
want of jurisdiction over hi person, he must appear, if
at all, for the sole purpo e of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court. If he appear for another purpose, such appearance is general, and a waiver of all defects in the original process, and an acknowledgment of the complete juri diction of the court in the action. Banker Life Ins. Co. v.
Robbins, 59 Neb. 170; Oniaha Loan & Trust Co. v. Knight,
50 Neb. 342; L eake v. Gallogly, 34 Neb. 857; South Omaha
Nat. Bank v. Farmer & lllerchants Nat . Bank, 45 Neb. 29;
Dry/us v. IJ;J oline, ll.tf ilburn & Stoddard Co., 43 Neb. 233;
Hurlburt v. P almer, 39 Neb. 158, 173. An exception to this
rule is, that, . where the lack of jurisdiction does not appear
on the face of the re ord, the defendant may unite a plea
to the jurisdiction with his other defen es to the action,
without wai ing his rights to in ·ist on the lack of juri diction of the court. Hurlburt v . P almer, supra. But, we think,
uch exception mu t be limited to ca es where the plea to
the jurisdiction i joined only with such defenses as go to
lefeat a recovery by the plaintiff, and should not be extended to cases where, as in this case, such plea is joined
with a cross petition, or counter-claim, which necessitates
1 trial on the merits of the issues tendered by the petition. Such pleading, though denominated an an wer, contains all the es ential elements of a petition or complaint,
and might be made the ba is of an independent action and
l er a ain t the plaintiffs. It puts it beyond the lawful
power of the court to di pose of the ca e by a finding on
th i ue tendered y the plea to the jurisdiction, and
compel an adjudication on the merit . The defendants,
ha ing thus comp lled an adjudication on the merits, can
not now be heard to qu tion the authority of the court
whose juri diction the~ thu in-v oked.
* • ' * * * * . * *
By the Court: For the rea ons tated in the foregoing
lThe portion in bracket ha b

n condensed by the editor.
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opinion, the decree of the district court is affirmed. 1

opinion, tlie decree of the district court is affirmed.^

lOn appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, this case was

aflBrmed. Linton v. Heye, 194 U. S. 628. The same rule was announced by

the Supreme Court of the United States in Merchants' Heat and Light Co.

V. J. B. Clow & Sons, (1906) 204 U. S. 286, where defendant filed a plea of

set-off, under the Illinois practice, after saving an exception to an order over-

ruling its special appearance, though it was conceded that a purely defensive

plea would not have waived defendant 's right to rely upon its objection to the

jurisdiction of the court over its person.

10n appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, this case was
affirmed . Linton v. Heye, 194 U. S. 628. The same rule was announced by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Merchants' Heat and Light Co.
v. J. B. Clow & Sons, (J906) 204 U. S. 286, where defendant filed a plea of
set-off, under the Illinois practice, after saving an exception to an order overruling its special appearance, though it was conceded that a purely defen ive
plea would not have waived defendant 's right to rely upon its objection to the
jurisdiction of the court over its person.

WABASH WESTERN RAILWAY V. BROW.

Supreme Court of the United States. 1896.

164 United States, 271.

Joseph Brow commenced suit in the Circuit Court of

Wayne County, Michigan, against the Wabash Western

Railway to recover the sum of twenty thousand dollars for

personal injuries, caused, as he alleged, by defendant's

negligence, by the service, September 24, 1892, of a declara-

WABASH WESTERN RAIL\VAY V. BROW.

tion and notice to appear and plead within twenty days,
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on Fred J. Hill, as agent of the company, which declaration

Supreme Court of the United States.

1896.

and notice were subsequently filed in that court. On the

164 Unit ed States, 271 .

7th of October defendant filed its petition and bond for

removal in that court, and an order accepting said bond

and removing the cause to the Circuit court of the United

States for the Eastern District of Michigan, and directing

the transmission of a transcript of record, was entered.

**********

The record having been filed in the Circuit Court of the

United States for the Eastern District of Michigan, a mo-

tion to set aside the declaration and rule to plead was made

in the cause in these words and figures: ''And now comes

Mie Wabash Western Railway, defendant (appearing spec-

ially for the purpose of this motion), and moves the court,

upon the files and records of the court in this cause, and

upon the affidavit of Fred J. Hill, filed and served with this

motion, to set aside the service of the declaration and rule

to plead in this cause, and to dismiss the same for want of

•in-is(li(*tion of the person of the defendant in the state

court from which this cause was removed, and in this

Joseph Brow comm need suit in the Circuit Court of
Wayne County, :Michigan, against the Wabash Western
Railway to recover the um of twenty thou and dollars for
pe rsonal injuries, caused, as he alleged, by defendant'
n gligence, by the service, September 24:, 1892, of a declaration and notice to appear and plead within twenty days,
on Fred J. Hill, as agent of the company, which declaration
and notice were sub equ ntly filed in that court. On the
7th of October defendant filed its petition and bond for
removal in that court, and an order accepting said bond
;:ind removing the cau e to the Circuit court of the United
, tates for the Eastern Di trict of Michigan, and directing
tbe transmission of a transcript of record, was entered.

* * * * * * * * * *
The record having b n filed in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the ~a tern Di trict of Michigan, a motion to set aside the d claration and rule to plead was made
in th a use in the e words and figures: ''And now come.
4h
Waba h W t rn ailwa;, d fendant (appearing specially for th purpose of this motion), and moves the court,
n n th fi] , n<l 1·
r . o E th
urt in thi cause, and
upon the affidavit f Fr d J. Hill, fil d and erved with thi
l
ti n, t . t .·i 1 th , rvi of th d laration and rul
t pl a i thi .' a
and to i i th sa e for want of
:nri : lic in of the pr on of the d f ndant in the state
ourt from whi h thi
au
wa r move and in this
1
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court." The affidavit was to the effect that Hill, on Septem-

ber 24, 1892, was the freight agent of "the Wabash Rail-

road Company, a corporation wliich owns and operates a

railroad from Detroit to the Michigan state line, and was

not an agent of the Wabash Western Railway, defendant

in this suit;" *****

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the case, deliv-

ered the opinion of the court.

This was not a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, but

a personal action brought in the Circuit Court of Wayne

county, Michigan, against a corporation wliich was neither

incorporated nor did business, nor had any agent or prop-

erty, within the state of Michigan; and service of declara-

tion and rule to plead was made on an individual who was

not, in any respect, an officer or agent of the corporation.

The state court, therefor, acquired no jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant by the service. Did the applica-

tion for removal amount to such an appearance as con-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ceded jurisdiction over the person?

We have already decided that when in a petition for

removal it is expresed that the defendant appears specially

and for the sole purpose of presenting the petition, the ap-

plication cannot be treated as submitting the defendant to

the jurisdiction of the state court for any other purpose.

Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518.

The question "how far a petition for removal, in general

terms, without specifying and restricting the purpose of

the defendant's appearance in the state court, might be

considered, like a general appearance, as a waiver of any

objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the person

of the defendant," was not required to be determined, and

was, therefor, reserved ; but we think that the line of rea-

soning in that case and in the preceding case of Martin v.

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 151 U. S. 673, compels the

same conclusion on the question as presented in the case

before us.

In Goldey v. Morning Neics, Mr. Justice Gray, speaking

for the court, observed: "The theory that a defendant, by

filing in the state court a petition for removal into the Cir-

cuit Court of the United States, necessarily waives the

riorht to insist that for anv reason the state court had not
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court." The affidaYit was to the effect that Hill on eptemher 24, 1892, was the freight agent of "the Waba h Rail road Company, a q ration which own and operates a
railroad from Detroit to the :Michigan tate line and wa
not an agent of the Wabash Western Railway, defendant
in this suit · " * * * * *

'

* * * * * * * * * *

MR. CHIEF J STICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
This was not a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, but
a per onal action brought in the Circuit ourt of Wayne
county, Michigan, against a corporation which was neither
incorporated nor did bu ine
nor had any agent or property, within the stat e of 11ichigan; and service of declaration and rule to plead was made on an individual who wa"'
not, in an re pect, an officer or agent of the corporation.
The state court therefor acquired no juri diction over the
person of the def end ant by the service. Did the application for removal amount to such an appearance as conceded juri diction over the person~
We have alread decided that when in a petition for
removal it is expre ed that the defendant appears specially
and for the sole purpo e of pre enting the p etition, the application cannot be tr ated as ubmitting the defendant to
the jurisdiction of the state court for any other purpo .
Goldey v. JIJ orning 0.-.. eivs, 156 U. . 518.
The que tion "how far a petition for removal, in general
terms, without pecifying and re ·tricting the purpose of
the defendant's appearance in the tate court, might be
n idered, like a general appearance, a a waiver of any
objection to the juri diction of the court over the per on
of the defendant '' wa not required to be determined, an~
wa , therefor, re erYe ; but we think that the lin of rea. oning in that ca e and in the preceding case of llf artin Y .
altiniore & Ohio Railroad, 151 U . S. 673, compels th
ame conclu ion on the qu e tion a pre nted in the ca. e
efore u .
In Goldey v. Morning N zc. 1fr. Ju tice GR Y, speakin{Y
f r the court ob en ed: ' The theor that a defendant, by
filinO' in the tate ourt a petition for removal into the Ciruit Court of th Unit
State nece arily waiv s th
right to insist that for any r ea . n th tate court had not
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acquired jurisdiction of his person, is inconsistent with the

terms, as well as with the spirit of the existing act of Con-

gress regulating removals from the court of a State into

the Circuit Court of the United States. The jurisdiction

of the Circuit Court of the United States depends upon the

acts passed by Congress pursuant to the power conferred

upon it by the Constitution of the United States, and can-

not be enlarged or abridged by any statute of a State. The

legislature or the judiciary of a State can neither defeat

the right given by a constitutional act of congress to re-

move a case from a court of the State into the Circuit

Court of the United States, nor limit the effect of such re-

moval * * * Although the suit must be actually pending

in the state court before it can be removed, its removal

into the Circuit Court of the United States does not admit

that it was rightfully pending in the state court, or that

the defendant could have been compelled to answer therein ;

but enables the defendant to avail himself, in the Circuit
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Court of the United States, of any and every defense,

duly and seasonably reserved and pleaded, to the action

'in the same manner as if it had been originally commenced

in said Circuit Court.' " 156 U. S. 523, 525.

Want of jurisdiction over the person is one of these

defenses, and, to use the language of Judge Drummond

in Atchison v. Morris, 11 Fed. Rep. 582, we regard it as

not open to doubt that ''the party has a right to the opin

ion of the Federal court on every question that may arise

in the case, not only in relation to the pleadings and merits,

but to the service of process; and it would be contrary to

the manifest intent of Congress to hold that a party, who

has the right to remove a cause, is foreclosed as to any

question which the Federal court can be called upon, under

the law, to decide."

Moreover the petition does not invoke the aid of the court

touching relief only grantable in the exercise of juris-

diction of the person. The statute imposes the duty on

the state court, on the filing of the petition and bond, "to

accept such petition and bond and proceed no further in

such suit," and, if the cause be removable, an order of the

state court denying the application is ineffectual, for the

TRIAL PRACTICE
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'acquired jurisdiction of hi s person, is inconsistent with the
terms, as well as with the spirit of the existing act of Congress regulating removals from the court of a State into
the Circuit Court of the United States. The jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court of the United States depends upon the
acts passed by Congress pursuant to the power conferred
upon it by the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be enlarged or abridged by any statute of a State. The
legislature or the judiciary of a State can neither defeat
the right given by a constitutional act of congress to remove a case from a court of the State into the Circuit
Court of the United States, nor limit the effect of such removal * * * Although the uit mu t be actually pending
in the state court before it can be removed, its removal
into the Circuit Court of the United States does not admit
hat it was rightfully pending in the state court, or that
the defendant could have been compelled to answer therein;
but enables the defendant to avail himself, in the Circuit
Court of the United States, of any and every defense,
duly and seasonably reserved and pleaded, to the action
'in the same manner as if it had been originally commenced
in said Circuit Court.' '' 156 U. S. 523, 525.
* * * * * * * * * *
Want of jurisdiction over the person is one of these
def ens es, and, to use the language of Judge Drummond
in Atchison v. Ill orris, 11 Fed. Rep. 582, we regard it as
not open to doubt that ''the party has a right to the opin
ion of the Federal court on every question that may arise
in the ca e, not only in r lation to the pleadino· and merits,
but to th service of process; and it would be contrary to
the manif t intent of ono-r s to hold that a party, who
has the rio-ht to remove a cau e, is foreclo d as to any
qu tion whi h the F deral court can be called upon, under
the law, to d ide. ''

* * * * * * * * * *
v r th p tition o not i voke the aid of the ourt
r li f only gr ntabl in the exercise of juri f th
r son. Tl statute impo se th duty on
ourt, on th :filing of the petition and bond, "to
a c pt . u ·h
ti ti n cIHl hond and proceed no further in
. u h uit," n , if th
u b r movabl , an ord r of th
tate court d nyincr th appli ation i ineff ctual, for th
M r
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petitioner may, notwithstanding, file a copy of the record

in the Circuit Court and that court must proceed in the

l etitioner may, notwithstanding, file a copy of the recor I
in the Circuit Court and that court mu t proceed in the
cause.

• * * * * * * * * *

cause.

**********

It is conceded that if defendant had stated that it ap-

peared specially for the purpose of making the application,

that would have been su;licient; and yet when the purpose

for which the applicant comes into the state court is the

single purpose oi removing the cause, and what he does has

no relation to anything else, it is not apparent why he

should be called in to repeat that this is his sole purpose;

and when removal is had before any step is taken in the

case, as the statute provides that ' ' the cause shall then pro-

ceed in the same manner as if it had been originally com-

menced in said Circuit Court," it seems to us that it cannot

be successfully denied that e^ery question is open for de-

termination in the Circuit Court, as we have, indeed, al-

ready decided.
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**********

We are of opinion that the filing of a petition for removal

does not amount to a general appearance, but to a special

appearance only.

**********

Me. Justice Bbewer and Me. Justice Peckham dis-

135
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It is conceded that if defendant had tated that it appeared specially for the purpose of making the application
that woul ha\T be n um i nt; and yet when the purpose
'or which the applicant comes into the state court is the
ingle purpo e ot removing the cau e, and what he does ha
no relation to anything el e, it i not apparent why he
should be called in to rep at that this i hi sole purpose;
and when removal is had before any tep is taken in the
case, as the statute provid tbat ''the cau e shall then pro- ·
ceed in the ame manner as if it had been originally commenced in aid Circuit ourt,'' it eem to u that it cannot
be succes fully deni d that every que tion i open for determination in the Circuit Court, as we have, indeed, already decided.

sented.

* * * * * * * * * *

FISHER, SONS & COMPANY V. CROWLEY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1906.

57 West Virginia, 312.

[Action of assumpsit. The defendants moved to quash

the summons. After the motion was overruled a plea of non-

assumpsit was tendered. Judgment for the plaintiffs. De-

fendants assign error.] ^

Poffenbarger, J. * * * It has been suggested that, by

We are of opinion that the filing of a petition for removal
does not amount to a general appearance, but to a special
appearance only.

* * * * * * * * • •
MR. J us TICE BREWER and MR. J usTICE PECKHAM dis-

tendering the plea of non-assumpsit after the motion to

quash had been overruled and making other defenses, the

sented.

defendants submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the

iThe matter in brackets has been condensed hj the editor.

FISHER, SONS &

OMP ANY V. CROWLEY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

1906.

57 West Virginia, 312.

[Action of assump it. The defendants moved to qua h
the ummons. After the motion was overruled a plea of nonassumpsit was tendered. J udgm nt for the plaintiffs. Defendant assiO'n error.]1
PoFFENBARGER J. * * * It ha been uO'gested that, by
tendering the plea of non-a. u 1npsit after the motion to
qua h had b en overrul d and making other def ens es, the
defendants submitted them l e to the jurisdiction of the
1 The

matter in brackets has been condensed by

~

editor.
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court, waiving the defect in the writ. * * * No decision of

this court holds that there is a waiver of a defect in a

summons by proceeding to trial after an adverse ruling on

a Emotion to quash and an exception taken thereto. Sears v.

Starhird, 78 Cal. 225, and Desmond v. Superior Court, 59

Cal. 274, so hold, but they are not in accord with the more

carefully considered cases of Lyman v. Milton, 44 Cal.

630, and Deidesheimer v. Brown, 8 Cal. 339, neither

of which is noticed in the opinion in the two subse-

quent inconsistent cases. Desmond v. Superior Court

went up from a justice court and Sears v. Starhird simply

adopted the rule without comment. In view of this, it may

be fairly said they are not well considered cases. In Michi-

gan, Indiana, Colorado, Nebraska, Florida and Missouri,

it has been held that defective service is waived by going

to trial, 2 Ency. PI. & Pr. 631 and cases cited, but the au-

thority for the decisions, in some instances, is found in pe-

culiar statutes, and most of the cases originated in justice's
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courts where practically all formalities are dispensed with.

Against this doctrine of waiver in cases of defective ser-

vice stand the decisions of many states and the high author-

ity of the Supreme Court of the United States. Harkness v.

Hyde, 98 U. S. 476, holds that ''Illegality in the service of

process by which jurisdiction is to be obtained is not waived

by the special appearance of the defendant to move that

the service be set aside; nor after such motion is denied,

by his answering to the merits. Such illegality is consid-

ered as wavied only when he, without having insisted upon

it, pleads in the first instance to the merits." Mullen v.

Railroad Co., (N. C.) 19 S. E. 106, says: ''Where a motion

made on special appearance to dismiss for want of service

of summons is overruled, and defendant excepts, his sub-

sequent appearance to the merits, waives none of his

rights." Ames v. Windsor, 19 Pick (Mass.) 247,

says: "So, where the defendant, upon the entry of

the action in the court of common pleas, moved that

court to dismiss it, on the ground that the writ was

not duly served, and this motion was overruled, and

the defendant thereupon joined in the common de-

murrer, and the action was thereupon entered in this

court, it was held, that the defendant had not thereby

waived his exception to the legality of the service." To
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ourt, wai' ing the defect in the writ . * * * No decision of
this court holds that there is a waiver of a defect in a
.'ummons by proceeding to trial after an adver se ruling on
a !40tion to quash and an exception taken thereto. Sears v.
Starbird, 78 Cal. 225, and Desrnond v. Superior Court, 59
Cal. 27 4, so hold, but they are not in accord with the more
carefully considered cases of Lyman v. ll1ilton, 44 Cal.
630, and D eidesheinier v. Brown, 8 Cal. 339, neither
of which is noticed in the opinion in the two subsequent inconsistent cases. Desmond v. Superior CouJ"t
went up from a justice court and Sears v. Starbird simply
adopted the rule without comment. In view of this, it may
be fairly said they are not well considered cases. In 1\!Iichigan, Indiana, Colorado, Nebraska, Florida and Missouri,
it has been held that defective service is waived by going
to trial, 2 Ency. PL & Pr. 631 and cases cited, but the authority for the decisions, in some in tances, is found in peculiar statutes, and most of the cases originated in justice'..,
court s where practically all formalities are dispensed with.
Against this doctrine of waiver in cases of defective service stand the deci ions of many states and the high authority of the Supreme Court of the United States. Harkness v.
II yde, 98 U. S. 476, holds that "Illegality in the service of
I roce s by which jurisdiction is to be obtained is not waived
by the special appearance of the defendant to move that
the service be set a ide; nor after uch motion is denied,
by bis answerinO' to the merits. Snch illegality is considred a wavied only when he, without having insisted upon
it, pl ads in the fir t in tance to the merits." lltfullen v.
Railroad Co ., (N. C.) 19 S. E. 106, says : "Where a motion
ma 1 on p cial appearance to di miss for want of service
of . ummo s i overruled, and def ndant excepts, his sub. qu nt a pearance to the merits, waives none of his
Ames v. Windsor, 19 Pick (Mass.) 247,
ri 0 ·ht . "
~ay :
'' o, where the d fendant, upon the entry of
tb
tion in the court of common pl a , moved that
c urt t dis iss it, on the ground that th writ was
not uly . rv d, and this motion wa overrul d, and
t
f nd t th reupon join d in th
common deur r a
th a ·ti on wa ther upon nt r d in this
rourt, it w . hPlrl, th t th d f ndant had n t thereby
, 1v hi x p1 ion t th 1 gality of the ervice." To
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the same effect are State v. Dupre, 46 La. Ann. 117, and

Railroad Co. v. Heath, 87 Ky. 651. Authorities of greater

dignity in this court, however, are its own decisions in

Chapman v. Haitian d, 22 W. Va. 329, (Syl. pt. 3), Price v.

Finnell, 4 W. Va. 296, and Steele v. Harkness, 9 W. Va. 13.

***

That pleading to the merits, without previous objection

to the process or return, is a waiver of process, defects in

process, defects in return, defective service and total want

of service is in no sense denied. The proposition is asserted

by a vast array of authorities. See 2 Ency. PI. & Pr. 646.

It is ancient law in this state. Tuherville v. Long, 3 H. & M.

2>QQ;Winston v. Overseers, 4 Call. 357; Harvey v. Skipivith,

16 Grat. 410; Mahamj v. Kephart, 15 W. Va. 619; Todd &

Smith V. Gates, 20 W. Va. 604; Bank v. Bank, 3 W. Va. 386.

But the principle, as sound in law as it is in reason and

justice, that the appearance, to have such effect, must be

voluntary, has never been departed from except in the
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single case of Railway Co. v. Wright, 50 W. Va. 653, and

that, as has been shown, compelled only a waiver of service,

a matter of less consequence than the requisites of a valid

summons. A man may waive perfect defenses to any de-

mand, however large, though without a shadow of merit,

by a mere failure to appear and defend, but, by any law

or decision which would prevent his appearance or cut off

his opportunity to make defense, he would be more effect-

ually robbed of his money than if it were taken from him

by a highwayman. It must be voluntary and free from

constraint, else it is not binding. Nor can he be deprived

of any other legal right except by his own voluntary act.

He has a perfect right to remain out of court until regu-

larly and legally brought in, and, if an attempt is made to

bring him in irregularly, he has a perfect right to object,

on the ground of irregularity, in proper time, and manner.

To force him to waive it, by saying, if he does not do so, he

can make no defense on the merits, is a palpable denial

of a legal right. He must then determine whether he will

risk his whole case on the question of insufficiency of the

writ or return, as the case may be, however full and com-

plete he might be able to make his defense on the merits,

or waive the defect and submit himself to a jurisdiction

not lawfully obtained, in order to prevent his being forever
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th same effect are State v. Dupre, 46 La. Ann. 117, and
Railroad Co. v. Heath, 87 Ky. 651. Authorities of greater
rlignity in this court, however, are its own decisions in
haprnan v. Maitland, 22 W. Va. 329, (Syl. pt. 3), Price v.
Pinnell, 4 W. Va. 296, and Steele v. Harkness, 9 W. Va. 13.
"'' * *
That pleading to the merits, without previous objection
to the process or return, is a waiver of process, defects in
proce s, defects in return, defective service and total want
of rvice is in no sense denied. The propo ition is asserted
by a va t array of authorities. See 2 Ency. PL & Pr. 646.
It is ancient law in this state. Tuberville v. Long, 3 H. & M.
309; Winston v. Overseers, 4 Call. 357; Harvey v. Skipwith,
16 Grat. 410; Mahany v. Kephart, 15 W. Va. 619; Todd &
Smith v. Gates, 20 W. Va. 60±; Bank v. Bank, 3 W. Va. 386.
But the principle, as sound in law as it is in reason and
justice, that the appearance, to have such effect, must be
voluntary, has never been departed from except in the
single case of Railway Co. v. Wright, 50 W. Va. 653, and
that, as bas been shown, compelled only a waiver of service,
a matter of less consequence than the requisites of a valid
summGn . A man may waive perfect defenses to any demand, however large, though without a shadow of merit,
by a mere failure to appear and defend, but, by any law
or decision which would prevent his appearance or cut off
hi opportunity to make defen e, be would be more effectually robbed of bis money than if it were taken from him
by a highwayman. It must be voluntary and free from
constraint, else it is not binding. Nor can be be deprived
of any other legal right except by his own voluntary act.
He has a perfect right to remain out of court until regularly and legally brought in, and, if an attempt is made to
bring him in irregularly, he has a perfect right to object,
on the ground of irregularity, in proper time, and manner.
To for e him to waive it, by sayino·, if he does not do so, he
can make no defense on the merits, is a palpable denial ·
of a le()'al right. He must then determine whether he will
ri k hi whol case on the question of in ufficiency of the
writ or r turn as the case may be, however full and complete he mi()'ht be abl to make hi defen e on the merits,
or waive the defect and submit himself to a jurisdiction
not lawfully obtained, in order to prevent his being forever
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deprived of bis defense in case his objection to the writ or

return should prove to be not tenable. A test of the courts

jurisdiction could never be made except at great peril, a

result of which would be that no attempt to do so would

ever be made in a case in which defense on the merits could

be made. In order to do so it would be necessary to suffer

a judgment by default, then go back to the same court with

a motion to set it aside for insufficiency of process, vainly

ask the court to reverse itself, suffer the same adverse rul-

ing, and then, if possible, obtain a writ of error from this

Court and reverse the judgment for the defect in process

alone, and, on failure of that, to be forever barred of any

defense on the merits. For the court to present to a party

the alternative of waiving a jurisdictional defect or giving

up his defense, and compel him to choose, is not to allow

a voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, but to coerce such

submission or a relinquishment of the defense on the merits,

however ample and just it may be, and give to the plaintiff
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what he is clearly not entitled to — the appearance of the

defendant without process or relinquishment of defense in

that action. How can the action of a court, in arbitrarily

taking from one man a right, trivial and unimportant

though it be, and conferring it upon another, be justified,

either legally or morally I Is the right to stay out of court

until legally brought in worth nothing? Is process a mere

idle formality? If so, whj^ allow a default judgment to be

set aside for want of it? That this will be done all admit,

and, in admitting, confess that the acquisition of jurisdic-

tion by process is a matter of substance and not of form.

To say in the same breath that a man may not test it with-

out surrendering his defense to the merits is squarely and

flatly inconsistent, contradictory of the admitted nature of

the right, and violative of law in that it forcibly deprives

the citizen of a substantial legal right. To say that the

office of process is to bring the defendant into court and

that, after his appearance, it is wholly unimportant and

may be disregarded, falls far short of justifying the ruling.

His appearance is involuntary. He must come or risk every-

thing on the question of insufficiency of the process. If he

does not, a judgment by default goes against him, forever

precluding any defense, be it a release, payment, fraud or

what not, unless he can have it set aside for the defect in

TRIAL PRACTICE
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deprived of his defense in case his objection to the writ or
return should prove to be not tenable. A test of the courts
jurisdiction could never be made except at great peril, a
result of which would be that no attempt to do so would
ever be made in a case in which defense on the merits could
be made. In order to do so it would be n ecessary to suffer
a judgment by def a ult, then go back to the same court with
a motion to set it aside for insufficiency of process, vainly
a k the court to reverse itself, suffer the same adverse ruling, and then, if possible, obtain a writ of error from this
Court and reverse the judgment for the defect in proces
alone, and, on failure of that, to be forever barred of any
defen e on the merits. For the court to present to a party
the alternative of waiving a jurisdictional defect or giving
up hi defense, and compel him to choose, is not to allow
a voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, but to coerce such
ubmission or a relinquishment of the defense on the merits~
however ample and just it may be, and give to the plaintiff
what he is clearly not entitled to-the appearance of the
defendant without process or relinquishment of defense in
that action. How can the action of a court, in arbitrarily
taking from one man a right, trivial and unimportant
though it be, and conferring it upon another, be justified,
either legally or morally~ Is the right to stay out of court
until legally brought in worth nothing~ Is process a mere
idle formality1 If so, why allow a default judgment to be
set aside for want of it~ That this will be done all admit,
and, in admitting, confess that the acquisition of jurisdiction by process is a matter of substance and not of form.
To say in the same breath that a man may not test it without surrendering bi d fen e to the merits is squarely and
flatly inconsistent, contradictory of the admitted nature of
the riO'ht, and violativ of law in that it forcibly deprives
the itizen of a substantial legal right. To say that the
offi
of ro s is to brino· the defendant into court and
that, after hi app aran , jt i wholly unimportant and
ma)· b di r ar d, fall far . hort of ju tifying the rulinrr.
Jri .· app aran e i involuntary. Ile must come or risk everyt Ji in O'
th u tion of in uffici ncy of the process. If he
cl .· n t, a judg nt by d fault o·oes aO'ainst him, forever
J1r ]u jno- any ef n , be it a r 1 as , paym nt, fraud or
what n t, unl s h a hav it t a id for th d f ct in
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the process or some other error. It puts him under com-

pulsion from the moment of service. The court has laid

its powerful hand upon him and will render judgment

against him without a hearing if he does not bring to its

attention the defect in its process and ask to be discharged.

For the court to say, upon such compulsory appearance and

protest against jurisdiction, now that you are here, you

must stay, no matter how you were dragged in, is but bit-

ter mockery, utterly inconsistent with the principles of the

law, eulogized in these days of enlightenment for their

justice and fairness even in those periods in which society

was comparatively crude and barbarous.

To test the sufficiency of the summons, the appearance

must be special, of course, but it is not necessary in a court

of record to make the order, plea or motion expressly state

that the appearance is only for the purpose of excepting

to the jurisdiction. * * * Groves v. County Court, 42 W. Va.

587, seems to impliedly hold that if the record show that a
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defendant came into court without saying he came

for a special purpose, his ajDpearance is presumed and

taken to have been a general appearance, but the record

showed that the case, commenced by notice, had been dock-

eted and the cause removed to another court, on motion,

after appearance, and before any exception to the notice

was taken. Hence the record showed more than mere pres-

ence in court. Here the record as a whole negatives any

intent to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction. An immedi-

ate and direct attack was made upon the writ, and an ex-

ception to the action of the court in refusing to quash it put

upon the record. However it may be when the objection

is insufficiency of service, and defectiveness of the sum-

mons in a justice's court, the uniform holding by this court

has been that where the writ commencing an action in a

court of record is excepted to before any plea has been

tendered or continuance had, or other step taken, import-

ing a general appearance, the defendant is deemed not to

have waived or lost the benefit of his motion, if an exception

was taken and saved, although he afterward plead to the

merits and went to trial.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment must be re-
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the proce s or some other error. It puts him under compulsion from the moment of ervice. The court has laid
its powerful hand upon him and will render judgment
against him without a hearing if he doe not bring to its
attention the defect in its proces and ask to be di charged.
For the court to say, upon such compul ory appearance and
I rotest again t jurisdiction, now tba t you are here, you
must stay, no matter how ou were dragged in, i but bitter mockery, utterly incon istent with the principles of the
law, eulogize in th e da
of enlightenment for their
justice and fairne even in tho e periods in which society
was comparatively crude and barbarou .
* * * * * * * * * *
To test the suffi iency of the ummon , the appearance
must be special, of cour e, but it i not nece sary in a court
of record to make the order, plea or motion expre ly tate
that the appearance i only for the purpo e of xc I ting
to the jurisdiction. * * * Groves v. County Court, 42 W. Va.
587, eems to impliedly bold that if the record how that a
defendant came into court without saying he came
for a special purpose, his appearance is pre urned and
taken to have be€n a general appearance, but the record
:bowed that the ca e, commenced by notice, had been docketed and the ause removed to another court, on motion,
after appearanc , and before any exception to the notice
was taken. Hence the record bowed more than mere presence in court. Here the record as a whole negative any
intent to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction. An immediate and direct attack was made upon the writ, and an exception to the action of the court in refu ing to qua h it put
upon the record. Howe er it ma be when the obj ction
is in ufficiency of ervice and defectivene s of the ummon in a ju tice 's court, the uniform holding by thi court
has been that where the writ commencing an action in a
court of record i xcepted to before an p] a ha been
tender d or continuance had, or other tep taken importin()' a g neral app arance, the d f ndant i de m d not to
have waived or lo t th h nefit of hi motion, if an ex 1 ti on
was tak n and a ed, althou 0 h he afterward plead to the
merits and w nt to trial.
T

* * * * * * • * • •

For the for goinrr reasons, the judgment must be re-
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^•el•sed, the summons quashed and the action dismissed,

with costs both in this court and the court below.

Reversed.

Sanders, Judge, dissented in part.

CORBETT V. PHYSICIANS' CASUALTY

TRIAL PRACTICE
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Yersed, the summons quashed and the action dismissed,
\\.·ith costs both in this court and the court below.
Reversed.
SANDERS, JuDGE, dissented in part.

ASSOCIATION.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 1908,

135 Wisconsin, 505.

Action to recover on an accident insurance policy issued

on the mutual assessment plan. * * * The answer stated

three defenses, as follows, in effect: (1) The defendant is

a Nebraska corporation which has never complied with the

laws of this state authorizing service of process upon it by

serving ujDon the commissioner of insurance and the only

service made was of that character; (2) without waiving

CORBET'f V. PHYSICIANS' CASUALTY
ASSOCIATION.

the plea to the jurisdiction of the court the defendant shows

that it never qualified to do business in this state and, there-

fore, the making of the insurance contract was prohibited

Suprenie Court of Wisconsin.

1908.
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by sec. 1978, Stats. (1898), and is not enforceable in the

courts of this state; (3) without waiving any right under

135 Wisconsin, 505.

the foregoing, the allegations of the complaint as to the

assured being a member in good standing of the association

at the time he was injured are denied. * * *

The plea to the jurisdiction was tried first and over-

ruled. Defendant by its counsel excepted to the ruling. No

specific objection was made to then proceeding to a trial

upon the merits, which was done. * * *

Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, from

which this appeal was taken.

Marshall, J. At the threshold in the consideration of

this case is presented the question of whether a defendant

can challenge the jurisdiction of the court in which he is

f'ited to appear, upon the ground that the summons in the

action was not efficiently served, and failing in that can

submit to a trial upon the merits and in case of an adverse

Action to recover on an accident insurance policy issued
on the mutual as essment plan. * * * The answer stated
three defenses, as follows, in effect: (1) The defendant is
a Nebraska corporation which has never complied with the
laws of this state authorizing service of process upon it by
erving upon the commissioner of insurance and the only
ervice made was of that character; (2) without waiving
tbe plea to the jurisdiction of the court the defendant show~
that it never qualified to do business in this state and, therefore, the making of the insurance contract was prohibited
by sec. 1978, Stats. (1898), and is not enforceable in the
courts of thi tate; ( 3) without waiving any right under
the foregoin()', the allegation of the complaint as to the
a ured being a member in good tanding of the as ociation
at the time he was injured are denied. * * *
The plea to the jurisdiction was tried first and overruled. Defendant by it oun 1 xcepted to the ruling. No
peci:fic objection wa made to then proceeding to a trial
ur n the merit , whi h wa don . * * *
udgment wa rendered in favor of the plaintiff, from
which thj pp a] wa tak n.
MAR. ALL, J. At the thr hold in the consideration of
hi. a is pr . ented th u tion of wheth r a defendant
hall n()'e the juri di tion of the court in which he i.
to app ar, upon th crround that the summons in th
a t] n was not fficient]y . rv d, and failincr in that can
.. bmi t t a trial upon the m rit and in ca of an ad er
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decision can, on appeal, have the benefit of the objection

made at the start. * * *

As we view the case we need not follow and endeavor to

answer counsel's argument in detail on the jurisdictional

question, because it is firmly settled in respondent's favor

by numerous decisions of this court. Loive v. Stringhmn,

14 Wis. 222 ; Grantier v. Rosecrance, 27 Wis 488 ; Blackivood

V. Jones, 27 Wis. 498; Anderson v. Cohurn, 27 Wis. 558; 3

Ins. Co. of N. A. V. Swineford, 28 Wis. 257; Alderson v.

White, 32 Wis. 308; Dikeman v. Struck, 76 Wis. 332, 45

N. W. 118. The following language by Dixon, C. J., in

Alderson v. White, supra, referred to by counsel for re-

spondent, is often quoted as an unmistakable indication of

the doctrine prevailing in this state :

"The party seeking to take advantage of want of juris-

diction in every such case, must object on that ground

alone, and keep out of court for every other purpose. If

he goes in for any purpose incompatible with the supposi-
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tion that the court has no power or jurisdiction on account

of defective service of process upon him, he goes in and

submits for all the purposes of personal jurisdiction with

respect to himself, and cannot afterwards be heard to make

the objection. It is a general appearance on his part,

equivalent in its effect to proof of due personal service of

process."

It will be thus seen that the right to proceed to a trial

on the merits after a decision against the defendant on the

jurisdictional question, efficiently saving an objection to

the ruling in that regard, is not recognized as having any

place in our practice. The quoted language was only a

reiteration, in effect, of what was said in Loive v. String-

ham, supra. There the doctrine which has from the start

prevailed here, was thus plainly stated in these words:

"We think it is also a waiver of such a defect for the

party, after making his objection, to plead and go to trial

on the merits. To allow him to do this, would be to give

him this advantage. After objecting that he was not prop-

erly in court, he could go in, take his chance of a trial on

the merits, and if it resulted in his favor, insist upon the

judgment as good for his benefit, but if it resulted against

him, he could set it all aside upon the ground that he had

never been properly got into court at all. If a party

APPEARANCE
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decision can, on appeal, have the benefit of the objection
made at the start. * * *
As we iew the case we need not follow and endea or t 11
answer counsel's argument in detail on the juri di tiona I
que ti on, because it is firmly settled in respondent' favor
by numerous decisions of this court. Lowe v. Stringham )
14 Wi . 222; Grantier v. Rosecrance, 27 Wis 488; Blackwood
v. Jones, 27 Wi. 498; Anderson v. Coburn, 27 Wi. 558; . .
Ins . Co. of N. A. v. Swineford, 28 Wis. 257; Alderson v.
White, 32 Wis. 308; Dikeman v. Struck, 76 Wis. 332, 45
N. W . 118. The following language by Dixon, C. J., in
Alderson v. White, supra, referred to by counsel for respondent, is often quoted as an unmistakable indication of
the doctrine prevailing in this state :
''The party eeking to take advantage of want of juri ·diction in every such case, must object on that grounfl
alone, and keep out of court for every other purpose. If
he goes in for any purpose incompatible with the suppo ition that the court has no power or jurisdiction on account
of defective ervice of process upon him, he goes in and
ubmits for all the purposes of personal juri diction with
respect to himself, and cannot afterwards be heard to mak
the objection. It is a general appearance on his part.
equivalent in its effect to proof of due personal service of
process.''
It will be thus seen that the right to proceed to a trial
on the merits after a decision against the defendant on th
jurisdictional question, efficiently saving an objection to
the ruling in that regard, is not recognized as having any
lace in our practice. The quoted language was only a
reiteration, in effect, of what was said in Lowe v. Stringham,, upra. There the doctrine which has from the start
prevailed here, was thus plainly stated in these word :
"We think it i also a waiver of such a def ct for the
arty after making his objection, to plead and go to trial
on the merits. To allow him to do thi , would be to gi
hi thi ad anta · . After o jecting that he wa not properly in court be could 0'0 in, take his chance of a trial on
the merit , and if it re ulted in hi favor, insist upon th
jud ment a good for hi benefit but if it re ulted against
him, he could set it all a ide upon the ground that he had
never been properly got into court at all. If a party
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wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court,

he must keep out for all purposes except to make that

objection. ' '

We recognize that there are very respectable authorities

to the contrary of the foregoing, among which are the fol-

lowing : Harhness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476 ; Miner v. Francis,

3 N. D. 549, 58 N. W. 343; 2 Ency. PI. & Pr. 629, 630, and

note 1. However, it is believed that the great weight of

authority, or at least the better reasoning, is the other way.

These are but a few of the many cases that might be cited

in support of that : In re Clarke, 125 Cal. 388, 392, 58 Pac.

22; Manhard v. Scliott, 37 Mich. 234; Stevens v. Harris, 99

Mich. 230, 58 N. W. 230 ; Union Pac. R. Co. v. De Bush, 12

Colo. 294, 20 Pac. 752 ; Lord v. Hendrie S B. Mfg. Co., 13

Colo. 393, 22 Pac. 782 ; Ruhtj Chief M. S M. Co. v. Gurley,

17 Colo. 199, 29 Pac. 668; Stephens v. Bradley, 24 Fla. 201,

3 South. 415 ; Thayer v. Dove, 8 Blackf. 567 ; Kronshi v. Mo.

Pac. R. Co., 77 Mo. 362.
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By the Court — The judgment is affirmed.

Section 4. Withdrawal of Appearance.

ELDRED V. BANK.

Supreme Court of the United States. 1873,

17 Wallace, 545.

Error to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin.

* * * The Michigan Insurance Bank, on the 14th of Au-

gust, 1861, sued Anson Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and Uri

[Chap. 3
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wishes to insist upon the objection that be is not in court,
he must keep out for all purposes except to make that
objection.''
We recognize that there are very respectable authorities
to the contrary of the foregoing, among which are the following: Harkness v. Hyd e, 98 U. S. 476; Miner v. Francis,
3 N. D. 549, 58 N. W. 343; 2 Ency. PL & Pr. 629, 630, anrl
note 1. However, it is believed that the great weight of.
authority, or at least the better reasoning, is the other way .
These are but a few of the many cases that might be cited
in support of that: In re Clarke, 125 Cal. 388, 392, 58 Pac.
22; Manhard v. Schott, 37 Mich. 234; Stevens v. Harris, 99
Mich. 230, 58 N. W. 230; Union Pac. R. Co. v. De Busk, 12
Colo. 294, 20 Pac. 752; Lord v. H endrie & B. Mfg. Co., 13
Colo. 393, 22 Pac. 782; R1"by Chief 1YI. & M. Co. v. Gurley,
17 Colo. 199, 29 Pac. 668; Stephens v. Bradley, 24 Fla. 201,
3 South. 415; Thay er v. Dove, 8 Blackf. 567; Kronski v. Mo.
Pac. R. Co., 77 Mo. 362.

* * * * * * * * * •

Balcom, trading as Eldreds & Balcom, in the court of

Wayne County, Michigan, as indorsers on a .promissory

By the Court-The judgment is affirmed.

note for $4,000. * * * Publication-notice under the laws of

Michigan was given. * * * The defendant, Anson Eldred,

filed a plea of non-assumpsit, with notice of set-off, De-

cember 27th, 1861, and demanded a trial.

On the 22nd of April, 1862, as the record of the case

SECTION

4.

WITHDRAWAL OF APPEAR•A NCE.

ELDRED V.

BANE~.

Supreme Court of the United States.

1873.

17 Wallace, 545.

Error to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Wiscon in.
* * * The Mi higan In uran Bank, on the 14th of Aurust, 1861, sued Anson Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and Uri
alcom, trading a -1 ldreds & Balcom, in the court of
Wayn
nty, Michi()' n, a indor ers on a promissory
n t f r $4,000. * * * Publi ation-notice und r the laws of
.\1i higan wa giv n. * * * Th defendant, Anson Eldred,
fil
a 1 a f non-as um1 it, with notice of set-off, De1· 'illlJ r 27th, 18
, and m n
a trial.
f A pr1 I, 1 62, a th record of the ca ~ c
n th .... 2n

ec. 4]
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stated, the cause came on to be heard, and the plea of the

defendants theretofore pleaded by them was withdrawn,

and the default of Elislia Eldred and Uri Balcom entered,

and on the 10th day of May the said default was made ab-

solute. On the 13th of May, the record continues :

"The plea of the defendant, Anson Eldred, heretofore

pleaded by him, having been withdrawn, and the default

of the defendants, Elisha Eldred and Uri Balcom, having

been duly entered, * * * therefor, it is considered that said

plaintiffs do recover against said defendants their damages

aforesaid, together with their costs aforesaid to be taxed,

and that said plaintiff have execution therefor."

In this state of things the bank brought this, the present

suit, in the court below, on the same note against the same

Anson Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and Uri Balcom. * * * Ansov

Eldred, who alone was served or appeared, pleaded the

general issue; and the case came on for trial. * * * The

defendant * * * then oft'ered in evidence the record of the
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above mentioned suit on the same note in the Wayne

County Court :

1st. * * *

2nd. As being a bar to recovery on this note in suit.

**********

Judgment having gone accordingly for the bank, Anson

Eldred brought the case here on error; the error assigned

being the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that the

judgment was a bar,

******##**

Mr. Justice Miller delivered the. opinion of the court.

It is argued by the counsel of the defendant in error that

the withdrawal of the plea of Anson Eldred left the case

as to him as though he had never filed the plea, and that

never having been served with process he was not liable to

the personal judgment of the court.

We do not agree to this proposition. The filing of the

plea was both an appearance and a defense. The case stood

for the time between one term and another with an appear-

ance and a plea. The withdrawal of the plea could not

have the effect of withdrawing the appearance of the de-

fendant, and requiring the plaintiff to take steps to bring

that defendant again within the jurisdiction of the court.

Having withdrawn that plea he was in a condition to de-
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·tated, the cause came on to be heard, and the plea of the
defendants theretofore pleaded by th m was withdrawn,
and the default of Elisha Eldred and ri Balcom entered,
and on the 10th day of May the said default was made abolute. On the 13th of May, the record continues:
"The plea of the def ndant, Anson Eldred, heretoforP.
pleaded by him, having been withdrawn, and the defaulL
of the defendants, Elisha Eldred and Uri Balcom, having
been duly entered, * * * therefor, it is consider d that said
plaintiffs do recover against said defendants their damages
aforesaid, together with their co ts aforesaid to be taxed,
and that said plaintiff have execution therefor."
In this state of thing the bank brought this, the pre ent
suit, in the court below, on the same note again t the same
Anson Eldred, Eli ha Eldred, and Uri Balcom. * * * Anso11
Eldred, who alone was erved or appeared, pleaded th
general issue; and the case came on for trial. * * * Th
defendant * * * then off red in evidence the record of the
above mentioned suit on the same note in the Wayne
ounty Court:
1st. * * *
2nd. As being a bar to recover; on this note in suit.
* * * * * * * * * *
Judgment haYing gone accordingly for the bank, Anson
Eldred brought the ca e here on error; the error assigned
being the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that the
judgment was a bar.
* * * * * * * • * *
Mr. JusTICE MILLER deli red the. opinion of the court.
It is argued by the coun el of the defendant in error that
the withdrawal of the plea of Anson Eldred left the case
as to him as though he had ne er filed the plea, and that
never having been i·v d with proce s he wa not liable to
the personal judgm nt of the court.
We do not agree to this propo ition. The filing of the
plea was both an a pearance and a defen e. The case stood
for the time between one term and another with an appearance and a plea. The withdrawal of the plea could not
have the effect of withdrawino· the ap earance of the def ndant, and requirin()' the laintiff to take ter s to bring
hat d fendant again within the juri diction of t e court.
Having withdrawn that pl a he wa in a condition to de·

144
144 Trial Pbactice [Claap. 3

mur, to move to dismiss the suit if any reason for that

could be found, or to file a new and different plea if he

chose, either with the other defendants jointly, or for him-

self. He was not, by the withdrawal of the plea, out of

court. Such a doctrine would be very mischievous in cases

where, as it is very often, the first and only evidence of

the appearance of a party is the filing of his plea, answer,

or demurrer. The case might rest on this for a long period

before it was ready for trial, when, if the party could obtain

leave of the court to withdraw his plea (a leave generally

granted without objection), he could thereby withdraw his

appearance, the plaintiff is left to begin de novo.

We are of opinion that the record of the suit in Michigan

shows a valid personal judgment against Anson Eldred,

and that that judgment was a bar to recovery in the present

suit.

Judgment reversed, but without costs to either party in

this court, and a new trial granted in the Circuit Court.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

INSUEANCE TRUST AND AGENCY V. FAILING.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1903,

66 Ka7isas, 336.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Johnston, C.

T.*****

mur, to move to dismiss the suit if any reason for that
could be found, or to file a new and different plea if he
chose, either with the other defendants jointly, or for himself. He was not, by the withdrawal of the plea, out of
court. Such a doctrine would be very mischievous in cases
where, as it is very often, the first and only evidence of
the appearance of a party is the filing of his plea, answer,
or demurrer. The case might rest on this for a long period
before it was ready for trial, when, if the party could obtain
leave of the court to withdraw his plea (a leave generally
granted without objection), he could thereby withdraw his
appearance, the plaintiff is left to begin de nova.
We are of opinion that the record of the suit in Michigan
shows a valid personal judgment against Anson Eldred,
and that that judgment was a bar to recovery in the present
suit.

• • • • • • • * • *

On April 3, 1900, the defendants appeared by their at-

torney and filed separate demurrers, in each of which the

following grounds were stated:

*'l. That the court had no jurisdiction of the person of

[Chap. 3
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Judgment reversed, but without costs to either party in
this court, and a new trial granted in the Circuit Court.

the defendant or the subject of this action.

"2. That there is a defect of parties defendant.

**3. That several causes of action are improperly joined

and

''4, That the petition does not state facts sufficient to

constitute a cause of action."

On June 29, 1900, the defendants, without notice to the

INSURANCE TRUST AND AGENCY V. FAILING.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
66

1903.

Kansas, 336.

The opinion of the court was delivered by JoHNSToN, C.

J.: * * * * *
On April 3, 1900, the defendants appeared by their attorney and fil d separate demurrers, in each of which the
following Tounds were stated:
'' 1. That the court had no juri diction of the person of
the d fendant or the subject of this action.
'' .;.;. Tb at th re i a d feet of partie defendant.
That veral caus s of action are improperly joined
"
and
'' 4. That the petition does not state facts sufficient to
con ti tut a cause of action.''
On June 29, 1 00, the defendants, without notice to the

Sec. 4]
Sec. 4] Appearance 145

plaintiff, orally asked and obtained leave to withdraw the

demurrers and appearances previously filed. * * *

* * * Was jurisdiction lost by the attempted withdrawal

of the demurrers and appearances several months after-

ward? We think not. The code (<^67; Gen. Stat. 1901,

<^4497) declares that "the voluntary appearance of a de-

fendant is equivalent to service." Will it be contended

that a defendant served with summons, who has tired of

the litigation, can withdraw from the case and the juris-

diction of the court at will? Where a defendant pleads

and makes a general appearance, he waives the service

of summons and any defect that there may be in the pro-

cess, and is in court as fully and effectually as though per-

sonal service had been made on him. A submission to the

jurisdiction of the court, whether coerced by process or

voluntary as in this case, cannot be retracted or withdrawn

to the prejudice of the plaintiff. To allow a withdrawal

which would divest the court of jurisdiction obtained by a
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general appearance would be a great injustice to a plaintiff

who had relied on the appearance of a non-resident defend-

ant until the time and opportunities to obtain service other-

wise had passed. The court may permit a withdrawal, or

rather set aside an appearance made without authority, or

procured by fraud, but under a code provision making a

general appearance co-equal with service, the court has no

more right to permit a withdrawal of such appearance con-

ferring jurisdiction, than it would have to set aside service

of a summons regularly made. Here there was no claim of

fraud, or of misapprehension, as the appearance was made

by counsel who was shown to have full authority to repre-

sent the defendants. The action of the court in permitting

a withdrawal of appearance was unwarranted.

**********

Reversed.

T. p.— 10

145

APPEARANCE

plaintiff, orally asked and obtained leave to withdraw the
demurrers and appearances previously fil ed. * * *
* * * Was juri diction lost by the attempted withdrawal
of the demurrers and appearances several months afterward
We think not. The code ( §67; Gen. Stat. 1901,
§4497) declares that "the voluntary appearance of a defendant i equivalent to service." Will it be contended
that a defendant served with summons, who has tired of
the litigation, can withdraw from the case and the jurisdiction of the court at will? Where a defendant pleads
and makes a general appearance, he waives the service
of summons and any defect that there may be in the process, and is in court as fully and effectually as though personal service had been made on him. A submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, whether coerced by process or
voluntary as in this case, cannot be retracted or withdrawn
to the prejudice of the plaintiff. To allow a withdrawal
which would divest the court of jurisdiction obtained by a
~eneral appearance would be a great injustice to a plaintiff
who had relied on the appearance of a non-resident defendant until the time and opportunities to obtain service otherwi e had passed. The court may permit a withdrawal, or
rather et aside an appearance made without authority, or
procured by fraud, but under a code provi ion making a
~eneral appearance co-equal with service, the court has no
more right to permit a withdrawal of such appearance conf errin juri diction, than it would have to set aside service
of a summons regularly made. Here there was no claim of
fraud, or of mi apprehension, as the appearance was made
by coun el who was shown to have full authority to repreent the defendants. The action of the court in permitting
a withdrawal of appearance was unwarranted.

....... ..
~

Reversed.
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Section 5. Authority of Attorney to Appear.

HAMILTON V. WRIGHT.

SECTION 5.

AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEY TO APPEAR.

Court of Appeals of New York. 1868.

37 Nerv York, 502.

HAMILTON V. WRIGHT.

This was an action of ejectment, brought in the name

of the appellants [Hamilton and Livingston] and one Glea-

son, to recover possession of certain lands in the town of

Court of Appeals of New York.

1868.

Shandaken, Ulster county. * * * Judgment in favor of the

defendant for his costs, was rendered against all of the

37

New York, 502.

jolaintiffs, and was affirmed on appeal to the General Term.

Hamilton and Livingston moved at the Poughkeepsie

Special Term that the judgment against them be vacated,

or, in case Gleason failed to pay the costs, that William

Lounsbury, plaintitfs' attorney, should pay the judgment,

upon the ground that the use of their names as plaintiffs

was unauthorized and unknown to them. The special Term

denied the motion with costs. From this order denying

the motion, Hamilton and Livingston appealed to the Gen-
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eral Term, where the order was modified, directing that

the judgment be in the first instance collected, if collecti-

ble, of W. S. Gleason, their co-plaintiff, who caused the

action to be brought, and that the question of the liability

of plaintiffs' attorney to Hamilton and Livingston, in

case they are to pay the judgment, be left open : neither of

the parties to have costs, as against the other, upon such

appeal. From this last order, Plamilton and Livingston

appealed to this court.

Woodruff, J. The general rule, that an appearance by

attorney, whether for the plaintiff or the defendant, if

there be no collusion, may be recognized by the adverse

party as authentic and valid, I deem important to the safe

administration of justice, and well founded in the scheme

and plan of such administration in England and this coun-

try ever since such officers were commissioned to repre-

sent litigants in the courts.

Receiving their authority from the court, they are

deemed its officers. Their commissions declare them entitled

to confidence, and, in a just sense, their license is an assur-

Thi was an action of ejectment, brought in the name
of the appellants [Hamilton and Livingston] and one Gleason, to recover possession of certain lands in the town of
Shandaken, 1Dster county.* **Judgment in favor of the
defendant for his costs, was rendered against all of the
plaintiffs, and was affirmed on appeal to the General Term.
Hamilton and Livingston moved at the Poughkeepsie
Special Term that the judgment against them be vacated,
or, in case Gleason failed to pay the costs, that William
Lounsbury, plaintiffs' attorney, should pay the judgment,
upon the ground that the use of their names as plaintiffs
was unauthorized and unknown to them. The special Term
denied the motion· with costs. From this order denying
the motion, Hamilton and Livingston appealed to the General Term, where the order was modified, directing that
the judgment be in the first instance collected, if collectible, of W. S. Gleason, their co-plaintiff, who caused the
action to be brought, and that the question of the liability
of plaintiffs' attorney to :Hamilton and Livingston, in
ca e they are to pay the judgment, be left open: neither of
the parties to have costs, as against the other, upon such
appeal. From this last order, Hamilton and Livingston
app aled to this court.
WoonRUFF, J. The general rule, that an appearance by
9-ttorney, whether for the plaintiff or the defendant, if
th r b no collu ion, may be recognized by the adverse
party as authentic and valid, I deem important to the saf
admini tration of ju tice, and w 11 founded in the scheme
nd lan f uch dmini tration in England and this coun·
tr
v r ·i
su h fficers were commi sioned to repret Jiti ants in the ourts.
R ivinO' th ir authority from the court, they are
mNl jt, ffi er . . Th ir comr i si ns declare them entitled
t
n.fi
, and, in a ju. t s n e, their lie ns is an assur-
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ance, not only of their competency, but of their character

and title to confidence.

The direct control of the courts over them as officers, by

way of summary discipline and punislunent to compel the

performance of their duty, or to suspend or degrade them,

is retained and exercised as a guaranty of their fidelity. It

is no denial of the rule that, where there are special cir-

cumstances calling for its relaxation, the courts may and

do relieve from its rigid application. The exception aris-

ing from such special circumstances strengthens, as well

as recognizes the rule itself.

Hence, when an appearance is entered by an attorney

without authority, the inquiry, whether such attorney is

of sufficient responsibility to answer for his unauthorized

conduct to the party injured thereby, is entertained. And

it may be proper always to inquire, whether the injury

to the party is irremediable unless such appearance be set

aside, and the i3roceedings founded thereon vacated.
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In exercise of their general equitable control over their

own judgments, the < -t may and should consider whether

they can relieve the party for whom an unauthorized ap-

pearance is made, without undue prejudice to the party,

who has in good faith relied upon such appearance and the

official character of the attorney who appears.

But it would be at variance with the scheme and plan

upon which we universally administer the law, if a de-

fendant could be prosecuted by a responsible attorney, in

full authority to practice in our courts, and after having

successfully and in good faith defended, as the case might

be, through all the tribunals of justice, and to final judg-

ment in the court of last resort, be required to submit to an

order setting aside the proceedings, and be left to be again

prosecuted for the same cause of action, on the mere

ground that the plaintiff's attorney had no authority from

the plaintiff to bring the action. The law which gives to at-

torneys their commissions, must be deemed to guarantee

to defendants protection against such a result. And, at the

same time, the rule should jaeld to equitable considerations,

where they arise, and should permit the courts to give

relief when they can thereby prevent irremediable wrong

to either party.

And if it be asked, why should the party for whom he

APPEARANCE
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ance, not only of their competency, but of their character
and title to confidence.
The direct control of the courts over them as officers, by
wa ' of ummary di ci lin and punishment to compel the
performanc of their duty, or to u pend or degrade them,
is retain d and exercised a a guaranty of their fidelity. It
i no denial of the rule that, where there are special circum tance calling for its relaxation, the courts may and
<lo relieve from its rigid applicp,tion. The exception arising from u h special circumstances strengthens, as well
a recognize the rule itself.
Hence, when an appearance is entered by an attorney
without authority, the inquiry, whether uch attorney is
of ufficient re ponsibility to an wer for his unauthorized
onduct to the party injured thereby, i entertained. And
it may be pro1 er alway to inquire, whether the injury
to the party i irremediable unless such appearance be set
a.·ide, and the proceedings founded thereon vacated.
In exerci e of their general equitable control over their
own judgments, the 1 :·t may and hould consider whether
they can relieve th lJ..trty for whom an unauthorized appearance i made, without undue prejudice to the part;,
who has in good faith relied upon such appearance and the
official character of the attorney who appears.
But it would be at variance with the cheme and plan
upon which we universally administer the law, if a defendant could be pro ecuted by a responsible attorney, in
full authority to practice in our courts, and after havin()'
.·uccessfully and in good faith defended, as the case might
be, through all the tribunal of ju tice, and to final judgment in the court of la t re ort, be required to ubmit to an
rder setting a ide the proceedings, and be left to be again
prosecuted for the ame cau e of action, on the mere
ground that the plaintiff's attorney had no authority from
the plaintiff to bring the action. The law which gives to attorneys their commi ion , mu t be deemed to guarantee
to def ndant protection a ·ain t u h a re ult. And, at the
. ame tim , th rule hould i ld to equitabl consideration ,
where they arise, and hould permit the courts to gjve
relief when they can there y prevent irremediable wrong
to either arty.
An if it be a ked, wh~ hould the party for whom he
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appears be left to seek his remedy against the attorney? —

why should not the party who has been subjected to an un-

authorized litigation pursue that remedy, rather than cast

that hazard and burden on one who has done nothing to

deserve it? — the answer lies in the suggestion already

made, that the law warrants a party in giving faith and

confidence to one who, by law, is authorized to hold himself

out as a public officer, clothed with power to represent

others in the courts. And besides this, the consequences of

the contrary rule would often be altogether disastrous.

Evidence would be lost; witnesses die; the statute of limita-

tions bar claims; and death of parties themselves might

often happen. In various ways, to set aside proceedings at

the end of a protracted litigation would be to work inevit-

able wrong to the party who had relied upon an appear-

ance.

It may be said that proof of the authority of the attor-

ney to appear and prosecute should be demanded, if the
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party would be safe. If such demand could in all cases be

insisted upon, it would be only one step toward safety. It

might often be practically, ineffectual. Ex parte evidence

of authority might be produced, and yet, if the party might

afterward impeach it, the question would again arise, in

all its force. Besides, it is not the practice to require at-

torneys to produce their authority, except in special cases.

No doubt there is power in the courts to order it: it has

sometimes been done. {Ninety-nine Plaintiffs v. Vanderhilt,

4 Duer, 632.)

When, pending a litigation, the authority of the attorney

to appear is denied, and application is made in due season,

the court, if probable cause appears, would, in general,

protect the party applying. Still, the general rule remains,

that a retainer will be presumed; and the adverse party,

having no notice or ground of suspicion, may act on that

presumption. (3 Merivale, 12; 2 Mylne & Keen, 1; 1 Ves.

196; 6 Johns. 297; 9 Paige, 496.) And in general where

there are no circumstances of suspicion, of facts indicating

fraud, and no evidence of bad character discrediting the

appearance, the courts do not require a respectable and

responsible attorney to exhibit his authority to appear.

(6 Johns. 34; 5 Duer, 643.)

It is, however, suggested, that, as in ejectment, the
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appears be left to seek his remedy against the attorney~
why should not the party who has been subjected to an unauthorized litigation pursue that remedy, rather than cast
that hazard and hurden on one who has done nothing to
deserve it~- the answer lies in the suggestion already
made, that the law warrants a party in giving faith and
confidence to one who, by law, is authorized to hold himself
out as a public officer, clothed with power to represent
others in the courts. And besides this, the consequences of
the contrary rule would often be altogether disastrous.
Evidence would be lost; witnesses die; the statute of limitations bar claims; and death of parties themselves might
often happen. In various ways, to set aside proceedings at
the end of a protracted litigation would be to work inevitable wrong to the party who had relied upon an appearance.
It may be said that proof of the authority of the attorney to a pp ear and prosecute should be demanded, if the
party would be safe. If such demand could in all cases be
insisted upon, it would be only one step toward safety. It
might often be practically .ineffectual. Ex parte evidence
of authority might be produced, and yet, if the party might
afterward impeach it, the question would again arise, in
all its force. Besides, it is not the practice to require attorneys to produce their authority, except in special cases.
No doubt there is power in the courts to order it: it has
sometimes been done. (Ninety-nine Plaintiffs v. Vanderbilt,
-t. Du r, 632.)
When, pending a litigation, the authority of the attorney
to appear is denied, and application is made in due season,
the court, if probable cause appears, would, in general,
pr tect the I arty a1 plying. Still, the general rule remains,
that a r tain r will be presumed; and the adverse party,
havjncr no notice or ground of suspicion, may act on that
l r umption. ( 3 Merivale, 12; 2 Mylne & Keen, 1; 1 Ve .
J96 ; 6 Johns. 297; 9 Paige, 496.) And in g neral where
h re are no circumstances of suspicion, of fact indicating
fr ud, and no evidence of bad character discrediting the
a
arance, the courts do not require a respectable and
r . pon i le attorney to exh ibit his authority to appear.
(6 Johns. 34; 5 Duer, 643.)
It is, howev r, sugo-ested, that, as in ejectment, the
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defendant is authorized by statute to require the attorney

for the plaintiff to produce his authority (2 R. S. 306), this

action should be deemed an exception to the general rule,

and it be held that the defendant's own laches have caused

his misfortune, if it afterward appear that the plaintiff did

not authorize the suit. But it is obvious that the statute

itself does not furnish complete protection. It only makes

the production of apparent written authority, sustained by

affidavit, presumptive evidence. And if the authority do

not actually exist, the same question will arise in ejectment

as in other actions : How far is the plaintiff bound by the

appearance of an attorney for him! And, as respects an

appearance for a defendant, the statute makes no provision.

I do not think, therefore, that the omission of the defend-

ant to demand the production of authority, where he has

nothing to put him on his guard, awaken his suspicion, or

to lead him to distrust the good faith of the attorney who

prosecutes the action, should affect his right to insist upon
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his judgment, when it is not claimed that the attorney is

not of full and sufficient responsibility to answer to the

plaintiff for any costs or other damage he may have sus-

tained.

Judgment affirmed.

DANVILLE, HAZLETON AND WILKES-BARRE

RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT, V. RHODES.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 1897.

180 Pennsylvania State, 157,

Appeal by plaintiff from order striking off warrant of

attorney.

David C, Harrington, for appellant.

George L, Crawford, for appellee.

Opinion of Mr. Justice Williams : — On the seventh day of

June, 1892, D. C. Harrington, Esq., an attorney at law reg-

ularly admitted to practice in the courts of Philadelphia
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<l f ndant i authorized by tatute to require the attorney
for the plaintiff to produce hi authority ( 2 R. . 306), this
action hould be deem d an exception to the general rule,
and it be held that th def ndant' own laches have caused
hi mi fortune, if it afterward appear that the plaintiff did
not authorize the uit. But it i obvious that the tatute
it elf doe not furni h complete protection. It only makes
the production of apparent written authority, u tained by
c. ffidavit, pre umpti' e eviden e. And if the authority do
not actually exist, the same question will ari e in ejectment
as in other action : How far i the plaintiff bound by the
appearance of an attorn y for him. And, a respect an
appearance for a defen .ant, the statute makes no pro vi ion.
I do not think, the ref ore that the omis ion of the defendant to demand the I roduction of authorit. , where he bas
nothing to put him n bi guard, awaken hi suspicion, or
to lead him to di tru t the good faith of the attorney who
pro cute the action, hould affect hi right to insi t upon
his judgment, when it i not claimed that the attorney is
not of full and uffi ient responsibility to answer to the
plaintiff for any co ts or other damage he may have sustained.

* * * * * * * * * *
Judg ment affinned.

DANVILLE
HAZLETON AND WILKES-BARRE
RAILROAD COMP ANY, APPELLANT, V. RHODES.

Supreme Coitrt of Pennsylvania. 1897.
180 Pennsylvania State, 157.

Appeal by plaintiff fr om order striking off warrant of
attorney.
David C. Harrington, for appellant.
eorge L. rawford for appellee.
Opinion of Mr. Justice WILLIAMS :-On the seventh day of
June, 18 -, D. C. Harrino·ton, Esq., an attorney at law regularly ad~itted to practice in the courts of Philadelphia
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filed tlie bill in equity in this case as the attorney of the

plaintiff.

On the eighteenth day of the same month a rule was

entered in the minutes by the prothonotary, on the direction

of Crawford & Laughlin, attorneys for Rhodes et al. and

the D. H. and W. Eailroad Co., requiring D. C. Harrington

to file his warrant of attorney. No affidavit or statement of

facts tending to throw doubt upon his authority was filed

and no application whatever was made to the court of

which Harrington was a sworn officer. On the twenty-fifth

of the same month Harrington filed a warrant of attorney

in due form executed by the corporation under its seal.

This was a compliance with the rule and it should regu-

larly have been discharged. The court however without

any formal disposition of the warrant of attorney, and

without even a suggestion on the record that it was not

what it purported to be, granted a rule on Harrington to

show cause why the warrant should not be struck from the
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records. This rule it subsequently made absolute and the

w^arrant was struck off. For what reason this rule was

granted, or for what reason it was made absolute, it is im-

possible to tell so far as the records in this case are con-

cerned. Having thus disposed of the attorney of the plain-

tiff, a rule was at once granted requiring the plaintiff" to

show cause why the bill should not be struck from the

records. This was soon after made absolute. The cause

was sent out of court, after the attorney, in a novel and

peremptory manner. The record shows no reason what-

ever, given by Messrs. Crawford & Laughlin, for asking

either of these rules, and none given by the court below for

making them absolute. We know of no authority for such

a practice. It is elementary law that an attorney is an

officer of the court in whicli he is admitted to practice. His

admission and license to practice raise a presumption

])rima facie in favor of his right to appear for any person

whom he undertakes to represent. When his authority to

do so is questioned or denied the burden of overcoming

this presumption in his favor rests on liim who questions

or denies his authority, and such person must show by affi-

davit the existence of facts tending to overcome tlie pre-

sumption before lie can be called upon to file his warrant

of attorney: Weeks on Attorneys at T^aw, 387 to 400.
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filed the bill in equity in this case as the attorney of the
plaintiff.
On the eighteenth day of tbe same month a rule was
entered in the minutes by tbe prothonotary, on the direction
of Crawford &. Laughlin, attorneys for Rhodes et al. and
the D. H. and W. Railroad Co., requiring D. C. Harrington
to file his warrant of attorney. No affidavit or statement of
facts tending to throw doubt upon his authority was :filed
and no application whatever was made to the court of
which Harrington was a sworn officer. On the twenty-fifth
of the same month Harrington filed a warrant of attorney
in due form executed by the corporation under its seal.
This was a compliance with the rule and it should regularly have been discharged.
The court however without
any formal disposition of the warrant of attorney, and
without even a suggestion on the record that it was not
what it purported to be, granted a rule on Harrington to
how cause why the warrant should not be struck from the
records. This rule it subsequently made absolute and th
warrant was struck off. For what reason this rule wa.
granted, or for what reason it wa made absolute, it is impossible to tell so far as the records in this case are concerned. Having thus disposed of the attorney of the plaintiff, a rule was at once granted requiring the plaintiff t o
how cause why the bill should not be struck from th e
records. This was soon after made absolute. The caus
was sent out of court, after the attorney, in a novel and
peremptory manner. The record shows no reason whatever, given by Messrs. Crawford & Laughlin, for asking
ither of these rule , and none given by the court below for
making them absolute. 'lV e know of no authority for such
a practice. It i elementary law that an attorney is an
ffi er of the court in whi h he is admitted to practice. Hi
a mi ion and lie n e to practice rai e ·a presumption
prima facie in favor of hi ri<Yht to appear for any person
whom h undertakes to r pre nt. Wh n hi authority to
o i que tion d or d ni d the burd n of overcoming
thl. r ·umptjon in hi fa ror r . t. n him who questions
r
ni s hi. authority, an l n h p r son mu t how by afficlavit th
xi. t n of fa t . t nd]nl"'· to v r ome the pre.·11m 1 ti n l efor h an l
11 d u1 on to fil hi warrant
f att r y: \V J·, o A ttorn :~. <: t LFi w, 287 to 400.
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The established practice in this country and England is

to apply to the court by petition stating the facts relied

on to overcome the presumption and asking a rule upon

the attorney to file his warrant. When he has complied

with the rule by filing a warrant sufficient in form and in

the manner of its execution, the rule has been complied

with and is functus officio. If the warrant is alleged to be

defective, or forged, or in any manner insufficient to justify

the court in treating it as authority for the appearance of

the attorney, the defect should be pointed out by exceptions

and its sufficiency passed upon by the court. If the court

holds the warrant sufficient the case proceeds. If it is held

insufficient proceedings therein will be stayed or in a proper

case the suit may be dismissed. In Campbell v. Galhreath,

5 Watts, 423, Justice Kennedy discusses the practice to

some extent and says at page 430, that after it is ascer-

tained that the attorney for the plaintiff has no authority

to appear for him in the suit pending, the defendant may

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

proceed to have it dismissed. The same practice prevails

in the United States courts and in those of most of the

states. * * *

***

[Order affirmed on other grounds.]
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The established practice in this country and England iE
to apply to the court by petition stating the facts relied
on to overcome the presumption and asking a rule upon
the attorney to file his warrant. When he has complied
with the rule by filing a warrant sufficient in form and in
the manner of its execution, the rule has been complied
with and is functus officio. If the warrant is alleged to be
defective, or forged, or in any manner insufficient to justify
the court in treating it as authority for the appearance of
the attorney, the defect hould be pointe out by exception.
and its sufficiency pas ed upon by the court. If the court
holds the warrant sufficient the case proceeds. If it is held
insufficient proceedings therein will be stayed or in a proper
case the suit may be di missed. In Campbell v. Galbreath,
5 Watts, 423, Justice l{ennedy discusses the practice to
ome extent and . ays at page 430, that after it is ascertained that the attorney for the plaintiff has no authorit~
to appear for him in the suit pending, the defendant may
proceed to have it di mi sed. The same practice prevail
in the United States courts and in those of most of the
states. * * *

***
[Order affirmed on other grounds.]
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CHAPTER IV.

CONTINUANCE.

Section 1. Sueprise at the Tkiax,.

PITTSBURGH, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS

CHAPTER IV.

RAILWAY COMPANY V. GROM.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1911.

142 Kentucky, 51.

CONTINUANCE.

Opinion of the Court by Wm. Rogees Clay, Commis-

sioner — Affirming.

SECTION 1.

SURPRISE AT THE TRIAL.

Appellee, William Grom, brought this action against the

appellants, Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St, Louis

Railway Company and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to

recover damages in the sum of $1,999 for personal injuries,

PITTSBURGH, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS
RAILWAY COMPANY V. GROM.

alleged to have been due to the negligence of the railroad

companies while he was a passenger on their lines of rail-

road. The jury awarded him a verdict for the full amount

Court of Appeals of Kentiicky.

1911.

sued for, and the defendants have appealed.

The facts, briefly stated, are as follows : Appellee bought

142 Kentucky, 51.

a ticket from Louisville to Atlantic City and return. The
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accident occurred between Pittsburg and Altoona, in the

State of Pennsylvania. At the- time of the accident appel-

lee was sitting in the middle of the sixth seat from the

front end of the car. He was struck by some hard and

heavy substance over the left eye. The frontal bone was

fractured and his eye so seriously injured that the sight

thereof is permanent!}^ impaired. At the time of the acei

dent a freight train was passing. Just before and after

the injury, witnesses heard something rattling against the

side of the car. It sounded like a chain. Indentations

were found on the side of the car which looked as if they

had been made by an irregular object in the form of a chain.

One of the witnesses saw the passing shadow of the object

that struck appellee, and it looked like a chain. Immediate-

ly after the injury several persons searched the car, and

nothing was found therein which could have caused the

152

Opinion of the Court by WM. RoGERS CLAY, Commissioner-Affirming.
Appellee, William Grom, brought this action against the
appellants, Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis
Railway Company and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to
recover damages in the sum of $1,999 for personal injurie ,
alleged to have been due to the negligence of the railroad
companies while he was a passenger on their lines of railroad. The jury awarded him a verdict for the full amount
sued for, and the defendants have appealed.
The facts, briefly stated, are as follows: Appellee bought
a ticket from Louisville to Atlantic City and return. The
accident occurred between Pittsburg and Altoona, in the
State of Pennsylvania. At the-time of the accident appellee wa sittin<Y in the middle of the ixth seat from the
front nd of the car. He wa struck by some hard and
h a y ub tance over the left eye. The frontal bone wa
fractured and his y o riously injured that the sight
th reof i p rmanently impair d. At the time of the acci-d nt a freight train wa pa in<Y. Just before and aft r
th injury, witne. se b ard omething rattlin<Y against the
. id of th car. It sou,nd
like a chain. Indentations
w r f ind on tbe ide f the car whi h lo k d a if th ·:
ha b
m de by an irr gular obj tin tb e for of a chain.
n f th witn
aw th pa ino- h dow f the obj ct
that . tru k app 11 , and it looked like a hain. Immediat ly ft r th injury v ral p r n
ar h d the ar, an l
thin 0 wa f ou d th r in · hi h ould have caused the
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injury. Appellant's testimony was to the effect that on

the freight trains ordinarily used there are no chains in a

position to be swung out so as to strike or enter a train on

an adjacent track, and, even if there were such, they would

hang by the side of the car by reason of their own weight,

and would not swing out from the car by reason of the vel-

ocity of the train. The witnesses, however, had no knowl-

edge of the condition of the particular train in question

and they admit, on cross-examination, that there were num-

erous chains in and about freight cars.

**********

At the conclusion of the evidence for appellee, appel-

lants' senior counsel filed his affidavit and moved for a

CONTINUANCE

153

inJury. Appellant' te timony wa to the effect that on
the freight train ordinarily used there are no chains in a
position to be swung out so as to strike or enter a train on
an adjacent track, and, e en if there were such, they would
hang by the ide of the car by r a on of th ir own weight,
and would not wing out from the ar b reason of the velocity of the train. The witnesses, however, had no knowledge of the condition of the particular train in question
and they admit, on cross-examination, that there were numerous chains in and about freight cars.

continuance on the ground of surprise. In this affidavit

counsel stated, in substance, that he had had sole charge of

the defense of the action that was being tried; that there-

tofore he had made a most thorough investigation of

the facts of the case and had had submitted to him
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full reports made by the agents of appellants as to all

facts connected with the injur}-. He had never heard until

the day before the trial that any attempt would be made

to show that appellee was struck by a chain, when he was

then informed in a general waj^ by appellee's counsel that

he would show that fact. In all the investigations made

and in the reports submitted to him, it had never been sug-

gested that the accident could have happened in that way.

He was, therefore, taken completely by surprise, as were

the appellants, by the evidence introduced by appellee, and

he was not then prepared to rebut such evidence. He had

taken the deposition of the train conductor, but did not ask

him about a chain, because he had never heard it suggested

or thought it possible that a chain could have anything to

do with the accident. If allowed an opportunity to do so

he could and would procure testimony of witnesses — all

residing in the state of Pennsylvania — which would prove

(1) that there were no marks on the car on which appellee

was injured indicating that it had recently been struck

by anything; (2) that all the persons who were in the coach

and near appellee were asked by the conductor and brake-

man as to the cause of the accident, and none of them

could give any explanation of it, and none of them said

anything about hearing a chain or seeing a chain, and none

* * * * * * * * * *
At the conclu ion of the evidence for appellee, appellant ' senior coun el filed hi affidavit and moved for a
continuance on the ground of surpri e. In thi affidavit
coun el tated, in ubstance, that he had had sole charge of
the defen e of the action that wa being tried; that theretofore he had made a mo t thorough investigation of
the fact of the a e and had had ubmitted to him
full reports made by the agents of appellants as to all
facts connected with the injury. He had never heard until
the day before the trial that any attempt would be made
to show that appellee was truck b a chain, when he wa
then informed in a general wa b appellee s conn el that
he would how that fact. In all the in e tigations made
and in the report ubmitted to him, it had never been sugge ted that the accident could have happened in that way.
He was, therefore, taken com11 tel~ b urprise, a were
the appellants, b the e idence introduced b appellee, and
he wa not then prepared to rebut such evidence. He had
taken the depo ition of the train conductor, but did not a k
him about a chain, becau e he had ne er heard it ugge ted
or thought it po ible that a chain could have anything to
do with the accident. If allowed an opportunity to do so
he could and would pro ure te timon of witne es-all
re iding in the tat of P nn lvania-which would prove
(1) that there wer no mark on the car on which appellee
wa injur d in i atino· that it had recently been struck
by anythin ·; (2) that all th per on who were in the coa h
and near app 11 w r a k d b. the onductor and brakeman as to the cau e of the accident and none of them
ould give any explanation of it, and none of them aid
anything about hearing a chain or seeing a chain, and none
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of tliem suggested that a chain had anything to do with the

accident; (3) that at the time there were no chains npon

or attached to appellants' engine or cars, or forming any

part of the equipment thereof that were long enough to

reach into the window of a passenger coach on an ad-

jacent track and strike a passenger, as appellee was struck;

(4) that all chains connected with such equipment were,

however, short chains, and in the event of their breaking

they would drag on the ground, and could not swing out

in a horizontal position so as to come in contact with a train

on an adjacent track; that such a thing is a physical im-

possibility; (5) that "shortly after the accident to plain-

tiff the conductor caused telegraphic notice to be given of it

and instructions were immediately given to inspect all west-

bound freight trains that had met plaintitf 's train to see if

anything was attached to or projected from them that could

have caused the accident, and such investigation was made

and nothing found to explain the cause of the accident;"
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that these facts could be established by the testimony of

several witnesses (naming them) and could not be estab-

lished by any witnesses living in the State of Kentucky.

Did not anticipate, nor did the railroad companies antici-

pate, and no one could have reasonably anticipated, that

appellee would attempt to prove that his injuries were

caused in such an unusual or unheard-of manner as being

struck by a chain. If the railroad companies had known in

time that such proof would be offered, they could and would

have met it by showing facts to the contrary.

The foregoing affidavit was not filed until appellants'

motion for a peremptory instruction, at the conclusion of

appellee's evidence, had been overruled. Before asking for

a continuance on the ground of surprise, therefore, counsel

for appellants first took the chance of appellee's failing to

make out his case. Though apprised of the fact in a gen-

eral way on the day before the trial that appellee would

attempt to show that he was struck by a chain, he did not

ask for a continuance of the case when it was called for

trial. At the time of the trial the law of Pennsylvania was

in proof. Tounsel knew that under that law upon mere

proof of iii.iiiry, unaccompanied by any facts tending to

show a collision or a defect of cars, track, roadway, ma-

chinery or other negligence appellee could not recover,

TRIAL PRACTICE
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of them sugge ted that a chain had anything to do with the
accident; (3) that at the time there were no chains upon
or attached to appellants' engine or cars, or forming any
part of the equipment thereof that were long enough to
reach into the window of a passenger coach on an adjacent track and strike a passenger, as appellee was struck;
( 4) that all chains connected with such equipment were,
however, short chain , and in the event of their breaking
they would drag on the ground, an~ could not swing out
in a horizontal position so as to come in contact with a train
on an adjacent track; that such a thing is a physical impossibility; ( 5) that "shortly after the accident to plaintiff the conductor caused telegraphic notice to be given of it
and instructions were immediately given to inspect all westbound freight trains that had met plaintiff's train to see if
anything was attached to or projected from them that could
have caused the accident, and such investigation was made
and nothing found to explain the cause of the accident;''
that these facts could be established by the testimony of
everal witnesses (naming them) and could not be establi hed by any witnesses living in the State of Kentucky.
Did not anticipate, nor did the railroad companies anticipate, and no one could have reasonably anticipated, that
appellee would attempt to prove that his injuries were
caused in such an unusual or unheard-of manner as being
struck by a chain. If the railroad companies had known in
tjme that such proof would be offered, they could and would
have met it by showing facts to the contrary.
The foregoing affidavit was not :filed until appellants'
motion for a peremptory in truction, at the conclusion of
appellee' evidence, had be n overruleC.. Before asking for
a continuanc on the ground of surpri , therefore, counsel
for a pellants :fir t took the chance of appellee 's failing to
m k out his case. Though apprised of the fact in a genral way on the day before the trial tbat appellee would
a tt mpt to show that he was struck by a chain, he did not
, . k for a continuance of the case when it was called for
n l. At the time of the trial the law of Pennsylvania was
1n
r f.
ounsel knew that under that law upon mere
]ff
f f jn.J nry, unaccompani d by any facts tending to
.·h w a c llision or a d f ct of cars, tra k, roadway, mah1n ry or oth r n glio- nee appelle could not recover,

~ec.
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The deposition of the conductor showed that there was

absolutely nothing the matter with the train on which ap-

pellee was a passenger. A search was made to find whether

or not the object which had struck appellee was in the car,

and nothing was found. Knowing the law of Pennsylvania,

counsel should have anticipated that appellee would at-

tempt to prove facts tending to show negligence in the

operation or mechanical appliances of the passing train,

as appellee could not recover by merely showing that he

was injured by some object, without showing the source

from which it came. Furthermore, counsel admits in his

affidavit that immediately after the accident, the conductor

caused telegraphic notice of the fact to be given, and in-

structions were immediately sent out to inspect all west-

bound freight trains that had met the train on which

appellee was a passenger, to see if anything was attached

to, or projected from them that could have caused the acci-

dent and such investigation was made and nothing found
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to explain the cause of the accident. This being true, coun-

sel should have taken the depositions of witnesses ac-

quainted with such facts, and should not have gone into the

trial in the hope that appellee would fail to make out his

case, and, in the event that he did make out his case, ap-

pellants w^ould be granted a continuance and a further

opportunity to prove facts which they could have estab-

lished before the trial. We, therefore conclude that the

court did not err in failing to grant the continuance asked

for.

**********

Judgment affirmed.

PETERSON V. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1908,

211 Missouri, 498.

Lamm, J. — Peter L. Peterson sued for damages — his

cause of action the negligence of defendant's servants man-

Jiing one of its street cars in Kansas City, Missouri, on the

1]

CuN'llN

A
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The depo ition of the conductor showe<l that th re wa ·
ab olutely notlling the matter with the train n which appellee was a passenger. A earch was mad to find whether
or not the object which bad truck appelle was in the car,
and nothing was found. l{nowing the law of Penn ylvania,
counsel should have antici1 ated that appellee would attempt to prove facts tending to show n gligence in the
operation or mechanical appliances of the pas ing train,
as appellee could not recover by merely showing that he
was injured by some object, without showing the source
from which it came. Furthermore, coun el admits in his
affidavit that immediately after the accident, the conductor
caused telegraphic notice of the fact to be given, and instructions were immediately sent out to inspect all westbound freight trains that had met the train on which
appellee was a pa s nger, to ee if anything was attached
to, or projected .from them that could have caused the accident and such inve tigation wa made and nothing found
to explain the cause of the accident. This being true, counel hould have taken the deposition of witnesses acquainted with such facts, and should not have gone into the
trial in the hope that appellee would fail to make out hi
a , and, in the event that he did make out his case, appellants would be granted a continuance and a further
opportunity to prove facts which they could have established before the trial. We, therefore conclude that the
court did not err in failing to grant the continuance asked
for.

• • • * * * * * * *

Judgment affirmed.

PETERSON V. METROP LITAN STREET RAILWAY
OMPANY.
Supreme Court of J.1issotlri.
211 Ji i,

01t ri,

1908.

49 .

AMM, J.-Peter
u d for damaO'es-his
ran , of a tion th n o·li 0 • n of def n ant' er ant manJl 1ng on
of it tre t ar in Kan a
it3~ 11issouri, on the
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13th dsLj of December, 1902. Defendant appeals from a

judgment in favor of Peterson for $5,000. Here, his death

was suggested and proceedings had reviving the the cause

in the name of Henrietta, administratrix of his estate.

Did the court err in allowing amendments ; and err again

in refusing a continuance? We think not; because;

(a) The statutory right to amend a petition is not open

to discussion. The right of a court to permit a petition to

be amended is nothing more than plain, everyday, hard-

headed sense. The right to act with good sense may

(modestly) be assumed to be inherent in any court, and (it

is likely) would exist without written law. Counsel make

the point that plaintiff had no right to amend the petition

at the trial, but they give no reason or cite no authority.

All things, says Coke, are confirmed or impugned in one

of two ways — by reason or authority. The point should

not have been made; for the only possible question is one

of terms on which the amendment may go and that question
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is not raised.

(b) The principal proposition under this head is the

refusal to grant a continuance after amendment. It is

argued that prior to the amendments the petition stated no

cause of action because there was no averment that the car

had stopped to receive passengers who might undertake to

get on; that the amendments supplied that omission; that

after amendment the petition for the first time stated a

cause of action; and that amendments of that character,

made at the commencement of a trial, entitling the defend-

ant to a continuance as of course, much more should one

go in view of the application and affidavit filed in this in-

stance.

But we can agree neither to the premise, nor to the con-

clusion if the premise were true. The petition did state a

cause of action. It alleged that defendant's Main street

cars regularly stopped about ten feet north of Twelfth

for the purpose of permitting passengers to get on and off.

That plaintiff on the 13th day of December, 1902, attempted

to enter defendant's car at said point to take passage and

that, while in the act of doing so with his foot upon the

step at the back end of the car, defendant's servants care-

TRIAL PRACTICE
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13th day of December, 1902. Defendant appeals from a
judgment in favor of Peterson for $5,000. H er e, his death
was suggested and proceedings had reviving the · the cause
in the name of Henrietta, administratrix of his estate.
* * * * * * * * * *
Did the cour t err in allowing amendments ; and err again
in ref using a continuance~ We think not; because;
(a) The statutory right to amend a petition is not open
to discussion. T he right of a court t o permit a petition to
be amended is nothing more than plain, everyday, hardheaded sense. The right to act with good sense may
(modestly ) be assumed to be inherent in any court, and (it
is likely ) would exist without written law. Counsel make
the point that plaintiff had no right to amend the petition
at the trial, but they give no reason or cite n o authority.
All things, says Coke, are confirmed or impugned in one
of two ways-by reason or authority. T he p oint should
not have been made; for the only possible question is one
of terrns on which the amendment may go and that question
is not raised.
(b) The principal proposition under this head is the
refusal to grant a continuance after amendment. It is
argued that prior to the amendments the petition stated no
cause of action because there was no averment that the car
had stopped to receive passengers who might undert ake to
get on; that the amendments supplied that omission ; that
after amendment the petition for the firs t t ime stated a
cause of action; and that amendments of that character,
made at the commencement of a trial, entitling the defendant to a continuance as of course, much more should one
go in view of the application and affidavit filed in this intance.
But we can agree neither to the premise, nor t o the con]usion if the premise were true. The petition did sta te a
·au e of a tion. It all ged that defendant' Main treet
rar. r gularly stopped about ten f et north of Twelfth
f r the purpose of p rmitting pa s ngers to get on and off.
That plaintiff on the 13th day of December, 1902, attempted
t
t r d f ndant' ar at said point to take pas age and
th t, whil in th act of doing o with his foot upon the
st p at th ba k end of the car, defendant 's servants care-

Sec. 1]
Sec. Ij Continuance 157

lessly and negligently started said car forward with a vio-

lent jerk.

The allegation that the car '^ started" was by necessary

implication an allegation that the car was stationary at

the time. A thing can't start without a stop. The one in-

cludes the other, ex vi termini. We had occasion to discuss

a similar contention in Flaherty v. Railroad, 207 Mo. 1 c.

335, where it was said: "But in ordinary speech, if A

says B 'moved forward,' there is a fair implication, at

least, that A means that B was in a condition of repose

when the movement began. If A was bent on expressing

the idea that B was going at the time, but then and there

began to hasten his pace, he would naturally have inserted

some word to convey the accelerated motion. The absence

of such modifying word, here, is not without significance."

What was said in the Flaherty case, though in discussing

an instruction, applies here. If the petition had said that

the car started forward "more rapidly" that would convey
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the idea it was moving at the time, but there is no such word

used and the petition is only subject to the criticism that it

defectively or obscurely stated a cause of action — not that

it stated none whatever. It would have been good after

verdict.

But, if it were conceded that the petition stated no cause

of action before amendment, defendant would not be en-

titled to a continuance, as of course, on that ground. The

canonized rule is, and all the cases hold, that a continuance

is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court — a

discretion to be soundly exercised. It is trite law that

every intendment exists in favor of the trial court's action

on an application for a continuance. The statute under

which tliese particular amendments were allowed is Re-

vised Statutes 1899, section 688, reading: "When a party

shall amend any pleading or proceeding, and the court

shall be satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the oppo-

site party could not be read}' for trial in consequence

thereof, a continuance may be granted to some day of the

same term, or at the next regular term of the court."

It will be seen from that statute that an affidavit is not

essential. The court may be satisfied "by affidavit or

otherwise" that the opposite party could not be ready for

trial in consequence of the amendment.

CONTINUANCE
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lessly and negligently started said car forward with a viole11t jerk.
·
The allegation that the car "started" was by necessary
implication an allegation that the car was stationary at
the time. A thing can't start without a stop. The one includes the other, ex vi termini. We had occa ion to di cuss
a similar contention in Flaherty v. Railroad, 207 Mo. 1 c.
335, where it was said: "But in ordinary speech, if A
says B 'moved forward,' there is a fair implication, at
least, that A means that B was in a condition of repose
when the movement began. If A was bent on expressing
the idea that B was going at the time, but then and there
begap. to ha ten bis pace, he would naturally have inserted
some word to convey the accelerated motion. The absence
of such modifying word, here, is not without significance.''
What was said in the Flaherty ca e, though in di cussing
an instruction, applies here. If th~ petition had said that
the car started forward "more rapidly" that would convey
the iaea it was moving at the time, but there i no such word
u ed and the petition is only ubject to the criticism that it
defectively or obscurely stated a cause of action-not that
it tated none whatever. It would have been good after
verdict.
But, if it were conceded that the petition stated no cause
of action before amendment, defendant would not be entitled to a continuance, as of course, on that ground. The
anonized rule is, and all the ca es bold, that a continuance
is addre sed to the sound di cretion of the trial court-a
discretion to be soundly exerci ed. It is trite law that
ff\ ery intendment exist in favor of the trial court's action
on an application for a continuance. The statute under
which the e particular amendments were allowed is Revi ed Statute 1899, section 6 8, reading: "When a party
hall amen any pleading or proceeding, and the court
shall be atisfied, by affidavit or otherwi e, that the opposite party could not be read for trial in con equence
thereof, a continuance may be granted to ome day of the
ame term, or at the next reO'ular term of the court.''
It will be seen from that tatute that an affidavit i not
essential. The court may be atisfied "by affida' it or
otherwise" that tbe op o ite party could not be ready for
trial in consequence of the amendment.
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There was no attempt, except by the affidavit, to satisfy

the court that the defendant could not be ready for trial;

attending to that affidavit, it does not show defendant had

not subpoenaed witnesses on the issues made by the amend-

ments. Subsequent events showed it had — and all it knew

of. It does not state that the allegations, as amended, are

not true, or that it had a meritorious defense to the new

matter, nor does it point out that defendant could be ready

to meet those allegations at any other time. Hence, we

find no fault with the court's ruling on the application. It

is fully sustained by the following cases cited by counsel

construing section 688, supra: Colhoun v. Craivford, 50

Mo. 458; Keltenhaugh v. Railroad, 34 Mo. App. 147; Pifer

V. Stanley, 57 Mo. App. 516; Keeton v. Railroad^ 116 Mo.

App. 281.

The point is ruled against defendant.

EAHLES V. J. THOMPSON & SONS MANUFACTUR-

ING COMPANY.
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Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 1909.

137 Wisconsin, 506.

Timlin, J. The original complaint was quite inartistic.

But after setting forth the age, nationality, and occupation

of the plaintiff and his lack of knowledge of the English

language and the corporate character and the business of

[Chap. 4
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There was no attempt, except by the affidavit, to satisfy
the court that the defendant could not be ready for trial;
attending to that affidavit, it does not show defendant had
not subpoenaed witnesses on the issues made by the amendments. Subsequent events showed it had-and all it knew
of. It does not state that the allegations, as amended, are
not true, or that it had a meritorious defense to the new
matter, nor does it point out that defendant could be ready
to meet those allegations at any other time. Hence, we
find no fault with the court's ruling on the application. It
i.s fully sustained by the following cases cited by counsel
construing section 688, supra: Calhoun v. Crawford, 50
Mo. 458; K eltenbaugh v. Railroad, 34 Mo. App. 147; Pifer
v. Stanley, 57 Mo. App. 516; Keeton v. Railroad, 116 Mo.
App. 281.
The point is ruled against defendant.

* * * * * * * * * •

the defendant, it averred lack of knowledge of machinery

and of tlie dangers attending its operation and lack of ex-

perience on the part of the plaintiff. Defendant had and

used a described drop hammer, out of repair and defec-

tive. Defendant, knowing the plaintiff's want of experi-

ence, and without instructing the plaintiff concerning his

duties except as specified, and without warning the plain-

tiff that there was any danger in working about the

drop hammer or that it was liable to fall, ordered the plain-

RAHLES V. J. THOJ'.\1PSON & SONS MANUF ACTURING COMP ANY.

tiff to assist the operator of tlie drop hammer. Plaintiff,

assisting without knowledge of the danger, was injured by

Supreme Court of TiJTisconsin.

1909.

137 Wisconsin, 506.

TIMLIN, J. The original complaint was quite inartistic.
But after setting forth the age, nationality, and occupation
f the plaintiff an his la k of knowledge of the EnO'lish
lan ua e and th corporate character and the bu ine s of
ih
f ndant, it av rred lack of knowledge of machinery
f th dang r att nding its operati n and lack of exe on the
rt f the laintiff. Def ndant had and
a d crib d ro hammer, out f repair and defecf n nt, kn wi g the plaintiff's want of experin without in. tru ting th plaintiff cone rninO' his
t
p ifi d, and with ut warninO' th
lainh r
ny d
r in workinO' about the
it
1i b] io f 11 r r d th lainr of th
r p ham r.
lain tiff,
g f th dang r, was injured by
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the hammer dropping upon his hand, which in consequence

of this injury was amputated. That if the said defendant

by its officers or agents, its superintendent and foreman

acting as vice-principals, had warned or in any manner in-

structed the plaintiff as to the dangers and the use of the

said hammer, the precautions to be taken about the same,

plaintiff would not have been injured in any manner and

would have avoided the said injury. Again:

''That the cause of the injury to this plaintiff was the

neglect of the said defendant * * * to warn the said plain-

tiif of the dangers and of the dangerous condition of the

said machine."

No defect in the machine having been shown, but the

evidence on the part of the plaintitf tending to show that

the plaintiff accidentally stepped on the treadle of the drop

hammer while having his hand in the path of the descend-

ing hammer, the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's

evidence moved that the plaintiff be non-suited. Plain-
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tiff then asked leave to amend his complaint, presenting an

amended complaint, which is the same as the original com-

plaint except that therein the negligence of the defendant

was predicated, not upon any defect in the machine, but

upon the ignorance and inexperience of the plaintiii,

known to the defendant, and the failure of the defendant to

instruct or warn the plaintiff before or at the time of

placing plaintiff to work upon the drop hammer. The court

allowed this amended complaint to be filed, whereupon

counsel for the defendant asked for the ''continuance of

the case over the term, the immediate taxing by the clerk

of this court of the taxable disbursements of the defendant

down to this time, and the usual attorney fee of $25. By

the Court: The motion is granted upon the sole ground

that $10 costs be paid forthwith." Exception to this ruling

was taken, and error is assigned on this ruling.

We perceive no error in the ruling. It was proper to

allow the amendment on the trial. Gates v. Paul, 117 Wis.

170, 9-1: N. W. 55. Where the complaint is amended on the

trial, in order to entitle the defendant to a continuance he

must make a showing, if not by affidavit, at least by a

statement to the court based on the pleadings apparently

supporting such statement, that he is unprepared to meet

^nd cannot, with the evidence at hand or available, meet the
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the hammer dropping upon his hand, which in con equence
of this injury wa amputated. That if the said defendant
by its officers or agents, its superintendent and foreman
acting as vice-principals, had warned or in any manner instructed the plaintiff as to the dangers and the use of the
said hammer, the precautions to be taken about the same,
plaintiff would not have been injured in any manner and
would have avoided the said injury. Again:
"That the cau e of the injury to this plaintiff was the
neglect of the said defendant * * * to warn the said plaintiff of the dangers and of the dangerous con di ti on of the
said machine. ''
No defect in the machine having been shown, but the
evidence on the part of the plaintiff tending to show that
the plaintiff accidentally tepped on the treadle of the drop
hammer while having his hand in the path of the descending hammer, the defendant at the clo e of the plaintiff'
evidence moved that the plaintiff be non- uited. Plaintiff then a ked leave to amend his complaint, presenting an
amended complaint, which i the ame as the original complaint except that therein the negligence of the defendant
wa predicated, not upon any defect in the machine, but·
upon the ignorance and inexperience of the plaintin,
known to the defendant, and the failure of the defendant to
in truct or warn the plaintiff before or at the time of
placing plaintiff to work upon the drop hammer. The court
allowed this amended complaint to be filed, whereupon
counsel for the defendant a ked for the ''continuance of
the ca e over the term, the imm diate taxing by the clerk
of thi court of the taxable disbursements of the defendant
down to thi time, and the usual attorney fee of $25. By
th
ourt: The motion i granted upon the ole ground
that $10 cost be paid forthwith.' Exception to this ruling
was taken, and error is a igned on this ruling.
We percei e no error in the rulino-. It wa proper to
allow the amendment on the trial. Gates v. Paiil, 117 Wis.
170, 94 N. W. 55. Wber th complaint i amended on the
trial, in ord r to ntitle th defendant to a continuance h
mu t mak a howinO' if not bv affida it at 1 a t by a
tat m nt to th ourt ba ed on the pl ading appar ntly
supporting uch tatem nt that he i unprepar d to m t
£lnd cannot, with th vid n e at band or availabl meet th
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issues raised by the amended complaint. W'ithee v. Simon,

104 Wis. 116, 80 N. W. 77. The amendment here brought

about no radical change of the issues and the terms were in

the discretion of the court. III. S. Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis.

499, 82 N. W. 534; Mcllquham v. Barber, 83 Wis. 500, 53

N. W. 902 ; Pellage v. Pellage, 32 Wis. 136, 141 ; Schaller

V. C. & N. W. R. Co., 97 Wis. 31, 71 N. W. 1042. * * *

Section 2. Absence op Witness.

CAMPBELL V. DREHER.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1908.

issues raised by the amended complaint. Withee v. Simon,
104 Wis. 116, 80 N. W. 77. The amendment here brought
a bout no radical change of the issues and the terms were in
the discretion of the court. Ill. S. Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis.
499, 82 N. W. 534; Mcllquham v. Barber, 83 Wis. 500, 53
N. W. 902; Pellage v. Pellage, 32 Wis. 136, 141; Schaller
v. C. ct N. W. R. Co., 97 Wis. 31, 71 N. W. 1042. * * •

* *

33 Kentucky Law Reporter, 444.

Lassing, J. In a collision between appellee, a 16-year-

*

*

* * * * *

2.

ABSENCE OF WITNESS.

*

old boy, on a bicycle and appellant's automobile appellee

was injured. Conceiving that his injuries were the direct

result of appellant's negligence in operating his machine,

appellee, through his father as next friend, instituted suit

to recover damages. Appellant denied liability, and plead-

ed that the injuries, if any, to the boy were the result of
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his own carelessness and negligence. Upon the issues thus

SECTION

joined a trial was had, which resulted in a verdict in favor

of appellee for $500. To reverse this judgment this appeal

CAMPBELL V. DREHER.

is prosecuted.

Appellant relies upon four grounds: * * *; second, be-

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1908.

cause the trial court erred in refusing him a continuance

on his showing, made at the time of the trial, that the wit-

ness Dr. Geo. W. Leachman, was absent from the state,

33 Kentucky Law Reporter, 444.

and that his testimony could not be procured at that

time; * * * *

Appellant's second ground for reversal is not well taken

for two reasons: First, it is not shown that he used any

diligence whatever to secure the presence of this witness

at his trial. The record show!^ that his answer was filed on

the 15th day of December, 19Q§. The reply was filed on the.

LASSING, J.
In a collision between appellee, a 16-yearold boy, on a bicycle and appellant's automobile appellee
was injured. Conceiving that his injuries were the direct
re ult of appellant's negligence in operating his machine,
appellee, through his father as next friend, instituted suit
to r ecover damages. Appellant denied liability, and pleaded that the injuries, if any, to the boy were the result of
bi. own car les ness and negligence. Upon the issues thus
j ined a trial was had, which resulted in a verdict in favor
of app 11 e for $500. To reverse this judgment this appeal
i prose uted.
A p ll ant r lies upon four grounds: * * *; second, bet h tri al court erred in refusing him a continuance
howin , made at the time of the trial, that the witn .. · r .
o. W. L achman, wa ab ent from the state,
n that hi t e timony could not be procured at that
t im · 41< * * *

'

* * * * * * * * * •

A1 p llan '. cond round for reversal is not well taken
f or iw r ·a. n : Fir t, it is not shown that he used any
cl ilig<' · ~ \ hat ver t o
ur th presence of this witness
at 11 i.· tri · 1. The r
r d . h ow .. that his. answ r wa filed on
th, 15tl1 ay of Dec ber, 1
. The reply was filed on the.
1
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22nd day of December, 1906, completing the issues. The

case was called for trial the 26th of March, 1907, or more

than 90 days after the issues were made up. During all of

this time, save about two weeks prior to the date of the

trial, as shown by the affidavit, the witness. Dr. George W.

Leachman, was within the jurisdiction of the court, and

could have been subpoenaed, and his attendance procured.

This was not done, and the fact that appellant did not know

he was going to leave offers no excuse for his failure to

have a subpoena issued for this witness at a time when he

knew he was within the jurisdiction of the court and could

have been served. The court did not err in refusing to

continue the case because of the absence of this witness for

the further reason that it is shown that his evidence would

have been merely cumulative. He was in the automobile

with the witness John Straus, and the facts to which he

would have testified, if present, as disclosed by the affi-

davit, were testified to by the witness John Straus. The
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ruling of the trial judge, in permitting this affidavit for

continuance to be read as the deposition of the absent wit-

ness, was certainly as favorable to appellant as he could

ask.

Perceiving no error in the conduct of the trial prejudicial

to the rights of appellant, the judgment is affirmed.

TERRAPIN V. BARKER.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma. 1910.

26 Oklahoma, 93.

This action was brought in the District Court of Wash-

ington county by defendant in error to recover for services

rendered by him to plaintiff in error as an attorney, of an

161
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Sec. 2]

:...:...nd day of Decen1ber, 1906, completing the is ues. The
case was called for trial the 26th of 1\1arch, 1907, or more
than 90 days after the i sues were made u1 . During all of
this time, save about two weeks prior to the date of the
trial, as shown by the affidavit, the witne , Dr. George W.
Leachman, was within the jurisdiction of the court, and
could have been subpoenaed, and hi attendance procured.
This was not done, and the fact that appellant did not know
he was going to leave offers no excuse for his failure to
have a subpoena issued for this witness at a time when he
knew he was within the juri diction of the court and could
have been served. The court did not err in refu ing to
continue the case because of the ab ence of this witness for
the further reason that it is shown that his evidence would
have been merely cumulative. He was in the automobile
with the witness John Straus, and the facts to which he
would have testified, if present, as disclosed by the affidavit, were testified to by the witness John Straus. The
ruling of the trial judge, in permitting this affidavit for
continuance to be read as the deposition of the absent witness, was certainly as favorable to appellant as he could
ask.

alleged reasonable value of $1,000, and for expenses in-

curred and paid out by him for plaintiff in error in render-

ing said services. From a verdict and judgment in favor of

defendant in error, hereafter called ''plaintiff," plaintiff

in error, hereafter called ' ' defendant, ' ' brings this proceed-

Perceiving no error in the conduct of the trial prejudicial
to the rights of appellant, the judgment is affirmed.

T. P.— 11

TERRAPIN V. BARKER.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
26

1910.

Oklahoma, 93.

This action was brought in the District Court of Washington county by defendant in error to recover for er ice
rendered by him to plaintiff in error as an attorne , of an
alleg d reasonable value of $1,000 and for expen e incurred and paid out by him for plaintiff in error in rendering said services. From a verdict and judgment in favor of
defendant in error, hereafter called ''plaintiff,'' plaintiff
in error, hereafter called ''defendant,'' brings this proceedT. P.-ll-
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ing in error. The facts alleged in the pleadings and estab-

lished by the evidence, in so far as they are necessary in

the consideration of the questions presented by this pro-

ceeding, will be stated in the opinion.

**********

Hayes, J. (after stating the facts as above.) After an-

nouncement of both parties in the trial court that they

were ready for trial, a motion by defendant to strike out

certain 23ortions of plaintiff's reply to his answer was over-

ruled, and he thereupon filed a motion for continuance,

which was also overruled. His motion for continuance

stated, that he was informed that two certain persons who

were absent had information material to his case; that he

has a right to expect that they would be in attendance at

the trial of his cause. Section 5836 of the Compiled Laws

of Oklahoma of 1909 prescribes what an application for con-

tinuance on account of the absence of evidence shall con-

tain. It must show the materiality of the evidence ex-
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pected to be obtained ; that due diligence has been used to

obtain it; where the witnesses reside, if their residence is

known to the party; the probability of procuring their tes-

timony within a reasonable time ; and what facts mover be-

lieves the witness will prove; and that he believes them

to be true.

The motion in this case fails to contain several of these

essential elements. No showing whatever is made in the

application of any diligence used by plaintiff in error to

obtain the attendance of the absent witnesses ; nor does the

affidavit state the residence of but one of said witnesses.

No showing is made that their testimony can be procured

within a reasonable time; nor is any statement made as to

any facts that can be established by them that would be

material to the case. It is stated that if one of the wit-

nesses was present he would testify that, "so far as he is

informed, defendant in error was not plaintiff in error's

attorney in the matter in which he alleges he rendered the

services for plaintiff in error." But such evidence would

be incompetent. The witness could not be permitted to

testify as to liis information. The application also fails to

state that applicant believes that the alleged facts which

tlie absent witness will testify to are true. An application

for continuance could hardly be more defective than the

rt1RIAL
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ing in error. The facts alleged in the pleadings and es tab·
lished by the evi 1ence, in so far as they are necessary in
th con ideration of the qu tion presented by this proceeding, will be tated in the opinion.
* * * * * * * * * *
HA-YES, J. (after stating the facts as above.)
After announcement of both parties in the trial court that they
were ready for trial, a motion by defendant to strike out
certain portions of plaintiff' reply to his answer wa overruled, and h thereupon :filed a motion for continuance,
which wa al o overruled. His motion for continuance
tat d, that he wa informed that two certain pers.)ns who
w re ab ent had information material to his case; that he
ha a right to expect that they would be in attendance at
th trial of hi caE e. Section 5836 of the Compiled Laws
of Oklahoma of 1909 prescribes what an application for continuance on account of the ab ence of evidence shall contain. It must show the materiality of the evidence excted to be obtained; that due diligence has been used to
obtain it; where the witnesses reside, if their residence is
known to the party; the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time; and what facts mover beli v the witne will prove; and that he believes them
to be true.
The motion in this case fails to contain several of these
e ential el men ts. No showing whatever is made in the
ap1 li ation of any diligence used by plaintiff in error to
obtain the att ndance of the ab ent witnesses; nor doe the
affidavit stat the residence of but one of said witnesses.
N howing i made that their testimony can be procured
within a rea nCLble time; nor i any tatement made a to
any fa t that can be e tabli b d b. them that would be
m t rial to th a e. It is t ted that if one of the witnt he woul t tify that, ''so far as he is
nt in error wa
ot plaintiff in error'
ait rn y in th
tt r in whi h b all ges he r ndered the
·
f r l l in tiff in rr r. '' But such evidence would
r nt. r h witn could not be permitted to
"· if
, t l1i . inf r
ti on. Th
lication al o fails to
·h
th·1t ·Pl lir t
Jj v s th t th all ged facts whi h
lie c h: <·nt wi Ln
j]l t . tify to ar true. An application
f r continuan
· ul
,·dly be more defective than th
J
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one here relied upon. It is not an abuse of discretion to

overrule an application for continuance, where no diligence

is shown to procure the attendance of the witnesses. {Siuope

d Son V. Burnliam, Hanna, Hunger & Co., 6 Okla. 736, 52

Pac. 924; Kirk v. Territory, 10 Okla. 46, 60 Pac. 979), and

the party applying must clearly state the facts he expects

to prove, and their materiality must be made to appear

from the application {Murphy v. Hood, et al., 12 Okla. 593.)

And even when all the matters prescribed by the statute are

set forth in an affidavit for continuance, a continuance will

not be granted, if the adverse party consents that on a

trial the facts alleged in the affidavit shall be read and

treated as a deposition of the absent witness. Section 5836.

supra; Chandler v. Colcord, 1 Okla. 260, 32 Pac. 330. De-

fendant is in no position to complain that his motion was

overruled, for plaintiff would, in all events have been en-

titled to know what facts he intended to establish by the

absent witnesses, in order that he might determine whether
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he would admit that the witness would so testify; and that

such facts might be read to the jury as a deposition of the

absent witnesses, rather than to suffer the inconvenience of

a continuance.

**********

Finding no error in the record requiring a reversal, the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

BEAN V. MISSOULA LUMBER COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Montana. 1909.

40 Montana, 31.

Mr. Chief Justice Brantly delivered the opinion of the

court.

Contention is made that the court erred in refusing to
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one here relied upon. It is not an abu e of di cretion to
overrule an applica-tion for continuance, where no diligence
is shown to procure the attendance of the witnesse . (Swope
& Son v. Burnham, Hanna, Munger & Co., 6 Okla. 736, 5:..
Pac. 924; Kirk v. Te1·ritory, 10 Okla. 46, 60 Pac. 979), and
the party applying must clearly state the fact he expect
to prove, and their materiality must be made to appear
from the application (1V1'urphy v. Hood, et al., 12 Okla. 593.)
And even when all the matters prescribed by the statute are
set forth in an affidavit for continuance, a continuance will
not be granted, if the adverse party consents that on a
trial the facts alleged in the affidavit shall be read and
treated as a deposition of the ab ent witne s. Section 5 36.
supra; Chandler v. Colcord, 1 Okla. 260, 32 Pac. 330. Defendant is in no position to complain that his motion wa
overruled, for plaintiff would, in all event have been entitled to know what facts he intended to establi h by the
absent witnesses, in order that he might determine whether
he would admit that the witness would so testify; and that
such facts might be read to the jury as a deposition of the
absent witnesses, rather than to suffer the inconvenience of
a continuance.

* • * * • • • * * *

grant to defendant a postjionement of the trial because of

the absence of one Wendorf, a witness who was expected

to be present and testify in defendant's favor. The appli-

Finding no error in the record requiring a reversal, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
All the Justices concur.

BEAN V. MISSOULA LUMBER COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Montana. 1909.
40 Montana, 31.

MR. CHIEF JusTICE BRANTLY deliver d the opinion of the
court.
Contention i made that the court erred in refu ing to
grant to defendant a o t1 n m nt of the trial because of
the ab n e f one W n orf a witne who wa expect d
to be pre ent and te tify in defendant's favor. The appli-
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cation was made upon affidavit by defendant's counsel. Be-

sides setting forth the facts to which the witness would

testify, the affidavit shows that the witness was a resident

of the state of Idaho; that he was then in that state and

had been for some months; that he was the only witness

who could testify to the facts set forth ; that the defendant

expected to have him present, but that, after the cause was

set for trial, counsel ascertained that he was ill at his home

and was unable to attend ; and that, if granted a postpone-

ment, he could secure the attendance of the witness in per-

son. However meritorious the application may have been

in other respects, it was properly denied, because it wholly

failed to show diligence by defendant in its efforts to se-

cure the evidence of the witness. The cause had been at

issue for several months. The witness was a non-resident

of the state of Montana, and beyond the jurisdiction of the

court. If the defendant chose to rely upon his promise to

attend — if he did make such promise — it did so at its own
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risk. Under the circumstances, the only safe course to

pursue was to take the deposition of the witness. The re-

fusal to grant a continuance was, under the circumstances,

not such an abuse of discretion as to call for interposition

by this court. The case of State v. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417,

43 Pac. 182, cited by counsel, is not in point. Though the

application there made showed that the witness resided in

the state of Kansas, it appeared that the defendant knew

not] ling of his whereabouts until within so short a time be-

fore the trial that it was impossible to take his deposition,

and the postponement was asked in order that the defend-

ant might be given time to take it.

Let tlie judgment and order be affirmed.

'Afirmed.

Mr. Justice Smith and Mr. Justice Holloway. concur.

[Chap. 4
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cation was made upon affidavit by defendant's counsel. Beides setting forth the facts to which the witness would
testify, the affidavit shows that the witness was a resident
of the state of Idaho; that he was then in that state and
bad been for some months; that he was the only witness
who could testify to the facts set forth; that the defendant
expected to have him present, but that, after the cause was
set for trial, counsel ascertained that he was ill at his home
and wa unable to attend; and that, if granted a postponement, he could secure the attendance of the witness in person. However meritorious the application may have been
in other re pects, it was properly denied, because it wholly
fail d to bow diligence by defendant in its efforts to secure the evidence of the witness. The cause had been at
i ue for several months. The witness was a non-resident
of the state of Montana, and beyond the jurisdiction of the
court. If the defendant chose to rely upon his promise to
attend-if he did make such promise-it did so at its own
ri k. Under the circumstances, the only safe course to
pur ue was to take the deposition of the witness. The refu al to grant a continuance was, under the circumstances,
not u ·h an abu e of di scretion as to call for interposition
br thi court. The case of State v. "}.1 etcalf, 17 Mont. 417,
4
a . 1 2, cited by counsel, is not in point. Though the
a] I ]ieation there made showed that the witness resided in
th . L te of Kansas, it appeared that the defendant knew
n thing of his whereabouts until within so short a time befor th trial that it was impos ible to take his deposition,
an th postpon ment was a ked in order that the defendant might e given time to take it.

* * * * * * * * * *
Let the judgment and order be affirmed.
~ffirmed.

MR. JusTICE

SMITH

and MR. JusTICE

HoLLOWAY.

concur.
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HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY V.

HAMMOND.
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HARTFORD FIRE INSUR NCE CO fPANY V.
HAM1!0ND.

THE LIVERPOOL AND LONDON AND GLOBE IN-

SURANCE COMPANY V. HAMMOND.

Supreme Court of Colorado. 1907.

41 Colorado, 323.

THE LIVERPOOL AND LO DON ND GL BE JNSURAN E C01IPA Y V. HAMJ\10 D.

Mr. Justice Bailey delivered the opinion of the court :

The same questions are presented in each of these cases,

Supre11ie Court of Colorado.

1907.

and we will, therefore, dispose of them in one opinion.

The first contention is that the court should have granted

a continuance of the trial, asked for by defendants, appel-

41 Colorado, 323.

lants here. It appears that Charles F. Hawkins was a

material witness on behalf of the defendants and that he

was ill and unable to attend the trial. Because of his

absence, defendants requested a postponement and filed an

affidavit wherein were stated the facts which Hawkins had

been expected to testify to. Plaintiff objected to a continu-

ance and admitted that if the witness, Hawkins, were pres-
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ent he should testify as stated in the affidavit. When this

was done the application for a continuance upon that

ground was properly overruled. — Code of Civil Proc, sec.

177; Baldwin Coal Co. v. Davis, 15 Colo. App. 371; Flor-

ence Oil Co. V. Oil Well Supply Co., 38 Colo. 124.

We are unable to find any error in the proceedings in

these cases, and therefore, are of the opinion that each of

the judgments should be affirmed.

Affirmed.

Chief Justice Steele and Mr. Justice Goddard concur.

MR. JusTicE B ILEY delivered the opinion of the court:
The ame que tions are pre ented in each of th se ca es
and we will, therefore, dispo e of them in one opinion.
The fir t contention i that the court hould have gran~ed
a continuance of the trial, a ked for b defendant , appellants here. It appear that Charles F. Hawkin wa "" a
material witne on behalf of the defendant and that he
was ill and unable to attend the trial. Becau e of hi '
absence, efendant requ ted a postponement and filed :tn
affidavit wherein were tated the facts which Hawkins had
een expected to te tify to. Plaintiff objected to a continuance and admitte 1 that if the witne s, Hawkins, were pre ent he hould t tify as tated in the affidavit. When thi
wa done the application for a continuance upon that
ground was properl overruled.-Code of Civil Proc. ec.
177; Baldwin Coal Co. v. Davis, 15 Colo. App. 71; Florence Oil Co. v. Oil Well Supply Co., 3
olo. 124.
* * * * * * * * * *
We are unable to find any error in the proceeding in
th e ca e , and therefore, are of the opinion that ach of
th judgments should be affirmed.
Affinned.
CHIEF J us TICE STEELE and MR. J us TICE GODDARD concur.
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BROWN V. ABILENE NATIONAL BANK.
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BROWN V. ABILENE NATIONAL BANK.

Supreme Court of Texas. 18S8.

70 Texas, 750.

Suprerne Cou,rt of Texas. 1888.

Stayton, Chief Justice. On January 25, 1886, the

Abilene National Bank brought an action against B. M.

Dangherty on several promissory notes, and sued out a

70 Te xas, 750.

writ of attachment that was levied on property belonging

to Daugherty. On March 9, 1886, the appellant filed a plea

in intervention, in which he alleged that he had also brought

an action against Daugherty, and caused a writ of attach-

ment to be levied on the property which the appellee had

first caused to be attached. The intervener set up several

grounds on which he claimed that precedence should be

given to the lien acquired through the attachment sued out

by him. On March 12, 1886, a judgment was rendered in

favor of the appellee against Daugherty, whereby the at-

tachment lien was foreclosed and the proceeds of the at-

tached property — the same having been sold and deposited

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

with the clerk — was directed to be paid to the appellee. By

that judgment no disposition of the intervention was made.

On April 2, 1886, the appellee announced ready for trial

on the matters set up in the intervention, and the inter-

vener made an application for continuance, which was by

the court overruled, and a judgment was then rendered in

favor of the appellee against the intervener, who offered no

evidence. The action of the court in refusing a continuance

is assigned as error.

The ruling of the court refusing a continuance, was on

the ground that the intervener could not delay the appellee

in the assertion and collection of his claim against Daugh-

erty. In view of the grounds on which the continuance was

sought, it is unnecessary to inquire whether an intervener,

in any case, is entitled to a continuance whereby a plaintiff

will be delayed in the collection of a judgment against a

defendant; or, if he be so entitled, to determine on what

terms a continuance upon sufficient showing should be

granted. The a])plication for a continuance was based on

the absence of witnesses, and it showed that sul)poenas for

them were obtained by the intervenor on the day that he

STAYTON, CHIEF JusTrcE. On January 25, 1886, the
Abilene National Bank brought an action against B. J\L
Daugherty on several promissory notes, and sued out a
writ of attachment that was levied on property belonging
to Daugherty. On March 9, 1886, the appellant filed a plea
in intervention, in which he alleged that he had also brought
an action against Daugherty, and caused a writ of attachment to be levied on the property which the appellee had
first caused to be attached. The intervenor set up several
ground on which he claimed that precedence should be
given to the lien acquired through the attachment sued out
by him. On March 12, 1886, a judgment was rendered in
favor of the appellee against Daugherty, whereby the attachment lien was foreclosed and the proceeds of the attached property-the same having been sold a.nd deposited
with the clerk-was directed to be paid to the appellee. By
that judgment no di position of the intervention was made.
On April 2, 1886, the appellee announced ready for trial
on the matters set up in the intervention, and the intervenor made an application for continuance, which was by
the court overruled, and a judgment was then rendered in
favor of the appellee against the intervenor, who offered no
evid nee. The action of the court in refusing a continuance
i a igned as error.
The ruling of the court refusing a continuance, was on
the ground that the intervenor could not d lay the appellee
i tl1 a ertion and ollection of his claim a 0 ·ain t Daugbrt r. In view of tbe grounds on whi h the continuance was
.· u ht, it i unnec ary to inquire whether an int rvenor,
jn ny a.'e, i
ntitl d to a ontinuance wher by a plaintiff
' ill
d Jay
in th coll tion of a judgm nt gain t a
cl f
if h be so entitl , to det rmine on what
upon urn i nt showing hould be
gr nt d. Th app1i ation for a ontinuan e wa ba ed on
h b. ln · f witn ... . a d it . how d that suh1 o na. for
th
w r oht in c] h tb int rv nor on the day that he
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filed his pleadings in intervention, but it did not show when

they were placed in the hands of an officer for service. It

showed that the witnesses had been served, but did not state

when they were summoned.

When a first application for a continuance is sought, by

one entitled to ask it, for the want of testimony, the

statute requires that such applicant shall state "That he

has used due diligence to procure the same, stating such

diligence." (Rev. Stats., art. 1277.) No such statements

are found in the application, which was verbal, and is con-

tained in a bill of exceptions. On an application for a con-

tinuance, a court will not assume a necessary fact to exist

when the applicant fails or is unwilling to state its exist-

ence. Every fact stated in the application may be true, and

still due diligence not have been used.

The time when the subpoenas were served on the wit-

nesses should have been stated, in order that the court

might determine whether this was such reasonable time
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before the trial as would enable the witnesses to be present.

{Conner v. Sampson, 22 Texas 20; Stanley v. Epperson, 45

Texas, 650.) No facts are shown by the application which

can take this case out of the general rule.

There is no error in overruling the application for con-

tinuance, and the judgment will be affirmed.

Affirmed.

Section 3. Absence of Attorney.

CICERELLO V. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1909.

65 West Virginia, 439.

Miller, President.

The plaintiff, as personal representative of Frank Olvino,

deceased, seeks recovery of damages from defendant, for

negligently causing the death of decedent on February

8th, 1907, while employed by Rinehart and Dennis, inde-
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filed his pleadings in intervention, but it did not show when
they were placed in the hand of an officer for service. It
showed that the witnesses had been served, but did not state
when they were summoned.
When a first application for a continuance i sought, by
one entitled to a k it, for the want of testimony, the
statute requires that such appli12ant shall state 'That he
has used due diligence to procure the same, tating uch
diligence." (Rev. Stats., art. 1277.) No uch tatements
are found in the application, which was erbal, and is contained in a bill of exception . On an application for a continuance, a court will not a ume a n ce sary fact to exi t
when the applicant fail or is unwilling to state its exi tence. Every fact stated in the application may be true, and
till due diligence not have been u ed.
The time when the subpoenas were served on the witnesses should have been stated, in order that the court
might determine whether this was such rea onable time
before the trial a would enable the witne es to be present.
(Conner v. Sampson, 22 Texas 20; Stanley v. Epperson, 45
Texas, 650.) No fact are shown by the application which
can take this case out of the general rule.
There is no error in overruling the application for continuance, and the judgment will be affirmed.
.Affirmed.

SECTION

3.

ABSENCE OF ATTORNEY.

CICERELLO V. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY
COMPANY.
Supreme Court of ..Appeals of West Virginia. 1909.
65 West Virgi nia, 439.

President.
.
.
The plaintiff, as personal r pre ntahve of Frank Olv1no,
decea ed, eek re over - of damacre from d f ndant, for
neglig ntly cau ing t e death ?f d cedent on F.ebr~a;y
8th, 1907, while employed by Rinehart and Dennis, inaeMrLLER,
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pendent contractors, near Scott Station, in Putnam county,

in excavating and widening a hillside cut for another track

along defendant's main line. Olvino's duty, as alleged,

was to keep defendant's main track cleared of the dirt and

rock which fell from the steam shovel employed in making

the excavation. The negligence charged is, that defend-

ant's servants and employes so carelessly and negligently

and with such great force and violence drove and struck

against the said Frank Olvino, a certain locomotive with

cars attached, thereby inflicting upon him such severe and

fatal wounds and injuires, that he then and there died.

On the trial there was a verdict and judgment for the

plaintiff for $1,500.00, and for errors alleged to have been

committed preliminary to and during the progress of the

trial, and for refusal of the court below to set aside the ver-

dict and award defendant a new trial, the defendant seeks

a reversal of the judgment below.

Of the preliminary rulings complained of, the first is,
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that the court refused to continue the case on motion of de-

fendant, when called for trial, because of the absence of F.

B. Enslow, defendant's leading counsel; and because of the

absence of J. B. Thomas, one of its witnesses ; and the sec-

ond is, the rejection of defendant's special plea number

two tendered. The motion to continue was supported by

the affidavits of said Enslow and R. M. Baker, another at-

torney for the defendant. Baker was also cross examined

on the matter of his affidavit, and the clerk of the court was

also examined in relation to the issuance of subpoenas for

the witnesses, and the want of service and return thereof.

This evidence shows that Enslow was necessarily absent

in attendance upon the United States Circuit Court of Ap-

peals at Richmond, on the day this case was set for trial,

but that Baker, who assisted in the conduct of the trial

on behalf of the defendant, was present. The record of

the trial shows that Enslow was a member of the well

known firm of Simms & Enslow, or Simms, Enslow, Fitz-

patrick and Baker, that defendant's special plea number

two was signed by Alexander & Barnhart and R. M. Baker,

Attorneys, and not by either of the other firms of which

Enslow was a member, and that Mr. Alexander was also

present and assisted in the trial, and that the defense was

conducted with skill and ability. In the case of Rossett v.
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pendent contractor , near Scott Station, in Putnam county,
in excavating and widening a hillside cut for another track
along defendant's main line. Olvino 's duty, as alleged,
was to keep defendant's main track cleared of the dirt and
rock which fell from the steam shovel employed in making
the excavation. The negligence charged is, that defendant's servants and employes so carele sly and negligently
and with such great force and violence drove and struck
against the said Frank Olvino, a certain locomotive with
cars attached, thereby inflicting upon him such severe and
fatal wounds and injuires, that he then and there died.
On the trial there was a verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff for $1,500.00, and for errors alleged to have been
committed preliminary to and during the progress of the
trial, and for refusal of the court below to set aside the verdict and award defendant a new trial, the defendant seeks
a re-\ ersal of the judgment below.
Of the preliminary rulings complained of, the first is,
that the court r efu ed to continue the case on motion of defendant, when called for trial, because of the. absence of F.
B. Enslow, defendant's leading counsel; and because of the
absence of J. B. Thomas, one of its witnesses; and the second is, the rejection of defendant's special plea number
two tendered. The motion to continue was supported by
the affidavit of said Enslow and R. ~L Baker, another attorney for the defendant. Baker was also cross examined
on the matter of his affidavit, and the clerk of the court was
al o examined in relation to the i suance of subpoenas for
the witnes es, and the want of service and return thereof.
Thi evid nee shows that Enslow was necessarily absent
in attendan e upon the United States Circuit Court of Apal at Ri hmond, on the day this case was set for trial,
but that ak r, who a isted in the conduct of the trial
on 1 h lf of the d fendant, was present. The record of
th trial show tbat n low as a m mber of the well
kn w £rm of imm & En low, or Sim s, En low, Fitz1 tri k anc1 ak r, that d f ndant 's sp cial 1 a number
tw \ a. ign 1 b. A lex n r & Barnhart an R. M. Baker,
A t r
'. , and not by eith r of the oth r firm of whi h
mlwr, and that Mr. 1 xan er wa al o
pr "'c•nt a 1 , ·.· istN1 in th trial, and that the d f n wa
· ndud
' ill1 sk ill and ability. In the cas of Rossett v.
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Gardner, 3 W. Va. 531, relied upon, upon the question of the

absence of counsel, it was shown that appellant had used

due diligence to be prepared for trial ; that one of his coun-

sel was unavoidably absent, and that the other, though

present on a preceding day, was for some cause, not ex-

plained in the record, absent when the cause was heard,

and the appellant was left without the aid of any coun-

sel. In the present case defendant had able counsel pres-

ent to conduct the trial. In the case of Myers and Axtell,

Receivers, v. Trice, 86 Va. 835-841-2, the absence of leading

counsel on account of sickness, in connection with the ab-

sence of an important witness, not summoned by reason of

mistake in name, was held good cause for continuance, and

denial of the continuance was, on writ of error, held suffi-

cient cause for a reversal of tlie judgment. Several cases

are cited by the Virginia court in support of its ruling, two

from Georgia, one United States Circuit Court decision,

and the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 11 Peters
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226. In the latter case, says the Virginia Court, a contin-

uance was granted by the Supreme Court of the United

States upon the ground that the leading attorney for the

state of Rhode Island was ill, although the attorney general

of that state was present. The case was of exceptional im-

portance says the court, and that the inference was that

the court was influenced more by the deep concern and the

high importance of the case than by any purpose to ex-

emplify the rule in such cases. ''In all such cases, however,"

says the Virginia court, *'the application should be watched

with jealousy, and the discretionary power of the court ex-

ercised with caution; but if there is no sufficient reason to

induce the belief that the alleged ground of the motion is

feigned, a continuance should be granted, rather than to

seriously imperil the just determination of the cause by

refusing it." This court further says: "Under the pecu-

liar circumstances of the present case, and especially in

view of the very harsh ruling on the preceding motion, we

are clearly of opinion that the circuit court erred in re-

fusing to continue the case on the ground of the absence

of the leading counsel of the defendants, by reason of sick-

ness."

With respect to the absence of the witness Thomas, the

evidence shows that he was or had been in the emploj^ of the

3]
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Gardner, 3 W. Va. 531, relied upon, upon the question of th
ab ence of counsel, it was shown that appellant had used
due diligence to be prepared for trial; that one of his counsel was unavoidably absent, and that the other, though
pre ' ent on a preceding day, was for some cause, not exlained in the record, ab ent when the cau e was heard,
and the appellant was left without the aid of any counsel. In the l re ent ca e defendant had able counsel pre ent to conduct the trial. In the ca e of JJ!yers and Axtell,
Receivers, v. Trice, 86 Va. 835- ±1-2, the ab ence of leading
coun el on account of sicknes , in connection with the absence of an important witne , not ummoned by reason of
mi take in nam , was held good cause for continuance, and
denial of the continuance wa , on writ of error, held sufficient cause for a rever al of th judgment. Several cases
are cited by the Virginia court in support of its ruling, two
from Georgia, one United tates ~ ircuit Court deci ion,
and the case of Rhode Island v. ll!a sachiisetts, 11 Peters
226. In the latter case, says the \ irginia Court, a continuance was granted by the Supreme Court of the United
tates upon the ground that the leading attorney for the
tate of Rhode Island wa ill although the attorney general
of that tate wa present. The ca e wa of exceptional imortance sa
the court, and that the inference was that
the court wa influenced more b the deep concern and the
high importance of the case than by any purpose to exmplify the rule in such cases. ''In all such cases, however,''
ay the\ irginia court "the application should be watched
with jealou y and the di cretionar power of the court exerci ed with caution; but if there is no ufficient rea on to
indu e the belief that the alleged ground of the motion is
fei ned, a continuance hould be granted, rather than to
eriou ly imperil the ju t determination of the cause by
refu ing it." This court further ay : "Under the peculiar cir um tance of the pre ent ca e and e pecially in
view of the v ry har h ruling on the preceding motion we
are 1 arly of opinion that the ircuit court erred in refu inO' to continue the ca e on the ground of the absence
of th 1 ading counsel of the defendants, by reason of sickne . "
Wi h r sp ct to the ab ence of the witne s Thomas, the
Yidence hows that he was or had been in the emploi of the
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defendant company, was in fact the fireman on the engine

at the time of the killing of Olvino; that a subpoena for

him and another witness was secured from the clerk only

six days before the case was called for trial and sent to

the company's counsel at Huntington; that no return of

service thereof on Thomas was made, and the testimony of

Baker, counsel for defendant on cross-examination, shows

that he sent the subpoena for Thomas to the company's

superintendent requesting him to secure the presence of

Thomas, who, he was told, was at Hinton, and gave direc-

tions that an order be given him on the ticket agent there

for transportation. He did not know whether Thomas had

been served or provided with transportation. We do not

think the record shows due diligence on the part of defend-

ant to secure the presence of Thomas. Besides he was only

one of the numerous witnesses present at the time of the

killing of the deceased, including the engineer, and who were

present and examined as witnesses on the trial and gave
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testimony. Motions for continuance are generally ad-

dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The

judgment of the court thereon not being reviewable on

writ of error and appeal unless there has been manifest

abuse of such discretion. Mullinax v. Waybrig-ht, 33 W. Va.

84; Halstead v. Eorton, 38 W. Va. 727; State v. Lane, 44

W. Va. 730. It was not shown what was proposed to be

proven by the witness. Where the motion to continue is

based on the absence of a witness it must be shown that

proper diligence to secure his presence has been used, and

if there is any ground to suspect that the continuance is

for delay, it must appear what evidence the absent witness

is expected to give. State v. Broivn, 62 W. Va. 546. In

Thompkins v. Burgess, 2 W. Va. 187, and Dimmey v. Wheel-

ing, etc., R. Co., 27 W. Va. 33, it is said that on such motion

it must be shown that the same facts cannot be proved by

any other witness in attendance and that the party whose

witness is absent cannot proceed in the absence of such

witness. The affidavit of Baker, is that the witness is mater-

ial and that defendant cannot prove the same facts by any

one else, as he is informed; but on cross examination it is

shown that he does not know what Thomas will swear, ex-

cept from his report. It is not shown what this report was.

U is suggested in brief of counsel, however, that as Thomas
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def end ant company, wa in fact the fireman on the engine
at the time of the killing of Olvino; that a subpoena for
him and anoth r witnes was ecured from the clerk only
six days before the case wa called for trial and sent to
the company's counsel at Huntington; that no return of
service thereof on Thoma s was made, and the testimony of
Baker, counsel for defendant on cross-examination, shows
that he sent the subpoena for Thoma to the company's
uperintendent requesting him to secure the presence of
Thomas, who, he was told, wa at Hinton, and gave directions that an order be given him on the ticket agent there
for t ransportation. He did not know whether Thomas had
been erved or provided with transportation. We do not
think the record shows due diligence on the part of def endant to ecure the pre ence of Thomas. Besides he was only
one of the numerous witnesses present at the time of the
killing of the deceased, including the engineer, and who were
present and examined as witnesses on the trial and gave
testimony. Motions for continuance are generally addre ssed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The
judgment of the court thereon not being reviewable on
writ of error and appeal unless there has been manifest
abu e of such di cretion. Mullinax v. Waybright, 33 W. Va.
84; Halstead v. Horton, 38 W. Va. 727; State v. Lane, 44
W. Va. 730. It wa not shown what was proposed to be
proven by the witness. Where the motion to continue is
based on the absence of a witnes it mu t be shown that
proper diligence to ecure hi pres nee has been used, and
if there is any ground to su pect that the continuance is
for delay, it mu t app ar what evidence the ab ent witness
i exp ted to give. State v. Brown, 62 W. Va. 546. In
Thompkins v. Burge , _, 1V. a. 1 7, and Dimmey v. Wheeling, etc., R . Co., 27 vV. Va .. 3, it i aid that on uch motion
it mu t b hown that th . am fa t annot be proved by
any oth r witne in att ndan e and that th party wl10se
wi tn . . i. ab nt annot proc d in th ab ence of u h
witn . . h affidavit f ak r, i. that th witne s i mat r1 I and that d f ndant annot pr v the am fact y any
n 1 a he is inf arm, d; but on cross examination it is
.-lt wn tha h
o n t know what Thomas will w ar, xfr m hi . r port. t i not hown what thi r port wa .
in bri f of coun 1, how ver, that as Thoma .
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was fireman on the engine that killed deceased, he would

be a material witness, he and the engineer being the only

two persons on the engine, and that each seeing what oc-

curred from different points of view, this rendered Thomas

a most important witness. But other witnesses were pres-

ent and gave testimony as to what was seen and heard by

them from their several view points, including the ringing

of the bell and the blowing of the whistle, and we cannot see

that the defendant was greatly prejudiced by the absence

of Thomas. We cannot say from this record that there was

any abuse of the discretion of the court on the motion to

continue. We do not think this a parallel case to the Vir-

ginia case. Evidently the court there was more influenced

by the arbitrary ruling of the trial court in refusing to con-

tinue on the ground of the absence of an important witness

than because of the absence of counsel.

Affirmed.

RANKIN V. CALDWELL.
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Supreme Court of Idaho. 1908.

15 Idaho, 625.

Stewart, J. This is an action to recover possession of

two diamond rings, alleged to be of the value of $250 each.

The plaintiff alleges that she is the owner and entitled to the

possession of said property. The plaintiff did not file the
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was fireman on the engine that killed deceased, he would
be a material witnes , he and the engineer being the only
two persons on the engine, and that each seeing what occurred from different points of view, this rendered Thomas
a most important witne s. But other witnesses were pre ent and gave testimony as to what was seen and heard by
them from their several view point , including the ringin 0
of the bell and the blowing of the whistle, and we cannot see
that the defendant was greatly prejudiced by the absence
of Thomas. We cannot say from this record that there was
any abuse of the di cretion of the court on the motion to
continue. We do not think this a parallel case to the Virginia case. Evidently the court there was more influenced
by the arbitrary ruling of the trial court in refusing to continue on the ground of the ab ence of an important witness
than because of the ab ence of counsel.
.Affirmed.

affidavit provided for by the statute, where immediate de-

livery is claimed. The defendant answers the complaint

and denies the plaintiff's ownership and right of possession

of said rings, and denies that they are of the value of $250

each, or any greater sum than $125 each. The defendant

admits that he holds and detains said property from the

possession of plaintiff, but denies that he does so unlaw-

RANKIN V. CALDWELL.

fully, and alleges that said rings were pledged to him as

security by one Harry Noyes, and that such pledge was

made by and with the consent and approval of the plaintiff.

Sup reme Court of Id aho . 1908.

The case was set for trial before a jury sometime prior

to February 5,. 1908, and when the case was called for trial

15 Idaho, 625.
STEWART, J. This is an action to recover posses sion of
two diamond ring , alleged to be of the value of $250 each.
The plaintiff alleges that she i the owner and entitled to the
posse sion of said property. The plaintiff did not file the
affidavit pro ided for by the statut , where immediate delivery i claimed. The defendant an wers the complaint
and d nies the plaintiff' owner hip and right of posses ion
of said rings, and denie that they are of the value of $250
each, or any greater sum than $125 each. The defendant
admit that he hold and detains said property from the
posse ion of plaintiff, but denie that he doe o unlawfully, and alleo·e that aid ring were pledged to him a
ecurity by one Iarry oy , and that such pledge wa
made by and with the con ent an approval of the plaintiff.
The ca e was set for trial b fore a jury ometime rior
to February 5,_1908, and when the case was called for trial
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on February 5th, the defendant made a motion for a con-

tinuance and filed his affidavit made on that day in which

he swears "that he cannot safely go to trial at this term

of the above-entitled court on account of the absence of his

attorney, John Green, who is confined to his bed with ill-

ness in Culdesac, Nez Perce county, state of Idaho, and

conduct the trial of this case ; that affiant did not know that

the said Green would be unable to appear in court at the

time this case was set for trial until yesterday morning,

the 4th day of February, A. D. 1908; that affiant has con-

sulted no other attorney regarding this case, and had re-

tained no other attorney, and it would be an injustice to

affiant to compel him to go to trial without the presence of

his attorney.

"That affiant expects to have present for the purpose of

testifying in this cause at the trial of the same one George

Martin, who is the cashier of the Bank of Culdesac, and

who is confined to his bed with illness, and unable to ap-
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pear to attend the trial of this cause; that affiant did not

have a subpoena issued for the said George Martin, for the

said Martin agreed and intended to attend upon the trial

of this cause, and would have been present had he not been

detained on account of illness."

The affidavit then continues to set forth what the affiant

claims Martin will testify to if present at the trial. An

affidavit of Dr. E. L. Burke was also filed, to the effect that

Mr. Green was suffering with la grippe, confined to his bed

under the instruction of the physician, and that it would be

injurious and probably fatal for him to leave his bed or

make any effort whatever to appear as an attorney on the

5th day of February. The affidavit of Mr. Green, made

February 4th, was also filed to the effect that he was at-

torney for the defendant in the above action, and that the

defendant had consulted no other attorney concerning his

interest in said action, and that he was unable to appear in

the district court on the 5th as attorney for the defendant,

because of illness.

The district court overruled the motion for a continuance,

and tlie cause went to trial before a jury and a verdict re-

turned for the plaintiff, assessing the damages at $450. A

motion for a new trial was made and overruled, and this

appeal is from the judgment and from the order overruling
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on February 5th, the defendant made a motion for a continuance and :filed bis affidavit made on that day in which
he swears ''that he cannot safely go to trial at this term
of the above-entitled court on account of the absence of his
attorney, John Green, who is confined to his bed with illness in Culdesac, Nez Perce county, state of Idaho, and
conduct the trial of this case; that affiant did not know that
tbe said Green would be unable to appear in court at the
time this case was set for trial until yesterday morning,
the 4th day of F ebruary, A. D. 1908; that af:fiant bas consulted no other attorney regarding this case, and bad retained no other attorney, and it would be an injustice to
affiant to compel him to go to trial without the presence of
his attorney.
"That af:fiant expects to have present for the purpose of
testifying in this cause at the trial of the same one George
Martin, who is the cashier of the Bank of Culdesac, and
who is confined to his bed with illness, and unable to appear to attend the trial of this cause; that affiant did not
have a subpoena is ued for the said George 1\1artin, for the
said Martin agreed and intended to attend upon the trial
of this cause, and would have been present had he not been
detained on account of illness.''
The affidavit then continues to set forth what the af:fiant
claims Martin will testify to if pre ent at the trial. An
affidavit of Dr. E. L. Burke was also filed, to the effect that
Mr. Green was suffering with la grippe, confined to his bed
under the instruction of the I hysician, and that it would be
injurious and probably fatal for him to leave hi bed or
make any effort whatever to appear as an attorney on the
5th day of February. The affidavit of Mr. Green, made
February 4th, was al o filed to the eff ct that he was att r ey for the defendant in the above action, and that the
def ndant had consulted no other attorney con erning bi
int r . t in .·aid action, and that be wa unabl to appear in
tb :Ii. trict ourt on tb 5th as attorney for the d fendant,
b a .· of illn . .
'lb' i: tri t court ov rruled tb motion for a continuance,
an tlt
u. w nt to trial befor a jury and a verdict return cl r r th plaintiff, a. s sing th dama
at $±50. A
motion .f r a new tri 1 w mad and ov rrul , and thi
ap )al i fr m th ju gment a
from th order ov rruling
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the motion for a new trial. The first error assigned is,

that the trial court erred in overruling the motion for a

continuance. It will be observed from an examination of

the affidavit that the continuance was asked for upon two

grounds : first, because of absence of counsel on account of

illness; second, on account of absence of witness, Ijecause

of illness and failure to attend. The affidavit shows that

John Green, defendant's counsel, was ill and unable to at-

tend the trial of said cause ; that defendant had knowledge

of this fact on the 4th day of February, the day prior to the

day upon which the cause was set for trial. The defend-

ant made no effort to secure other counsel and there is no

showing in the affidavit that the case was in any way com-

plicated or difficult, or that other counsel could not have

been procured who could have familiarized himself with

and properly tried said case on the 5th. In this respect the

affidavit is insufficient. A party to a suit cannot have a post-

ponement of the trial upon the ground of illness of coun-
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sel, without showing diligence on the part of such applicant

to secure other counsel or to consult other counsel as to the

merits of the case for the purpose of ascertaining whether

or not other counsel can be secured who can properly try

said case. If the mere fact that counsel for the applicant

is ill is sufficient to secure a continuance, then it might be

possible to prevent a cause from ever reaching trial. The

applicant must show diligence on his part in supplying the

place of the counsel who is ill, or show some reason why it

is not done. A motion for a continuance is addressed to the

sound discretion of the trial court, and his ruling thereon

will not be disturbed on appeal, unless it appears that there

has been an abuse thereof. (Herron v. Juiy, 1 Ida. 164;

Lillienthal v. Anderson, 1 Ida. 676; Cox v. Northwestern

Stage Co., 1 Ida. 376; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Ida. 151, 77

Pac. 972; Robertson v. Moore, 10 Ida. 115, 77 Pac. 218; Holt

V. Gridley, 7 Ida. 416, 63 Pac. 188; Reynolds v. Corhus, 7

Ida. 481, 63 Pac. 884.)

It is not an abuse of the legal discretion vested in the

trial court to deny an application for a continuance upon the

sole ground that applicant's counsel is ill, where no affidavit

of merits is filed showing that the applicant has a meritor-

ious cause or defense and that other counsel cannot be pro-

cured who are able to try said case. {Condon v. Brockway,

CONTINUANCE
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the motion for a new trial. The first error a ·io-ned is,
that the trial court erred in overruling the motion for a
continuance. It will be observed from an examinati n of
the affidavit that the continuance was a. ked for upon two
grounds: first, becau e of ab ence of counsel on ace unt 0f
illness ; econd, on account of absence of witne s, because
of illn
and failure to attend. The affidavit bow that
John Gr en, defendant's counsel, was ill and unable to attend the trial of said cause; that defendant had knowledge
of this fact on the 4th day of February, the day prior to the
day upon which the cause was set for trial. The defendant made no effort to secure other counsel and there is no
showing in the affidavit that the ca e was in any way complicated or difficult, or that other coun el could not have
been procured who could have familiarized him elf with
and properly tried said ca e on the 5th. In thi re pect the
affidavit is in ufficient. A party to a suit cannot have a postponement of the trial upon the ground of illness of counsel, without howing diligence on the part of such applicant
to ecure other counsel or to con. ult other conn el as to the
merit of the ca e for the purpo. e of a certaininO' whether
or not other oun el can be ecured who can properl try
said case. If the mere fact that counsel for the applicant
is ill is sufficient to secure a continuance, then it might be
po sible to prevent a cause from ever reaching trial. The
ar plicant mu t show diligence on his part in supplying the
place of the coun el who is ill, or show some rea on why it
i not done. A motion for a continuance is addre sed to the
ound discretion of the trial court, and hi ruling thereon
will not be disturbed on appeal, unle s it appears that there
ha been an abuse thereof. (Herron v. Jury , 1 Ida. 164;
Lillienthal v. Ander on, 1 Ida. 676; Co x v. Northwestern
Stage Co., 1 Ida. 376; Richard on v. Ruddy, 10 Ida. 151, 77
Pac. 72; Robertson v. Moore, 10 Ida. 115, 77 Pac. 218; Halt
v. Gridl y, 7 Ida. 416, 63 Pac. 188; Reynolds v. Corbus, 7
Ida. 4 1, 6 Pac. 4.)
It i not an abu e of the l O'al di r tion ve ted in the
trial ourt to den an appli ation for a continuanc u1 on the
sole Tound that applicant' coun el is ill, where no affidavit
of m rit i filed howinO' that the applicant has a meritoriou au e or defense and that other conn el cannot be procured who are_able to try said ca e. (Condon v. Brockway,
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157 111. 90, 41 N. E. 634; Earloe v. Lambie, 132 Cal. 133, 64

Pac. 88; Berentz v. Belmont Oil Co., 148 Cal. 577, 133 Am.

St. Rep. 308, 84 Pac. 47; Thompson v. Thornton, 41 Cal.

626.) As to the sufficiency of the affidavit on account of the

absence of a witness, the affidavit as to the absence of the

witness Martin does not show the facts upon which the

statement is made that the witness is ill and unable to at-

tend said trial. The affidavit does not allege that the appli-

cant knows this as a fact, or disclose from whom he pro-

cured the information, or that he himself or the person

from whom he procured the information was qualified to

say that such witness was too ill to attend said trial. It

does not disclose whether the statement is made upon per-

sonal knowledge of the affiant or upon information. Nei-

ther does the affidavit show any diligence exercised by the

applicant to procure the attendance of the witness. The

fact that the witness agreed to be present is not such a

showing of diligence as will be sufficient to secure a con-
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tinuance for failure of such witness to attend. A party is

not entitled to a continuance of a cause without showing

due diligence and the use of legal means to procure the

desired evidence. A bare request to furnish the evidence is

in no sense a compliance with the requirements of the law.

{Alvord V. United States, 1 Ida. 585; Kuhland v. Sedgwick,

17 Cal. 123; Lightner v. Menzel, 35 Cal. 452.) For these

reasons the court committed no error in overruling the

motion for a continuance.

**********

We find no error in the record in this case, and the judg-

ment will be affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

AiLSHiE, C. J., and Sullivan, J., concur.

157 Ill. 90, 41 N. E. 634; H arloe v. Lambie, 132 Cal. 133, 64
Pac. 88; Berentz v. Belmont Oil Co., 148 Cal. 577, 133 Am.
St. Rep. 308, 84 Pac. 47; Thonipson v. T ·h ornton, 41 Cal.
626.) As to the sufficiency of the affidavit on account of the
absence of a witness, the affidavit as to the absence of the
witness Martin does not show the facts upon which the
statement is made that the witness is ill and unable to attend said trial. The affidavit does not allege that the applicant knows this as a fact, or disclose from whom he procured the information, or that he himself or the person
from whom he procured the information was qualified to
say that such witne was too ill to attend said trial. It
does not disclose whether the statement is made upon personal knowledge of the affiant or upon information. N either does the affidavit show any diligence exercised by the
applicant to procure the attendance of the witness. The
fact that the witness agreed to be present is not such a
showing of diligence as will be sufficient to secure a continuance for failure of such witness to attend. A party is
not entitled to a continuance of a cau e without showing
due diligence and the use of legal means to procure the
de ired evidence. A bare request to furnish the evidence is
in no sense a compliance with the requirements of the law.
(Al orcl v. Unit eel State , 1 Ida. 585; J(uhland v. Sedgwick,
17 Cal. 123; Lightner v. JJ1 enz el, 35 Cal. 452.) For these
rea ons· the court committed no error in overruling the
motion for a continuance.
* * * * * * * * * *
We find no error in the record in thi ca e, and the judgment will be affirmed. Costs award d to respondent.
AILsnrn, C. J., and SULLIVAN, J., concur.
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Section 4. Absence of Party.

JAFFE V. LILIENTHAL.

JAFFE V. LILIENTHAL.

Supreme Court of California. 1894.

101 California, 175.

Supreme Court of California. 1894.

Haynes, C. — On the 21st of December, 1891, this cause

was set for trial for January 6, 1892. On that day plaint-

iff's attorney moved for a continuance upon affidavits of the

plaintiff and his physician showing in substance that the

plaintiff, who then and for about a year prior thereto re-

sided in Seattle, Washington, was confined to his room by

an attack of acute rheumatism to which he was subject, and

was wholly unable to move or leave his room, and in the

opinion of his physician would not be able to leave his room

in less than two months. The affidavit of plaintiff further

stated that his presence at the trial was indispensably nec-

essary; that he was the only person who knew the where-

abouts of the witnesses necessary to be called on his behalf;

that their names had not been communicated to his attor-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ney, nor the matters to which they would testify. D. M,

Delmas, Esq., attorney for plaintiff, also presented his own

affidavit that plaintiff's presence was necessary, that he did

not know the names of plaintiff's witnesses, nor the details

of the case.

No counter-affidavits were presented. The continuance

was denied, plaintiff's attorney left the courtroom, and a

judgment was entered for nonappearance of the plaintiff,

and the plaintiff appeals.

"VVe think the court erred in not granting a continuance.

Respondent suggests that it does not appear that plaintiff

was a witness, nor that his attorney used any diligence to

prepare for the trial.

It seldom happens that a trial can be properly liad in thS

absence of the plaintiff, even where he is disqualified as a

witness, especially where it is to be tried upon oral testi-

mony. With all the care that can reasonably be taken' by

both attorney and client, some matter of vital importance

is liable to be overlooked by them until the trial calls it to

the recollection of the plaintiff, and this is especially true

in relation to matters purely in rebuttal. It is the right

101 California, 175.

HAYNES, 0.-0n the 21st of December, 1891, this cause
was set for trial for January 6, 1892. On that day plaintiff's attorney moved for a continuance upon affidavits of the
plaintiff and hi physician showing in sub tance that the
plaintiff, who then and for about a year prior thereto resided in Seattle, Wa hington, was confined to his room by
an attack of acute rheumati m to which he wa subject, and
was wholly unable to move or leave his room, and in the
opinion of hi ph sician would not be able to leave his room
in less than two months. The affidavit of plaintiff further
stated that his presence at the trial was indispensably necessary; that he was the only per on who knew the whereabout of the witnesse nece ary to be called on his behalf;
that their names bad n·ot been communicated to bis attorney, nor the matters to which they would testify. D. M.
Delma , Esq., attorney for plaintiff, also presented his own
affidaYit that plaintiff's presence was necessary, that he did
not know the name of plaintiff's witnesses, nor the details
of the case.
No counter-affidavits were presented. The continuance
wa denied, plaintiff's attorney left the courtroom, and a
judgment was entered for nonappearance of the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff appeals.

* * * * * * * * * •
We think the court erred in not granting a continuance.
Respondent sugge t that it does not appear that plaintiff
wa a witne s, nor that his attorney used any diligence to
prepare for the trial.
It seldom happens that a trial can be properly bad in th~
absence of the plaintiff, even where he is disqualified as a
witne , e pecially where it is to be tried upon oral testimon . With all th care that can rea onably be taken· by
both attorney and client ome matter of vital importance
i liable to be overlooked by them until the trial calls it to
the recollection of the plaintiff, and this is especially true
in relation to matters purely in rebuttal. It is the right
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of parties tb be present at the trial of their cases. This

right may be waived, and should be held to be waived

where the absence of the party is voluntary and under cir-

cumstances which ought not to induce a reasonable man

having a due regard for the rights and interests of others

and of the public, all of whom are interested in the due

and prompt administration of justice, to absent himself.

So far as the want of preparation on the part of the at-

torney is concerned, the most laborious and painstaking

preparation on his part would not have prevented the sick-

ness and absence of his client; nor does it appear that if

the plaintiff had not been sick the necessary preparation

could not have been made after the case was set for trial.

Eespondent further contends that the affidavits do not

show the materiality of the evidence expected to be ob-

tained.

The application for continuance was not made under sec-

tion 595 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but under section
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594, which authorizes the court ''for good cause" to post-

pone the trial in the absence of a party. The consequences

of a dismissal of an action because of the absence of a

plaintiff should always be considered, especially where any

reasonable excuse is shown for his absence, as where a plea

of the statute of limitations could be interposed to a new

action. In such case the dismissal is the absolute destruc-

tion of the plaintiff's right, and so serious a penalty should

not be imposed unless the due administration of justice

clearly requires it.

The judgment appealed from should be reversed.

Vanclief^ C, and Searls, C, concurred.

For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judg-

ment appealed from is reversed.

Fitzgerald, J., De Haven, J.

McFarland, J. — I concur in the judgment.
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of parties to be present at the trial of their cases. This
right may be waived, and should be held to be waived
where the absence of the party is voluntary and under circumstances which ought not to induce a reasonable man
having a due regard for the rights and interests of others
and of the public, all of whom are interested in the due
and prompt administration of justice, to absent himself.
So far as the want of preparation on the part of the attorney is concerned, the most laborious and painstaking
preparation on his part would not have prevented the sickness and absence of his client; nor does it appear that if
the plaintiff had not been sick the necessary preparation
could not have been made after the case was set for trial.
Respondent further contends that the affidavits do not
show the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained.
The application for continuance was not made under section 595 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but under section
594, which authorizes the court ''for good cause'' to postpone the trial in the absence of a party. The consequences
of a dismissal of an action because of the absence of a
plaintiff should always be considered, especially where any
reasonable excuse is shown for his absence, as where a plea
of the statute of limitations could be interposed to a new
action. In such casf3 the dismissal is the absolute destruction of the plaintiff's right, and so serious a penalty should
not be imposed unless the due administration of justice
clearly requires it.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed.
VANCLIEF, C., and SEARLS, C., concurred.
For th rea on given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment appealed from is reversed.
FrTZGE ALD, J., DE HAVEN, J.
McFARLAND, J.-I concur in the judgment.
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USBORNE V. STEPHENSON.

U BORNE V. STEPHENSON.

Supreme Court of Oregon. 1899.

36 Oregon, 328.

* * * On the day set for the trial, but before the jury

Supreme Court of Oregon. 1899.

was called, the plaintiff moved for a continuance on account

of the absence of material testimony; basing his motion

36 Oregon, 328.

upon an affidavit of his counsel to the effect that he could

not safely proceed to trial without the depositions of several

residents of London. The motion being denied, a jury was

impaneled and sworn; but, before any evidence had been

given, the plaintiff filed a motion for permission to with-

draw a juror, based upon an affidavit of his counsel sub-

stantially the same as the one filed in support of the motion

for a continuance, except that it contained a statement to

the effect that the cause had been set down for hearing

in violation of a verbal understanding and agreement with

counsel for defendants, which, however, was denied by a
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counter affidavit. This motion was likewise denied, and the

cause proceeded to trial, resulting in a judgment in favor

of defendants for the sum of $537. Oi, from which the plain-

tiff appeals, assigning as error the overruling of his mofion

to withdraw a juror, and certain instructions given to the

jury.

Ajjirmed.

Mr. Justice Bean, after stating the facts, delivered the

opinion of the court.

1. This is the first attempt, so far as we are advised,

to invoke in this state the practice of withdrawing a juror.

There is but little satisfactory information to be obtained

from the books in regard to the ancient practice, which

used to be resorted to when a party was taken by surprise

on a trial, of withdrawing a juror, and thus causing a mis-

trial, and, of necessity, a postponement of the case. It was

originally confined to criminal cases, and seems to have

been adopted for the purpose of avoiding a rule which once

obtained, based largely upon a dictum of Lord Coke, that a

jury sworn and charged in any criminal case could not be

T. p.— 12

• • • On the day set for the trial, but before the jury
was called the plaintiff moved for a continuance on account
of the ab ence of material te timony; ba ing his motion
upon an affidavit of his counsel to the effect that he could
not safely proceed to trial without the depo itions of seYeral
resident of London. The motion being denied, a jury wa
impaneled and sworn; but, before any evidence had been
given, the plaintiff filed a motion for permi ion to withdraw a juror, based upon an affidavit of hi coun el ubstantially the ame as the one filed in upport of the motion
for a continuance, except that it contained a tatement to
the effect that the cau e had been set down for hearin ·
in violation of a verbal under tanding and agr ement with
coun el for defendant which, however wa d nied by a
counter affidavit. Thi motion wa likewi e denied and the
cau e proceeded to trial re ulting in a judement in fayor
of defendant for the sum of $537.0±, from which the plaintiff appeals as igning a error the O'i erruling of hi mo~lon
to withdraw a juror, and certain in truction ;iYen to th
JUry.
Affirm ed.
Mn. J STICE BEAN, after stating the fact , liv red the
opinion of the court.
1. This is the first attempt o far a we ar ad' i ed
to invoke in thi state th practice of withdrawin a Juror.
There i but little ati fa tor. information to h btainecl
from the book in re ·ar to th an ·i n t l ra ti
which
u ed to be re orted to wh n a part3 wa tak n l y urpri e
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discharged without giving a verdict. To escape the effect

of this rule, and yet apparently observe it to the letter, the

courts resorted to the fiction of directing the clerk to call a

juror out of the box, when it appeared that the prosecution

was taken by surprise on the trial, whereupon the prosecu-

tion objected, or was supposed to object, to proceeding

with the eleven jurors, and the trial went over for the term:

2 Hawk, P. C. 619; 2 Hale, P. C. 294; Wedderburn's Case,

Fost. 22; People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cas. 301 (1 Am. Dec.

168); United States v. CooUdge, 2 Gall. 363 (Fed. Cas.

No. 14,858). It was nothing more, however, than a means

of obtaining a continuance or postponement of the trial

after the jury had been impaneled and sworn. At first it

was thought this could be done only by the court ordering

the discharge of one of the jurors, and then holding that,

as the case could not be tried before the remaining eleven,

it must be continued. But after the doctrine of Lord Coke

had been repudiated, and it became the settled rule that
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it was within the power of the court, in a proper case, to

discharge the jury after it had been impaneled and sworn,

and continue the cause, the device of withdrawing a juror

seems to have become practically obsolete, and but little,

if any, reference to it as a substantive practice is to be

thereafter found in the books. That it ever prevailed at

common law in civil cases is very doubtful. No case has

come under our observation in which it was resorted to in

England. Indeed, the only reference we have been able

to find to the question in the early authorities is a note to

Chedwick v. Hughes, Carth. 464, in which it is stated that

Lord Chief Justice Holt, in a case of perjury tried before

him, said that it was the opinion of all the judges of Eng-

land, upon debate between them, that in civil cases a juror

cannot be withdrawn but by consent of all parties. And

while the authority of this note underwent a critical exami-

nation in the subsequent case of Sir John Wedderhurn,

Fost. 28, from which its authority is rendered rather ques-

tionable, it seems to be the only reference to the practice in

civil cases. It was early ruled, however, in this country,

by the courts of New York, after some hesitation, that a

court may allow a juror to be withdrawn in a civil case,

when necessary to save the plaintiff from the consequence

of a fatal mistake in his testimony: People v. Judges of

discharged without giving a verdict. To escape the effect
of this rule, and yet apparently observe it to the letter, the
courts resorted to the fiction of directing the clerk to call a
juror out of the box, when it appeared that the prosecution
was taken by surprise on the trial, whereupon the prosecution objected, or was supposed to object, to proceeding
with the eleven jurors, and the trial went over for the term:
2 Hawk, P. C. 619; 2 Hale, P. C. 294; Wedderburn's Case,
Fost. 22; People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cas. 301 (1 Am. Dec.
168) ; United States v. Coolidge, 2 Gall. 363 (Fed. Cas.
No. 14,858). It was nothing more, however, than a means
of obtaining a continuance or postponement of the trial
after the jury had been impaneled and sworn. At first it
was thought this could be done only by the court ordering
the discharge of one of the jurors, and then holding that,
as the case could not be tried before the remaining eleven,
it must be continued. But after the doctrine of Lord Coke
had been repudiated, and it became the settled rule that
it was within the power of the court, in a proper case, to
discharge the jury after it had been impaneled and sworn,
and continue the cause, the device of withdrawing a juror
seems to have become practically obsolete, and but little,
if any, reference to it as a substantive practice is to be
thereafter found in the books. That it ever prevailed at
common law in civil cases is very doubtful. No case has
come under our observation in which it wa resorted to in
1 ngland.
Indeed, the only reference we have been able
to find to the question in the early authorities is a note to
Chedwick v. Hughes, Carth. 464, in which it is stated that
Lord Chief Justice Holt, in a case of perjury tried before
him, said that it was the opinion of all the judges of England, upon debate between them, that in civil cases a juror
annot b withdrawn but by onsent of all parties. And
whil the authority of thi not und rwent a critical examin ti n in the sub equent ca e of Sir John Wedderburn,
:B, t. 28, from wbi h it authority i rendered rather que i
bl , it e m. to b the only reference to the practice in
ivil a . It w . arly rul d, how ver, in thi country,
y t e
rt. f ew ork, aft r · ome he itation, that a
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llow a juror to b withdrawn in a civil ca. '
w}1 n n · ·: ry to av th plaintiff from th
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of a fatal mi tak in hi t ·Lim ny: People v. Judges of
r
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'Bew York, 8 Cow, 127. And we believe it is still regarded

as a proper practice in that state, and is open to either

party: Bishop, Code PI. sec. 428; Dillon v. Cockcroft, 90

N. Y. 649; Messenger v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 48 How. Prac.

542. But, so far as we have been able to ascertain, it does

not prevail elsewhere in this country; the same result being

accomiDlished by a direct application to the court for a post-

ponement of the trial: 4 Enc. PI. & Prac. 863. We are

therefore of the opinion that the motion was properly

denied on the ground that no such jDractice prevails in this

state.

2. But, however that may be, whatever authorities there

are on the subject all agree that the practice can be re-

sorted to only when a party finds himself taken by surprise

on the trial, and when further proceeding therewith would

be productive of great hardship or manifest injustice to him.

Mr. BishojD, in the section of his work on Code Pleading al-

ready recited, in speaking of the New York practice, says :
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'* Instead of submitting to a nonsuit, the plaintiff, if he finds

himself taken by surprise on the tiral, — as by the absence

of a witness who has been in attendance, or by the unex-

pected presentation of evidence by his adversary which he

is not prepared to meet, or by any accident which might

render the further progress of the trial disastrous and un-

fair to him, — may ask the court to withdraw a juror. The

result of this application, if granted, will be to produce a

mistrial; and the court may then continue the pending ac-

tion, and set the trial over to a future da}^, when the plaintiff

may come properly prepared to try the case afresh. ' ' With-

in this rule, the plaintiff's motion was likewise properly

denied, because it is not based upon anything occurring at

the trial, but upon matters happening long prior thereto,

and which could be, and were, properly submitted to the

court in support of the motion for a continuance made be-

fore the jury was empaneled.

**********

This disposes of the questions made on the appeal, and,

there being no error in the record, we have no alternative

but to affirm the judgment.

Affirmed.^

^The practice of withdrawing a juror in civil causes is familiar in several

states. Eosengarten v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, (1903) 69 N.
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New Yark, 8 Cow. 127. And we believe it is still regarded
as a proper practice in that state, and i open to either
party: Bishop, ode Pl. sec. 428; Dillo n v. Cockcroft, 90
N. Y. 649; "JJ1essenger v. Fou rth Nat. Bank, 48 How. Prac.
542. But, so far a we ha' e been able to a certain, it doe
not prevail el ewhere in thi country; the same result being
accompli hed by a direct application to the court for a po tponement of the trial: 4 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 863. We are
therefore of the opinion that the motion was properly
denied on the ground that no uch practice prevails in this
state.
2. But, however that may be, whate er authorities there
are on the subject all agree that the practice can be resorted to only when a part find himself taken by surprise
on the trial, and when further proceeding therewith would
be productive of great hard hip or manife t injustice to him.
Mr. Bishop, in the section of his wor.k on Code Pleading already recited, in speaking of the New York practice, says:
''Instead of submitting to a non uit, the plaintiff, if he finds
himself taken by surpri e on the tiral,-as by the absence
of a witness who has been in attendance, or by the unexpected presentation of evidence by hi adversary which he
is not prepared to meet, or by any accident which might
render the further progress of the trial disastrous and unfair to him,-may ask the court to withdraw a juror. The
result of this application, if granted, will be to produce a
mistrial; and the court may then continue the pending action, and set the trial over to a future day, when the plaintiff
may come proper! prepared to try the case afresh.'' Within this rule, the plaintiff's motion was likewi e properly
denied, because it is not based upon anything occurring at
the trial, but upon matters happening long prior thereto,
and which could be, and were, properly submitted to the
court in support of the motion for a continuance made be£ore the jury was empaneled.
* * * * * * * * * *
This dispo e of the que tions made on the appeal, and,
there being no error in the record, we have no alternative
but to affirm the judgment.
Affirmed. 1
1The practice of withdrawing a juror in civil causes is familiar in seve ral
states. Rosengarten v. Central Railroad Company of New Jer ey, (1903) 69 N.
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J. L. 220, 54 Atl. 564; McKahan v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., (1909) 223

Pa. St. 1, 72 Atl. 251; Smith v. Chicago Junction Ry. Co., (1906) 127 111,

App. 89; Crane v. Blaekman, (1901) 100 111. App. 565; Cattano v. Metropolitan

Street Ry. Co., (1903) 173 N. Y. 565, 66 N. E. 563; Rawson v. Silo, (1905)

105 N. Y. App. Div. 278, 93 N. Y. Suppl. 416.

In Planer v. Smith, (1876) 40 Wis. 31, the court said: "The power of the

circuit court, in a proper case, to permit a juror to be withdrawn, or to order a

nonsuit, is undoubted; but there is no necessary connection between the two

processes. The withdrawal of a juror operates to continue the cause, and does

not of itself entitle the defendant to a judgment of any kind. If a nonsuit

be properly granted, the withdrawal of a juror as preliminary thereto is en-

tirely superfluous and harmless. But if judgment of nonsuit be rendered

merely because a juror has been withdrawn, such judgment is founded upon a

TRIAL PRACTICE
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J. L. 220, 54 Atl. 564; McKahan v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., (1909) 223
Pa. St. 1, 72 Atl. 251; Smith v. Chicago Junction Ry. Co., (1906) 127 Ill.
App. 89; Crane v. Blackman, (1901) 100 Ill. App. 565; Cattano v. Metropolitan
Street Ry. Co., ( 1903 ) 173 N. Y. 565, 66 N. E. 563; Rawson v. Silo, ( 190;:))
105 N. Y. App. Div. 278, 93 N. Y. Suppl. 416.
In Planer v. Smith, (1876) 40 Wis. 31, the court said: "The power of the
circuit court, in a proper case to permit a juror to be withdrawn, or to order a
nonsuit, is undoubted; but there is no necessary connection between the two
processes. The withdrawal of a jnror operates to continue the cause, and does
not of itself entitle the defendant to a judgment of any kind. If a nonsuit
be properly granted, the withdrawal of a juror as preliminary thereto is en·
tfrely superfluous and harmless.
But if judgment of nonsuit be rendered
merely because a juror has been withdrawn, such judgment is founded upon a
misapprehension of the legal effect of withdrawing a juror, and is erroneous.''

misapprehension of the legal effect of withdrawing a juror, and is erroneous."

Section 6. Teems.

MAUND V. LOEB.

Supreme Court of Alabama. 1888.

87 Alabama, 374.
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Clopton, J. The continuance of a case is in the discre-

tion of the court, and such terms may be imposed, under the

rule of iDractice, as to the court may seem proper. At the

SECTION

6.

TERMS.

Fall term, 1888, of the Circuit Court, defendant obtained

a continuance, upon payment of all the costs as a condition

MAUND V. LOEB.

precedent, to be paid in ninety days, or judgment to go

against him at the next term. The costs were not paid until

the first day of the next term, and after the case was called

Supreme Court of .Alabama. 1888.

for trial, which was more than ninety days from the time

of the order. Defendant having applied for, obtained, and

87 .Alabama, 374.

accepted the continuance, we must infer that he consented

to the terms upon which it was granted. It was no excuse,

that an itemized bill of costs had not been furnished, when

it is not shown that defendant otfered to pay the costs, or

applied for such bill; and the court was not bound to ac-

cept payment after the expiration of the prescribed time,

as a compliance with the condition upon which the con-

tinuance was obtained. The court was authorized to render

judgment nil dicit against defendant. Waller v. Sultz-

lacher, 38 Ala. 318.

Afirmed.

CLOPTON, J. The continuance of a case is in the discretion of the court, and such terms may be imposed, under the
rule of practice, as to the court may seem proper. At the
Fall term, 1888, of the Circuit Court, defendant obtained
a continuance, upon payment of all the costs as a condition
preced nt, to be paid in ninety days, or judgment to go
a()'ainst him at the next term. The co ts were not paid until
the :first day of the next term, and after the case was called
for trial, which was more than ninety days from the time
of the order. Defendant having applied for, obtained, and
a pted the continuance, we must infer that he consented
t th term u on whi hit wa granted. It was no excuse,
tlmt an it mizod bill of costs had not been furnish d, when
jt j _ n t hown that defendant offered to pay the co ts, or
appli d for such bill; and the court was not bound to ac. 'Pt pa_ m nt aft r the xpiration of the pr scribed time,
,.
m lian e with the condition upon which the contiuuan e wa o tained. The court wa authorized tor nder
.iu J
nt nil dicit <>"ainst def ndant. Waller v. Sultzuacher, 38 .Ala.

• • • • • • • • • •

Affirmed.

CHAPTER V.

THE JURY.

Section 1. Eight to a Juey Trial.

LEE V. CONRAN.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1908.

CHAPTER V.

213 Missouri, 404.

Woodson, J. — This suit is based upon section 650, Ee-

THE JURY.

vised Statutes 1899, to determine and quiet title to the lands

described in the petition.

**********

1. The first insistence of appellant is that the action of

SECTION

1.

RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.

the trial court in refusing him a trial by jury was error.

So far as I am aware, this court has never jDassed directly

upon the question as to whether or not the parties to a suit

LEE V. CONRAN.

based upon section 650, Revised Statutes 1899, are entitled

to a jury.

Supreme Coiirt of 1.IJissouri. 1908.

In order to properly determine that question we must

first ascertain the nature of the issues joined and the rem-

213 Missouri, 404.

edy the parties are entitled to under the pleadings. If
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the issues joined entitled the parties to an ordinary judg-

ment at law, then, under the Constitution and the laws of

the State, the parties are entitled to a trial by a jury; but

if the issues tendered are equitable in their nature and

call for equitable relief, then the cause is triable before the

WoonsoN, J. -This uit i ba ed upon section 650, Revised Statutes 1899 to determine and quiet title to the lands
de cribed in the petition.

chancellor.

Section 28 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1875 pro-

vides that "The right of trial by jury, as heretofore en-

joyed, shall remain inviolate." This court, in the case of

State V. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 1. c. 358, held that the constitu-

tional guaranty of "the right of trial by jury as hereto-

fore enjoyed" has reference to the status of that right as

it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.

And this court, in the case of State ex rel. v. Withrow, 133

181

1. The first in i tence of appellant is that the action of
the trial court in refu. ing him a trial by jury wa error.
o far a I am aware, this court has never pa ed directly
upon the que tion as to whether or not the parties to a suit
ba ed upon section 650, Re' i ed Statutes 1899, are entitled
to a jury.
In order to properly determine that que tion we must
first a certain the nature of the i sues joined an the remed the parties are entitled to un ler the pleadings. If
the i ues joined entitled the partie to an ordinar judgment at law, then under the Con titution and the laws of
the State, the parties are entitled to a trial by a jury; but
if the issue. tendered are equitable in their nature and
call for equitable relief, then the cause is triable before the
chancellor.
Section 28 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1 75 provides that ''The right of trial by jury, as heretofore enjoyed, hall remain inviolate." This court, in the ca e of
tate v. Boele tr1tck, 136 Io. 1. c. 35 , held that th con titutional ·uaranty of ' tb ri ·ht of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed" has ref r nee to the tatus of that right as
it exi ted at the time of the ado1Jtion of the on titution.
And this court, in the case of tate ex rel. v. Withrow, 133

181

182
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Mo. 1. c. 519, held that said section 28 ''means that all the

substantial incidents and consequences which pertained to

the right of trial by jury are beyond the reach of hostile

legislation, and are preserved in their ancient substantial

extent as existed at common law."

In order to determine whether the case at bar comes

within the meaning of that section of the Constitution,

as interpreted by those adjudications, we must first de-

termine what the issue tendered by the pleadings is, and,

after doing so, we must then ascertain how that issue was

triable before the adoption of that constitutional provis-

ion ; if by jury, then either party is entitled to a trial of that

issue by a jury regardless of any statutory provision; but

if it was not triable by jury prior to that time, then the

Constitution does not govern, and we would then look to the

statutes and the common law for a rule by which to solve

the question.

We will first determine the nature of the issue presented
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by the pleadings. The petition charges that the plaintiff

is the owner of the land described therein, and that de-

fendant claims some interest or estate therein, the nature

of which is unknown to plaintiff, except that it is adverse

and prejudicial to his interests. The answer denies the

allegations of plaintiff's ownership, and alleges that the

lands are accretions; that plaintiff claims that they ac-

creted to his patent land on the Missouri side of the Missis-

sippi river; that he claims and charges the fact to be that

they are accretions to an island formed and located in the

Mississippi river ; that under an act approved April 8, 1895,

the title to such lands vested in the county for the use of

the public schools ; and that he purchased them from the

county of New Madrid. When reduced to its final analysis,

the issue is plainly one of accretion — that is, was the land

in question accreted and added to the shore line of plaint-

iff's land, by gradual and imperceptible alluvial deposits,

or was it added by that means to the lands of the island?

Tf to the former, then the title is in plaintiff as charged

in bis petition; but if to tlie latter, tlion they belong to the

defendant. That is the sole and only question presented

by the pleadings; and that was the finding and judgment

of tlie trial court.

Having rk'teiniined that the issue is one of accertion, we

Aw

wI
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Mo. 1. c. 519, held that said section 28 "means that all the
substa11tial incidents and consequences which pertained to
the right of trial by jury are beyond the reach of hostile
legislation, and are pre erved in their ancient substantial
extent as existed at common law."
In order to determine whether the case at bar comes
within the meaning of that section of the Constitution,
as interpreted by those adjudications, we must first determine what the issue tendered by the pleadings is, and,
after doing so, we must then ascertain how that issue was
triable before the adoption of that constitutional provision; if by jury, then either party is entitled to a trial of that
issue by a jury regardless of any statutory provision; but
if it was not triable by jury prior to that time, then the
Constitution does not govern, and we would then look to the
statutes and the common law for a rule by which to solve
the question.
We will first determine the nature of the issue presented
by the pleadings. The petition charges that the plaintiff
is the owner of the land described therein, and that defendant claims some interest or estate therein, the nature
of which is unknown to plaintiff, except that it is adverse
and prejudicial to hi interests. The answer denies the
allegations of plaintiff's ownership, and alleges that the
lands are accretions; that plaintiff claims that they accreted to his patent land on the Missouri side of the J\fississippi river; that he claims and charges the fact to be that
they are accretions to an island formed and located in the
Mi sissippi riv r; that under an act approved April 8, 1895,
the title to uch land., ve ted in the county for the use of
the public . chool. ; and that he purchased them from the
county of N w J\1adrid. \Vh n reduced to its final analysis,
th i . ue is plainly on of accretion-that is, was the land
in u tion accret d and add d to the shore line of plaintiff': land, by O'radual and imper eptible alluvial deposits,
r wa it add d h that means to th lands of the island 1
f t the former,· then the title is in plaintiff as charged
in hi .
tition; 1 ut if to th . latt r, th n th b long to the
d f n a t. Th t i. th . ol and o ly ue ti n presented
h. th
1 adin g. ; an 1 that a th findinO' a
ju O'ment
of he tri c l onrt.
Haring l ' L 'l'min c that the i. u j on of ac rtion, we
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will DOW ascertain in what manner that issue was triable

at common law and under the statute of this State prior

to the adoption of the constitutional provision. I have been

unable to find a case in this State where that precise ques-

tion has been decided, yet by an examination of numerous

cases, which fill our reports, involving the question of ac-

cretion, I find that they were invariably tried before a jury,

except in a few cases where a jury was waived. In addi-

tion to that, I might add that during the thirty years I

have been practicing law and occupying the bench, I have

never seen or heard of a case in which it was contended that

the question of accretion was not triable by a jury. Clearly

that was the practice prior to the passage of section 650,

Kevised Statutes 1899, which was enacted in the year 1897.

All suits in this State prior to that enactment involving

questions of accretion were possessory actions, and were

for the recovery of specific real property. In fact, without

that section, I know of no way in which the question of ac-
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cretion could be tried, except by ejectment, which has al-

ways been triable by jury, excepting, of course, those cases

where the answer set up an equitable defense and crossbill

and asked for affirmative relief, which were and are triable

before the chancellor without the aid of a jury. If it be

true that prior to the adoption of the constitutional pro-

vision mentioned the question of accretion was triable alone

in some action involving the recovery of the specific land

accreted, then under the express provisions of section 691,

Kevised Statutes 1899, which was enacted long prior to the

adoption of the Constitution of 1875, the issue was triable

by a jury. That section of the statute provides that, ''An

issue of fact in an action for the recovery * * * of

specific real or personal property must be tried by a jury,"

etc.

From these observations it seems to be clear that the

question of title by accretion was one triable by a jury prior

to the adoption of said section 28 of the Constitution; and,

consequently, in obedience to its mandate, any action in-

volving that issue must still be triable by a jury regardless

of any subsequent legislation upon the subject.

We are, therefore, of the opinion the court erred in re-

fusing defendant a trial by a jury.

THE JURY

183

will now ascertain in what manner that issue was triable
at common law and under the statute of this State prior
to the adoption of the constitutional provi ion. I have been
unable to find a case in thi State where that precise question has been decided, yet by an examination of numerous
cases, which fill our report , involving the question of accretion, I find that they were invariably tried before a jury,
except in a few cases where a jury was waived. In addition to that, I might add that during the thirty years I
have been practicing law and occupying the bench, I have
never seen or heard of a case in which it was contended that
the question of accretion wa not triable by a jury. Clearly
that was the practice prior to the passage of section 650,
Revised Statutes 1899, which was enacted in the year 1897.
All suits in this State prior to that enactment involving
questions of accretion were possessory actions, and were
for the recovery of specific real property. In fact, without
that section, I know of no way in which the question of accretion could be tried, except by ejectment, which has always been triable by jury, excepting, of course, those ca es
where the answer set up an equitable defense and crossbill
and asked for affirmative relief, which were and are triable
before the chancellor without the aid of a jury. If it be
true that prior to the adoption of the constitutional provision mentioned the question of accretion was triable alone
in some action involving the recovery of the specific land
accreted, then under the express provisions of section 691,
Revised Statutes 1899, which was enacted long prior to the
adoption of the Con titution of 1875, the issue was triable
by a jury. That section of the statute provides that, ''An
issue of fact in an action for the recovery * * * of
pecific real or personal property must be tried by a jury,''
etc.
From these observations it seems to be clear that the
que tion of title by accretion was one triable by a jury prior
to the adoption of aid ection 28 of the Con ti tation; and:
consequently, in ob dience to its mandat , any action in' olving that is ue mu t till be triable by a jury regardle s
of any sub equent le()'i l tion upon the subject.
We ar , therefore, of th opinion the ourt erred in re·
fusing d f ndant a trj al b~~ a jury.

• • * * * • * • • •

184
184 Trial Peactice [Chap. 5

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment

shoiild be reversed and the canse remanded for a new trial.

It is so ordered.

AU concur, except Valliant, P. J., absent.

Section 2. Wai\t:r of Jury.

TRIAL PRACTICE

[ Chap.5

We are, the ref ore, of the opinion that the j udgment
should be reversed and the cause remanded for a n ew t rial.
It is so ordered.
All concur, except VALLIANT, P. J., absent.

SCHUMACHER V. CRANE-CHURCHILL COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Nebraska. 1902.

66 Nebraska, 440.

Pound, C.

Although a number of difficult and interesting questions

were argued, we need only consider the assignment that the

court erred in denying the plaintiff a jury trial. The action

is in ejectment. After the defendant had answered, plaint-

SECTION 2. \!VAIVER

OF

JURY.

iff moved that the cause be transferred to the equity docket,

for the reason that certain equitable defenses were set up.

SCHUMACHER V. CRANE-CHURCHILL COMPANY.

This motion was granted, the cause was transferred, and

at the May term, 1900, the whole case was tried to the

court, without objection, and a judgment rendered. At

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

1902.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the same term this judgment was vacated and the cause re-

submitted, without further trial, after which a new judg-

66 Nebraska, 440.

ment was entered. Thereupon the plaintiff moved for a

new trial under section 630, Code of Civil Procedure, and

an order was entered, pursuant to said section, sus-

taining the motion and continuing tlie cause to the next

term. At the February term, 1901, as the cause was com-

ing on for trial, tlie plaintiff filed a written motion or de-

mand that a jury pass upon the issues of a legal nature,

namely, whether he had a legal estate in the premises in

controversy and was entitled to possession thereof. The

motion was overruled, and the request was denied, to which

the plaintiff excepted. Thereafter, in due course, the whole

cause was tried to the court, over plaintiff's objection, and

findings and judgment were entered, from which he pro-

secutes error.

We are satisfied that the order transferring the cause to

POUND, C.
Although a number of difficult and interesting que tions
were argued, we need only consider the assignment that the
court erred in denying the plaintiff a jury trial. The action
is in ejectment. After the defendant had answered, plaintiff moved that the cause be tran £erred to the equity docket,
for the reason that certain equitable def en. es were set up.
This motion was granted, the cause was tran. ferred, and
at the May term, 1900, the whole case was tried to the
court, without obj ction, and a judgment rendered. At
the ame term thi judo·ment was vacated and the cause resubmitted, without further trial, after which a new judgm nt was entered. Thereupon the plaintiff moved for a
n w trial under section 630, Code of Civil Procedure, and
an ord r wa
nterecl, I ur uant to aid section, sustainin · the motion an
ontinuino· th
ause to the next
term. At the F bruar)r t rm, 1901, as the cau e was coming on for trial, the i laintiff fil d a writt n motion or demand that a jury pa. upon the is u
of a 1 gal natur ,
nam ly, wh th r be had a leO'al , tate in the premi es in
ntr v r y an l wa
ntit1ed to po ,_· ion thereof. Th
m lj m a. ov rrul , an th r gu st a l i d, to which
th_, plaintiff x cpt d. Th reafter in ue cour e, the whol
<' u. , wa. tri
t th ourt, v r i Iaintiff's obj ction, and
fi <lino- and jnrlo·m nt w l'
nt r d, from whi h he pro. c· 1tr: rr r.
V ar sati, fi · th t tbc order transferring the cause t o

Sec. 2]
Sec. 2] The Juky 185

the equity docket because of the equitable defenses set up in

the answer did not preclude the party who procured the

order from demanding that the purely legal issues be tried

by jury, if his request for a jury trial was timely and was

insisted upon. It has been decided that an order transfer-

ring a cause to the equity docket is not an adjudication

that the parties are not entitled to a jury trial, and that

if demand is made prior to the time the cause is called for

trial, it is error to deny a jury. Lett v. Hammond, 59 Nebr.

339. In that case, the cause was transferred at the instance

of one party, while the other demanded a jury. But the

distinction would not be material unless it could be said

that the application to have the cause transferred was an

assertion that there was nothing for a jury to trj^, and es-

topped the moving party from assuming a contrary posi-

tion subsequently. This car not be true, for the same rea-

son that the order transferring the cause is not a decision

whether the parties are entitled to a jury. The whole case
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is not of necessity triable to the court without a jury be-

cause there are incidental issues which are equitable in

their nature. Lett v. Hammond, supra; Yager v. Exchange

Nat. Bank, 52 Nebr. 321. By asking for the transfer,

plaintiff merely asserted that there were equitable issues

proper for the court to decide. He did not assert that there

was nothing for a jury. Under a practice not unlike ours,

it has been held more than once that consent that a case

in which the facts require both equitable and legal relief

should be placed on the equity docket for trial does not of

itself waive the right to have the issues requiring purely

legal relief tried bv a jury. Wheelock v. Lee, 74 N. Y. 495 :

Underhill v. Manhattan R. Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.),

478; Eggers v. Manhattan R. Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.),

463. This must be so, since the practice of trying to the

court the equitable defenses, by reason of which the right

to maintain the action at law is challenged, and thereafter,

if the disposition of the equitable defenses makes it neces-

sary, trj'ing the purely legal controversy, which is the gist

of the case, to a jury, is well settled. Arguello v. E dinger,

10 Cal. 150; Sicasey v. Adair, 88 Cal. 179, 25 Pac. Rep.

l\V^',Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. (U. S.), 670; Smith v.

Bryce, 17 S. Car. 538, 544. AVe think, therefore, that the

motion to transfer the cause to the equity docket and the
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the equity docket becau e of the equitable def en es et up in
the an. wer did not pre lude the party who procured the
order from em anding that the purely l gal i ues be tried
by jury, if bi reque t for a jurv trial wa timely and was
insi ted upon. It bas been decid d that an order tran £erring a cau e to the equity docket i not an a judication
that the partie are not entitled to a jury trial, and that
if demand i made prior to the time th cau e i called for
trial, it is error to deny a jury. L ett v. H aniniond, 59 Nebr.
339. In that case the can e wa transferred at the instance
of one party, while the other demanded a jury. But the
di tin tion would not be material unle it could be said
that the a plication to have the cause tran £erred was an
assertion that there wa nothing for a jury to try, and estopped the moving party from a urning a contrary position sub equently. Thi ca11 not be true, for the same reason that the order tran f rrin()' the cau e is not a decision
whether the partie are entitled to a jury. The whole case
is not of nece it~ triable to the court without a jury beau e there are incid ntal i ues which are equitable in
their nature. L ett v. Hammond, supra; Yager v. Exchange
L\ at . Bank, 52 Nebr. 321. By a king for the transfer~
plaintiff merely as ert cl that there were equitable issues
proper for the court to decide. He did not assert that there
was nothino· for a jury. Under a practice not unlike ours,
it has been held more than once that con ent that a case
in which the fact require both equitable and legal relief
should be placed on the equit docket for trial does not of
it elf waive the right to hav the is u
requiring purely
legal relief trie 1 by a jury. TT7h eelock v. Lee, 74 N. Y. 495:
U11d rhill v. Manhattan R. o., 27 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.),
47 ; Eggers v. Manhattan R. o., 27 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.),
463. Thi mu t be o, ince the practice of trying to the
court the equitable def n e , 1 y rea on of which the right
to m i tain th action at law is chall no-e , and thereafter.
if the i po. ition of th quitable def en
makes it necesary, tr. ino- the ur ly l ·al ntrover y, which i the gist
of the a
t a jury i
11 ttl d. Arguello v. Edinger,
10 al. 1- ; zca. ey v. Adair,
al. 1'"" 25 Pac. Rep.
111 ;Ba ey v. allag'1Pr :...0 \Vall. (U. .), 670; Smith v.
Bryce, 17
ar. .J \ 3-1-L \Y think th r fore, that the
motion to t! an f r the
u e to the equity docket and the

186

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 5

186 Trial Practice [Chap. 5

order in accordance therewith, did not, of themselves,

amount to waiver of a jury, especially as the equitable de-

fenses in this case were relatively of little moment. There

can be no doubt, however, that the plaintiff waived a jury

at the first trial by going to trial upon all the issues with-

out demanding a jury as to any of them. The statutory

method of waiving a jury is not exclusive. Any unequivocal

acts or conduct which clearly show a willingness or intention

to forego the right, and are so treated by the trial court

without objection, will have that effect. McCarty v. Hop-

kins, 61 Nebr. 550; Poppitz v. German Ins. Co., 85 Minn,

188, 88 N. W. Rep. 438. AYhen the whole case was tried

and submitted to the court without objection, the right to

a jury was waived. Baumann v. Franse, 37 Nebr. 807;

Gregory v. Lancaster County Bank, 16 Nebr. 411.

It becomes necessary to consider next whether waiver of

a jury at the first trial operated to prevent the plaintiff

from demanding one at the second trial, after the judg-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ment had been set aside under section 630, Code of Civil

Procedure. The waiver arose by implication only, and was

not made by stipulation or agreement in open court. But

we do not think that circumstance material. In either

event, when a trial has been had to the court, pursuant to

the waiver, the waiver has done its work and lost its force ;

and when subsequently, for any reason, an entirely new

trial becomes necessary, neither party is precluded by the

action taken with reference to the former trial, but may de-

mand a jury, or not, as he is advised or may elect. In

Cochran v. Stewart, 66 Minn. 152, 68 N. W. Rep. 972, this

very question was presented under circumstances not with-

out analogy to the case at bar. The action was one in eject-

ment, and it was claimed that a waiver of a jury at the

first trial operated to waive a jury at the second trial, ob-

tainable as of course under the statute. The court held

that it was of no force at the second trial, saying: '^ Con-

ditions may be wholly different at the second trial from

what they were at the first. There may be a different judge,

and the jury to be obtained may also be different in char-

actor. Then it is hardly fair to presume that by waiving

a jury for one trial the parties intended to waive a jury

for any further trial that may be had under the statute,

and we can not hold this to be the meaning of their agree-

order in accordance therewith, did not, of themselves,
amount to waiver of a jury, especially as the equitable defenses in this case were relatively of little moment. There
can be no doubt, however, that the plaintiff waived a jury
at the first trial by going to trial upon all the issues without demanding a jury as to any of them. The statutory
method of waiving a jury is not exclusive. Any unequivocal
acts or conduct which clearly show a wElingness or intention
to forego the right, and are so treated by the trial court
without objection, will have that effect. McCarty v. Hopkins, 61 Nebr. 550; Poppitz v. German Ins. Co., 85 Minn.
188, 88 N. W. Rep. 438. When the whole case was tried
and submitted to the court without objection, the right to
a jury was waived. Baumann v. Franse, 37 Nebr. 807;
Gregory v. Lancaster CoiJ,nty Bank, 16 Nebr. 411.
It becomes necessary to consider next whether waiver of
a jury at the first trial operated to prevent the plaintiff
from demanding one at the second trial, after the judgment had been set aside under section 630, Code of Civil
Procedure. The waiver arose by implication only, and was
not made by stipulation or agreement in open court. But
we do not think that circumstance material. In either
event, when a trial has been had to the court, pursuant to
the waiver, the waiver has done its work and lost its force;
and when subsequently, for any reason, an entirely new
trial becomes necessary, neither party is precluded by the
action taken with reference to the former trial, but may demand a jury, or not, as he is advised or may elect. In
Cochran v. Stewart, 66 Minn .. 152, 68 N. W. Rep. 972, this
very question was presented under circumstances not without analoo-y to the case at bar. The action was one in ejectment, and it was claimed that a waiver of a jury at the
fir t trial o erated to waive a jury at the second trial, obt in ble a of course under the statute. The court held
that it wa of no force at the second trial, saying: ''Coni ti n. may be wholly different at the second trial from
what th w r at the fir t. Th re ay be a differ nt judge,
and th jury t be obtain d may also be different in chara r. Th n it is hardly fair to presume that by waiving
a jury f r ne tri 1 th partie int nded to waive a jury
f r any furth r trial that may be had under the statute,
and we can not hold this to be the meaning of their agree-
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ment." In Cross v. State, 78 Ala. 430, the court held

for substantially the same reasons, that such a waiver

should be construed, ordinarily, to apply only to the partic-

ular trial with reference to which it is made. And it seems

to be well settled that the waiver will not prevent a de-

mand for jury trial at a second trial after the cause has

been remanded from an appellate court. Hopkins v. San-

ford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N. W. Rep. 39; Benhoiv v. Bobbins,

72 N. Car. 422; Osgood v. Skinner, 186 111. 491, 57 N. E.

Rep. 1041; Burnliam v. North Chicago St. B. Co., 32 C.

C. A. 64, 88 Fed. Rep. 627. The many cases which bold

that a waiver of jury trial may not be withdrawn are not

in point, since, until the trial has been had, it may be said

plausibly that the parties are bound by their election as to

the form of trial. Moreover, there are well-considered

authorities to the contrary. Ferrea v. Chabot, 121 Cal. 233,

53 Pac. Rep. 689, 1092; Wittenberg v. Onsgard, 78 Minn.

342, 81 N. W. Rep. 14, 47 L. R. A. 141; Broivn v. Cheno-
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ivorth, 51 Tex. 469. Neither is our conclusion affected by

Boslow v. Shenberger, 52 Nebr. 164, QQ Am. St. Rep. 487.

In that case, there had been a waiver, at a previous term,

and it was presumed that the waiver was general, and not

limited to the term at which it was made, in the absence of

anything in the record to the contrary. No trial had been

had, and until there was a trial, the waiver entered into

with reference thereto remained in force.

We recommend that the judgment be reversed and the

cause remanded for a new trial.

Bar^stes and Oldham, CO., concur.

By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing

opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed and

the cause is remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

THE
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m nt. '' In Gros v. State, 78 Ala. 430 the court held
for ub tantially the same reason , that uch a waiYer
hould be construed, ordinaril , to apply only to the parti ular trial with reference to which it is made. And it seem
to be well settled that the wai' er will not prevent a demand for jury trial at a econd trial aft r the cau e ha
been remanded from an ap1 ellate court. Hopkins v. Sanford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N. W. Rep. 39; Benbow v. Robbins,
72 N. Car. 422; Osgood v. Skinner, 186 Ill. 491, 57 N. E.
Rep. 1041; Bitrnham v. North Chicago St. R. Co., 32 C.
. A. 64, 88 Fed. Rep. 627. The many cases which bold
that a waiver of jury trial may not be withdrawn are not
in point, since, until the trial ha been had it may be said
plau ibly that the partie are bound by their election as to
the form of trial. I\1oreover, there are well-considered
authorities to the contrary. Ferrea v. Chabot, L.1 Cal. 233,
53 Pac. Rep. 6 9, 1092; TrVittenberg v. Onsgard, 78 Minn.
34:.., 81 N. W. Rep. 14, 47 L. R. A. 141; Brown v. Chenoworth, 51 Tex. 469. Neither i our conclusion affected by
Bo ·low v. hen berger, 5.;.J Nebr. 164, 66 m. t. Rep. 487.
In that case there had been a wai er, at a previous term,
and it was pre urned that the waiver was general, and not
limited to the term at which it was made, in the ab ence of
anything in the record to the contrary. No trial had been
had and until there was a trial, the waiver entered into
with referen e thereto remained in force.
We recommend that the judgment be reversed and the
au e remanded for a new trial.
BARNE and OLDHAM,
., concur.
By the ourt: For the rea ons tated in the foregoing
opinion, the judgment of the di trict court i rever ed and
the cau e is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
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p ANEL.

Section 3, Objections to the Panel.

LOUISVILLE, HENDERSON & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY

COMPANY V. SCHWAB.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1907,

LOUISVILLE, HENDERSON & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY
CO:MP ANY V. SCHWAB.

127 Kentucky, 82.

Opinion of the Court by Judge Carroll — Reversing.

Appellee, alleging that she was injured in a collision be-

Co urt of Appeals of Kentucky.

1907.

tween a freight train operated by appellant Louisville,

Henderson & St. Louis Railway Company and one of the

127 Kentucky, 82.

cars of appellant Louisville Railway Company, caused by

the negligence of the companies, brought this action to re-

cover damages from each of them. A trial was had before

a ju-ry, and a verdict rendered against both appellants.

The principal error assigned by appellants is the failure

of the trial court to sustain the motion made by them at the

beginning of the trial to discharge the panel for miscon-

duct of the jury commissioners in failing to select the jurors

in the manner prescribed by the statute, "in that the com-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

missioners did not write the name of each juror on a slip

of paper and place them in the drum wheel, but merely

checked off names on the assessor's book and employed

others not under oath to do the really important work of

writing off the names and putting them in the wheel; the

persons so employed not being under the direct supervision

of the commissioners, who did not know whether they did

the work assigned to them right or wrong." * * *

Ky. St. 1903, section 2241, provides in part that ''the cir-

cuit judge of each county shall at the first regular term of

circuit court therein after this act takes effect, and annual-

ly thereafter, appoint three intelligent and discreet house-

kee})ers of the county, over twenty-one years of age, resid-

ing in different portions of the county, and having no ac-

tion in court requiring the intervention of a jury, as jury

commissioners for one 3'ear, who shall be sworn in open

coiii't to faithfully discharge their duty. They shall hold

their meetings in some room to be designated by the judge,

and while engaged in making the list of juries and select-

ing the names, writing and dej^ositing or drawing theit

Opinion of the Court by JUDGE CARROLL-Reversing.
Appellee, alleging that she was injured in a collision between a freight train operated by appellant L ouisville,
H enders on & St . Louis Railway Company and one of the
cars of appellant Louisville Railway Company, caused by
the negligence of the companies, brought this action to recover damages from each of them. A trial was had before
a jury, and a verdict rendered against both appella nts.
The principal error assigned by appellants is the failure
of the trial court to sustain the motion made by them at the
beginning of the trial to di charge the panel f or misconduct of the jury commissioners in failing to select t he jurors
in the manner prescribed by the statute, ' 'in that the commissioners did not write the name of each juror on a slip
of paper and place them in the drum wheel, but merely
checked off names on the assessor's book and employed
other not under oath to do the really important work of
writing off the names and putting them in the wheel; the
persons so employed not being under the direct supervision
of the commissioners, who did not know whether they did
the work assigned to them right or wrong.'' * * *

• • • * • •

>)!:

•

* *

Ky. St. 1903, s ction 2241, provides in part that "the circuit jud ·e of each county shall at the fir t regular t erm of
cir uit court ther in after this a t takes effe t, and annually th rea.fter, appoint three intellig nt and di er et housek p r . of th county, over twenty-one y ar of age, residin in diff r nt portions of the county, and having no acti n in urt r quiring th intervention of a jury, as jury
m1m:. i
r f r one ; ar, who shall be sworn in open
c rn rt t f itlifully (li s harge their uty. Th y shaH hold
thC'i r m ti rr, j • om room to b
. ignat d by the judge,
· nd while no- o- cl in maldno- th Ii t of juri s and electi g th na . , wriLing a d depositing or drawing: then.
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from the drum or wheel case, no person shall be permitted

in said room with them. They shall take the last returned

assessor's book of the county and from it carefully select

from the intelligent, sober, discreet and impartial citizens,

resident housekeepers in different portions of the county,

over twenty-one years of age, the following number of

names of such persons, to-wit: (then follows the number

that shall be selected from each county, graded according

to the population.) Each name so selected they shall write

in jDlain handwriting on a small slip of paper, each slip

of paper being as near the same size and appearance as

practicable ; and each slip with the name written thereon

shall be by them enclosed in a small case made of paper or

other material and deposited unsealed in the revolving

drum or wheel case hereinafter provided for."

In answer to the argument made for appellants, it is

said for appellee that the record does not show that the

substantial rights of appellants were prejudiced by the
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action of the court in overruling the challenge to the array ;

* * * The record does not disclose that the members of

the panel from which the jurors were selected to try the

case were in any respect objectionable, and in this partic-

ular the substantial rights of appellants were not preju-

diced by the rulings of the trial court ; but, in a matter that

strikes at the very foundation of our system of selecting

jurors, we do not deem it material or necessary that any

prejudicial error shall be made to apj)ear, other than a

substantial one committed in failing to select the juries in

the manner pointed out in the statute. It is probable that

the jurors selected to and that did try this particular case

were men who possessed all the statutory qualifications;

and it may also be conceded that they were entirely ac-

ceptable to counsel and parties on both sides. But back of

this is the more important question that litigants have the

unqualified right to demand that juries shall be selected in

the manner prescribed in the statute, and in passing on this

right the individual qualification of the juror or the fact

that he may be entirely acce]itable to the parties is not to be

considered. If the contention of appellee was sound, the

careful and elaborate scheme devised for selecting juries

would be nullified, the statute would be a dead letter, and

no inquiry could be made into the manner in which jurors

T

E JuRY

189

from th drum or wh el ca e, no person hall be permitted
in aid room with them. The ball take the la t returned
as e or book of the ounty and from it carefully elect
from the intelligent sober, di creet and impartial citizens,
re id nt hou ekeeper in different portion of the county,
ov r twenty-one year of age, the followi o- number of
name of uch person , to-wit: (then follow the number
that shall be elected from each county, graded according
to the population.) Each name so selected they hall write
in plain handwriting on a mall lip of paper, each slip
of paper being a near the ame ize and appearance as
practicable; and each slip with the name written thereon
hall be b th m enclo ed in a small ca e made of paper or
other material and depo ited un ealed in the revolving
drum or wheel ca e her inafter pro\ ided for."
In answer to the argument made for appellants, it is
aid for appellee that the record does not how that the
ub tantial rights of appellants were prejudiced by the
action of the court in overruling the challenge to the array;
* * * The record doe not 1i clo e that the members of
the panel from which the juror were select d to try the
ca e were in any re pect objectionable, and in this particular the sub tantial ri ht of appellant were not prejudic d by the rulings of the trial court; but, in a matter that
trikes at the very foundation of our y t m of selecting
jurors we do not deem it material or nece ary that any
rejudicial error shall be made to appear, other than a
ub tantial one committ d in failing to select the juries in
the manner pointed out in th tatute. It is probable that
the juror elected to and that did try thi articular case
were men who po es ed all the tatutory qualifications;
an it may al. o be on de that the. were entirely aceptable to ounsel an parti on both ide . But back of
thi i th mor im1 rtant qu tion that litio-ants have the
unqualifi d rio·ht to mand that jurie ball be elected in
tb mann r Ir crib d in th tatute and in pa ing on this
ri bt the indi,Tiuual 1ualifi ati n of the jur r or the fact
that b may be entir ly a c I table to th arties is not to be
on id r d. If th ont nti n of app llee was ound the
careful and laborat
h m
Yi ed for 1Pd1no· jurie
would be nullifi d, the tatute would be a d ad letter, and
no inquiry could b ma
into th mann r in w hicb jurors
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were originally chosen, if those selected to try the particular

case possessed the statutory qualifications and were person-

ally satisfactory. The Legislature, in obedience to a pop-

ular demand that a radical change be made in the manner

of selecting juries, after long delay and much discussion,

enacted the statute now in force; and this court in more

than one case has given to this law the sanction of its ap-

proval and declared that its efficiency shall not be impaired

or destroyed by the failure of public officers to observe its

requirements.

Thus, in Curtis v. Com., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 267, 62 S. W.

886, a motion was made to discharge the entire panel of

petit jurors, because the names of the jurors were not

drawn from the jury wheel as they should have been, but

were selected from a list regularly summoned in a previous

month. This being a criminal case, this court had no power

to review the action of the trial court in overruling the

challenge to the array, but in the course of the opinion
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said: "These men so selected may have been, and doubt-

less were, of the very best citizenship in the county; but

they were not drawn impartially from the body of legally

qualified jurymen of the county. The mode provided by

law for the selection of qualified and impartial jurymen

was ignored, and the jury were selected by the judge of the

circuit court himself. This was clearly erroneous. He

may have done this with the very best of motive, but it was

not the method provided by law, and should not have been

done." In Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Smith,

25 Ky. Law Kep. 2292, 88 S. W. 440, in discussing this jury

law, the court said: "The statutes quoted provide an elab-

orate system for the selection monthly in courts of con-

tinuous session of impartial jurymen fresh from the body

of the people. If these provisions are enforced, each liti-

gant is guaranteed that the best effort possible has been

made to secure for the trial of his case an impartial jury.

It is not believed that the requirements in the statute in

regard to the selection of juries would have been set forth

with such minute particularity and detail, if it had been

intended that the court might nullify the manifest inten-

tion of the Legislature by ignoring them." In Risner v.

Com., 95 Ky. 539, 26 S. W. 388, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 84, the jury

commissioners did not put in the wheel the number of names
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were originally chosen, if those selected to try the particular
case possessed the statutory qualifications and were personally satisfactory. The Legislature, in obedience to a popular demand that a radical change be made in the manner
of selecting juries, after long delay and much discussion,
enacted the statute now in force; and this court in more
than one case 4as given to this law the sanction of its approval and declared that its efficiency shall not be impaired
or destroyed by the failure of public officers to observe its
requirements.
Thus, in Curtis ''· Coni., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 267, 62 S. W.
886, a motion was inade to discharge the entire panel of
petit jurors, because the names of the jurors were not
drawn from the jury wheel as they should have been, but
were selected from a list r egularly summoned in a previous
month. This being a criminal ca se, this court had no power
to review the action of the trial court in overruling the
challenge to the array, but in the course of the opinion
said: "These men so selected may have been~ and doubtless were, of the very best citizenship in the county; but
they were not drawn impartially from the body of legally
qualified jurymen of the county. The mode provided by
law for the selection of qualified and impartial jurymen
was ignored, and the jury were selected by the judge of the
circuit court himself. This was clearly erroneous. He
may have done this with the very best of motive, but it was
not the method provided by law, and should not have been
done." In Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Smith,
25 K y. Law Rep. 2'.292, 88 S. W. 440, in discu sing this jury
law, the court aid: ''The statutes quot d provide an elaborate sy tern for the selection monthly in courts of continuou ession of impartial jurymen fr sh from the body
of the people. If these provisions are enforced, each litio-ant i guarante d that the best effort possible has been
m
to
ur e for the trial of his case an impartial jury.
It i . n t b liev d that th requirements in the statute in
r ,. rd t th
1 ction of juries would have been set forth
with uch inut particularity and detail, if it had been
int n
that the cour t might nullify the manifest intenti
of th L O'i lature by irnorin o- them." In Risner v.
'o n.,, Ky. : . , 2 . W .
, 16 I y. Law Rep. 84, the jury
"'"'~~~is ·i n rs did n t put in the wheel th number of names
1
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required, and the court said: "Wliile it is not made to di-

rectly or certainly appear that appellant was thereby sub-

stantially prejudiced, still he had the right to insist upon be-

ing tried by only a jury obtained according to the statute,

which was passed for the purpose of securing fair and im-

13artial jurors; and, to more effectually accomplish that end,

the names of at least 200 persons should have been placed

in the drum or wheel case. This provision cannot be disre-

garded in any substantial particular without defeating one

of the principal purposes of the statute." Central Ken-

tucky Asylum for the Insane v. Hauns, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 22,

50 S. W. 978, to which our attention is called by counsel

for api)ellee, is not in point; nor is it in conflict with the

authorities cited. There the objection to the manner in

which the jury was selected was not made until after the

trial was completed, and hence came too late to be avail-

able.

If the methods avowed to have been adopted in this case
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by the commissioners are upheld, all the safeguards thrown

around the selection of juries will be virtually abolished,

and the effort of the legislative department to improve and

elevate the jury system a failure. The juries are almost

entirely composed of men selected by the commissioners,

and this power confided to them cannot be delegated in

whole or in part to others. No minor officers connected with

the administration of justice have more important duties

to perform than do the jury commissioners. Upon their

judgment and discretion in the selection of intelligent,

sober, discreet, and impartial citizens and housekeepers of

the county depends in a large measure the pure and im-

partial administration of justice in the conduct of jury

trials, and this valuable privilege ought not and will not

be frittered away merely because delay or inconvenience

to the court or litigants may result from sustaining a chal-

lenge to the array because of substantial irregularity in

the selection of the juries. It is iafinitely better that there

should be some delay in the trial of cases or inconvenience

suffered by individuals than that a statute intended to safe-

guard the rights of all litigants should be totally disre-

garded. If the mistake or irregularity was a minor one,

we would not regard it as material; but, if the avowals

made are true, the statute was violated in several substan-

THE JURY

required, and the court said: "While it is not made to directl or certainly appear that appellant was thereby sub·tantially prejudiced, still he had the right to insi t upon being tried by only a jury obtained according to the statute,
which was pas ed for the purpose of securing fair and impartial jurors; and, to more effectually accomplish that end,
the names of at least 200 persons should have been placed
in the drum or wheel case. This provision cannot be disregarded in any substantial particular without defeating one
of the principal purposes of the statute." Central J(entucky Asylum for the Insane v. Hauns, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 22,
50 S. W. 978, to which our attention is called by counsel
for appellee, is not in point; nor is it in conflict with the
authorities cited. There the objection to the manner in
which the jury wa selected was not made until after the
trial was completed, and hence came too late to be available.
If the methods avowed to have been adopted in this case
by the commissioners are upheld, all the safeguards thrown
around the selection of juries will be virtually abolished,
and the effort of the legislative department to improve and
elevate the jury system a failure. The juries are almost
entirely composed of men ·selected by the commissioner ,
and this power confided to them cannot be delegated in
whole or in part to others. No minor officers connected with
the administration of justice have more important duties
to perform than do the jury commissioners. Upon their
judgment and discretion in the selection of intelligent,
sober, discreet, and impartial citizens and housekeepers of
the county depends in a large measure the pure and impartial administration of justice in the conduct of jury
trials, and thi valuable privilege ought not and will not
be frittered away merely because delay or inconvenience
to the court or litigant may re ult from su taining a challenge to the array becau e of ub tantial irregularity in
the election of the jurie . It i i~finitely better that there
hould be om d lay in the trial of ca es or inconvenience
uffer d b r indi idual than that a tatute intended to safeo·uard th rights of all litigant
hould be totally di regard d. If the mi take or irr gularity was a minor on ,
we would not regard it a material; but if the a\ owal
made are true, th . tat te wa iolated in ev ral ub tan-
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tial particulars. The provisions disregarded are not direc-

tory, but mandatory. They constitute the very substance

and life of the law, and may not lightly be ignored or dis-

obeyed. No fraud or improper purpose can be imputed to

these commissioners, nor is it necessary that it should be.

Doubtless they acted in good faith, but nevertheless in open

disobedience of the law under which they were selected,

and their conduct can neither be overlooked nor approved.

For the error mentioned, the judgment must be re-

versed} * * *

ULLMAN V. STATE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 1905.

124 Wisconsin, 602.

Plaintiff in error was duly informed against as having

on the 3rd day of August, 1902, at Dodge County, Wiscon-

sin, made an assault on Ida Ullman with a loaded revolver

with intent her, the said Ida Ullman, to kill and murder. In

[Chap.5
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tial particulars. The provisions disregarded are not directory, but mandatory. They constitute the very substance
and life of the law, and may not lightly be ignored or disobeyed. No fraud or improper purpose can be imputed to
these commissioners, nor is it neces ary that it should be.
Doubtle they acted in good faith, but nevertheless in open
disobedience of the law under which they were selected,
and their conduct can neither be overlooked nor approved.
* * * * * * * * * *
:B-,or the error mentioned, the judgment must be reersed · * * ii;

'

due time and form he entered a plea of not guilty, and was
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tried in October, 1903, in the circuit court for Dodge county.

Makshall, J. Before the impaneling the jury for the

trial was commenced, counsel for the accused said he de-

sired to "file a challenge to the array of jurors," accom-

panying such statement by presenting a paper in that re-

gard, which was placed on file. Such paper was not in-

corporated into the bill of exceptions, neither does the bill

ULLMAN V. STATE.

show in any formal way the grounds of the challenge. The

proceedings had in respect to the matter show i3retty clearly

what such grounds were. The point is made by the attorney

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

1905.

general tliat such a challenge must be made in writing, stat-

ing specifically the grounds thereof, and that the writing

124

Wisconsin, 602.

must bo embodied in the bill of exceptions in order to en-

aI)lo this court to review the decision of the trial court in re-

spect thereto. If that be correct, whether the decision over-

Plaintiff in error was duly informed against as having
on the rd day of August, 1902, at Dodge County, Wisconin, made an assault on Ida Ullman with a loaded revolver
with intent her, the aid Ida UlJman, to kill and murder. In
due time and form be ent red a plea of not guilty, and was
tried in October, 1903, in the cir uit court for Dodge county.
* * * * * * * * * *
:MARSHALL, J.
Before the impaneling th jury for the
trial as comm n ed, ounsel for the ac u ed said he de. ir d t '' 1 a hall n · to tb array of juror , '' accom1 n ·in · u h tat m nt y pr
nting a pap r in that regar whi h wa plac d on fil .
u h pa r wa not inrp rat
into the bill of x ption , neither do s the bill
·h win any formal way th oT und of the chall nge. Th
r
din ·· had in ·
ct to th matt r h w pr tty clearly
wbat ·ue] Tound .
r . Th I oi tis mad by the ttorney
g •11 •ral th· t . u h a h ll n<r
u t b m d in writing, tati.1g . J •eifi ·all
th oT i
tli r f, and that th writing
mn.·t he· m h di
in h 1 iJl f x ption in ord r to n·1 IJI • tlii .· c tut t r vi w th d
i. i n f th trial ourt in rerr t, wh ther th de i ion over. l' ·c·t th r to. If th t l
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' ruling the challenge to the array was proper or not, is not

before us.

At common law a challenge to the array was required to

be made in writing, stating specifically the grounds relied

on. An issue of law or fact was then formed in respect

thereto, which was tried by the court, if one of law, and by

triers appointed by the court, if of fact. Under our statu-

tory system for selecting and returning jurors there is no

challenge to the array in the strict common-law sense. The

Code was designed to be as complete for the trial of crimi-

nal as for the trial of civil cases. It makes no provision

for a challenge to the array, or for any equivalent pro-

ceeding. One is liable to fall into confusion in respect to

the matter by failing to note the fact that most of the de-

cisions in this country in Code states, where it is said that

a challenge to the array must be in writing, are based on

statutory requirements. In Iowa, where there is an ex-

press provision for a challenge to the entire panel, it is
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said that the common-law challenge to the array does not

exist. State v. Davis, 41 Iowa, 311. It is said in cases de-

cided in New York, California, Texas, Michigan, Minne-

sota, Mississippi, and other states that might be mentioned,

that a challenge to the array must be in writing, but it will

be found on investigation that such decisions merely follow

statutory requirements. The ancient method of trying is-

sues of fact raised on such challenge is obsolete. All is-

sues, whether of law or fact, on an abjection to the entire

panel of jurors are now triable summarily by the court,

whether the making of the challenge is regulated by statute

or is a mere matter of practice regulated by the court.

Trial courts have inherent authority, and it is their duty,

to permit and give consideration to objections seasonably

and properly made to the entire panel of jurors, based upon

grounds specifically stated, which, if true, indicate that the

statutory method of selecting jurors was prejudicially de-

parted from. The motion or objection may properly be, as

it commonly has been in this state under the Code, called a

challenge to the array. State v. Cameron, 2 Pin. 490;

ConJi-ey v. Norfhern Bank, 6 Wis. 447; Perry v. State, 9

Wis. 19. But that does not imply that it must be regarded

as having all the common law characteristics. It has only

such of them as are appropriate to our judicial system. It

T. p.— 13
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· ruling the challenge to the array was proper or not, is not
before u .
At common law a challenge to the array was required to
be made in writing, stating specifically the grounds relied
on. An i sue of law or fact was then form d in respect
thereto, which was tried by the court, if one of law, and by
triers appointed by the court, if of fact. Under our tatutory system for electing and returning jurors there i no
challenge to the array in the strict common-law sen e. The
ode was de igned to be as complete for the trial of criminal as for the trial of civil ca es. 1t makes no provi ion
for a challenge to the array, or for any equi alent proceeding. One is liable to fall into confu ion in re pect to
the matter by faili:c.g to note the fact that mo t of the decisions in this country in Code state , where it is said that
a challenge to the array mu t be in writing, are ba ed on
statutory requirement . In Iowa, where there is an expre s provision for a challenO'e to the entire panel, it is
aid that the common-law hallenge to the array does not
exi t. State v. Davis, 41 Iowa, 311. It i said in cases decided in New York, California, Tex a , :Michigan, Minnesota, 1\fi sis ippi, and other state that might be mentioned,
that a challenge to the array mu t be in writing, but it will
be found on inve tigation that such deci ions merely follow
statutory requirements. The ancient method of trying isues of fact rai ed on such challenge i ob olete. All issues, whether of law or fact on an abject1on to the entire
panel of jurors are now triable summarily by the court,
whether the makin · of the ballenge i r gulated by statute
or i a mere matter of practice regulated by the court.
Trial court have inherent authority, and it is their duty
to permit and give con ideration to obj tions seasonabl.
and properl made to the entire panel of jurors, based upon
ground pecifically tat a whi h, if true indicate that th ·'
statutory method of selectino· juror wa prejudicially depart d from. The motion or objection may properly be, as
it commonl ha been in thi stat under the Code, called a
chall n ·e to th array.
tat v. Cameron, 2 Pin. 490;
ConkPy v. Northern Bank, 6 Wi . 447 · Perry v. State, !)
Wi . 19. But that do s not imply that it mu t be regarded
a ha ing all the common law char act ri tics. It has onl>
such of them as are appropriate to our judicial system. It
T. P.-13 -
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is said in 12 Ency. PI. & Pr. 426: ''At common law a chal-

lenge to the array was required to be in writing, and where

this requirement has not been abrogated by statute the rule

of the common law is still in force," citing authorities from

seven states, in each of which, however, the matter is regu-

lated by statute.

There is neither any statute nor rule of court nor de-

cisions in this state regulating definitely the practice as to

objecting to the entire panel of jurors. The right to make

such an objection, however, has always been recognized,

and exists by well established practice. It makes no very

great difference how the question of the validity of the

panel is raised so long as the grounds thereof are brought

definitely to the attention of the court. It may be in the

form of an objection to the entire panel, or a motion to

quash the return thereof, or be made in the set phrase of a

challenge to the array. Mere form is of little consequence

when not necessary by statute. The spirit of the Code, gen-
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erally speaking, is that the substance of things only is

material. If it were the practice to make the objection

only in writing and to denominate it by any particular name,

and the trial court were to permit a violation thereof and

entertain the matter nevertheless, unless it appeared that

the adverse party was prejudiced thereby the error would

be regarded as harmless under sec. 2829, Stats. 1898.

While it is good practice to make a challenge to the ar-

ray, so called, in writing, since there is no statute requir-

ing it to be so made, and a stenographer is now a part of

the regular machinery of a trial court, who is expected to

take down accurately everything that occurs in the course

of a trial, the reason, in the main, for the common-law rule

as to the manner of presenting the challenge, no longer ex-

ists. It should therefore be deemed entirely sufficient if the

challenge is stated definitely at the bar of the court and

taken down by the stenographer.

It was early held here in harmony with the common-law

rule that the grounds of a challenge to the array should be

specifically stated. Conhey v. Northern Bank, 6 Wis. 447.

That should be regarded as the settled practice. Though

the trial court has some discretion as to how specifically

the grounds of challenge must be stated, the statement

should be sufficiently full and definite to inform the trial

TRIAL PRACTICE
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js said in 12 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 426: "At common law a challenge to the array was required to be in writing, and where
this requirement has not been abrogated by statute the rule
of the common law is still in force," citing authorities from
even states, in each of which, however, the matter is reguJated by statute.
There is neither any statute nor rule of court nor decisions in this state regulating definitely the practice as to
objecting to the entire panel of jurors. The right to make
such an objection, however, has always been recognized,
and exists by well established practice. It makes no very
great difference how the question of the validity of the
panel is raised so long as the grounds thereof are brought
definitely to the attention of the court. It may be in the
form of an objection to the entire panel, or a motion to
quash the return thereof, or be made in the set phrase of a
challenge to the array. l\1ere form is of little consequence
when not necessary by statute. The spirit of the Code, generally speaking, is that the substance of things only is
material. If it were the practice to make the objection
only in writing and to denominate it by any particular name,
and the trial court were to permit a violation thereof and
entertain the matter nevertheless, unless it appeared that
the adverse party was prejudiced thereby the error would
be regarded as harmless under sec. 2829, Stats. 1898.
While it is good practice to make a challenge to the array, so called, in writing, since there is no statute requiring it to be so made, and a stenographer is now a part of
the regular machinery of a trial court, who is expected to
take down accurately everything that occur in the course
of a trial, the reason, in the main, for the common-law rule
as to the manner of presentinO' the challenO'e, no long r exL ts. It hould th ref ore be d emed entirely ufficient if the
hall nO' i. tat rl d finit ly at the bar of the court and
tak
down by the stenographer.
It w s arly h ld h re in harmony with the common-law
r 1 th t the grou d of a challenge to the array should b
.·1 ·ifi lly stat 1. Conkey v. North rn Bank, 6 Wis. 447.
That , h ul b r O' rd
a th s ttl d practic . Though
h trial urt }1 a om di r ti on a to how specifically
th gr un . of hall n
must be tated, the tatement
sh uld be suffi i ntly full and definite to inform the trial
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court and the adverse party reasonably of the precise de-

partures from the legal requirements relied upon. The

right of challenge should be exercised before commencing

to impanel the jury, otherwise it should be deemed waived.

12 Ency. PI. & Pr. 424. No departure from that rule is per-

missible except for extraordinary reasons.

In this case the practice as to the time of making the

objection, motion, or challenge and the manner thereof, ex-

cept in that the specific grounds relied on do not appear in

the bill of exceptions, the writing in respect thereto being

absent therefrom, was proper. The practice of the court

also in treating the grounds assigned for the challenge,

not admitted by the adverse party, as at issue and sum-

marily trying the issues, was proper. Since such grounds

were not formerly stated, taken down by the stenographer,

and preserved in the bill, and the writing filed was not

so preserved we might properly omit consideration thereof.

However, since it appears that the questions raised by the
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challenge were fully tried and the grounds with reason-

able clearness appear from the evidence, we have concluded

to treat the matter.

The evidence taken upon the trial of .the issues involved in

the challenge indicates that the grounds relied on were

as follows: First, whereas the statute provides that the

jury commissioners shall furnish the clerk of the circuit

court one list of names of persons qualified to serve as

jurors, to be drawn from the body of the county, each com-

missioner proposed and furnished a partial list, and such

lists were treated as satisfying the statute. Second, the

commissioners did not furnish the clerk of the circuit court

a complete list of names verified or certified in proper

form. Third, the clerk did not make a copy of the lists

filed and deliver the same to the commissioners or any one

of them. Fourth, the names furnished to the clerk as

aforesaid were not written upon separate slips of paper,

and the slips folded and put into a box by the clerk or his

deputy, as the law requires. The facts appear to be these .•

Each commissioner made a list and submitted it to the three

for consideration. They approved of such three lists, which

in the aggregate included the requisite names, as the one

list which the statute required, and delivered the same to

the clerk of the circuit court. Such clerk did not make

THE JURY

195

court and the adverse party reasonably of the precise departures from the legal requirements relied upon. The
right of challenge should be exercised before commencing
to impanel the jury, otherwise it should be deemed waived.
12 Ency. PL & Pr. 424. No departure from that rule is permissible except for extraordinary reasons.
In this case the practice as to the time of making the
objection, motion, or challenge and the manner thereof, except in that the specific grounds relied on do not appear in
the bill of exceptions, the writing in respect thereto being
absent therefrom, was proper. The practice of the court
also in treating the grounds as igned for the challeng ,
not admitted by the adverse party, as at issue and summarily trying the issues, was proper. Since such ground ·
were not formerly stated, taken down by the stenographer,
and preserved in the bill, and the writing filed was not
so preserved we might properly omit onsideration thereof.
However, since it appears that the questions raised by the
challenge were fully tried and the grounds with reasonable clearness appear from the evidence, we have concluded
to treat the matter.
The evidence taken upon the trial of .the issues involved in
the challenge indicates that the grounds relied on were
as follows: First, whereas the statute provides that the
jury commissioners shall furnish the clerk of the circuit
court one list of names of persons qualified to serve as
jurors, to be drawn from the body of the county, each com·
missioner proposed and furnished a partial Ii t, and such
lists were treated as satisfying the statute. Second, the
commissioners did not furnish the clerk of the circuit court
a complete list of names verified or certified in proper
form. Third, the clerk did not make a copy of the Ii ts
filed and deliver the same to the commissioners or any one
of them. Fourth, the names furnished to the clerk as
aforesaid were not written upon separate lips of paper,
and the slips folded and put into a box by the clerk or hi
deputy, as the law requires. The fact a pear to be the e:
Each commi sioner mad a Ii t and ubmitt ditto the tbre
for consideration. They approved of u h three Ii t whi b
in the a0' 0 Tegate includ d the r qui ite name , a the on
list whi h the tatute r uir d, and d liv red th ame to
the clerk of the circuit court. Such lerk did not mak
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a copy of the lists so furnished and deliver the same to at

least one of the commissioners, as the law requires, but

each of the commissioners, to the knowledge of the clerk,

preserved a copy of the list proposed by him. The law does

not require the commissioners to make any verification or

formal certification of the list furnished to the clerk. While

neither the clerk nor his deputy wrote the names of the

persons appearing upon the lists furnished, as aforesaid,

on separate slips of paper, and it is not certain that either

one of them folded the slips after the names were written

thereon, and placed the same in a box in the presence of

the commissioners, as the law requires, the names were

so written by a person acting under the direction of* the

clerk in his presence and in the presence of the deputy

and the commissioners, and the slif)s were then by the

direction of the clerk, in his presence and in the presence

of the commissioners, either by the deputy clerk or

the person who wrote the names, placed in the box. The
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names so written upon slips of paper and put in the

box were the identical names on the list furnished by the

commissioners. There is an entire absence in the record of

any showing of prejudicial departure from the letter of the

statute. The mere fact that each commissioner proposed

a list of names for a part of the entire list -to be agreed

upon, and the several partial lists were approved and in

tliat form handed to the clerk, instead of the three lists

being transferred to one and in that form delivered, is of no

consequence whatever. The fact that the physicial acts

of writing the names on slips of paper and folding such

slips ready for the box and putting them therein, if such

be the fact, in the whole, is likewise of no consequence, since

it appears that such person acted under the immediate

direction of the clerk, in his presence and in the presence

of the commissioners, and there is not only no indication

<liat there was any prejudicial departure from the statute

in the matter, but tliei-e is conclusive affirmative evidence to

the contrary. Tiie general rule as to irregularties in execut-

ing tlie statutory method for selecting jurors is that they

are to ])e deemed immaterial, unless it appears probable that

tlic person seeking to take advantage thereof may be pre-

judiced thereby. Proffatt, Jury Trial, Sec. 154 ; Thompson

& Merriam, Juries, Sec. 134; 12 Ency. PI & Pr. 277.
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a copy of the lists so furnished and deliver the same to at
least one of the commissioners, as the law requires, but
each of the commi sioners, to the knowledge of the clerk,
preserved a copy of the Ii t propo ed by him. The law does
not require th commissioners to make any verification or
formal certification of the list furnished to the clerk. While
neither the clerk nor his deputy wrote the names of the
person appearing upon the lists furnished, as aforesaid,
on separate slips of paper, and it is not certain that either
one of them folded the slips after the names were written
thereon, and placed the same in a box in the presence of
the ommissioners, as the law requires, the names were
o written by a person acting under the direction of the
clerk in his pre ence and in the presence of the deputy
and the commissioners, and the slips were then by the
direction of the clerk, in his presence and in the presence
of tll e commi sioners, either by the deputy clerk or
th p r son who wrote the names, placed in the box. The
nam s . o written upon slips of paper and put in the
box w r the identical names on the list furnished by the
rnrni ioners. There is an entire absence in the record of
D )T howing of prejudicial departure from the letter of the
tatut e. The mere fact that each commissioner proposed
a Ii t of names for a part of the entire list ~o be agreed
u1 on, and the several partial lists were approved and in
tJrnt form handed to the clerk, instead of the three lists
11 in, · tra n £erred to one and in that form delivered, is of no
n. quen e whatever. The fact that the physicial acts
of wri tin · the n ames on slips of paper and folding such
.-lip.· r a y for the box and utting them therein, if such
lw th f a t, in the whole, i lik wi e of no con equence, since
i npp ar. that uch per on act d under the immediate
dj r , ·1ion of th cl rk, in bi presence and in the presence
lf th r mi. ioners, and th re i not only no indication
f l1nt th< r was any prejudicial d parture from the statute
i 111 · m e t •r hut t h r i on lu iv affirmativ evidence to
111 " <' <>nt nny. r h rr n ral rul a to irr gularties in execut- /
i rw t I 1 • ta nt r . m tli d for
I tin a- juror is that they
a r<• t n l )(• <l ·<·m immat ri 1, unl · · it a l ar pr bable that
111<· pc· r ·on : 0 kinri t tak a ]vantao- th r of may be prej11 d i ·Pd th r •l . .
r ffatt, ury Trial,
. 154; Thompson
· f ' tTi a , urirs,
1 4; 12 ~ n y. Pl & Pr. 277.
1
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The point is made by the attorney general that in any

case the challenge to the array was waived by the failure to

object to the jury as a whole, reliance being placed on

Jackson v. State, 91 Wis. 253, 267, 64 N. W. 838. The rule

invoked has never been, and it seems cannot reasonably be,

applied to objection to the entire panel of jurors. It

only goes to objections to individual jurors. When an ex-

ception is once properly saved to a ruling on an objection

to the entire panel of jurors it will be available upon a

subsequent review of the final result without further calling

the matter to the attention of the trial court.

**********

By the Court. — Judgment is affirmed.

Section 4. Qualifications of Jurors.

The point is made by the attorn J g neral that in any
case the chall nge to the array was waived by the ailure to
object to the jur. a a whole, reliance bein 0 placed on
Jackson v. State, 91 v i . 253, 267, 6± N. W. 83 . The rule
in oked has never been, and it seems cannot rea onably be,
applied to objection to the entire panel of jurors. It
only goes to objections to individual jurors. When an exception is once properly saved to a ruling on an objection
to the entire panel of jurors it will be available upon a
subsequent r view of the final result without further calling
the matter to the attention of the trial court.

KUMLI V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY.

* * * * * * * * * •

Supreme Court of Oregon. 1892,

21 Oregon, 505.

197
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By the Court.-Judgment is affirmed.

Bean, J. — This is an action to recover damages for in-
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juries alleged to have been received by plaintiff while a pas-

senger on one of defendant's passenger trains which was

wrecked by the falling of the bridge or trestlework across

the marsh known as Lake Labish, in Marion county, in No-

vember, 1890. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment

in favor of plaintiff for the sum of fifteen hundred dollars,

SECTION

from which defendant appeals, assigning as error the action

4.

QUALIFICATIONS OF JURORS.

of the court in overruling its challenge for actual bias, to the

jurors Kennedy, Harriott, Cooley, and Her, and in refusing

to set aside the verdict of the jury, because it is so excessive,

KU:MLI V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMP ANY.

and so disproportionate to the amount of plaintiff's injury

Supre11ie Cow·t of Oregon.

as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.

1892•

These assignments of error will be noticed in the order

.21 Oregon, 505.

indicated.

1. As to the overruling of the challenge to the jurors : It

is unnecessary to state the facts, as disclosed by the exam-

ination of any of the jurors, or their voir dire, except the

J.-This is an action to recover damages for injurie alleged to have been received by plaintiff while a pass ng r on one of defendant's pa senger trains which wa
wrecked by the falling of the bridge or trestlework aero s
the mar h known as Lake Labi h, in Marion county, in November, 1890. The trial resulted in a verdict and jud 0 ·ment
in faYor of plaintiff for the um of fifteen hundred dollar ,
from which def ndant appeal , a signing as error the action
of the ourt in ov rruling it s challenge for actual bia , to the
juror E~ennedy, Harriott, Cooley and Iler, and in r fu ing
to t aside the erdict f th jury, becau e it i o exces i e
an o di I ro1 ortionate to th e amount of plaintiff' injur.
a to indicat pa ion or pr ju 1ice on the part of the jury.
Th
a ignm nts of error will be noticed in the order
in icated.
1. A to the overrulin()' of the cballeng to th jnrors: It
is unnecessary to tat th fact as di clos d by the examination of any of th JUr r or their voir dire, except the
BEAN,
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juror Her, whose examination presents as strong a case

for the defendant as any in the record. The juror Her, in

his examination in chief by defendant's counsel, said that

he did not know the plaintiff; had heard nothing about this

case; had heard considerable talk about the wreck; read

of it in the newspapers, and heard persons talk about it

who claimed to have looked at and examined the wreck;

from what he had heard the persons say who had examined

the wreck, and what he saw in the newspapers, he had

formed and expressed an opinion as to whether or not the

railroad company was to blame for the wreck ; he had that

opinion then; did not know that it was a particularly fixed

opinion; it is one that would require some evidence to re-

move. He could not say how many persons he had heard

talk about the wreck, who had examined and looked at it, but

supposed, perhaps, a half dozen ; they said what they sup-

posed caused the wreck; they were persons whom he had re-

spect for. From what they said, and what he had read in
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the newspapers, he had formed an opinion as to the cause

of the wreck; he had heard the various theories put forth

through the newspapers, as to whether the wreck was

caused by a defective structure, or by a rail being removed

from the track by some evil-disposed person. At the con-

clusion of his examination by counsel, the juror, in response

to questions by the court, said that what he had heard about

the transaction was not from any of the witnesses in the

case, but just from persons who had gone to view the

wreck; that no opinion he had formed would influence his

judgment in the trial of the case, but he should try the case

impartially, according to the law and the evidence; that he

could disregard what he had heard about the wreck, and

would be governed by the evidence altogether; would not

regard what he had heard, as it was only hearsay; would

pay no attention to what he had been told, but would simply

be guided by the testimony given in court. The challenge

was thereupon overruled by the court, defendant excepting.

There is much conflict in the adjudged cases as to when

an opinion touching the merits of the particular case will

disqualify a person called as a juror. The standard of Lord

Mansfield, in Mylock v. Saladine, 1 W. Bl. 480, that ''a

juror should be as white as paper, and know neither plain-

tiff or defendant, but judge of the issue merely as an ab-
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juror Iler, whose examination presents as strong a case
for the defendant as any in the record. The juror Iler, in
his examination in chief by defendant's counsel, said that
he did not know the plaintiff; had heard nothing about this
ca e; had heard considerable talk about the wreck; read
of it in the newspapers, and heard persons talk about it
who claimed to have looked at and examined the wreck;
from what he had heard the persons say who had examined
the wreck, and what he saw in the newspapers, he had
formed and expressed an opinion as to whether or not the
railroad company was to blame for the wreck; he had that
opinion then; did not know that it was a particularly fixed
opinion; it is one that would require some evidence to remove. He could not say how many persons he had heard
talk about the wreck, who had examined and looked at it, but
supposed, perhaps, a half dozen; they said what they supposed caused the wreck; they were persons whom he had respect for. From what they said, and what he had read in
the new papers, he had formed an opinion as to the cause
of the wreck; he had heard the various theories put forth
tbrouO'h the newspapers, as to whether the wreck was
au d by a defective structure, or by a rail being removed
from the track by some evil-disposed person. At the conclu ion of hi examination by counsel, the juror, in response
to qu tion by the court, said that what he had heard about
the transa tion wa not from any of the witnesses in the
a e, but ju t from persons who had gone to view the
wr k; that no opinion he had formed would influence his
judQID nt in the trial of the ca e, but he should try the case
·
rtiall , according to th ·law and the evidence ; that he
di reO'ard what he had heard about the wreck, and
w ul
ov rn d by the evidence altog ther; would not
r
rd what h had heard, a it wa only hearsay; would
ay n attention to what he had b en told, but would imply
b rrni d by the t timony O'iven in court. The challenge
wa. th r up n v rrul d by th court, d f ndant ex e ting.
Th r i. mu h nfli t in the adjudged a es a to when
a
pini n t u hi o· th m rit of the particular cas will
li qualify a r
·all
a juror. Th tandard of Lord
A .'FT •L , in ~1ylod
aladine, 1 W. BL 4 0, that "a
.i r . h l
. whit . pa r and know neither plaintiff or
t, ut judg of th is ue m rely as an ab-
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stract propositon upon the evidence produced before him,"

has long since been discarded as impracticable. The courts

are agreed, that with the present popular intelligence and

wide dissemination of current events, through the medium

of the press, a juror's mind cannot reasonably be expected

to be ''as white as paper," and it is no longer regarded as

an objection, per se, to a person called as a juror, that he

has heard of the particular case, or even formed or ex-

pressed an opinion touching the merits thereof.

''Were it possible," said Mr. Chief Justice Makshall, ''to

obtain a jurv without any prepossessions whatever, respect-

ing the guilt or innocence of the accused, it would be ex-

tremely desirable to obtain such a jury; but this is perhaps,

impossible, and therefore not required. The opinion which

has been avowed by the court is, that light impressions,

which may fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony that

may be offered, which may leave, the mind open to a fair

jection to a juror; but that those strong and deep impres-
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sions which will close the mind against the testimony that

may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat

that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a suffic-

ient objection to him." (Trial of Aaron Burr, Vol. 1, 416;

1 Thomps. Trials, sec. 79.)

The rule laid down by this distinguished jurist in a

trial which at the time attracted universal attention, has

become substantially the settled law of this country, and it

is now generally considered that if the juror's opinion will

readily yield to the evidence presented in the case, he is not

incompetent to sit upon the trial of the issue.

As to when the opinion is of such a character, that it will

not readily yield to the evidence produced, the law in this

country is in such a state of confusion, that no success can

be hoped for in reconciling conflicting opinions, or arraying

the decisions in logical order. Expressed in the varying

terms of judicial utterances, the opinion or impression con-

cerning the merits of the cause on trial, which disqualifies

a person called as a juror, must be a "fixed," "absolute,"

"positive," "definite," "decided," "substantial," "delib-

erate," "unconditional" opinion. The rule is almost uni-

versally laid down by these words, or words of similar im-

port. A "conditional," "hypothetical," "contingent," "in-
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tract propositon upon the evidence produced before him,''
has long since been discarded as impracticable. The courts
are agreed, that with the present popular intelligence and
wide dis emination of current events, through the medium
of the press, a juror's mind cannot rea onably be expected
to be "as white as paper,'' and it is no longer regarded as
an objection, per se, to a person called as a juror, that he
has beard of the particular case, or even formed or expre sed an opinion touching the merits thereof.
"Were it possible," said Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL, "to
obtain a jurv without any prepossessions whatever, respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused, it would be extremely de irable to o tain such a jury; but this i perhaps,
impossible, and therefore not required. The opinion which
has been avowed by the court is, that light impressions,
which may fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony that
may be offered, which may leave . the mind open to a fair
jection to a juror; but that those strong and deep impressions which will clo e the mind against the testimony that
may be offered in opposition to them, which will combHt
that testimony and re i t its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him." (Trial of Aaron Burr, Vol. 1, 416;
1 Thomps. Trials, sec. 79.)
The rule laid down by this distinguished jurist in a
trial which at the time attracted universal attention, has
become sub tantially the settled law of this country, and it
is now generally con idered that if the juror's opinion will
readily yield to the evidence presented in the case, he is not
incompetent to sit upon the trial of the issue.
As to when the opinion is of such a character, that it will
not readily yield to the evidence produced, the law in this
country is in such a tate of confusion, that no success can
be hoped for in reconciling conflicting opinions, or arraying
the deci ions in logical order. Expressed in the varying
t rm of judicial utterance , the opinion or impre ion concerning the merits of the cause on trial, which disqualifies
a person called as a juror, mu t be a ''fixed,'' ''absolute,''
"positive," "definite," "de i ed," "substantial," "deliberate,'' ''unconditional'' opinion. The rule is almost universally laid down by these words, or words of similar import. A ''conditional,'' ''hypothetical,'' ''contingent,'' ''in-
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determinate," '' floating," ''indefinite," "uncertain" opin-

ion will not do. {Schoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. *823 ; People v.

Bodine, 1 Denio 281 ; Staup v. Com., 74 Penn. St. 458 ; Willis

V. State, 12 Ga. 444; Osiander v. Com., 3 Leigh 780, 24

Am. Dec. 693; People v. Stout, 4 Parker Crim. Rep. 71; 1

Thomps. Trials, sec. 78.) These terms convey one and the

same meaning, and, in substance, require that in order to

disqualify a juror, his opinion touching the merits of the

case on trial must be of a fi.xed and determinate character,

deliberately formed and still entertained; one that in an

undue measure shuts out a different belief. An opinion or

impression formed from rumor, newspaper reports, or

casual conversation with others, which the juror feels con-

scious he can dismiss, and so unsubstantial that contradic-

tion from the same source would be as readily accepted as

true, as the original statements upon which the impression

or opinion was formed,' constitute, ordinarily, no sufficient

objection to him.
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"The opinion or judgment," says Chief Justice Shaw,

"must be something more than a vague impression, formed

from casual conversation with others, or from reading im-

perfect, abbreviated newspaper reports. It must be such

an opinion, upon the merits of the question, as would be

likely to bias or prevent a candid judgment upon a full

hearing of the evidence. If one had formed, what in some

sense might be called an opinion, but which yet fell far

short of exciting any bias or prejudice, he might conscient-

iouslv discharge his duty as a juror." {Comw. v. Webster,

5 Cush. 297; 52 Am. Dec. 711.)

While the rule is genrally recognized, that the disquali-

fying opinion of a juror must be of a fixed and determined

character, its application is frequently a matter of great

nicety, and the courts have struggled, apparently in vain,

to establish some judicial test, by which the question can

})e determined. In order to avoid the uncertainty in the

d(!cisions, as well as the supposed inflexible rules of law, by

which the courts were driven, in many instances, to the illit-

erate and hopelessly ignorant portions of the community for

jurors, the legislature of this, as well as many other states,

lijis enacted a statute by which the competency of a person,

called as a juror, shall be determined, on the trial of a chai-
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determinate " "floating '' ''indefinite '' ''uncertain'' opin'
'
ion will not do.
(Schoeffler
v. State, 3' Wis. *823; People v.
Bodine, 1 Denio 281 ; Staup v. Com., 74 Penn.· St. 458; Willis
v. State, 12 Ga. 444 ; Osiander v. Com., 3 Leigh 780, 24
Am. Dec. 693; People v. Stout, 4 Parker Crim. Rep. 71; 1
Thomps. Trials, sec. 78.) These terms convey one and the
same meaning, and, in substance, require that in order to
disqualify a juror, his opinion touching the merits of the
ca e on trial must be of a fixed and determinate character,
deliberately formed and still entertained; one that in an
undue measure shuts out a different belief. An opinion or
impre ion formed from rumor, newspaper reports, or
casual conversation with others, which the juror feels consciou be can dismiss, and so unsubstantial that contradiction from the same source would be as readily accepted as
true, a. the original statements upon which the impres ion
or opinion was formed, constitute, ordinarily, no sufficient
objection to him.
"The opinion or judgment, " says Chief Justice SHA w,
" mu t be something more than a vague impression, formed
from ca. ual conver ation wjth others, or from reading imperf t abbreviated newspaper reports. It must be such
an or inion, upon the merits of the question, as would be
lik 1. to bia or prevent a candid judgment upon a full
h arino· of the evidenc . If one had formed, what in some
might be called an opinion, but which yet fell far
en
short of x iting any bias or prejudice, he might conscienti u ly di. charg his duty as a juror." ( Comw. v. Webster,
5 iu.-b. 297; 52 Am. Dec. 711.)
iVbil th rule is genrally recognized, that the disqualif jng pinion of a juror must be of a fixed and determined
hara t r, it application is frequently a matter of great
ni ty a d the courts have strugo-led, apparently in vain,
t
.·tabli h some judicial test, by which the que ti on can
lie> d ,t rmin d. In order to avoid the unc rtainty in the
<}p('j , ion ,· as well as the SUppO ed infle 'ible rule Of law, by
' lii('h Ll1 eourt w re driven, in many instan s, to the illit<•rat0 nncl hop l . , 1 io-norant portion of the ommu ity for
.i ror. th kgi : latur f thi. , as well as many oth r states,
Jin · <'nnd cl a . t, tit hy whi ·h the compet n y of a per<-'on
·t llPcl a. a j ror, ,·hall b
t r ined, on the trial of a chaiT

1

1

Sec. 4]

Sec. 4] The Juey 201

lenge, for having an opinion touching the merits of the par-

ticular case.

By section 187, Hill's Code, it is provided, that on the

trial of a challenge for actual bias, *' although it should ap-

pear that the juror challenged has formed or expressed

an opinion upon the merits of the cause from what he may

have heard or read, such opinion shall not of itself be suftic-

ient to sustain the challenge, but the court must be satisfied

from all the circumstances that the juror cannot disregard

such opinion, and try the issue impartially." This statute

is but a recognition of the fact that, at the present day,

when newspapers, railroads, and telegraphs have made

intercommunication easy, and when the important transac-

tions of today in all their details are published to the world

tomorrow, the advance of popular intelligence and wide

dissemination of knowledge of current events, have under

the former rules of law, rendered it inapossible to secure

a jury of intelligent men for the trial of causes which have
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excited much public attention and have resulted in the ne-

cessity of trying such cases before juries composed of the

illiterate and ignorant. Statutes of this character have been

held not unconstitutional as invading the right of trial by

jury. {Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164; 13 Am. Rep. 492;

Jones V. People, 2 Colo. 351; Cooper v. State, 16 Ohio St.

328.)

This statute does not deny the principle, which has its

foundation in natural justice as well as law, that jurors

should be impaHial and free from any existing bias which

may influence their judgment. But it assumes, and we think

correctly, that a man may be a fair and impartial juror, al-

though he have an opinion touching the merits of the cause

on trial, and that he may, notwithstanding, be able to set

aside and disregard such opinion and decide the case from

the evidence independently thereof and uninfluenced there-

by. We think human experience teaches that it may not

unfreqently happen that persons who have formed an opin-

ion touching the merits of a cause from reports verbal or

written, may, as jurors, lay aside their prepossessions, and

not only honestly and conscientiously endeavor, but in fact

be able to hear and decide the case upon the evidence,

uninflunced by such prepossessions. Whether a person

called as a juror can do so or not depends largely; upon his
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lenge, for having an opinion touching the merits of the particular ca e.
By section 187, Hill's Code, it is provided, that on the
trial of a challenge for actual bias, ''although it should appear that the juror challenged has formed or expressed
an opinion upon the merits of the cause from what he may
have heard or read, such opinion shall not of itself be sufficient to sustain the challenge, but the court must be satisfied
from all the circumstances that the juror cannot disregard
such opinion, and try the issue impartially.'' This statute
is but a recognition of the fact that, at the present day,
when newspapers, railroads, and telegraphs have made
in~cercommunic ation easy, and when the important transaction of today in all their details are published to the world
tomorrow, the advance of popular intelligence and wide
dissemination of knowledge of current events, have under
the former rules of law, rendered it impo sible to secure
a jury of intelligent men for the trial of causes which have
excited much public attention and have re ulted in the necessity of trying such cases before juries composed of the
illiterate and ignorant. Statutes of this character have been
held not uncon titutional as invading the right of trial by
jur . (Stok es v. People: 53 N. Y. 164; 13 Am. Rep. 492;
Jon es v. People, 2 Colo. 351; Cooper v. State, 16 Ohio St.
328.)
This statute does not deny the principle, which has its
foundation in natural ju tice as well as law, that jurors
should be impaHial and free from any existing bias which
may influence their judgment. But it assumes, and we think
correctly, that a man may be a fair and impartial juror, although he have an opinion touching the merits of the cause
on trial, and that he may, notwithstandino-, be able to set
aside and disregard such opinion and decide the case from
the evidence independently thereof and uninfluenced thereby. We think human experience teaches that it may not
unfreq ntly happen that per ons who have formed an opinion tou hino- the merits of a cau e from reports verbal or
written may, as jurors, lay aside their prepossessions, and
not only hone tl a d con cientiou ly endea or, but in fact
be a 1 to hear and decide the case upon the evidence,
uninfiune d by such prepo sessions. Whether a per on
called as a juror can do so or not depends largelY.: upon his
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general intelligence, manner, tone, appearance, personal

peculiarities, and sources of information from which his

opinion is formed, its strength, the fact whether he exhibits

any pride of opinion which may lead him to give too little

or too much weight to the testimony for or against either

party, and many other circumstances, difficult if not impos-

sible to suggest. The determination of his competency,

therefore, necessarily becomes primarily a question for the

trial court, keeping ever in view, as it should, that the ulti-

mate object to be attained is a trial before a fair and im-

partial jury. The question is wisely left largely to the

sound discretion of that court, and its findings upon a chal-

lenge to a juror for actual bias, where there is any reason-

able question as to his competency, ought not to be reviewed

by an appellate court unless it clearly appear that such dis-

cretion has been arbitrarily exercised. {State v. Tom, 8 Or.

177; State v. Saunders, 14 Or. 300.)

It is ordinarily more safe and just to the juror and the
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cause of truth, to trust to the impression made upon the

trial court, which heard his testimony, and noticed his

manner and appearance while under examination, subject

to the scrutiny of counsel, than to any written or reported

statement of his testimony. His tone, temperament, and

personal peculiarities, as exhibited on his examination, and

which do not appear in the written report of his testimony,

are important factors in determining his competency as a

juror. If a person called as a juror on his examination,

opinion in the case, on the merits, and nothing further is

shown, the court ought, as a matter of law, to reject him

as incompetent. Such a juror necessarily does not stand

indifferent between the parties, and it matters little from

what source he received the information upon which his

opinion is based. If, however, he has no fixed belief or

prejudice, and is able to say he can fairly try the case

on the evidence, freed from the influence of such opinion or

impression, his competency becomes a question for the trial

f'ourt, in the exercise of a sound discretion, and its findings

ought not to be set aside by an appellate court unless tiie

f'li-or is manifest. "No less stringent rules," says Mr. Jus-

tice Waite, "should be applied by the reviewing court in

siK'h a case than those whicli govern in the consideration

of motions for new trial because the verdict is against the
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general intelligence, manner, tone, appearance, personal
peculiarities, and sources of information fr om which his
opinion is formed, its trength, the fact whe ther he exhibits
any pride of opinion which may lead him to give too little
or too much weight t o the testimony for or against either
party, and many other circumstances, difficult if not impossible to suggest. The determination of his competency,
therefore, necessarily becomes primarily a question for the
trial court, keeping ever in view, as it should, that the ultimate obj ect to be attained is a trial before a f air and impartial jury. The question is wisely left la rgely to the
sound discretion of that court, and its findings upon a challenge to a juror for actual bias, where there is any reasonable question a to his competency, ·ought not to be reviewed
by an appellate court unless it clearly appear that such discr tion has been arbitrarily exercised. (Sta te v . To m, 8 Or.
177; State v. Saunders, 14 Or. 300. )
It is ordinarily more safe and just to the juror and the
can e of truth, to trust to the impression made upon the
trial court, which heard his testimony, and noticed his
manner and appearance while under examination, subject
to the crutiny of counsel, than t o any written or reported
tat ment of his testimony. His t one, temperament, and
er onal peculiarities, as exhibited on his examination, and
whi h do not appear in the written report of his testimony,
are important factor in determining his competency as h
juror. If a person called as a juror on his examination,
opinion in the case, on the merits, and nothing further is
hown, the court ought, a a matter of law, to r ej ect him
as incompetent. Su h a juror necessarily does not stand
indifferent between the parti , and it matt er s little from
what our e he r iv d th information up on which his
pm1on i bas d. If, bow v r, he has no fixed belief or
r JU
and is abl to say h
an fairly t ry the ca e
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s th n tho.
1 i h O'Overn in th on ideration
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evidence. It must be made clearly to appear that upon

the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had

formed such an opinion that he could not in law be deemed

impartial. The case must be one in which it is manifest

the law left nothing to the conscience or discretion of the

court." {Reynolds v. U .8., 98 U. S. 156.)

In the case before us, we think the challenges to the jurors

were each properly overruled. Such opinions as they had

were formed from newspaper reports and casual conversa-

tions with persons who had visited the wreck. They evident-

ly had no prejudice against the defendant, and had taken no

particular interest in the case. It is apparent that they

had nothing but loose, floating, hesitating opinions ; and as

far as we can see, there was no such prejudgment of the

case as would prevent them from sitting as fair and im-

partial jurors. The language of their examniation is quali-

fied and considerate, and is not that of positive men, hasty

to judge and prompt to condemn, but rather that of honest,
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careful conscientious men, fair, open, and candid, with an

obvious purpose to conceal nothing and suppress nothing.

They each was conscious that they could disregard all they

had heard about the case, and try it on the evidence as pro-

duced, uninfluenced by any opinion or impression they then

had. We cannot think this is such a manifestation of par-

tiality or prejudice as left nothing to the conscience or dis-

cretion of the trial court.

**********

The judgment is affirmed.

THEOBALD V. ST. LOUIS TRANSIT COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1905,

191 Missouri, 395.

Marshall, J. — This is an action for $5,000 damages aris-

ing from the death of the plaintiff's nineteen year old son,

about six o'clock in the afternoon on the 20th of January,

1903, caused by one of the defendant's cars colliding with

the rear of a wagon driven by the deceased, at a point sev-
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evidence. It mu t be made clearly to appear that upon
the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had
formed such an opinion that he could not in law e deemed
impartial. The case mu t be one in which it is manifest
the law left nothing to the conscience or di cretion of the
court." (Reynolds v. U .S., 98 U. S. 156.)
In the case before us, we think the challenges to the jurors
were each properly overruled. Such opinions as they had
were formed from new paper reports and casual conversations with person who had vi ited the wreck. They evidently had no prejudice against the def end ant, and had taken no
particular interest in the case. It is apparent that they
had nothing but loo e, floating, hesitating opinions; and a
far as we can see, there was no such prejudgment of the
case as would prevent them from sitting as fair and impartial jurors. The language of their examniation is qualified and con iderate, and is not that of po itive men, hasty
to judge and prompt to ondemn, but rather that of hone t,
careful conscientious men, fair, open, and candid, with an
obvious purpose to conceal nothing and suppress nothing.
They each was con ciou that they could disregard all they
had heard about the case, and try it on the evid nee as produced, uninfluenced by any opinion or impression they then
had. We cannot think thi is such a manife tation of partiality or prejudice as left no thin to the conscience or discretion of the trial court.
(J'

* * * * * • • • • •

The judgment is affirmed.

THEOBALD V. ST. LOUIS TRANSIT COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Missouri.

1905.

191 Missou ri, 395.

J.-Thi i an action for $5 000 damao·e arising from the d ath of th p1aintiff 's nineteen y ar old on
about ix o' lock in th aft rnoon on the .. 0th of J anuar
1903, au ed by on f th def ndant' car ollidin with
the rear of a wagon dri n by the decea ed, at a point evMARSHALL,
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enty to one hundred fifty feet west of Union avcmue on De

Giverville avenue, in the city of St. Louis. There was a

verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000, and the

defendant appealed.

I.

[Chap. 5
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enty to one hundred fifty feet west of Union avonue on De
Giverville avenue, in the city of St. Louis. There was a
verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000, and the
defendant appealed.

* * * * * * * * *

The first error assigned is the ruling of the trial court

~

in overruling the challenge for cause of the jurors Hart-

I.

man and Bensberg.

Briefly stated the facts developed upon the voir dire

were, that eight or nine years before the trial the juror

Hartman had been thrown off of a car. He stated that that

fact would influence him in the trial of this cause. He also

stated that he would, be governed by the testimony and in-

structions of the court, and believed that he could render an

impartial verdict; that he had nothing against this de-

fendant, but that he had during all those years entertained

a prejudice against street car companies, and that that pre-

judice existed when he was first examined as to his quali-
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fications for a juror, but that during the examination, that

prejudice had been removed, and that he had reached the

conclusion within the last five minutes that he could try this

case impartially.

The juror Bensberg testified that he had a sort of a

prejudice against the company, and that he did not think

it would influence his verdict as a juror, yet added, ''But

still a person having a prejudice, that would probably un-

consciously bias his opinion." And further added: "I

would give more preference to the testimony of a non-em-

ployee of the company than I would an employee." Upon

the court's suggestion that he meant thereby that he would

consider the interest of the employee in determining the

credibility of his evidence, the juror acceded to that view.

After examination by the court and counsel, the juror was

asked: "Q. Well, really, Mr. Juror, I do not understand

your position now. Tliat is the reason I am asking these

questions. A. Well, as I said before, I have a prejudice

against the company to start with. Q. You still have that

prejudice? A. Still have it. Q. And you also have a

prejudice against the testimony of employees. A. I would

not give it the same preference that I would the evidence

The first error a signed is the ruling of the trial court
in overruling the challenge for cause of the jurors Hartman and Bensberg.
Briefly stated the facts developed upon the voir dire
were, that eight or nine years before the trial the juror
Hartman had been thrown off of a car. He stated that that
fact would influence him in the trial of this cause. He also
stated that he would be governed by the testimony and instructions of the court, and believed that he could render an
impartial verdict; that he had nothing against this defendant, but that he had during all those years entertained
a prejudice against street car companies, and that that prejudice existed when be was first examined as to his qualifications for a juror, but that during the examination, that
prejudice bad been removed, and that he had reached the
conclu ion within the last five minutes that he could try this
case impartially.
The juror Bensherg testified that he had a sort of a
prejudice against the company, and that he did not think
it would influence his verdict as a juror, yet added, "But
still a person having; a prejudice, that would probably unon. iou ly bias his opinion.'' And further added: ''I
would give m r pref rence to the testimony of a non-employ e of the company than I would an employee.'' Upon
th ourt 's sug 0 • stion that he m ant th re by that he would
con. i er th inter t of the employee in determining the
er di bility of his evid nee, the juror ace ded to that vi w.
Aft ·r examination by the court and oun l, the juror wa
a kc;<l: "
\V ell, r all y, 1Ir. Juror, I do not under tand
your }J • ition now.
hat is the reason I am asking the e
qu( : t ion ·. A. \V 11, as I said before, I have a Ir judi e
a<,ain . L 1l1e
mpany t . tart with. Q. You still have that
prc·.i11<1ic·<'? A. Still liav it. Q. And you also have a
r jndiC'P an·ainst th t stimony of employees.
. I would
not gi v · it the same pre.r ronce that I would th evi<l }nee
\j ·
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of a person who was not an interested party on either side

— more so an employee of the company."

Under our system of jurisprudence there is no feature

of a trial more important and more necessary to the pure

and just administration of the law than that every litigant

shall be accorded a fair trial before a jury of his country-

men, who enter upon the trial totally disinterested and

wholly unprejudiced. Where a juror admits, as Hartman

did, that he had a prejudice against street car companies of

eight or ten years standing, and that that prejudice existed

up to the time he gave his first answer upon his voir dire,

yet after being examined and cross-examined by counsel and

the court, and being put in the position of having to say

he would allow that prejudice to overcome the obligation of

his oath as a juror, or on the other hand to say that he

could divest his mind of such a prejudice and fairly try a

case, and that the prejudice had become dissipated within

the last five minutes, it can scarcely be reasonably said that
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such a juror fills the requirements of our system of juris-

prudence.

The juror Bensberg more candidly and accurately stated

the conditions existing in such cases when he said: ''Well,

a person having a prejudice, that would probably unconsci-

ously bias his opinion." The truth of this statemenr is

self-evident. The question of the qualification of a juror is

a question to be decided by the court, and not one to be de-

cided by a juror himself. It is the prerogative and duty of

the trial court to exercise a wise, judicial discretion in this

regard, and the conclusion of the court should rest upon the

facts stated by the juror with reference to his state of

mind, and should not be allowed to depend upon the con-

clusions of the juror as to whether or not he could or

would divest himself of a prejudice he admitted existed in

his mind. And this is true whether the prejudice exists

against either of the parties or against the character of the

subject-matter in litigation, or against either of the parties

as a class, and not against the party as an individual. It is

proper to examine a juror as to the nature, character and

cause of his prejudice or bias, but it is not proper to per-

mit the juror, who admits the existence in his mind of such

prejudice or bias, to determine whether or not he can or

cannot, under his oath, render an impartial verdict. Such

THE
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of a person who was not an interested party on either side
-more so an employee of the company.''
Under our ystem of jurisprudence there is no f eature
of a trial more important and more necessary to th e pure
and just administration of the law than that every litigant
shall be accorded a fair trial before a jury of bis countrymen, who enter upon the trial totally disinterested and
wholly unprejudiced. Where a juror admits, as Hartman ·
did, that he had a prejudice against street car companies of
eight or ten ears standing, and that that prejudice existed
up to the time he gave his first answer upon his voir dire,
yet after being examined and cross-examined by coun el and
the court, and being put in the po ition of having to say
he would allow that prejudice to overcome the obligation of
his oath as a juror, or on the other hand to ay that he
could divest his mind of such a prejudice and fairly try a
case, and that the prejudice had become dissipated within
the last five minutes, it can scarcely be reasonably said that
such a juror fills the requirements of our system of jurisprudence.
The juror Bensberg more candidly and accurately stated
the condition. existing in such cases when he said: ''Well,
a person having a prejudice, that would probably unconsciously bia hi opinion.'' The truth of this statement is
self-evident. The question of the qualification of a juror is
a que tion to be decided by the court, and not one to be decided by a juror himself. It is the prerogative and duty of
the trial court to exerci e a wi e, judicial discretion in this
regard, and the conclusion of the court should rest upon the
facts stated by the juror with reference to his state of
mind and should not be allowed to depend upon the conclusions of the juror as to whether or not he could or
would divest him elf of a prejudice he admitted existed in
his mind. And thi is true whether the prejudice exi ts
ao·ain t either of the parties or against the character of the
subj ct-matter in litigation, or against either of the parties
as a clas , and not again t the party a an indi idual. It is
pro1 r to examin a juror a to the nature, character and
cau of his prejudice or bia , but it is not proper to permit the juror who admit the exi tence in his mind of such
prejudic or bia , to determine w h ther or not he can or
cannot, under _his oath, render an impartial verdict. Such
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a course permits the juror to be the judge of his qualifica-

tions instead of requiring the court to pass upon them as

questions of fact.

It is altogether a mistaken idea that the ruling of the

trial court on such questions is conclusive and not subject to

review. In some cases it has been loosely said that the

ruling of the court on such questions is like the ruling of

the trial court in law cases, and that where there is any

evidence to support the ruling, an appellate court will not

review the same. Such questions generally arise only in

cases at law. It is the discretion exercised by the trial judge

which is the subject of review. In approaching the decision

of that question an appellate court is always guided by the

same rule that obtains with reference to the review of dis-

cretionary judicial acts of inferior tribunals. Great defer-

ence is paid to the finding of a trial judge, but that finding

is not conclusive, and where the facts are, as here, practic-

ally undisi3uted, such ruling is subject to review on appeal.
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Otherwise the whole power and authority as to the selection

of jurors would be vested in the trial court, and it is against

the policy of our law to permit any ruling in nisi prius court

to be beyond review and correction by an appellate court.

Accorded such a power, all else would be a foregone con-

clusion, and a litigant would be entirely at the mercy of

the trial judge, and the usefulness and propriety of appel-

late courts, would, to a large extent, be diminished.

This matter has been the subject of much consideration

and adjudication, not only in this State but in sister states,

and text writers have undertaken to formulate rules which

should be observed in the determination of the question. An

examination of cases cited in the briefs of counsel, shows a

vast contrariety of opinion and ruling in cases of this char-

acter.

Counsel for plaintiff refer to Thompson in his work on

Trials, section 100, where it is said: "Under modern prac-

tice the court acts as trier of all challenges. And the de-

termination of questions of fact is final and not subject to

review." Of this it is sufficient to say that such is not the

lule in tliis State.

Counsel for plaintiff further refer to Thompson on Trials,

section 115, where the doctrine is laid down as follows:

TRIAL PRACTICE
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a cour e permits the juror to be the judge of his qualification instead of requiring the court to pass upon them as
questions of fact.
It is altogether a mistaken idea that the ruling of the
trial court on such questions is conclusive and not subject to
review. In some ca es it has been loosely said that the
ruling of the court on such questions is like the ruling of
the trial court in law cases, and that where there is any
evidence to support the ruling, an appellate court will not
review the same. Such questions generally arise only in
case at law. It i the discretion exercised by the trial judge
which is the subject of review. In approaching the decision
of that question an appellate court is always guided by the
ame rule that obtains with reference to the review of discretionary judicial acts of inferior tribunals. Great deference is paid to the finding of a trial judge, but that finding
is not conclusive, and where the facts are, as here, practically undisputed, such ruling is subject to review on appeal.
0th rwi e the whole power and authority as to the selection
of jurors would be ve ted in the trial court, and it is against
the policy of our law to permit any ruling in nisi prius court
to b beyond review and correction by an appellate court.
A orded such a power, all else would be a foregone conlu ion, and a litiO'ant would be entirely at the mercy of
the trial judge, and the usefulness and propriety of appellat court , would, to a large extent, be diminished.
Thi matter ha been the subject of much consideration
and adjudication, not only in this State but in sister states,
and text writer have undertaken to formulate rules which
. houl be ob rv din the determination of the question. An
xamination of a es cited in the brief of coun el, shows a
va . t ontrari ty of opinion and ruling in cases of this charact r.
* * * * * * * * * *
1 for plaintiff refer to Thomp on in his work on
· tio 100, where it i said: "Under mod rn pracurt acts as trier of all ch 11 nges. And the de-1c·rm in· ti n f ue tions of fact is final and not ubJect to
rP i w. ''
f this it is suffi ient to ay that such is not the
i ul · in this ~ tat .
1 f r pl inti ff furth r r f r to Th mp on on Trials,
. , w h r th
trin is laid down as follows:
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''The sound and prevailing view is that a party cannot, on

error or appeal, complain of a ruling of a trial court in over-

ruling his challenge for cause, if it appear that, when the

jury is completed, his peremptory challenges were not ex-

hausted ; since he might have excluded the obnoxious juror

by a peremptory challenge, and therefore the error is to

be deemed error without injury. For the same reason, if

a court erroneously overrules a challenge for cause, and

thereafter the challenging party excludes the obnoxious

juror by a peremptory challenge, he cannot assign the ruling

of the court for error, unless it appear that, before the jury

was sworn, his quiver of peremptory challenges was ex-

hausted ; in which case there is room for the inference that

the erroneous ruling of the court may have resulted in leav-

ing upon the panel other obnoxious jurors whom the party

might, but for the ruling, have excluded by peremptory chal-

lenge. Some courts, therefore, hold that it is enough, in such

a juncture, to show that his peremptory challenges were ex-
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hausted before the jury was sworn. But others take what

seems the better view, that it must also appear, not only

that his peremptory challenges were exhausted, but that

some objectionable person took his place on the jury, who

otherwise would have been excluded by a peremptory chal-

lenge."

Counsel for plaintiff cite cases which hold that even where

the trial court erred in overruling a challenge for cause it

must affirmatively appear by the record that the party had

exhausted his peremptory challenges in order to success-

fully challenge the ruling of the court.

This doctrine is manifestly pregnant with difficulty, and

would necessitate an extensive collateral inquiry precedent

to the regular proceedings in a case, in order that it might

appear that the aggrieved party had or had not exhausted

his peremptory challenges, or had not been driven to the

necessity of using some of his peremptory challenges to get

rid of the alleged prejudiced juror, whom he had challenged

for cause, and thereby been deprived of the opportunity

of getting rid of other objectionable jurors, though less ob-

jectionable than the juror challenged for cause. Such a

ruling imposes a burden upon the party aggrieved, which

he ought not to be compelled to bear, and reverses the theory

of our system of jurisprudence that error is prejudicial,

THE
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''The sound and prevailing view i that a party cannot, on
error or appeal, complain of a ruling of a trial court in overruling bis challenge for cau e, if it appear that, when the
jury is completed, hi peremptory challenges were not exhausted; since be migbt ha' e excluded the obnoxious juror
by a peremptory challenge, and therefore the error is to
be deemed error without injury. For the same rea on, if
a court erroneously o errules a challenge for cause, and
tbereaf ter the challenging party excludes the obnoxious
juror by a peremptory challenge, he cannot assign the ruling
of the court for error, unless it appear that, before the jury
was sworn, his quiver of peremptory challenges was exhausted; in which ca e there is room for the inference that
the erroneou ruling of the court may have resulted in leaving upon the panel other obnoxious jurors whom the party
might, but for the ruling have excluded by peremptory challenge. Some courts, therefore, bold that it is enough, in such
a juncture, to how that hi peremptory challenges were exhausted before the jury wa sworn. But other take what
seems the better view, that it mu t also appear, not only
that bis peremptory challenge were exhau ted, but that
some objectionable per on took his place on the jury, who
otherwise would have been excluded by a peremptory challenge.''
Counsel for plaintiff cite cases which hold that even where
the trial court erred in overruling a challenge for cause it
mu t affirmatively appear by the record that the party bad
exbau ted bis peremptory challenges in order to successfully challenge the ruling of the court.
This doctrine i manife tly pregnant with difficulty, and
would necessitate an extensive collateral inquiry precedent
to the regular proceeding in a case, in order that it might
appear that the aggrieved party had or had not exbau ted
his peremptory chall nge or had not been driven to the
nece sity of using ome of bis peremptory challenges to get
rid of the alleged pr judiced juror, whom be bad challenged
for cause, and thereb b en deprived of the opportunity
of getting rid of other objectionable jurors, though le obj ctionable than the juror challenged for cau e.
ucb a
ruling impo es a burden upon the party aggrieved, which
he ought not to be comp ll d to bear, and reverse the theor.
of our ystem of juri prudence that error is prejudicial,
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unless the party in whose favor the error is committed,

shows that it was harmless error. The rule stated by

Thompson on Trials reverses this practice and imposes

upon the party who points out and assigns the error, the

further burden of showing affirmatively that he was pre-

judiced by the error. Under our statute each party is abso-

lutely entitled to three peremptory challenges. The statute

also gives parties litigant the right to challenge a juror for

cause. If error appears in the ruling of the court on a chal-

lenge for cause that question should be decided wholly in-

dependent of any consideration of whether the party liti-

gant had or had not exhausted his peremptory challenges.

In other words, the statute provides for two classes of chal-

lenges, one for cause and the other peremptorily without

assigning any cause. And in the determination of the ques-

tion of the propriety of the ruling upon a challenge for

cause, it is improper to mix with it a consideration of the

question as to whether or not the complaining party had
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exhausted his peremptory challenges.

The conclusion is irresistible that the trial court should

have sustained the challenge for cause.

**********

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit

court is reversed.

Bkace^ p. J., concurs ; Valliant and Lamm, J. J., concur

in paragraphs 1 and 2, and in the result.

WILSON V. WAPELLO COUNTY.

Supreme Court of loiva. 1905.

129 Iowa, 77.

Action at law to recover damages growing out of the

death of W. M. Wilson, plaintiff's intestate, and which

deatli was occasioned, as alleged, by the negligence of the

defendant county in permitting a county bridge to remain in

[Chap.5
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unless the party in whose favor the error is committed,
shows that it was harmless error.
The rule stated by
Thompson on Trials reverses this practice and imposes
upon the party who points out and assigns the error, the
further burden of showing affirmatively that he was prejudiced by the error. Under our statute each party is absolutely entitled to three peremptory challenges. The statute
also gives parties litigant the right to challenge a juror for
cause. If error appears in the ruling of the court on a challenge for cause that question should be decided wholly independent of any consideration of whether the party litigant had or had not exhausted his peremptory challenges.
In other words, the statute provides for two classes of challenges, one for cause and the other peremptorily without
assigning any cause. And in the determination of the question of the propriety of the ruling upon a challenge for
cause, it is improper to mix with it a consideration of the
question as to whether or not the complaining party had
exhausted his peremptory challenges.

• * * * * * * • * *
The conclusion is irresistible that the trial court should
have sustained the challenge for cause.

• * * • * • • * • •

a defective and dangerous condition. Upon trial there was

For the foregoing rbasons the judgment of the circuit
court is r eversed.
BRACE, P. J., concurs; VALLIANT and LAMM, J. J., concur
in paragr~ phs 1 and 2, and in the result.
+M F
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WILSON V. WAPELLO COUNTY.
Siipreme Court of Iowa.

1905.

129 Iowa, 77 •

.A rtion at ]aw to r over dam~ ge growing out of the
'Lh f W. M. Wil · n, plaintiff's int tat , and which
Lh w· . o asi
d, as all ged, by the n gligence of the
f Pnd nt · unty in p rmittinO' a county brido-e to remain in
d .fe ·ti e and dangerous condition. Upon trial there was
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a verdict and judgment in favor of defendant, and tlie plain-

tiff appeals. — Affirmed.

THE

JURY

209

a verdict and judgment in favor of defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.-Affinned.

**********

Bishop, J. — I. This action was commenced in January,

1903, and was reached for trial upon the issues joined in De-

cember, 1904. As the jury was being impaneled, the plain-

tiff challenged for cause each of the individual jurors called

into the box who made answer that he was a property owner

and tax payer in the county. The ground of challenge was

that the juror was ''incomiDetent because of showing such

a state of mind as would preclude him from rendering a just

verdict in said cause." The several challenges were over-

ruled, and, after exhausting her right of peremptory chal-

lenge, the plaintiff was compelled to go to trial before a

jury made up of taxpayers of the county. Out of this sit-

uation arises the error first complained of. The statute en-

umerates the several grounds upon which a challenge for

cause to an individual juror may be laid. Among these,
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and it is the only one having any pertinency to the present

inquiry, is the following: "When it appears the juror * * *

shows such a state of mind as will preclude him from

rendering a just verdict." Code, section 3688, subd. 9.

It must be apparent that a challenge based upon such

ground calls only for a conclusion upon a fact question,

and of necessity such question is addressed to the sound dis-

cretion of the trial court. And, as in other cases, where an

exercise of discretion is under review, we may not interfere,

except an abuse be made to appear. Anson v. Dwight, 18

Iowa, 241 ; Sprague v. Atlee, 81 Iowa, 1 ; Goldthorp v. Gold-

thorp, 115 Iowa, 430.

Now it may very well be considered that a personal pe-

cuniary interest in the result of an action is of itself suffic-

ient to justify a finding that a state of mind exists such as

to preclude a just verdict. And without doubt every tax-

payer within the limits of a municipal corporation is inter-

ested in a pecuniary sense in the result of an action brought

against such corporation to recover damages as for a per-

sonal injury. He must contribute in the way of payment

of taxes to liquidate any judgment that may be obtained.

It is in line with this thought that we have uniformly held

that in actions against a city or town for the recovery of

money there was no abuse of discretion in sustaining a

T. p.— 14

BrsHoP, J.-I. This action was commenced in January,
1903, and was reached for trial upon the issues joined in December, 1904. As the jury was being impaneled, the plaintiff challenged for cause each of the individual jurors called
into the box who made answer that he was a property owner
and tax payer in the county. The ground of challenge was
that the juror was ''incompetent because of showing such
a state of mind as would preclude him from rendering a just
verdict in said cause.'' The several challenges were overruled, and, after exhausting her right of peremptory challenge, the plaintiff was compelled to go to trial before a
jury made up of taxpayers of the county. Out of this situation arises the error first complained of. The statute enumerates the several grounds upon which a challenge for
cause to an individual juror may be laid. Among these,
and it is the only one having any pertinency to the present
inquiry, is the following : "When it appears the juror * * *
shows such a state of mind as will preclude him from
rendering a just verdict.'' Code, section 3688, subd. 9.
It must be apparent that a challenge ba ed upon such
ground calls only for a conclusion upon a fact question,
and of necessity such question is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. And, as in other cases, where an
exercise of discretion is under review, we may not interfere,
ex ept an abuse be made to appear. Anson v. Dwight, 18
Iowa, 241; Sprague v. Atlee, 81 Iowa, 1; Goldthorp v. Goldthorp, ] 15 Iowa, 430.
Now jt may very well be considered that a personal pecuniary intere t in the result of an action is of itself sufficient to justify a finding that a state of mind exists uch as
to preclude a just verdict. And without doubt every taxpayer within the limits of a municipal corporation is interested in a pecuniary sense in the result of an action brought
again t su h corporation to r over damages as for a peronal injury. I e mu t contribute in the way of payment
of ta." to liquidate any judQTilent that may be obtained.
It i in line with thi thouo·ht that we have uniformly held
th t in acti n again t a city or town for the r co very of
mon
th re as no abu e of di cretion in sustaining a
T. P.- 14
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challenge for cause to a juror; the challenge being predi-

cated wholly upon the fact that the juror was a taxpayer

of the defendant city or town. Of such cases are these:

Davenport, etc., Co. v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229; Dively v.

Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa 567; Cramer v. Burlington, 42 Iowa

315; Cason v. Ottumwa, 102 Iowa 99.

Some language is used in the opinion in the Cramer Case,

and likewise in the Cason Case, upon which an argument

might be based, to the effect that it would be reversible er-

ror to overrule a challenge made to a taxpayer called as a

juror in such a case, but respecting such matter we need not

make any pronouncement at this time. It is sufficient to

remark in this connection that jurors are drawn from the

county at large, and where a city, town, or other minor

municipality is proceeded against no substantial injustice

could result from a trial to a jury made up of non-taxpaying

members of the panel. Moreover, no difficulty need be ap-

prehended in such cases, as challenges on the ground of in-
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terest, if sustained, could not have the effect of blocking the

machinery of the court, and thus make it impossible that a

case be put upon trial. When, however, a county is pro-

ceeded against, the court is confronted with quite a differ-

ent situation. While there is no requirement in the statute

that one must be a taxpayer to be eligible as a juror, yet

it is fair to presume that each person drawn for jury ser-

vice is the owner of some property, greater or less in

amount or value, which is the subject of taxation. Indeed,

we think it within common experience in this State that

the appearance of a non-taxpaying juror furnishes a rare

exception to the rule. And it is hardly conceivable that a

panel should be drawn in any county presenting a sufficient

number of non-taxpaying members to make it possible to

make up a jury out of such for the trial of a case. It may

be true enough that, after exhausting the regular panel,

the drawing of talesmen might be resorted to and continued

indefinitely until a sufficient number of jurors who could

pass challenge should be found. Conceding the possibility

of such a course, and to say nothing of the expense incident

thereto, we should be very slow to condemn the discretion-

ary action of a trial court in refusing to compel parties

to sul)mit tlioir important matters of difference to a jury

which might be eventually thus made up. And this conclus-

challenge for cause to a juror; the challenge being predicated wholly upon the f act that the juror was a taxpayer
of the defendant city or town. Of such cases are these :
Davenpod, etc., Co. v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229; Dively v.
Cedar Fall , 21 Iowa 567; Cramer v. B urlington, 42 I owa
315; Cason v. Ottumwa, 102 Iowa 99.
Some language is used in the opinion fn the Cramer Case,
and likewise in t he Cason Case, upon which an argument
might be ba ed, to the effect that it would be reversible error to overrule a challenge made t o a t axpayer called as a
juror in such a case, but respecting such matter we need not
make any pronouncement at this t ime. It is sufficient to
remark in this connection that j urors are drawn from the
county at large, and where a city, town, or other minor
municipality is proceeded against no substantial injustice
could result from a trial to a jury made up of non-taxpaying
members of the panel. Moreover, n o difficulty need be apr bended in such cases, as challenges on the ground of int r t, if ustained, could not have the effect of blocking the
machin ry of the court, and thus make it impossible that a
ca e be put upon trial. When, however, a county is proe ded again t, the court is confronted with quite a differn t ituation. While there is no requirement in the statute
that one must be a taxpayer t o be eligible as a juror, yet
it is fair to presume that each person drawn for jury seri e is the owner of some property, great er or less in
amount or value, which is the subject of taxation. Indeed,
we think it within common experience in this State that
th a pearance of a non-taxi ayincr juror f urnishes a rare
x ption to the rule. And i t is hardly conceivable that a
l an 1 hould be drawn in any county presenting a sufficient
nu 1 r of n n-taxpaying m mbers to make it possible to
mak u a jury out of such for the trial of a case. It may
l tr
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ion is the more readily reached in view of the statute which

gives a phiintiff who has brought an action triable to a jury

against a county, in the court of that county, as he must,

the unqualified right to have the place of trial changed to

an adjoining county. Code, section 3505, subd. 1.

In some of the sister States it has been provided by stat-

ute that, in an action against a county, it shall be no ground

of challenge that a juror called to the box is a taxpayer of

the county. And such enactments are undoubtedly based

upon the thought that the extent of the personal interest

of an individual taxpayer is too slight to be permitted to

outweigh, not only the necessity for a speedy disposition

of cases thus brought, but the desirability of having every

jury made up from the substantial citizenship of the county.

In other States it has been held that, in the absence of a

mandatory statute, the slight financial interest which flows

from the obligation to pay taxes is not sufficient to disqualify

a juror, where otherwise there would be a failure of justice.
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Com. V. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90; Com. v. Brown, 147 Mass. 585

(18 N. E. Rep. 587, 1 L. R. A. 620, 9 Am. St. Rep. 736) ; State

v. Intoxicating Liquors, 54 Me. 564; Middletown v. Ames,

7 Vt. 166',Bassett v. Governor, 11 Ga. 207.

We conclude that there was no error, and the judgment is

affirmed.

SEARLE V. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF

SPRINGFIELD.

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SPRINGFIELD

V. SEARLE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1909,

203 Massachusetts, 493.

Two Actions of Tort; the first action by George Everett

Searle against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield,

who as a corporation sole under St. 1898, c. 368, held the

title to certain real estate in the town of Easthampton, which
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ion i the more readily reached in view of the statute which
gives a plaintiff who has brought an action triable to a jury
again t a ounty, in th court of that county, as he must,
the unqualifi d right to have the place of trial changed to
an adjoining county.
ode, ection 3505, subd. 1.
In ome of the si ter States it has been provided by statute that, in an action against a county, it shall be no ground
of challenge that a juror called to the box is a taxpayer of
the county. And such enactments are undoubtedly based
upon the thought that the extent of the personal interest
of an individual taxpayer is too slight to be permitted to
outweigh, not only the neces ity for a speedy disposition
of ca es thus brought, but the de irability of having every
jury made up from the substantial citizen hip of the count;.
In other States it has been held that, in the ab ence of a
mandatory statute, the slight financial interest which flow
from the obligation to pay taxe is not sufficient to di qualify
a juror, where otherwi e there would be a failure of justice.
Com. v. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90; Com. v. Brown, 147 :Mass. 585
(18 N. E. Rep. 587, 1 L. R. A. 6...0, 9 Am. St. Rep. 736); Stat e
v. Intoxicating Liquors, 54 Me. 564; Middletown v. Ames,
7 Vt. 166; Bassett v. Go ernor, 11 Ga. 207.
* * * * * * * * * *
We conclude that there was no error, and the judgment is
affirmed.

SEARLE V. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
SPRINGFIELD.
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SPRINGFIELD
V. SEARLE.
Supreme Judicial Court of llf assachusetts. 1999.
203

Two
Searle
who a
title to

Ma sachusetts, 493.

AcTIONS OF ToRT; the fir t action by George E er tt
again t the Roman atholic Bi bop of pringfi ld,
a corporation ole un er t. 1 9 , c. 36 , held the
c rtain r al ta te in th town of Ea thampton, which
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was bought as a site for a church edifice, alleging the con-

version by the defendant of a one story and a half wooden

building alleged to be personal property and to be the

property of the plaintiff, having been built for the plaintiff

by one Charles W. Smith, with the consent of Delia A.

Strong, who then was the owner of the land; and the

second action by the defendant in the first case against the

plaintiff in the first case and certain other persons, for

damages alleged to have been caused by an attempt to re-

move the building from the real estate, of which it was al-

leged to be a part, seeking also equitable relief by way of

injunction. *****

Knowlton, C. J. The question at the trial was whether

a building erected on land of the defendant in the first ac-

tion, who will hereinafter be called the defendant, was per-

sonal property belonging to Searle, who will hereinafter be

called the plaintiff, or was real estate owned by the de-

fendant.
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**********

Exception was taken by the defendant to the ruling of

the judge at the request of the plaintiff, that no person of

the Roman Catholic faith should sit as a juror in these cases.

Under this ruling two jurors were excluded from the panel,

one a resident of Northampton and the other a resident of

South Hadley. The ruling was made on the ground that the

defendant is the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield,
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was bought as a site for a church edifice, alleging the conver ion by the defendant of a one story and a half wooden
building alleged to be personal property and to be the
property of the plaintiff, having been built for the plaintiff
by one Charles W. Smith, with the consent of Delia A.
Strong, who then was the owner of the land; and the
econd action by the defendant in the :first case against the
plaintiff in the :first case and certain other persons, for
damages alleged to have been caused by an attempt to remove the building from the real estate, of which it was alleged to be a part, seeking also equitable relief by way of
injunction. * * * * *
KNo" LTON, C. J. The question at the trial was whether
a building erected on land of the defendant in the first action, who will hereinafter be called the defendant, was personal property belonging to Searle, who will hereinafter be
called the plaintiff, or was real estate owned by the defendant.

a corporation sole under the St. 1898, c. 368, who holds

the title to the real estate in trust for the Roman Cath-

olic church, and that these excluded jurors have an inter-

est in the suit analogous to that which taxpayers have

in a suit against the city or town in which they re-

side. It is not contended and it could not successfully

be contended that holding the same religious belief as one

of tlie parties, or affiliation with him in the same church,

woukl disqualify a person from sitting as a juror in his

case. The application of such a doctrine would be un-

just and impracticable. Commonwealth v. Buzzell, 16 Pick.

153; Purple v. Horton, 13 Wend. 1; Barton v. Erickson,

14 Neb. 164; Smith v. Sisters of Good Shepherd, 27 Ky.

Law Rep. 1170.

The real estate held by the defendant is in the town of

Easthampton, and it was bought as a site for a church edi-

Exception was taken by the defendant to the ruling of
the judge at the request of the plaintiff, that no person of
the Roman Catholic faith should sit as a juror in these cases.
nder thi ruling two jurors were excluded from the panel,
ne a re ident of Northampton and the other a resident of
outh Iadley. The ruling was made on the ground that the
d f ndant i the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield,
a orporation ole under the St. 1898, c. 3G8, who holds
th titl to the real estate in trust for the Roman Catholic chur h, and that these excluded jurors have an inter~ t in the . uit analogous to that which taxpayers have
m
·ui again t the city or town in which they re·i<1
t i: n t
nt nde and it could not succes fully
lw r·onLn1c1 d th t holdino- the · same religious belief as one
of ili ) l >' rtie , r affiliation with him in the ame chur h,
wonlcl di. c1ualify a per on from sitting as a juror in bis
"a ·c.
h ap li ation of such a doctrine would b un.in t and i pra ti able. Commonwealth v. Bitzzell, 16 Pick.
15:~ · Purple v. IT orton, 13 W nd. 1; Barton v. Erickson,
4
h. ] 4; mith v. Si ters of Good Shepherd, 27 Ky.
I av
p. 117 .
'J h r 1 t t h 1 by the d f ndant is in the town of
, . th·
it wa oug t a a sit for a church edi-
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fice. The excluded jurors were not taxpayers in that town,

and it may be assumed that they were not members of the

parish that was expected to use the church. The ruling ap-

plied to all jurors of the Roman Catholic faith, without

reference to their residence or to any close affiliation with

the local church. Has every person of the Roman Catholic

faith in the diocese of the bishop of Springfield a pecuniary

interest, of which the court can take notice, in every church

owned by the defendant in every part of the diocese? We

are of opinion that he has not. It does not appear, and

we have no reason to suppose, that every Roman Catholic

living in a remote part of the diocese can be affected pecun-

iarily by a small loss or gain of the bishop as owner, in con-

nection with the erection of a Roman Catholic church in

Easthampton.

Under the St. 1898, c. 368, the defendant's holding of

property is "for the religious and charitable purposes of

the Roman Catholic Church." In the R. L. c. 36, sec. 44-46,
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it is strongly implied that there is a difference in the trusts,

and in the beneficiaries, among churches in different places^

and that the members of a particular parish and those

directly connected with the church therein have different

pecuniary relations to the church there from those of the

same faith who live in a different part of the same diocese.

Upon the record before us this ruling of the judge appears

to be wrong. See Bxirdine v. Grand Lodge of Alabama, 37

Ala. 478; Delaivare Lodge v. AUmon, 1 Penn. (Del.) 160.

The remaining question is whether the error was pre-

judicial to the legal rights of the defendant. The manner

of impaneling jurors is prescribed by the R. L. c. 176, sec.

25. The names of those summoned as jurors are written

on ballots and placed in a box, and, after the ballots are

shaken up, the clerk draws them one by one in succession

until twelve are drawn. Apart from challenges, 'Hhe twelve

men so drawn * * * shall be the jury to try the issue," etc.

The order of the judge was a violation of the statutory pro-

vision, and of the defendant's right to have the excluded

men sit as jurors unless challenged by the plaintiff.

The case was tried by other qualified jurors, and it is

argued that the defendant was not injured by the order.

Under the R. L. c. 176, sec. 32, no irregularity in the draw-

ing, summoning, returning or impaneling of jurors is suffic-
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:fice. The excluded jurors were not taxpayers in that town,
and it may be a urned that they were not members of the
pari h that wa expected to u e the hurch. The ruling applied to all jurors of the Roman Catholic faith without
reference to their residence or to any close affiliation with
the local church. Ha eYery per on of the Roman Catholic
faith in the dioc se of the bi hop of Springfield a pecuniary
interest, of which the court can take notice, in ever church
owned by the defendant in eYery part of the dioce e . We
are of opinion that he bas not. It does not appear, and
we have no reason to suppo e, that every Roman Catholic
living in a remote part of the dioce. e can be affected pecuniaril by a small lo s or gain of the bishop as owner, in connection with the erection of a Roman Catholic church in
Easthampton.
Under the St. 1898, c. 368, the defendant-'s holding of
property is "for the reljgious and charitable purpo es of
the Roman Catholic Church." In the R. L. c. 36, sec. 44-46,
it is trongly impli d that there i a difference in the tru ts,
and in the beneficiaries, among churches in different places~
and that the members of a particular parish and those
direct] connected with the church therein have different
pecuniary relations to the church there from tho e of the
same faith who liYe in a different part of the same diocese.
Upon the record before u this ruling of the judge appears
to be wrono-. See B itrcline v. Grand Lodge of Alabam,a, 37
Ala. 478; Delaware Lodge v . .Allmon, 1 Penn. (Del.) 160.
The remaining que ti on is whether the error wa prejudicial to the legal right of the defendant. The manner
of impaneling juror i pre cribed 1 y the R. L. c. 176, sec.
25. Tbe name of those summoned as jurors are written
on ballot and pla ed in a box, and, after the ballots are
shaken up the clerk draws them one by one in succe sion
until twelve are drawn. Apart from challenges "the twel e
men so drawn * * * shall be the jury to try the is ue " etc.
The order of th ju] o·e wa a violation of the ta tutor proYi ion, and of the defendant's ri ght to have the excluded
men it a juror unle challenged by the plaintiff.
Th ca e wa tried by other qualified juror , and it is
argu d that the defendant wa not injured b the ord r.
Und r the R. L. c. 176, sec. 32, no irr ·ularity in the drawing, summoning, returning or impaneling of jurors is suffic-
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lent to set aside the verdict, unless the objecting party was

injured thereby. In general it may be assumed that all

duly qualified jurors, against whom there cannot be a suc-

cessful challenge for cause, will consider and try a case pro-

perly. But a man may have affiliations and friendships or

prejudices and habits of thought which would be likely to

lead him to look more favorably for the plaintiff, or less

favorably for him, upon a case of a particular class, or

upon one brought by a particular person or a member of a

particular class of persons, than would the average juror,

even though his peculiarities are not sufficiently pronounced

to disqualify him for service. It is in reference to these

peculiarities that the parties are given a limited number of

peremptory challenges. While they have no direct right of

selection, this right of peremptory challenge gives to each

party a restricted opportunity for choice among qualified

persons. Anything wliich renders this statutory right of

peremj:)tory challenge materially less valuable is an injury
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to a party, within the meaning of the statute. We do not

intimate that any juror would consciously allow feelings of

friendship or prejudice, or unusual and peculiar habits

of thought, to affect his conduct in the jury room; much

less that a party has a right to have the benefit of the pe-

culiar views or special feelings of a particular juror in the

trial of his case. But the right of peremptory challenge

in the impaneling of jurors cannot be disregarded as of no

value to the parties. In the case at bar, a class of per-

sons qualified as jurors, whom the plaintiff thought in such

relations of religious affiliation with the defendant that

they would be likely to hear his defense in an attitude of

special friendship, was withdrawn from the list of jurors.

The order of the judge rejecting these men, at the request

of the plaintiff, gave him at the outset an additional power

of choice, and made his right of peremptory challenge rela-

tively more valuable, while the defendant's similar right

\ias made relatively less valuable. We are of opinion that

this was an injury to the defendant which entitles him to

a new trial. The number of persons summoned as jurors

that b(!l()nged to this class does not appear. It only ap-

])eMrs that the names of two of them happened to be drawn

from tlio box.

Our decision sooms to be in accordance with the weight
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ient to set aside the verdict, unl ess the objecting party was
injured thereby. In general j t may be assumed that all
duly qualified jurors, against whom there cannot be a succe ful challenge for cau e, will con ·ider and try a case properly. But a man may have affiliations and friendships or
prejudices and habits of thought which would be likely to
lead him to look more favorably for the plaintiff, or less
favorably for him, upon a case of a particular class, or
upon one brought by a particular per on or a member of a
particular class of persons, than would the average juror,
even though his peculiarities are not sufficiently pronounced
to disqualify him for service. It is in reference to these
peculiarities that the parties are given a limited number of
peremptory challenges. While they have no direct right of
selection, this right of peremptory challenge gives to each
party a restricted opportunity for choice among qualified
p rson . Anything which renders this statutory right of
peremptory challenge materially less valuable is an injury
to a party, within the meaning of the statute. We do not
intimate that any juror would consciously allow feelings of
friendship or prejudice, or unusual and peculiar habits
of thought, to affect his conduct in the jury room; much
le s that a party has a right to have the benefit of the peuliar vi ws or special feelings of a particular juror in the
trial of his case. But the right of peremptory challenge
in the impaneling of jurors cannot be disregarded as of no
value to the parties. In the case at bar, a class of person qualified as jurors, whom the plaintiff thought in such
r latj n of religious affiliation with the defendant that
th y wo ld be likely to hear his defense in an attitude of
. p ial friendship, wa withdrawn from the list of jurors.
'l h or r of the judo· rejecting these men, at the request
f th pl intiff ·av him at the outset an additional power
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of authority, although some of the cases depend upon local

statutes. Hildreth v. Troy, 101 N. Y. 23i;Welch v. Tribune

Publishing Co., 83 Mich. 661 ; Scranton v. Gore, 124 Penn. St.

595; Montague v. Commonwealth, 10 Gratt. 767; Kunneen

V. State, 96 Ga. 406; Bell v. State, 115 Ala. 25; Danzey v.

State, 126 Ala. 15.

We are aware that courts have often required prett>

clear proof of injury before setting aside a verdict for a

cause of this kind. West v. Forrest, 22 Mo. 344; Southern

Pacific Co. V. Rauh, 49 Fed. Kep. 696; Pittsburg, Cincin-

nati, Chicago S St. Louis Railroad v. Montgomery, 152 Ind.

1, 23 ; People v. Searcey, 121 Cal. 1 ; Tatum v. Young, 1 Por-

ter, (Ala.) 298; Abilene v. Hendricks, 36 Kans. 196, 200. It

is also generally held that an appellate court will not review

an exercise of discretion, or a mere finding of fact of a

trial judge, determining whether a person shall sit upon

a jury. Commonwealth v. Hayden, 4 Gray 18; Grace v.

Dempsey, 75 Wis. 313; People v. Searcey, 121 Cal. 1, 3;
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Commonivealth v. Moore, 143 Mass. 136, and cases cited.

Whether an error of law like that in the present ease, if

it arose only in determining the qualifications of a single

juror, should be held so far to injure an objecting party as

to require the verdict to be set aside, we do not find it

necessary to determine; but when, as in the present case,

the ruling applies to a class of persons, we feel constrained

to say that there was an injury of which the law should

take notice.

Exceptions sustained.

Section 5. Questioning the Jury.

GOFF V. KOKOMO BRASS WORKS.

Appellate Court of Indiana. 1909,

43 Indiana Appellate, 642.

Myers, J. — Action by appellant to recover damages for

[)ersonal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him

while in the. service of appellee. The issues were formed
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of authority, although some of the cases depend upon local
statutes. Hildreth v. Troy, 101 N. Y. 234; Welch v. Tribune
Publishing Co., 83 Mich. 661; Scranton v. Gore, 124 Penn. St.
595; 111 ontague v. Commo nwealth, 10 Gratt. 767; K unneen
v. State, 96 Ga. 406; Bell v. State, 115 Ala. 25; Danzey v.
State, 126 Ala. 15.
We are aware that courts have often required prett)
clear proof of injury before setting aside a verdict for a
cause of this kind. West v. Forrest, 22 Mo. 344; Southern
Pacific Co. v. Rauh, 49 Fed. Rep. 696; Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad v. ll1 ontgomery, 152 Ind.
1, 23; P eople v. Searcey, 121 Cal. 1; Tatum v. Young, 1 Porter, (Ala.) 298; Abilene v. H endricks, 36 Kans. 196, 200. It
is al o generally held that an appellate court will not review
an exercise of discretion, or a mere finding of fact of a
trial judge, determining whether a person shall sit upon
a jury. Commonwealth v. Hayden, 4 Gray 18; Grace v.
Dempsey, 75 Wis. 313; P eople v. Searcey, 121 Cal. 1, 3;
Commonwealth v. Moore, 143 Mass. 136, and cases cited.
Whether an error of law like that in the present oase, if
it arose only in determining the qualifications of a single
juror, should be held so far to injure an objecting party as
to require the verdict to be set aside, we do not find it
necessary to determine; but when, as in the present case,
the ruling a pp lies to a class of persons, we feel constrained
to say that there was an injury of which the law should
take notice.
Exceptions sustained.

SECTION

5.

QUESTIONING THE JUBY.

GOFF V. KOKOMO BRASS WORKS .

.Appellate Court of Indiana.
43

1909.

Indiana Appellate, 642.

J.-Action by appellant to re over damages for
p r onal injurie all g
t ha v b n u tain d by him
while in th _sen ic of appellee. The i ues were formed
MYERS,
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by the complaint and answer of general denial. The cause

was tried by a jury and a verdict returned for appellee.

From a judgment in favor of appellee appellant has ap-

pealed to this court, assigning as error the overruling of

his motion for a new trial.

The reasons assigned in support of the motion relate

solely to the action of the court in sustaining the objections

of appellee to certain questions, propounded by appellant to

the persons called to act as jurors, touching their compe-

tency and qualifications so to act. These questions called

for information as to whether they were acquainted with

any of the officers or agents of the Travelers Insurance

Company, whether any of them ever had any business re-

lations with that company, whether they were then or ever

had been the agents or in the employ of that company, or

whether they were then acquainted with any agent of that

company? Preliminary to these questions appellant offered

to introduce evidence to the court tending to show that
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the Travelers Insurance Company was interested in the

result of the suit, and this offer was refused. A complete

examination of each of the jurors upon his voir dire is

made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions. Appellee

contends that, the jury being accepted by appellant, without

making any peremptory challenge or objection to the com-

petency of any juror, he thereby waived any error that

may have been committed in impaneling the jury.

From the objections made to the various questions pro-

pounded by appellant to each of the jurors, and from the

rulings of the court as disclosed by the record, it appears

that the court proceeded upon the theory that, as appellee

was the only defendant of record, the latitude of appellant's

inquiry did not extend to elicit the suggested informa-

tion.

The matter of impaneling a jury must, to a great ex-

tent, be left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and

only in cases where an abuse of that discretition is clearly

shown will appellate tribunals disturb the judgment of that

court. Courts of last resort having to do with questions,

in principle, not unlike the one here presented, with al-

most 0'i.ie accord, have held that where parties are acting ui

good faith considerable latitude should be allowed along

lines touching the competency of persons called as jurors
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by the complajnt and an wer of general denial. The cause
wa tried by a jury and a verdict returned for appellee.
From a judgment in favor of appellee appellant has appealed to this court, assigning as error the overruling of
his motion for a new trial.
The rea on a igned in support of the motion relate
olely to th action of the court in sustaining the objections
of appellee to certain que tions, propounded by appellant to
the per ons 0alled to act as jurors, touching their competency and qualification so to act. The e questions called
for information as to whether they were acquainted with
any of the officers or agents of the Travelers Insurance
Company, whether any of them ever had any business relation with that company, whether they were then or ever
had been the agents or in the employ of that company, or
whether they were then acquainted with any agent of that
com1 any? Preliminary to these questions appellant offered
to introduce evidence to the court t ending to show that
th Travelers Insurance Company was interested in the
r e ult of th suit, and this offer was refused. A complete
examination of each of the jurors upon his voi r dire is
mad a part of the record by a bill of exceptions. Appellee
cont n 1 that, the jury being accepted by appellant, without
making any peremptory challenge or objection to the compet n y of any juror, he thereby waived any error that
a} hav been committed in impanelinO' the jury.
~ ro
the obj ection made to the various questions prop un d by app Hant to a h of the jurors, and from the
n1l in o-. f tb court a. di clo ed by the re or , it appear
that the ourt proc eded upon the theory that, as appell e
wa th only ef ndant of record, the latitude of appellant'
inquiry did ot ext nd to elicit the sugge ted informa1on.
Th matter f impan lin a jury must, to a great extc·nt, b l ft to the sound di cretion of th trial court, and
nly in ;a s wh r an al us of that dis r tition i clearly
:lH1\\ 11 wi 11 appPllat tri unaL di. turb th ju lo-ment of that
c·uu rl. ) u rt of la t r sort havin to do with question ,
in prill(·ipl ~ , not unlik t1ie one here pr . ented, with alm<>. t <>'i1 • Hr·<·onl, hav~ held th, t wh r
arti s ar actin 0 u1
gouJ foitli · lJ. iclPrnbl0 1· titud
houl<l b allowed alonO'
lw · toucl1ing the om1 rt
y of persons called as jurors
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to act in the matter under investigation, as also for the

purpose of furnishing a basis upon which the court and

parties may proceed intelligently, to the end that a fair and

impartial jury may be obtained. 2 Elliott, Gen Prac, Sees.

507; Epps V. State (1885), 102 Ind. 539, 545; Evansville

Metal Bed Co. v. Loge (1908), 42 Ind. App. 4:61; Donovan v.

People (1891), 139 111. 412, 28 N. E. 964; SJioots v. State

(1886), 108 Ind. 415; Connors v. United States (1895), 158

U. S. 40'8, 15 Sup. Ct. 951, 39 L. Ed. 1033; 24 Cyc. 341;

StepJienson v. State (1887), 110 Ind. 358, 362, 59 Am. Rep.

216. The juror is, no less than a witness, obliged to dis-

close, upon his oath, true answers to such questions as may

be asked touching his competency to serve as a juror in the

case about to be tried (Thornton Juries and Instructions,

Sees. 128; Burt v. Panjaiid (1878), 99 U. S. 180, 25 L. Ed.

451), and the court should exclude questions which are ir-

relevant, and would not, however answered, affect the

juror's competency in the particular case, or which would
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tend to mislead or confuse a juror, or would, as said in the

case of ChyhoivsU v. Bncyrus Co. (1906), 127 Wis. 332, 106

N. W. 833, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 357, clearly give ''undue im-

portance to the insurance company's connection with the

case, since no such basis was necessary." Howard v. Beld-

enville Lumber Co. (1906), 129 Wis. 98,* 108 N. W. ^8;Faber

V. C. Reiss Coal Co. (1905) 124 Wis. 554, 102 N. W. 1049;

Connors v. United States, supra; 24 Cyc. 341.

In M. O'Connor & Co. v. Gillaspy (1908), 170 Ind. 428, it

is said: "Parties litigant in cases of this class are entitled

to a trial by a thoroughly impartial jury, and have a right

to make such preliminary inquiries of the jurors as may

seem reasonably necessary to show their impartiality and

disinterestedness. In the exercise of this right counsel

must be allowed some latitude, to be regulated in the

sound discretition of the trial court, according to the na-

ture and attendant circumstances of each particular case.

The examination of jurors on their voir dire is not only

for the purpose of exposing grounds of challenge for cause,

if any exist, but also to elicit such facts as will enable

counsel to exercise their right of peremptory challenge in-

telligently. Questions addressed to this end are not barred

though directed to matters not in issue, provided they are

pertinent, and made in god faith. It does not appear from
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to act in the matter under investigation, as also for the
purpose of furni hin a ba i upon which the court and
parties may proceed intelligently, to the end that a fair and
impartial jury may be obtained. 2 Elliott, G n Prac., t)ecs.
507; Epps v. tate (1 5), 102 Ind. 539, 545; Evansville
jJfetal Bed Co . v. Loge (1 0 ), 42 Ind. App. ±6 ; Donovan v.
People (1891), 139 Ill. 412, 28 N. E. 96±; Shoot v. State
(1 6), 108 Ind. 415; Connors v. Unit ed States (1895), 158
U. S. 40.8, 15 Sup. Ct. 951, 39 L. Ed. 1033; -± Cyc. 341;
Stephenson v. State (1887), 110 Ind. 358, 36.;.J, 59 Am. Rep.
216. The juror i , no less than a witne s, oblio-ed to disclo e upon hi oath, true an wer to uch que tion as may
be asked touching hi compet ncy to serve a a juror in the
ca e about to be tried (Thornton Juries and In tructions,
Sec . 1_8; Burt v. Panjaud (1878), 99 U. S. 1 0, 25 L. Ed.
451), and the court should exclude que tions which are irrele ant, and would not, however an wered, affect the
juror' competency in the particular case, or which would
tend to mislead or confu ~ e a juror, or would, a aid in the
ca e of Ohybowski . Bucyrits Co. (1906), 127 Wi . 332, 106
N. W. 833, 7 L. R. A . (.._ . S.) 357, clearly gh e 'undue importance to the in urance cornpan. 's conne tion with the
ca e, ince no uch ba i was nece ary." How a rd v. B eldenville Lwnber Co. (190G), 1_9 \Vi . 98, 108 N. W. ±8; Faber
v. C. Rei s Coal Co . (1905) 124 Wi . 554, 102 . W. 1049;
Connors v. Unit ed tate , upra; 24 Cyc. 3±1.
In jJf. O'Connor & Co . v. Gillaspy (1908), 170 Ind. 428, it
is said: '' Pa rtie litiO'ant in ca e of this cla s are entitled
to a trial by a thorouo·h1y impartial jury, and haYe a right
to make such preliminary inquiries of the jurors as may
seem rea onably nece ary to how their impartiality and
di intere tedne . In the ex rcise of this right counsel
must be allowed ome latitude, to be reQlllated in the
ound di cretition of th trial court, accordino- to the nature an attendant circum tances of each I articular case.
The examination of jur r
n their voir dire i not only
for the purpo e of e:x1 i rr ground of challenge for cau e
if an exi t but aL t
Ii it uch facts as will enable
conn ~ I to x r ci th ir ri!),'ht of perem1 tory hall ncre into thi end ar not barred
t llig ntly. Que tio ad re
though dire t
to m tt r n t in i ue provi e they are
pertinent, aJ!rl made in god faith. It does not appear from
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the record that an accident or indemnity insurance com-

pany was in any manner interested in this action, but the

laws of this state authorize the incorporation of companies

for indemnifying employers against liability for accidental

injuries to employes, and it is a matter of common knowl-

edge that numerous companies are engaged in such insur-

ance in this State."

In the case at bar the Travelers Insurance Company was

not a party to the record, and for aught that appears from

the complaint was not interested in the result of the suit,

but the record shows that appellant offered to introduce

evidence to the court tending to show that it was present

in court by hired counsel actively engaged in defending the

action ; and that it had issued a policy of insurance to ap-

pellee. This evidence was admissible only in the discretion

of the court, and for its sole use in determining counsel's

good faith in pursuing the inquiry. Therefore, meeting the

question, does the record before us show an abuse of that
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discretion lodged with the trial court as will authorize this

court to set aside the judgment? Limiting our inquiry to

the particular information desired by appellant, as in-

dicated by the questions propounded to each juror, and to

which objections were sustained, it seems to us quite clear

that the questions should have been answered. For, in case

the insurance company was pecuniarily interested in the

litigation, a person in its employ or otherwise interested

in it, naturally would be more liable to be unduly influenced

to grant an advantage on the side of his employer or in

the protection of a private interest than one having a

single purpose — returning a verdict according to the law

and the evidence. In Spoonick v. Backus-Brooks Co. (1903),

89 Minn. 354, 358, 94 N. W. 1079, it is said: ''That either

litigent has the right to challenge for implied bias must,

of course, be admitted, and we think it would be impossible

to say, or for the court to hold in the exercise of its proper

discretion, that any person connected with the indemnifying

company as a stockholder or otherwise could be a proper

person to sit as a juror in a case the result of which might

l)e of pecuniary interest to such company. If the proposed

juror was a stockliolder.or otlierwise interested in such a

company his disqualification would seem to follow as a

matter of law. If this be so, it is difficult to see upon what.
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the record that an accident or indemnity insurance company was in any manner intere sted in this action, but the
laws of this state authorize the incorporation of companies
for indemnifying employers against liability for accidental
injuries to employes, and it is a matter of common knowledge that numerous companies are engaged in such insurance in this State."
In the case at bar the Travelers Insurance Company was
not a party to the record, and for aught that appears from
the complaint was not interested in the result of the suit,
but the record shows that appellant offered to introduce
evidence to the court tending to show that it was present
in court by hired counsel actively engaged in defending the
action; and that it had issued a policy of insurance to appellee. This evidence was admissible only in the discretion
of the court, and for its sole use in determining counsel's
good faith in pursuing the inquiry. Therefore, meeting the
que tion, does the record before us show an abuse of that
di cretion lodged with the trial court as will authorize this
court to set a ide the judgment~ Limiting our inquiry to
the particular information desired by appellant, as indicated by the questions propounded to each juror, and to
which objections were sustained, it seems to us quite clear
that the questions should have been answered. For, in case
the insurance company was pecuniarily interested in the
litigation, a person in its employ or otherwise interested
in it, naturally would be more liable to be unduly influenced
to grant an advantage on the side of his employer or in
th protection of a private interest than one having a
ingl purpo e-r turning a · verdict according to the law
an th eviden . In Spoonick v. Backu -Brooks Co. (1903),
8 Mjnn. 354, 358, 94 N. W. 1079, it is said: "That either
1iti
t ha th right to challenge for implied bias must,
of ur. ,
a mitted, and we think it would be impossible
to , ay, or r the court to hold in the exercise of its proper
1 n, tbat any p r on onn t d with the indemnifying
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ground the court could refuse to permit counsel to ascertain

the facts while impaneling the jury. It is no answer to this

to say that the insurance company is not named as a party

to the action, for the bias of the juror is not to be determ-

ined by this fact. Xor is it an answer to say that counsel

may protect his client by using a peremjDtory challenge. It

is his right first to learn the facts, and he must do so to

exercise intelligently his right to challenge peremptorily.

The authorities all go to show that a very insignificant in-

terest in the result of an action, and frequently a ver\^ trif-

ling relationship to one of the parties, is sufficient to dis-

qualify a person from sitting as a juror. In order to secure

to litigants unbiased and unprejudced jurors, we are com-

pelled to hold that plaintiff's counsel had a right to ascer-

tain whether there was such a relationship between the per-

sons called as jurors and the insurance company, a cor-

poration vitally interested in the result, which would dis-

qualify these persons, because, by implication, they would
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be biased and prejudced." And see Block v. State (1885),

100 Ind. 357; Burnett v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (1884), 16

Neb. 332, 20 N. W. 280; Ensign v. Harney (1883), 15 Neb.

330, 18 N. W. 73, 48 Am. Rep. 344; Martin v. Farmers, etc.

Ins. Co. (1905), 139 Mich. 148, 102 N. W. 6D6;Hearn v. City

of Greenshurgh (1875), 51 Ind. 119; Terre Haute Electric

Co. v. Watson (1904), 33 Ind. App, 124; Johnson v. Tyler

(1891), I Ind. App. 387; 2 Elliott, Gen. Prac. Sees. 507, 514,

515; Beall v. Clark (1883), 71 Ga. 818.

The weight of authority affirms the right of parties to

examine persons called as jurors on their voir dire, as coun-

sel sought to do in this case. He was denied that right. The

information indicated by the questions does not appear in

the record as having been furnished in any other manner.

Whether any or all of the jurors who tried the case had

any interest in the insurance company, which counsel for

appellant offered to show to the court was financially in-

terested in the result of the litigation, nowhere appears.

The action of the court in refusing to permit counsel for

appellant to examine the persons called as jurors along the

line suggested in this opinion was error, and, in the ab-

sence of a showing that it was harmless, entitles appellant

to reversal of the judgment without first showing that
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ground the court could refu e to I nnit coun el to a certain
the fact wliile im1 an ling the jury. t i n an w r to thi:
to ay that the in urance compan-) i not named as a party
to the action, for the bia of the juror i not to be d termined by this fact. Nor is it an an wer to ay that coun 1
may protect hi client by u ing a perem1 tor challenge. It
is his right :first to learn the fa ts, and he must do so to
exercise intelligently his right to challenge peremptori] .
The authorities all go to how that a ver; in igni:ficant intere t in the re ult of an action, and frequ ntl a very trifling relation hip to one of the artie , i ufficient to disqualify a person from itting a a juror. In order to secure
to litigants unbia ed and unprejudced jurors, we are compelled to hold that plaintiff' coun el had a right to a certain whether there was such a relation hip between the person called a jurors and the in urance company, a corporation vitally intere ted in the re ult, which would di qualify the e person , becau e, b implication, they wou]d
be biased and prejudced." And see Block v. tate ( 1885),
100 Ind. 357; Burnett v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (1884), 16
Neb. 332, 20 N. W. 280; Ensign v. Ha1'ney (1883), 15 Neb.
330 18 N. W. 73, 48 Am. Rep. 344; JJiartin . Fanners, etc.
In . Co. (1905), 139 :Mich. 148, 102 N. W. 656; Hearn v. City
of Green burgh (1875), 51 Ind. 119; Terre Ha ute Electric
Co. v. Watson (1904), 33 Ind. App. 124; Johnson v. Tyler
(18 1) I Ind. App. 387; 2 Elliott, Gen. Prac. Secs. 507, 514,
515; Beall v. Clark (1883), 71 Ga. 818.
The w ight of authority affirms the right of parties to
examine person called as jurors on their voir dire, as counsel ought to do in thi ca e. He wa denied that right. The
information indicated b the que ti on doe not appear in
the record as having been furni hed in an other manner.
Whether any or all of the juror who tried the ca e had
any intere t in the in urance compan which coun el for
appellant offered to how to the court wa :financially int re ted in the re ult of th liti ation nowhere appear .
The action of the court in refu jn · to permit coun el for
a pellant to examine th p r on call d as juror along the
lin
uo·ge t d in thi
p1m n wa
lTOr and in the abnce of a showin · tha it wa har 1
ntitl ap ellant
to rever al of the ju gment without :first showing that
1
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some disqualified juror sat in the case. * * *

Judgment reversed.'^

[Chap. 5
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some disqualified juror sat in the case. * * *
Judgment rev ers ed. 1

iStatutory restrictions. In some states the character and scope of the

questions to be asked a juror are prescribed by statute. See Commonwealth v.

Warner, (1899) 173 Mass 541, 54 N. E. 353; Commonwealth v. Poisson, (1893)

157 Mass. 510, 32 N. E. 906; State v. Bethum, (1910) 86 S. C. 143, 67 S. E.

466; State v. Eoberts, (1910) (Del.) 78 Atl. 305; Woolfolk v. State, (1890)

85 Ga. 69, 11 S. E. 814.

Section 6. Method of Empanelling.

1Statittory restrictions. I n some states the character and scope of the
que tions to be asked a juror are prescribed by statute. See Commonwealth v.
Warner, (1 99) 173 Mass 541, 54 N . E. 353; Commonwealth v. P oisson, (1893)
157 Mass. 510, 32 N. E. 906; State v. Bethum, (1910) 86 S. C. 143, 67 S. E.
466 · State v. Roberts, (1910) (Del.) 78 Atl. 305; Woolfolk v. State, (1890)
85 Ga. 69, 11 S. E . 814.

POINTER V. UNITED STATES.

Supreme Court of United States. 1894.

151 United States, 396.

Me. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.

At the February term, 1892, of the Circuit Court of the

United States for the Western District of Arkansas, the

grand jury returned an indictment against John Pointer

SECTION 6.

METHOD

OF'

EMPANELLING.

for the crime of murder.

The entire panel of the petit jury was called and the
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jurors were examined as to their qualifications, and, the

POINTER V. UNITED STA TES.

journal entry states, thirty-seven in number were found

to be generally qualified under the law, that is, in the

Supreme Court of United States.

1894.

words of the bill of exceptions, ''qualified to sit on this

case." The defendant and the government were then fur-

nished, each, with a list of the thirty-seven jurors thus

151 United States, 396.

selected, that they might make their respective challenges,

twentv by the defendant and five by the government, the

remaining first twelve names, not challenged, to constitute

the trial jury. Tlie defendant at the time objected to this

mode of selecting a jury: ''1st, because it was not accord-

ing to the rule prescribed by the laws of the State of Ar-

kansas; 2d, because it was not the rule practiced by com-

mon law courts; 3d, because the defendant could not know

the particular jurors before whom he would be tried until

after his cliallcngos. as guaranteed by the statutes of the

Unitod Sfntos. bnd been exhausted; 4th, because the gov-

ernment did not tender to the defendant the jury before

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.
At the February term, 1892, of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Western District of Arkansas, the
grand jury returned an indictment against John Pointer
for the crime of murder.
* * * * * * * * * *
The entire panel of the petit jury was called and the
jurors were examined as to their qualifications, and, the
journal entry states, thirty-seven in number were found
to be
nerally qualified under the law, that is, in the
ord of the bill of e~yceptions, '' qualified t o sit on this
·a . '' The lef ndant and the government were then furnish d each, with a list of the thirty-seven jurors thus
. 1 rt cl, that they might make their respective challenges,
twrntv b. r th d fendant and five by the o-overnm nt, the
r me ining fir. t twelv names, not challenged, to constitute
tl10 trial jur?.
Th d f ndant at the time ohje ted to t his
O(lr of . 10rtjng a jury: "1st, because it was not according to the rul pre ribed by the laws of the State of Ar Jwn ·< c:; • 2cl hr('anse it was not thr rule pra tic d by comon l~w ronrt.·;
, heranse the d f ndant could not know
h , rtif'nlnr jnror. hrfore whom h wonld b tri d until
,1ft r hjs drn llrng s. as gun re nte0d bv the . tatut
of the
T nit rl ~ •t, 10s, h, cl hrrn p ·l1mistecl; 4th,
cans th o-ovrn
i lid not t nrlrr t the a f ndant the jury before
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whom he was to be tried, but tendered seventeen men in-

stead of twelve, and made it impossible for defendant to

know who the twelve men before whom he was to be tried

were until after his right to challenge was ended."

At the time this objection was made the defendant's

counsel saved an exception to the mode pursued in form-

ing the jury, and said: ''The point we make is, that the

government must offer us the twelve men they want to

try the case." The court observed: ''They offered you

thirty-seven." "We understand," counsel said, "but we

want to save that point."

The right to challenge a given number of jurors with-

out showing cause is one of the most important of the

rights secured to the accused. "The end of challenge,"

says Coke, "is to have an indifferent trial, and which is

required by law; and to bar the party indicted of his law-

ful challenge is to bar him of a principal matter concern-

ing his trial." 3 Inst. 27, c. 2. He may, if he chooses,
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peremptorily challenge "on his own dislike, without show-

ing any cause;" he may exercise that right without reason

or for no reason, arbitrarily and capriciously, Co. Lit. 156

b; 4 Bl. Com. 353; Leivis v. United States, 146 U. S. 376.

Any system for the empanelling of a jury that presents

or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the ac-

cused of that right, must be condemned. And, therefore,

he cannot be compelled to make a peremptory challenge

until he has been brought face to face, in the presence of

the court, with each proposed juror, and an opportunity

given for such inspection and examination of him as is re-

quired for the due administration of justice.

Were his rights in these respects impaired or their exer-

cise embarrassed by what took place at the trial? We

think not. The jurors legally summoned for service on

the petit jury were, as we have seen, examined in his pres-

ence as to their qualifications, and thirty-seven were ascer-

tained, upon such examination, to be qualified to sit in the

case. Both the accused and the government had ample

opportunity, as this examination progressed to have any

juror who was disqualified rejected altogether for cause.

A list of all those found to be qualified under the law, and

not subject to challenge for cause, was furnished to the
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whom he was to be tried, but tendered seventeen men instead of twelve, and made it impossible for defendant to
know who the twelve men before whom he wa to he tried
were until after his right to challenge was ended.''
At the time this objection was made the defendant's
counsel saved an exception to the mode pur ued in forming the jury, and said: ''The point we make i , that the
government must offer us the twelve men they want to
try the case.'' The court observed: ''They offered you
thirty-seven." "We understand," counsel aid, "but we
want to save that point.''
* * * * * * * • * *
The right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause is one of the most important of the
rights secured to the accused. "The end of challenge,"
says Coke, "is to have an indifferent trial, and which is
required by law; and to bar the party indicted of his lawful challenge is to bar him of a principal matter concerning his trial." 3 Inst. 27, c. 2. He may, if he chooses,
peremptorily challenge "on hi own dislike, without showing any cau e;'' he may exerci e that right without reason
or for no reason, arbitrarily and capricious!. , Co. Lit. 156
b; 4 BL Com. 353; L ewis v. Unit ed States, 146 U. S. 376.
Any system for the empanelling of a jury that presents
or embarra es the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right must be condemned. And, therefore,
he cannot be compelled to make a peremptory challenge
until be ha been brought fa e to face, in the presence of
the court, with each proposed juror and an opportunity
given for such ins ection and examination of him as is required for the due admini tration of ju tice.
Were bi rights in these re p ct impaired or their exerise embarra ed by what took place at the trial. We
think not. The juror leo·ally ummoned for servic on
the petit jury were a w have e n examined in his pre ence a to th ir qualification and thirty- even were a certain d upo uch examination, to be qualified to it in the
case. Both th accu d and th
O\ ernment
ad ample
opportunity as thi examination progre sed to hav any
juror who wa di qualifi
r j e t d altoo-ether for au. .
A list of all tho e found to b qualified und r th law and
not subject to chall nge for caus , was furni h d to the
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accused and to the government, each sMe being required

to make their challenges at the same time, and having no-

tice from the court that the first twelve unchallenged

would constitute the jury for the trial of the case. It is

apparent, from the record, that the persons named in the

list so furnished were all brought face to face with the

prisoner before he was directed to make, and while he

was making his peremptory challenges.

Was the prisoner entitled, of right, to have the govern-

ment make its peremptory challenges first, that he might

be informed, before making his challenges, what names

had been stricken from the list by the prosecutor? In

some jurisdictions it is required by statute that the chal-

lenge to the juror shall be made by the State before he is

passed to the defendant for rejection or acceptance.

Such is the law of Arkansas, and the court below was at

liberty to pursue that method. Mansfield's Digest, sec.

2242. And such is regarded by some courts as the better
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practice, even where no particular mode of challenge is

prescribed by statute. State v. Cummings, 5 La. Ann.

330, 332. But as no such provision is embodied in any

act of Congress, it was not bound by any settled rule of

criminal law to pursue the particular method required by

the local law. The uniform practice in England, as ap-

pears from the observations of Mr. Justice Abbott, after-

wards Lord Tenterden, in Brandeth's Case, 32 Howell's

St. Tr. 755, was to require the accused to exercise his

right of challenge before calling upon the government. He

said: ''Having attended, I believe, more trials of this

kind than any other of the judges, I would state that the

uniform practice has been that the juryman was presen-

ted to the prisoner or his counsel, that they might have a

view of his person; then the officer of the court looked

first to the counsel for the prisoner to know whether they

wished to challenge him ; he then turned to the counsel for

the crown to know whether they challenged him." p. 771.

In the same case. Lord Chief Baron Richards said that he

conceived it to be clear that ''it is according to the prac-

tice of the courts that the prisoner should first declare

his resolution as to challenging." p. 774. Mr. Justice

Dallas expressed his concurrence in those views, pp. 774,

775. But the general rule is, that where the subject is not
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accused and to the government, each stde being required
to make their challenges at the same time, and having notice from the court that the first twelve unchallenged
would constitute the jury for the trial of the case. It is
apparent, from the record, that the persons named in the
list so furnished were all brought face to face with the
prisoner before he was directed to make, and while he
was making his peremptory challenges.
Was the prisoner entitled, of right, to have the government make its peremptory challenges first, that he might
be informed, before making his challenges, what names
had been stricken from the list by the prosecutor? In
ome jurisdictions it is required by statute that the challenge to the juror shall be made by the State before he is
pas ed to the defendant for rejection or acceptance.
uch is the law of Arkansas, and the court below was at
liberty to pursue that method. Mansfield's Digest, sec.
2242. And such is regarded by some courts as the better
practice, even where no particular mode of challenge is
prescribed by statute. State v. Cummings, 5 La. Ann.
330, 332. But as no such provision is embodied in any
act of Congress, it was not bound by any settled rule of
criminal law to pursue the particular method required by
the local law. The uniform practice in England, as appears from the observations of Mr. Justice Abbott, afterwards Lord Tenterden, in Brandeth's Case, 32 Howell's
t. Tr. 755, was to require the accused to exercise his
ri ht of challenge before calling upon the government. He
aid: "Having attended, I believe, more trials of this
kind than any other of the · judges, I would state that the
unif rm practice has been that the juryman was present d to the pri oner or his coun el, that they might have a
vi w of his
rson; then the officer of the court looked
:flr. t to th oun 1 for the prisoner to know whether they
i. h a to hall ng hi ; he then turned to the counsel for
tl1
r wn to kn w wh th r they challenO' d him." p. 771.
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s , Lord hief Baron Ri hards said that he
c i c1 jt t be 1 ar that "it is a cordinO' to the pracf th
irt that th pri on r sl1ould fir t d clare
lu i n a. to h 11 ngin O'." p. 77 4. Mr. Justice
] hi on 'UIT
e i th s views. pp. 77 4,
n ral rule is t at wh r t
ubj ct is not
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controlled by statute, the order in which peremptory chal-

lenges shall be exercised is in the discretion of the court.

Commonwealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185; Turpin v. State,

55 Maryland, 464; Jones v. State, 2 Blackford, 475; State

V. Hays, 23 Missouri, 287; State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 406;

State V. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477, 480, 504; State v. Boat-

ivright, 10 Rich. (Law), 407; Shuflin v. State, 20 Ohio St.

233.

In some jurisdictions the mode pursued in the challeng-

ing of jurors is for the accused and the government to

make their peremptory challenges as each juror, previous-

ly ascertained to be qualified and not subject to be chal-

lenged for cause, is presented for challenge or acceptance.

But it is not essential that this mode should be adopted.

In Regina v. Frost, 9 Car. & P. 129, 137, (1839), the names

of jurors were taken from the ballot-box, and each was

sworn on the voir dire as to his qualifications before be-

ing sworn to try. When the government peremptorily
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challenged one who had been sworn on the voir dire as to

his qualifications, it was objected that the challenge came

too late, because the juror had taken the book into his

hand to be sworn to try. In disposing of this objection

Chief Justice Tindal said: ''The rule is that challenges

must be made as the jurors come to the book and before

they are sworn. The moment the oath be begun it is too

late, and the oath is begun by the juror taking the book,

having been directed by the officer of the court to do so.

If the juror takes the book without authority, neither par-

ty wishing to challenge is to be prejudiced thereby."

These observations, it is apparent, had reference only to

the question whether a peremptory challenge could be

permitted after the juror had, in fact, taken the book into

his hand for the purpose of being sworn to try. At most,

in connection with the report of the case, they tend to

show that the practice in England, as in some of the

States, was to have the question of peremptory challenge

as to each juror, sworn on his voir dire and found to be

free from legal objection, determined as to him before

another juror is examined as- to his qualifications. But

there is no suggestion by any of the judges in Frost's case

that that mode was the only one that could be pursued

without embarrassing the accused in the exercise of his

THE JURY

223

·ontrolled by statute, the order in which peremptory challrnges shall be exercised is in the discretion of the court.
Uoninionwealth v. Piper, 120 1\fass. 185; Turpin v. State,
55 :M aryland, 464; Jones v. State, 2 Blackford, 475; State
v . Hays, 23 Missouri, 287; State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 406;
State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477, 480, 504; State v. Boatwright, 10 Rich. (Law), 407; Shufiin v. State, 20 Ohio St.
233.
In some jurisdictions the mode pursued in the challenging of jurors is for the accused and the government to
make their peremptory challenges as each juror, previously ascertained to be qualified and not subject to be challenged for cause, i pre ·ent d for challenge or acceptance.
But it is not essential that thi mode hould be adopted,
In Regina v. Frost, 9 ar. & P. 129, 137, (1839), the names
of jurors were taken from the ballot-box, and each was
sworn on the voir dire as to his qualification before being sworn to try. When the governm nt peremptorily
challenged one who had been sworn on the voir dire as to
hi qualifications, it wa objected that the hallenge came
too late, because the juror had taken the ook into his
hand to be sworn to try. In disposing of thi objection
Chief Justice Tindal aid: "The rule i that hallenges
must be made as the juror ome to the book and before
they are sworn. The moment the oath be b gun it is too
late, and the oath is begun by the juror taking the book,
having been directed by the officer of the court to do so.
If the juror takes the book without authority, neither party wishing to challenge is to be prejudiced thereby."
These observations, it is apparent, had reference only to
the que tion whether a peremptory challenge could be
permitted after the juror had, in fact, taken the book into
his hand for the purpo e of being sworn to try. At most
in connection with the report of the case, they tend to
show that the practice in England, a in ome of the
State was to have the que tion of peremptor. challenge
a to a h juror worn on hi v oir dire and found to be
free from 1 gal obj ti n d t rmined as to him b fore
another juror is xamin
a · to hi qualifi ation . But
th re is no suggestion . an. of the judges in Fr t' ca e
that that mode wa the onl. one that could l pur u d
without embarra ing he ac u ed in the exercise of hi
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right of challenge. The authority of the Circuit Courts

of the United States to deal with the subject of empanel-

ling juries in criminal cases, by rules of their own, was

recognized in Lewis v. United States, subject to the condi-

tion that such rules must be adapted to secure all the

rights of the accused. 146 U. S. 379.

We cannot say that the mode pursued in the court be-

low, although different from that prescribed by the laws

of Arkansas, was in derogation of the right of peremptory

challenge belonging to the accused. He was given, by the

statute, the right of peremptorily challenging twenty

jurors. That right was accorded to him. Being required

to make all of his peremptory challenges at one time, he

was entitled to have a full list of jurors upon which ap-

peared the names of such as had been examined under the

direction of the court and in his presence, and found to be

qualified to sit on the case. Such a list was furnished to

him, and he was at liberty to strike from it the whole num-
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ber allowed by the statute, with knowledge that the first

twelve on the list, not challenged by either side, would con-

stitute the jury. And after it was ascertained, in this

mode, who would constitute the trial jury, it was within

the discretion of the court to permit them to be again ex-

amined before being sworn to try. But no such course

was suggested, and the record discloses no reason why a

further examination was necessary in order to secure an

impartial jury. The right of j^eremptory challenge, this

court said, in United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480,

482, and in Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 71, is not of

itself a right to select, but a right to reject, jurors.

It is true that, under the method pursued in tliis case, it

might occur that the defendant would strike from the list

the same persons stricken off by the government. But

that circumstances does not change the fact that the ac-

cused was at liberty to exclude from the jury all, to the

number of twenty, who, for any reason, or without reason,

were objectionable to him. No injury was done if the

government united with him in excluding particular per-

sons from the jury. He was not entitled, of right, to know,

in advance, what jurors would be excluded by the govern-

ment in the exercise of its right of peremptory challenge.

He was only entitled, of right, to strike the names of twen-

right of challenge. The authority of the Circuit Courts
of the United States to deal with the subj ect of empanelling juries in criminal cases, by rules of their own, was
recognized in Lewis v . United States, subject to the condition that such rules must be adapted to secure all the
rights of the accused. 146 U. S. 379.
We cannot say that the mode pursued in the court be~
low, although different from that prescribed by the laws
of .Arkansas, was in derogation of the right of peremptory
hallenge belonging to the accused. He was given, by the
tatute, the right of peremptorily challenging twenty
juror . That right was accorded to him. Being required
to make all of his peremptory challenges at one time, he
was ntitled to have a full li t of jurors upon which appeared the names of such as had been examined under the
dire tion of the court and in his presence, and found to be
qualified to sit on the ca e. Such a list was furnished to
him , and he was at liberty to strike from it the whole numb r allowed by the statute, with knowledge that the first
tw lve on the list, not challenged by either side, would constitute the jury. And after it wa ascertained, in this
mod who would constitute the trial jury, it was within
the di retion of the court to permit them to be again examine before being sworn to try. But no such course
wa uO'ge ted, and the record discloses no reason why a
furth r xamination was nece sary in ord r to secure an
inJTmrtial jury. The right of I rem tory challenge, this
ourt aid, in United State v. 111 archant, L., Wheat. 480,
+ :. , an 1 in Hayes v. llfi. ouri 120 U. S. 68 71, is not of
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ty from the list of impartial JTir}Tnen furnished him by the

court. If upon that list appeared the name of one who

was subject to legal objection, the facts in respect to that

juror should have been presented in such form that they

could be passed upon by this court. But it does not ap-

pear that any objection of that character was made, or

could have been made, to any of the thirty-seven jurors

found, upon examination, to be qualified.

Thus, in our opinion, the essential right of challenge to

which the defendant was entitled was fully recognized.

And there is no reason to suppose that he was not tried

by an impartial jury. The objection that the government

should have tendered to him the twelve jurors whom it

wished to try the case, or that he was entitled to know

before making his challenges the names of the jurors by

whom it was proposed to try him, must mean that the gov-

ernment should have been required to exhaust all of its

peremptory challenges before he peremptorily challenged
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any juror. This objection is unsupported by the authori-

ties, and cannot be sustained upon any sound principle.

We perceive no error in the record to the prejudice of

the substantial rights of the plaintiff in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Section 7. Challenges.

COUGHLIN V. PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1893.

144 Illinois, 140, 164.

Mr. Chief Justice Bailey delivered the opinion of the

court :

**********

Challenges to jurors, based upon an allegation of bias,

favor or partiality, were, at the common law, di\dded into

two classes, viz., principal challenges and challenges to the

favor. A principal challenge was grounded on such mani-

r
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ty from the list of impartial jurymen furnished him by the
court. If upon that list appeared the name of one who
was subject to legal objection, the facts in respect to that
juror . hould have been presented in such form that they
could be pas ed upon by this court. But it does not appear that any objection of that charact r wa made, or
could have been made, to any of the thirty-seven jurors
found, upon examination, to be qualified.
rrhus, in our opinion, the es ential right of challenge to
which the defendant was entitled was fully r ecognized.
And there is no rea on to suppose that he was not tried
by an impartial jury. The objection that the government
should have t endered to him the twelve jurors whom it
wi hed to tr; the case, or that he was entitled to know
before making his challenges the names of the jurors by
whom it was proposed to try him must mean that the government should have been required to exhaust all of its
I eremptory challenges before he peremptorily challenged
any juror. This objection is unsupported by the authorities, and cannot be sustained upon any sound principle.

* * * * * * * * * *
We perceive no error in the record to the prejudice of
the substantial rights of the plaintiff in error.
J 'l6dgment affirmed.

T. p.— 15

SECTION

7.

CHALLENGES.

COUGHLIN V. PEOPLE.
Supreme Court of Illinois.

1893.

144 Illinois, 140, 164.

MR.

CHIEF JusTICE

BAILEY delivered the opm10n of the

court:

* * * * * * * * * *
ChallenO'es to juror , ba ed upon an allegation of bia
fa"\ r or partiality, were, at th common law divided into
two la e viz. principal chall n°·e and hallenge to the
favor. A principal challenge was grounded on such mani1
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fest presumption of partiality, that if the fact alleged was

proved to be true, the disqualification of the juror follow-

ed as a legal conclusion, incapable of being rebutted, in

case of a challenge to the favor, on the other hand, the dis-

qualification arose as a conclusion of fact to be determined

by the triers, the evidence adduced in support of the chal-

lenge leading to no presumption which might not be over-

come by other evidence.

Among the various matters which, at common law, were

held to be principal cause of challenge, that is, cause from

which bias or partiality would be inferred as a legal con-

clusion, were these: consanguinity or affinity of the juror

with either of the parties within the ninth degree ; that the

juror was god-father to the child of either party, or e con-

verso; that the juror was of the same society or corpora-

tion with either party; or was tenant or ''within the dis-

tress" of either party; or had an action implying malice

depending between him and either party; or was master,
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servant, counsellor, steward or attorney for either party;

or after he was returned, he ate and drank at the expense

of either party; or had been chosen as arbitrator by either

party. By most of the authorities it was held to be ground

of principal challenge, that the juror had formed and de-

clared his opinion touching the mater in controversy. 5

Bac. Abridg. 353; 3 Black Com. 363; 2 Tidd's Prac. 853;

Coke Litt. 155; 3 Burns' Justice of the Peace (28th Ed.)

519; 21 Viner's Abridg. 252; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 541; 3

Chit. Gen. Prac. 794; Pringle v. Hulse, 1 Cow. 436, note

1 ; People V. Bodine, 1 Denio, 304. According to these

authorities and others like them, where the matter alleged

was held to be ground for principal challenge, all the chal-

lenging party was called upon to do was, to prove the ex-

istence of the fact alleged by him as a ground of challenge,

and that being shown, the incompetency of the juror fol-

lowed as a necessary legal consequence, and in such case,

no inquiry was permitted as to whether, notwithstanding

the fact shown, he could sit as a juror and render a fair

and impartial verdict. The law, from the fact proved, con-

clusively presumed bias, and permitted no further inquiry.

In til is State, triers are not appointed, according to the

mode of procedure at common law, all challenges, by our

practice, being determined by the court. Nor has the com-
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fest pre umption of artiality, that if the fact alleged was
pro' ed to be true, the disqualification of the juror followed as a legal conclusion, incapable of being rebutted. 1n
case of a challenge to the favor, on the other hand, the disqualification arose as a conclusion of fact to be determined
by the triers, the evidence adduced in support of the challenge leading to no presuruption which might not be overome by other evidence.
Among the various matters which, at common law, were
held to be principal cause of challenge, that is, cause from
which bias or partiality would be inferred as a legal conlu ion, were these: con anguinity or affinity of the juror
with either of the parties within the ninth degree; that the
juror wa god-fa th er to the ~hild of either party, or e conerso; that the juror was or the same society or corporation with either party; or was tenant or "within the distress'' of either party; or had an action implying malice
depending between him and either party; or was master,
servant, counsellor, steward or attorney for either party;
or after he was returned, he ate and drank at the expense
of either party; or had been chosen as arbitrator by either
party. By most of the authorities it was held to be ground
of principal challenge, that the juror had formed and declared bis opinion touching the mater in controversy. 5
ac. Abridg. 353; 3 Black Com. 363; 2 Tidd 's Prac. 853;
oke Litt. 155; 3 Burns' Justice of the Peace (28th Ed.)
51 ; 21 Viner 's Abridg. 252; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 541; 3
hit. Gen. Prac. 794; Pringle v. Hulse, 1 Cow. 436, note
1; People v. Bodine, 1 Denio, 304. According to these
authoriti s and others like them, where the matter alleged
wa. held to be ground for principal challenge, all the chal1 n ing party wa called upon to do wa , to prove the ext n of th fa t alleged by him as a ground of hallenge,
that h jn , hown, the incompet ncy of the juror folas a
ary leO'al ons qu nee, and in such ca e,
no inq ir. wa. p rmitt d a to whether, notwith tandin()'
h , f ·t . h vrn., h ould sit as a juror and r nder a fair
< cl im1 rtial v r j t.
Th law, from the fa t prov d, conc·ln : i l. T .'UID d ia., and permitted n further inquiry.
n ihi.
tri r ar n t ap int d, according to the
1 f r
hu at mm n law, all chall DO' , by our
t r in
by the court. Nor has the com-

Sec. 7]
Sec. 7] The Juey 227

mon law distinction between principal challenges and chal-

lenges to the favor been kept up in this State, still many of

the principles growing out of that distinction have been

habitually recognized and enforced. Indeed, most of the

objections to jurors which at common law were held to be

ground of principal challenge, are held with us to be ab-

solute disqualifications, that is, ujDon mere proof of the

fact alleged, the disqualification follows as a legal conclu-

sion, and evidence is not admitted to show that, notwith-

standing the fact proved, the juror is really impartial.

STATE V. MYERS.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1906,

198 Missouri, 225.

227

THE JURY

mon law distinction between principal challenges and challenges to the favor been kept up in this State, still many of
the principles growing out of that di tinction have been
habitually recognized and enforced. Indeed, mo t of th e
objections to jurors which at common law were held to be
ground of principal ha.Henge, are held with us to be absolute disqualifications, that is, upon mere proof of the
fact alleged, the disqualification follows as a legal conclusion, and evidence is not admitted to show that, notwithstanding the fact proved, the juror is really impartial.

• * * * * * * * • *

Gantt, j # * « * *

2. It is next insisted that the court erred in overruling

the defendant's challenge to the Jurors Lancaster, Golden,

Cossett, Borgnier, Wharton, Miller, Soper and Capps for

the reason that the said jurors on their voir dire examina-
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tion testified that they had formed opinions as to the guilt

or innocence of the defendant from having read a copy of

the confession of Frank Hottman published in the Kansas

STATE V. MYERS.

City newspapers. To this assignment of error the State

makes two answers: First, no specific ground of challenge

Supreme Court of 111issouri.

was stated by the defendant to either or all of said jurors ;

and, second, that the jurors were not incompetent because

1906.

they had formed an opinion from the reading of the news-

198 Missouri, 225.

paper report of the Hottman trial, and what purported to

be Hottman 's confession published in the newspapers. The

record discloses that upon the close of the exauiination of

each of the said jurors, the defendant made the general

challenge, "Defendant challenged this juror;" no specific

ground of challenge was given in either case. "Were the

challenges sufficient to preserve the error now complained

of for review by this court? In Kansas City v. Smart, 128

Mo. 1. c. 290, it was said: "The grounds of challenge to a

J .• "' * * *
2. It is next insisted that the court erred in overruling
the defendant's challenge to the Jurors Lancaster Golden,
Cossett, Borgnier, Wharton 1\filler Soper and Capps for
the reason that the said jurors on their voir dire examination testified that they had formed opinions as to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant from having read a copy of
the confession of Frank Hottman publi hed in the Kansas
City newspapers. To this assignment of error the State
makes two an wers: First, .no specific ground of challenge
was stated by the defendant to either or all of said jurors·
and, second, that the jurors were not incompetent because
they had formed an opinion from the reading of the newspaper report of the B ottman trial and what purported to
be Hottman 's conf sion published in the new papers. The
record discloses that upon the clo e of th exaJllination of
each of the aid jurors, the defendant mad th
eneral
challenge '' D fend ant challenged thi juror;'' no r eci:fic
ground of challen()'e wa
iven in eith r ca e. Were th
challenges suffici nt to pr rve the error now complained
of for review by this ourt~ In Kansa City . mart, 128
Mo. 1. c. 290, it was said: ''The grounds of challenge to a
GANTT,
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juror must be stated when it is offered and tested on his

voir dire. The trial court is entitled to know the reason

for the challenge. {State v. Broivnfield, 83 Mo. 453, 454;

Thompson & Merriam on Juries, sec. 253, and cases cited ;

1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 98.)" In State v. Taylor, 134

Mo. 142, Judge Sherwood, speaking for this court, review-

ed the authorities on this point and said:

"The defendants of course, were entitled to a full and

competent panel of forty men before announcing their final

challenges, but in reaching this stage of the proceedings it

became necessary to make what might be termed interme-

diary challenges. In making such preliminary challenges

that is, challenges for cause, this formula was observed at

the close of the examination of each venireman: 'Counsel

for defendants objected to this juror as disqualified and

not qualified to sit as a competent juror in this cause, and

challenged said juror for cause. Objection and challenge

overruled, to which ruling defendant excepted.' Nothing
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is better settled than that challenges for cause must be

specifically stated. The particular cause must be set forth,

{People V. Reynolds, 16 Cal. 128; Mann v. Glover, 14 N. J.

L. 195; Powers v. Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227; Southern Pa-

cific Co. V. Rauh, 49 Fed. 696; Drake v. State, 20 Atl. 747;

2 Elliott's Gen. Prac, sec. 530, and other cases there cited.)

The facts constituting the cause of complaint were not given

in this instance ; the challenge simply amounted to the state-

ment of a legal conclusion. The rule should be the same

here as it is where general objections are taken to the evi-

dence, that it is incompetent, immaterial, etc., and where it

is held that general objections amount to nothing more than

saying, 'I object.' Indeed, there seem to be more cogent

reasons why specific objections should be urged in a case

of this sort, where the question is as to the admission of a

juryman, than where it is as to the admission of a piece of

evidence. At any rate, in either case, fairness to the court

and to adverse counsel alike demand the grounds of the

challenge for cause to be particularly set forth."

The doctrine announced in that case on this point was

roafTirincd in State v. Bced, 137 Mo. 1. c. 132; State v. Mc-

Ginvis, 158 Mo. 1. c. 118; and in State v. Evans, 161 Mo.

1. c. 108.

Counsel for the defendant, however, insists that in this
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juror must be stated when it is offered and tested on his
voir dire. The trial court is entitled to know the reason
for the challenge. (State v. Brownfield, 83 Mo. 453, 454;
Thompson & :Merriam on Juries, sec. 253, and cases cited;
1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 98.)" In State v. Taylor, 134
~10. 14-, Judge Sherwood, speaking for this court, reviewed the authorities on this point and said:
''Th defendant of course, were entitled to a full and
ompet ent panel of forty men before announcing their final
challenO'es, but in reaching this stage of the proceedings it
became necessary to make what might be termed intermeiary chall nge . In making such preliminary challenges
that i , challenges for cause, this formula was observed at
the lo e of the examination of each venireman: 'Counsel
for d fendants obj ected to this juror as disqualified and
not qualified to sit as a competent juror in this cause, and
hallen gcd said juror for cause. Objection and challenge
ov rruled, to which ruling defendant excepted.' N othinoi bett r settled than that challenges for cause must be
pec1fically stated. The particular cause must be set forth.
(P eople v. Reynolds, 16 Cal. 128; Mann v. Glover, 14 N. J.
L. 195; Powers v. Presg ra ves, 38 Miss. 227; Soitthern Paci.fir
v. R auh, 49 Fed. 696; Drake v. State, 20 Atl. 747;
.... Elli tt' Gen. Prac., ec. 530, and other cases there cited.)
T11P fa t con ti tu ting the cause of complaint were not given
in th i in tance; the challenge simply amounted to the statem nt of a legal conclusion. The rule hould be the same
h r a it i wh re general objection are taken to the evinc , that it i incompetent, immaterial, tc., and where it
L Ji ]d that n ral objection amount to nothing more than
. aying, 'I obj ct.' Indeed, th re seem to be more coO'ent
rea. n. why spe ific objection
ould be urged in a a
f thi. , ort wher th qu tion i a to the admi ion of a
juryman, than wh r it i a to the admi ion of a pi c of
<'virl nc·0.
t any rat , i ith r ca e. fairne s to th court
nn<l to nch' r
un 1 alik d mand th grounds of the
·lw ll<·n°·<· for au. to b I rtj ularly s t forth."
J l1P cl drjnp announ
in th t ase on thi
oint wa.
1
rc·:if'finnN] in i lat e . R ed, 1. 7 M . 1. c. 1 2; Stat v. McOin11i.·, 15 f . 1. . lJ ; nd in State v. Evans, 61 Mo.
l. r. 10 .
1
un .· 'l f r the def ndant, however, insists that in this

ro.

Sec. 7]
Sec. 7] The Jury 229

229

THE JURY

case the ground of the challenge was so apparent to the
court and the oppo ite counsel that ,,hey could not haxe
been misled a to the ground of the challenge. \ e. :ire unable to concur in this view. The e jurors ha b n fully
examined as to their competency, and among other
things as to their opinions formed from reading newspaper
reports. If the objection was intended to be ba ed specifically upon the ground of opinions formed or expre ·ed, it
should have been so stated and the matter :r,roperly preserved for our review.
JYioreover, we are of the opinion that the jurors were not
di qualified because they bad formed an opinion from reading the new paper reports of the Hottman trial and what
purported to be Hottman 's confession, because each one of
said jurors testified that he could sit a a juror in this ca e
and be governed solely by the evidence and render an impartial verdict, notwithstanding his opinion formed from
the reading of such news pa per reports and such opinion as
he had wa based entirely upon the newspaper reports. Section 2616, Re i ed Statutes 1899, provides: "It shall be a
good cau e of challenge to a juror that he has formed or
delivered an opinion on the issue, or any material fact to
be tried, but if it appear that such an opinion is founded
only on rumor and new paper reports, and not such as to
prejudice or bias the mind of the juror, he may be sworn.''
It is a well-settled law in this state that a person otherwi e qualified to it as a juror in a criminal case is not di qualified by rea on of having formed an opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused, from reading partial new pap r accounts of the homicide, or from rumor when he
states on his voir dire that he can give the defendant a fair
and impartial trial. (Stat e v. Reed, 137 Mo. 132 and State
v. For ha, 190 Mo. 1. c. 323, 3:...±.) In the last cited ca e
c rtain of the jurors upon the voir dire examination answ red that thev- had r a a report of the Bailey trial, in
which Bailey ha been tri d for the same murder, and that
th y had read what purport d to be the evi 1ence on that
trial, including th te timony f the Bio-o·s woman who wa
pr nt with Bailey and or ha when the murder wa ommi t d and from uch reading had formed an o ini n as to
the guilt of the d fendant, hut that they could give the
d f ndant a fair and impar iRl trial notwith tanding such
1

case the ground of the challenge was so apparent to the

court and the opposite counsel that they could not have

been misled as to the ground of the challenge. AVe are un-

able to concur in this view. These jurors had been fully

examined as to their competency, and among other

things as to their opinions formed from reading newspaper

reports. If the objection was intended to be based specifi-

cally upon the ground of opinions formed or expressed, it

should have been so stated and the matter properly pre-

served for our review.

Moreover, we are of the opinion that the jurors were not

disqualified because they had formed an opinion from read-

ing the newspaper reports of the Hottman trial and what

purported to be Hottman 's confession, because each one of

said jurors testified that he could sit as a juror in this case

and be governed solely by the evidence and render an im-

partial verdict, notwithstanding his opinion formed from

the reading of such newspaper reports and such opinion as
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he had was based entirely upon the newspaper reports. Sec-

tion 2616, Revised Statutes 1899, provides: *'It shall be a

good cause of challenge to a juror that he has formed or

delivered an opinion on the issue, or any material fact to

be tried, but if it appear that such an opinion is founded

only on rumor and newspaper reports, and not such as to

prejudice or bias the mind of the juror, he may be sworn."

It is a well-settled law in this state that a person other-

wise qualified to sit as a juror in a criminal case is not dis-

qualified by reason of having formed an opinion as to the

guilt or innocence of the accused, from reading partial news-

paper accounts of the homicide, or from rumor when he

states on his voir dire that he can give the defendant a fair

and impartial trial. [State v. Reed, 137 Mo. 132, and State

V. Forsha, 190 Mo. 1. c. 323, 324.) In the last cited case,

certain of the jurors upon the voir dire examination an-

swered that they had read a report of the Bailey trial, in

which Bailey had been tried for the same murder, and that

they had read what purported to be the evidence on that

trial, including the testimony of the Biggs woman, who was

present with Bailey and Forsha when the murder was com-

mitted, and from such reading had formed an opinion as to

the guilt of the defendant, but that they could give the

defendant a fair and impai-tial trial notwithstanding such

230
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an opinion, and it was ruled that they were not disqualified.

The grounds of disqualification in that case were almost

identical with those urged in this, and we do not think ren-

dered the jurors incompetent.

TRIAL PRACTICE
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an 0pinion, and it wa ruled that they were not disqualified.
'rhe ground of di qualifi ation in that case were almost
identical with tho e urged in thi , and we do not think rendere the juror incomp tent.

• • • * * • • • • *

The judgment of the Circuit Court must be and is af-

firmed, and the sentence which the law pronounces is di-

rected to be carried into execution.

BuKGEss, P. J., and Fox, J., concur.

M 'DONALD V. STATE.

Supreme Court of Indiana. 1909,

172 Indiana, 393.

Myeks, J, Appellant was convicted on an indictment

The jud()'ment of the ircuit Court must be and is affirm , and the ent nee which the law pronounces is dicarried into e:x cution.
r t d to
BuR E , P. J., and Fox, J., concur.

charging him and another with conspiring for the purpose

and with the intent unlawfully, feloniously and designedly

to defraud the Adams Express Company, by preparing a

package, securely wrapped, which package contained,

among other things, two damp sponges, excelsior and damp

phosphorus, so arranged that when sufficiently dried the

M'DONALD V. STATE.
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phosphorus would ignite and cause such package and its

contents to be burned and consumed ; that, in pursuance of

Supreme Court of Indi(J/J1,a. 1909.

the conspiracy, they delivered the package to said express

company to be transported from Indianapolis, Indiana, to

Louisville, Kentucky, and falsely represented that the pack-

172 Indiana, 393.

age contained papers of the value of $10,000; that the con-

spirators intended, by the preparation of such package, and

its delivery to the express company, that the contents of

the package, while in possession of the company, should

l)e('ome sufliciently dry to ignite, burn and destroy the pack-

age, and to claim to have been damaged in the sum of $10,-

000, and fraudulently and unlawfully to make demand upon

the company tlu^-efor, and cheat and defraud the latter by

obtaining money from such company by virtue of such false

pretenses.

The only error assigned is upon the overruling of the

motion for a new trial.

J. AppelJant was convicted on an indictment
h r ·i o- him and another with conspiring for the purpose
an with th intent unlawfully, feloniou ly and designedly
to
frau the Adam Expres Company, by preparing a
ur ly wrapp d, which package contained~
th r thin()', two dam1 pong , excel ior and damp
o arrange that wh n sufficiently dried the
w uld i ·nite an
au e uch package and its
burne and n urned; that, in pursuance of
y, th . d li red the package to said expr s
<'
] ny t
l tran ported from Indianapoli , Indiana, to
1: \·ilJ h ntu k , and fa] 1 r re ented that the packI r of th alu of $10,000; that the cont in
1 th pr p ration of u h package, and
mr any, that th e ontent of
"'"'"'..,"'· ion of th
om any, houl
it , ur nd d tro., th pa kn~ · allrl
C'la in t J1a'
ma<Y d in the um of $10,'>00 and frauclul ,ntl. and uulawfully t make
an u1 n
t ltc "' ml an~· Ll1<'r •f r " nc1 ·h t n<l fr au th latt r b
)htai11i11 rrn 11··fr 11 .·u·h · m1anybyvirtueof u hfal e
MYERS

1

}II' •fl'lt .' ', .

cm I r
m; 1ou r a
rltf'

l.'

n the overruling of th
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The questions sought to be presented arise upon alleged

error in refusing the peremptory challenge of a juror on

his voir dire, and in giving instructions. The evidence is

not in the record. A bill of exceptions discloses that in

impaneling the jury, when the jury had been passed back

to the defendant's counsel for re-examination for the third

time, and defendant had used but three peremptory chal-

lenges, being entitled to ten, the defendant peremptorily

challenged a juror who had been in the jury box from the

time the impaneling of the jury began, and the challenge

was disallowed, ''for the reason that, under a rule of said

court, which had been in existence for many years, the de-

fendant's peremptory challenge was made too late," said

rule was stated by the court at the time as follows: "That

each side, the defendant and the State, is entitled to examine

each juror twice, and challenge, if desired, but cannot chal-

lenge a juror after the jury has been passed twice with

each juror in the box. Said rule is an oral rule, and is not
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entered in the records of the court, but has been regularly

enforced for many years." It is further recited that the

defendant and his attorney, at the time of the challenge,

did not know of the rule, but they did not inform the court

on being advised of such rule that either or both of them

were ignorant of it, and did not ask that it be suspended,

nor that an exception be made to its enforcement, on ac-

count of such ignorance. We think it quite clear that there

can properly be no such thing as an oral rule of a court.

Rules of court, when legally adopted and promulgated, have

the effect of positive laws. Sec. 1443, Burns 1908, sec. 1323

R. S. 1S81 iMagnuson v. Billings (1899), 152 Ind. 177 ; State

V. Van Cleave (1902), 157 Ind. 608; Smith v. State, ex ret.

(1894), 137 Ind. 198; 11 Cyc. 742.

They ought not only to be formally promulgated, but

they should be definiteiy stated, which could not be true of

a practice reposing solely in the breast of a judge. They

should be published and made known in some permanent

form, so that they might be known to all. The so-called rule

was clearly not a rule at all, and binding upon no one —

clearly not upon one who has no notice of it. The statutory

provision (sec. 2099 Burns 1908, Acts 1905, pp. 584, 634,

sec. 228), is as follows: ''In prosecutions for capital of-

fenses, the defendant may challenge, peremptorily, twenty

THE
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The que tions sought to be presented arise upon alleged
error in refu ing the peremptory challenge of a juror on
his voir dire, and in giving instruction . The evidence is
not in the r cord. A bill of exceptions di clo es that in
impaneling the jury, when the jur had been pa ed back
to the defen ant's counsel for re-examination for the third
time, and defendant had u ed but three peremptory challenges, being entitled to ten, the defendant peremptorily
challenged a juror who had been in the jury box from the
time the impaneling of the jury began, and the challenge
was di allowed, ' for the reason that, under a rule of aid
court, which had been in exi tence for many year , the defendant's peremptor cball nO'e wa made too late," said
rule wa stated by the court at the time as follows: "That
each side the def ndant and the State, is entitled to examine
each juror twice, and challenge if de ired, but cannot challenge a juror after the jury ha been pas ed twice with
each juror in the box.
aid rule i an oral rule, and is not
entered in the record of the court, but has been regularly
enforced for many years.'' It is further recited that the
def ndant and hi attorney at the time of the challenge,
did not know of the rul , but they did not inform the court
on being advised of such rule that either or both of them
were ignorant of it, and did not a k that it be u pended,
nor that an exception be made to its enforcement, on account of such ignoran e. We think it quite clear that there
can properly be no uch thing as an oral rule of a court.
Rules of court, wh n legall r adopted and promulgated, have
the effect of po itive law . Sec. 14-13 Burns 190 , sec. 1323
R. . 1 1; jJ[ agnus on v. Billings ( 189 ) , 152 Ind. 177; State
v. Van Cleave (1902) 157 Ind. 60 ; Smith v. State, ex rel.
(1 4) 1 7 Ind. 198; 11 ye. 742.
They ought not only to be formally promul ated but
they hould be d finitely stated, which could not be tru of
a pra tice repo . in ol ly in the breast of a judge. They
hould be publi h d a d ma e known in ome permanent
form o that the mi ht
known to all. The so-called rule
'
~
wa !early not a rule at all an binding upon no onelearly not upon one wh ha n notice of it. The tatutory
provi ion ( ec. 20 9 urn 1 0
ct .1905, pp. 5 .4, 634,
ec. 22 ) , i as foll w : ''In prosecution for capital offenses, the defendant may challenge, peremptorily, twenty
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jurors; in prosecutions for offenses punishable by imj^ris-

onment in the state prison, ten jurors; in other prosecu-

tions, three jurors. When several defendants are tried to-

gether, they must join in their challenges.

Irrespective of the so-called rule, was appellant denied

a statutory right? No provision is made by statute nor

by rule as to how or when the right shall be exercised, and

it is claimed by appellant that it may be done at any time

until the jury is sworn. In some jurisdictions the passing

of a juror after he has been examined, tendered to and ac-

cepted by the other party, is a waiver of the right to

challenge. In others, the right to challenge is in the sound

discretion of the court. In others, a party who accepts a

juror with knowledge of an objection waives the objection,

but if a cause of objection is afterward discovered it is not

waived, unless he is guilty of negligence in not discovering

the objection. 24 Cyc. 322, 323. There is no showing made

that appellant did not know from the beginning the grounds
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for the peremptory challenge, and he stands here upon the

bare proposition that he was entitled to the challenge in

any event, without offering any excuse to the court, or

making any request for exemption or relief from the local

practice. Had any request for exemption upon the ground

that the so-called rule was void, or that the appellant or his

counsel had no knowledge of it, been made, or if any reason

were shown why the juror twice passed by appellant as

satisfactory had been discovered to be unacceptable, a dif-

ferent question would be presented, for, independently of

the so-called rule, appellant shows no ground for relief

from his own act and acquiescence.

We think it cannot be said that the right of challenge is

denied where it is restricted to a defined number of oppor-

tunities for challenge, nor that there must be a definite rule

fixing the time wlien, or the manner in which, it must be

exercised, for we think it may be controlled either by a fixed

rule, or by any reasonable limitation imposed in any specific

case, so long as the right of peremptory challenge is not

taken away; in other words, that, when reasonable oppor-

tunity is given to challenge, the spirit of the statute is com-

l)li(Hl with, and that it does not mean that the right is an

open on(! at all times until the jury is sworn, irrespective of

all else J that there is no good reason why there may be spec-
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juror ; in prosecutions for offenses punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, ten jurors; in other prosecutions, three jurors. When several defendants are tried together, the mu t join in their challenges.
Irre pecti e of the o-called rule, was appellant denied
a statutory right~ No provi ion is made by statute nor
by rule a to how or when the right shall be exercised, and
it i claimed by appellant that it may be done at any time
until the jury is sworn. In some jurisdictions the passing
of a juror after he has been examined, tendered to and accepted by the other party, is a waiver of the right to
chall ng . In others, the right to challenge is in the sound
i er tion of the court. In others, a party who accepts a
juror with knowledge of an objection waives the objection,
but if a cause of objection is afterward discovered it is not
aiv d unle he i guilty of negligence in not discovering
the obj ection. 24 Cyc. 322, 323. There is no showing made
that a1 pellant did not know from the beginning the grounds
f r the rern1 tory challenge, and he stands here upon the
hare pro1 osition that he was entitled to the challenge in
any vent, without offering any excuse to the court, or
making an r qu t for exemption or relief from the local
practi e. Iad any request for exemption upon the ground
that the so-called rule was void, or that the appellant or his
un 1 bad no knowledge of it, been made, or if any reason
w re bown why the juror twice passed by appellant as
sati factor had been discovered to be unacceptable, a diff r nt qu ti n would be presented, for, independently of
th~ ·o-c 11 d rule, appellant shows no ground for relief
.fro bj wn act and acquiescence.
think it cannot be said that the right of challenge is
( ni d wh re it i re tricted to a defined number of opportuniti , .f r hall no- , nor that there must be a definite rule
fi .·ing th tim when, or the manner in which, it must be
<·.· •n;i,· d, for w think it may be controlled either by a fixed
rn1 , or lJy ru1y r asouahl limitation imposed in any specific
·a." · Jong , s th ribht of perempt ry chall en<re i not
1n1· n awa .\'; in otlwr wor ]s, that, when r a onabl opporhm it· i. g·i\·c· n to C'liall ln~· , th spirit of th . tatut is compli cl wi1li :im1 llii t it o : n t
ran that th rio·ht i an
''l''''I nn<' nt all l.itn<' · mdil the jury is. worn, irr s1 tive of
· 11 ·l · ·; tlrnl tl1un· i: no good r a on hy th r may be spec-
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ulation as to what the opposite party may do, and the jury

passed backward and forward to await the action of the

adversary; that the statute means that when the jury is

passed to a partj^ he must challenge peremptorily if he

would challenge, in the absence of an after-arising condi-

tion, and that, when the opportunity was twice given, as

here, and not exercised, a party cannot complain, unless

new conditions arise, calling for an exception to, or relaxa-

tion of, the practice or the order in the particular case, and

that if a given practice, not rising to the dignity of a rule,

is invoked, as here, one to be exempt from its operation, on

account of his ignorance of it, must seasonably apply to be

relieved from its operation. At common law no challenge

to the array or panel could be made until the full jury was

present. 1 Chitty, Crim. Law (4th Am. ed.),*544. Our

statute (sec. 210l' Burns 1908, Acts 1905, pp. 584, 634, sec.

230), was evidently adopted with this practice in mind, and

the right to challenge contemplated the right to challenge
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as the panel thus full stood, or as it might stand, and not

that the right should be one arising out of indefinitely pass-

ing the jury as acceptable.

In Ward v. Cliarlestoivn City R. Co. (1883), 19 S. C. 521,

45 Am. Rep. 794," after a plaintiff had announced that she

had no objection to the jury, the defendant challenged two

jurors, and plaintiff then claimed the right of peremptory

challenge. The court said: "There was no denial on the

part of the court; on the contrary the right was tendered to

her at the proper time, and having waived the exercise of

it then, for the reasons given by the circuit judge, we think

it was too late to demand it after the defendant had exer-

cised his right." It is said in Mayers v. Smith (1887), 121

111. 442, 448, 13 N. E. 216: "Under the practice at common

law, no such case would arise as is here presented, of a

party reserving his power of peremptorj^ challenge until

after he had examined and passed upon the whole twelve

jurors, or eight of them, for causes of challenge, and then

to claim the exercise of such right of peremptory challenge

as to jurors who had previously been passed upon and ac-

cepted, for the reason that the practice there was to require

each juror to be sworn when his examination was com-

pleted."

In State v. Potter (1846), 18 Conn. 166, a talesman was

~HE JURY

233

ulation as to what the opposite party may do, and the jury
pas ed backward and forward to await the action of the
adversary; that the statute means that when the jury is
pas ed to a party he must challenge peremptorily if he
would challenge, in the absence of an after-arising condition, and that, when the opportunity was twice given, as
here, and not exerci ed, a party cannot complain, unless
new conditions arise, calling for an exception to, or relaxation of, the practice or the order in the particular case, and
that if a given practice, not rising to the dignity of a rule,
is invoked, as here, one to be exempt from its operation, on
account of his ignorance of it, mu t seasonably apply to be
relieved from its operation. At common law no challenge
to the array or panel could be made until the full jury was
pre ent. 1 Chitty, Crim. Law (4th Am. ed.), *544. Our
statute (sec. 2101 Burns 1908, Acts 1905, pp. 584, 634, sec.
230), was evidently adopted with this practice in mind, and
the right to challenge contemplated the right to challenge
as the panel thus full stood, or as it might stand, and not
that the right should be one arising out of indefinitely passing the jury as acceptable.
In Ward v. Charlestow n City R. Co. (1883), 19 S. C. 521,
45 Am. Rep. 794, after a plaintiff had announced that she
had no objection to the jury, the defendant challenged two
jurors, and plaintiff then claimed the right of peremptory
challenge. The court said: ''There was no denial on the
part of the court; on the contrary the right was tendered to
her at the proper time, and having waived the exercise of
it th n, for the rea ons given by the circuit judge, we think
it wa too late to demand it after the defendant had exercised his right." It is aid in JY!ay ers v. Smith (18 7), 121
Ill. 442, 448, 13 N. E. 216: "Under the practice at common
law, no such case would arise as is here presented, of a
party re erving his power of peremptory challenge until
after he had examined and pa sed upon the whole twelv
juror , or ight of them, for cau e of challenge, and then
to claim the ex rci e of such right of peremptory challeng
a to juror who had I reviou ly been passed upon and accepted for the rea on that the practice there was to require
ea h juror to be sworn when his examination was completed.''
In State v. Potter (1846), 18 Conn. 166, a talesman wa
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called and examined by the counsel for defendant as to his

bias, or for cause of challenge, and no objection appearing

the court informed defendant's counsel that they could

challenge him peremptorily. They declined to exercise the

right at that time, as the panel was not full, and after it was

full they challenged the juror peremptorily, and the court

inquired whether any cause then existed which did not exist

when they first declined the right. They answered in the

negative, and the court held that the challenge came too late,

and this ruling was upheld. The reasoning, which is per-

tinent here, is as follows: ''Again, it is said, the prisoner

has been deprived of a right to a peremptory challenge,

which he was entitled to. It is not denied that time and

opportunity were given to the prisoner to challenge a juror ;

but it is claimed, that he had not all the time the law allows

him. Dickerman, a talesman, had been examined, and there

was no cause of challenge known against them. The court

then told the counsel, if they intended a peremptory chal-
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lenge, they must make it at that time. They then had a

reasonable opportunity to make their challenge; but they

claim they may make it at their own time^ provided it is

done before the jurors are sworn. The statute, it is said,

gives them power to challenge peremptorily twenty jurors

summoned and impaneled, — and much criticism has been

had upon the word 'impaneled.' It is claimed, that it means

the jury sworn to try the cause ; and that until sworn, they

are not impaneled. * * * But it is said, that by the Eng-

lish practice, the party has a right to challenge until the

jury is sworn. There, each juror is sworn, as soon as he

has been examined and opportunity given for challenge.

By our practice, jurors are none of them sworn until all

have been examined, and an opportunity offered for chal-

lenge."

Under the statute of Arkansas, the state in criminal cases

is required to exhaust its challenges before passing a jury

to the defendant, and it was held that when the state had

passed a jury to the defendant it was error to permit a

jtcremptory challenge by the state. Williams v. State

(1897), 63 Ark. 527, 39 S. W. 709.

Where, upon impaneling a jury, the judge announced that

he would require the defendant to make his challenges as he

desired, to each juror as called, it was held not error to re-

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 5

called and examined by the counsel for defendant as to his
bia , or for cause of challenge, and no objection appearing
the court informed defenda_n t 's coun el that they could
challenge him peremptorily. They declined to exercise the
right at tba t time, as the panel was not ful1 , and after it was
fu11 they challenged the juror peremptorily, and the court
inquired whether any cause then existed which did not exist
when they first declined the right. They answered in the
negative, and the court held that the challenge came too late,
and this ruling was upheld. The reasoning, which is pertinent here, is as follows: ''Again, it is said, the prisoner
has been d prived of a right to a peremptory challenge,
which he was entitled to. It is not denied that time and
opportunity were given to the prisoner to challenge a juror;
but it is claimed, that he had not all the time the law allows
him. Dickerman, a talesman, had been examined, and there
wa no cause of challenge known against them. The court
then told the counsel, if they intended a peremptory challeng , they mu t make it at that time. They then had a
rea onable opportunity to make their challenge ; but they
claim they may make it at their own time, provided it is
don before the jurors are sworn. The statute, it is said,
gi es them power to challenge peremptorily twenty jurors
ummoned and impaneled,-and much criticism has been
had upon the word 'impaneled.' It is claimed, that it means
the jury sworn to try the cause; and that until sworn, they
are not impaneled. * * * But it is said, that by the Engli h practice, the party has a right to challenge until the
jury is sworn. There, each juror is sworn, as soon as he
ha been examined and opportunity given for challenge.
B y our practice, jurors are none of them sworn until all
have e n examined, and an opportunity offered for chal1 ng . ''
nr1 r th tatut of Arkan a , the state in criminal cases
i: r 1uir
t xh u t its ball nge before passinO' a jury
to th·
f ·n nt, nd it wa h 1 that when the state had
pa :
jury to th d f ndant it wa error to permit a
JH·r ·mpt ry hall no- by th state.
Williams v. State
(1 ~J7) 6. Ark. h....,7, .
. W. 709.
WhPr , ip n impan lin 0 a jury, the judge announced that
he· 'vo11lc1 r quir th d f ndant to make his challeng s as he
u· it d, lo ea h jur r as called, it was held not error to re1
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fuse a peremptory challenge after the juror was sworn and

accepted, and it was held that, when there was a fair oppor-

tunity to interpose a peremptory challenge, the defendant

cannot complain of a refusal to be allowed the further exer-

cise of the right. People v. Carpenter (1886), 102 N. Y. 238,

6 N. E. 584.

We are not unaware that in the earlier cases in this State

and in other states it is held that the right of challenge con-

tinues up to the swearing of the jury, but we are unable to

perceive that any substantial right of a defendant is in-

vaded when an opportunity for challenge of the full num-

bers is afforded and it is not availed of up to the time the

jury is sworn. The object to be attained is an impartial

jury, and while the right of peremptory challenge is an

absolute one, it is not, we think, so far so that it may be

exercised under all conditions. If, by the introduction of

new men upon the panel, a cause for challenge should arise

— such as the coming on of a person at such enmity to one
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already passed that they could not work in harmony, or the

introduction of anything which might prejudice the right of

a defendant — he would have a clear right to exercise his

preference, and challenge the man already acceptable,

rather than the new man, and the right would thus be pre-

served until the full panel is complete and the jury sworn.

He has a right to a full panel to begin with, the right of

canvass and comparison among jurors, and if his full right

of challenge is preserved, within the line here indicated, it

is practically a right of peremiDtory challenge until the jury

is sworn, but it does not follow that the opportunity must

be open under all circumstances or conditions, for it is a

right which may be waived. Neither do we understand that

the rule here declared is in conflict with the earlier holdings

of the court, which upon examination are found to be gen-

eral declarations as to the right of peremptory challenge ex-

tending until the jury is sworn, and did not involve any

question of practice as to the mode of conducting the im-

paneling of juries, and of exercising the right of challenge,

or of the right and power of courts to direct the manner of

its exercise. * * * No reversible error is shown, and the

judgment is affirmed.^

Wrder of challengef!. "The right to challenge jurors is one given and

secured by law, and cannot be taken away by the court. Until the challenges
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fuse a peremptory challenge after the juror was sworn and
accepted, and it was held that, when there was a fair opportunity to interpose a peremptory challenge, the defendant
cannot complain of a refusal to be allowed the further exercise of the right. People v. Carpenter (1886), 102 N. Y. 238,
6 N. E. 584.
We are not unaware that in the earlier cases in this State
and in other states it is held that the right of challenge continues up to the swearing of the jury, but we are unable to
perceive that any substantial right of a defendant is invaded when an opportunity for challenge of the full numbers is afforded and it is not availed of up to the time the
jury is sworn. The object to be attained is an impartial
jury, and while the right of peremptory challenge is an
absolute one, it is not, we think, so far o that it may be
exercised under all conditions. If, by the introduction of
new men upon the panel, a cause for challenge should arise
-such as the coming on of a person at such enmity to one
already passed that they could not work in harmony, or the
introduction of anything which might prejudice the right of
a defendant-he would have a clear right to exercise his
preference, and challenge the man already acceptable,
rather than the new man, and the right would thus be preserved until the full panel is complete and the jury sworn.
He has a right to a full panel to begin with, the right of
canvass and compari on among jurors, and if his full right
of challenge is preserved, within the line here indicated, it
is practically a right of peremptory challenge until the jury
is sworn, but it does not follow that the opportunity must
be open under all circumstances or conditions, for it is a
right which may be wai ed. Neither do we understand that
the rule here declared is in conflict with the earlier holdings
of the court, which upon examination are found to be general declarations as to the right of peremptory challenge extending until the jury is wor.n, and did not invol e any
question of practice as to the mode of conducting the impaneling of juries and of exerci ing the right of chall nge
or of the right and power of courts to direct the manner of
its exercise. • * * No reversible error is shown, and the
judgment is affirmed. 1
10rder of challenge . ''The rj ght to chall enge jurors j one given and
secured by law, and cannot be taken away by the court. Until the challenge
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to which a party is entitled under the statutes are exhausted, the right extends

to every juror called. The juror is first challenged for cause, either actual or

implied bias; then peremptorily. In civil actions, each party is entitled to

three peremptory challenges. G. S. 1894, $ 5370. The usual practice in the

selection of a jury in such actions is to require the peremptory challenges to
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to which a party is entitled under the statutes are exhausted, the right extends
to every juror called. The juror is :first challenged for cause, either actual or
implied bias; then peremptorily. In civil actions, each party is entitled to
three peremptory challenges. G. S. 1894, § 5370.
The usual practice in the
election of a jury in such actions is to require the peremptory challenges to
be made by the parties alternat ely, one at a time, beginn ing with defendant."
Swanson v. Mendenhall, (1900) 80 Minn. 56, 82 N. W . 1093.

be made by the parties alternately, one at a time, beginning with defendant."

Swanson v. Mendenhall, (1900) 80 Minn. 56, 82 N. W. 1093.

STATE V. CADY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1888,

80 Maine, 413,

Peters, C. J. Two respondents were arraigned together

under a joint liquor indictment, having the same counsel to

answer for them. The judge allowed each respondent two

STATE V. CADY.

peremptory challenges in impaneling tbe jury, and when

one respondent in person challenged a juror, the other dis-

Supreme Jitdicial Court of Maine.

1888.

puted the challenge, claiming that he had a right to have the

challenged juror on the panel. One respondent accepted

and the other rejected the juror.

80 Maine, 413.
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The judge accorded to them two challenges each, while

they were entitled to two jointly, and no more. In capital

cases each prisoner, under a joint trial, is entitled to his

personal challenges. The statute in that case prescribes

that ''each person" shall be so entitled. In all other crim-

inal cases it is ''the party" that is entitled to the two chal-

lenges. If they do not agree upon the persons to be ob-

jected to, they lose their challenges. The presumption is,

where respondents in criminal cases, not lately capital, con-

sent to be tried togetlier, or where the judge in his discre-

tion orders a joint trial, that their interests are alike, and

differences between them are uncalled for. By R. S., c. 134,

sec. 20, it is provided that issues in fact in criminal cases

not capital, shall be tried by a jury drawn and returned in

the same manner, and cliallenges shall be allowed, as in civil

cases. By E. S., ch. 82, sec. 74, it is provided that in civil

cases, and criminal cases not capital, "each party" is en-

titled to two peremptory challenges when a jury is im-

panclU'd by lot. Party does not mean person. Allowing

challenges without cause is a merely statute right, not to

PETERS, C. J. Two respondents were arraigned together
under a joint liquor indictment, having the same counsel to
answ r for them. The judge allowed each r espondent two
per mptory challenges in impaneling tbe jury, and when
one re pond nt in person challenged a jur or, the other disputed the challenge, claiming that he had a right to have th e
hall n ·ed juror on the panel.
One r espondent a ccepted
and th other rejected the juror.
The judg accorded to them two challenges each, while
they w re entitled to two jointly, and no more. In capital
ca
each pri on r, under a joint trial, is entitled to his
per onal challenges. The statute in that case prescribes
that '' ach erson '' shall be so entitled. I n all other criminal ca s it i "the party" that is entitled to the two chal1 ng , . If they do not agree upon the persons to be obje t d to, they lose their challenges. The p r esumption is~
wh re r
ond nts in criminal cases, not lat ely capital, cons nt to be tri d tog ther, or where the judge in his discret.i n r ers a joint trial, that their interests are alike, and
cliff r n
b two n th m are uncalled fo r. By R. S., c. 134,
s . 20 it is provi d that issues in fact in criminal ca s
not ·npita1 , hall b trie 1 1 y a jury lrawn and returned in
he . amP <inner and hall ng s hall be allowed, as in civil
a '"'· 1>Y H. R., h. ..J' sc . 74, it is provid d t hat in civil
·n ·" uncl c·rirnin l a. s n t apital, "each party " is enitlr·d to tw l en·m1 t ry hall nges when a jury is iman ·11('(1 hy l t.
art. lo . not m an person. AllowinO'
h 11 ·n r !. without cau i a merely statute r ight , n ot to
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be extended by construction. Wliere defendants are numer-

ous, if each had personal challenges, it would require the

presence of an impracticable number of jurors. This ques-

tion is settled by several authorities. State v. Reed, 47 N.

H. 4G6; Stone v. Segur, 11 Allen, 568; State v. Sutton, 10

R. I. 159. These cases show that several respondents are

but one party, and are entitled to no more challenges than

one defendant. But if in his discretion, the judge extended

a greater privilege than the statute concedes, neither re-

spondent is in a position to complain of it. We have held in

Snoiv V. Weeks, 75 Maine, 105, that to a ruling of a judge,

in excusing or rejecting a juryman, exceptions will not lie.

It is there said: "He may put off a juror when there is no

real and substantial cause for it. That cannot legally in-

jure an objecting party as long as an unexceptionable jury

is finally obtained. He may put a legal juror off. He can-

not allow an illegal juror to go on." This question was ex-

haustively and learnedly examined in a case of piracy,
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United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480, in which Judge

Story maintains the same doctrine, and he there says: "The

right of peremptory challenge is not of itself a right to

select but a right to reject jurors." He further remarks

that the right "enables the prisoner to say who shall not

try him, but not to say who shall be the particular persons

who shall try him."

The objection to the county attorney's remarks is with-

out force. He was expressing his judgment upon the testi-

mony and giving illustrations of it in an unobjectionable

manner. He was not relating outside facts. The other ob-

jections have no weight.

Exceptions overruled.

Walton, Danforth, Virgin, Libbey and Foster, JJ., con-

curred.
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be extended by construction. Where defendants are num rous, if each had personal challenges, it would require the
presence of an impracticable number of juror . This qu : tion is settled by several authorities. State v. Reed, 47 N.
H. 466; Stone v. Segur, 11 Allen, 568; State v. Su tto n, 10
R. I. 159. These ca es show that several respond ents are
but one party, and are entitled to no more challenge than
one defendant. But if in his discretion, the judge ext nded
a greater privilege than the statute concedes, neither respondent i in a po ition to complain of it. We have held in
Snow v. Weeks, 75 Maine, 105, that to a ruling of a judge,
in excusing or rejecting a juryman, exceptions will not lie.
It is there said: "He may put off a juror when there is no
real and substantial cause for it. That cannot legally injure an objecting party as long as an unexceptionable jury
is finally obtained. He may put a legal juror off. He cannot allow an illegal juror to go on.'' This question was exhaustively and learnedly examined in a case of piracy,
United Stat es v. Marcha;nt, 12 Wheat. 480, in which Judge
Story maintains the same doctrine, and he there ays: ''The
right of peremptory challenge is not of it elf a right to
select but a right to reject jurors.'' He further remarks
that the right ''enables the prisoner to say who shall not
try him, but not to say who shall be the particular person
who shall try him."
The objection to the county attorney's remarks is without force. He was expressing his judgment upon the testimony and givinO' illu trations of it in an unobjectionable
manner. He wa not relating outside facts. The other ob-·
jections have no weight.
Exceptions ov erruled.
WALTON, DANFORTH, VIRGIN, LIBBEY and FosTER, JJ., concurred.
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Section 8. Discharge of Juror.

STATE V. DAVIS.

SECTION

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1888.

8.

DISCHARGE OF JUROR.

31 West Virginia, 390.

STATE V. DAVIS.

Johnson, President :

On the 20th day of February, 1888, William Davis was, in

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1888.

the Circuit Court of Ritchie county, indicted for maliciously,

etc., stabbing one Creed Wilson, with intent to maim, dis-

figure, disable, and kill him. The prisoner moved to quash

31 West Virginia, 390.

the indictment, which motion was overruled, and the pris-

oner pleaded not guilty. The jury was sworn on the 24th

day of February to try the issue. It appears from an order

JOHNSON, PRESIDENT :

entered on the next day that '*it appearing to the court

that Peter G. Six, a juror, is unable to perform his duty,

George W. Hammer, a qualified juror, was selected, tried,

and sworn in his place," etc. The prisoner objected to the

swearing of a new juror, which objection was overruled.

•***
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The prisoner moved the court to discharge him, because

he had not been tried before a proper jury. He also moved

in arrest of judgment, and also for a new trial ; which sev-

eral motions were respectively overruled, and the court pro-

nounced judgment on the verdict, and sentenced the pris-

oner to confinement in the penitentiary for the term of two

years.

**********

Upshur, Judge, in delivering the opinion of the court in

Fell's Case, 9 Leigh 617, said, after reviewing a number of

FiUglish and American cases: ''One general rule is de-

ducible from all the cases, which is that the court may dis-

charge the jury whenever a necessity for so doing shall

On the 20th day of February, 1888, William Davis was, in
the Circuit Court of Ritchie county, indicted for maliciously,
etc., stabbing one Creed Wilson, with intent to maim, disfigure, disable, and kill him. The prisoner moved to quash
the indictment, which motion was overruled, and the prisoner pleaded not guilty. The jury was sworn on the 24th
day of February to try the issue. It appears from an order
entered on the ne~t day that "it appearing to the court
that P ter G. Six, a juror, is unable to perform bis duty,
George W. Hammer, a qualified juror, was selected, tried,
and worn in hi place,'' etc. The prisoner objected to the
swearing of a new juror, which objection was overruled.

arise; but what facts and circumstances shall be considered

as constituting such a necessity can not be reduced to any

general rule. The power to discharge is a discretionary

power, which the court, as in all other cases of judicial dis-

cretion, must exercise soundly according to the circum-

*:tances of the case. The object of the law is to obtain a

fair and just verdict, and, whenever it shall appear to the

The pri oner moved the court to discharge him, because
he had not been tried before a proper jury. He also moved
in arre t of judgment, and also for a new trial; which several motions were re pectively overruled, and the court pronounced judgm nt on the verdict, and sentenced the prison r to confinement in the penitentiary for the term of two
years.
hur, Judge, in delivering the opinion of the court in
Fell's ase, 9 L i h 617, said, after reviewing a number of
'J'l i. ·h and Am rican ca es : ''One general rule is ded IC'ihl fr m all the cases, which is that the court may disc:har
th jury wh never a nece ity for so doing shall
ari s ; l ut what fa ts and cir um tances hall be con idered
a. c· n.· titutinJ . u h an s ity can not be reduc d to any
uc•nc•ra] I'UIP. rfh
OW r to di charge i a di cretionary
powPr \ l1i ·h th · urt, a. in all other cases of judicial dis1.: r ·1 i un, must x r i
.· nn lly accordino· to the circumt;111<· ... of' t]H· ('(L .
rr 11 bj t of the law is to obtain a
J'ai r mid j 11
·r i ·i, and, wh n ver it shall appear to the
J

I
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court that the jury impaneled can not render such a ver-

dict, it ought to be discharged and another jury impaneled.

This is emphatically the case of necessity contemplated in

the authorities we have referred to ; as where the prisoner

became too sick to attend to his defense or one of the jury

was rendered physically unable to discharge his duty. There

are other cases of necessity equally strong, one of which

probably is where a juror, from the peculiar condition of his

mind and feelings, is manifestly disqualified from bestow-

ing upon the case that attention and impartial considera-

tion which is necessary to a just verdict. * * * The actual

sickness of a juror, and his consequent inability to discharge

his duty, is admitted on all hands to present such a neces-

sity. In the case before us, the juror was not actually sick,

but there was every reason to believe that he would become

so through longer confinement. Was the court bound to

wait till the case actually occurred! We think not. * * *

A necessity not less strong was presented by the situation
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of the wife of another juror. If the object of the trial be,

as it undoubtedly is, to obtain a fair, just and impartial ver-

dict, there can be but little prospect of such a result from

the constrained and reluctant action of minds wholly ab-

sorbed in the deep and peculiar interest of their domestic

relations." It was held that it would be improper, under

such circumstances, to discharge the prisoner.

Here it appears from the record that the juror, Six, was

informed that his son had just died. It would, indeed, be a

stout-hearted father who could, unmoved, receive news of

the death of a child. Some men could receive such news

and proceed with their work with steady nerve and mind

clear and strong ; but observation teaches us, if, indeed, we

have not learned from sad experience, that the natural re-

sult of information, suddenly imparted to a father, of the

death of a child, is to unfit him, for the time, to attend to

business. It would have been cruel to have required the

juror to remain on the jury under such circumstances. His

grief would naturally unfit him for the discharge of such an

important duty. And if, as the court said in Fell's Case,

the object of the trial is to obtain a fair, just and impartial

verdict, there could be little prospect of it under such cir-

cumstances. * * *
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court that the jury impaneled can not render such a verdict, it ought to be discharged and another jury impaneled.
This is emphaticall the case of nece ity contemplated in
the authoritie we have referred to; a where the prisoner
became too sick to attend to hi defense or one of the jury
was rendered physically unable to discharge his duty. There
are other ca es of necessity equally strong, one of which
probably is where a juror, from the peculiar condition of his
mind and feelings, is manifestly disqualified from bestowing upon the case that attention and impartial consideration which is necessary to a just verdict. * * * The actual
sickness of a juror, and his consequent inability to discharge
bis duty, is admitted on all hands to present such a necessity. In the case before us, the juror was not actually sick,
but there was every reason to believe that he would become
so through longer confinement. Was the court bound to
wait till the case actually occurred~ We think not. * * *
A necessity not less strong was presented by the situation
of the wife of another juror. If the object of the trial be,
a it undoubtedly is, to obtain a fair, just and impartial verdict, there can be but little prospect of such a result from
the constrained and reluctant action of minds wholly absorbed in the deep and peculiar interest of their domestic
relations.'' It wa held that it would be improper, under
such circumstances, to discharge the prisoner.

• • • • * * * * * *

Here it appears from the record that the juror, Six, was
informed that his son had just died. It would, indeed, be a
stout-hearted father who could, unmoved, receive news of
the death of a child. Some men could receive such news
and proceed with their work with steady nerve and mind
clear and strong; but ob ervation teaches us, if, indeed, we
ha e not learned from ad experience, that the natural reult of information, uddenly imparted to a father, of the
eath of a child, is to unfit him, for the time, to attend to
business. It would have been cruel to have required the
juror to remain on the jury under such circumstances. His
o-rief would naturally unfit him for the discharge of such an
important duty. And if, as the court aid in Fell's Ca e,
the obj ct of the trial is to obtain a fair, just and impartial
verdict, there could be little pro pect of it under such circumstances. * * •
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The statute says — and it is in perfect accord with the

principles of the common law — that if a juror, after he is

sworn, be unable from any cause to perform his duty, the

court may, in its discretion, cause another qualified juror

to be sworn in his place. Code, ch. 159, sec. 1. '^ ^ ^

##

Both on principle and authority, the court, in this case,

did not err in discharging the juror Six, for the reason

shown by the record, because a manifest necessity existed

therefor. Neither did the court err in ordering the trial to

proceed with the jury as constituted after the substitution

of the juror Hammer for Six, as he had had his legal chal-

lenge to the original jurors and to the substituted juror.

Every right guaranteed to him by the constitution was

granted him. * * *

* * * The prisoner was not prejudiced by the fact that

the juror Hammer had not heard everything that the other

jurors heard. When the substituted juror was sworn, the
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trial commenced de novo. Then the prosecuting attorney

introduced the evidence just as if the jury was entirely dif-

ferent from what it was before, and the defence, of course,

had the right to bring forward all the evidence it could. We

can not perceive how the prisoner was prejudiced by this.

Certainly, nothing appears in the record to his prejudice in

this respect. The court did not, therefore, err in refusing

to exclude the evidence of the State.

There is no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court

and it is affirmed.

Affirmed.
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• • • * • • • • • •
The statute says-and it is in perfect accord with the
principles of the common law-that if a juror, after he is
sworn, be unable from any cause to perform his duty, the
court may, in its discretion, cause another qualified juror
to be sworn in his place. Code, ch. 159, sec. 7. • • •
• • • * • • * * * •
Both on principle and authority, the court, in this case,
did not err in discharging the juror Six, for the reason
shown by the record, because a manifest necessity existed
therefor. Neither did the court err in ordering the trial to
proceed with the jury as constituted after the substitution
of the juror Hammer for Six, as he had had his legal challenge to the original jurors and to the substituted juror.
Every right guaranteed to him by the constitution was
granted him. * * *
* * * The prisoner was not prejudiced by the fact that
the juror Hammer had not heard everything that the other
jurors heard. When the substituted juror was sworn, the
trial commenced de nova. Then the prosecuting attorney
introduced the evidence just as if the jury was entirely differ nt from what it was before, and the defence, of course,
had the riO'ht to bring forward all the evidence it could. We
can not perceive how the prisoner was prejudiced by this.
ertainly, nothing appears in the record to his prejudice in
this re pect. The court did not, therefore, err in refusing
to exclude the evidence of the State.
• • • * • • • * • •
Th r is no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court
and it is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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OATH ADMINISTERED.

Section 9. Oath Administered.

WELLS V. SMITH.

WELLS V. SMITH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1901.

49 West Virginia, 78.

Brannon, President. — This is an action of ejectment * *.

Supreme Court of ..Appeals of West Virginia. 1901.

It resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs.

The defendant complains of the overruling a motion in

49 lVest Virginia, 78.

arrest of judgment. The ground for this motion is that

the oath of the jury was not such as the law requires. The

record says that a jury came "who were the duly tried and

BRANNON,

President.-This is an action of ejectment • •.

sworn the truth to speak upon the issue joined in this case ;"

whereas it should have been sworn, ''You shall well and

truly try the issue joined between Charles E. Wells and

It re ulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs.
• • • • • • • • * *

others, plaintiffs, against H. L. Smith, defendant, and a

true verdict give according to the evidence." The oath to try

the issue joined is good in civil cases. It is the oath given

as proper in that excellent work of late date, Encylopaedia

of Pleading and Practice, Vol. 12, p. 516. What does the
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oath in this case lack? Only the injunction to try the issue

and render a verdict according to the evidence. Of course,

the omission to enjoin the jury to render a verdict is im-

material, and as to the omission of the oath to enjoin the

jury to render a verdict according to the evidence, that is

immaterial, since the law requires a jury to pass on tlie

evidence, to respond to facts shown by the evidence. By

what else could the jury try the case? It is necessarily to

be understood, in a legal point of view, that the trial must

be by evidence. Even in a felony case the entry would be

sufficient. In Lawrence's Case, 30 Grat. 845, the order book

showed that the jury ''were sworn the truth of and upon

the premises to speak," and it was held good. The court

said that while the oath in felony cases, "You shall well and

truly try and true deliverance make between the common-

wealth and the prisoner at the bar, whom you shall have

in charge, and a true verdict give according to the evidence.

So help you God," — is the correct oath, still no law pre-

scribed it, common or statute, and one of the same import

T. p.— 16

The defendant complains of the overruling a motion in
arrest of judgment. The ground for this motion is that
the oath of the jury was not such as the law requires. The
record says that a jury came "who were the duly tried and
sworn the truth to speak upon the i ue joined in this ca e;''
whereas it should have been sworn, ''You shall well and
truly try the i sue joined between Charles E. W 11 an l
other , plaintiffs, again t H. L. Smith, d fend ant, and a
true verdict give according to the evidence.'' The oath to try
the i sue joined i good in civil cases. It i the oath gi en
as proper in that excell nt work of late date Enc lopaedia
of Pleading and Practice, Vol. 12, p. 516. What doe the
oath in this case lack. Only the injunction to try the is ue
and render a verdict according to the evidence. Of cour. ,
the omi sion to enjoin the jury to render a verdict is immaterial, and as to the omi ion of the oath to enjoin the
jur to render a verdict according to the evidence, that i ~
immaterial, since the law requires a jury to pa on th
eviden , to re pond to facts shown by the e idence. B.
what el e could the jury try the ca e ~ It is nee arily to
be under toad, in a legal poin+ of view, that the trial mu t
be bv evidence. Even in a f lony ca e the ntry would be
uffi ient. In Laz rence' Ca e, 30 Grat. 45 the order book
bowed that the jury "were sworn the truth of and upon
the I r mise to speak '' and it was held ·ood. The court
aid that while the oath in felony case , "You hall w 11 and
truly try and true deli erance make betw en th commonw alth and th pri oner at the bar, whom ou hall hav
in char e, and a true verdict give according to the evidence.
o help you G d "-i the correct oath, till no law precri d it, common or statute, and one of the ' ame import
T. P.-16

242

[Chap. 5

TRIAL PRACTICE

242 Tkial Peactice [Chap. 5

would be sufficient, and that it was not necessary that the

full form of the oath should be literally inserted in the rec-

ord, but it would be sufficient that it should therein simply

appear that the jury was duly sworn according to law. The

court said that the statement of the record as to the oath

was obviously not the form of oath actually administered,

but was merely intended to state the fact that the jury was

sworn. So we can say in this case. * * * I must not be under-

stood as saying that if the record shows the oath actually

administered in full, and it is not substantially good, it is

not error, but I mean to hold that unless it so appears a mere

statement of the record, in any words, attesting the swear-

ing of the jury, both in civil and criminal cases, is sufficient.

But this case being a civil case I think the oath shown by

the record, even if regarded as t'he full literal oath, is good,

though we are not compelled to so regard it, but may pre-

sume that the injunction to well and truly try the case

according to the evidence was really in the oath adminis-
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tered. I just now discover that State v. Ice, 34 W. Va. 244,

so holds. Ample authority so settles the point. See 12

Ency. PI. and Prac. 522, where it is stated that the better

entry is, not to give the oath in full but simply state that

the jury was duly sworn according to law. I think so. Can

we say that the oath in this case is not substantially good?

**If the oath is substantially in the prescribed or recognized

form, it will be sufficient, and a literal adherence to form

will not be required." 12 Ency. PI. and Prac. 518. Mere

technicality should not be allowed such sway as is proposed

in this case.

There is another reason why this point should not reverse

the trial. The defendant had right to object to the oath

when administered and to demand a proper one, if not sat-

isfied with the one used, and he could not sit silent, take his

chances of a verdict in his favor, and then take advantage

of such a defect. He could have shown the oath actually

administered by bill of exceptions, and must do so, as held

in Lawrence's Case, 30 Grat. 650, and in Dysen v. State, 26

Miss. 32, and many other cases cited in 1 Thompson on

Trials, s. 108. I will add that an oath such as that in this

case, to try tlio issue joined, was held good on principle and

authority in civil cases. Pierce v. Tate, 27 Miss. 283;

Windham v. Williams, Id. 313. We affirm the judgment.

Afirmed,

would be sufficient, and that it was not necessary that the
full form of the oath should be literally inserted in the record, but it would be sufficient that it should therein simply
appear that the jury was duly sworn according to law. The
court said that the statement of the record as to the oath
wa ob iou ly not the form of oath actually administered,
but wa merely intended to state the fact that the jury was
worn. So we can say in this case. * ':f * I must not be understood as aying that if the record shows the oath actually
admini tered in full, and it is not substantially good, it is
not error, but I mean to hold that unless it so appears a mere
statement of the record, in any words, attesting the swearing of the jury, both in civil and criminal cases, is sufficient.
But thi ca e being a civil case I think the oath shown by
the r cord, even if r garded as ~he full literal oath, is good,
though we are not compelled to so regard it, but may preume that' the injunction to well and truly try the case
cording to the evidence was really in the oath administ r . I ju t now di cover that State v. Ice, 34 W. Va. 244,
o hold . Ample authority so settles the point. See 12
Ency. Pl. and Prac. 522, where it is stated that the better
ntry i , not to give the oath in full but simply state that
the jury was duly sworn according to law. I think so. Can
we ay that the oath in this case is not substantially good~
'' f the ath is ubstantially in the prescribed or recognized
form, it will be ufficient, and a literal adherence to form
will not be required.'' 12 Ency. PL and Prac. 518. Mere
t hnicality should not be allowed such sway as is proposed
in thi case.
Th r is anoth r reason w by this point should not reverse
th trial. The d f n ant had right to object to the oath
wh n a ini t r d and to d mand a proper one, if not satwith the one u d, and he could not it ilent, take his
f a v rdi t in hi f v r, and then take advantage
of :u<'h cl f ct. I coul have hown the oath actually
a l111ini . t r cl r bill f ex , ptions, and mu t o so, a held
in Lwr rr>u e's as ,
r t. 650, and in Dys en v. State, 26
• Ii . :~~' and ma
th r a
cited in 1 Thompson on
''rial:, ·. 1 .
ill · dd tl1· t an ath su h as that in thi
<" c t 1 tr.v 11 • i .'
, wa held good on principle and
<111l11nrity in ivil a s. Piere v. Tate, 27 Mis. 2 3;
i indham v. TVilliam , <l. · 1'. W affirm th judgment.
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CHAPTER VI.

THE RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE.

JOHNSON V. JOSEPHS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1884.

CHAPTER VI.

75 Maine, 544.

Trespass in which the plaintiff claimed damages in the

sum of two thousand dollars for an alleged assault and bat-

THE RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE.

tery by the defendant upon the person of the plaintiff.

The pleadings and the question presented to the law court

JOHNSON V. JOSEPHS.

are stated in the opinion.

**********

Petees, C. J. Plaintiff sued for an assault and battery.

Defendant pleaded ''son assault demesne," and plaintiff

Supreme J udicial Court of Maine. 1884.

replied " de injuria." Under these pleadings the defendant,

75 Maine, 544.

against the plaintiff's protest, was allowed by the court "to

open and close." This was contrary to what we regard as

the well settled practice in this state. The rule of practice

and of law in this state, is that, when a plaintiff has to prove

anything to make out a full and perfect case, he is entitled
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to open and close. The test is, whether he need put in any

proof of any part of his claim. In this case, the burden fell

upon him to prove the extent of the damages sustained. It

is a case of unliquidated damages, and not a case of nom-

inal damages, or of damages to be assessed by computation

Trespass in which the plaintiff claimed damages in the
"um of two thousand dollars for an alleged a sault and bat-

tery by the defendant upon the person of the plaintiff.
The pleading and the question presented to the law court
are stated in the opinion.

merely.

The plaintiff certainly had something to prove. The

counsel for the defendant contends that the defendant's

plea confessed everything alleged against him. "We think

not. It did not admit more than a general demurrer or a

default would admit, and that would be nominal damages

only. Hanley v. Sutherland, 74 Maine, 212, and cases cited.

The plea of "son assault demesne" is but a qualified ad-

mission of the injury alleged. The point may be tested in

this way: Suppose that, after the pleadings were com-

243

C. J. Plaintiff sued for an assault and battery.
Defendant pleaded "son assault demesne," and plaintiff
replied" de injuria." Under these pleadings the defendant,
against the plaintiff' prote t, was allowed by the court ''to
open and close.'' Thi was contrary to what we regard a
the well settled practice in this state. The rule of practice
and of law in thi state i that, when a plaintiff has to prove
anything to make out a full and perfect case, he is entitled
to open and close. The te t is, whether he need put in any
proof of any part of his claim. In this case, the burden fell
upon him to prove the extent of the damages sustained. It
is a case of unliquidated damages, and not a ca e of nominal damages, or of damages to be asses ed by computation
merely.
The plaintiff certainly had something to prove. The
counsel for the d fendant contend that the defendant's
plea conf e ed everything alleged against him. We think
not. It did not admit more than a general demurrer or a
default would admit and that would be nominal damaO'es
only. Hanley v. utherland, 74 :Maine, 2L., and ca e cit d.
The plea of "son assaidt dem e ne" is but a qualified admission of the injury alleged. The point may be te ted in
this way: Suppose that after the pleadings were comPETERS,
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pleted the defendant had rested without any proof what-

ever. Judgment wonld go for the plaintiff, no doubt. But

for how much? Would the court order judgment for the

sum of one thousand dollars, the amount of damages which

the plaintiff alleges, or would the plaintiff be required to

prove the damages? Can it be, that a plea of son assault

demesne admits any amount of damages which a plaintiff

inserts in the ad damnum of his writ? If so, a plaintiff may

prevent the plea in many cases by alleging exaggerated

damages.

In fact, the defendant cautiously worded his plea to avoid

admitting the whole injury charged. He says he did ''un-

avoidably a little beat, bruise and ill-treat the said plain-

tiff." One of the issues of the case, therefore, was whether

the beating was little or much. The declaration for an as-

sault and battery is usually formal and general. Under the

common form, in our practice, the plaintiff may prove

malice as the foundation for punitive damages. The dam-
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ages are necessarily a matter of uncertainty. The judicial

discretion of a jury can be invoked by a plaintiff to settle

them, and whatever the pleadings, if in the common form,

there must be proof of the nature and extent of the injury

sustained. We think there might be great abuse of the

practice, if the ruling in this case be sustained. Defendants

would adopt the plea of self defence, in order to have th'3

last word, in cases where no real question exists but to have

the amount of damages ascertained. It is not the natural

order of things to hear the accused before the accuser is

lieard.

In the trial of this cause there was testimony upon both

sides. No one would doubt that the plaintiff proceeded with

testimony after the defendant's side was closed. The de-

fendant had the privilege of closing the argument upon the

<luestion of the extent of the plaintiff's injury and amount

of damages thereby sustained. To take the lead, a defend-

ant "must admit all the facts necessary to be proved by

the plaintiff," and not merely a prima facie case, Spauld-

iuff V, Hood, 8 Cush, 602. "When anything is left for the

])laintiff to show, he has the right to begin and close,"

Thurston v, Kennett, 2 Foster, N, H, 151; Belknap v, Wen-

dell, 1 Foster, N, li, 175. The latest authorities sustain the

])hiintiff's view upon this question. See 1 Green, Ev. sec.

T:Er.E

JURY
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pleted the defendant had rested without any proof whate er. Judgment would go for the plaintiff, no doubt. But
for how much~ Would the court order judgment for the
um of one thousand dollars, the amount of damages which
the plaintiff alleges, or would the plaintiff be required to
prove the damages~ Can it be, that a plea of son assault
demesne admits any amount of damages which a plaintiff
in erts in the ad damnurn of his writ 1 If so, a plaintiff may
prevent the plea in many cases by alleging exaggerated
damages.
In fact, the defendant cautiously worded his plea to avoid
admitting the whole injury charged. He says he did "unavoidably a little beat, bruise and ill-treat the said plaintiff.'' One of the i ues of the case, the ref ore, was whether
the beatin · was little or much. The declaration for an asault and battery is usually formal and general. Under the
ommon form, in our practice, the plaintiff may prove
malice as the foundation for punitive damages. The damages are nece arily a matter of uncertainty. The judicial
i cretion of a jury can be invoked by a plaintiff to settle
them, and whatever the pleadings, if in the common form,
there mu t be proof of the nature and extent of 'the injury
u tained. We think there might be great abuse of the
practice, if the ruling in this case be sustained. Defendants
would adopt the plea of self defence, in order to have tlv~
last word, in case where no real question exists but to have
the amount of damages a certained. It is not the natural
rder of t ings to hear the accused before the accuser is
h ard.
In the trial of thi cause th re wa t stimony upon both
. No on woul doubt that the plaintiff proceeded with
t . t im n aft r th
fendant' id was clo ed. The def ·nc1 nt ha the privil o·e of clo ing the argum nt upon the
·
f th xtent of the plaintiff's injury and amount
"f' dan o- th reby su t in d. To take the lead, a defendnnt ' mu. t a mit all tb fact n ces ary to b proved by
1lt< pln i nt iff," an n t m r ly a prirna facie ca e. Spaitld11u; v. JI ood,
u h.
...,. "Wh n anything i left for tl e
phi11liff t .h ow, h ba the rio·ht to beo-in and clo e."
'J '/111 r. I rrn v. K 11ne t t . ., ~ . t r,
. 51; B llcnap v. Wenrl "" 1 J n. t r
. JI. 7 .
l t t authoriti sustain the
l 'h i tiff · i w u n thi
u ti n.
ee 1 Gre n, Ev. sec.

Chap. 6]
Chap. 6] The Right to Open and Close 245

sec. 75, 76, and English and American cases cited in notes

of the latest editions. Lunt v. Wormell, 19 Maine, 100;

Saivyer v. Hopkins, 22 Maine, 276; Washington Ice Co, v.

Webster, 68 Maine, 449 ; Page v. Osgood, 2 Gray, 260 ; Dorr

V. Tremont National Bank, 128 Mass. 359; Carter v. Jones,

6 C. & P. 64; Mercer v. WJiall, 5 Ad. & El. N. S. 447.

The favor extended to the defendant deprived the plain-

tiff of a valuable legal right — one highly prized by advo-

cates. It did not rest in the discretion of the trial judge to

grant it. The rule should be fixed and certain, and not be

subject to the varying judgments of different judges. The

bar should know what the rule is, and that it may be de-

pended upon.

Exceptions sustained^

Walton, Virgin, Libbey and Symonds, J. J., concurred.

lEule the same as to Evidence and Argument. "The general rule is that

the order of argument follows the burden of proof; and whoever opens the

case with the evidence, if he has a right to so open, has the same right in the
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argument:" Abel v. Jarrett, (1897) 100 Ga. 732, 28 S. E. 453. To the

same effect:— D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Kline, (1885) 18 Nebr. 344, 25 N.

W. 360; O'Connor v. Henderson Bridge Co., (1894) 95 Kv. 633, 27 S. W.

251; Lowe v. Lowe, (1875) 40 la. 220; Palmer v. Adams, (1*893) 137 Ind. 72,

THE RIGHT TO
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AND CLOSE
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sec. 75, 76, and Engli h and American ca es cited in notes
of the latest editions. Lunt . TT ormell, 19 ·uaine 100;
Bai yer v. H op kins 22 :Maine, ... 76; TV a hington I ce Co. v.
TVeb ter, 6 J\faine, 449; Page v. Osgood, 2 Gray, 260; Dorr
v. Tr mont National Ba nk, 12 1Ia . 359 ; Carter v. Jones,
6 C. & P. 64; lllercer v. Tl hall, 5 Ad. & El. N. S. 4±7.
The fa or extended to the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a valuable legal right-one highly prized by advocate . It did not re t in the di cretion of the trial judge to
grant it. The rule bould be :fixed and certain, and not be
subject to the varying judgment of different judge . The
bar hould know what the rule is, and that it may be depended upon.
E xceptions sustained. 1
WALTON, VIRGIN, LIBBEY and SYMO . . ns, J. J., concurred.

36 N. E. 695.

BUZZELL V. SNELL.

Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire. 1852.

25 New Hampshire, 474.

Assumpsit. The declaration contained three counts, for

the j)rice of a sleigh. One upon an account annexed for $26,

the others special. One of these alleged a sale of the sleigh

for $26, and a contract to pay for it 275 bushels of char-

1R1ile the same as to Ei·idence and Argume1it. ''The general rule is that
the order of argument follo\l·s the burden of proof; and whoever opens the
case with the evidence, if b has a right to so o en, ha the ame right in the
argument:
Abel v. Jarrett (1 97) 100 Ga. 732 2 S. E. 453.
To the
same effect:- D. M:. 0 borne & Co. v. Kline, (1 85) 18
ebr. 344, 25
.
W. 360 · 0 'Connor v. Hender on Bridge Co., (1 94) 95 Ky. 633, 27 S . W.
251; Lowe v. Lowe, (1 75) 40 Ia. 220· Palmer v. Adams, (1 93) 137 Ind. 72 1
36 N. E. 695,

coal, of a certain quality, to be delivered at a specified place

and time, or to pay $26 in money.

The defendant pleaded the general issue to the whole

declaration, except the sum of seven dollars and ten cents,

and as to that sum pleaded a tender, and issues were joined.

The coiirt ruled that upon these pleadings the defendant

was not entitled to the opening and close in the trial of the

c£ise, and the defendant excepted.

BUZZELL V. SNELL.
Superior Coitrt of Judicature of New Hanipshire.

1852.

25 New Ham,p hire, 474.

As MP IT. Th leclaration contained three count , for
the price of a leigh. One upon an account annexed for $2 ,
the other pecial. One of these alleged a sale of the leiO'h
for $2 , and a contra t to pay for it 275 bu hels of charcoal of a c rtain quality to be deli ered at a speci:fie I lace
and time or to pay $- 6 in mone . .
The def ndant pl aded the general i ue to the whole
declaration exc pt the um of even dollars and ten cent
and a to that sum pleaded at n ler, and i sue were joined.
The co1i.rt ruled that upon th
pleadin · th defendant
wa not entitled to the opening and close in the trial of the
case, and the defendant excepted.

246
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The plaintiff offered evidence tending to sustain his spe-

cial count, and the proof on both sides was that the sleigh

was called $26 in the trade, and that the payment was to

be 275 bushels of coal, or $26 in money. The defendant did

not contend that he had performed the original contract,

whatever it was, but endeavored to show that 200 bushels

of coal had been delivered and accepted in part payment,

the plaintiff at the same time agreeing to receive money for

the residue; but upon this point the testimony was conflict-

ing. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was

not bound to accept the coal, unless it was according to the

contract in respect to time, quantity and quality, but he

might waive his rights in any of these particulars ; and that

after the plaintiff had proved a contract for 275 bushels of

coal, or the money, if the defendant would maintain that 200

bushels had been received in jDayment pro tanto, the burden

of proof was upon him to show the fact. To this instruc-

tion, in relation to the burden of proof, the defendant ex-
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cepted.

Bell, J. The principal question presented by this case

is upon the right, claimed by the defendant, to open the case

to the jury, and, consequently, to make the closing argu-

ment. The question whether the plaintiff or the defendant

has the right, almost necessarily arises at the commence-

ment of the hearing, and before the court can have any

opportunity to know anything of the nature or character of

the questions which are to arise upon the trial, except as

they are disclosed by the pleadings. The right is, there-

fore, usually held to de])end upon the state of the pleadings.

''The party who asserts the affirmative of the issue is en-

titled to begin and to reply." 1 Green. Ev., sec. 74. "If

the record contains several issues, and the plaintiff holds

the affirmative in any one of them, he is entitled to

begin." lb.

This question was considered, and the cases collected and

examined, in the case of Belknap v. Wendell, 1 Foster's

rjep. 175. Gilchrist, C. J., there lays down the rule thus;

"The plaintiff begins and has the right of reply, in all cases

where the defendant's pleadings, or any part of them, deny

llie wliole or any part of the plaintiff's pleadings, so as to

leave any arfinnnlive allegation on his side to be estab-

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 6

The plaintiff offered evidence tending to sustain his spe·ial count, and the proof on both sides was that the sleigh
was called $26 in the trade, and that the payment was to
be 275 bushels of coal, or $26 in money. The defendant did
not contend that he had performed the original contract,
whatever it was, but endeavored to show that 200 bushels
of coal had been delivered and accepted in part payment,
the plaintiff at the same time agreeing to receive money for
the re idue; but upon this point the testimony was conflicting. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was
not bound to accept the coal, unless it was according to the
contract in re pect to time, quantity and quality, but he
might waive hi rights in any of these particulars; and that
after the plaintiff had proved a contract for 275 bushels of
coal, or the money, if the defendant would maintain that 200
bu hel bad been received in payment pro tanto, the burden
of proof wa upon him to show the fact. To this instruction, in r la tion to the burden of proof, the defendant exc pted.
* * * * * * * * * *
BELL, J.
The principal question presented by this case
i upon tbe right, claimed by the defendant, to open the case
to the jury, and, consequently, to make the closing argum nt. The qu tion whether the plaintiff or the defendant
has the right, almost necessarily arises at the commencement of the hearing, and before the court can have any
portuni ty to know anything of the nature or character of
the que tion
hi b are to arise upon the trial, except as
th y ar di lo d b. · th pleadings. The right is, there£ r , u u 11 held to d p nd upon the state of the pleadings.
" h
arty who a ,· erts the arfirmative of the issue is entitl
t
to reply." 1 Green. Ev., sec. 74. "If
th r c rd nt
.· v ral issues, and the plaintiff holds
th affirm ti' m any one of them, he is entitled to
b n·in." Il.
r Iii.
ur. ti n w s consi r d, and the cases collected and
xnmi d, in th ca. of Belknap v. TVendell, 1 Fo ter's
f'l'· 175. 1 ilrhri . t,
., th r Jays down the rule thus:
"' li ~ pl·intiffl<·gi1 .· nc1h th rirrhto fre ly,inallcases
wh ·re 1}1 ( l f'pnclnnt' . pl c lino-., or any art of t11 em, deny
11 1" wliolP or nn>- pnrt of th
laintiff' 1 adino-., so as to
l ·a · <111 nrti rni·di\'C• ·tll<'gatio
n hi , s id t be e tab1
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lislied by proof." ''And this (he says) is uniformly the

case, unless the defendant, by the form of pleading, admits

the plaintiff's right of action, but for the cause which he

sets up in his plea, no proof in such case being required on

the part of the plaintiff." This rule is in accordance with

the practice in this State. We are not aware that there has

ever been any difference of ruling in the common pleas, or

of decisions in this court, or that any exception has ever

been admitted in this respect.

This case comes clearly within the rule in Belknap v.

Wendell, since the affirmative of one of the issues is upon

the plaintiff. Two pleas are filed. Tlie first is the general

issue as to all the plaintiff's claim, except the sum of seven

dollars and ten cents. Upon this issue, it is the duty of the

plaintiff to go forward, and introduce proof of the facts

alleged in his declaration; and if he does not, the case of

course must end in a non-suit. Before this is done, he can-

not call upon the defendant to take any step in the cause.
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The second plea alleges a tender as to seven dollars and

ten cents. Upon this the burden of proof is upon the de-

fendant. But it is suggested that as a plea of tender is an

admission of the plaintiff's cause of action, as set forth in

his declaration, this has the effect, substantially, to change

the issue upon the first plea. We do not so regard it. The

right, by the rule in Belknap v. Wendell, depends upon the

form of the pleading, and is determined by the fact that the

affirmative of one of the issues is upon the plaintiff, and this

is in no way affected by the circumstance that the plaintiff

has greater or less facilities for making the required proof.

Any material fact may be proved by the admissions of the

adverse party; and it does not change the burden of proof

upon the pleadings, that the defendant has admitted the

claim, which he formally denies by his plea. Nor is it in any

way material in what form the admission is made, so long

as he chooses to deny it upon the record, and join issue

upon it.

The admission is evidence of a matter of fact, to be de-

cided by the jury, and the plaintiff, to sustain his case, must

lay that evidence before them. In this respect, the admis-

sion of the contract declared upon, implied from the pay-

ment of money into court, stands upon the same ground as

the admission of the signature of a written instrument de-
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Ii shed by proof.'' ''And this (he says) is uniformly the
case, unless the defendant, by the form of pleading, admits
the plaintiff's right of action, but for the cause which he
sets up in his plea, no proof in such case being required on
the part of the plaintiff.'' This rule is in accordance with
the practice in this State. We are not aware that there has
ever been any difference of ruling in the common pleas, or
of decisions in this court, or that any exception has ever
been admitted in this respect.
This case comes clearly within the rule in Belknap v.
Wendell, since the affirmative of one of the issues is u pon
the plaintiff. Two pleas are filed. The fir t is the general
issue as to all the plaintiff's claim, except the sum of seven
dollars and ten cents. Upon this issue, lt is the duty of the
plaintiff to go forward, and introduce proof of the facts
alleged in his declaration; and if he does not, the case of
course must end in a non-suit. Before this is done, he cannot call upon the defendant to take any step in the ca use.
The second plea alleges a tender as to seven dollars and
ten cents. Upon thi the burden of proof is upon the defendant. But it is suggested that as a plea of tender is an
admission of the plaintiff's cause of action, as set forth in
his declaration, this has the effect, substantially, to change
the issue upon the fir t plea. We do not so regard it. The
right, by the rule in B elknap v . Wendell, depends upon the
form of the pleading, and is determined by the fact that the
affirmative of one of the issues is upon the plaintiff, and this
is in no way affected by the circumstance that the plaintiff
has greater or less facilities for making the required proof.
Any material fact may be proved by the admissions of the
adverse party; and it does not change the burden of proof
upon the pleadings, that the defendant has admitted the
claim, which he formally denies by his plea. Nor is it in any
way material in what form the admi sion is mad , o long
as he chooses to deny it upon the record, and join issue
upon it.
The admission is evidence of a matter of fact, to be decided by the jury, and the plaintiff, to sustain his case, mu t
lay that evidence befor them. In this r espect, the admision of the contract de lar d upon implied from the paym nt of mon y into ourt tand upon th
a-round as
the admis ion of the ignatur of a written in trument de-
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clared upon, resulting from a neglect to gi\e notice upon the

docket of the denial of such signature, according to the gen-

eral rule of the court. In actions upon promissory notes,

the proof of the signature of the instrument is all that the

plaintiff is required to make, upon the general issue: and

this is admitted under the rule by the want of notice of a

denial, upon the docket. It has never occurred to any one

to imagine that this admission changed the burden of proof

upon the general issue, or gave to the defendant a right to

begin and to reply.

This question, substantially, arose in the case of Gump

V. Smith, 11 N. H. Rep, 48. The general issue was pleaded,

with a brief statement. A fact, necessary to be proved by

the plaintiff, was admitted by the statement. But the court

held that the general issue imposes upon the plaintiff the

burden of making out his whole case, before the matter of

the brief statement comes in issue at all; and the same, the

court say, is the result where special pleas are pleaded with

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the general issue. This decision is but a recognition of the

common principle, that where several pleadings are filed,

they are to be tried precisely as if each was pleaded alone;

and the admissions, expressed or implied, in one plea, can-

not be used as evidence "against the party upon otlier issues.

alley V. Jenness, 2 N. H. Rep. 89; Chapman v. Sloan, 2 N.

H. Rep. 467.

The plea of tender is of course not evidence upon the

general issue for any purpose, but the independent fact of

the payment of money into court with the plea of tender, is

an admission of the contract declared on; but this fact is to

be proved by the plaintiff, like any other admission. Upon

the pleadings in such case, nothing appears which changes

tlie ordinary effect of the general issue.

The question presents itself under an entirely different

aspect from that it would have had, if the defendant, in-

stead of pleading the general issue, had pleaded what seems

to have been his true defence, either payment or a delivery

and accptance pro tanto of coal, of a different quality, and

l)erha])H at a different place. In that case, the burden of

proof upon both pleas would have been upon the defendant,

and the right to begin and close, would have belonged to

liirii. This would have been apparent at once upon the rec-

ord, but upon the general issue, it cannot appear that the
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clared upon resulting from a neglect to gi·H' no tice upon the
docket of the denial of such signature, according to the general rule of the court. In actions upon promi ~s ory notes,
the proof of the signatur of the instrument is all that the
plaintiff i required to make, upon the general issue ; and
this is admitted under the rule by tbe want of n otice u.f a
denial upon the docket. It has neYer occurred to any one
to ima()'ine that thi admi sion changed the burden of proof
upon tbe general i sue, or gave to the defendant a right to
begin and to reply.
This que tion, substantiall~T' arose in the case of Gump
v. S11iith, 11 N. H. Rep. 48. The general is sue was plead d,
with a brief statement. A fact, necessary to be p r oved by
the plaintiff, wa admitted by the statement. B u t the court
held that the c:;eneral issue imposes upon the plaintiff the
burden of making out his whole case, before the matt er of
the brief tatement come in issue at all; and the same, the
court say, i the result where special pleas are pleaded with
the gen ral i. u . Thi decision is but a recognition of the
common principle, that where several pl adings are filed:
the ar to be trjed preci el:y as if each was pleaded alone;
and th admis. ion expres. ed or implied, in one plea, cannot b u ed as vidence 'ag·a in. t the party upon other issues.
Gill y v. J enness, 2 N. H. Rep. 89; Chapinan v. Sloan, 2 N.
H. ep. 467.
Th plea of tender is of cour e not evidence upon the
g neral i rn for any purpo e, but the independent f act of
th pa, m nt of money into court with the plea of tender, is
an admis. ion of th contra t declared on; l ut this fact is to
be pr YPd h · the plaintiff, lik any other adrni ion. Upon
th l adin<r · in su h ca. e, n thin()' appears which changes
th ordinar. cff ct f the g n ral is u .
The qu ti n I r . ent iL lf und r an entirely diffe r ent
a:1 rt fr m that it would hav had, if the d fendant, in,t
of pl ding th o· n ral i su , had pl ad d what seem
t ha h n 111. · true d f n , ith r pa, rm nt or a delivery
< ncl HC'C'planc pro tanto of oal, f a differ nt quality, and
n that a. , the burden of
1 ·rliap. ~ t c cJiffPr nt J ]a .
JJro >f upon lJ th p1Pa. w ul h· v b
on the defendan t,
ancl th ; ri rht to lH'gin an
have belono·ed t o
]1im. rl lti . w nlcl }!Cl\' 1) n l I ar nt at n
upon th r-ecr , but UlJ n ih b n ral i , ue, it cannot appear that the
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defence is payment or its equivalent. Nor does it seem to

us that it can ever be desirable to substitute for the simple

inquiry by which the courts now determine the right to

begin, — the form of the issues, — any inquiries as to what

are the real points in controversy.

The second point raised by the exception, as to the duty

of the defendant to prove the defence of payment, if he

relies upon it, is admitted by the defendant to have beea

correctly decided in itself; but it is insisted upon to show

the incorrectness of tlie ruling as to the right to open and

close. It surely could not be expected that the court would

hold that the plaintiff was bound to prove the defendant's

plea, nor that it was to be taken for granted without proof,

or the plaintiff required to disprove it. In our judgment,

there was no inconsistency in holding that upon the plead-

ings, as they were drawn, the burden of proof was upon the

plaintiff, and that he was, therefore, entitled to begin and

close; and in holding afterwards, when the defendant had
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taken upon himself his defence, that if the defendant relied

not upon a denial of the plaintiff's claim, but upon a dis-

charge of that claim by new and independent facts, that the

burden was upon him to prove his defence. This point was

before the court in BelJcnap v. Wendell, where the court say,

''The burden of proof may shift during the trial. In a suit

upon a written contract, the plaintiff produces his evidence,

proves the signature of the defendant, and stops; the de-

fendant then alleges payment, or other matter of defence;

the burden of proof is upon him, and yet the plaintiff opens

and closes the argument."

Judgment is to be rendered upon the verdict, * * *
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defence i payment or it eq ui alent. Nor does it seem to
us that it can ever b de irable to sub titute for the imple
inquiry by which the courts now determine the right to
begin,-the form of the is ues,-any inquiries as to what
are the r ea l points in controversy.
The econd point raised by the exception, a to the duty
of the defendant to prove the defence of payment, if he
relies upon it, is admitted by the defendant to have been
correctly decided in it elf; but it is insisted upon to show
the incorrectne of the ruling as to the right to open and
close. It surely could not be expected that the court would
hold that the plaintiff wa bound to prove the defendant's
plea, nor that it wa to be taken for granted without proof
or the plaintiff requir d to di prove it. In our judgment,
there wa no incon i tency in holding that upon the pleadings, as th y were drawn, the burden of proof was upon the
plaintiff, and that be wa , therefore, entitled to beg·in and
clo e; and in holding afterwards, when the defendant had
taken upon him elf hi defence, that if the def ndant r elied
not ur on a denial of the plaintiff's claim, but upon a discharge of that claim by new and independent fact , that the
burden was upon him to pro' e bis defence. This point was
before the court in Belknap v. TV endell, where the court a. ,
' The burden of proof ma hif t during the trial. In a suit
upon a written contract the plaintiff produces hi evidence,
proves the ignature of the d fendant, and top ; the defendant then alleges payment, or other matter of d fence;
the burden of proof is upon him, and yet the plaintiff opens
and closes the argument.''

• • * * •

~

* * * *

Judgment is to be rendered upon the verdict, • ~ •
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LAKE ONTARIO NATIONAL BANK V. JUDSON.

Court of Appeals of Neiv York. 1890.

LAKE ONTARIO NATIONAL BANK V. JUDSON.

122 New York, 278.

This action was brought to recover the amount of four

Court of .Appeals of New Yark.

1890.

promissory notes, which, by the complaint, the plaintiff al-

leged were made by the defendant payable to the order of

122 New York, 278.

E. M. Fort, delivered to the payee, and by him endorsed,

and transferred to the plaintiff. The complaint also alleged

that the defendant was indebted to respondent in a sum

stated, for money advanced on his checks drawn upon the

plaintiff for an amount in excess of his deposits there.

The defendant, by his answer, alleged that he and Fort

purchased of the plaintiff some canal boats ; that they were

induced to make the purchase by the warranty of the plain-

tiff, particularly specified, and gave for them their joint

notes ; that afterward the plaintiff took up those notes, and

the makers gave their individual notes for their respective

interests in the purchase to the plaintiff, which notes were
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received by the plaintiff "in place of and in payment of said

first-mentioned notes, and which notes last given are the

notes, and the renewal thereof set forth in the complaint."

The answer then alleged a breach of this warranty and

damages as the consequence; it also alleged, by way of

counter-claim, that the plaintiff was indebted to defendant

in a further sum for services performed by him for and at

the request of the plaintiff, for which, with the amount of

damages for the alleged breach of warranty, he demanded

judgment. And for further answer he denied the complaint,

and each and every allegation therein contained except as

thereinbefore admitted. The plaintiff, by reply, put in

issue the new matter of the answer constituting the alleged

counter-claims. The trial court directed judgment for the

amount of the notes and of the overdraft mentioned in the

complaint.

Further facts appear in the opinion.

**********

Bradley, J. The contest on the trial mainly had relation

to the defendant's alleged counter-claim for services, upon

which claim he gave evidence to the effect that they were

This action was brought to recover the amount of four
promissory notes, which, by the complaint, the plaintiff alleged were made by the defendant payable to the order of
E. M. Fort, delivered to the payee, and by him endorsed,
and tran ferred to the plaintiff. The complaint also alleged
that the defendant was indebted to respondent in a sum
stated, for money advanced on his checks drawn upon the
plaintiff for an amount in excess of his deposits there.
The defendant, by bis answer, alleged that he and Fort
purcha ed of the plaintiff some canal boats; that they were
induced to make the purchase by the warranty of the plaintiff, particularly specified, and gave for them their joint
not s; that afterward the plaintiff took up those notes, and
the makers gave their individual notes for their re spective
intere ts in the purchase to the plaintiff, which notes were
rec ived by the plaintiff "in place of and in payment of said
fir t-mentioned note , and which notes last given are the
note , and the ren wal thereof set forth in the complaint.''
Tbe answer then alleged a breach of this warranty and
damage a the consequence; it also alleged, by way of
ount r- laim, that the plaintiff was indebted to defendant
in a further um for services performed by him for and at
tbe r ue t of the plaintiff, for which, with the amount of
ama · for the alleged breach of warranty, he demanded
judo-m nt. And for furtb r answer he denied the complaint,
a
a h and v ry all gation therein contained except a~
h r inb fore admitt d. Tbe plaintiff, by reply, put in
i ::uP th n w mat r of the an wer constituting the alleged
r nnt r- lair
h trial court directed judgment for the
am un f th not and of the overdraft mentioned in the
·c plaint.
1• 11th r fa t. app ar i th opinion.
•

•

oil<

,,..

•

~

:l(c

,,.

•

....

•

BI \JJLhY, .J.
h ont . t n the trial mainly bad relation
1 J h · def mclant' ll g c unter-claim for services, upon
~ ill ·h claim b • gave evidence to the effect that they were
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performed by him pursuant to an agreement with the plain-

tiff, by which the latter undertook to pay him $2,500, of

which $160 had been paid. This claim, and the evidence on

the part of the defendant tending to support it, were dis-

puted by the evidence on the part of the plaintiff, and the

trial court found the facts against the defendant. For the

purpose of this review, the findings and determination of

the court below must be deemed conclusive. Upon the trial

the question as to which party was entitled to the closing

argument was raised; the court held that the plaintiff had

tlie right to it, and the defendant excepted. The rule that

the party having the affirmative of the issue in an action

shall have the opportunity to make the opening and closing

presentation of his case is deemed founded upon a substan-

tial right, the denial of which is error. {Conselyea v. Sivift,

103 N. Y. 604.) In its application to trials by jury it has

ordinarily more practical importance than in those before

the court without a jury and before referees. If it appears
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that a party could not have been prejudiced by the failure

of the court to observe this rule, the error would not be

available, and in trials by the court without jury or before

referees that question would be dependent upon the circum-

stances of each case. In the present case the view of the

court evidently was that the affirmative of the entire issue

was not with the defendant, and that is the question pre-

sented for consideration. The denial by the defendant in

his answer, except as therein admitted, of each and every

allegation of the complaint, put in issue any material allega-

tion of the complaint not distinctly admitted by the answer.

(Allis v. Leonard, 46 N. Y. 688; 22 Alb. L. J. 28; Calhoun

V. Hallen, 25 Hun. 155.) The charge in the complaint, in

due form, of the indebtedness of the defendant to the plain-

tiff" for the amount advanced to him upon his check in excess

of the balance of his account with the plaintiff, was not ad-

mitted by the answer, but was controverted by such denial.

It appears that after the trial had been moved and the plain-

tiff, by its counsel had, by statement of it, made the opening

of the case to the court, the defendant orally admitted the

count of the complaint alleging the overdraft. * * * The

question arises whether the oral admission at the trial of

the plaintiff's claim for the amount of the defendant's over-

draft, entitled him to the right of closing the argument on
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performed by him pur uant to an agreem nt with the plaintiff, by which the latter undertook to pay him $2 500, of
which $160 had be n paid. This claim, and the evidence on
the part of the defendant tending to support it, were di puted by the evidence on the part of the plaintiff, and the
trial court found the fact again t the defendant. For the
purpose of this review, the findings and determination of
the court below must be deemed conclu ive. Upon the trial
the question as to which party was entitled to the clo in()'
argument was raised; the court held that the plaintiff had
the right to it, and the defendant excepted. The rule that
the party having the affirmative of the is ue in an action
shall have the opportunity to make the opening and closing
pre entation of hi ca e is deemed founded u on a ubstantial right, the denial of which is error. ( Conselyea v. Swift,
103 . Y. 604.) In it application to trial by jury it ha
ordinarily more practical importance than in tho e before
th court without a jur. and before referee . If it appear
that a party could not have been prejudiced by the failure
of the court to ob erve this rule, the error would not be
available, and in trials by the court without jury or before
referees that que tion would be dependent upon the circumtances of each case. In the pre ent case the iew of the
court evid ntl was that the affirmati e of the entire issue
wa not with the defendant, and that is the question preented for con ideration. The denial by the defendant in
hi answer exc pt a therein admitted, of each and every
alle()'ation of the complaint, put in i ue any material allega.
tion of the c mplaint not di tinctly admitt d by the answer.
(Allis v. Leona1·d, 46 . Y. 68 ; 22 Alb. L. J. 2 ; Calhoun
v. Hall en, 25 Hun. 155.) The charg in tbe complaint, in
due form, of the in lebt ne s of the defendant to the plaintiff for the amount ad anced to him upon his check in exce s
of the balance of i a count with the plaintiff, wa not admitted by the an w r but was contro"rnrted
uch denial.
It appears that aft r th trial had be n move and the plaintiff by it conn l ha 1 y . tatement of it made the opening
f the ca e to h
urt t·h d f nda t rally a mitted the
ount of the complaint all ino- th OY r raft. * * • The
question ari
wh tb r h oral ad i. ion at the trial of
th 1 intiff s 1 im f r th a ount of th
fendant s overraft~ ntitled him t
1J right of clo ing the argument on
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the final submission of the case to the court for determina-

tion. And that depends upon the question whether the af-

firmative of the issue, with a view to such a right, must be

ascertained from the pleadings, or may arise from admis-

sions orally made at the trial. The issues to be tried can be

ascertained only by reference to the pleadings, and they

must govern so far as relates to the right of the parties to

open the case at the beginning and conclude the argument

at the close of the trial. When the parties go to trial they

respectively assume the burden of establishing that which

they have affirmatively alleged as a cause of action or coun-

ter-claim, if it is controverted by allegation sufficient to put

it in issue. The admission of a fact upon the trial is evi-

dence merely. It may obviate the necessity of further trial

of the issue to which it relates, but does not change it as

represented by the pleadings. That can be done by amend-

ment only. It is true that the admission made at the trial

may reduce the controversy to matter as to which the
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affirmative is with the defendant. Such would be the effect

of evidence of any character, undisputed and indisputable

of the facts constituting the alleged cause of action. The

right under consideration does not depend simply upon the

admission of those facts, unless they are admitted or uncon-

troverted by the answer; otherwise it is evidence only.

There is no occasion to extend the rule so as to give effect

for such purpose, to concessions at the trial. This might

lead to the adoption of such a course when further dispute

of the facts upon which a plaintiff relies may appear hope-

loss to a defendant, for the purpose of obtaining the right

of closing the trial. There is no apparent reason for apply-

ing such rule to any one more than to any other stage of the

trial. Tlie defendant who may wish to take the right of

opening and concluding the trial, must frame his pleading

with that view, and so as to present no issue upon any alle-

gation of the complaint essential to the plaintiff's alleged

cause of action. If the defendant fail to do that, no matter

how little proof the remaining issue may require, or how

easily, or in what manner it may be established by evidence,

the right of the plaintiff to open and close the case is not

denied to him. (Mercer v. Whall, 5 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 447.)

The test is, whether without any proof, the plaintiff, upon

the pleadings, is entitled to recover upon all the pauses
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the final ubmi sion of the ca e to the court for determination. And that depend upon the question whether the affirmative of the i ue, with a view to such a right, must be
a rtained from the p] eadings or may arise from admision orall r made at the trial. The issues to be tried can be
ascertained only by reference to the pleadings, and they
mu t govern so far as relates to the right of the parties to
open the case at the beginning and conclude the argument
at the close of the trial. When the parties go to trial they
re pectively a ume the burden of establishing that which
they have affirmatively alleged as a cause of action or counter-claim, if it is controverted by allegation sufficient to put
it in i ue. The admi sion of a fact upon the trial is eviden m rel . It may obviate the necessity of further trial
of th i ue to which it relates, but does not change it as
represented b. the pleadings. That can be done by amendment only. It is true that the admission made at the trial
may reduce the controversy to matter as to which the
affirmative i with the defendant. Such would be the effect
of vidence of any character, undisputed and indisputable
of th facts on tituting the alleged cause of action. The
ri ·ht under con ideration does not depend simply upon the
ad i ion of tho e fact , unless they are admitted or uncontr v rt d by the answer; otherwise it is evidence only.
here i no occa ion to extend the rule so as to give effect
for uch purpo , to co nee sions at the trial. This might
l a to th a ption of such a course when further dispute
of th fa t u on wbi h a plaintiff relies may appear hope1 :. to a def ndant, f r the purpose of obtaining the right
f ·1 . in()' th trial. Th re is no apparent reason for applying .·n ·li rnl t any on more than to any other stage of the
trial. r1 h d f n ant who may wish to take the right of
J]H·nin~· c nc1 eon ludin 0 th trial, must frame his pl adinO'
"i 111 that vi
an 1 o . to pre ent no is u upon any alle<ra t ion of th0 ·
plaint e. ntial to the pl intiff's alle 0 ·ed
<'a 11 . <· f ndi n. If tll
f n ant fail to do that, no matter
l1<1w little pr of th r mainino· issue may r quire, or how
''" ·ily or in wlia mann r it c r h e tabli h d by evidence,
tl1<· ricrht of' il1 plaintiff t
p n an<l 1os th ca i not
d' 11 i " I 1o 11 i m . ( Ur r r Pr v. Tl h all, 5
. & E 1. ( N. S. ) 44 7. )
'I 11 · t . t i : wh<' h r w ith ut a y Ir f, th plaintiff, upon
l11 · pl<'a ling., is nliU
to r co er upon all the Q.auses
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of action alleged in his comiDlaint. If he is, and the defend-

ant alleges any counter-claim, controverted by the plain-

tiff's pleading or any affirmative matter of defense in avoid-

ance of the plaintiff's alleged cause of action, and which is

the subject of trial, the defendant has the right to open and

close, otherwise not. * * * If the defendant, by permission

of the court, had stricken out the denial in his answer, or

amended it by inserting the admission orally made, a differ-

ent question would have been presented at the trial upon the

claim of the defendant to the right to conclude it.

No other question requires the expression of considera-

tion.

The judgment should be affirmed.

All concur except Follett, Ch. J., not sitting.

Judgment Affirmed.

iThere is some authority for the rule that admissions made at the trial will

determine the right to open and close. See Abel v. Jarrett, (1897) 100 Ga.

732, 28 S. E. 453.
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169 Illinois, 40.
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of action all ged in hi complaint. If he is, and the defendant all e any counter-claim, contro ert d by the plaintiff' pleading or any affirmative matter of defen e in avoidance of the plaintiff's alleged cau e of action and which is
· th subject of trial, the defendant ha the right to open and
clo e, otherwi e not. * * * If the defendant, b permi ion
of the court, had stricken out the denial in hi answer, or
amended it by in erting the admi ion orally made, a different que tion would have been pre ented at the trial upon the
claim of the defendant to the right to conclude it.
o other que tion requires the expression of con ideration.
The judgment should be affirmed.
All concur except FOLLETT, Ch. J., not sitting.
Judgment Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Wilkin delivered the opinion of the court :

This was a suit in assumpsit upon a promissory note for

$1,000, given by John J. Girtin and William C. Girtin to

Nash, Wright & Co., dated September 6, 1889, due in ninety

lThere is some authority for the rule that admissions made at the trial will
determine the right to open and clo e. See Abel v. Jarrett, (1897) 100 Ga.
732, 28 S. E. 453.

days, and duly assigned to one Henry A. Gardner. The

defendant John J. Girtin was not served. The defense made

by William C. Girtin was, that the consideration of the note

was a balance due upon certain transactions on the Board

of Trade of Chicago, which were in violation of the statute

against option dealing in grain, and the note was therefore

void. There was a verdict and judgment for the de-

GARDNER V. MEEKER.

fendant. * * *

After the trial had begun the defendant withdrew his plea

of the general issue, and the court, over the objection of the

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1897.
16 9

Illinois, 40.

MR. J STICE WILKIN delivered the opinion of the court:
This wa a suit in a um it upon a promissory note for
$1,000 giY n by John J. Girtin and William . Girtin to
Nash, Wri 0 ·bt & Co. dated eptember 6 1 9 due in ninet.
da
and dul a io·ned to one Henry A. Gardner. The
defendant J
J. Girti wa. not erv d. The defen mad
by William . Girtin wa , that the con ideration of the not
wa a balan due upon certain tran action on the Board
of Tra of hi a o which w re in violation of the statute
again t option d aling in rain and the note wa th ref ore
void. There wa a verdi t a d judgment for the defendant. * * •

bn

* * • • * * * * • •

After the trial had gun the defendant withdr w hi pl
of the general i u and the court, over th obj tion of the

254
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plaintiff, permitted him to have the opening and closing of

the argument. This, also, is assigned for error. The rule

on the subject of the opening and closing of the argument is

this: ''That where the plaintiff has anything to prove in

order to get a verdict, whether in an action ex contractu or

ex delicto, and whether to establish his right of action or to

fix the amount of his damages, the right to begin and reply

belongs to him." (1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 228; Mc-

Reynolds v. Burlington and Ohio River Raihvay Co., 106 111.

152.) The withdrawal of the plea of the general issue

amounted to an admission of the right of the plaintiff to re-

cover the amount of the note sued on, unless the defense

alleged in the special pleas was proven by a preponderance

of the evidence. There is no doubt that the defendant had

a right, before the commencement of the trial, to withdraw

the general issue and rely upon the special pleas, and if he

did so, he would have the right to open and close. {Harvey

V. Ellithorpe, 26 111. 418 ; Carpenter v. First Nat. Bank, 119
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id. 352.) The trial court had the right, in the exercise of a

sound, reasonable discretion, to permit the issues to be

changed, and to allow the defendant, in consequence thereof,

to assume the affirmative and to open and close the argu-

ment, as well after the case was on trial as before, and we

think that discretion was not abused in this case. Nor was

it error to permit the defense to file additional special pleas

in the midst of the trial, no affidavit of surprise or applica-

tion for continuance having been made.

**********

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.^

1 statutory Modification of Bule. The practice is sometimes governed by

statute. Thus, in Schoonover v. Osborne, (1902) 117 Iowa, 427, 90 N. W.

844, it was held that under fode ^ 3701, the right to open and close the argu-

ment is to be determined by the evidence, and not by the pleadings.

Discretionary or of right, in some jurisdictions the opening and closing

is hold to be a matter resting in the discretion of the court. Woodward v.

Insurance Co., (1899) 104 Tenu. 49, 56 S. W. 1T)20; Smith v. Frazier, (1866)

r,:? T'a. St. 220; Young v. Newark Fire Tns. Co., (1890) .59 Conn. 41, 22 Atl.

32. Rut in the great majority of jurisdictions it is deemed a matter of right.

In Michifinn, where the defendant is obliged in all cases to file a general

issue, he may obtain the opening and closing under Circuit Court Rule 24 (c)

by expressly waiving the benefit of the general issue and admitting the facts

alleged in the plaintifT's declaration, this being done by a special notice ac-
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laintiff, permitted him to have the opening and closing of
the argument. This, also, is assigned for error. The rule
on the subject of the opening and closing of the argument is
this: "That where the plaintiff has anything to prove in
order to get a verdict, whether in an action ex contractu or
x delicto, and wheC1er to establish hitS right of action or to
fix the amount of hi damages, the r ight t o begin and reply
belongs to him.'' ( 1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 228; McReynolds v. Burlington and Ohio River Railway Co., 106 Ill.
152.) The withdrawal of the plea of the general issue
amounted to an admission of the right of the plaintiff to rever the amount of the note sued on, unless the defense
alleged in the special pleas was proven by a preponderance
f the evidence. There is no doubt that the defendant had
a right, before the commencement of the trial, to withdraw
the general issue and rely upon the special pleas, and if he
Ed o, he would have the right to open and close. (Harv ey
v. Ellit-horpe, 26 Ill. 418; Carpenter v. First Nat. Bank, 119
id. 352.) The trial court had the right, in the exercise of a
ound, reasonable discretion, to permit the issues to be
hanged, and to allow the defendant, in consequence ther eof,
to assume the affirmative ·and to open and close t he argument, as well after the case was on trial as before, and we
think that di cretion was not abused in this case. Nor was
it error to ermit the defense to file additional special pleas
in the midst of the trial, no affidavit of surprise or application for continuance having been made.

* * * * * * * * * *
he judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. 1

companying the general issue.

1S t atutor y Modi fication of Rule. The practice is sometimes governed by
i-:tat ute.
Thus, in choonover v. Osborne, (1902) 117 Iowa, 427, 90 N. W.
44, it was helrl th at under corle § 3701, the ri ght to open and close t he a r gu·
inc>nt is to be c1 t r min c.1 by the evidence, and not by the pleadings.
JJisrr tionary or of rig ht. In some jnri diction the opening and closing
i hf'lrl to h n matt er r sting in th <li r tjon of the court. Woodwar d v.
In. 11ranr
o., (1 !)!)) 104 T m1. 49, 56 . W. 1020; mi th v. Frazier, (1866 )
!i:l f>a. • 't. 22<i; Yo11 ng v. ,. wark Fire Jn R. o., (1890) 59 Conn. 41, 22 Atl.
::12.
B11t in the gr nt maj ority of juri sdictions it is deemed a matter of r ight.
/ 11 J1irliir1011, "h r th cl f n11a nt js obli g Cl in all a P to fi le a general
i II<', h mHy oli tnin th open ing Rnd clo )n g nn 1 r Circuit onrt Rule 24 (c)
liy PXJtr ~!!ly w:iiving t h h ncfit of th g n ral issue and admitting the facts
all •g ·11 in th plninti ff 's rl cla ration 1 this b ing don by a special notice aceornp nying the gen ral issue.

CHAPTER VII.

OPENING STATEMENT OF COUNSEL.

SCEIPPS V. EEILLY.

Supreme Court of Michigan. 1877.

CHAPTER VII.

35 Michigan, 371.

Graves, J.

Defendant in error recovered judgment in the superior

court of Detroit in an action for libel, and plaintiff in error

OPENING STATEMENT OF COUNSEL.

complains of various proceedings at the trial.

SCRIPPS V. REILLY.

Defendant in error was a lawyer in practice in Detroit.

He was a single man. In the spring of 1875 he was elected

Supreme Court of Michigan.

circuit judge of Wayne county, and in the fall thereafter

1877.

was appointed to fill a vacancy caused by the resignation

35 Michigan, 371.

of Judge Patchin.

In 1873 plaintiff in error began publishing the newspaper

called the "Evening News," and has continued the publica-

tion since that time. In 1875 the paper had a large daily

circulation and the news items of each issue averaged some

two hundred. The parties were not personally acquainted,
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but the paper opposed the election of defendant in error

and supported another gentleman, and during the canvass

some intemperate articles were published. Some time in

the fall after the election one Bobbins filed a bill in the

superior court to obtain a divorce from his wife, and among

other charges in the bill against her, alleged that she had

been guilty of adultery with defendant in error.

Almost immediately after this bill was placed on file, a

reporter and gatherer of local news for the paper got ac-

cess to the bill, and with the help of the city editor prepared

an article covering this charge in Eobbins' bill, and caused

it to be published in the paper. This occurred on the 7th

of December. This article is the libel complained of. The

action was commenced the next day. *****

The first in the order of proceeding at the trial seems

naturally to call for attention first.

255

GRAVES,

J.

Defendant in error recovered judgment in the superior
court of Detroit in an action for libel, and plaintiff in error
complains of various proceedings at the trial.
Defendant in error was a lawyer in practice in Detroit.
He was a single man. In the spring of 1875 he was elected
circuit judge of Wayne county, and in the fall thereafter
was appointed to :fill a vacancy caused by the resignation
of Judge Patchin.
In 1873 plaintiff in error began publishing the newspaper
called the ''Evening News,'' and has continued the publication since that time. In 1875 the paper had a large daily
circulation and the news items of each issue averaged some
two hundred. The parties were not personally acquainted,
but the paper opposed the election of defendant in error
and supported another gentleman, and during the canvass
some intemperate articles were publi hed. Some time in
the fall after the election one Robbins filed a bill in the
superior ourt to obtain a divorce from his wife, and among
other charge in the bill against her, alleged that she had
been guilty of adultery with defendant in error.
Almost immediately after this bill was placed on file a
r porter and gatherer of local news for the paper got access to the bill, and with the help of the city editor prepared
an article coverinO' this charge in Robbin ' bill, and cau ed
it to be publi hed in the paper. This occurred on the 7th
of D ember. Thi article i the libel complained of. The
a tion wa comm n d the next day. * * * * *
The first in th ord r of proc eding at the trial eem
naturally to call for att ntion first.
255

_56

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 7

256 Teial Peactice [Chap. 7

It relates to the course the counsel for defendant in error

was permitted to pursue, against repeated objections, in

opening the case to the court and jury.

He declared it to be his purpose, as part of his open-

ing, to read at length before the jury a series of articles

published in the newspaper during the course of several

months and commencing in the spring of 1875 and running

until some time after the appearance of the publication in

suit.

And the first group suggested consisted of articles from

the 19th of March to the 6th of December, and none of which

referred to defendant in error. The reading of them was

objected to on the ground that neither of them would be

relevant or competent if regularly offered as evidence under

the issue. Counsel for defendant in error then stated that

he proposed to read such articles as in good faith he should

offer in evidence, and he would read them because he could

not remember their contents. The court thereupon ruled
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that he might read in his opening such articles as he claimed

to be libelous, and which had been afterwards retracted.

About twenty articles, not relating to defendant in error,

and running through the period before indicated, were then

read to the jury as part of the opening. An exception was

taken to each. They were calculated from their character

to influence the minds of the jurors against plaintiff in er-

ror. The counsel for defendant in error then offered to

road at length, as part of his opening, a series of articles

published the spring before the publication charged as

libelous, concerning the defendant in error when running

for the office of circuit judge.

This was objected to on the ground that the articles did

not tend to show actual malice, and would not be competent

if offered as evidence. Counsel for defendant in error then

ex))]ainod that he did not propose to then read them as

evidence to show malice, but to read such as he expected to

offer and prove afterwards, and such as when put in evi-

dence would tend to show malice towards defendant in er-

ror. The court overruled the objection and allowed coun-

sel to read as he proposed. He then read, as part of his

oy)oning to the jury, five articles he claimed tended to show

aclufil malice by plaintiff in error against defendant in er-

It relates to the course the counsel for defendant in error
was permitted to pursue, against repeated objections, in
opening the case to the court and jury.
He declared it to be his purpose, as part of his openin to read at leno·th before the jury a series of articles
publi hed in the newspaper during the course of several
month and commencing in the spring of 1875 and running
until ome time after the appearance of the publication in
:·uit.
nd the fir t group suggested consisted of articles from
the 19th of March to the 6th of December, and none of which
r f err d to defendant in error. The reading of them was
obj e t ed to on the ground that neither of them would be
r elevant or competent if regularly offered as evidence under
the i u .
ounsel for def end ant in error then_stated that
h propo d to read such articles as in good faith he should
ff r in evid nee and he would read them because he could
n t r emember their contents. The court thereupon ruled
that h micrht r ead in his opening such articles as he claimed
t b lib lou , and which had be n afterwards r etracted.
About tw nty articles, not relating to defendant in error,
and runnin ·through the period before indicated, were then
r ad to the jury as part of the openino·. An exception was
t ak n to ea h. They were calculated from their character
t influ en e th e mind of the juror against plaintiff in err or.
b oun 1 for def ndant in error then offered to
r ra at ] ngth a part of his opening, a series of articles
pnbli. h d the pring before th e publication charged as
1ib 1 u..
n rnincr the d f ndant in error when running
f r tJ
ffic of circuit judge.
Thi. a. l j te to on th ground that the articles did
not t n to . how actual malice, and would not be competent
if ff r d . vid n .
oun 1 for def ndant in error then
'XPI' i110 1 tlrn he i not pr po
to th n read them as
c•vi<1('D<' t . h w mali , but to r ad uch as he expected to
ff r an
r v aft rward , and u h a wh n put in evi<1<·11<· - wonld t
t o h w mali toward defendant in err rul
th bj ·ti
a d llow d counror. 'l l1P <'Out
·c l to r<·a(1 ~ . h pr po
. II th n r ad, as part of his
>JI •11i11',. t i h jur fi v
rti 1 h lajm d t d d to show
adw1l nrn ]iC' y l intiff i err r again t defendant in er-

hap. 7]
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ror. They bore date March 12th, March 22nd, March 29th,

March 31st, and April 3rd, 1875.

The counsel for defendant in error then proposed to read

at length, as part of his opening and not as evidence, an-

other series of articles published after the libel.

This was objected to on the ground that the articles would

not be competent or admissible if offered as evidence. They

all referred to the alleged libelous article and the legal pro-

ceedings growing out of it.

The objection was overruled. ***** The opening state-

ment having been allowed to embrace the reading in full

of all these publications, and having been brought to a

close, the counsel for defendant in error proceeded to offer

evidence. None had yet been received, and although the

plaintiff in error had not been able to prevent the reading

of the publications to the jury he was still not able to meet

them as evidence, for any purpose or in any way.

They were lodged in the jurors' minds as matters in the
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cause they were entitled to receive, but not through the

channel the law has made for the conveyance of evidence,

or at the stage of proceeding proper for submitting evi-

dence. They were matters which could not fail, when so

presented, to prepossess the jury unfavorably against the

plaintiff in error. Confining attention now to this branch

of the case, it appears from the record, that of the series

of publications not relating to defendant in error, and per-

mitted to be read at length in the opening statement, on

the pledge that they would be afterwards offered in good

faith as evidence, five were not even offered as evi-

dence at all at any stage of the trial, and as to one other the

record is contradictory; some ten or a dozen or more, the

record being ambiguous as to a few, were not offered except

upon the rebutting case, and were then rejected by the

court ; and the residue of this list, being five or six, were re-

served until the plaintiff in error had rested his defense,

and were then offered and admitted as rebutting evidence.

Of the series published in the spring of 1875, concern-

ing the candidacy of defendant in error as circuit judge,

and which were read at length in the opening, on the avowal

of counsel's belief that they intended to show actual notice

by plaintiff in error against defendant in error, and would

be offered in evidence for that purpose, not one was offered

T. p.— 17

OPENING STATEMENT OF

OUNSEL

2~7

ror. They bore date 11arch 12th, :March 22nd, March 29th,
March 31 t, and April 3rd, 1875.
The coun el for defendant in error then proposed to read
at length, as part of his opening and not as evidence, another series of articles publi hed after the libel.
This wa objected to on the ground that the articles would
not be competent or admis ible if offered as evidence. They
all referred to the alleged ljbelou article and the legal proceeding growing out of it.
The obj ction wa oYerruled. * * * * * The opening statement having been allowed to embrace the reading in full
of all the e publication , and having been brought to a
close, the coun el for defendant in error proceeded to offer
evidence. None had et been received, and although the
plaintiff in error had not been able to prevent the reading
of the publications to the jury he was still not able to meet
them a evidence, for an. purpo e_or in any way.
They were lodged in the juror ' mind a matters in the
ause the were entitled to receive but not through the
channel the law has made for the conveyance of evidence.
or at the tage of proceeding proper for ubmitting evidence. They were matter which could not fail when so
presented to prepo sess the jury unfavorablr again t the
plaintiff in error. ConfininO' attention now to tbi branch
of the ca e it appears from the record that of the serie
of publications not relatinO' to defendant in error and permitted to be read at length in the openinO' statement on
the pledge tba t the would be afterwar s offered in good
faith as evidence five were not even offered as evidence at all at any tage of the trial and a to one other th
record is ontradictory; some ten or a dozen or more, th
record bein · ambiguous as to a few, were not off ·red except
upon the rebutting case, and were then reject d by th
court· and the re idue of this Ii t beinO' fiV"e or ix were reserved until the plaintiff in error had re ted hi d fense
and were then offered and admitted a rebuttin Yidence.
f the erie publi h d in the pring of 18"'5, cone rn1n the candidacy of d f endant in error a ir uit judg ,
an whi h were r ad at 1 no·th in th o ning on the avowal
of oun el' belief that the_ intend d to how actual notic
by laintiff in error aO'ain t d f ndant in error and would
be offere in evidence for that purpose, not one was offered
T

T. P.-17
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during the making out the case in chief. They were held

back until the plaintiff in error had rested, and were then

tendered as rebutting evidence. All were excluded. There

were five in this group.

Of the set published after the appearance of the alleged

libel, five were given in evidence b}^ the defendant in error

to show actual malice, and they were so given, but against

objection, as part of his case in chief. *****

When the judge came to charge the jury, he referred to

the course which he had permitted in respect to the open-

ing statement, and observed, "Mr. Griffin in his opening

read several articles which at the trial were finally excluded.

These should also be withdrawn from your consideration

and laid out for view in your deliberations upon the case."

No further reference was made to the subject of the open-

ing statement, and no caution whatever was given concern-

ing the articles which had been read at length by permission

of the court against objection, but which had not even been
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offered in evidence at all.

The question is, whether the practice which was here al-

lowed in the opening address was correct, and if not,

whether the advice quoted from the charge cured the error,

and in case it did not, then whether it is competent for this

court to revise the proceedings.

The trial judge must always have a very large discre-

tion in controlling and managing the routine proceedings

at the trial, and it is not necessary to specify the matter to

which such discretion extends. It applies beyond doubt to

the addresses of counsel as well as to other incidents. But

it must be a reasonable, a legal discretion, and whether it be

so or not must depend upon tiie nature of the proceeding on

which it is exercised, the way it is exercised and the special

circumstances under which it is exercised. It can never be

intended that a trial judge has purposely gone astray in

dealing with matters within the category of discretionary

proceedings, and unless it turns out that he has not merely

misstepped, l)ut has departed widely and injuriously, an

appellate court will not re-examine. It will not do it when

there is no better reason than its own opinion that the

course actually taken was not as wise or sensible or orderly

as another would have been. For example, if all the arti-

cles allowed to be read m the opening statement had been

TRIAL PRACTICE
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1uring the making out the case in chief. They were held
back until the plaintiff in error had rested, and were then
tendered as rebutting evidence. All were exclurled. There
were five in this group.
Of the set published after the appearance of the alleged
libel, fi e were given in evidence by the defendant in error
to show actual malice, and they were so given, but against
objection, as part of his case in chief. * * * * *
When the judge came to charge the jury, he referred to
the cour e which he had permitted in respect to the openinO' tatement, and observed, "Mr. Griffin in his opening
r ad everal articles which at the trial were finally excluded.
The e should also be withdrawn from your consideration
and laid out for iew in your deliberations upon the case."
"N" o furth er reference was made to the subject of the opening ~t::ttement, and no caution whatever was given concerning the articles which had been read at length by permissi0n
of the court against objection, but which had not even been
offered in eYidence at all.
The que tion is, whether the practice which was here allowed in the opening address was correct, and if not,
whether the advice quoted from the charge cured the error,
and in case it did not, then whether it is competent for this
ourt to revi e the proceedings.
The trial judge must always have a very large discretion in controlling and mana<TinO' the routine proceedings
at the trial, and it is not necessary to specify the matter to
which such di cretion extends. It applies beyond doubt to
the addresse of counsel as well as to other incidents. But
it mu t be a r asonable, a legal di cretion, and whether it be
or not must d pend upon t~1e nature of the proceeding on
hi h it is ex rci ed, the way it is exercised and the special
rir um. tan
u 1 r whi h it i ex rci d. It can never be
int n d that a trial ju ge ha purposely gone astray in
<l ,, ling with matt rs within the cat gory of di er tionary
}Jr
' in . , nd
1 s it turn out that he has not merely
llli .·: l Ppp
hut he , d
rted wid 1. and injuriou ly, an
~1 r llc t court
ill not re-ex mine. It will not do it wh n
th •r is n b tt r rea on than its own opinion that the
·our: .. r uall y t, k n wa. not a. wi or n ibl r ord rly
· n t11rr
uJd have b n. For xampl , if all the articl s allo\ ed to be r ad 7n the opening statement had been
1
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afterwards given in evidence, their reading in the opening,

however contrary to settled practice, might not have of-

fered anything proper for consideration here. Questions

concerning their admissibility wonld fall under another

head. But where it is manifest the trial judge has fallen

into a serious mistake, — one likely to have hurt a party, —

an error mentioned in the books as an abuse of discretion, —

this court is bound to take cognizance, or disregard its con-

stitutional duty of supervision.

It is a chief duty of the trial judge to secure fair play

to litigants, and so far as practicable to shape the order and

course of proceedings in such a way that neither party will

be put to a disadvantage not due to his case or its mode of

management by his counsel. The rules of the court, and

what is called the course of the court, have their origin in

the purpose to secure fairness in legal controversies, and

the order of business and the regulated succession of steps

at trials have the same object.
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The rule (62) ordained by this court for the circuit courts

in regard to an opening statement, is especially meant to

guard against surprise and deception and to promote fair-

ness. And when it declares that ' ' it shall be the duty of the

plaintiff's counsel, before offering evidence to support the

issue on his part, to make a full and fair statement of his

case and of the facts which he expects to prove," it indicates

very distinctly the extent of both right and duty. It draws

a line between "evidence" and "facts," and contemplates a

"fair" statement of the "facts" expected to be "proved"

before putting in the testimony or "evidence" by which

these "facts" are expected to be "proved." Neither the

nature of the proceeding, nor that fairness it is intended to

promote, nor the plain meaning of the rule, gives any sanc-

tion to the claim that in this opening statement the plain-

tiff's counsel may read at length to the jury any documen-

tary matter he may assert his intention of subsequently of-

fering as evidence. But the position taken in this cause in-

volves the assertion of the right to fill up the opening state-

ment with any depositions on file and the whole of oral

statements of expected witnesses, without regard to objec-

tions to admissibility as evidence. Surely it cannot require

much tliought to decide against the reasonableness and fair-

ness of such a practice.

OPENING STATEMENT OF COUNSEL

259

afterwards given in evi ence, their readino· in the opening,
however contrary to settled practice, might not have offered anything proper for consideration here. Questions
concerning their admissibility would fall under another
head. But where it i manifest the trial judge has fallen
into a serious mistake,-one likely to have hurt a party,an error mentioned in the books as an abuse of discretion,this court is bound to take cognizance, or disregard its constitutional duty of supervi ion.
It is a chief duty of the trial judge to secure fair play
to litigants, and so far as practicable to shape the order and
course of proceedings in such a way that neither party will
be put to a disadvantage not due to his ca e or it mode of
management by his counsel. The rules of the court, and
what is called the cour e of the court, have their origin in
the purpose to secure fairness in legal controversies, and
the order of business and the regulated succession of steps
at trials have the same object.
The rule ( 62) ordained by this court for the circuit courts
in regard to an opening statement, is especially meant to
guard against surprise and deception and to promote fairness. And when it declares that "it shall be the duty of the
plaintiff's counsel, before offering evidence to support the
issue on his part, to make a full and fair statement of his
case and of the facts which he expects to prove," it indicates
-very distinctly the extent of both right and duty. It draws ·
a line between" evidence" and "facts," and contemplates a
"fair" statement of the "facts" expected to be "proved"
before putting in the testimony or "evidence" by whi h
the e "facts" are expected to be "proved." Neither the
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The text books in this country which deal with the subject

are distinctly agreed concerning the end and scope of this

opening address. They all represent it as a proceeding

prefatory to putting in evidence, and as one practically

necessary to make an advance exhibit of the legal nature of

the controversy and its salient peculiarities, and enable the

judge, jury and opposing counsel to apprehend the necessi-

ties of the plaintiff's case and correctly understand the drift

and bearing of each step and each offer of proof as it shall

occur subsequently. And considering that its office is to

afford preliminary explanation, that it is to precede proofs

and precede controversy before the jury, and is not to em-

body or convey proof or prepossess the jury, they unite in

substantially denying the right to make use of it to get

before the jury a detail of the testimony expected to be of-

fered, and especially any not positively entitled to be intro-

duced, and deny the right to use it as a cover for any topics

not fairly pertinent. A brief summary or outline of the
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substance of the evidence intended to be offered, with req-

uisite clear and concise explanations, are considered prop-

er. But a relation of expected oral testimony at length, or

a reading of expected docuirtentary proofs at large, or any

otbor course fitted to mislead the triers, should not be tol-

erated. Of course there mav be cases and instances where

a statement of the evidence itself, or a reading of a paper,

may be convenient and harmless. Such, however, must be

exceptional, and not within the spirit of the general require-

ment. * * * *

The courts have usually been very firm in confining coun-

sel within proper bounds and in guarding jurors against

unfair and irregular acts and endeavors, and parties have

been deprived of their verdicts upon evidence merely indi-

cating the operation of influences about the outskirts of the

trial. Tt has been many times ruled that counsel in arguing

may not seek to influence the jurors by reference to matters

in the nature of evidence not in proof before them, and that

tlie trinl judge should promptly repress the attempt as

sometliing reprehensible. * * * *

In tlie case of The State v. Hascall, 6 N. H. 352, the de-

fcTidant was convicted of prejury, whereupon it was shown

tliat i)apcrs calculated to make an unfavorable impression
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are distinctl agreed concerning the end and scope of this
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on the jury were exhibited by the prosecutor at several

public places where jurors boarded, and were read in the

hearing of jurors during term and before the trial, and

the court decided that for this cause the verdict should be

set aside.

In Spenceley v. De Willot, 7 East R. 108, which was an

action for usury, a new trial was granted because the plain-

tiff had published a statement of the case which was dis-

tributed about the court and hall before and at the time of

trial; and in Coster v. Merest, 3 Brod. & Bing. 272, a new

trial was allowed on an affidavit stating that handbills re-

flecting on the plaintiff's character had been distributed in

court at the time of the trial and had been seen by the jury,

and the court refused to hear affidavits, made by all the

jurors, stating that no such placard had been shown to them.

There is no occasiem for dwelling on this part of the case

after what has been said. The practice pursued was wrong,

und the error was not cured or materially alleviated by the
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charge. The jury were not even told to disregard such of

the articles as were read in the statement of the case and not

afterwards offered in evidence, and the special direction to

refuse attention to those which had been offered and rejec-

ted was calculated to imply in the jurors' minds that they

were entitled to regard all others. Tlie omission to tell the

jury to disregard the articles not offered was no doubt an

inadvertence of the court. The effect, however, was the

same as if it had been designed. But if the charge had been

to disregard all unadmitted articles it would not have cured

the error. Because it is quite impossible to conclude that

the jurors had not been influenced too far by the erroneous

rulings and proceedings, to be brought into the same impar-

tial attitude by the court's admonition, which they would

have held if tlie counsel for defendant in error had been

properly confined in his opening statement. The course of

fair and settled piactice was violated to the prejudice of

plaintiff in error, and it is not a satisfactory answer to say

that the court went as far as practicable afterwards to cure

the mischief, so long as an inference remains that the reme-

dy applied by the court was not adequate. And there is no

doubt of the right of this court to revise in such a case as

this. If the trial court may pursue any course it pleases

in relation to the opening statement, if it raav act inde-
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on the jury were exhibited by th prosecutor at . everal
public places where jurors board d, and were read in the
hearing of jurors during term and before the trial, and
the court decided that for this cause the verdict hould be
set aside.
In Spenceley v. De Willot, 7 East R. 108, which was an
action for usury, a new trial was granted because the plaintiff had published a statement of the case which wa distrH:mted about the court and hall before and at the time of
trial; and in Coster v. Merest, 3 Brod. & Bing. 272, a new
trial was allowed on an affidavit stating that handbills reflecting on the plaintiff's character had been distributed in
court at the time of the trial and had been seen by the jury,
and the court refused to hear affidavits, made by all the
jurors, stating that no such placard had been shown to them.
There is no occasim:i for dwelling on this part of the case
after what has been said. The practice pursued was wrong,
and the error was not cured or materially alleviated by the
charge. The jury were not even told to disregard such of
the articles as were read in the statement of the case and not
afterwards offered in evidence and the special direction to
refuse attention to those which had been offered and rejected was calculated to imply in the juror ' minds that they
were entitled to regard all others. The omission to tell the
iury to disregard the articles not offered was no doubt an
inadvertence of the court. The effect, however, was the
ame as if it had been designed. But if the charge had been
to disregard all unadmitted article it would not have cured
the error. Because it is quite impos ible to conclude that
the jurors had not been influenced too far by the erroneous
rulings and proceeding , to be brought into the same impartial attitude by the court's admonition which the, would
have held if the coun el for defendant in error had been
properly confined in hi opening statement. The course of
fair and ettled p1artic was violated to the prejudice of
plaintiff in error and it i not a satisfactory answer to a
that th ourt went as far a practicable afterward to cure
the mi chi f, o long as an inferen e remains that the remed. applied b. r the court wa not adequate.
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doubt of the right of thi court to revi e in such a case a
this. If the trial court may pursue any our e it pleases
in r lation to the openino· tatement if it may a t inde-
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pendently of all control, then the idea of a rule to be pre-

scribed by this court under the constitution and legislative

enactment for its guidance and government, is preposterous

and absurd. But the point is too plain for argument. As

already suggested, this court will not revise such matters

unless there is plain evidence of action amounting to what

is called an abuse of discretion and calculated to injurious-

ly affect the legal rights of a party, and where such is the

case, whether the result of accident, or inadvertence, or mis-

conception, it will take cognizance. The error in this case

was not cured, and is one subject to review, and is suffi-

cient to require a reversal.

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new

trial ordered.

FOSDICK V. VAN ARSDALE.

Supreme Court of Michigan. 1889.

74 Michigan, 302.

Morse, j. * * * *
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The record shows that, after the primary case of the

plaintiff was closed, —

"V. H. Lockwood proceeded to state the defendants' case
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pendently of all control then the idea of a rule to be prescribed by this court under the con titution and legislative
enactment for its guidance and government, is preposterous
and absurd. But the point is too plain for a r gument. As
already suggested, this court will not revise such matters
unl
there is plain evidence of action amounting to what
is called an abuse of discretion and calculated to injurioush' affect the legal rights of a party, and where such is th P
ca e, wh ther the result of accident, or inadvertence, or misonception, it will take cognizance. The error in this case
was not cured, and is one ubject to review, and is sutfiient to r quire a rever al.
* * * * * * * * * *
The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new
trial ordered.

to the jury, and during the opening proceeded to state the

law governing the defendants' case, and upon which the de-

fense was based ; whereupon the counsel for the plaintiff in-

terposed an objection, and the said court sustained the ob-

jection, stating that the law would come from the court in

due time."

This is made the first assignment of error in defendants'

brief.

FOSDICI{ V. VAN ARSDALE.

We are not able, from this meager statement in the rec-

ord, to know whether error was committed or not by this

Supreme Court of JJ1ichigan. 1889.

action of the circuit judge. But counsel have the right in

74 Michigan, 302.

stating their case to the jury at the opening to briefly set

forth what points of the law they rely upon, and the na-

ture of the testimony they propose to introduce to support

MoR. E, J. '"' * • *
Th r cord , how that, after the primary case of the
plaintiff was closed,"V. H. Lockwood pro e ded to state the def ndant ' case
to th jury, and durin tl1e op ninO' proceed d to tat e th e
Jaw g v rninO' th d f ndants' ca e and upon whi h the def n wa. ba. cl; wh r upon tb oun el for th plaintiff int r . d an 1 j tion, and th
aid ourt u , tain d the obj di n, . tatino- that th law would come from the court in
flnP timP.''
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such points. It is true the law is to be given by the court ;

but, as it is not given in most cases until the testimony

is ended, and the counsel have summed the same up in sup-

port of their case before the jury, the counsel have the

right, both in opening the case to the jury, before the testi-

mony to support their case is offered, and when closing the

argument, after the testimony is in, to state to the jury that

they claim the law to be thus and so, and that they shall

request the court to so instruct them, and that they will ad-

duce such and such testimony to support their claim under

the law in the first instance, or at the close to state that the

evidence in the case, under the law as they shall claim it to

be, establishes their right to a verdict at the hands of the

jury. The counsel have no right to read law to the jury,

or to usurp the province of the court in any way in this re-

spect, but they have the undoubted right to state so much of

the law, as they claim it to be, as may enable them to lay

before the jury an intelligent idea of the force, effect, and
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bearing of the testimony upon their case, either before or

after said testimony is in the case.

SAN MIGUEL CONSOLIDATED GOLD MINING COM-

PANY V. BONNER.

Supreme Court of Colorado. 1905.

33 Colorado, 207.

Mk. Justice Campbell delivered the opinion of the court.

The dispute is over a strip of mining ground claimed by

plaintiffs and appellants as a parcel of the Happy Home
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such points. It is true the law is to be given by the court;
but, as it is not given in most cases until the testimony.
is ended, and the coun el have summed the same up in support of their case before the jury, the counsel have the
right, both in opening the case to the jury, before the testimony to support their case is offered, and when closing the
argument, after the testimony is in, to state to the jury that
they claim the law to be thus and so, and that they shall
request the court to so instruct them, and that they will adduce such and such testimony to support their claim under
the law in the first instance, or at the close to state that the
evidence in the case, under the law as they shall claim it to
be, establishes their right to a verdict at the hands of the
jury. The conn el have no right to read law to the jury,
or to usurp the province of the court in any way in this respect, but they have the undoubted right to state so much of
the law, as they claim it to be, as may enable them to lay
before the jury an intelligent idea .of the force, effect, and
bearing of the testimony upon their case, either before or
after said testimony is in the case.

placer, and by defendant (appellee) as a part of the Loop-

ton lode mining location. The owner of the lode claim first

applied for a patent, and appellants, as owners of the plac-

er, filed in the United States land office their protest or ad-

verse claim against the same, and seasonably brought this

action in its support. Trial was to the court and jury, and a

verdict was returned for defendant on which judgment was

SAN MIGUEL CONSOLIDATED GOLD MINING COMP ANY V. BONNER.
Supreme Court of Colorado.

1905.

33 Colorado, 207.

MR. JusTICE

delivered the opinion of the court.
The dispute is over a strip of mining ground claimed by
plaintiffs and appellants as a parcel of the Happy Home
placer, and by defendant ( appellee) as a part of the Loopton lode mining lo ation. The owner of the lode claim first
applied for a patent and appellants as owners of the placer, filed in the Unit d tat land office their prote t or adverse claim again t tb ame and ea onably brought this
action in its support. Trial wa to the court and jury, and a
verdict was returned for defendant on which judgment was
CAMPBELL
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rendered, and plaintiffs are here with this appeal, urging as

grounds for reversal alleged erroneous rulings below, to

the consideration of which we now proceed.

1. In his opening statement to the jury counsel for

plaintiffs, after stating to the jury that they were to take

the law from the court in instructions that would be given

at the close of the trial and before argument, proceeded to

state the law applicable to the case, as he understood it,

for the alleged purpose of giving to the jury his theory of

the case, so that they might be the better enabled to appre

ciate and apply the facts as they were elicited during the

trial. To this course defendant objected, in which he was

sustained by the court. In support of plaintiffs' exception

to the ruling they insist that a plaintiffs' counsel has the

absolute right to state to a jury in his opening address not

only the case as made by the pleadings, and the evidence

by which he proposes to sustain it, but that he may also

state so much of the law as, in his judgment, is necessary
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to enable him to convey to the jury an intelligent idea of

the force, effect and bearing of the testimony in the case.

To this are cited: — Fostick v. Van Arsdale, 74 Mich. 302;

Prenfis v. Bates, 93 Mich. 234; McDonald v. People, 126

Ills. 150; 2 Enc. PI. & Pr. 706.

To the contrary appellee cites: — Giffen v. Lewiston

{Idaho), 55 Pac. 545, 549; Hill v. Colorado National Bank,

2 Colo. App. 324-9; Felt v. Cleghorn, 2 Colo. App. 4:-%; Pick'

ett V. Handy, 5 Colo. App. 295.

The respective contentions are substantially sustained by

some of these authorities. Whatever the practice may be

in other jurisdictions, our code, section 187, in prescribing

the order of trials by jury, provides that after the jury is

sworn, unless for good cause shown the court otherwise

directs, the proceeding shall be :

''First. — The party on whom rests the burden of the is-

sues may briefly state his case, and the evidence by which

he expects to sustain it.

''Second. — The adverse party may then briefly state his

defense, and the evidence he expects to offer in support of

it."

These clauses confer upon respective counsel no authori-

ty in opening to state the law of the case to the jury. Sub-

divisions G and 7 of the same section require the court to
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rendered, and plaintiffs are here with this appeal, urging as
grounds for rev er al alleged erroneous rulings below, to
the consideration of which we now proceed.
1. In his opening statement to the jury counsel for
plaintiffs, after stating to the jury that they were to take
the law from the court in instructions that would be given
at the close of the trial and before argument, proceeded to
state the law applicable to the case, as he understood it.
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give instructions upon the law after the evidence is closed

and before argument is begun, which may, in all cases, be

read to the jury and commented on by the attorneys in

argument, and, if requested by either party or the jury,

may be taken by the latter in their retirement. Ample pro-

vision is thus made for counsel, at a certain stage in the

progress of the trial, to read to the jury, and comment up-

on, the law of the case which the jury must take from the

court. The mere fact that the court does not allow coun-

sel in his opening to exercise the statutory right here given,

and before he could know what the court would declare

the law to be, instead of in his argument at the close of the

case, where the code says it shall be enjoyed, is not some-

thing of which a party may complain. In other words,

since the code has declared what a party may state to the

jury in his opening, he may not, as of right, make any

statements other than those specially permitted.

Furthermore, the right of counsel here asserted, if it ex
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ist at all, does not, as already said, spring from statute.

Practice and procedure, outside of statutory provisions,

are so largely within the sound discretion of trial courts,

and the conduct of trials and the latitude to be allowed

counsel are so largely within their control, that, except for

illegal or gross abuse of discretion, their action with re-

spect thereto should be upheld. — McClure v. Sanford, 3

Colorado, 514, 518. From the brief reference found in the

abstract, we do not believe that any prejudice could have

resulted to plaintiffs by reason of the refusal of the court

to permit their attorney to state to the jury the law of the

case in the opening remarks.

Perceiving no material prejudicial error in the record,

the judgment is affirmed.^

iTo the same effect see Maynard v. State, (1908) 81 Nebr. 301, 116 N W

53. , . .
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give instructions upon the law after the evidence is closed
and before argument is begun, which may, in all cases, be
read to the jury and commented on by the attorneys in
argument, and, if reque ted by either party or the jury,
may be taken by the latter in their retirement. Ample provision is thus made for counsel, at a certain stage in the
progress of the trial, to read to the jury, and comment upon, the law of the case which the jury must take from the
court. The mere fact that the court does not allow counsel in his opening to exercise the statutory right here given,
and before he could know what the court would declare
the law to be, instead of in his argument at the close of the
case, where the code says it shall be enjoyed, is not something of which a party may complain. In other words,
since the code ha declared what a party may state to the
jury in his opening, he may not, as of right, make any
statements other than tho e specially permitted.
Furthermore, the right of counsel-here a erted, if it ex
ist at all, does not, a already said, spring from statute.
Practice and procedure, outside of statutory provisions,
are so largely within the sound discretion of trial courts,
and the conduct of trials and the latitude to be allowed
counsel are so largely within their control, that except for
illegal or gro s abuse of discretion their action with respect thereto should be upheld.-McCli~re v. Sanford, 3
Colorado, 514, 518. From the brief reference found in the
abstract, we do not believe that any prejudice could have
resulted to plaintiffs by reason of the refusal of the court
to permit their attorney to state to the jury the law of the
case in the opening remark .

* * * * * * * * * *
Perceiving no material prejudicial error in the record,
the judgment is affirmed. 1
lTo the same effect see Maynard v. State, (1908) 81 Nebr. 301, 116 N . W.
53.
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PIETS H V. PIETSCH.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1910.

245 Illinois, 454.

Supreme Court of Illinois . 1910.

Mr. Justice Cartwright delivered the opinion of the

eonrt :

This is a suit in forcible detainer for the possession of

245

Illinoi s, 454.

a lot in Chicago, begun by Charles F. Pietsch, the appellee,

by filing his complaint in the municipal court of Chicago

against Otto E. Pietsch and Helen Pietsch, appellants. Af-

ter a jury had been empaneled and sworn the attorney for

plaintiff made an opening statement of the case to the jury,

to the effect that the defendants, who are husband and wife,

had made a mortgage or trust deed on the lot. which was

foreclosed; that a sale was made under the decree, from

which there was no redemption; that a deed was made, in

pursuance of the sale, to Charlotte L. Clark; that the prop-

$4,000 and a deed was made to him; that the defendants

were in possession of the premises and refused to surrender
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possession after demand in writing; that the testimony

might show there was some talk concerning an agreement

that if the defendants would pav to the plaintiff the amount

of monev that was represented bv his purchase of the prop-

erty, with interest and costs, within a reasonable time, they

miirht have the property and he would deed it to them ; that

if it should appear there was an agreement the plaintiff

was still willing to perform it. but that he was claiming tho

possession of the property in the suit. An attorney for the

defendants then stated to the jury, in substance, that the

defendant PTelen Pietsch, beincr the owner of the premises

occupied by the defendants as their home, made a mortgage

on the same, which was foreclosed ; that about the time when

the redemption Avould expire she went to the plaintiff, her

brother-in-law, and wanted him to loan her the amount of

the mortgage and permit her to remain there; that he let

her have the money as a loan but said he' would take the

deed in his own name as security; that he put up something

over Jf;4,000; that the matter ran along and she paid him

back $1,000 at one time, $150 at another and afterward $200

more; that it ran along for three or four years afterward,

MR. J usTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the
court:
This is a suit in forcible detainer for the possession of
a lot in Chicago, begun by Charles F . Pietsch, the appellee,
by filing- his complaint in tbe municipal court of Chicago
against Otto E . Pietsch and Helen Pietsch, appellants. After a jury had been empaneled and worn the attorney for
plaintiff made an opening statement of the case to the jury,
to the effect that the defendants, who are husband and wife,
had made a mortgage or trust deed on the lot. which was
foreclo . ed; that a sale was made under the decree, from
which there was no redemption; that a deed was made, in
pur nance of the sale, to Charlotte L. Clark ; that the prop$4,000 and a deed was made to him; that the def en<lants
were in posse sion of the premises and refused to surrender
possession after demand in writing; that the testimony
might Rhow there was some talk concerning an agreement
that if the defendants would pav to the plaintiff the amount
of monev that was represented bv his purchase of the propertv, with interest and costs, within a reasonable time, they
might have the property and be would deed it to them; that
if it should appear there was an agreement the plaintiff
was till wming to perform it. but that he was rlaiming th~
possession of the prop rty jn the suit. An attorney for th6
<1 f Pndants th n stated to ·t]ie jury, in substance, that the
f ndant H len Pietsch, lw jrnr the owner of th pr mises
o cnpi d hy th d f ndant a, their home, mad a mortgage
on thr , am , whj h was for los d; that about the tim wh n
thr r <l mption would e,' pir , he w nt to th plaintiff her
hrofo r-in -law, and wanted him to loan her the amount of
1h mort..., O' and p rmit her to r main ther ; that he let
h r hav th mon y as a l an but aid h ·would tak the
rlr• •cl in his w nam a s curity; that be ut up omethin
v r $4,000 · that th ma t0r r n alon and h paid him
hac·k $1 000 at n tim $15
t anotlwr and after ard $200
rn<>r ; th t it ran along for three or four year aft rward,
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and she had another piece of property upon which there

was a mortgage of $8,800 and he said he would loan her

enough money to take that in. The attorney for the plain-

tiff objected to the statement relating to other property,

and the attorney for the defendants said that he wanted

to state to the jury that the plaintiff got his money back by

means of a mortgage upon the other piece of property and

this one, but the court sustained the objection and an ex-

ception was taken to the ruling. Continuing, the attorney

stated that the amount was $4,283.98 upon which pa\Tnents

had been made, and that it was agreed that Mrs. Pietsch

should remain in possession of the premises and was en-

titled to remain there. The court then said, ''I assume you

have stated all of your defense," and the attorney replied,

"Yes, sir," whereupon the court instructed the jury to re-

turn a verdict finding the defendants guilty of unlawfully

withholding possession of the premises and that the right

of possession was in the plaintiff. The jury returned a
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verdict accordingly, and the court, after overruling a mo-

tion for a new trial, entered judgment on the verdict. The

Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the judg-

ment and granted a certificate of importance and an appeal

to this court.

When the jury had been sworn to try the issues and ren-

der a verdict according to the evidence it was the privilege

of the attorney for each party, if he saw fit to do so, to

make an opening statement of what he expected to prove.

Such a statement is not intended to take the place of a dec-

laration, complaint or other pleading, either as a statement

of a legal cause of action or a legal defense, but is intended

to advise the jury concerning the questions of fact involved,

so as to prepare their minds for the evidence to be heard.

How full it shall be made, within reasonable limits, is left

to the discretion of the attorney, but the only purpose is to

give the jury an idea of the nature of the action and de-

fense. To relate the testimony at length will not be tol-

erated. (1 Thompson on Trials, 267.) A party is entitled

to introduce evidence and prove a cause of action or to de-

fend against evidence tending to sustain a cause of action

if no statement at all is made, and is not confined in the in-

troduction of evidence to the statement made in the opening,

if one is made, The opening statement may be wrong as to

OPENING STATEMENT OF
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and she had another piece of property upon which there
was a mortgage of $ ,800 and he said he would loan her
enough money to take that in. The attorney for the plaintiff objected to the statement relating to other property,
and the attorney for the defendants said that he wanted
to state to the jury that the plaintiff got his money back by
mean of a mortgage upon the other piece of property and
thi one, but the court su tained the objection and an exception was taken to the ruling.
ontinuing, the attorney
stated that the amount ' a $4,283.9 upon which payments
had been made, and that it was agreed that Mrs. Pietsch
should remain in posse sion of the premi es and was entitled to remain there. The court then aid, "I assume you
have stated all of your defense,'' and the attorney replied,
"Yes, sir," whereupon the court instructed the jur. to return a 'erdict finding the defendants guilty of unlawfully
withholding posse ion of the premises and that the right
of posses ion was in the plaintiff. The jury returned a
erdict accordingly, and the court, after overruling a motion for a new trial, entered judgment on the verdict. The
Appellate Court for the Fir t Di trict affirmed the judgment and granted a certificate of importance and an appeal
to this court.
When the jury had been sworn to try the issues and render a erdict according to the evidence it was the privilege
of the attorney for each party, if he saw fit to do so, to
make an opening tatement of what he expected to prove.
Such a statement is not intended to take the place of a declaration, complaint or other pleading, either as a statement
of a legal cau e of action or a legal defense, but is intended
to advise the jury concerning the questions of fact involved,
so as to prepare their minds for the evidence to be heard.
How full it hall be made, within rea onable limits, i left
to the discretion of the attorney, but the only purpose is to
give th jury an idea of the nature of the action and d fen e. To relate the t timon at length will not be tolerated. (1 Thom ·on on Trial 267.) A party i entitled
to introrlu e e' idence and prove a au e of action or to defend again t y·i n t n in · to ustain a cau of a tion
if no tat m nt at all i mad and i not confined in th intro uction of Yid n to the tat ment made in the op nin()'
if on i mad . Th o n1ng tat ment may be wrong a to
T
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some facts, and there is no requirement that it shall give

all the facts of the case, which may turn out to be different

from the statement. The argument that a court may direct

a verdict, not upon the evidence or the want of evidence

but upon the statement of an attorney, rests mainly upon

the power of an attorney to make admissions binding upon

his client and to waive his rights. There is no dispute

about the authority of an attorney to admit facts on the

trial and waive the necessity of introducing evidence as to

such facts, but the authorities cited relate to such admis-

sions in the trial of the case. That the opening statement

to the jury cannot be treated as an admission of facts bind-

ing upon the client was decided in Lush v. Throop, 189 111.

127, where the refusal of an instruction that any statement

made by the attorney for the plaintiffs in his opening state-

ment, about what the evidence would show, was as binding

upon the plaintiffs as if the plaintiffs themselves had made

such statement, and as such should be considered by tht
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jury in making their verdict, was endorsed by this court.

If the jury could not treat statements of an attorney, in his

opening statement, as to what the evidence would show as

admissions of fact binding on the client and consider the

same in making up their verdict, the same rule must neces-

sarily be applied to the court, and it follows that there was

no admission here of the cause of action or that there was

no defense to it. Even if it could be said that the attorney

admitted that the legal title to the lot was in the plaintiff

and the title could not be tried in forcible detainer, there

was no attempt to try the question of title. The title was

not involved and could not be tried or determined, but it did

not necessarily follow that the plaintiff was entitled to the

possession of the property. The law in England is, that a

court cannot take such action as was taken in this case up-

on an opening statement. In Fletcher v. London and

Northivestern Bmlivay Co., G5 Ij. T. Eep. 605, the judge non-

suit od flic plaintiff on the ground that the opening state

ment did not show any cause of action, and it was held that

the ludgo at the trial had no right to non-suit a plaintiff up-

on his counsel's opening statement without the consent of

his counsel. It was pointed out that a suitor might lose

his case because his counsel had omitted or mis-stated some-

thing in the opening, and the course adopted in that case

some facts, and there is no requirement that it shall give
all the facts of the case, which may turn out to be different
from the statement. The argument that a court may direct
a verdict, not upon the evidence or the want of evidence
but upon the statement of an attorney, rests mainly upon
the power of an attorney to make admissions binding upon
bi client and to waive his rights. There is no dispute
about the authority of an attorney to admit facts on the
trial and waive the necessity of introducing evidence as to
such facts, but the authorities cited relate to such admissions in the trial of the case. That the opening statement
to the jury cannot be treated as an admission of facts binding upon the client was decided in Lusk v. Throop, 189 Ill.
127, where the refusal of an instruction that any statement
made by the attorney for the plaintiffs in his opening statement, about what the evidence would show, was as binding:
upon the plaintiffs as if the plaintiffs themselves had made
such statement, and as such should be considered by th~
jury in making their verdict, was endorsed by this court.
If the jury could not treat statements of an attorney, in his
opening statement, as to what the evidence would show as
admis ions of fact binding on the client and consider the
same in making up their verdict, the same rule must necessarily be applied to the court, and it follows that there was
no admi ion here of the cause of action or that there was
no defens to it. Even if it could be said that the attorney
admitted that the legal title to the lot was in the plaintiff
and the title could not be tried in forcible detainer, there
was no att mpt to try the question of title. The title was
not involved and could not be ·tried or determined, but it did
not nee ssarily follow that the plaintiff was entitl d to the
po .. e.. i.on of the property. The law in En()'land is, that a
court <> nnot tak such a tion a. was taken in this case upon an oprnin.cr stat m nt. In Fletcher v. London and
North1 estern Rrri.71r·ay Co., 65 L. T. R. p. 605, the judo-e nonsi1if Nl th0 plaintiff on t11 groun<l t11at the opening statem n cli<l no . how any ca us of a ·tion, and it wa h Jd that
th irnfo;P nt 1lw trial Jrnd no right t non-suit a plaintiff upn hi · c·01m : rl 's oprnino- statemrnt without the cons nt of
hii:; 11n . cl. It was p intc l out that a ui.tor might lose
hi s r, . h rm1 . his <>oun~ l ha<l omittPd or mis-stat 1 something in the p ning, and th ourse adopt d in that caR
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was condemned as most dangerous to the rights of litigants.

The law is the same in Wisconsin. {Fisher v. Fisher, 5

Wis. 472; Hadley v. Western Transit Co., 76 id. 344.) The

same argument was made to the Wisconsin court that is

made here, — that it would be convenient and conduce to the

speedy administration of the law and justice to permit the

court to decide the case upon an opening statement; but

while that was conceded by the court, the practice was con- ;

sidered too dangerous to the rights of clients to be sanc-

tioned. It is undoubtedly true that the method adopted in

this case would be expeditious, and if there were no omis-

sions or defects in the statement, and it was certain that the

evidence would turn out in accordance with it, the court

might be enabled to do justice ; but it would be a still more

expeditious method and equally conduce to the ends of jus-

tice for the court to call up the attorneys and examine them

and decide the case on what they say before calling a jury,

whereby much time, labor and expense would be saved.
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But if parties have a right to a trial by jury of the issues

made by the pleadings, the verdict must rest upon evidence

or want of evidence and not upon opening statements.

The decision chiefly relied upon in support of the ruling

of the court was made in Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeat-

ing Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, but that was a case where the

statement disclosed a contract that was void, as being cor-

rupt in itself and prohibited by morality and public policy.

The Statement was that the plaintiff sued for commissions

on a sale of arms to the Turkish government, of which he

was then consul general at the port of New York, and no

court would entertain any action upon such a contract.

Counsel for appellee is unable to perceive any difference

between stating a corrupt cause of action contrary to pub-

lic policy and good morals and failing to state a good cause

of action or defense, but the difference is quite apparent.

If a cause of action is such as no court would entertain, a

court is bound to raise the question in the interest of due

administration of justice and not for the benefit or in the

interest of either party. Whether a claim of illegality is

made by the pleadings or not, parties cannot compel a court

to adjudicate upon alleged rights growing out of a contract

void as against public policy or in violation of public law.

was condemned as most dangerous to the rights of litigants.
The law is the same in Wisconsin. (Fisher v. Fisher, 5
Wis. 472; Hadley v. vVestern Transit Co., 76 id. 344.) The
same argument wa made to the Wiseon in court that is
made here,-that it would be convenient and conduce to the
speedy administration of the law and justice to pe1mit the
court to decide the case upon an opening statement; but
while that was conceded by the court, the practice was con- •
sidered too dangerous to the rights of clients to be sanctioned. It is undoubtedly true that the method adopted in
this case would be expeditious, and if there were no omissions or defects in the statement, and it was certain that the
evidence would turn out in accordance with it, the court
might be enabled to do justice; but it would be a still more
expeditious method and equally conduce to the ~nds of justice for the court to call up the attorneys and examine them
and decide the case on what they say before calling a jury,
whereby much time, labor and expense would be saved.
But if parties have a right to a trial by jury of the issues
made by the pleadings, the verdict must rest upon evidence
or want of evidence and not upon opening tatements.
The deci ion chiefly relied upon in support of the ruling
of the court was made in Oscanyan v. Winch ester R epeating Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, but that was a ca e where the
statement di clo ed a contract that was void, as being corrupt in it elf and prohibited by morality and public policy.
The Statement was that the plaintiff sued for commissions
on a sale of arm to the Turkish government, of which he
was then consul general at the port of New York, and no
court would entertain any action upon such a contract.
oun 1 for appellee is unable to perceive any difference
tween stating a corrupt cau e of action contrary to publi olicy and good morals and failing to state a good cau e
of action or defen e but the difference is quite apparent.
If a cau e of action i such as no ourt would entertain a
court i bound to rai e the qu tion in the int re t of due
admini tration of ju tice and not for the benefit or in the
inter t of either party. Whether a claim of illeO'ality i,
made by the pleadings or not, parti cannot compel a ourt
to adjudicate upon all
d riO'ht O"rowinO' out of a contract
oid as against public policy or in violation of public law.
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Wright v. Cudahy, 168 111. 86; CricJifield v. Bermudez As-

phalt Paving Co., 174 id. 466.

In this case the defendants had moved for a continuance

for a limited time and nrged as a ground that their remedy

against the action was in equity and that they desired to

proceed in a court of equity, but the continuance was de-

nied and the grounds stated in support of the motion form-

ed no basis for directing the verdict.

The judgments of the Appellate Court and the municipal

court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the muni-

cipal court.

Reversed and remanded.

LINDLEY V. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE

EAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1891,

47 Kansas, 432.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Johnston, J. : D. C. Lindley brought this action against

TVri_qht v. Cudahy, 168 Ill. 86; Crichfield v. Bermudez .Asphalt Paving Co., 174 id. 466.
.
.
In this case the defendants had moved for a contmuance
for a limited time and urged as a ground that their remedy
against the action was in equity and that they desired to
proceed in a court of equity, but the continuance was denied and the grounds stated in support of the motion formed no basis for directing the verdict.
The judgments of the Appellate Court and the municipal
court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the municipal court.
Reversed and remanded.
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the railroad company to recover damages for personal in-

juries alleged to have been sustained while traveling on a

stock train. The first trial of the case resulted in a verdict

in his favor, but proceedings in error were prosecuted, and

the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the

cause remanded for a new trial. (Railroad Company v.

Lindley, 42 Kas. 714.) Wlien the case was called for trial

the second time, a jury was impaneled, after which the plain-

tiff by his counsel stated his case to the jury, and the evi-

LINDLEY V. ATCHISON, TOPEI{A & SANTA FE
RAILROAD COMP ANY.

dence by which he expected to sustain it. He then offered

in evidence a deposition which had been taken, when the

Supreme Court of Kansas.

1891.

defendant objected to the reading of the same, for the rea-

son that the amended petition did not state facts sufficient

to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and

47 Kans as, 432.

agninst tlie defendant, and for the further reason that the

statement made to the jury shows that the plaintiff was

guilty of such contributory negligence as would preclude a

recovery against the defendant. The objection was sus-

The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOHNSTON, J.: D. C. Lindley brought this action against
the railroad company to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained while traveling on a
sto k train. The first trial of the case resulted in a verdict
in his favor, but proceedings in error were prosecuted, and
the jud ment of the di trict court was reversed, and the
ause r mantled for a new trial. (Railroad Company v.
Lindley, 42 Kas. 714.) When the ca e was called for trial
thr, c nd tim , a jury w . impan 1 d, after which the plaintiff y hi oun 1 stat d his case to the jury, and the evid n by which he expe t d to u tain it. He then offered
in vid n e a d po. ition which had be n taken, when the
clef nd nt obj t d t th reading- of the ame, for the reas n th t th am nd d petition did not tate facts sufficient
t c·o .·tit lt a u
f action in favor of the laintiff and
·1.rrc in.·t th
1 f n lant, and for tl e further rea on that the
. tnt mC'nt m, d to th jury hows that the plaintiff was
uuilt. ' f . 1 h
tril 11tm·y n o·Jio- n as would preclude a
r ro r
g in.· t th d f
nt. Th objection was sus-
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tained by the court, and the jury discharged. The plain-

tiff brings the case here upon a transcript of the record,

asking a review and a reversal of the ruling of the district

court.

The first question presented is, whether the court may

dispose of the case upon the statement made by the plain-

tiff in opening his case. Such a statement is a part of the

procedure of the trial. The code provides that, when the

jury is sworn, the plaintiff or party who has the burden

of proof may proceed to state his case to the jury, and the

evidence by which he expects to sustain it. (Civil Code,

§ 275.) If the statements or admissions then made are

such as to absolutely preclude a recovery, it would be use-

less to consume further time or to prolong the trial. The

court is warranted in acting upon the admission of the

parties the same as upon the testimony offered; and, as it

may sustain a demurer to the evidence of the plaintiff and

give judgment against him, it would seem that when he
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stated or admitted facts which were fatal to a recovery the

court might close the case at once. The same question

arose in like manner in Oscanyan v. Arms Company, 103

U. S. 251. Justice Field, who pronounced the judgment of

the court, stated that —

''The power of the court to act in the disposition of a

trial upon facts conceded by counsel is as plain as its power

to act upon the evidence produced. The question in either

case must be whether the facts upon which it is called to in-

struct the jury be clearly established. If a doubt exists

as to the statement of counsel, the court will withhold its

directions, as where the evidence is conflicting, and leave

the matter to the determination of the jury. In the trial

of a cause the admissions of counsel, as to matters to be

proved, are constantly received and acted upon. They may

dispense mth proof of facts for which witnesses would

otherwise be called. They may limit the demand made or

the set-off claimed. Indeed, any fact bearing upon the is-

sues involved, admitted by counsel, may be a ground of the

court's procedure, equally as if established by the clearest

proof. And if, in the progress of a trial, either by such ad-

mission or proof, a fact is developed which must necessari-

ly put an end to the action, the court may, upon its own

motion, or that of counsel, act upon it and close the case."
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tained by the court and the jury di harged. The plaintiff brings the ca here upon a tran. cript of the r cord,,
a king a re iew and a rever al of the ruling of the di tri ~
court.
The first question pre ent d i , whether the court may
dispose of the case upon the tatement made by the plaintiff in opening his case. Such a statement is a part of the
procedure of the trial. The code provides that, when the
jury is sworn, the plaintiff or party who has the burden
of proof may proceed to state his ca e to the jury, and the
evidence by which he expects to su tain it. (Civil ode,
§ 275.) If the statements or admi sion then made are
such as to absolutely preclude a recovery, it would be useless to consume further time or to prolong the trial. Th
court is warranted in a ting upon the admi ion of the
partie the same as upon the testimon offered; and as it
may sustain a demurer to the evidence of the plaintiff and
give judgment again t him, it would seem that when he
stated or admitted fact which were fatal to a recovery the
court might clo e the ca e at once. The same question
arose in like manner in Oscanyan v. Arnis Conipany, 103
U. S. 251. Ju tice Field, who pronounced the judgment of
the court, stated that'' The power of the court to act in the dispo ition of a
trial upon facts conceded by coun el i a plain a it power
to act upon the evidence produced. The que tion in either
case mu t be whether the fact upon which it i called to intruct the jury be clearly e tablished. If a doubt exists
a to the statement of coun. el, the court will withhold its
directions, as where the evidence is conflicting, and leave
the matter to the determination of the jury. In the trial
of a cause the admi . ions of coun el as to matter to be
proved, are constantly received and acted upon. They may
di. pense with proof of fact for which witne e would
otherwi e be called. They may limit the demand made or
the set-off laim d. Indeed an fact bearing upon the i ues invol ed admitted by counsel may be a ground of the
court' procedure equally a if e tabli hed by the leare t
proof. And if, in the pro re s of a trial either by such admi ion or proof, a fa t i d veloped whi h mu t n ce arily put an end to the a tion, the court may upon it own
motion or that of counsel act upon it and close the case."

..72
272 Trial Peactice [Chap. 7

If the statement made to the court and jury by the plain-

tiff showed beyond dispute that the injuries which he re-

ceived were the result of his own negligence, he could not

recover anything from the defendant, and it would have

been idle to have proceeded further with the trial of the

cause. It is contended, it is true, that the statement made

contained no fatal admission or any statements which jus-

tified the action of the court; but, unfortunately for the

plaintiff, the statement is not found in the record. It

might have been preserved by a bill of exceptions or in a

case-made, but neither has been done. There appears to

have been an attempt to make the statement a part of the

record, as there is attached to what purports to be the state-

ment a certificate made by the official stenographer of the

district court. This certificate is unavailing. Such a

statement can only be made a part of the record through a

bill of exceptions settled and signed by the court, and it is

not contended that this has been done. A certificate has
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been made by the judge that the statement appended to the

record is a true and correct transcript of the same; but it

is not the province of the judge to authenticate a transcript

of record. If the court had allowed a bill of exceptions

containing the statement, and made the same a part of the

record, it would have been the province of the clerk, and

not of the judge, to have authenticated a transcript of the

same. It follows that the statement is not before us for

consideration, and therefore the ruling and judgment of the

district court must be affirmed.

All the Justices concurring.

REDDING V. PUGET SOUND IRON & STEEL WORKS.

Supreme Court of Washington. 1905.

36 Washington, 642.

RuDKiN, J. — This was an action brought by the widow

and minor children to recover damages for the death of the

husband and father, caused by the wrongful act of the de-

fendant. After the jury was impaneled to try the cause in

[Chap. 7
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If the statement made to the court and jury by the plaintiff showed beyond dispute that the injuries which he received were the result of his own negligence, he could not
recover anything from the defendant, and it would have
been idle to have proceeded further with the trial of the
cause. It is contended, it is true, that the statement made
contained no fatal admission or any statements which justified the action of the court; but, unfortunately for the
plaintiff, the statement is not found in the record. It
might have been preserved by a bill of exceptions or in a
case-made, but neither has been done. There appears to
have been an attempt to make the statement a part of the
record, as there is attached to what purport.s to be the statement a certificate made by the official stenographer of the
district court. This certificate is unavailing. Such a
statement can only be made a part of the record through a
bill of exceptions settled and signed by the court, and it is
not contended that this has been done. A certificate has
been made by the judge that the statement appended to the
record is a true and correct transcript of the same; but it
is not the province of the judge to authenticate a transcript
of record. If the court bad allowed a bill of exceptions
containing the statement, and made the same a part of the
record, it would have been the province of the clerk, and
not of the judge, to have authenticated a transcript of the
same. It follows that the statement is not before us for
con ideration, and therefore the ruling and judgment of the
district court must be affirmed.
All the Justices concurring.

REDDING V. PUGET SOUND IRON & STEEL WORKS.
Supreme Court of W asliington.
36

Washington,

1905.

642.

R uoKIN, J.- This was an action brought by the widow

an min r hil r n t re over damages for the death of the
hu ·
d an f atb r, aused by the wrongful act of the defendant. After the jury was impaneled to try the cause in
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the court below, the attorney representina^ the plaintiff

made the opening statement of his case to the jury. Upon

this statement the defendant moved the court to withdraw

the case from the consideration of the jury, and to direct

a judgment for the defendant. At the suggestion of the

court, the motion was so amended as to include the plead-

ings, and, as thus amended, the motion was granted, the

jury discharged, and a final judgment entered in favor of

the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

No reason is assigned in support of a judgment on the

pleadings except that the complaint is defective and does

not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The

judgment rendered was a final judgment on the merits, and,

if warranted at all, must find its support in the opening

statement of counsel, and not in some defect in the com-

plaint. The complaint alone, however deficient, would not

justify or sustain a judgment on the merits such as was

rendered by the court below. For this reason we will not
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consider or pass upon the sufficiency of the complaint, as

the same may be amended after the case is remanded. It

is unnecessary to set forth the opening statement of counsel

in full. We deem it sufficient to say that the statement

was most general in its character, and fell far short of

stating facts sufficient to warrant a recovery against the

respondent. Nothing was stated affirmatively, however,

that would constitute a defense to the action or bar a re-

covery. When, then, is a court justified in taking a case

from the jury and directing a judgment on the opening

statement of counsel? That a party to an action is bound

by admissions made by his attorney in the opening state-

ment of his case, or at any stage of the trial, and that the

court may act upon such admissions and direct a judgment

in accordance therewith in a proper case is not disputed or

denied. This is all that was decided in Lindleij v. Atchi-

son etc. B. Co., 47 Kan. 432, 28 Pac. 201, and Johnson v.

Spohane, 29 Wash. 730, 70 Pac. 122. In neither case was

the opening statement upon which the trial court acted

brought before the appellate court. Oscanyan v. Arms Co.,

103 U. S. 261, was an action on contract. It appeared from

the opening statement of counsel that the contract in suit

was against public policy and void, and the supreme court

of the United States held that upon such a statement the

T. p.— 18

the court below, the attorne. representing the plaintiff
made the opening tatement of his case to the jury. Upon
this statement the defendant moved the court to withdraw
the ca e from the con ideration of the jury and to <lirect
a judgment for the defendant. At the suggestion of the
court the motion was so amended as to include the pleadings, and, as thus amended the motion was granted, the
jur. discharged, and a final judgment entered in favor of
the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.
No reason is assigned in support of a judgment on the
pleadings except that the complaint is defective and does
not state facts sufficient to con titute a cau e of action. The
judgment rendered was a final judgment on the merits, and,
if warranted at all, must find its support in the opening
statement of counsel, and not in some defect in the complaint. The complaint alone, however deficient, would not
justify or sustain a judgment on the merits such as was
rendered by the court below. For this rea on we will not
consider or pass upon the sufficiency of the complaint, as
the same may be amended after the case is remanded. It
is unnecessary to set forth the opening statement of counsel
in full. We deem it sufficient to say that the statement
wa mo t general in its character, and fell far short of
stating facts sufficient to warrant a recovery against the
respondent. Nothing was stated affirmatively, however,
that would constitute a defense to the action or bar a recov-er . When, then is a court justified in taking a case
from the jury and directing a judgment on the opening
. tatement of counsel~ That a party to an action is bound
by admissions made by his attorney in the opening statement of his case, or at any stage of the trial, and that the
court may act upon such admissions and direct a judgment
in accordance therewith in a proper case is not disputed or
denied. This i all that was decided in L indley v. Atchi. on etc. R. Co., 47 Kan. 4 2 28 Pac. 201 and Johnson v.
pokane, 29 Wash. 730 70 Pac. 122. In neither case was
t e open.in
tatement upon which the trial court acted
brought before the a1 pellate court. Oscanyan v. Arms Co.
103 U. . 261 wa an action on contract. It appeared from
th opening tatement of ounsel that the contra t in suit
wa. again t rm lie poli :v and void and the upreme court
of the Unite
tate held that upon such a statement the
T. P.-18
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circuit court properly directed a verdict for the defendant.

So, in any case, if it affirmatively appears from the open-

ing statement of counsel that the contract in suit is void, or

if facts are admitted which constitute a full and complete

defense to the action, it would be idle for the court to pro-

ceed further with the trial.

But such is not the case here. Counsel stated too little,

not too much. The court directed a judgment, not because

the appellant was admitted oui of court, but because the

opening statement did not state facts sufficient to consti-

tute a cause of action. Counsel may state their case as

briefly or as generally as they see fit, and it is only when

such statement shows affirmatively that there is no cause

of action, or that there is a full and complete defense there-

to, or when it is expressly admitted that the facts stated

are the only facts which the party expects or intends to

prove, that the court is warranted in acting upon it. The

opening statement now before the court contained no admis-
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sions which would constitute a defense or defeat the action,

and the omission of counsel to state the case more fully

is no justification for the action of the court below in with-

drawing the case from the jury.

The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause re-

manded for new trial.^

Mount, C. J., and Fullerton, Hadley, and Dunbar, JJ.,

concur.

iln Jordan v. Reed, (1908) 77 N. J. L. 584, 71 Atl. 280, it was held that

to authorize a non-suit ' ' the statement of counsel, by its omissions or ad-

missions, must render it clearly evident either that no case can be made out

or that a recovery is precluded. ' '

In Kelly v. Bergen County Gas Co., (1906) 74 N. J. L. 604, 67 Atl. 21, the

court stated that ' ' if objection be made to a statement too meagre to sustain

the plaintiff's case, counsel will, doubtless, be i^ermitted to enlarge his state-

ment."

In Hoffman House v. Foote, (1902) 172 N. Y. 348, 6.5 N. E. 169, the

court said: "The practice of disposing of cases upon the mere opening of

counsel is generally a very unsafe method of deciding controversies, where

there is or ever was anything to decide. It cannot be resorted to in many

cases with justice to the parties, unless counsel stating the case to the jury

circuit court properly directed a verdict for the defendant.
So, in any case, if it affirmatively appears from the opening statement of counsel that the contract in suit is void, or
if facts are admitted which constitute a full and complete
defense to the action, it would be idle for the court to proceed further with the trial.
But su h is not the ca e here. Counsel stated too little,
not too much. The court directed a judgment, not because
the appellant was admitted out of cour t, but because the
opening tatement did not state facts sufficient to constitute a au e of action. Counsel may state their case as
briefly or as generally as they see fit, and it is only when
such statement shows affirmatively that there is no cause
of action, or that there is a full and complet e defense thereto, or when it is expre sly admitted that the facts stated
are the only facts which the party expects or intends to
pro e that the court is warranted in acting upon it. The
pening statement now before the court contained no admision which would constitute a defense or defeat the action,
and the omis ion of counRel to state the case more fully
i no justification for the action of the cour t below in withdrawing the case from the jury.
The judO'ment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for new trial. 1
MouNT, C. J., and FULLERTON, HADLEY, and DUNBAR, J J.,
concur.

deliberately and intentionally states or admits some fact that, in any view

of the case, is fatal to the action."

lln Jordan v. Reed, ( 1908) 77 N. J . L . 584, 71 Atl. 280, it was held tha t
to authorize a non-suit ''the statement of counsel, by its omissions or admi si on , must render it clearly evident either that no case can be ma de out
or that a r covery is precluded.''
In telly v. Bergen ounty Gas o., ( 1906) 74 N. J. L. 604, 67 Atl. 21, the
court , tated that ''if objection be mad to a tatement too meagre to su 'tain
the plaintiff's cas , coun el will, doubt! s, be permitted to enlarge his st a tem nt."
Jn Hoffman House v. Foote, (19 2) 172
. Y. 348, 65 N. E . 169 the
onrt said : ''Tb practi
of (lisposing of a s upon the mere openi~g- of
ouns l is gen rally a very un de method of deciding controver sies, where
th r iR or v r was anything to d cid . It nnnot be r . orted t o in many
ras R with jm;tire to th parti , unl
ouni:: 1 stating the ca t o the jury
d Jili<'r::tt ly anc1 illt ntiomilly stnt s or admits some fact that, in any view
of the cas , is fatal to the action.''

CHAPTER VIII.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.

COBB V. WM. KENEFICK COMPANY.

Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. 1909,

23 Oklahoma, 440.

CHAPTER VIII.

Dunn, J. — This action was begun in the United States

court for the Western District of the Indian Territory, at

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.

Muskogee, by the Wm. Kenefick Company, defendant in

error, against S. S. Cobb, City National Bank of Wagoner.

Ind. T., First National Bank of Wagoner, Ind. T., W. B.

COBB V. WM. KENEFICK COMP ANY.

Kane, and J. W. Wallace, to enforce payment of two notes

given by S. S. Cobb to the said company to cover a sub-

Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

1909.

scription made by him to secure the construction of a rail-

road to the city of Wagoner under the terms and conditions

as shown by the pleadings. A demurrer to the liability

23 Oklahonia, 440.

charged against the other parties named who signed the

notes was sustained by the court, from which no appea]

was prosecuted. Hence they are eliminated from the case,

and we have but to deal with the controversy existing be-
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tween the appellant Cobb and the appellee. On the filing

of the amended answer, plaintiff filed a motion for judg-

ment on the pleadings, which was sustained by the court,

from which appeal was prosecuted to the United States

Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory, and the case now

comes to us for review by virtue of our succession to that

court.

**********

As a preliminary question, counsel for appellant in their

brief contend that such a motion as was filed by appellee,

for judgment on the pleadings, is unknown to our Code.

While this is, strictly speaking, true, yet the practice is well

established by the procedure adopted in the courts and

meets nearly, if not quiffe, uniform approval. Black on

Judgments, vol. 1, sec. 15 ; Ency. Pleading & Practice, vol.

275

D NN, J.-Thi action was begun in the United States
court for the We tern District of the Indian Territory, at
Mu kogee, by the Wm. Kenefick Company, defendant in
rror, against S. S. Cobb, ity National Bank of Wagoner,
Ind. T., Fir t National Bank of Wagoner, Ind. T., W. B.
Kane, and J. W. Wallace, to enforc~ payment of two notes
gi·ven by S. S. Cobb to the aid company to cover a subcription made by him to secure the con truction of a railroad to the city of Wagoner under the terms and conditions
as shown by the pleadings. A demurrer to the liability
charged against the other parties named who signed the
notes was sustained by the court, from whi h no appeaJ
was prosecuted. Hence they are eliminated from the case,
and we have but to deal with the controvers existing between the appellant Cobb and the app llee. On the filin()'
of the amended an wer plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was sustained by the court,
from which appeal was prosecuted to the United State
Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory and the case now
comes to us for review by virtue of our succession to that
court.

* * * * * * * * * *
As a preliminary question, counsel for appellant in their
brief contend that uch a motion as wa filed by appell e,
for judgment on the pleading , i unknown to our ode.
While tbi i , tri tl p eaking, true, yet the practice is w 11
establi bed by the procedure adopted in the courts and
meets nearly, if not qui~~, uniform approYal. Black on
Judgments, vol. 1, sec. 15; Ency. Pleading & Practice, vol.

275
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11, pp. 1044, 104:5; Hutchis 071 v. Myers, 52 Kan. 290, 34 Pac.

742.

In the case of Hutchinson v. Myers, supra, Justice Johns-

ton in the consideration thereof, speaking of the motion for

judgment on the pleadings, has this to say :

"Complaint is next made of the action of the court in

entertaining a motion for judgment upon the pleadings, and

in allowing judgment against Hutchison without testimony.

The motion for judgment on the pleadings was equivalent

to a demurrer to Hutchison's answer, and is a common and

permissible practice. If the averments of the petition were

sufficient, and the answer did not allege a defense, and no

amendment was asked for or allowed, plaintiff was certain-

ly entitled to a judgment."

The general rule is stated in 23 Cyc. 769, as follows :

"This is a form of judgment not infrequently used in

practice under the reformed Codes of Procedure. It is

rendered on motion of plaintiff, when -the answer admits or
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leaves undenied all the material facts stated in the com-

plaint; but such a judgment cannot be given where the

pleadings of defendant set up a substantial and issuable

defense or where the suit is for unliquidated damages and

the answer states matters in mitigation."

And, say the authorities, in the consideration thereof,

"the pleadings objected to as insufficient Avill be liberally

construed, and the motion will be denied, where there is any

reasonable doubt as to their insufficiency." 11 Ency. of

Pleading & Practice, 1047; McAllister v. Welker, 39 Minn.

535, 41 N. W. 107 ; Kelley v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146 ; Giles

Lithographic S Liberty Printing Company v. Recaniier

Manufacturing Company, 14 Daly (N. Y.), 475. In the

case of Malone et al. v. Minnesota Stone Company, 36

Minn. 325, 31 N. W. 170, the court in the syllabus says:

"Upon such motion every reasonable intendment is in

favor of the sufficiency of the pleading objected to."

Now with this rule, requiring, as we have seen, the liberal

construction of the answer filed in the case, the question

arises: Does the complaint and the answer, taken together,

considering those portions of the former admitted or un-

denied, in conjunction with the averments of the answer,

leave the case in such a situation and present such a state-

ment of facts as will justify an affirmance of this judg-

TRIAL PRACTICE
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11 pp. 1044, 1045; Hittchison v. My er , 52 Kan. 290, 34 Pac.

742.
In the case of Hutchinson v. Myers, supra, Justice Johnston in the consideration thereof, speaking of the motion for
judgment on the pleadings, bas this to say:
''Complaint is next made of the acti~n of the court in.
entertaining a motion for judgment upon the pleadings, and
in allowing judgment against Hutchison without testimony.
The motion for judgment on the pleadings was equivalent
to a demurrer to Hutchison's answer, and is a common and
permissible practice. If the averments of the petition were
ufficient, and the answer did not allege a defense, and no
amendment was asked for or allowed, plaintiff was certainly entitled to a judgment.''
The general rule is stated in 23 Cyc. 769, as follows:
"This is a form of judgment not infrequently used in
I ractice under the reformed Codes of Procedure. It is
r end r ed on motion of plaintiff, when .the answer admits or
1 aves undenied all the material facts stated in the complaint; but such a judgment cannot be given where th e
pleadino-s of defendant set up a substantial and issuable
defen se or where the suit is for unliquidated damages and
the an wer states matters in mitigation."
And, say the authorities, in the consideration thereof,
' the pleadings objected to as insufficient will be liberally
n tru d, and the motion will be denied, where there is any
r a nabl doubt as to their insufficiency.'' 11 Ency. of
1 ading & Practice, 1047; McA lli ter v . W elk er, 39 Minn.
535, 41 N. W. 107; K elley v . Rogers, 21 1\1inn. 146; Giles
£ithographic & L ibe rty Printing Co m pany v. Recamier
.Jlanufa turing Conipany, 14 Daly (N. Y.), 475. In the
(·~.
f JJ1alone et al. v. Minn esota Stone Company, 36
. finn . 32"', 1 N. W. 170, th court in the syllabus says:
' pon . lJ.rh motion v ry reasonable intendment is in
f ~n r of th suffi i ncy of the pleadino- objected to."
.. ow with th i. r ul , r quiring, as we have een, the lib ral
r·on ·trurti n of the answer fil d in the ca , the que tion
, ri . : o . tJ1 om laint and the an w r, tak n to ther,
l"'on. id ring tho
p r tj on. of the form r a mitt d or unrlPnj rl in onjunrtion with th averm nt
f the answer,
I , v th r . in surh a . itu ation and pr s nt su h a statePn t f fact a. will ju. tify an affirmance of this judg-
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ment! This question will necessitate an analysis of the

pleadings filed, to the end that we may ascertain the precise

facts shown thereby. If the complaint states a cause of ac-

tion which is undenied by the answer, and there is no new

matter pleaded in the answer under the rule above noticed,

sufficient to deny plaintiff the right to the relief demanded,

then the judgment should be sustained ; otherwise it should

be reversed.

HOOVER V. HORN.

Supreme Court of Colorado. 1909.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

277

ment. Thi que tion will necessitate an analysis of the
pleadings filed, o the end that we ma a certain the precise
facts hown thereby. If the complaint states a cau e of action which is undenied by the an wer, and there is no new
matter pleaded in the answer under the rule above noticed,
sufficient to deny plaintiff the right to the relief demanded,
then the judgment hould be sustained; otherwise it should
be reversed.

* * * * * * * * * *

45 Colorado, 288.

Chief Justice Steele delivered the opinion of the court :

The district court of Boulder County rendered judgment

in favor of S. T. Horn and against Hoover and Keables, the

defendants, upon a certain promissory note executed by

Hoover and Keables and one Gearhart, dated August 4,

1904, and payable two months after date, to the order of

Horn. The judgment was rendered on the pleadings.

HOOVER V. HORN.
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The defendants' answer, aside from denials which were

bad, one as being a negative pregnant, and the other as

Supreme Court of Colorado.

stating a legal conclusion, shows an attempt to plead two

1909.

inconsistent defenses :

First, that the plaintiff, Horn, had, at the time the note

45 Colorado, 288.

sued on became due, a valid chattel mortgage upon proper-

ty of the said Gearhart, of the value of five or six hundred

dollars, and that he made no attempt to realize on such

property; and,

Second, that, for the purpose of inducing the defendants

to sign the said note with Gearhart, the said Horn falsely

and fraudulently pretended to them that he had a good

and valid chattel mortgage upon property of the said Gear-

hart, of the value of five or six hundred dollars ; whereas,

in truth and in fact, as the said Horn well knew, all the

property originally covered by the chattel mortgage had,

at that time, been removed from the county of Boulder by

J usTICE STEELE delivered the opinion of the court:
The district court of Boulder County rendered judgment
in favor of S. T. Horn and again t Hoover and Keables, the
defendants, upon a certain promissory note executed by
Hoover and Keable and 011e Gearhart, dated August 4,
1904, and payable two months after date, to the order of
H.orn. The judgment was rendered on the pleadings.
The defendants' answer, a ide from de11ials which were
bad, one as being a n egative pregnant, and the other as
stating a legal conclusion, shows an attempt to plead two
inconsistent defenses:
First, that the lai11tiff, Horn, had, at the time the note
sued on be ame due, a valid chattel mortgage upon propert. of the said Gearhart, of the value of five or six hundred
dollars, and that he made no attempt to realize on such
property; and,
Second, that, for the urpose of inducing the defendants
to sign the said note with Gearhart, the aid Horn falsely
and fraudulently pr tended to them that he had a good
and alid chattel mortgao·e upon property of the said Gearhart, of the 'alue of five or six hundred dollars; whereas,
in truth and in fact, as the said Horn well knew, all the
propert originally covered by the chattel mortgao-e had,
at that time, been removed from the county of Boulder by
CHIEF
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the said Gearhart, and sold and disposed of; that the de-

fendants believed said representations to be true, and were

induced thereby to sign the said note as sureties for the

said Gearhart, in consideration of an extension of two

months, by Horn to Gearhart, of the term of said chattel

mortgage.

The rule adopted by this court with reference to judg-

ment ujDon the pleadings is thus stated in the case of Mills

et al. V. Hart, 24 Colo. 505, wherein Mr. Justice Gabbert

states: ''As a general proposition, a motion for judgment

on the pleadings, based on the facts thereby established,

cannot be sustained, except where, under such facts, a judg-

ment different from that pronounced could not be rendered ;

notwithstanding any evidence which might be produced

{Rice V. Bush, 16 Colo. 484) ; or that such a motion cannot

be sustained, unless, under the admitted facts, the moving

party is entitled to judgment, without regard to what the

findings might be on the facts upon w^hich issue is joined;
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so that, in determining the rights of the defendants to the

judgment given them, the real question to determine is, the

sufficiency of the admitted facts to warrant the judgment

rendered, and the materiality of those on which issue was

joined." And, quoting from 9 Col. App. 211, Judge Gab-

bert further states : ''A motion for judgment on the plead

ings cannot prevail, unless, on the facts thereby established,

the court, as a matter of law, can pronounce a judgment on

the merits; that is, determine the rights of the parties \

the subject matter of the controversy, and render a judg-

ment in relation thereto which is final between the parties,

Such a motion cannot, under the guise of a motion for

judgment on the pleadings, be substituted for some other

plea."

Upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings inconsis-

tent defenses cannot be regarded as vitiating one anothei ,

but if any good defense is stated in the answer, it must be

considered as true. The answer states that the owner of

the note represented to these defendants that he held a

flialtel mortgage which was a first lien upon certain prop-

erty of Gearhart, and that the property was of the value of

five or six lumdred dollars. The answer further alleges

that llicy, believing these representations, agreed to be-

coiiic, and did become, sureties n])on the note of Gearhart.
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the said Gearhart, and sold and disposed of; that the defendants believed aid repre entations to be true, and were
induced thereby to ign the said note as sur eties for the
aid Gearhart, in consideration of an exten sion of two
month , by Horn to Gearhart, of the term of said chattel
mortgage.
The rule adopted by this court with reference to judgment upon the pleadings is thus stated in t he case of Mills
et al. v. Hart, 24 Colo. 505, wherein l'v1r. Justice Gabbert
tates: ''As a general proposition, a motion for judgment
on the pleading., ba. ed on the facts thereby established,
cannot be sustained, except where, under such f a cts, a judgment different from that pronounced could not be rendered;
notwithstanding any evidence which might be produced
(Rice v. Bush, 16 Colo. 484) ; or that such a motion cannot
be su tained, unless, under the admitted facts , the moving
party is entitled to judgment, without regard to what the
findings might be on the facts upon which issue is joined;
o that, in determining the rights of the defendants to the
judgment given them, the real question t o determine is, the
sufficiency of the admitted facts to warrant the judgment
rend red, and the materiality of tho e on which issue was
join d. '' And, quoting from 9 Col. A pp. 211, Judge Gabbert further states: ''A motion for judgment on the plead
in()" cannot prevail, unless, on the facts thereby established,
the court, as a matter of law, can pronounce a judgment 01 1
th merits; that is, determine the right s of the parties i
th ubj ct matt r of the controversy, and render a judgm nt in relation thereto which is final between the parties.
~ u h a motion cannot, under the gui e of a motion for
jud
nt on the pleadin()" , b substituted f or some other
pl a."
n a motion for judo-ment on the pleading inconsi. f n. .
nnot b r O"arded as vitiating one anoth J .
hut if' a n. · o
f n.· i , tat d in th an wer , it mu t b .
r n.·i l rP l a. tru . Th a . w r tat s that th owner of
th e n t r l r s nt 1 t th
d f ndant that h held a
d1<1lt <•l mo rt ga,()'
hi. h ~n1. a fir. t li n up n rtain p ropr ~; of 1 · ~ rh a rt anr1 th <t tl1 nr l') rty wa f th valu of
fi vf' ()}' . i . l111n<lr0<l rl )lla r.'. Th nn. w T furth r a ll o· .
1lia t 11 1".' lJPli <'Y in g 1.l H'~P r pr : nt, tion. , gr d to bec·1 llH' <1 11 l l i l lJ , ·1 lll l', ·urc ti s 11p n tl1 n t
f
a rb a rt.
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The answer further states that, at the time the said mort-

gage was given, all of the property mentioned therein had

been removed from the county of Boulder, where the prop-

erty was supposed to have been situated, and had been sold

by said Gearhart, and that the plaintiff knew of such facts.

These matters are perhaps not properly pleaded, and a

motion to strike the answer because it contained but one

defense and that defense contained several contradictory

and inconsistent statements, might properly have been

granted; but it was improper to grant a motion for judg-

ment upon the pleadings. If the defendants were induced

to become the sureties of Gearhart upon the statement of

the holder of the mortgage that he had a valid first lien

upon the property, when in truth and in fact there was no

property of the mortgagor in that county upon which he

had a lien, it deprived these sureties of the right to pay off

the mortgage and become subrogated to the rights of the

mortgagee.
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The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Mk. Justice Gabbekt and Mr. Justice Hill, concur.

STERNBERG V. LEVY.

Supreme Court of Missouri, 1901.

159 Missouri, 617,

Marshall, j * * * *

It is claimed that the motion for judgment on the plead-

ings is a demurrer, and hence is part of the record proper,

and therefore no motion for new trial or bill of exceptions

was necessary, but that the court will review the judgment

upon the record, so constituted.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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The an wer further states that, at the time the said mortgage was given, all of the property mentioned therein bad
been removed from the county of Boulder, where the property was upposed to have been ituated, and had been sold
by said Gearhart, and that the plaintiff knew of such facts.
These matters are perhaps not properly pleaded, and a
motion to strike the answer because it contained but one
defense and that defense contained several contradictory
and inconsistent statements, might properly have been
granted; but it was improper to grant a motion for judgment upon the pleadings. If the defendants were induced
to become the suretie of Gearhart upon the statement of
the holder of the mortgage that he had a valid first lien
upon the property, when in truth and in fact there was no
property of the mortgagor in that county upon which be
had a lien, it depri ed these sureties of the right to pay off
the mortgage and become subrogated to the rights of the
mortgagee.
The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JusTICE GABBERT and MR. JusTICE HILL, concur.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is not a demur-

rer. It partakes of some of the qualities of a demurrer

but it is not a demurrer, and hence it is not a part of the

record. It is a matter of exception and can only be made

a ])art of the record by a bill of exceptions.

It partakes of the nature of a demurrer, in that, it ad-

STERNBERG V. LEVY.
'Supreme Court of Missouri.

1901.

159 Missoitri, 617.

M RSHALL, J. * * * *
It i claimed that th motion for judgment on the pleadin is a demurrer, and h nee is part of the record proper
< nd therefore no motion for new trial or bill of exceptions
was nece ar! but that the court will review the judgment
upon the record so con titut d.
A motion for jud m nt on the pleading i not a demurrer. It partake of ome of the qualitie of a demurrer
hut it j not a de urr r and hence it is not a part of the
r rd. It is a matt r of :x
tion a d an onl. be made
a art of the r ord y a bill f x
tion .
It partakes of the nature of a demurrer, in that, it ad-
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mits all facts that are well pleaded, and if it is overruled

the order overruling it is not a final judgment from which

an appeal will lie, but the party may plead over or proceed

to trial on the issues joined. On the contrary, if it is sus-

tained, judgment goes at once, whereas if a demurrer is

sustained the order is not a final judgment, the party has

a right to plead over, and it is only in case of refusal to

plead over that final judgment can be rendered on demur-

rer.

There is no motion for judgment on the pleadings con-

tained in this record. The bill of exceptions filed does not

call for any such motion, and therefore there is no such
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question ojDen to review in this case.

mits all facts that are well pleaded, and if it is overruled
the order overruling it is not a final judgment from which
an appeal will lie, but the party may plead over or proceed
to trial on the i sues joined. On the contrary, if it is sustained, judgment goes at once, whereas if a demurrer is
ustained the order is not a final judgment, the party has
a right to plead over, and it is only in case of refusal to
plead over that final judgment can be rendered on demurrer.
There i no motion for judgment on the pleadings contained in this record. Tb e bill of exceptions filed does not
call for any such motion, and therefore there is no sucl1
question open to review in this case.

• • • * • * * * • •

CHAPTER IX.

DEMURRER TO THE EVIDENCE.

COPELAND V. NEW ENGLAND INSURANCE COM-

PANY.

CHAPTER IX.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1839.

22 Pickering, 135.

This was assumpsit on a policy of insurance, whereby

the . defendants insured the sum of $2,500 on the brig

DEMURRER TO THE EVIDENCE.

Adams, at and from Wilmington to Jamaica and at and

from thence to her port of discharge in the United [States.

It was alleged, that the vessel was totally lost upon a coral

reef near the Isle of Pines, w^hile on her voyage from Ja-

COPELAl~D

V. NEW ENGLAND INSURANCE COMP A.NY.

maica to Wilmington.

Plea, the general issue.

The plaintiffs, in order to maintain the issue on their

Supreme J udicial Coiirt of Massachitsetts.

1839.

part, introduced the policy, the register of the vessel, the

written abandonment of their interest, and the depositions

of three witnesses, which had been taken on behalf of the

22 Pickering, 135.

defendants, detailing the circumstances attending the loss
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of the vessel. They also examined a witness viva voce, and

his testimony was reduced to writing. The defendants,

''confessing all said evidence to be true, and admitting

every fact and every conclusion which the evidence thus

given by the plaintiffs conduces to prove," say that the

matters thus shown in evidence are not sufficient in law to

maintain the issue on the part of the plaintiffs, and pray

judgment that the jury m.ay be discharged from giving any

verdict upon such issue, and that the plaintiffs may be

barred from having their action against them. The plain-

tiffs joined in the demurrer.

Morton, J. delivered the opinion of the Court. This is

assumpsit on a policy of insurance on the brig Adams. It

is alleged, that the brig was totally lost upon a coral reef

281

This was assumpsit on a policy of insurance, whereby
the . defendants insured the sum of $2,500 on the brig
Adams, at and from Wilmington to Jamaica and at and
from thence to her port of discharge in the United ~tate ·.
It was alleged, that the vessel wa:s totally lost upon a coral
reef near the Isle of Pines, while on her voyage from J amaica to Wilmington.
Plea, the general issue.
The plaintiffs, in order to maintain the i sue on their
part, introduced the policy, the r egister of the vessel, the
written abandonment of their intere t, and the depo itions
of three witne ses, which had been taken on behalf of the
defendants detailing the circumstances attending the loss
of the vessel. They al o examined a witne s viva voceJ and
his testimony wa r duced to writing. The defendants,
"confessing all said evidence to be true, and admitting
every fact and every conclu i.on which the evidence thu
given by the plaintiffs conduces to prove," say that the
matter thus shown in evid nee are not sufficient in law to
maintain the i ue on the part of the plaintiffs and pra
judgment that the jury may be discharged from giving any
verdict upon uch i. ue and that the plaintiff may be
barred from haYi · th ir action against them. The plaintiffs joined in the emurrer.
MoRTON, J. d liv re th opinion of the Court. This i
as ump it on a polic~ · of in. urance on the bri Adam . It
is alleged, that the brig wa totally lost upon a coral reef
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near the Isle of Pines on the coast of Cuba. The admis-

sions of the parties reduced the case to the simple question,

whether the loss was caused by any of the perils insured

against. To prove the affirmative the plaintiffs introduced

the testimony of four witnesses, and here submitted their

case. The defendants believing this evidence to be insuf-

ficient to support the action, demurred to it. The plaintiff

joined in the demurrer; and the case has been argued upon

the evidence thus brought before us.

This mode of trial is very unusual in this State. No

case of the kind has happened since the commencement of

our Eeports ; and it is believed that very few instances oc-

curred before that time. But however unusual the resort

to this mode of trial may be, it cannot be questioned, that

the legal right to demur to evidence exists, under proper

regulations and restrictions. However, as its purpose

seems to be, to withdraw facts from the tribunal specially

provided for their determination, it is no favorite of our
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system. And when the hazard and disadvantages which it

imposes upon the party demurring, are duly considered,

and the few cases to which it may properly apply are re-

collected, there will be no danger of its coming into common

practice.

There are undoubtedly cases, though they are rare, in

which a demurrer to evidence may be safely and properly

taken. Where all the evidence in a case, consists of writ-

ten instruments, and these are introduced by the party

having the affirmative, his opponent may safely demur to

the evidence, and be sure thereby to bring the merits of his

case before the court. As it would be the province of the

court to determine the construction and legal operation of

the instruments, they would have, by the concession of

the parties, all the materials necessary to enable them to de-

termine the legal rights of the parties in the action. The

facts being thus before them they, in applying the law to

thorn, are in the exercise of their appropriate duty.

P'Ut a demurrer is not confined to written evidence.

Wlioro witnesses positively testify to certain definite facts,

and there is no discrepancy between them, and no other evi-

denco to be offered, a demurrer will properly bring these

facts before the court, and enable them to judge whether

near the Isle of Pines on the coast of Cuba. The admissions of the parties reduced the case to the simple question,
whether the loss was caused by any of the perils insured
against. To prove the affirmative the plaintiffs introduced
the testimony of four witnesses, and here submitted their
case. The defendants believing this evidence to be insufficient t o support the action, demurred to it. The plaintiff
joined in the demurrer; and the case has been ar gued upon
the evidence thus brought before us.
This mode of trial is very unusual in this State. No
case of the kind has happened since the commencement of
our Reports; and it is believed that very few ins tances occurred before that time. But however unusual the resort
to this mode of trial may be, it cannot be questioned, that
the legal right to demur to evidence exists, under proper
regulations and restrictions. However, as its purp ose
seems to be, to withdraw facts from the tribunal specially
provided for their determination, it is no favorite of our
system. And when the hazard and disadvantages which it
imposes upon the party demurring, are duly considered,
and the few cases to which it may properly apply are recollected, there will be no danger of its coming into common
practice.
There are undoubtedly cases, though they are rare, in
which a demurrer to evidence may be safely and properly
taken. Where all the evidence in a case, consists of written in truments, and these are introduced by the party
having the affirmative, his opponent may safely demur. to
the eviden e, and be sure thereby to bring the merits of his
ca b fore the court. As it would be the province of the
urt to d termine the construction and legal operation of
th in trum nt , they would have, by the conces ion of
th parti , all the mat rial neces ary to enable them to <let rmjn th legal rjght of the parties in the action. The
fad. h ing thus b for them they, in applying the law to
th m r in th x r ise of their appropriate duty.
>llt
d mnrrer is not confin d to written evidence.
WJ1 •re \vi tn . . . positiv ly t stify to certain definite f a ts,
an l 01 ·r i. n di . r p n y b tw n them, and no other evi<1 •nr· to h ff r d, a d murr r will properly bring these
f ·t.
fore the court, and enable them t o judge whether
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the will ustain the action or defen whi h the are introduced to u port.
But it not infr quentl. happen that the laintiff or
party having the affirmative, attempt to ur port the is ue
on his part b indirect and circum tantial vi nee. And
when the position are to be e tabli hed by inf rences from
many other facts, it is difficult, if not impracticable, to admit a demurrer.
It may be well here to con ider the effect of a demurrer
to evidence. And we shall do it with the more care because we apprehend, that it was not duly con idered or perfectly understood by the coun el on either side. It eern.
to have been suppo ed to be an admi ion of tbe trnth of
the evidence· and the Court have been called upon suppo ing it all to be true to determine what inferences may be
drawn from it, and whether it would be competent for the
jury upon it to find a 'erdict for the plaintiff . And it
ha been argu ed, that if we would set a ide a verdict found
for the plaintiff on this evidence, we mu t r nder judgment for tbe defendants on the demurrer.
But we think thi is a mi taken view of the subject and
fail to give to the demurrer its legal effect. It leaves it
to the court to draw inferences from the circum tances
proved and to judge of the weight of the evidence; which
vould be trenching upon the province of the jury. The
f'ffect of a demurrer to evidence i not only to admit the
truth of the eYiclence, but the exi tence of all the fact
which are stated in that evidence or which it conduces to
prove. Hence that mo~t acute and learned pleader, Mr
Ju tice Gould says, that this demurrer, ''though called a
demurrer to e idence, is e entially a demurr r to the facts
shown in evidence." Gould on Pleading. 47 48 49. As
a demurrer to a declaration a ks the opinion of the court
upon the facts properly pleaded, so a demurrer to evi<l n e a ks their opinion UJ n the fa ct hown in evidence.
In both ca e the deci. ion is purely a matter of law and
annot invoke any qu . ti n of fact on the evidence.
The true que tion alwav- raised by thi. kind of demurrer
j , . not
hat it i com1 etent fo' the jury to find but what
the evidence t nd to proy . Thi. vi w i fully u tained
hy a mo8t rlflar an<l lnhorate o inion gi'
. the very
learned Lord hi f Ju ti e Eyre in pronouncing the judgT

they will sustain the action or defence wliich they are in-

troduced to support.

But it not infrequently happens, that the plaintiff or

party having the affirmative, attempts to support the issue

on his part by indirect and circumstantial evidence. And

when the positions are to be established by inferences from

many other facts, it is difficult, if not impracticable, to ad-

mit a demurrer.

It may be well here to consider the effect of a demurrer

to evidence. And we shall do it with the more care, be-

cause we apprehend, that it was not duly considered or per-

fectly understood by the counsel on either side. It seems

to have been supposed to be an admission of the truth of

the evidence ; and the Court have been called upon, suppos-

ing it all to be true, to determine what inferences may be

drawn from it, and whether it would be competent for the

jury upon it to find a verdict for the plaintiffs. And it

has been argued, that if we would set aside a verdict found
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for the plaintiffs on this evidence, we must render judg-

ment for the defendants, on the demurrer.

But we think this is a mistaken view of the subject and

fails .to give to the demurrer its legal effect. It leaves it

to the court to draw inferences from the circumstances

proved and to judge of the weight of the evidence; which

would be trenching upon the province of the jury. The

offect of a demurrer to evidence, is not only to admit the

truth of the evidence, but the existence of all the facts

which are stated in that evidence or which it conduces to

prove. ITence that most acute and learned pleader, Mr

Justice Gould, says, that this demurrer, 'though called a

demurrer to evidence, is essentiallv a demurrer to the facts

slioivn in evidence." Gould on Pleading. 47, 48, 49. As

a demurrer to a declaration asks the opinion of the court

upon the facts properly pleaded, so a demurrer to evi-

dence asks their opinion upon the facts shown in evidence.

In both cases the decision is purely a matter of law, and

cannot involve any questions of fact on the evidence.

The true question alwaA's raised by this kind of demurrer

is, not what it is competent for the jury to find, but what

the evidence tendfi to prove. This view is fully sustained

by a most clear and elaborate opinion given by the very

learned Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in pronouncing the judg-
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ment of the House of Lords in the case of Gibson v. Hunter,

2 H. Blackstone, 187. This case contains a most lucid and

able discussion of the whole subject. He says, the precise

operation of a demurrer to evidence is, to take from the

jury and refer to the judges the application of the law to

the fact. In the nature of things the facts are first to be

ascertained. Wliere the evidence is written or, if in parol,

is positive, definite and certain, the party offering the evi-

dence is bound to join in demurrer. But the reason of the

rule ''does not apply to parol evidence which is loose and

indeterminate, which may be urged with more or less ef-

fect to a jury; and least of all will it apply to evidence of

circumstances, which evidence is meant to operate beyond

the proof of the existence of those circumstances, and to

conduce to the proof of the existence of other facts. And

yet if there be no demurrer in such cases, there will be no

consistency in the doctrine of demurrers to evidence, by

which the application of the law to the fact on an issue is
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meant to be withdrawn from a jury and transferred to

the judges. If the party who demurs, will admit the evi-

dence of the fact, the evidence of which fact is loose and in-

determinate, or in the case of circumstantial evidence, if he

will admit the existence of the fact, which the circumstances

offered in evidence conduce to prove, there will then be no

more variance, in this parol evidence, than in a matter in

writing, and the reasons for compelling the party who of-

fers the evidence to join in demurrer, will then apply, and

the doctrine of demurrers to evidence will be uniform and

consistent." See also Mid diet on v. BaJcer, Cro. Eliz. 753.

This doctrine seems to be foimded upon and well sup-

ported by the case of Wright v. Pindar, reported in Style,

34, and also in Aleyn, ig, * * * *

The same principles are recognized by the Supreme

Court of the United States, in Young v. Black, 7 Cranch,

5G5. Mr. Justice Story, in giving the judgment of the

court, says, '* the party demurring is bound to admit as

tine not only all the facts proved by the evidence intro-

dnood by the other party, but also all the facts which that

evidence may legally conduce to prove."

In this case, Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, 11

Whcaton, 320, the learned judge says, ''It is no part of the

[Chap. 9

ment of the I-Iouse of Lords in the case of Gibson v. Hunter ,
~ H. Blackstone, 187. This case contains a most lucid and
able discus sion of the whole subject. He says, the precise
operation of a demurrer to evidence is, to take from the
jury and refer +o the judges the application of the law to
the fact. In the nature of things the facts are first to be
a certained. Where the evidence is written or, if in parol,
is positive, definite and certain, the party offering the evidence is bound to join in demurrer. But the reason of the
rule ''does not apply to parol evidence which is loose and
indeterminate, which may be urged with more or less effect to a jury; and least of all will it apply to evidence of
circumstances, which evidence is meant to operate beyond
the proof of the existence of those circumstances, and to
conduce to the proof of the existence of other fa cts. And
yet if there be no demurrer in such cases, there will be no
con istency in the doctrine of demurrers to evidence, by
which the application of the law to the fact on an issue is
meant to be withdrawn from a jury and transferred to
the judges. If the party who demurs, will admit the evidence of the fact, the evidence of which fact is loose and indeterminate, or in the case of circumstantial evidence, if he
will admit the existence of the fact, which the circumsta11ces
offer d in evidence conduce to prove, there will then be no
more variance, in this parol evidence, than in a matter in
writing, and the reasons for compelling the party who offer the evidence to join in demurrer, will then apply, and
t.h do trine of d murrers to evidence will be uniform and
,.. nsi. tent." See al o lliiddlefon v. Baker, Oro. Eliz. 753.
Thi do trin seem to be found ed upon and well suprt d hy th as of Wright V. Pindar, reported in Style,
. 4, ancl a1s i AJ yn, 18. * * * *
Th . am prin iple are recognized by the Supreme
flonrt of th Unit d tates, in Young v. Black, 7 Cranch,
5o5. Mr. Ju, tire Story, in givin()' the judgm nt of the
<'our , . ays '' th party demurrinO' is bound to admit as
11 ur not only all the facts proved by th
vid nre introclllN·rl by th oth r party, but a] o all the facts which that
i 1 n<'
a. lro-a ll y <'on once to prov . ''

* * • * • * • * • •

Tn 1his <'nsr Powle v . Common Coitncil of Alexandria. 11
\ h: t n, .)20, the 1 ar d judge says, "It is no part of the
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object" of a demurrer to evidence '' to bring before the

court an investigation of the facts in dispute, or to weUjh

the force of testimony, or the presumptions arising from

the evidence. That is the proper province of the jury.

The true and proper object of such a demurrer is to refer

to the court the law arising from the facts. It supposes,

therefore, the facts to be already ascertained and admitted,

and that nothing remains but for the court to apply the

law to those facts."

Judge Gould expresses the same doctrine in a little dif-

ferent language. He says, § 47, *'The object of a demurrer

is to bring in question on the record, the relevancy of the

evidence on one side, and to make the question of its relev-

ancy, the sole point on which the issue in fact is to be de-

termined. ' ' He adds, § 51, " that evidence is always relev-

ant to any issue it conduces in any degree to prove. And

as its relevancy is the only point of which the court can

judge, it follows, that it can never be safe for a party to
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demur to evidence which is clearly relevant to the whole

issue, viz. which clearly conduces in any degree to prove the

whole affirmative side of the issue."

The result of these authorities is, that a demurrer to evi-

dence admits not only all the facts directly stated in it, but

also all the facts which the evidence in any degree tends to

prove.

Where the evidence consists of written documents or of

direct and positive testimony of witnesses, there can be no

difficulty in demurring to it and of raising the question of

law on the facts. But where the evidence is circum-

stantial or uncertain, leaving much to inference and pre-

sumption, it is not easy or safe to frame a demurrer upon

it, or a rejoinder thereto. It will not be sufficient to demur

to the evidence generally and leave the court to ascertain

what it tends to prove, or what inferences may be drawn

from it. But in reciting the evidenc-e, in the demurrer, the

party demurring must state distinctly the facts which the

evidence tends to prove, and which he thereby admits, that

the court may readily perceive the facts upon which they

are to decide.

Judge Gould, adopting the language of Lord Chief Jus-

tice Eyre, says, "Where the evidence is circumstantial, the

party demurring must distinctly admit upon the record
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object" of a demurrer to evidence " to bring before the
court an in' e tigation of the facts in dispute, or to wei.rJh
the force of testimony, or the pre umptions arising from
the evidence. That is the proper province of the jury.
The true and proper object of uch a demurrer is to refer
to the court the law ari ing from the facts. It supposes,
therefore, the facts to be already a certained and admitted,
and that nothing remains but for the court to apply the
law to those facts.''
Judge Gould expresses the same doctrine in a little differ nt language. He ay , § 47, "The object of a demurrer
is to bring in question on the record, the relevancy of the
evidence on one side, and to make the question of its relevancy, the sole point on which the issue in fact is to be determined." He adds, § 51, "that evidence is always relevant to any is ue it conduces in any degree to prove. And
as its relevancy is the only point of which the court can
judge, it follow , that it can never be safe for a party to
demur to evidence which i clearl_r rele ·ant to the whole
issue, viz. which clearly conduces in any degree to prove the
whole affirmative side of the issue."
The result of these authorities is that a demurrer to evidence admits not only all the facts directly stated in it but
also all the facts which the evidence in any degree tends to
prove.
Where the evidence consists of written documents or of
direct and positive te timony of witnesses, there can be no
difficulty in demurring to it and of raising the question of
law on the facts.
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are to decide.
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,,. r fact and every conclusion, in favor of the opposite
1 rty which the evidence conduces to prove ; otherwise he
1 · n t bound to join in the demurrer, because without such
a mi ion the weight as well as the relevancy of the evinc would be ref rred to the court.''
nd :11r. Ju tice Story, in the case before cited, uses this
1 ngua e : "No art; can in ist upon the others joining in
th demurrer, without distinctly admitting, upon the recrd every fact and every conclusion, which the evidence
nduc s to prove.'' This is exactly the doctrine of Gibon v . Hunter.
ow in the ca e at bar, the defendants demur generally
Yid nee, which is circumstantial, loose and indetert
minat . And o far from reciting the facts and conclui n whi h th vidence tends to prove, and which they int n t admit, they r fer generally to all the evidence as it
xi t in the form of deposition , consisting of a great vari ty f interrogatories and cross interrogatories, and the
an w r to th m which are neither direct and positive nor
n i t nt.
Thi we think to be clearly irregular.
To
u t again th languao-e of J ud <Ye Story, ''The defendants
ha
urr d, not to facts but to evidence of facts, not to
1mi . ion l nt to m r circum tances of presumption.''
The vid nee offered in thi case tends to show, and unu t dl. oe how, that the brig insured, in a squall,
(n ta v r o e to be sure,) ran upon: a coral reef and was
t t lly lo t. This proof, by itself, clearly would support
tlJ i l intiff ' action. But the defendants contend that
tli t · ·tim ny f th same witn
es tends to show, that the
V<'
c·l wa.· run on . h r int ntionally or through the gro
irn·apaC'ity of the ma t r.
Now t e e are distinct sub. fanti\· f ·t.
hi h th d f ndants wi h to establish. It
i · t ru th
i n t n s stronO'ly, very strongly, to prove
Put th
f nclant
annot avail themselves of
f
f
on a d murrer to the evidenc .
not how a prima facie case,
f It · d •f ·1Hlnnt.· me. r d
ur. But if th y wi h to set up any
f':il'f . i11 clc f'c·11c· tli '. mn:t r . ort t the jury to have them
,. fnl 1li 11Nl.
'l h cl l .· ition, introdu d by the plaintiff
' •r 1• 1al ·n l . · thr cl ·f nclc ntf:.\, Rncl tlrn. the facts may bo
1 r<· <·11I1 ·'1 i 11 n n orcl r < ncl , f rm mo. t fav rable to th
lnlti·r.
r1 It <lc·rPrnla L t
by 1 murdno·, admit the facts
T

every fact and every conclusion, in favor of the opposite

party, which the evidence conduces to prove ; otherwise he

is not bound to join in the demurrer, because without such

admission the iveight as well as the relevancy of the evi-

dence would be referred to the court."

And Mr. Justice Story, in the case before cited, uses this

language: '*No party can insist upon the others joining in

the demurrer, without distinctly admitting, upon the rec-

ord, every fact and every conclusion, which the evidence

conduces to prove." This is exactly' the doctrine of Gib-

son V. Hunter.

Now in the case at bar, the defendants demur generally

to evidence, which is circumstantial, loose and indeter-

minate. And so far from reciting the facts and conclu-

sions which the evidence tends to prove, and which they in-

tend to admit, they refer generally to all the evidence as it

exists in the form of depositions, consisting of a great va-

riety of interrogatories and cross interrogatories, and the
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answers to them, which are neither direct and positive nor

consistent. This we think to be clearly irregular. To

quote again the language of Judge Story, ' ' The defendants

have demurred, not to facts but to evidence of facts, not to

admissions, but to mere circumstances of presumption."

The evidence offered in this case tends to show, and un-

doubtedly does show, that the brig insured, in a squall,

(not a severe one to be sure,) ran upon a coral reef and was

totally lost. This proof, by itself, clearly would support

the plaintiffs' action. But the defendants contend that

the testimony of the same witnesses tends to show, that the

vessel was run on shore intentionally or through the gross

incapacity of the master. Now these are distinct sub-

stantive facts, which the defendants wish to establish. It

is true the evidence tends strongly, very strongly, to prove

them. But the defendants cannot avail themselves of

these grounds of defence on a demurrer to the evidence.

If llie plaintiff's evidence does not show a prima facie case,

tlie defendants may demur. But if they wish to set up any

facts in defence, they must resort to the jury to have them

estaljlished. Tlie depositions introduced by the plaintiffs

were taken by the defendants, and tlius the facts may bo

prescnlrd in an order and a form most favorable to the

hitter. Tlie defr'Tidants too, by demurring, admit the facts
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which the evidence conduces to prove for the plaintiffs,

and cannot avail themselves of such as it tends to show for

the defendants. The plaintit¥s, by joining in the de-

murrer, did not admit the truth of that part of the testi-

mony which is favorable to the defendants, much less any

inferences which may be drawn from it. If the defend-

ants wish to set up any facts to exonerate or discharge

them, they must look to the jury to establish them. The

Court cannot examine, compare and weigh the different

parts of the evidence. It would be performing a duty

which the law has not imposed upon them, and which they

uniformly refuse to accept from the agreement of the par-

ties themselves.

Without going into a further examination of the evi-

dence, we are fully convinced that the demurrer was not

properly tendered, that the evidence did not present a

proper case for a demurrer, that the plaintiffs ought not

to have joined in it, but to have prayed the judgment of
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the court whether the defendants should be admitted to it.

The Court have an important discretion in allowing or

disallowing demurrers to evidence. Although a demurrer

is a matter of right and the opposite party may be com-

pelled to join in it, when properly presented, yet he should

always be careful to see that it contains the proper admis-

sions before he joins in it. On the whole, we are satisfied,

that the demurrer was tendered and joined without fully

examining and duly considering the nature and effect of

the measure.

And we think, not as Lord Chief Justice Rolle said,

"that both parties have misbehaved themselves," but in

the language of the Supreme Court of the United States,

''that the demurrer has been so incautiously framed, that

there is no manner of certainty in the state of facts upon

which any judgment can be founded. Under such a pre-

dicament, the settled practice, is to award a new trial, upon

the ground that the issue between the parties has not been

tried." This was done in the analogous cases of W right

V. Pindar, and Gibson v. Hynfer, by the PTouse of Lords,

and in Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, bv the

Supreme Court of the United States.

Venire facias de novo awarded.

which the e idence conduce..., to proYe for the plaintiffs,
and cannot avail themselves of such as it tends to show for
the defendants.
The plaintiffs, b joining in the demurrer, did not admit the truth of that part of the testimony which i favorable to the def ndant , much le s any
inferences which may be drawn from it.
If the defendants wish to set up any facts to exonerate or discharge
them, they must look to the jury to e tablish them. The
ourt cannot examine, compare and weigh the different
parts of the evidence.
It would be performing a duty
which the law ha not impo ed upon them, and which they
uniformly refuse to accept from the agre ment of the parties them elves.
Without goin into a further examination of the evince, we are fully conYinced that the demurrer wa not
properly tender d that the evidence did not present a
proper ca e for a demurrer, that the plaintiff ought not
to have joined in it but to have pray d the judgment of
the ourt whether the defendants shoul] be admitted to it.
The ourt have an important di cretion in allowing or
di allowing demurrers to evidence. Although a demurrer
i a matter of ri ·h and the oppo ite part>T ma>T be compelled to join in it when I roperly pre ented yet he hould
always be careful to ee that it contain the proper admi. ions before he joins in it. On the whol , w ar ati fi d,
that the demurrer wa tendered and join d without fully
xamining and duly on idering the nature and effect of
the measure.
And we think, not a Lord hief Ju tice Rolle aid
''that both parties hav mi behaved them el Ye, '' but in
the language of the upreme Court of the U ited tates
"that the demurr r ha been so incautiou ly framed that
there is no manner of certainty in th tat of fact upon
which an~ judrrrn nt can h foun ed. 1 nd r u h a preclicament the s ttl
ractice i to award a n w trial, upon
the ground that th j , u etween th partie ha not heen
tried." This wa d n in the analogoui:: ra . of Wriqht
v. Pindar, and Gib rm "· Hunt er. h> th II TIRP f Lord. ,
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GALVESTON, HARRISBURG & SAN ANTONIO RAIL-

WAY COMPANY V. TEMPLETON.

Supreme Court of Texas. 1894.

87 Texas, 42.

GALVESTON, HARRISBURG & SAN ANTONIO RAILWAY COMPANY V. TEMPLEr.I_,ON.

Brown ; Associate Justice. — Defendant in error, plaintiff

below, brought this suit by petition filed August 1, 1891, in

Supreme Court of Texas. 1894.

the District Court for the Forty-fifth Judicial District of

Bexar county, to recover $15,000 damages, alleged to have

been sustained by him on or about August 20, 1890, at San

87 Te xas, 42.

Antonio, by reason of injuries received, while in the service

of appellant and in the discharge of his duties as switch-

man, in attempting to mount a flat car on which was a de-

fective brake, causing him to be thrown from the car, his

right leg broken, and thereby made much shorter than the

other, and rendering him a cripple for life, unable to per-

form manual labor. From the injury he charges that he

suffered great physical pain and mental anguish.

There was a trial by jury. The plaintiff having closed his
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evidence, the defendant demurred thereto; upon which

plaintiff joined issue, and the court overruled the demurrer

and instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff the actual

damages by him sustained, if any, as the only question left

for their determination. There was a verdict and judgment

in favor of plaintiff for $4,600. Defendant made its motion

for a new trial, which being overruled, it excepted thereto

and in open court gave notice of appeal ; and thereafter per-

fected its appeal by filing a supersedeas bond and an assign-

ment of errors,

Tlie Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the

District Court,

Tliis case is presented to this court upon the following

pr()j)ositions and objections to the judgment of the District

Court and tlie ('ourt of Civil Appeals:

Third. Tliat tlie Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding

that upon overruling the defendant's demurrer to evidence

the court below properly refused to submit the case to the

BROWN; ASSOCIATE J USTICE.-Defendant in error, plaintiff
below brou ·ht thi suit by petition filed August 1, 1891, in
h
i trict ourt for the Forty-fifth Judicial District of
-ar county, to recover $15,000 damages, alleged to have
n . .,u tained by him on or about August 20, 1890, at San
nto i by r ea on of injuries received, while in the service
f a1 p Hant and in the di charge of his duties as switchman in att mr ting to mount a fl at car on which was a def fr'\ e brake, cau ing him to be thrown from the car, his
ri 0 ·ht 1 o· broken, and thereby made much shorter than the
th r, an rendering him a cripple for life, unable to perform manual labor. From the injury he charges that he
uff r d gr at physical pain and mental anguish.
* * * * * * * * * *
h re wa a trial by jury. The plaintiff having closed his
Yi n , the defendant demurred thereto; upon which
laintiff join dis ue, and the court overruled the demurrer
nd instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff the actual
<lama O' s b. hi
ustained, if any, as the only question left
f r th ir d t rmination. There was a verdict and judgment
in fa 'T r f plaintiff for $4,600. Defendant made its motion
f r n n w tri 1, hi h beinO' overruled, it excepted thereto
and in ]> n court o-av notice of appeal; and thereafter perf' ·<·trc1 it: app al y fili g a sup er edeas bond and an a ssignnwnt f •rr r . .
'1'!1 ' Jourt f ivil App als affirmed the judgment of the
1>i . f ric·t (i nr .
'I hi . ·a. 0. is pres t d to this ourt upon the following
p1·c1po. i1 ion ·
d obj ti n. to the jud ment of the District
< ourl ;l]Jd t11C> Court f 1ivH PI al :
'lliinl. 'l'liatili ~ 1 mrt f i ilAprealserr dinholding
1liri1 t1JHH1ovrrr11ling1'1•
nlant' d murrer to evidence
111.: f'f 11rt below pr< l rly r ·fus d to submit the case to the
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jury upon the evidence, to determine whether or not the

EM 'RRER TO THE EVIDENCE.

2 0

jur) upon the evi nee, to determine whether or not the
plaintiff wa entitl d to a erdict.

plaintiff was entitled to a verdict.

The defendant having demurred to the evidence, and the

plaintiff having joined in it, the case was as to the facts and

the right of plaintiff to recover withdrawn from the jury,

and must be decided by the court. Booth v. Cotton, 13

Texas, 362; Tierney v. Frazier, 57 Texas, 443; Thornton v.

Bank, 3 Pet. 40; Ohaugh v. Finn, 4 Ark. 110; 1 Tidd's

Prac. 575.

If the damages claimed by plaintiff were liquidated, the

court might decide the entire case, for in that event there

would be no issue to submit to the jury. But when, as in

this case, the damages claimed are unliquidated that ques-

tion must be submitted to a jury to ascertain the amount.

Ins. Co. V. Lewis, 1 So. Rep. 863; Boyd v. Gilchrist, 15 Ala.

856; Young v. Foster, 7 Port. (Ala.) 420; 1 Tidd's Prac.

575 ; 2 Id. 866.

When a demurrer to evidence has been presented and
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joined in by the opposite party, the court may submit the

case to the jury to ascertain the damages before deciding

upon the demurrer, and hold the verdict subject to decision

on the demurrer. Or if the demurrer be decided before the

jury then empanelled has been discharged, the court may

submit the question of damages to the jurj^ that heard the

evidence. Or the court may, upon presentation of the de-

murrer, discharge the jury, and in case it be overruled em-

panel a new jury to assess the damages. 2 Tidd's Prac.

866; Ins. Co. v. Leivis, 1 So. Rep. 863; Ohaugh v. Finn, 4

Ark. 110; Young v. Foster, 7 Port. (Ala.) 420; Boyd v.

Gilchrist, 15 Ala. 856; Humphreys v. West, 3 Rand. 516.

It is the better practice, we think, to submit the question

of damages to the jury that has heard the evidence, either

before or after decision on the demurrer, by which delay

and cost would be saved for the parties to the action.

Whether it be submitted before or after the decision upon

the demurrer can not be of importance nor work injury to

either party. It was not error to submit the issue as to the

amount of damages to the jury then empanelled, after the

demurrer had been overruled.

Plaintiff in error claims that the court, after overruling

its demurrer to the evidence, should have submitted the case

T. p.— 19

The defendant having demurred to the evidence, and the
plaintiff ha Ying joine in it, the ca e wa a to the fa ts and
the right of plaintiff to recover withdrawn from the jury,
and mu t be decided by the court. Booth . Cotton, l.
'rexas, 362; Tiern ey v. Frazier, 57 Texa , 443; Thornton v.
Bank, 3 Pet. 40; Obaugh v. Finn, 4 Ark. 110; 1 Tidd'
Pra . 575.
If the damage claimed by plaintiff were liquidated, the
court might decide the entire case, for in that event there
would be no i ue to submit to the jury. But when, as in
this case, the damages claimed are unliquidated that que tion must be ubmitted to a jury to a certain the amount.
Ins . Co. v. L ewi , 1 o. Rep. 863; Boyd v. Gilchri t, 15 Ala.
56; Young v. Foster, 7 Port. (Ala.) 420; 1 Tidd 's Prac.
575; 2 Id. 866.
When a demurrer to evidence has been presented and
joined in by the oppo ite party, the court may submit the
case to the jury to ascertain the damages before deciding
upon the demurrer, and hold the verdict ubject to deci ion
on the demurrer. Or if the demurrer be decided before the
jury then empanelled has been di charo·ed, the ourt may
ubmit the que tion of damage to the jur. that heard the
evidence. Or the court may, upon pre entation of the demurrer, di charge the jury, and in ca e it be O\ erruled empanel a new jury to a ess the damage . 2 Tidd 's Prac.
866; Ins. Co. v. L ewis, 1 So. Rep. 863; Obaugh v. Finn, 4
Ark. 110; Young v. Fo ter, 7 Port. (Ala.) 4_0; Boyd v.
Gilchrist, 15 Ala. 56; Humphr eys v. W t, 3 Rand. 516.
It i the tter practice, we think, to ubmit the que tion
of damage to the jury that has heard the evidenc either
before or after deci ion on the demurrer b. T whi h delay
and co t would be aved for the parti
to h action.
Whether it be submitted before or after the d i ion upon
the demurr r can n t be of importance nor work injury to
eith r part. . It wa not error to ubmit th i ue as to th
amount of damaO' s to the jur r then em anelled after the
d murrer had been ov rruled.
Plaintiff in rror laims that the court after overruling
it d murrer to the evidence, hould have submitted the case
T. P.-

9
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to tlie jury on the evidence as to the right of plaintiff to re-

cover. This would be a most extraordinary result of a de-

murrer to evidence. By it defendant would, under that

practice (if it were the practice in any court), withdraw the

case from the jury as to the rights of the plaintiff, and in

case the decision was favorable to the defendant, the plain-

tiff would be deprived of a trial by jury at the election of

the defendant ; but in case the court to which defendant ap-

pealed should decide against it, then it must be allowed that

trial which it sought to avoid by the demurrer. It would

have been error to have done what plaintiff in error claims

tlie court should have done. It would have been contrary to

tlie kiw, against reason, and against the right.

**********

The judgments of the District Court and the Court of

Civil Appeals are affirmed.

Affirined.^

iComparison between Demurrer to Eviaence and Motion for a Directed
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Verdict. In Eberstadt v. State, (1898) 92 Tex. 94, 45 S. W. 1007, the court

said: "The effect of the motion made by the defendants to instruct the jury to

find for them has practically the same effect as a demurrer to the evidence in

calling for the opinion of the court on the legal sufficiency of the proof, but

it does not have the effect to withdraw the case from the jury. If a motion

be overruled the trial must proceed as if it had not been made,- and the

RIAL PRACTICE
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th jury on th vi ]en e as to the right of plaintiff to rev r. Thi w uld be a mo t extraordinary result of a ilemurr r to viLl nee. By it defendant would, under that
l ra ·tic if it w re the practice in any court), withdraw the
fr m the jury a to the right of the plaintiff, and in
<·a
th eci ion wa favorable to the defendant, the plainuld be d riY d of a trial by jury at the election of
th
f n ant; but in case the court to which defendant ap1 al d hould d id again t it, then it must be allowed that
tri·:il \\hi h it ought to avoid by the demurrer. It would
lie'" be n error to have done what plaintiff in error claims
th"' urt houl have done. It would have been contrary to
th ]a
arrain t r a on, and again t the right.
• * * * • * * * * *
r h
of the Di trict Court and the Court of
affirmed.
ivil
Affirmed. 1

court can not because the motion has been overruled instruct the jury to find

for the plaintiff upon the ground that the motion admitted the truth of the

evidence adduced. 2 Thomp. on Trials, sec. 2270, p. 1624; Harris v. Woody,

9 Mo. 113. The difference between the demurrer to the evidence and the

motion to instruct a verdict for the defendant is technical, it is true, but it is

Btill a practical difference, in this, that the defendant does not choose to with-

draw his case from the jury and rely upon the testimony already introduced,

but exercises his option of calling for the judgment of the court upon the

strength of the plaintiff's case, with the privilege in case the decision is

against him of proceeding to develop his defense to the plaintiff 's action.

Instead of moving the court to instruct the jury, the defendants might have

presented a written instruction to that effect, and it being refused could have

proceeded to introduce their testimony."

FRITZ V. CLARK.

Supreme Court of Indiana. 1881.

80 Indiana, 591.

Bert, (^.--Tliis action was brought by the appellees

against the appellant to recover sixty-six acres of land in

||()w;ii(] ccHiuty, Indiana. The complaint consisted of three

1 omparison between D em11rrer to JJvia ence and Motion for a Directed
T7 rdict . In Ebersta<lt v. State, (1 9 ) 92 Tex. 94, 45 S. W. 1007, the court
sair1: 'The ff ct of the motion made by the defendants to instruct the jury to
fine! for th m ha practically tbe ame effect as a demurrer to the evidence in
·ailing for th opinion of the comt on the legal sufficiency of the proof, but
it do not have th
ffect to withdraw th e case from the jury. If a motion
\J ov rrnle l the trial mu t proc eel as if it had not been made and the
·ourt can not b cau the motion has been overrnled instruct the jury to find
for tb plaintiff upon the ground that the motion admitted the truth of the
\id nr acl<lncecl. 2 Tbomp. on Trials, sec. 2270, p. 1624; Harris v. Woody,
9 ~Io. 113. Tb tliff rence bet"·e n the lemurrer to the evidence and the
motion to in tru t a \' rtli t for the defendant is technical, it is true, but it is
~till a practical di ff r n , in thi , that th d fendant does not choo e to withdraw his ca · from the jury and rely upon the testimony already introunceLl,
. rri~e. bi option of calling for the judgment of the court u1 on the
hu
tr ngtb of th plaintiff's cas , with the privilege in case the decision is
tt.J.{ainst Lim of JHO<' ding to d v lop hi defen se to the plaintiff' action .
Jn t :111 of moving th court to in i:;truct th jury, th <l f nclants might have
pr nt d a writt n in. tru tion to that effect, and it b incr
refu ed could have
0
JHOCe ·J tl to intro<ln · • th i1· t . timony. ' 1

ITZ V. CLARIC.
Supreme

ourt of Indiana. 1881.
80 Indiana, 591.

Lr RT, r1.

'l l1i: n<'1 io n wa: 1 r ught by the app 11 es
cover sixty- ix acr s of land in
'l1he ·o pl int n. i ted f thr

ar~iJJ.t t11<' app<'ll nt t r
Io\ ·:u u euuu L ', l udi ana.
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paragraphs. * * * An answer of three paragraphs was

then filed. * * * a reply in denial was filed to the second

paragraph of the answer, and the issues thus formed were

submitted to a jury for trial. After the evidence on both

sides had been heard, the appellees demurred to the evi-

dence. The court withdrew the case from the jury, sus-

tained the demurrer to the evidence, and rendered final

judgment thereon for the appellees, to all of which the ap-

pellant duly excepted. A motion for a new trial was also

made and overruled.

Various errors have been assigned in this court. Among

others, it is insisted that the court erred in sustaining the

appellees' demurrer to the evidence; and, as the conclusion

reached by us upon this question is decisive of the case, the

others will not be considered.

The appellant insists that the evidence of a party who

demurs will not be considered upon such demurrer, and in

the absence of the appellees' evidence the demurrer should
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have been overruled.

The question thus raised has not been, so far as we are

informed, decided in this State. * * *

**********

There are many cases in our reports where the defendant

has demurred to the evidence of the plaintiff. The follow-

ing are among them : Lindley v. Kelley, 42 Ind. 294 ; Pin-

nell v. Stringer, 59 Ind. 555 ; FoucJi v. Wilson, 60 Ind. 64 ;

Netvhoiise v. Clark, 60 Ind. 172 ; Indianapolis, etc., R. W. Co.

V. Goar, 62 Ind. 411 ; Miller v. Porter, 71 Ind. 521 ; Ohio, etc.,

R. W. Co. V. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261.

There are some cases where the plaintiff has demurred to

the evidence of the defendant, aside from those mentioned

in the former part of this opinion, but in each of such cases

the burthen of the issue was upon the defendant. The fol-

lowing cases are among them: Strough v. Gear, 48 Ind.

100; Lemmon v. Whitman,!^ Ind. 318.

In none of them, however, was the question here discussed

involved, but all of them proceeded upon the familiar doc-

trine that the evidence of the party who joins in the de-

murrer must determine its sufficiency. Will the evidence of

the party who tenders the demurrer be considered?

In Hart v. Calloway, 2 Bibb, 460, the defendant, after the

evidence on both sides had been admitted, tendered a de-

DEMURRER TO THE EVIDENCE.
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paragraphs. * * * An an wer of three paragra hs was
then filed. * * * A reply in denial was filed to the econd
paragraph of the answer, and the issues thu formed were
submitted to a jury for trial. After the evid nee on botb
sides had been heard, the appellees demurred to the evidence. The court withdrew the case from the jury, sustained the demurrer to the evidence, and rendered final
judgment thereon for the appellees, to all of which the appellant duly excepted. A motion for a new trial was also
made and overruled.
Various errors have been assigned in this court. Among
others, it is insisted that the court erred in sustaining the
appellees' demurrer to the evidence; and, as the conclu ion
reached by us upon this question is decisive of the case, the
others will not be con idered.
The appellant insists that the evidence of a party who
demurs will not be considered upon such demurrer, and in
the absence of the a ppellees' evidence the demurrer should
have been overruled.
The question thus raised has not been, so far as we are
informed, decided in this State. * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
There are many cases in our reports where the defendant
has demurred to the evidence of the plaintiff. The following are among them: Lindley v. Kelley, 42 Ind. 29±; Pin·
nell v. Stringer, 59 Ind. 555; Foitch v. Wilson, 60 Ind. 64;
Newhouse v. Clark, 60 Ind. 172; Indianapolis, etc., R. W . Co.
v. Goar, 62 Ind. 411; Miller v. Porter, 71 Ind. 521; Ohio, etc.,
R. W. Co. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261.
There are some ca es where the plaintiff has demurred to
the evidence of the defendant, aside from those mentioned
in the former part of this opinion, but in each of such ca e
the burthen of the issue was upon the defendant. The following case are among them: Strough v. Gear, 48 Ind.
100; Lemmon v. Tif!hit1nan, 75 Ind. 318.
In none of them, bow ver was the que tion here di cussed
invoh ed, but all of them proceeded upon the familiar doctrine that the evid n e of the party who join in the demurrer mu t det rmin it uffi iency. Will th evid nee of
the part who t nd r th demurrer be n .·i 1 r
In Hart v. Calloi ay, 2 Bibb, 460, the d f ndant, aft r th
evidence on both ides had been ad i tted ten er d a de-

.., .
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murrcr embracing the evidence of both parties, and the

question was whether the plaintiff could be compelled to

join in such demurrer. The court, in speaking of the nature

of a demurrer to the evidence, said: "The demurrant, ac-

cording to the established forjn, alleges that the matter

shewn in evidence by his adversary, is not sufficient in law

to maintain the issue on his part, and that he, the demur-

rant to the matters aforesaid, in form aforesaid shewn in

evidence, hath not any necessity, nor is he obliged by the law

of the land to answer, and concludes with a verification.

* * * The party whose evidence is demurred to, in the

joinder alleges that he hath shewn in evidence to the jury,

sufficient matter to maintain the issue joined on his part,

and for as much as the demurrant doth not deny nor in any

manner answer the said matters, prays judgment. Thus

is the issue joined between the parties, upon the question

whether the matters shewn by the party whose evidence is

demurred to, is sufficient in point of law to maintain the
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issue on his part. To this question the judgment of the

court responds, either in the affirmative, that the matter

shewn in evidence by him is sufficient, or in the negative

that it is not sufficient."

In Woodgate's Aclm'r v. Threlkeld, 3 Bibb. 527, the court

upon a similar demurrer, said: "The defendant could not

by demurring cause his own evidence to be taken for true,

and the court can not, without usurping the province of the

jury, decide upon its truth. In principle, it is not less ab

surd for a party to demur to his own evidence, than it would

be to demur to his own plea; and it is believed that there

is no precedent to be found in the English books for the

former, no more than there is for the latter practice."

In Fowle v. The Common Council of Alexandria, 11

\Vlioat. 320, the court, upon a similar demurrer, where the

f'vidence was circumstantial, said: "Even if the demurrer

could be considered as being exclusively taken to the plaint-

iff's evidence, it ought not to have been allowed without

a distinct admission of the facts which that evidence con-

duced to prove; })ut where the demurrer was so framed as

to h't in tlif defendants' evidence, and thus to rebut what

the otiier .side aimed to estalilish, and to overthrow the pre-

sumptions arising tlierefrom, by counter presumptions, it

was the duty of tlie circuit court to overrule the demurrer,

murr r mbracing the evidence of both parties, and the
qu tion wa whether the plaintiff could be compelled to
join in ucb d murrer. The court, in speaking of the nature
f a murr r to the evidence, said: "The demurrant, acr in · to the e tablished fortn, alleges that the matter
h "-n in 'i en e by bis adver ary, is not sufficient in law
t mai tain the i ue on bi part, and that he, the demurrant t th matter aforesaid, in form aforesaid shewn in
'i l n e hath not any nee s ity, nor is he obliged by the law
of th Ian to answer, and concludes with a verification.
* * :f.· Th
arty who e evidence is demurred to, in the
j in 1 r all O"e that be bath shewn in evidence to the jury,
uffi ien t matter to maintain the issue joined on his part,
ancl f r a much a the demurrant doth not deny nor in any
m a1 n r an w r the aid matter ", prays judgment. Thus
i th i · u joi ed between the parties, upon the question
\\h th r the matter s hewn by the party who se evidence is
l ·mu rr 1 to, i . um ient in point of law to maintain the
i .. n
n hi part. To thi question the judgment of the
f'ou rt r e p nd . , either in the affirmative, that the matter
. 11<·\\-11 in
vid nc by him is sufficient, or in the negative
11 ·lt it i. not . uffi c1ent. ''
n n 'oo dg at e' Adni'r V. Threlkeld, 3 Bibb. 527, the court
H J on 'l : imila r
murrer, aid : ''The defendant could not
by 11 lnmrring u bi own evidence to be taken for true,
an d 11
urt n not, without u ·urping the province of the
jnr.\· l ·i
ui on it truth. In principle, it is not less ab. n rc1 fo r part t ] mur to hi own evidence, than it would
b · o <l r•mur t hi . wn pl a; and it is believed that there
i
no pr'
t t
f und in the English books for the
fo11 11·r no r r than th re i for the latter practice. ''
fl 1 Fr111'1r> v. Th e ornmon Cowicil of Alexandria, 11
\ lir·at. :::.w th
urt, upon a imilar demurrer, wh r the
1 i1l1•n('<• \\ · • ·i rc· u n.· ta ti 1, aid: '' 1 ven if the d murr r
(' ' lid I JI' ·011: id r l .· l <-'in rr x lu. ively tak n to th
Jainti f ' ,·j<J, Tl<'(· i oug ht n i t hav b n allow d without
1 1 i 1'11 ·t :idmi . i 1 of th
f t whi h that vid n e cond1 · d l<1 J rc>v" · llllt \ 11 r th 1 murr r was so fram d as
11 Ii i11 111£' <lPfrn< ant: ' vi<lPn , nd thus to rebut what
tl 1• ,,111 ·r. id1· nirn ·d to •. tuldi . h, n to ov r throw the pre11 q Ii fJTt
:i ri. i n'' 1l H! r ' fr om , y
unt r pr um tions, it
r'
11H· cJu t ' of th ·ircuit · urt to overrule the demurrer,
1
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as incorrect, and untenable in principle. The question

referred by it to the court, was not a question of law, but

of fact."

These cases abundantly show that the evidence of the

as incorrect, and untenable in principle. 1'he question
referred by it to the court, was not a question of law, but
of fact.''

• * * * * * * * * *

demurrant will not be considered upon the demurrer, and,

in the absence of authorities, it would seem impossible to

reach any other conclusion. The demurrant attacks the

evidence of his adversary, and, in the very nature of things,

this attack can not be aided by his own evidence. The suf-

ficiency of the adversary's evidence to support the issue

upon his part is the only question presented by the demur-

rer, and this question must be determined without reference

to the evidence of the demurring party; indeed, such party

does not and can not have any evidence. The evidence of

the adversary is alone involved in the issue raised by the

demurrer. The cases of Thomas v. Ruddell, 66 Ind. 326,

and Baker v. Baker, 69 Ind. 399, so far as they are inconsist-

ent with this opinion, should be overruled.
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As the evidence of the demurring party is not to be con-

sidered, the case stands precisely as though no evidence

was offered by the appellees; and, as the burthen of the

issue was upon them, the demurrer should have been over-

ruled, and judgment rendered for the appellant. Fouch v.

Wilson, 60 Ind. 64.

For these reasons, the judgment should be reversed.

BENNETT V. PERKINS.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1900.

47 West Virginia, 425.

McWhorter, President :

''Fourth. It was error for the court to require defend-

ant to join in plaintiff's demurrer to the evidence," as set

out in the bill of exceptions No. 4; and, fifth, "It was error

to render judgment, on the demurrer to the evidence, for

plaintiff." The contract sued upon here was for the pay-

These cases abundantly how that the evidence of the
demurrant will not be con idered upon the demur rer, and,
in the absence of authoritie , it would seem impo ible to
reach any other conclusion. The demurrant attack the
evidence of bis adversary, and, in the very nature of thing ,
this attack can not be aided by his own evidence. The uf:ficiency of the adversary's evidence to support the i sue
upon hi part is the only que tion pre ented by the demurrer, and this question must be determined without reference
to the evidence of the demurring party; indeed, such party
does not and can not have any evidence. The evidence of
the adversary is alone involved in t}1e i sue raised by the
demurrer. The cases of Thomas v. Ruddell, 66 Ind. 26,
and Baker v. Baker, 69 Ind. 399, so far as they are incon istent with this opinion, should be overruled.
As the evidence of the demurring party is not to be considered, the case stands precisely as though no evidence
was offered by the appellee ; and, as the burthen of the
issue wa upon them, the demurrer should have been overruled, and judgment rendered for the appellant. Fouch v.
Wilson, 60 Ind. 64.
For these reasons, the judgment should be reversed.

BENNETT V. PERKINS.
Suprenie Court of Appeal of West Virginia. 1900.
47
McWHORTER

West Virginia, 425.

Pre ident:

* * * * * * * * * *
''Fourth. It wa error for the court to require d fendant to join in 1 intiff' demnrr r to the evidence," a set
out in the bill of exc ption No. 4; and, fifth, ''It wa error
to render judgment on th demurrer to the evidence for
plaintiff.'' The contract u d upon here was for the pay-
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ment to plaintiff of the sum of three hundred dollars in

case he succeeded in relieving or releasing two certain

tracts of land from the lien of a judgment which endangered

it. If he was wholly successful he was to be paid the

three hundred dollars, with interest, but, in the event he

should fail to release both of said tracts from said lien, and

should relieve from liability the one tract on which said

defendant then lived, then he was to be paid the one-half

of said sum. The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff

to show to the satisfaction of the jury that he had per-

formed his part of the contract, and was entitled to re-

cover the three hundred dollars, or the one-half thereof,

as the case might be. Counsel for plaintiff contend that

either party may demur to the evidence, and cite Insurance

Co. V. Wilson, 29 W. Va. 528, (2 S. E. 888) ; Shmv v. County

Court, 30 W. Va. 488, (4 S. E. 439), and Arnold v. Bunnell,

42 W. Va. 479, (26 S. E. 359) in support of their con-

tention, and this is true, with certain restrictions. 6 Enc,
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PL & Prac. 440, says: "Either party has a right to

demur to the evidence, but the demurrer is only applicable

to the evidence of the party holding the affirmative of the

issue." In Pickel v. Isgrigg, (C. C.) 6 Fed. 676, it is held:

"The evidence of a party upon the affirmative side of an

issue of fact before a jury may be demurred to by the

adverse party under certain conditions ; but the party upon

whom the l)urden of proof of the issue rests is not per-

mitted to demur to the evidence of the other party, for he

cannot be allowed to assume that he has made out his

case." So, in Styles v. Inman, 55 Miss. 469, (Syl., point

8): "A demurrer may 'be taken to the evidence of either

party, plaintiff or defendant, liolding the affirmative of

the issue." While it has not been held, in so many words,

by this Court, that the evidence of the party not having

the burden of proof cannot be demurred to, yet it has so

lield by implication. In Bank v. Evans, 9 W. Va. 373, (Syl.,

point 7): "The defendant ought to be compelled to join

in a demurrer to evidence when the burden of proof is upon

liiiM, uiih'ss the case is clearly against the plaintiff, or the

court (l(jul)ts what facts should be reasonably inferred from

the evidence." What is the plain inference here but that,

if the burden of proof is not upon the defendant, he should

not be recpiired to join in the demurrer. To a jury of his
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m nt to plaintiff of the sum of three hundred dollars in
a e h
uc eeded in relie-ving or releasing two certain
tra t of land from the lien of a judgment which endangered
it. If he was wholly successful he was to be paid the
thr e hundred dollar , with interest, but, in the event he
·houl 1 fail to relea e both of said tracts from said lien, and
houl r Ii \ from liability the one tract on which said
1 f n lant then lived, then he was to be paid the one-half
f ai . um. The burden of proof was upon the plain tiff
h w to the sati faction of the jury that he bad i,erfor
hi part of the contract, and was entitled to ree v r the three hundr d dollar , or the one-half thereof,
a th
a e might be. Conn. el for plaintiff contend that
itb r p rt may demur to the e-vidence, and cite I nsurance
Co . v. lYil on, 29 \V. Va. 528, (2 S. E . 888 ); Sha;iv v. Coirn ty
ourt, 30 W. Va. 488, ( 4 S. E. 439), and Arnold v . Bunnell,
4.., W. Va. 479, (26 S. E . 359) in support of their cont ntion and thi. is true, with certain restrictions. 6 Enc.
1. & Prac. 4-±0, ays :
"Either party has a right to
ur to the evidence, but the demurrer is only applicable
to the evidence of the party holding the affirmative of the
i u . " In Pickel v. I grigg, ( C. C.) 6 Fed. 676, it is held:
''Th 'idence of a I arty upon the affirmative side of an
of fact before a jury may be d~murred to by the
arty und r certain condition. ; but the party upon
wh m th hur lrn of proof of the issu r ts is not permitt 1 t cl ml11· to the vidence of the other party, for he
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to a ume that be has made out his
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in 'tyl v. Inman, 55 Mis . 469 , (Syl., point
clc> urr r may be tak n to the evidence of either
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111 • i .. n . " \ 7 1ii1 it ha . not b n held, in o many words,
hy 111i ' ~ urt 111.: t th
vi nc of the party not having
1h ~ lmrcl
f l r of C'annot b demurred to, yet it has so
lwld 1,~. im1)1if'aLion. In JJank v . Evan. 9 W. Va. 373, (Syl.,
point 7 : ' l IH· clc·f )n l nt ought to b om elled to join
in :1 lc·1m1 rr ·r i <\'id ii
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th bur n of proof is upon
Jiirn, 1111lr·:. tl1 · <':t . P i. el arlv ao- inst th plaintiff or the
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peers the defendant as well as the plaintiff has a right,

under the Constitution of the United States, and of this

State, to submit all questions of fact in issue in actions

at law. Article VII. of the former instrument provides

that: "In suits at common law, when the value in contro-

versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by

jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall

be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States

than according to the rules of the common law;" and our

State Constitution (Article III., § 13) makes the same pro-

vision; and, when a defendant submits his facts in evidence

before a jury impaneled to try the issue made in the case,

and the same tend in any degree, however slight, to contra-

dict plaintiff's evidence, or to prove failure on the part

of plaintiff to comply with his contract, the riglit to have

such evidence weighed and considered by the jury is guar-

anteed to him, and he cannot be deprived of this right by

the court withdrawing the case from the jury, the consti-
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tuted triors of the issues of fact, and itself weigh the evi-

dence, and decide which party succeeds on the issue. If

either party has an absolute right, whether the onus pro-

handi was upon him or not, to demur to the evidence, and

force his adversary to join therein, then the right of trial

by jury is at an end, and that which has ever been held by

the American people as one of their most sacred rights, is

a myth. The rule is that he who affirms a proposition

must maintain it with sufficient evidence. * * * rj'jjg

fifth assignment — that it was error to render judgment for

the plaintiff on the demurrer to the evidence — is, there-

fore, well taken.

It follows that the judgment and the verdict of the jury

should have been set aside, and the plaintiff's action dis-

missed.

Reversed.

DEMURRER TO THE EVIDENC~.

peer the defendant as well as the plaintiff has a right,
under the Constitution of the United States, and of thi
State, to submit all que tions of fact in issue in actions
at law. Article VII. of the former instrument provides
that: "In suits at common law when the value in controver y shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be pre ·er ed, and no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States
than according to the rules of the common law;'' and our
State Constitution (Article III., § 13) makes the ame provision; and, wh n a defendant submit his fact in evidence
before a jury impaneled to try the is ue made in the case,
and the same tend in any degree, howe\ er slight, to contradict plaintiff's evidence, or to prove failure on the part
of plaintiff to compl., with bi contract, the right to have
such evidence weighed and con ·idered by the jury is guaranteed to him, and he cannot be deprived of this right by
the court withdrawing the case from the jury, the constituted triors of the issue of fact, and it elf weigh the evidence, and decide which party succeeds on the issue. If
either party has an ab olute right, whether the onus probandi was upon him or not, to demur to the evidence, and
force his adversary to join therein, then the right of trial
by jury is at an encl, and that which has ever been held by
the American people as one of their most sacred rights, is
a myth. The rule is that he who affirms a propo ition
must maintain it with sufficient evidence. * * *
The
fifth as ignment-that it wa error to render judgment for
the plaintiff on the demurrer to the evidence-is, ther fore, well taken.

* * * * * * * * * *
It follows that the judgment and the verdict of the jury
should have been set aside, and the plaintiff's action i ·missed.
Reversed.
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HOPKINS V. RAILROAD.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee. 1895.

1895.

96 Tennessee, 409.

96 Tennessee, 409.

McAltstee, J. — The only question presented for determi-

nation upon the record is whether the practice of demurring

to the evidence is sanctioned by the Constitution and laws

of this State. The suit was brought by W. D. Hopkins, Ad-

ministrator, to recover damages for the unlawful killing

of his son, W. 0. Hopkins.

The plaintiff's intestate, at the time of his death, was

employed by the railroad company in the capacity of fire-

McALI

TER,

J.-The only question presented for determi-

m tion upon the record is whether the practice of demurring

t the · vidence is sanctioned by the Con titution and law
f thi
tate. The uit wa brought by W. D. Hopkins, Ad-

man upon a locomotive. The gravamen of the action, as

outlined in the declaration, is that the death of the plain-

tiff's intestate was occasioned by the negligence of the en-

gineer in charge of the train. * * *

* * * The record discloses that the deceased, in obedience

to the rules of the company, had voluntarily taken his posi-

tion at the rear brake of the rear car ; that, with knowledge
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of the signals, he gave a danger signal to the engineer, and

the latter, in answer to said signal, immediately shut off

steam, producing a jar in the train which threw the

plaintiff from his position on the car violently to the

ground. This was the proximate cause of the accident.

* * *So that, in any view of the case, upon the plaintiff's

own showing, no liability was made out against the com-

pany. It a]ipears from the record that at the conclusion

of the plaintiff's testimony before the jury, council for de-

fendant company interposed a written demurrer to the

evidence, as follows, towit : ' ' The defendant comes and de-

murs to the evidence of plaintiff, and offers to admit of rec-

ord that the following testimony and proof introduced by

tlie ])laintiff (setting out all the testimony introduced by

plaintiff) is true, and further admits as true all proper and

l«'gal deductions and inferences therefrom in law. The de-

fendant offers to admit, that the facts so stated are the

facts in the case, and were proven entirely by plaintiff and

his witnesses, and does now aver that the facts so stated

present no ground for a recovery against it under the

pleadings in this cause, and this it is ready to verify.

mini tr a tor, to recover damages for the unlawful killing
f hi on, W. 0. Hopkins.
Th I laintiff 's inte tate, at the time of his death, was
m loyed by the railroad company in the capacity of fireman upon a locomotive. The gravamen of the action, as
o tlin d in the declaration, is that the death of the plaintiff' int tate wa occa, ioned by the negligence of the eno-in r in charge of the train. * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
* * * The record di clo es that the de.ceased, jn obedience
t th rul of the ompany, had voluntarily taken his positi n at th rear brake of the rear car; that, with knowledge
f th io·nals, he g:iYe a danger signal to the engineer, and
thP latt r, in an w r to said signal, immediately hut off
.t J
I rodu ino- a jar in the train which threw the
pl ]ntiff from hi poRition on the car violently to th e
groun l. Thi wa the pro . imate cause of the accident.
that, in any vi w of the ca e, upon the plaintiff's
n }10 in°·, no liability was made out against the comp ny. It app ar. from the record that at the conclu ion
of h plai1 tiff's te timony b fore the jury, council for def •JHlant c·ompan inl rpo . d a written demurrer to the
., iclf'nc· c. f l1 w. , t wit: ''The defendant com s and dern nr.·to th "\'id nr of I laintiff, and offers to admit of recorcl 1lwt tl1 f 110 incr t timony and proof introduced by
Uie plaintiff (" ttin~ ut all the te timony introduc d by
plaintiff) i : trn · and furth r admit a tru all proper and
Ir ,rr:tl clN111<'t inn and inf r n
th r fr m in law. The def Pnda 11 t off 'l'.' to n<lmit that th fa t
0 tat d are the
fad . i 11 t lie c·a . P. n ncl w r 1 rov n ntir ly by plaintiff and
Iii. ~;if 111 .. ·:c·s nn<l <lor. now aver that th fact so tated
pr• · rd 111 <•Totmcl for a r0r v ry aO' i t it und r the
}JI ·adi 11•'
i 1J tl1i: c·au · , a d this it is ready to verify.
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Wherefore, defendant prays the Court to allow this de-

murrer, and direct plaintiff to join therein; and judgment

of the Court accordingly ; and that plaintiff may be barred

against having or maintaining his action against it, or

further prosecuting the same.

"East & Fogg,

*'C. D. Porter,

"J. D. B. DeBow,

"Attorneys."

It will be observed that the demurrer in this cause was

in writing, and set out in full the plaintiff's evidence, which

is in accordance with the established practice in such

cases.

Counsel for plaintiff moved to dismiss the demurrer, be-

cause unknown to the forms or practice of the law, and be-

cause insufficient, which motion was by the Court overruled.

Thereupon, plaintiff joined issue upon the demurrer. Up-

on argument of counsel and consideration by the Court the
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demurrer was sustained, and the suit dismissed. Plaintiff

appealed, and has assigned errors.

The first assignment is that the trial Judge erred in al-

lowing defendant to file a demurrer to the evidence, sus-

taining the same, and dismissing the suit. It is insisted

this action of the Court violates Article 1, Section 6 of the

Constitution of the State, which provides that the right

of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, etc. ; and also Arti-

cle 6, Section 9, which ordains: "Judges shall not charge

juries witli respect to matters of fact, but may state the

testimony and declare the law." It may be well to under-

stand at the threshold of this investigation what is meant

by the right of trial by jury as guaranteed by the Consti-

tution. The late Mr. Justice Miller, in his lectures on Con-

stitutional Law, quotes, with approval, the following from

the Encyclopedia Britannica, in its article "Jury," to-wit:

"The essential features of trial by jury, as practiced in

England and countries influenced by English ideas, are the

following : The jury are a body of laymen, selected by lot,

to ascertain, under the guidance of a Judge, the truth in

questions of fact, arising either in a civil litigation or a

criminal process. * * * Their province is strictly limited

to questions of fact, and, within that province, they are

still further restricted to the exclusive consideration of
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Wherefore, defendant prays the Court to allow this demurrer, and direct plaintiff to join therein; and judgment
of the Court accordingly; and that plaintiff may be barred
against having or maintaining his action against it, or
further prosecuting the same.
"East & Fogg,
"C. D. Porter,
'' J. D. B. DeBow,
''Attorneys.''
It will be observed that the demurrer in this cause was
in writing, and set out in full the plaintiff's evidence, which
is in accordance with the established practice in such
cases.
Coun el for plaintiff moved to dismiss the demurrer, because unknown to the forms or practice of the law, and because insufficient, which motion wa by the Court overruled.
Thereupon, plaintiff joined is ue upon the demurrer. Upon argument of coun el and consideration by the Court the
demurrer was sustained, and the suit di mi sed. Plaintiff
appealed, and has assigned errors.
The fir t a signment i that the trial Judge erred in allowing defendant to file a demurrer to the evidence, sustaining the same, and dismissing the suit. It is in iste
this action of the Court violates Article 1, Section 6 of the
Constitution of the State, which provides that the right
of trial by jury shall r emain inviolate, etc.; and also Article 6, Section 9, which ordain : "Judge hall not charge
jurie witb re pect to matters of fact, but may tate the
te timony and declare the law.'' It ma} be well to understand at the threshold of tbi inve tigation what is meant
by the right of trial by jury a guaranteed by the Constitution. Th late Mr. Justice Miller, in bis lectures on Constitutional Law, quotes, with approval, the following from
th Encyclop dia Britannica, in it article "Jury," to-wit:
''The e ential features of trial by jury as practiced in
Eno-land and countrie influenced by Engli h ideas, are th
followin5: The jury are . a bod of la lllen, elected by lot,
to ascertain under the guidance of a Judo-e, the truth in
qu tion of fact, ari ino· itber in a civil litigation or a
riminal proc . * * * Their province i trictly limited
to que tion of fa t and, within that province, they are
still further restricted to the exclusive consideration of

... 9
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matters tliat liavo been proved by evidence in the course of

the trial. They must submit to the direction of the Judge

as to any rule or principal of law that may be applicable

to the case," etc.

Again, Forsyth, in his History of Trial by Jury, pub-

lished in 1852, says: *'The distinctive characteristic of

the system is this, that the jury consists of a body of men

taken from the community at large, summoned to find the

truth of disputed facts. They are to decide upon the effect

of the evidence, and thus to assist the Court to pronounce a

right judgment, but they have nothing to do with the judg-

ment or sentence which follows the verdict. They are not,

like the Judges, members of a class charged with the duty

of judicial inquiry; they are taken from varied pursuits

to make a special inquiry, and return to their ordinary

avocations when this labor is over."

It will be observed that in both of these definitions the

distinctive feature of the jury system is, that it is a trib-
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unal erected for the settlement of variant, contested, and

disputed facts. If the facts upon which the plaintiff re-

lies are uncontroverted and are expressly admitted by the

defendant, together with all legal and reasonable infer-

ences that may be deduced. therefrom, it is difficult to per-

ceive what function is to be performed by the jury in the

settlement of such agreed facts. The province of the jury

is to weigh the evidence, but when there is no disputed

facts in the record, there is nothing to be weighed. It was

upon this idea that the demurrer to the evidence became an

established practice at common law.

"It is defined by the best text writers to be a proceeding

by which the Court in which the action is depending is

called upon to decide what the law is upon the facts shown

in evidence, and it is regarded, in general, as analogous to

a demurrer upon the facts alleged in the pleading. When

a party wishes to withdraw from the jury the application

of tlie law to the facts, he may, by the consent of the Court,

demur in law upon the evidence, the effect of which is to

tak(! from the jury and refer to the Court the application

of tlie law to the facts; and thus the evidence is made a

j)art of the record, and is considered by the Court as in the

rase of a special verdict." Siujdam v. Williamson, 20 How.

4U7 ; Van^tone v. Siillwell Mfg. Co., 142 U. S. 134.
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rn tt r · that haY b en proved by evidence in the course of
the trial. Tb - mu t ubmit to the direction of the Judge
a to an3T rule or principal of law that may be applicable
to the ca e," etc.
O'ain For . yth, in his History of Trial by Jury, publi bed in 1852, says: ''The distinctive characteristic of
the
tern i this, that the jury consists of a bod3 of men
tak n from the community at large, summoned to find the
truth of di puted fact s. They are to decide upon the effect
f the evidence, and thus to assist the Court to pronounce a
rio·ht judO'ment, but they have nothing to do with the judg-ment or entence which follow s the verdict. They are not,
like the Judges, members of a class charged with the duty
of judi ial inquiry; they are taken from varied pursuits
to make a special inquiry, and return to their ordinary
a\ o ations when this labor is over.''
It will be observed that in both of these definitions the
di tinctive feature of the jury system is, that it is a tribunal rected for the settlement of variant, contested, and
di l ut d facts. If the facts upon which the plaintiff reli ar uncontroverted and are expressly admitted by the
f n ant, together with all legal and reasonable infern
tbat may be deduced . therefrom, it is difficult to periY what function is to be performed by the jury in the
ttl m nt of such agreed facts . The province of the jury
i to weigh the evidence, but when there is no disputed
f t in the r cord, there i s nothing to be weighed. It was
u n this idea that the demurrer to the evidence became an
e. t bli h
pra tice at common law.
'' t is d fin d by th b st text writers to be a proceeding
y hi ·h th Court in which the action is depending is
" 11"
I n to d i what the law is upon the facts shown
in •\'id n · ., an it i r O'arded, in O'eneral, as analogou to
a clc·rnun r l on tb fl ts all
d in the pleading. Wben
a party wi.'hc ,' to with raw fr m the jury the application
i1· t Ji • law b lh f t., h may, by the con ent of th Court,
d i' Hill r in Jaw u1 n th . vid nc , the effect of whi b is to
t nh· f n rn th j r y n r f r to th Court the application
''" t 111· law t th f < t ; an tl u the evid nee is made a
}>ilrl CJf t.IH! r 'C·orcl, an i · n."id r d by the ourt a in the
C' il . (•rd' fl ·110<'i; 1 VPnlirt." I uydam v. Williamson, 20 How .
1
.J :. - ; I' crn/) lune v. Still well Mfg. Co., 142 U. S. 134.
)Q'
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''The demurrer not only admits the truth of all the evi-

dence adduced by the party against whose evidence the de-

murrer is directed, but it also admits all the inferences that

may be logically and reasonably drawn from the evidence.

The probative force of the evidence is not confined to the

direct effect of the evidence, but extends to the results rea-

sonably deducible from it by logical and legitimate infer-

ence. * * * i^ follows, therefore, that the facts which

the evidence, directly or indirectly, tends to prove must

be taken as admitted." Elliott's General Practice, Vol. 2,

Sec. 858.

**********

We have seen from the authorities that the only province

of the jury is to settle disputed questions of fact, while the

office of the demurrer to the evidence is to admit the facts

and invoke the application of the law by the Court. Is this

practice in any sense an invasion of the constitutional guar-

anty ''that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,"
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or is it subversive of the other provision "that judges shall

not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may

state the testimony and declare the law?" We do not so

understand it. It is not so understood in other States of

'he Union with similar constitutional provisions.

Says Mr. Elliott : "In some jurisdictions," citing Maine,

"the Courts refuse to recognize the practice of demurring

to the evidence but, as we think, without reason, for the

practice is an ancient and well established one, having a

firm support in principle. It is recognized in most of the

States, and also by the Federal and English Courts." Vol.

2, Sec. 855.

"It is illogical," says the same author, "to assert that

that there is any encroachment upon the province of the

jury where the evidence is conceded to be true, and all legit-

imate and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from

it are admitted, for in such a case there is no disputed

question for the jury to decide. Nor is there any injustice

in entertaining a demurrer, for, if the law is against the

party to whose evidence the demurrer is addressed upon

the evidence and the legitimate inferences that may be

drawn from it, he can by no possibility be rightfully en-

titled to a recovery, and it is the duty of the Court to so

''The demurrer not only admits the truth of all the evidence adduced by the party against whose evidence the demurrer is directed, but it al o admits all the inferences that
may be logically and reasonably drawn from the evidence.
The probative force of the evidence is not confined to the
direct effect of the evidence, but xtends to the re ults reasonably deducible from it by logical and legitimate inference. * * * It follows, therefore, that the facts which
the evidence, directly or indirectly, tends to prove mu t
be taken as admitted.'' Elliott's General Practice, Vol. 2,
Sec. 858.

* * * *

* *

* * * *

We have seen from the authorities that the only province
of the jury is to settle di puted questions of fact, while the
office of the demurrer to the evidence is to admit the facts
and invoke the application of the law by the Court. Is this
practice in any sense an invasion of the constitutional guaranty'' that the right of trial by jury hall remain inviolate,''
or is it subver ive of the other provision "that judg
hall
not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may
. tate the testimony and declare the law~'' We do not so
understand it. It is not so understood in other States of
Lhe Union with similar constitutional provisions.
Says Mr. Elliott: ''In some jurisdictions,'' citing ~1aine,
''the Courts refuse to recognize the practice of demurring
to the evidence but, as we think, without reason, for the
practice is an ancient and well establi hed one, having a
firm support in principle. It is recognized in mo t of the
States, and al o by the F deral and English Courts.'' Vol.
2, Sec. 855.
"It is illogical," says the same author, "to a sert that
that there is any encroachment upon the provin e of the
jury where the evidence is ron d d to be true, and all legitimate and r a onable inferences that may be drawn from
it are admitt d, for in uch a ca e there is no di puted
question for the jur to e id . Nor is there any inju ti e
in entertaining a d murrer, for, if the law i a ·ain t the
party to who
'idence the emurrer i addr ed u1 on
the e id nc and the 1 ·itimate inference that ma! be
drawn from it he an by no po ibility be rio·htfully ntitled to a re overy, and it i the duty of the ourt to so
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adjudge." Elliott's General Practice, Vol. 2, Sec. 858.

It will thus be seen from this review that the demurrer

to the evidence is still preserved in seventeen of the States.

The practice has not been repudiated in the other States

as obnoxious to their Constitutions, but it has been super-

seded by a less cumbersome and more radical procedure,

to- wit, ordering- n -"^n'^nit and <lirecting a verdict.

* * * It will be preceived, moreover, that in every

State of the Union the Judge is allowed to withdraw a case

from the jury whenever there is a destitution of any com-

petent, relevant, and material evidence to support the issue,

and this authority is exercised, either by directing a ver-

dict, sustaining a demurrer to the evidence or enforcing

a compulsory nonsuit, as the practice may prevail in the

particular State. This fact is incontestable, and is abund-

antly shown in the overflow of cases already cited.

But it is argued by counsel for plaintiff in error that,

whatever may be the practice in other States of the Union,
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the adjudications of this Court are against either form of

practice, and necessarily so, since the Constitution of Ten-

nessee not only secures the right of trial by jury, but fur-

ther declares that "Judges shall not charge juries with re-

spect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and

declare the law." As already seen, the first clause in re-

spect of the trial by jury, is found in the Constitution of all

the States in one form or another, but the latter clause is

found in the organic law of only five States. We do not

think the latter clause adds anything to the prohibition con-

tained in the first clause.

It will be found that the practice in the five States whose

Constitutions embody this additional clause sanctions eith-

er the compulsory nonsuit or the right of the Judge to

direct a verdict, in either case confessedly a more radi-

cal procedure than the demurrer to the evidence.

We hold that an ai)iJropriate form for determining

wlieth(!r, as a matter of law, any recovery can be had, or

liability fixed, against the defendant upon facts which are

not disputed la by demurring to the evidence. This form

TRIAL PRACTICE
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a judge.'' Elliott 's General Practice, Vol. 2, Sec. 858.
* * * * * * * * * *
It will thus be se n from this review that the demurrer
t the evidence is still preserved in seventeen of the States.
Th practice ha not been repudiated in the other States
a obnoxiou to their Constitutions, but it has been uperde by a less cumbersome and more radical procedure,
t -wit, ordering . " '"111 «11 it and <lirecting a verdict.
• * * * • * * * • *
• • * It will be preceived, moreover, that in every
tate of the Union the Judge is allowed to withdraw a case
from the jury whenever there is a destitution of any comp tent, relevant, and material evidence to support the issue,
an thi authority is exercised, either by directing a verdict u taining a demurrer to the evidence or enforcing
a ompul or nonsuit, as the practice may prevail in the
articular tate. This fact is incontestable, and is abundantly hown in the overflow of cases already cited.
ut it is argued by counsel for plaintiff in error that,
wh t ver may be the practice in other States of the Union;
the adjudications of this Court are against either form of
practice, and necessarily so, since the Constitution of Tenn
e not only secures the right of trial by jury, but furth r de lar that '' J uclges shall not charge juries with re"'P t to matter of fact, but may state the testimony and
d clar th law." As already seen, the first clause in ret f th trial b r jury, is found in the Constitution of all
h ~ tat in one form or another, but the latter clause is
f uncl i the oro-anic Jaw of only :five State . We do not
think th latter clause add anything to the prohibition contain <1 in th :fir. t lau. e.
* * * * * * * • ~ *
It will b found that th prartice in th :five States who se
n titntion. mho<ly thi additional clause sanction eithr 1h r·orn1rnl .ory non . uit or the rio·ht of the Judge to
di r · a v<·rclid in 'ith T ca
onf s dly a more radical pro<' <'<lur 11it n th cl mur · r to th evidence.
1

1

\ '" ho ld tlrnt an appro1 riate form for d t rminino·
\~' ] H·.11:1 ' r· .n. , nit t.t r of Jmv any r ovcry can be had, or
lrnl 1! 11 . f1.·e d, a 0 ·a11i. ·t tlw <kfendant u on facts which ar
n Jt Ii J>tif <·d i · 1 <l ~murring t the vid n e. Thi form
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of practice is expressly sanctioned by an adjudication of

this Court which has never been overruled, though it may

be conceded that the practice is cumbersome and antiquated.

In the nature of things, it can seldom be successfully in-

voked, for the reason that if, upon any rational or legiti-

mate view of the evidence, a prima facie case is made out,

"or if the testimony be doubtful, or the trend of facts con-

tradictory in themselves, or admit of different interpreta-

tion by fair-minded men," the case must be submitted to

the jury. Moreover, the practice is attended with the dan-

ger that, if unsuccessful, the prevailing party is entitled to

final judgment and an immediate assessment of his dam-

ages. Elliott's General Practice, Vol. 2, Sees. 865-870.

In the present record we are confronted with a perfectly

jDlain case, in which no liability is established against the

defendant upon the facts, or upon any reasonable or legiti-

mate inference that may be made upon such facts. The

law of every case, in whatever form presented, belongs to

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the Court. It is not only the prerogative of the Judge, but

a solemn duty to declare it.

The defendant in this case is entitled to the judgment of

the law, upon the undisputed facts found in the record.

Our duty is imperative, and, being of opinion that in no

\'iew of the facts shown in evidence is any liability made

out against the defendant company, we affirm the judgment

of the Circuit Court.

f practice is expressly sanctioned by an adjudicat j on of
this Court which has never been overruled, though it may
be conced d that the practice is cumbersome and antiquated
In the nature of things, it can seldom be succes full y invoked, for the reason that if, upon any rational or legitimate view of the evidence, a prinia f acie case i mad out,
''or if the te timony be doubtful, or the trend of fact contradictory in themselves, or admit of different interpretation by fair -minded men," the case must be submitted to
the jury. Moreover, the practice is attended with the danger that, if unsuccessful, the prevailing party is entitled to
final judgment and an immediate assessment of his damages. Elliott's General Practice, Vol. 2, Secs. 865-870.
In the pre ent record we are confronted with a perfectly
plain case, in which no liability is established against the
defendant upon the facts, or upon any reasonable or legitimate inference that may be made upon such facts. The
law of every ca e, in whatever form presented, belongs to
the Court. It is not only the prerogative of the Judge, but
a solemn duty to declare it.
The defendant in this case is entitled to the judgment of
the law, upon the undisputed facts found in the record.
Our duty is imperative, and, being of opinion that in no
view of the facts shown in evidence is any liability made
out against the defendant company, we affirm the judgment
of the Circuit Court.

CHAPTER X.

DISMISSAL, NON-SUIT AND DIRECTED VERDICT.

Section 1. Dismissal.

(a) Circumstances under which Plaintiff may Dismiss.

BERTSCHY V. McLEOD.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 1873,

CHAPTER X.

32 Wisconsin, 205.

Appeal from the County Court of Milwaukee County.

This action was brought to recover an alleged unpaid

balance due from the defendant to the plaintiff for a steam

DISMISSAL, NON-SUIT AND DIRECTED VERDICT.

engine and fixtures furnished by the plaintiff to defendant,

SECTION

pursuant to a written agreement between the parties, a copy

1.

DISMISSAL.

of which is inserted in the complaint. The answer contains,

in addition to certain matters pleaded as defenses, two

counter-claims, one of which alleges that the written agree-

(a)

Circunistances under which Plaintiff may Dismiss.

ment does not contain the contract made by the parties and

which they intended to include therein, in that an important

BERTSCHY V. McLEOD.

portion of such contract is omitted therefrom, and prays

that the written agreement be reformed so as to include
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the omitted portion; and the other counter-claim is for

Supreme Court of JiVisconsin.

1873.

damages for the alleged failure of the plaintiff to perform

sucli contract on his part, on account of which the defend-

32 JVisconsin, 205.

ant demands judgment against the plaintiff for a sum ex-

ceeding the demand of the plaintiff.

Tlic ])laintiff replied to such counter-claims, in effect deny-

ing tlie material allegations thereof. After issue was thus

joined in the action, the attorney for the plaintiff entered

a sidebar rule, or order of course, with the clerk of the

court, discontinuing the action on payment of the defend-

ant's taxable costs therein. lie also, on the same day,

served upon the attorneys for the defendant notice of such

proceeding, and an offer to pay the defendant's costs upon

presentation of a taxed bill thereof, and a further offer

302

ppeal from the County Court of Milwaukee County.
Thi action wa brought to recover an alleged unpaid
alance due from tb e defendant to the plaintiff for a steam
n in and fixtures furnished by the plaintiff to defendant,
pur uant to a written agreement between the parties, a copy
of whi h i in ert d in the complaint. The answer contains,
in addition to certain matters pleaded as defenses, two
ounter- laim , one of which alleges that the written agreem nt do not contain the contract made by the parties and
whi b they intend d to include therein, in that an important
rtion of u h contract is omitted therefrom, and prays
that th writt n agr ement be reformed so as to include
th
itt
portion; and the other counter-claim is for
, I
for th all ged failure of the plaintiff to perform
. u ·h (• ntra t on hi l art, on account of which the defendnt ] p m nd ju o·ment ao·ain t the plaintiff for a sum ex•<1in1r th d man of th plaintiff.
rJ Ji J plaintiff r pli d to uch counter-claims, in effect deny<r t l1e
, t )ria1 all 0 ·ation th reof. After issue wa thus
j it1f'd in U1 a ti n, th
ttor y for th laintiff ntered
a . icl c·lrn r r il , r r r f
ur , with the lerk of the
·011 r t di c·nntinuin th a tion on payment of the defend~lTl t . 1a . al>I · <" o:t. · th
in. Ile al o, on th
ame day,
. i·r <·cl 11po 11 Lli · att orn y . for th
f ndant noti e of such
prc><'<·ricli11 r arnl n off rt pay th
f n ant's osts upon
pr,. ·nt nl io n of 't ta · ] l ill t11 r of, an a further offer
4

2
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to appear without formal notice before any taxing officer

for the purpose of having the costs adjusted. The attor-

neys for the defendant immediately notified the plaintiff's

attorney that they should disregard the attempted discon-

tinuance of the action, for the reason that after a counter-

claim had been interposed the action could only be discon-

tinued by leave of court; and they accordingly noticed the

cause for trial, and caused it to be placed on the calendar

for trial at the next term of the court.

Thereupon a motion was made on behalf of the plaintiff,

to strike the cause from the calendar, on the ground that the

same had been discontinued. The court denied the motion,

holding that the cause had not been legally discontinued,

but was still pending. This ajDpeal is from the order deny-

ing such motion.

**********

Lyon, J.

The following propositions must, we think, be conceded :
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1st. At the common law, a plaintiff had the absolute right

to discontinue his action before or after issue joined, and

without leave of court, 2nd. In suits in equity, under the
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to appear without formal notice before any taxing officer
for the purpose of having the co ts adjusted. The attorneys for the defendant i1>tmediately notified the plaintiff's
attorney that they should di regard the attempted di continuance of the action, for the reason that after a counterclaim had been interpo ed the action could only be di continued by leave of court; and they accordingly noticed the
cause for trial, and caused it to be placed on the calendar
for trial at the next term of the court.
Thereupon a motion was made on behalf of the plaintiff,
to strike the cau e from the calendar, on the ground that the
same had been di continued. The court denied the motion,
holding that the cause had not been legally di continued,
but was still pending. This appeal is from the order denying such motion.

* * * * * * * • * *

former practice, the plaintiff might, in like manner, dis-

miss his bill, but such dismissal did not carry with it a

cross bill interposed by the defendant. 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 128

and cases cited. 3d. The right of discontinuance is not

effected by the code, but remains the same, both in legal

and equitable actions, as under the former practice.

By the common law, neither of the counterclaims here

interposed could be pleaded in the action. The one which

demands a reformation of the written agreement could only

be made available by a suit in equity; and the other, which

demands judgment for damages for the alleged violation

of his contract by the plaintiff, in excess of the plaintiff's

demand, could only be enforced by a separate action. Of

course, the subject matter of the latter counter-claim might

be pleaded as a defense to the action, either in whole or in

part; but the defendant could not in that case recover judg-

ment for any excess of damages eustained by him, over and

above the damages sustained by tiie plaintiff. In brief, at

the common law the defendant could only plead such matter

in defense, and could not obtain in the action equitable re-

lief, or recover a judgment for damages against the plain-
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The following propositions mu t, we think, be conceded:
1st. At the common law, a plaintiff had the ab olute right
to di continue hi action before or after i ue joined, and
without leave of court. 2nd. In suits in equity, under the
former practice, the plaintiff might, in like manner, dismiss his bill, but such dismissal did not carry with it a
cross bill interposed by the defendant. 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 128
and ca es cited. 3d. The right of discontinuance is not
effected by the code, but remains the same, both in legal
and equitable actions a under the former practice.
By the common law, neithe·r of the counterclaims here
interposed could be pleaded in the action. The one which
demands a reformation of the written a Tee:tnent could only
l e made available by a uit in equit ; and the other, whi h
emands judgment for damages for the alleged violation
of hi contract by the plaintiff, in exces of the plaintiff'
lemand, could only be enforced by a eparate action. Of
our e the ubject matter of the latt r counter-claim mi()'ht
be pleaded as a defen e to the action, either in whole or in
part; but the defendant could not in that case recover judgm nt for an exce of dama ·e su tained by him over and
above the damages u tai ed by tlle plaintiff. In brief at
the common law the d fendant could only plead u h matter
in defense, and could not obtain in the action equitable relief, or recover a judgment for damages against the plain-
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tiff, as he now may under proper pleadings and proofs.

Waterman on Set-Off, Recoupment, etc., 471; 1 Chitty's

PL, 569; 2 Black. Com. (Cooley's ed.), 305, note 19. Hence,

all there was of the action at the common law was the

cause of action as stated in the declaration, and the defense

pleaded thereto by the defendant; and that was all which

the plaintiff had an absolute right to discontinue. Such

right of discontinuance still remains under the present

practice, and, to the extent above indicated, has been right-

fully exercised in this case by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's

cause of action, and all defenses pleaded thereto which

could have been pleaded as such under the former practice,

have disappeared from the cause by force of the order of

discontinuance.

But we are unable to perceive how it can be held, upon

any logical principle, that such discontinuance necessarily

carried with it those proceedings of the defendant which

the code permits him to institute in the action, or rather to
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engraft upon it, but which are, in substance and effect, ac-

tions brought by the defendant against the plaintiff. Had

these proceedings been under the common law practice, as

already observed, the counter-claims interposed in this ac-

tion would have been asserted in two separate and distinct

actions, one at law and the other in equity, in both of which

the position of the parties would be the reverse of their

position in the present action. In such case, surely the dis-

continuance by the plaintiff of the action brought by him

would not work a discontinuance of such other actions

brought against him. Why should the plaintiff's discontin-

uance of his action lead to that result under the present

practice? The learned counsel for the plaintiff have failed

to answer this question satisfactorily, and we freely con-

fess our ina))ility to do so.

The cases decided by the various courts of New York

upon the sul),jer't of the right of discontinuance under the

cod(! are conflicting, and quite unsatisfactory; and we can

get but little aid from them in determining the question un-

der consideration.

It may be stated, in sui)port of the views above expressed,

that this right or practice of counter-claim is borrowed from

the civil law, where it is designated ''demand in reconven-

tion;" and the Louisiana cases referred to by the learned
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tiff as he now may under proper pleadings and proofs.
Wat rman on Set-Off, Recoupment, etc., 471; 1 Chitty's
Pl. 569;.., Black. Com. (Cooley's ed.), 305, note 19. Hence,
all there wa of the action at the common law was the
au e of action as tated in the declaration, and the defense
pleaded thereto by the defendant; and that was all which
·the plaintiff had an ab olute right to discontinue. Such
rio-ht of discontinuance still remains under the present
pra tice, and, to the extent above indicated, has been rightfully exercised in this case by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's
cau e of action, and all defen es pleaded thereto which
could have been pleaded as such under the former practice,
ha e di appeared from the cause by force of the order of
discontinuance.
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counsel for the defendant clearly show that, by the rules of

the civil law, a discontinuance of the action by the plaintiff

is ineffectual to put a defendant out of court who has inter-

posed a ''demand in reconvention."

If the foregoing views are correct, it necessarily follows

that the discontinuance of his action by the plaintiff left

the issues made by the counter-claims and the reply there-

to, pending in court and for trial, and that the court ruled

correctly in refusing to strike the cause from the calendar.

If application be made for that purpose, the county court

should, under the special circumstances of the case, permit

the plaintiff to vacate the order of discontinuance so en-

tered by him, to the end that the whole controversy between

the parties may be adjudicated in this action.

**********

By the Court. — The order appealed from is affirmed.

CARLETON V. DARCY.

Court of Appeals of Neiu York. 1878.
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75 New York, 375.

FOLGEE, J.

The plaintiff has seen fit to ask the court below for an

order permitting him to discontinue his action, on the pay

ment of costs to the defendants. That court has refused

counsel for the defendant clearly how that, bv the rule of
the civil law, a di continuance of the action by th plaintiff
i ineffectual to put a defendant out of court who ha interposed a "demand in reconvention."
If the foregoing views are correct, it nece arily follow
that the discontinuance of his action by the plaintiff left
the is ue made by the counter-claim and the re1 l thereto, pending in court and for trial, and that the court ruled
correctly in refusing to strike the cause from the calendar.
If application be made for that purpose, the county cour:t
should, under the special circumstances of the case, permit
the plaintiff to vacate the order of discontinuance so entered by him, to the end that the whole controver y betw en
the parties may be adjudicated in this action.
* * * * * * * * * *
By the Court.-The order appealed from is affirmed.

his request, and on appeal from the order he claims that he

has the right, of his own head, to discontinue his action on

those terms. But there is no valid discontinuance of an

action without an order to that end. That order, whether

ex parte or on motion, must be an order of the court, and

as its order, within its control. It is true, as a general rule,

that a plaintiff may, upon the payment of the costs of th(^

CARLETON V. DARCY.

defendant, enter an order of discontinuance of the action,

and give notice thereof, and that the cause will be there-

Court of .Appeals of New York.

by discontinued. Yet the court has always kept and exer-

cised the right to control such an order, as well as any

1878.

other order put upon its records. And where circum-

75 New York, 375.

stances have existed which have made it inequitable that
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The plaintiff has seen fit to ask the court below for an
order permitting him to discontinue his action, on the pay nt of co t to the defendant . That court ha refu ed
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tho e terms. But there i no valid di continuance of an
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e parte or on motion mu t be an order of the court an 1
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the plaintiff should, of his own head and without terms,

discontinue his action, they have refused his motion to do so

altogether, or except on terms; or when he has entered an

order ex parte, have opened it, and made it conform to

what was proper under the circumstances. Thus the or-

der has been refused where a counter-claim had been set

up, against which the statute of limitations would be a bar,

if the suit was discontinued; {Van Alen v. Schermerhorn,

14 How. 287) ; or where the defendants had been examined

as witnesses, unless the plaintiff would stipulate that the

examination might be used in evidence in any action to be

subsequently brought: Cockle v. Underwood, 3 Duer, 676;

see, also, Cooke v. Beach, 25 How. 356.

So that the court, to which the motion for leave to dis-

continue was addressed, had a discretion, under all the

circumstances of the case, whether or not to refuse it.

We do not think that it abused that discretion. The

plaintiff had pursued his action of ejectment against a
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tenant, until the landlord had interposed and been made

a defendant so that he might protect his own rights in the

premises; the plaintiff had recovered judgment in his ac-

tion of ejectment, and had been put in possession of the

lands; the defendant had paid the costs and taken a new

trial under the statute; and then the plaintiff, still in pos-

session, asks leave of discontinue his action. He got the

fruit of his action, the whole fruit of it, the possession of

the premises. By a discontinuance of his action, he would

turn the defendants about to an action of ejectment against

him, and lay on them the burden of showing a valid title,

sufficient to support the action against him. Had he pre-

ferred not only to give up the action, but the substantial

fruits of it which he had got, and to put the defendants, or

either of them, into the possession that he had taken from

them, he might not be required to prosecute an action which

he wislied to end, and to further continue litigation. But

it is quite different when he has got all that his action could

give him, and has put the defendants to the need of that

further litigation which the law allows them, to maintain

what they tliink is tlieir right, for him then to discontinue

his action and throw the burden of the affirmation of

anotlier issue upon the defendants. The court might well

require him to pursue the action that he had commenced,

the plaintiff should, of his own head and without terms,
di continue his action, they have refused his motion to do so
altog th r or except on terms; or whe:J he has entered an
rder ex parte, have opened it, and made it conform to
what wa proper under the circumstances. Thus the or1 r ha be n refu ed where a counter-claim had been set
ur ai:;ain. t which the statute of limitations would be a bar,
if tb uit was discontinued; (V mi A len v. Schermerhorn,
14 ow . . ., 7) ; or where the defendants had been examined
a witn
es, unless the plaintiff would stipulate that the
e ·amination might be u ed in evidence in any action to be
ub quently brought: Cockle v. Underwood, 3 Duer, 676;
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o that the court, to which the motion for leave to disontinue was addres ed, had a discretion, under all the
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until a definite and final result was reached in it, settling

positively the right of possession of the lands in dispute.

We therefore think that the court below, in making the

orders appealed from, did not abuse or exceed their discre-

tion.

The appeal should be dismissed.

All concur.

Appeal dismissed.^

iThe necessity for an order of the court dismissing an action, is some-

times dispensed with by statute. Luse v. Luse, (1909) 144 la. 396, 122 N W

970. '
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until a definite and final re ult was reached in it, settling
positi ely the right of po se ion of the lands in di lJute.
We therefore think that the court below, in making the
orders appealed from, did not abuse or exceed their di cretion.
The appeal should be dismis ed.
All concur.
Appeal di mi sed. 1

(b) Time when Plaintiff may Dismiss.

CARPENTER AND SONS COMPANY V. NEW YORK,

NEW HAVEN, AND HARTFORD RAILROAD

COMPANY.

1 The nece ity for an order of the court dismi sing an action, is sometimes dispen ed with by statute. Lu e v. Lu e, (1909) 144 Ia. 396, 122 N. W.
970.

GORHAM MANUFACTURING COMPANY V. SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1903.

184 Massachusetts, 98.
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LOEING, J.

It has always been a recognized principle of the English

law, on the equity as well as on the common law side of the

court, that a plaintiff is not bound to prosecute a suit or

(b)

Time when Plaint·i ff may Dismiss.

action to a finish because he has begun it. But on the con-

trary he is at liberty to abandon it without losing the right

of action on which it is founded, and he can enforce that

riglit subsequently on paying the costs of the former pro-

ceeding. In this respect a plaintiff is more fortunate than

a defendant who has a day in court to interpose his defence

CARPENTER AND S N COMP ANY V. NEW YORK,
NEW HAVEN, AND HARTFORD RAILROAD
C01\1PANY.

if he would not have final judgment given against him.

What is not so clear is how far the plaintiff's proceeding

GORHAM MANUFACTURING C01\1P ANY V. SAME.

(whether it be a suit in equity or an action on the common

law side of the court) must have gone for it to have readied

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachiisetts.

1903.

the stage where this right of abandonment is lost.

In England the plaintiff originally had a right to abandon

184 A-Iassachusetts, 98.

an action at law and become nonsuit at any time before

J.
It has always been a recognized principle of the Engli h
law, on the equit. a well as on the common law side of th
court, that a plaintiff is not bound to pro ecute a suit or
action to a fini b because be has begun it. But on the contrary he is at liberty to abandon it without lo ing the ri lit
of action on which it i founded, and he can enforce that
rignt sub equently on payino- the co t of the former proceeding. In this re pe t a plaintiff i more fortunate than
a defendant who ha a da. in court to int rpo e bi defence
if he would not have final jud 0 ·ment ·iv n aa-ain t him.
What i not o lear i · how far th lain tiff' pro e in()'
(whether it be a uit in equity or an action on the comm n
law side of the court) mu t have a-one for it to have rea he
the stage where thi rio-bt of abandonm nt i lo t .
In Eno·land the plaintiff ori ·inally had a right to a andon
an action at law and become nonsuit at any time bef re
LORING,

0
308 Teial pEACTicE [Chap. 10

verdict, if not before judgment. Derick v. Taylor, 171

Mass. 444, 445. That it was before verdict and not before

judgment is laid down in OiitJiwaite v. Hudson, 7 Exch.

380, 381; 2 Tidd's Practice, (3d Am. ed.) 867. This rule

was adopted here by an ordinance of the Colony in 1641;

Anc. Chart. 46; and in Locke v. Wood, 16 Mass. 317, it was

contended by Webster and Shaw in 1820 that that was the

rule of practice of the Commonwealth and that the plain-

tiff had a right to become nonsuit at any time before judg-

ment. But the court "were of opinion that there was no

such right; and that, after a cause is opened to the jury,

and begun to be proceeded in before them, the parties are

entitled to a verdict, unless the court should, in its discre-

tion, allow a nonsuit or discontinuance." Since then it has

been held or said to be the rule that a plaintiff can become

nonsuit as of right at any time before the trial has begun

but not afterwards. Means v. Welles, 12 Met. 356, 361;

Loivell V. Merrimack Manuf. Co., 11 Gray, 382; Shaiv v.
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Boland, 15 Gray, 571; Truro v. Atkins, 122 Mass. 418;

Burhank v. Woodward, 124 Mass. 357; Kempton v. Bur-

gess, 136 Mass. 192; Derick v. Taylor, 111 Mass. 444;

Worcester v. Lakeside Manuf. Co., 174 Mass. 299. See also

the previous case of Haskell v. Whitney, 12 Mass. 47.

The reason for denying in this Commonwealth the rule

of the English common law was the injustice done to the

defendant, who was subjected to being harassed a second

time on one and the same cause of action on receiving costs,

which in this Commonwealth are nominal. In that respect

the burden of being subject to a second action is much

greater here than in England, where costs are substantial.

But the common law rule has now been abolished in Eng-

land. By Order XXVI. of the Rules of the Supreme Court,

1883, adopted under the judicature act, it is provided that

"the plaintiff may, at any time before receipt of the de-

fendant's defence, or after the receipt thereof before tak-

ing any other proceeding in the action (save any interlocu-

tory application), by notice in writing" discontinue the

action. Wilson's Practice of the Supreme Court of Judi-

cature, (7tli ed.) 234.

The Massachusetts rule as to when a plaintiff could

])Oconi(! nonsuit in a common law action was established

wlien substanlially, if not absolutely, all such cases were
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Yerdict if not before judgment. D erick v. Taylor, 171
~fas . 444, 445. That it was before verdict and not before
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tried to a jury. No question could arise as to what the

rule was when applied to cases tried by the court, as so

many cases are now tried since Sts, 1874, c. 248, sec. 1;

1875, c. 212, sec. 1 ; 1894, c. 357, now R. L. c. 173, sec. 56,

directing all cases to be tried by the court unless a trial

by jury is claimed by one of the parties. Until the case is

opened the right to become nonsuit exists.

A question did arise as to the application of the rule in

case of a preliminary trial before commissioners in case

of a petition to recover compensation for property taken

under the right of eminent domain. It was held that when

the hearing before the commissioners was begun the right

to become nonsuit was lost. Worcester v. Lakeside Mamif.

Co., 174 Mass. 299.

The case as bar presents the question whether the right

is lost when a hearing before an auditor has been finished

but before the auditor's report is filed.

Were the question now before us a question of first im-
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pression depending entirely on the advantages and disad-

vantages to the plaintiff and the defendant respectively, it

is by no means clear that it ought not to be held to be too

late for a plaintiff to become nonsuit when an order had

been made sending the case to an auditor. A hearing be-

fore an auditor is not now, as it was, a preliminary investi-

gation of complicated accounts and nothing more. The

rule laid down in W-kitivell v. Willard, 1 Met. 216, was al-

tered by St. 1856, c. 202, now R. L. c. 165, sec. 55. Although

this rule was altered so long ago, it was not until lately that

the practice as to what cases should be sent to an auditor

was changed. It has become the practice now, however,

(owing to the overcrowding of the dockets), to send to

auditors cases involving a long investigation, no matter

what the kind of investigation may be. The result is that

an auditor's hearing is now a different thing from wliat it

was. Not onlv that, but this change has been recognized

by the Legislature. St. 1900, c. 418, (R. L. c. 165, sec. 59;

c. 173, sec. 81), provides that the court may set a day for

the "trial" before the auditor, and upon such order being

made the trial shall proceed from day to day until it is

concluded; that the actual engagement of counsel in a

hearing before an auditor shall be an excuse in another

Dr
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tried to a jury. N qu tion could arise as to what th
rule was when applied to ca e. tried b. the court, a Bo
many ca e are now tri d since St . 187±, c. 24 , ec. 1 ·
1 75, . 212, c. 1; 189± c. 57, now R. L . c. 173, ec. 56,
directing all ca
to be tried by the court unle a trial
by jury is clai ed by one of the parties. Until the ca e is
opened the right to become non uit exi t .
A que tion did ari e a to the application of the rule in
rase of a preliminary trial b fore commissioner in ca e
of a petition to recover compensation for property taken
under the right of eminent domain. It was held that when
the hearing before the commi ·i oner was be un the right
to become non uit was lo t. W orce ter v. Lake ide Manitf.
Co., 174 Ma s. 299.
The case a bar pre ent the que tion whether the right
is lost when a hearing before an auditor has been finished
but before the auditor' report is filed .

* * • • • • * • * *
Were the qu tion now before us a question of first impre ion depending entirely on the advantage and di advantage to the plaintiff and the def ndant re poctively, it
is by no mean clear that it ought not to be h ld to be too
late for a plaintiff to become nonsuit when an order had
been made sending tbe ca e to an auditor. A h aring b fore an auditor i not now, a it wa , a preliminary investigation of om1 li ate account. and nothing more. The
rule laid down in H ·hit well v. Willard, 1 l\Iet. 21 , was altered by St. 1856, c. _o:.., now R. L . c. 165, ec. 55. Although
this rul wa aJter d o long ago, it was not until lately that
the practic a to what ca e hould be ent to an auditor
wa
hano· d. It ha become the practi e now, however,
(owing to the ov rcrowding of the docket ) , to send tu
auditors a e invoking a Ion()' in e ti ation, no matter
what the kind of inve tio·ation may be. The r ult i that
an auditor's h arinc; i now a ifferent thing fr m what it
wa .
ot only that, hut thi hange has been recognized
b. the L o·i lature.
t. 1!100, c. 41 , (R. L. c. 16-, ec. 59;
~. 1"'3, e . 1), provi
that the court may t a day for
the ''trial'' befor the auditor, and upon su ch order bein
mad the trial hall proceed from day to day until it i
con lu ed; that the actual n ·a()' m nt of oun el in a
hearing efpre an auditor hall be an excuse in another
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cause as if he were engaged in court, and each party is re-

quired to proceed before the auditor at the time appointed

and "to produce in good faith, the testimony relied upon

by him."

But in spite of the character which auditor's hearings

have now assumed, it is still true that such hearings result

in evidence merely and cannot result in an adjudication;

and we are of opinion that a hearing which results in evi-

dence and cannot per se result in an adjudication is not a

trial within the rule which has now been laid down for over

eighty years, namely, that a plaintiff can become nonsuit

at any time before the trial begins and not afterward.

Moreover this seems to have been assumed by the Legis-

lature in this very statute, St. 1900, c. 418 (R. L. c. 165, sec.

59, and c. 173, sec. 81.) It is there provided that if the

plaintiff does not comply with the provisions of the act

and attend before the auditor, or if he refuses in good faith

to put in the testimony relied on by him, the court is author-
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ized to direct him to become nonsuit. In making that pro-

vision it is assumed that the court has no power to enter

judgment for the defendant at that stage of the proceeding.

Under these circumstances, we do not feel at liberty to

dispose of the question on its merits. If, under the prac-

tice which now oJ^tains, the rule, which we feel we are

bound by, does injustice to defendants, the remedy is with

the Legislature.

Entry of nonsuit to stand.

OPPENIIEIMER V. ELMORE.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 1899.

109 Iowa, 196.

Deemer, J.

The record discloses that after the issues were made up,

tho jury imp;molod and sworn, and the plaintiff's evidence

adduced, tlic (IclViuhuit snhrnitted a motion asking the court

to direct a verdict for liiin ; and tliat after the court had in-

dicated that lie would sustain the motion, but before any

[Chap. 10
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cau e a if he were ngaged in court, and each party is requir d to proceed before th auditor at the time appointed
and 'to produce in good faith, tbe testimony relied upon
by him.''
But in spite of the character which auditor's hearings
ha e now a urned, it is till true that uch hearings result
in vidence merely and cannot re ult in an adjudication;
and we are of opinion that a bearing which results in eviden e and cannot per se result in an adjudication is not a
trial within the rule which has now been laid down for over
eighty years, namely, that a plaintiff can become nonsuit
at any time before the trial begins and not afterward.
Moreov r this seems to have been assumed by the Legislatur in thi very statute, St. 1900, c. 418 (R. L. c. 165, sec.
59, and c. 173, sec. 81.) It is there provided that if the
plaintiff does not comply with the provisions of the act
and att nd before the auditor, or if he refuses in good faith
to put in the testimony relied on by him, the court is authoriz to dir ct him to become nonsuit. In mal ing that provi ion it i a urned that the court has no power to enter
judo-ment for th defendant at that stage of the proceeding.
nd r the e circumstances, we do not feel at liberty to
di po e of the que tion on its merits. If, under the practi
whi b now oJJtains, the rule, which we feel we are
bound y, does injustice to defendants, the remedy is with
the L gi la ture.
Entry of nonsitit to stand.

PPENJIEIMER V. ELMORE.
Supreme Coitrt of Iowa.

1899.

109 Iowa, 196.
hEMF.R

.J.

'J'hc rc•c·o r 1 di . rl
s that aft r th i. . u s were made up,
tl 1· j11r~, imp:mPl cl a n · orn, ano th plaintiff' evid ence
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entry was made on the docket or any direction in fact given

to the jury, the plaintiffs asked the court to dismiss their

case without prejudice, which it refused to do, but, on the

contrary, instructed the jury to return a verdict for defend-

ant, which was accordingly done, and a judgment was there-

after rendered thereon. Section 3764 of the Code is as

follows: *'An action may be dismissed, and such dismissal

shall be without prejudice to a future action, before the final

submission of the case to the jury," What, then, is the

submission of a case to a jury? That question seems to be

answered by Harris v. Beam, 46 Iowa, 118, wherein it is

said: "In every case finally submitted there must be some

moment of time in which the condition of being finally sub-

mitted is assumed. Ordinarily, there is no difficulty in de-

termining whether or not a case has been submitted. If

the last word of the court 's charge to the jury had not been

read, it would probably be conceded that no final submis-

sion had occured but, as the charge had been fully read, it
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is claimed nothing further remained for court or counsel

to do, and that the case was finally in the hands of the

jury. A cause is not finally submitted to a jury when the

last word of the charge is read. In practice, the jury are

directed by the court to retire in charge of a sworn officer

to consider their verdict, or to enter upon the consideration

of the case without retiring. This direction by the court to

the jury, to enter upon the consideration of the case, may be

fairly regarded as the moment when the final submission

of the case occurs. An attorney cannot always tell wheth-

er he can safely submit his case to the jury on the evidence

introduced until he hears the charge of the court. If, in

his judgment, the charge is so adverse to him that he can-

not safely trust his case in the hands of a jury, he ought at

the moment to be permitted to dismiss without prejudice

to future action." Morrisey v. Railway Co., 80 Iowa, 314,

is a case almost directly in point, and it is there said:

** Plaintiff having produced all his evidence, and rested, the

defendant made a motion to instruct the jury to find for the

defendant ; which being fully submitted, the court said that

he thought the motion ought to be sustained, and indicated

that he would sustain it, but had not yet made the entry on

the calendar, nor directed for the defendant." "The plain-

tiff's attorney then asked leave to dismiss, to which the

entr wa made on the docket or any direction in fact given
to the jury, the plaintiff asked the court to dismi s their
case without prejudice, which it refu ed to do, but, on the
contrary, instructed the jury to return a verdict for defendant, which was accordingly done, and a judgment was thereafter rendered thereon.
ection 3764 of the Code i a
follows: ''An action may be di mi ed and such di mis al
shall be without prejudice to a future action, before the final
submission of the ca e to th jur . '' What, then, is the
submission of a ca e to a jury. That qu stion seems to be
answered by Harris v. Beam,, 46 Iowa, 118, wherein it i
said: ''In every ca e :finally ubmitted there mu t be some
moment of time in which the condition of being finally submitted is assumed. Ordinarily, there is no difficulty in determining whether or not a case has been submitted. If
the last word of the court' charge to the jury had not been
read, it would probably be conceded that no final ubmi sion had occured but, as the charge had been fully read, it
is claimed nothing further remained for court or coun el
to do, and that the case wa :finally in the hands of the
jury. A cause is not finall submitted to a jury when the
last word of the charge i read. In practice the jury are
directed by the court to retire in charge of a worn officer
to consider their erdict, or to nter upon the con ideration
of the ca e without retiring. Thi direction by the court to
the jury, to enter upon the con ideration of the case, may be
fairly regarded as the moment when the final submis ion
of the case occurs. An attorney cannot alway tell whether he can afely submit his ca e to the jury on the evidence
introduced until he hear the charge of the court. If in
l!is judgment, the charge i o adver e to him that he cannot safely trust hi case in the hands of a jury, he ought at
the moment to be permitted to di mi without preju i e
to future action." J1 orrisey v. Railway Co., 0 Iowa, 314
i a case almo t directly in point, and it i there aid:
''Plaintiff having pr due d all bi e idence and re ted, the
defendant made a motion to in truct the jury to find for the
defendant; which b in full ubmitted, t h court aid that
he thought the motion oucrht to be ustained and indicated
tha h would u tain it, but had not yet ma e the entry on
th al ndar nor dir t 1 f r th def n ant. ' ' T b laintiff' attorney then a kc lea e to di mi s, t which the
T
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defendant objected, on the ground that the case had been

submitted to the court, which objection was overruled and

the case dismissed." This action of the court was assign-

ed as error. In passing upon this question, we said: "A

submission is final only when nothing remains to be done

to render it complete. Submission to a jury is not final

until the last words of a charge are read, and the jury di-

rected to consider their verdict. Harris v. Beam, 46 Iowa,

118. There was no final submission of this case to the jury.

They had not received the charge of the court, and as yet

had no authority to consider of or return a verdict. Ap-

pellant contends that, as the sustaining of the motion for

verdict was, in effect, a final disposal of the case, there was

a final submission of the case to the court before the plain-

tiff asked leave to dismiss. Surely, the submission of the

motion was not a submission of the case to the court ; for,

whether the motion was overruled or sustained, it remained

to submit the case to a jury for a verdict. There was no
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final submission of the case to the court or jury." See,

also, Partridge v. Wilsey, 8 Iowa, 459 ; Livingston v. Mc

Donald, 21 Iowa, 175; Hays v. Turner, 23 Iowa, 214. Noth-

ing at variance with the rule established by these cases is

announced in McArflmr v. Scliidtz, 78 Iowa, 264. In that

case there was a final submission, with an attempted reser-

vation of a right to dismiss without prejudice. Such prac-

tice was condemned, and the action of the trial court in per-

mitting a dismissal was reversed. Defendant's counsel

have cited a number of cases from the supreme court of

Kansas holding that the action of the trial court under

such a statute is discretionary, and will not be interfered

with on appeal. We have adopted a different rule, and, as

it is a rule of pi'actice, our own decisions must govern. The

trial court should have permitted a dismissal of the case

and its order and judgment are Reversed.

TRIAL PRACT ICE
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defen 1ant obj t d, on th ground tha+ th e ca e had been
ubmitted t the court, which objection was overruled and
th ca e di mi ed. '' Thi action of the cou r t was assigned a
rror. In pa ing upon this question, we said: ''A
..;ul mi ion i final only when nothing remain s to be done
to r n er it complete. Su mission to a jury is not final
until the la. t word of a charge are read, and the jury directed to con . icl r their verdict. Harri . Y . Beam, 46 Iowa,
11 . Th r wa no final submission of thi case to the jury.
They had not receiYed th charge of the cou rt, and a s y et
had no authority to con .. id r of or return a verdict. Appellant contend that as the ustaining of the motion for
verdi t \\a in effect, a final di I o. al of tb case, there was
a final ubmi , ion of the ca. to the court before the plaintiff a kc 1 lea-.;;e to di smis . Surely, the submi sion of the
motion wa not a submis ion of the case to the cour t; for,
wbeth r th motion was overruled or sustained, it r emained
to u1 mit the a e to a jur. for a verdict. T h ere wa s no
final ul mi. , ion of the cas to the court or jury.'' S ee,
al o Pa rt ridge v. TYi7. ey, 8 1owa, 459; Li1 ingL ton v. 1.11 c
Donald, ~1 owa, 175; Hays v. Turn er, 2:-3 Iowa, 21-!. Nothing at '(:ariance with the rule establi . bed by the. e ca es is
ann unced in McArtlwr v. i. chultz, 78 Iowa, 26+. In that
ca th r wa a final suhmi , ion, with an attem1 ted reservation of a right to li . mi s without prejudice. Su ch practir wa . c nd nm d, a111 the a tion of the trial ourt in peri tting a cli mi sal wa . r ver. ed. D f n<lant '. counsel
hav
it d a nnmh"r of ea ·e. from the upreme court of
I,.. an . a holdin/""I· that th e action of the trial court under
. ll('h n . tnt11te i. di : cr tionary, and will n t h
interfered
with on app al. \Y hav a loptec1 a different r ule and, as
it i. a rnl of prartieP onr own d i ions mu t o-overn. The
trial <·< nrt : honlcl lie vc p rmittccl a di mi al of the cas
and it rd r a 1 juclguwnt are Revers d.
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ASHMEAD V. ASHMEAD.

ASHMEAD V. ASHMEAD.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1880.

23 Kansas, 262.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Brewer, J.

This was an action for divorce. After the testimony had

1880.

been received, and the case taken under advisement, the

23 Kansas, 262 .

plaintiff moved the court for leave to dismiss her action

without prejudice. Defendant objected, and insisted that

judgment be rendered upon the merits, but the court sus-

tained the motion, and permitted the plaintiff to dismiss

without prejudice. Was this error? We have not before

us the testimony upon which the court acted in sustaining

this motion. We must therefore presume it sufficient, if the

court had the power to grant such a motion. It will be

conceded that after the final submission of the case, the

plaintiff had no right to a dismissal without prejudice. Up

to that time she had such right, and could exercise it of

her own option, without the consent of the defendant or
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the permission of the court. At that time her rights in

that respect ceased. But has not the court the power in

its discretion to permit a plaintiff, even after the final sub-

mission, to recall that submission and dismiss without prej-

udice? It would be both strange and harsh, if such power

did not exist. Oftentimes, by some oversight or forgetful-

ness, the plaintiff omits some essential portion of his testi-

mony. Is the court powerless to afford him relief? It is

constant practice to open a case for additional testimony.

Even after a jury has retired to consider of its verdict, the

court may recall it, and open the case for future evidence.

All this, it is true, rests within the discretion of the court,

and is not a right of the party. Here the court exercised

its discretion, and we cannot- say that there was any abuse

of such discretion. The case of Schafer v. Weaver, 20 Kas.

295, is in point. The question there arose, it is true, after

a demurrer to the evidence had been sustained, but the

principle is the same.

The judgment will be affirmed.

All the Justices concurring.

.BREWER,

J.

This was an action for divorce. After the testimony had
been received, and the case taken under advi ement, the
plaintiff moved the court for leave to dismi her action
without prejudice. Defendant objected, and insi ted that
judgment be rendered upon the merits, but the court sustained the motion and permitted the plaintiff to dismi
without prejudice. Was this error1 We have not before
us the testimony upon which the court acted in u taining
this motion. We mu t therefore presume it sufficient, if the
court had the power to grant such a motion. It will be
conceded that after the final submiss10n of the case, the
plaintiff had no right to a di mis al without prejudice. Up
to that time she had uch right, and could exerci e it of
her own option, without the consent of the defendant or
the permi sion of the court . At that time her rights in
that re pect ceased. But has not the court the power in
its di cretion to permit a plaintiff, even after the final submission, to recall that submis ion and dismi s without prejudice~ It would be both strange and bar h, if such power
did not exist. Oftentimes, by ome over ight or forgetfulness, the plaintiff omit some e sential portion of hi te timony. Is the court powerless to afford him relief. It is
constant practice to open a ca e fo:r additional te timon ..
Even after a jury ha .., retired to consider of it verdict, the
court may recall it, and open the case for future evidence.
All this, it i true, re t within the discre~ion of the court
and i not a right of the party. Here the court ex:erci ed
it di cretion, and w cannot ay that there was any abuse
of such discretion. The ca e of Schaf er v. Weaver, 20 Ka .
295, is in point. Th que tion there arose, it is true after
a demurrer to the 'idence had been sustained, but the
principle i the ame.
The judgment will be affirmed.
All the Ju tices concurring.
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(c) Effect of Dismissal.

(c)

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY V. MILLER.

Effect of Dismissal.

Supreme Court of the United States. 1909.

217 United States, 209.

Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court.

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY V. MILLER.

The defendant in error, plaintiff below, brought suit in

Supreme Court of the United States.

the City Court of Hall county, Georgia, against the South-

ern Railway Company, a corporation of Virginia, and

1909.

certain individual citizens of Georgia, to recover damages

217 United States, 209.

for personal injuries received by him while in the employ

of the railroad company as an engineer. A recovery in

the court of original jurisdiction was affirmed in the Court

of Appeals of Georgia (59 S. E. Rep. 1115), and the case

is brought here to review certain Federal questions pre-

sented by the record. These are, first, that the state court

erred in refusing to remove the case to the United States

Circuit Court upon the petition of the plaintiff in error;

second, as it appeared that the case had once been removed
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to the Federal court and was dismissed by the plaintiff,

the state court should have held that the right to further

prosecute in that court was lost, and the jurisdiction com-

pletely and finally transferred to the Federal court.

* * * There was no error in the refusal to remove the

case.

A further objection is made that inasmuch as the suit

was once removed from the state court to the Federal court

and therein dismissed, there was no right to begin the case

again in the state court. This argument is predicated upon

tlie statement in a number of cases in this court, to the

effect that where the petition for removal and bond has

been filed the state court loses jurisdiction of the case, and

subs('(|nent proceedings therein are void and of no effect.

P>ut this is far from holding that a Federal court obtains

jurisdiction of a suit thus removed in such wise that it can

never again be brought in a state court, although there has

been no judgment upon the merits in the Federal court,

and the case has been dismissed therein without any other

MR.

J u sTrcE

DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant in error, plaintiff below, brought suit in
the City Court of Hall county, Georgia, against the Southern Railwa3
ompan3, a corporation of Virginia, and
certain individual citizens of Georgia, to recover damag-es
for personal injuries received by him while in the employ
of the railroad company as an engineer. A recovery in
th ourt of original jurisdiction was affirmed in the Court
of ppeals of Georgia ( 59 S. E. R ep. 1115), and the case
i brou ht here to review certain Federal questions preent d by the record. These are, first, that the state court
err d in refu ing to remove the case to the United States
ir uit ourt upon the petition of the plaintiff in error;
ond, a it appeared that the case had once been removed
to the Federal court and was dismissed by the plaintiff,
the tat ourt hould have held that the right to further
pro ecute in that court was lost, and the jurisdiction compl t ly an finally transferred to the Federal court.
* * * * * * * * * *
• * • T re was no error in the refusal to remove the
ca .
A further obj tion i made that ina much as the suit
ov d from the ta te court to the Federal court
d, there was no right to begin the case
a · in in th
urt. This argument is predicated upon
Jw :tat m nt in a number of ases in this court, to the
ffC'd th t h r th
etition for removal and bond has
h 'Pn fi I •rl th · ..tat ourt loses jurisdiction of the case, and
111, c·qnent J ro · ings th r in are voi and of no effect.
B11t t hi : i · 1" r fr 1 hol linO' that a Federal court obtains
j11ri . dic·tir>n of a. uit th , r mov din such wis that it can
11 •\' l'I' <1 11·nin b(• hro ghL in a tate c urt, althou<>'h there has
h · ·11 110 j11dgnwnt u
th
rit in the Federal court,
au tho cas' lm. · b n dismissed therein without any other
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disposition than is involved in a voluntary dismissal witii

the consent of the court.

While it is true that a compliance with the act of Con-

gress entitling the party to remove the case may operate

to end the jurisdiction of the state court, notwithstanding

it refuses to allow such removal, it by no means follows that

the state court may not acquire jurisdiction in some proper

way of the same cause of action after the case has been dis-

missed without final judgment in a Federal court. By com-

plying with the removal act the state court lost its jurisdic-

tion, and upon the filing of the record in the Federal court

that court acquired jurisdiction. It thereby had the au-

thority to hear, determine and render a judgment in that

case to the exclusion of every other court. But where the

court permitted a dismissal of the action by the plaintiff

it thereby lost the jurisdiction which it had thus acquired.

We know of no principle which would permit the Federal

court under such circumstances, and after the dismissal of
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the suit, to continue its jurisdiction over the case in such

wise that no other court could ever entertain it. After the

voluntary dismissal in tJie Federal court the case was again

at large, and the plaintiff was at liberty to begin it again in

any court of competent jurisdiction.

We find no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals

of Georgia, and the same is affirmed.

Affirmed,

FKANCISCO V. CHICAGO «& ALTON RAILWAY

COMPANY.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Cir-

cuit. 1906.

79 Circuit Court of Appeals, 292.

Before Sanborn, Hook and Adams, Circuit Judges.

Sanborn, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff below is the plaintiff in error here. He

brought an action against the defendant to recover $5,000

damages for the negligent killing of George L. Gerew. The
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disposition than i involved in a voluntary di. mi al witJ1
the consent of the court.
While it is true that a compliance with the act of Con gress entitling the party to remove the case may operat
to end the juri diction of the tate court, n twi th tandin ·
it refuses to allow uch removal, it by no means follow that
the state court may not acquire juri di tion in ome prop r
way of the same cau e of action aft r the case ha been dismissed without final judgment in a Federal court. B corrrplying with the removal act the state court lost it jurisdiction, and upon the filing of the record in the Federal court
that court acquired jurisdiction. It thereby had the authority to hear, determine and render a judgment in that
case to the exclu ion of every other court. But where tbe
court permitted a dis mi sal of the action by the plaintiff
it thereby lo t the juri diction which it had thus acquired.
We know of no principle which woul 1 permit the Federal
ourt under such circumstance , and after the di missal of
th nit, to continue its juri diction over the case in , uch
wi. e that no other court could ever entertain it. After the
\Toluntary di mi sal in the Federal court the ca e was again
at large, and the plaintiff wa at lib rty to begin it again in
an court of competent juri di tion.
We find no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals
of Georgia, and the same is affirmed.
.Affirmed.

FRANCIS 0 V. CHICAGO & ALTON R ILWAY
COMPANY.
Fnit ed States Circuit Court of .Appeals, Eighth Circuit. 1906.
79 Circuit Coiirt of App als, 292.

B fore SANBORN, HooK an
D l\I ,
ircuit Jud<Yes.
ANBORN, ir uit Ju ..
Th plaintiff below i the I lai tiff in error here. He
ln· uo·ht an action again t th 1ef ndant to re o r $5 000
11flmag for th n glio· nt killin5 of G rge L. Gerew. The
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defendant denied its liability. There was a trial of the

issues before a jury. At the close of the evidence the de-

fendant moved the court to instruct the jury that under the

pleadings and evidence they must find a verdict for the de-

fendant. The court granted the motion, and the plaintiff

excepted. But before the jury were actually instructed the

})]aintiff prayed leave of the court to take an involuntary

nonsuit. The court granted him permission and a judg-

ment was rendered accordingly. Subsequently the plaintiff

moved the court to set aside this judgment of nonsuit and to

grant a new trial of the action, and this motion was denied.

He has sued out this writ of error to secure a reversal of

this judgment of nonsuit on account of numerous alleged er-

rors in the trial of the action, and especially because the

court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

cause of action and that the defendant was entitled to a ver-

dict thereon.

But invited error is irremediable. If the court erred in
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the rendition of the judgment of nonsuit, it erred at the

plaintiff's request and to the prejudice of the defendant,

and that error can form no ground for the reversal of the

judgment at the suit of the plaintiff who procured it. A

judgment of nonsuit upon the motion or request of the de-

fendant and against the objection or protest of the plain-

tiff is reviewable by writ of error. Central Transp. Co. v.

Pullman's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 29, 39, 40, 11 Sup. Ct. 478.

35 L. Ed. 55; Median v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611, 614, 618,

12 Sup. Ct. 972, 36 L. Ed. 835.

But a judgment of nonsuit on the motion, at the request

or with the consent of the plaintiff, is not reviewable by

writ of error at his suit, because he is estopped from con-

victing the trial court of an error which he requested it to

commit. * * *

In Parks v. Southern Ry. Co., 143 Fed, 276, a case which

arose in North Carolina, where, in the state courts, a plain-

tiff may take a nonsuit at any time before verdict, the de-

f(3ndant at the close of the evidence had moved the court to

instruct the jury to return a verdict in his favor, and the

court liad sustained the motion. Plaintiff then moved for

leave to tak(! a nonsuit. The court denied his motion and

instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
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d fendant denied its liability. There was a trial of the
i ues before a jury. At the close of the evidence the ef ndant moved the court to instruct the jury that under the
pleadings and evidence they must find a verdict for the def ndant. The court granted the motion, and the plaintiff
except d. But before the jury were actually instructed the
1 laintiff prayed leave of the court to take an involuntary
n n uit. The court granted him permission and a judgment was rendered accordingly. Subsequently the plaintiff
moved the court to set aside this judgment of nonsuit and to
grant a new trial of the action, and this motion was denied.
He has sued out this writ of error to secure a reversal of
thi judgment of nonsuit on account of numerous alleged errors in the trial of the action, and especially because the
ourt held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
ause of action and that the defendant was entitled to averdict thereon.
But invited error i irremediable. If the court erred in
he r ndition of the judgment of nonsuit, it erred at the
laintiff 's request and to the prejudice of the defendant,
an that error can form no ground for the reversal of the
judgment at the suit of the plaintiff who procured it. A
jud ·m nt of nonsuit upon the motion or request of the def ndant and a 0 ·ain t the objection or protest of the plaintiff i re iewable by writ of error. C ntral Transp. Co. v.
Pullman's Car Co . 139 U. S. 24, 29, 39, 40, 11 Sup. Ct. 478~
. 5 L. E . 55; 'JJI echan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611, 614, 618,
12 ~ UI . t. 97:..,, 6 L. Ed. 835.
ut a judo·ment of non, uit on the motion, at the request
r with the
ns nt of the plaintiff, is not reviewable by
wrjt of 1Tor at hi. uit, because he is e topped from convif'f ing th tri 1 court of an error which he reque ted it to
commit. * *
1

• • * * • • • * * ~
In Parks v. i outhern Ry. Co., 143 Fed. 276, a ca e which
=1r(). <·in . . nrih Car lina, her , in the tat courts, a pl in1i ft' 1 rn.Y h I P a no . uit at any tim befor verdict, th de~

f'1·11d<1 n n 1 tl1<• 10.
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iu t rud ·<l the jury

f the vidcn e had moved th court to
r tur a v rdi ·t in hi. favor, and the
th, m tion. Plaintiff th n moved for
ui . rrh ourt 1 ni d hi motion and
o r •t irn a v rdict for the defendant.
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The Circuit Court of Appeals held that, when the motion

to instruct the jury for the defendant was made, the plain-

tiff was put to his election to then take his nonsuit or to

submit the whole case upon the motion to instruct, that the

motion for leave to take a nonsuit after the decision upon

the motion to instruct came too late, and that there was no

error in the subsequent refusal of the court to grant the non-

suit. While a different rule has been established in this cir-

cuit in cases coming from Missouri, in deference to a statute

of that state and in conformity to the practice in its trial

courts {Chicago, M. S St. P. Rij. Co. v. Metalstaff, 41 C. C.

k. 669, 101 Fed. 769), the opinion in the Parks case con-

tains a statement of the duty of courts to respect the rights

of defendants, as well as plaintiffs, to a lawsuit, to make an

end of litigation and to prevent the abuse of the means of

administering justice by the trial of experiments upon the

courts with defective causes of action, which strongly ap-

peals to our judgment and presents a persuasive argument
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in support of the rule under consideration. Judge Pritch-

ard said:

"It is highly important that the court in the exercise of

its discretion should not only see that equal and exact jus-

tice is done between litigants, but it is equallj' important

that needless litigation should be speedily determined, and

in the trial of cases the court should consider the rights of

the defendant as well as those of the plaintiff, and, where

it appears that all the evidence which it is possible to

obtain has been offefed and the case has been submitted to

the jury or to the court, it is the duty of the court, if In

its opinion the evidence is not sufficient to justify a verdict

in favor of the plaintiff, to direct the jury to return a ver-

dict in favor of the defendant. The courts are not organ-

ized for the purpose of permitting the jDlaintitf in an action

to experiment with a certain state of facts for the purpose

of ascertaining the opinion of the court as to the law ap-

plicable to the same and then permit him to withdraw from

the scene of conflict and state a new cause of action and

mend his licks in another direction. Such policy, if adopted,

would be productive of much mischief, and should not be

tolerated."

The difference between a judgment upon an instructed

verdict and a judgment of nonsuit is that the former pre
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The Cir uit ourt of A1 p al held that, when the motion
to in. truct th jury for the d fendant wa made, the plaintiff wa 1 ut to hi elec ion to then take hi non uit or to
ubmit th8 whole cas upon the motion to in tru t, that the
motion for lea,Te to take a non uit after the deci ion upon
the motion to in truct cam too late, and that there was no
error in the subsequent refu al of the court to grant the nonsuit. While a different rule ha been e tabli hed in thi circuit in case coming from 11i ouri, in def ren e to a statut
of that state and in conformity to the practi e in its trial
court (Chicago, M. & t. P. Ry. Co. v. 1J1etal taff', 41 C. C.
A. 669, 101 Fed. 769), the 01 inion in the Park ca e contains a tatem nt of the duty of court to re pect the right
of defendant a well as plaintiff to a law uit to make an
end of litigation and to prevent the abu e of the means of
administerin ju tice by the trial of experiment upon the
courts with defective cau e of action which strongly appeal to our judgment and 1 re ent a per ua ive ar o·ument
in upport of the rule under on ideration. Judge Pritchard aid:
It is highly important that the court in the exercise of
it discretion hould not only e that equal and exact justic is done between litigant , but it i e ually important
that needle litigation should be peedil det rmined, and
in the trial of ca es the court hould con ider the right of
the defendant as well as tho e of the plaintiff, and, where
it appear that all the e-vidence whi h it is po ible to
obtain ha been off t d and the ca e ha been ubmitted to
the jury or to the ourt it i the dut of the court, if .:n
it 01 inion the evi n i not ufficient to ju tify a erdict
in fa ·or of the plaintiff to dir t the jury to return a verict in fayor of the def n ant. The court are not or anized for the purpo e of ermitting th plaintiff in an action
to e::q eriment with a c rtain tate of fact for the purpo e
of as ertainin · the opinion of the court a to the law a pli able to the ame and th n p rmit him to withdraw f ron:i
the cen of nflict an
tat a new au e of action and
mend bi lick in another dire ti n. uch policy, if adopted,
would be productive of much mi chief and should not b
tolerated.''
The difference betwe n a jud ment upon an in tructed
verdict and _a judgm nt of non uit is that the f rm r pre
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vents, while the latter permits, the maintenance of another

action for the same cause. When the evidence was closed

in the suit before us, each party had established rights in

the trial of this action. The plaintiff had the right to elect

whether he would take a nonsuit (section 639, Rev. St. Mo.

1899; Chicago, M. S St. P. Ry. Co. v. Metalstaff, 41 C. C.

A. 669, 101 Fed. 769), or would submit the whole cause

upon the motion to instruct and endeavor to secure a ver-

dict in his favor. The defendant had a right to elect

whether it would endeavor to obtain a nonsuit or a verdict

on the merits in its favor. It chose the latter alternative

and moved the court for a directed verdict. This motion

the plaintiff opposed and submitted the cause to the court

for decision. The court granted the motion, and the plain-

tiff excepted, lie then had the right to elect whether he

would take a nonsuit and bring another action on the same

cause, or would take a verdict against himself and secure a

review of the rulings of the court by a writ of error. He
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chose the former remedy. He moved the court for leave to

take an involuntary nonsuit. The parties then stood in

this situation: The defendant asked and pressed for an

instructed verdict and thereby necessarily objected to the

nonsuit which gave the plaintiff an opportunity to bring an-

other action. The plaintiff prayed for the nonsuit and

thereby necessarily objected to the instruced verdict and to

a judgment whi(?h would prevent his maintenance of another

action. The court granted the request of the plaintiff and

denied that of tlie defendant. Plaintiff thereby secured his

right to maintain his action for the same cause, and the de-

fendant lost the judgment in its favor and the entire bene-

fit of a trial in which it had succeeded. The nonsuit was

obtained by the act and request of the plaintiff against the

motion and objection of the defendant, and it may not be

successfully challenged by a writ of error procured by the

former.

It is said that this was an involuntary nonsuit because

the plaintiff was forced to take it by the decision of the

trial court that he had proved no cause of action, and that

the Supremo Court of Missouri has often so decided and

has reviewed cases from the inferior courts of that state

uf)ori writs of error to such judgments. Williams v. Finks,

156 Mo. 597, 57 S. W. 732; Ready v. Smith, 141 Mo. 305, 42
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yent while the latter permits, the maintenance of another
a tion for the same ause. When the evidence was closed
in th uit before us, each party had established rights in
be trial of this action. T be plaintiff had the right to elect
wheth r he would take a non uit (section 639, Rev. St. Mo.
1 99; Chicago, M. db St. P. Ry. Co . v. Metalstaff, 41 C. C .
. 669, 101 Fed. 769) or would submit the whole cause
upon the motion to instruct and endeavor to secure a verdi t in hi favor . The defendant had a right to elect
hether it would endeavor to obtain a nonsuit or a verdict
n the merits in it favor. It chose the latter alternative
and moved the court for a directed verdict. This motion
th 1 l intiff opposed and ubmitted the cause to the court
for deci ion. The court granted the motion, and the plaintiff ~' epted. He then had the right to elect whether he
would take a nonsuit and bring another action on the same
au , or would take a verdict against himself and secure a
r vi
of the ruling of the court by a writ of error. He
ho e the former remedy. He moved the court for leave to
tak an in oluntary non uit. The parties then stood in
t i ituation : The defendant a ked and pressed for an
in tru ted verdict and thereby necessarily objected to the
n n uit whi h gave the plaintiff an opportunity to bring another action. The plaintiff prayed for the nonsuit and
th r by ne
arily objected to the instruced verdict and to
a judo-m nt whi~b would prevent his maintenance of another
tion.
he ourt granted the request of the plaintiff and
ni d t at of th defendant. Plaintiff thereby secured his
ri o-ht t
aintain hi. action for the same cause, and the def n 1 nt 1 . t the judgm nt in its favor and the entire benefi of tri al in wbi h it had ucceeded. The non uit was
lJt· in d by th a t and r qu t of the plaintiff against the
oti n , n l ohj rti n f tbe defendant, and it may not be
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y a writ of error pro ured by the
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f t i: : aid th t thi · w . a n involuntary non uit because
tlic· plaintiff w .· forr0d t take it by th d ision of the
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S. W. 727; English v. Mullanphy, 1 Mo. 780; Coll'ms v.

Bowmer, 2 Mo. 195; Bates County v. Smith, 65 Mo. 464;

Schulter's Adm'r v. Bockivinkle's Adm'r, 19 Mo. 647;

Dumey v. Schoeffler, 20 Mo. 323; Greene Co. v. Gray, 146

Mo. 568, 48 S. W. 447. The answer is (1) that whether the

nonsuit was voluntary or involuntary in the conception of

the Supreme Court of Missouri, and whether or not it

would have been reviewable by that court, if it had been

granted by an inferior court of that state, an indispensable

condition of its review at the instance of a plaintiff in error

in a national court is that it was granted "without his con-

sent and against his objection," and this judgment lacks

this condition, for the nonsuit was granted at his request

and by his active procurement; (2) that the plaintiff was

not forced by the decision of the court below that he had

failed to prove his case to take a nonsuit, but he had the

option to take the verdict and judgment against him and

to review it, and if it was erroneous to reverse it by writ of
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error, or to take the dismissal of the action and try again;

and (3) that his choice of the latter alternative cannot be

made involuntary by placing that deceptive adjective be-

fore it in the face of the record that he was free to proceed

to verdict, judgment, and review, or to a judgment of non-

suit, and that of his own free will and against the motion

and objection of his opponent he asked and secured the dis-

missal. The real character of this nonsuit cannot be re-

versed or concealed by applying to it a false epithet.

It has been a fixed rule of practice of the appellate courts

of the United States for almost 100 years that no writ of

error will lie at the suit of a plaintiff to review a judg-

ment of nonsuit which has been rendered at his request or

with his consent, and that no judgment will be reversed for

an error which the plaintiff in the writ has invited the court

to commit, and the fact that the Supreme Court of Missouri

calls such a nonsuit "involuntary" and reviews it presents

no persuasive reason why one of the national appellate

courts should depart from this salutary rule while there are

many why it should abide by and enforce it. Courts are

established and maintained to settle and terminate contro-

versies between citizens and to enforce their rights, not to

furnish debating societies for the trial of legal experiments.

S. W. 727; English v. JJ1ullanphy, 1 Mo. 780; Coll·ins v.
Bowmer, 2 Mo. 195 ; Bates County v. Smith, 65 Mo. 464;
8chulter's .A.dm'r v. Bockwinkle's .A.dm'r, 19 Mo. 647;
Dumey v. Schoeffler, 20 Mo. 323; Greene Co. v. Gray, 146
Mo. 568, 48 S. W. 447. The answer is (1) that whether the
nonsuit was voluntary or involuntary in the conception of
the Supreme Court of Missouri, and whether or not it
would have been reviewable by that court, if it had been
granted by an inferior court of that state, an indispensable
condition of its review at the instance of a plaintiff in error
in a national court is that it was granted ''without his consent and against his obj ection,'' and this judgment lacks
this condition, for the non uit was granted at his request
and by his active procurement; (2) that the plaintiff was
not forced by the deci ion of the court below that he had
failed to prove his case to take a p.onsuit, but he had the
option to take the verdict and judgment against him and
to review it, and if it was erroneous to reverse it by writ of
error, or to take the dismissal of the action and try again;
and ( 3) that his choice of the latter alternative cannot be
made involuntary by placing that deceptive adjective before it in the face of the record that he was free to proceed
to verdict, judgment, and review, or to a jud o·ment of nonuit, and that of his own free will and again t the motion
and objection of his opponent he asked and secured the dismissal. The real character of this non uit cannot be reversed or concealed by applying to it a false epithet.

* * * * * * * * * *

It has been a fixed rule of practice of the appellate courts
of the United States for almost 100 years that no writ of
error will lie at the suit of a plaintiff to review a judgment of nonsuit which ha been rendered at hi reque t or
with his con ent, and that no judgment will be r versed for
an error which the plaintiff in the writ has invite the court
to commit, and the fact that the Supreme Court of Mi ouri
call u h a non uit ' in oluntary" and review it present
no per ua i e r a n why one of the national app llate
ourts hould depart from thi alutary rule whil th re are
many why it houl abide by and enforce it.
ourt are
stabli bed and maintain d to ettle and terminate controversie between citizen and to nfor their ri 0 ·bt not to
furnish de ating societi for the trial of legal x1 erim nt .
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The chief reason of their being is to end, not to perpetuate,

disputes. "Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium/' A

practice which permits a plaintiff to experiment with the

courts and to harass the defendant interminably at will

runs counter to the basic purpose of legal tribunals and of

all civilized governments, and, instead of assisting to wisely

administer justice, it inflicts and perpetuates wrong. Yet

this is the practice which a grave review of such nonsuits

as that in hand would establish. Under it a plaintiff could

introduce his evidence and try the Circuit Court to see

whether or not it would sustain his action. If it granted

a motion to instruct a verdict against him, he could procure

from the court an involuntary nonsuit, then sue out a writ

of error and try the appellate court, and, if it would not sus-

tain his action, he could pay the costs, bring another action

for the same cause, and continue his actions and experi-

ments interminably. The federal courts ought not to per-

mit themselves to be made the subjects of such experiments.
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The only material interests involved in the review of such

judgments are the costs of the actions, for the plaintiffs

may try their causes again whatever the decisions of the

appellate courts, and the demands upon these courts for

the decision of real and important issues are too grave and

pressing to permit them to devote their time to litigation so

frivolous.

There is a more compelling reason why proceedings of

this nature should not be sustained. The plaintiff is not the

only party to a lawsuit who has rights. The defendant has

some, and one of them is the right, not only to a fair and

impartial trial of the action against him, but to a final

adjudication of the alleged cause which the plaintiff pre

sents and to a termination of the litigation upon it. This

right he can never enforce, this termination he can never

secure under the practice here proposed, for there is no

limit to the number of actions on the same cause, or on the

want of it, which the plaintiff may bring, review, and dis-

miss under it.

The conclusion is that a writ of error will not lie in a

national appellate court at the suit of the plaintiff to re-

view a judgment of nonsuit or dismissal which has been

rendered at his request or with his consent after the court

The chief reason of their being is to end, not to perpetuate,
dispute . "Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium." A
practice which permits a plaintiff to experiment with the
ourts and to harass the defendant interminably at will
r uns counter to the basic purpose of legal tribunals and of
·ill ci ilized governments, and, instead of assisting to wisely
administ r justice, it inflicts and perpetuates wrong. Yet
this i the practice which a grave review of such nonsuits
a that in hand would establish. Under it a plaintiff could
introdu
bi evidence and try the Circuit Court to see
wb th r or not it would u tain bis action. If it granted
a m tion to in truct a verdict against him, he could procure
from the ourt an involuntary nonsuit, then sue out a writ
f rror and try the appellate court, and, if it would not susain bi action, he could pay the costs, bring another action
f r th ame cause, and continue his actions and experi.
m nt int rminably. The federal courts ought not to peri th m Iv s to be made the subjects of such experiments.
h nly material intere ts involved in the review of such
jud · nt are the costs of the actions, for the plaintiffs
ma~ try their cau es again whatever the deci ions of the
a I ll at courts, and the demands upon these courts for
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i ion of real and important issues are too grave and
pr :. ing to permit them to devote their time to litigation so
friY 1 U .
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irnparti l trial of the action again t him, but to a final
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has held at the close of the trial that the defendant is en-

titled to a verdict.

This case has been considered and determined upon the

theory that the evident intention of the plaintiff and of the

court to render a judgment of nonsuit has been effected.

But the form of the judgment is such that a claim may be

made that it was a judgment on the merits. For this rea-

son alone the judgment will be reversed, the defendant in

error will recover its costs in this court, and the case will

be remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to render

a judgment that the action be dismissed without prejudice

to the right of the plaintiff to maintain another for the

same cause, and that the defendant recover its costs of the

plaintiff, and it is so ordered.

(d) Form of Motion.

FERGUSON V. INGLE.

Supreme Court of Oregon. 1900.

38 Oregon, 43.
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Mr. Justice Moore, after stating the facts, delivered the
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has held at the close of the trial that the defendant is entitled to a verdict.
This ca e ha been considered and determined upon the
theory that the e ident intention of the plaintiff and of the
ourt to render a judgment of nonsuit ha been effected.
But the form of the judgment is su h that a claim may be
made that it was a judgment on the merit . For thi reason alone the judgment will be reversed, the defendant in
error will recover its costs in this court, and the ca e will
be remanded to the Circuit ourt, with directions to render
a judgment that the action be di mi sed without prejudice
to the right of the plaintiff to maintain another for the
ame cause, and that the defendant recover its costs of the
plaintiff, and it is so ordered.

opinion of the court.

1. It is contended by plaintiff's counsel that the court

erred in refusing to grant a voluntary nonsuit requested

by their clients; while defendant's counsel insist that, the

motion therefor not having specified the ground upon which

it was predicated, no error was committed in this respect.

Considering those questions in inverse order, the rule is

( d)

well settled that the motion of an adverse party for a non-

Form of Motion.

suit must specify the grounds therefor, and, unless it does

FERGUSON V. INGLE.

so, an appellate court will not review the action of the trial

court in denying the motion : 14 Enc. PI. & Prac. 117, 136 ;

Silva V. Holland, 74 Cal. 530 (16 Pac. 385) ; Flijnn v. Dougli-

Supreme Court of Oregon. 1900.

f.rtij, 91 Cal. 669 (27 Pac. 1080, 14 L. R. A. 230) ; Wright v.

Fire Ins. Co., 12 Mont. 474 (31 Pac. 87, 19 L. R. A. 211.)

38 Oregon, 43.

The reason for this rule is found in the fact that an appel-

late court will consider only such questions as have been

T. p.— 2r

MR. JusTICE MooRE, after stating the fact , delivered the
opinion of the court.
1. It is contended by plaintiff's counsel that the court
erred in refu ing to grant a voluntary non uit requ ted
by their clients; wbile defendant's coun. el insi t that, the
motion therefor no1 having specified the ground upon which
it wa predicated, no error was committed in thi re pect.
onsidering thf!Se question in inverse ord r, the rule is
well settled that the motion of an adverse party for a nonuit mu t p cify the ground tli refor, and, unles it doe
o, an appellate court will not r view the action of th trial
court in denying the motion: 14 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 117, 136;
Silva v. Holland, 74 Cal. 530 (16 Pac. 385); Flynn v. DonghArty, 91 al. 669 (27 Pa . 10 0 14 L. R. A. 230); Wright v.
Fire J.ns . Co., 1.... :Mont. 474 ( 1 Pac. 7 19 L. R. A. 211.)
The r a on for thi rule i found in the fa t that an appellate court will con ider only uch questions as have been
T. P .-2r

1),

•
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l)resented to the trial court at the projier time, and in an

appropriate manner; and when it appears that the ques-

tion sought to be reviewed was not thus submitted to such

court the presumption that its decision thereon is correct

ought to prevail. But, whatever reason may be adduced for

the existence of this rule, the point insisted upon is without

merit, for the motion in this case was not made by the ad-

verse party. The statute provides, in effect, that the plain-

tiff, upon his own motion, may secure a judgment of non-

suit at any time before trial, unless a counter-claim has been

pleaded as a defense. Hill's Ann. Laws, sec. 246. A volun-

tary nonsuit is, therefore, peremptory, and, whatever mo-

tive may have prompted a plaintiff to dismiss his suit or

action, he is not required to state it; for if the motion be

made before trial, and in the absence of a counter-claim

])leaded as a defense, the trial court is without discretion in

the matter, and must give the judgment requested.

The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause re-
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manded, with instructions to grant the nonsuit.

Reversed.

Section 2. Nonsuit.

CARROLL V. GRANDE RONDE ELECTRIC COM-

PANY.

Supreme Court of Oregon. 1907.

pr nt d to the trial court at the proper time, and in an
ap1 r I riat manner ; and when it appear s that the question ouo·ht to be reviewed was not thus submitted to such
ourt the pre umption that its deci ion thereon is correct
u ·ht to pre ail. But, whatever reason may be adduced for
th xi tence of this r ule, the point insisted upon is without
m rit, for the motion in tbi case was not made by the ad" r
party. The statute provides, in effect, that the plaintiff upon hi own motion, may secure a judgment of non. nit at any time before trial, unless a counter-claim has been
pl a ed a a defense. Hill 's Ann. Laws, sec. 246. A voluntarr non uit i., therefore, peremptory, and, whatever moti · may have prompted a plaintiff t o dismiss his suit or
action, he is not required to state it ; for if the motion be
mad before trial, and in the absence of a counter-claim
p1 ad d a a defen e, the trial court is without discretion in
th matter, and mu t give the judgment r equested.

* * * * * * * * * *

49 Oregon, 477.

Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Bean.

This is an action by Eliza Carroll, administratrix, against

tlie Grande Ronde Electric Co. On August 28, 1905, Leon-

ard Carroll was killed by an electric wire belonging to de-

fendant company. The administratrix of his estate

tChap. 10

The judgment i therefore reversed, and the cause remand d, with in tructions to grant the n on suit.
Reversed.

})rouglit an action to recover damages on account of his

dcatli, alleging that it was caused by the negligence of de-

fendant. The defendant answered, denying the allegations

of tJK; complaint, and, for a further and separate defense,

SECTION

2.

NON SUIT.

ARROLL V. GRANDE RONDE E LECTRIC COMP ANY.
Supreme Court of Oregon. 1907.
49 Or gon, 477.
RtatPm nth.

MR. C r • J

TI E BEAN .

'J hi.· i. , n dion y 1-Jliza arroll, admini tratr ix, against
th< J ran<l {ond ~J I tri i
On A uo-u t 2 , 1905, Leonn rcl ~arrnll was kill•
y an l ctri wire belono-ing to defc·JHl:mt <' mJ>i ny. Th
d ini tratrix of hi e tate
l1n1wrlit nn c dion t
r da ao- on a ount of hi
c11·n1l1, ~dl<>g1ng tli, t it a. au. d by the neglig n e of d f1·ll<l:mL 'l li0 <1 ·f 1Hlant an w r d, d nying the alleo-ations
<Jf lh ! ·ornvlaint, a , for a further and parate defense,
1
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setting up contributory negligence on the part of de-

ceased. The trial was begun before a jury on issues join-

ed, and, after the plaintiff had introduced her testimony

and rested, the defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the

ground, among others, that the evidence showed that the

death of her intestate was caused bv liis own negligence.

This motion was allowed ; the record of such allowance re-

citing 'Hhat the plaintiff's intestate Leonard Carroll, at

the time of the accident complained of, resulting in his

death, was guilty of contributory negligence, which was

the proximate and direct cause of the injury resulting in

his death." The judgment was subsequently affirmed:

Carroll v. Grande Ronde Elec. Co., 47 Or. 424, (84 Pac.

389; 6 L, R. A., N. S. 290). Thereafter the plaintiff com-

menced this action on the same cause as is alleged in the

action heretofore referred to. The defendant pleads the

judgment in the former action as a bar, and, such plea be-

ing sustained, judgment was rendered in its favor, and
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plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Bean.

The statute, after providing that a judgment of nonsuit

may be given against the plaintiff on motion of the defend-

ant, when upon the trial the plaintiff fails to prove a

cause sufficient to be submitted to the jury (Section 182, B.

& C. Comp.), declares that, when such judgment is given,

the action is dimissed, but it shall not have the effect to

bar another action for the same cause: Section 184, B. &

C. Comp. The statute would seem to leave no room for

argument as to the effect of an involuntary judgment of

nonsuit. But the defendant contends that because, in the

case at bar, the entry of the order sustaining the motion

contains a statement or finding that the contributory negli-

gence of the plaintiff's intestate was the proximate cause

of his death, it is a judgment on the merits, and therefore

a bar to another action. The vice of this position lies in

the fact that, on a motion for a nonsuit, the court has no

jurisdiction or authority to pass upon the merits or adjudi-

cate the rights of the parties, and an attempt to do so is a

nullity. A motion by defendant for a nonsuit does not

challenge the facts as shown by plaintiff, nor call upon the

DrsMrssALJ

NoN-

urT, DIRECTED VERDICT

32.3

setting up contributory negligence on the part of deceased. The trial wa begun before a jury on i ues joined, and, after the plaintiff had introduced her testimony
and rested, the defendant moved for a non uit, on the
ground, among others, that the eviden e 'how d that the
death of her intestate w . cau,,ed l v hjs own negligence.
This motion was allowed; the record of such allowance re·iting ''that the plaintiff's intestate L onard arroll, at
the time of the accident complained of, resulting in his
death, was guilty of contributory negligence, which was
the proximate and direct cause of the injury re ulting in
his death.'' The judgment was subsequently affirmed:
Carroll v. Grande Ronde Elec. Co., 47 Or. 424 ( 4 Pac.
389; 6 L. R. A., N. . 290). Thereafter the lain tiff commenced this action on the ame cau e as i alleged in the
action heretofore referred to. The defendant pleads the
judgment in the former action as a bar, and, su h plea being sustained, judgment was rendered in it favor, and
plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Opinion by MR. CHIEF JusTICE BEAN.
The statute, after providing that a judgment of nonsuit
may be given again t the plaintiff on motion of the defendant, when upon the trial the plaintiff fail to prove a
cause sufficient to be ubmittecl to the jury (Section 182, B.
& C. Comp.), declare that, when such judgment is given,
the action is dimi sed, but it shall not have the effect to
bar another action for the same cause: Section 184 B. &
C. Comp. The statute would seem to leave no room for
argument as to the effect of an involuntary judgment of
nonsuit. But the defendant ontends that be ause in the
case at bar, the entry of the order ustaininO' the motion
contain a tatement or :finding that the contributory n ·ligence of the plaintiff' int tate wa the proxi ate cau e
of hi death it i a jud ment on the merit and th refore
a bar to another a tion.
he vice of thi po ition lie i11
the fact that on a motion for a non uit the ourt ha no
juri di ti n or auth rity to a upon th m rit r adjudiat th right of th
arti
and an att mpt to d o i a
nnllit. . A motion y
f n lant for a non uit doe not
challenge the facts a hown by plaintiff nor all upon the
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court to determine the rights of the parties, but only to

decide as a matter of law whether upon the evidence of

plaintiff, as it now stands, he is entitled to take the opinion

of the jur}" on his case. It is a motion based on some de-

fect or neglect of the plaintiff, and does not involve the

merits. The plaintiff, therefore, is, under all the authori-

ties, authorized, if the motion is sustained to bring his

action again: Black, Judgments (2 ed.), sec. 699; Freeman,

Judgments, sec. 261; Reynolds v. Garner, 66 Barb. 319;

Lindvall v. Woods, (C. C), 47 Fed. 195; Manhattan Life

Ins. Co. V. Broughten, 109 U. S. 121 (3 Sup. Ct. 99, 27 L.

Ed. 878) ; United States v. Parker, 120 U. S. 89 (7 Sup. Ct.

454, 30 L. Ed. 601) ; Gardner v. Michigan Cent. R. Co.,

150 U. S. 349 (14 Sup. Ct. 140, 37 L. Ed. 1107). And it

can make no difference upon what point the motion is al-

lowed, or how the judgment may be framed, or what reci-

tals it may contain, or that the motion was ordered upon

the failure of plaintiff's evidence: 23 Cyc. 1137; 24 Am. &
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Eng. Enc. Law (2 ed.), 801; Black, Judgments (2 ed.), sec.

699; Glimmer v. Trustees of Village, 50 Wis. 247 (6 N. W.

885) ; United States v. Parker, 120 U. S. 89 (7 Sup. Ct.

454, 30 Law. Ed. 601). It is still nothing but a judgment of

nonsuit, which has been likened to the blowing out of a

candle, which a man, at his own pleasure, may light again,

and wliich the statute declares shall not be a bar to another

action for the same cause. At the time the motion was

made by the defendant, the plaintiff, on her own motion,

could have taken a voluntary nonsuit, which certainly

would not have been a bar, and she is in no worse position

because the court on motion of defendant did what she

herself voluntarily could have done. The defendant could

have had a judgment which would have been a bar to

another action if it had rested, and submitted the case

io the jury on plaintiff's evidence, instead of moving for

a nonsuit, but it has no right to experiment with a motion

for a nonsuit, thus reserving to itself the right, if the ruling

is against it, to go into a full trial on the merits, and deny

the ])laiiitirr, if she is the losing party, the right to bring

her Mclioii anew. If the defendant would not be bound by

tlic nilidg on the motion, the plaintiff ought not to be. If

a judgment of nonsuit, on the motion of defendant, is an

adjudication upon the merits, conclusive on the plaintiff.

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 10

ourt to determine the rights of the parties, but only to
ecide as a matter of law whether upon the evidence of
plaintiff, as it now stands, he is entitled to take the opinion
of the jury on his case. It is a motion based on some def ct or n glect of the plaintiff, and does not involve the
m rits. The plaintiff, therefore, is, under all the authoriti s authorized, if the motion is sustained to bring his
action a o·ain : Black, Judgments ( 2 ed.), sec. 699; Freeman,
JudO'ments, sec. 261; Reynolds v. Garner, 66 Barb. 319;
Lind all v. Woods, (C. C.), 47 Fed. 195; Manha,ttan Life
Ins. Co. v. Broughten, 109 U. S. 121 (3 Sup. Ct. 99, 27 L.
Ed. 87 ) ; United States v. Parker, 120 U. S. 89 (7 Sup. Ct.
454 30 L. Ed. 601); Gardner v. Michigan Cent. R. Co.,
150 U . S. 349 (14 Sup. Ct. 140, 37 L. Ed. 1107). And it
an make no difference upon what point the motion is allowed, or how the judgment may be framed, or what recital it may contain, or that the motion was ordered upon
th failure of plaintiff's evidence : 23 Cyc. 1137; 24 Am. &
'Jno-. En. Law (2 ed.), 801; Black, Judgments (2 ed.), sec.
99; Gwnmer v. Trust ees of Village, 50 Wis. 247 (6 N. W.
5); United States v. Park er, 120 U. S. 89 (7 Sup. Ct.
45-1 0 Law. Ed. 601). It is still nothing but a judgment of
non. nit which has been likened to the blowing out of a
ran.ell , which a man, at his own pleasure, may light ao-ain,
n 1 whirh the statute declares shall not be a bar to another
arti< n for the ame cause. At the time the motion was
ma 1 by the defendant, the plaintiff, on her own motion,
u1 have taken a voluntary nonsuit, which certainly
w nlc1 not have been a bar, and she is in no worse position
· n. the court on motion of defendant did what she
h r:rlf voluntaril. ould have done. The defendant could
h v had a ju gm nt which would have been a bar to
nnoth r action if it had re ted, and submitted the ca e
i< U1 jnTy
laintiff 's vidence, instead of moving for
~ n n. 11it, hut it ha no ri ·ht to ""'periment with a motion
for ( non:nit th . r
r in to it If the right, if the ruling
i fl''"l1in . t it, t g int a full trial on them rits, an d ny
tl i · pin i rd i ff if . h i. th 1 . ing party, the riO'bt to brinol1c I' :1<'t ion ' n W.
f th
f nd nt would not b bound by
11<· ntlirw m th' moii n, th
lain.tiff ouo·ht not to be. If
ri j11cl''llH'nt
f non:nit, n th motion of defendant, is an
adj11<li ·ati
n the m rit , on.elusive on the lain.tiff.
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and a bar to another action, then the correlative rule must

be adopted, that a denial of such motion is conclusive upon

the defendant, and operates as a judgment for the plaintiff,

a position nowhere asserted. No judgment can be an estop-

pel unless it is on the merits : Freeman, Judgments, sec.

260. And a motion for a nonsuit is a waiver of the right

to have a judgment on the merits, and submits to the court

the single question whether the plaintiff has proven a case

sufficient to be submitted to a jury, and the sustaining or

overruling of the motion is an adjudication of no other

matter. The case of Bartelt v. Seehorn, 25 Wash. 261 (65

Pac. 185), seems to be contra to this conclusion, but no

authorities are cited in its support, and we have been un-

able to find any, and the rule there announced is against the

plain provisions of our statute.

Judgmicnt reversed, and cause remanded for such other

proceedings as may be proper, not inconsistent with this

decision.
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Reversed.

SMALLEY V. RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILWAY

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Utah. 1908.

34 Utah, 423.

Straup, J.

This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover dam-

ages alleged to have been sustained by him by reason of the

defendant's negligence. The accident happened in the de-

2]
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and a bar to another action, then the correlative rule must
be adopted, that a denial of such motion i conclu ive upon
the defendant, and operate as a judgment for the plaintiff,
a position nowhere asserted. No judgment can be an estoppel unle s it is on the merits: Freeman, Judgments, sec.
260. And a motion for a non uit is a waiver of the right
to have a judgment on the merits, and submits to the court
the single que t ion whether the plaintiff has pro' en a case
sufficient to be submitted to a jury, and the sustaining or
overruling of the motion is an adjudication of no other
matter. The case of Bartelt v. Seehorn, 25 Wa h. 261 (65
Pac. 185), seems to be contra to this conclusion, but no
authorities are cited in its support, and we have been unable to find any, and the rule there announced is against the
plain provi ion of our statute.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for such other
proceedings as may be proper, not inconsistent with this
decision.
Reversed.

fendant's railroad yard at Ogden. It was alleged in the

complaint that the yard was located between two streets in

a well-settled portion of the city ; that in the vicinity of the

accident it had been the custom of the public to cross the

yard and walk along the tracks, and of children to play

about the yard and ride on cars, with the knowledge and

consent of the defendant ; that the yard and cars operated

therein were alluring and attractive to young children, who

SMALLEY V. RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILWAY
COMPANY.
S upreme Court of Utah.

1908.

34 Utah, 423.
STRAUP,

J.

This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages alleged to haYe been su tained by him by rea on of the
defendant's n gligence. The accident happened in the defendant's railroad ard at Ogden. It wa alleged in the
complaint that the yard wa located between two treet in
a well-settled portion of the city; that in the vi init of the
accident it had been t e u t m of the public to cro the
yard an walk aloncr th ti a k , and of children to play
about the yard and rid on car with the knowledge and
consent of the defendant; that the yard and car operated
therein wer _alluring an attra tive to young children who

326
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were attracted to tlie yard aud tempted to ride on cars;

that it was the duty of the defendant to fence the yard, and

in switching cars to have a sufficient number of men engaged

at such work to perform it with reasonable safety to those

who might be in and about the yard, and to have persons

stationed on the cars to control their movements and to ob-

serve proper lookout for the presence of children about the

tracks; that the defendant negligently failed to perform

such duties, by reason of which the plaintiff, a boy five

years of age, who had been attracted to the yard and at

play on or about the tracks, was run against and injured by

a car moved and switched about the yard. The defendant

denied the negligence charged in the complaint, and alleged

that the plaintiff unlawfully, and without the knowledge and

consent of the defendant, entered the yard and while tres-

passing therein attempted, without the defendant's knowl-

edge and consent, to board a moving car, which was being

switched about the yard, and in so doing fell and was in-
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jured without fault on the part of the defendant, and that

the custodian of the plaintiff, in whose charge the child

had been placed by its father, was guilty of negligence in

permitting it to wander about and to enter the yard. The

case was tried to the court and jury.

* * * At the conclusion of the evidence the court, on the

defendant's motion, directed the jury to render a verdict,

*'in favor of the defendant, no cause of action." The jury

rendered a verdict, finding ''the issues joined in favor of

the defendant, and against the plaintiff, no cause of ac-

tion." A judgment was entered on the merits in favor of

the defendant, from which this appeal is prosecuted by

plaintiff.

It is contended by appellant that, though the evidence

was not sufficient to let the case to the jury, the court never-

tlieless was not authorized to direct a verdict and enter a

judgment on merits, as was done. This claim is made up-

on tlio following statutory provisions (section 3181, Comp.

Tiuws 1907) : "An action may be dismissed or a judgment

of nonsuit entered in the following cases: (1) By the plain-

tiff himself at any time before trial, upon the payment of

costs, if a counter-claim has not been made, or affirmative

relief sought by the answer of the defendant, etc. (2) By

TRIAL PRACTICE
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were attracted to the Tard and tempted t o ride on cars;
that it wa the duty of the defendant to fence the yard, and
in witching cars to have a ufficient number of men engaged
at u h work to perform it with reasonable safety to those
wh might be in and about the yard, and to have persons
tation d on the cars to control their movements and to oberv proper lookout for the presence of children about the
tra k · that the d.efendant negligently failed to perform
" U h duti
, by rea on of ·which the plain tiff, a boy five
ar of age, who had been attracted t o the yard and at
pla on or about the track , was run against and injured by
a ar moy d and witched about the yard. The def endant
d ni d the negligence charO' d in the complaint, and alleged
that the plaintiff unlawfully, and without the knowledge and
con nt of the defendant, entered the yard and while tresI a ing th rein attempted, without the def endant's knowldO'e and onsent, to board a moving car, which was being
swit b d about tbe yard, and in so doing fell and was injur d without fault on the part of the defendant, and that
th u todian of the plaintiff, in whose charge the child
bad l en p]a ed by its father, wa guilty of negligence in
p rmittinO' it to wander about and to enter the yard. The
a e wa tried to the court and jury.
* * * * • * * * * *
t the conclu ion of the evidence the court, on the
nt . motion, dir cted the jury to render a verdict,
i f v r of the def ndant, no can e of action.'' The jury
r nd r
a v rdict, findinO' ''the i sues joined in favor of
th
f n la t and ap-ain t the plaintiff, no cause of acti n.' .A ju 1 :inent 'va ntered on the merit in favor of
th 1 f ndant, from which thi appeal i p r osecuted by
plaintiff.
i · <'ont nc1 d by app llant that, thouo-h the evidence
wn . n t .- um irnt t l t tli ra. e to the jury, th court n vertlu·l .,.,. wa: not au h riz 1 to dir t a ver i t and enter a
i11dg111<·nt o
l rit.·, a. w . don .
Thi laim i made upon t 11 • following .·ta u ory pr i i ns ( e tion 31 1, omp.
Law 1~Jn7 : '1 n a ·ti on
>T
di · i d or a jud<rment
of ll<>ll ·11it <·n1Prr<1 in tlir followino- a s: ( ) By th i lainifT l1i111 ." 1·lf nl any tim h •f r trial, upon th paym n t of
,.,, t .' , if a <·ount<•r-<'ln i n h·L· not 1 n ma, 1
r affirm tive
]'(>]ir·f . Oil rh I>) th Ull.'W r f th d f ndant, et c. (2) B'
1
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cither party upon the written consent of the other. (3) By

the court when the plaintiff fails to appear on the trial, and

the defendant appears and asks for the dismissal. (4) By

the court when upon the trial and before the final submis-

sion of the case the plaintiff abandons it. (5) By the court

upon motion of the defendant, when upon the trial the

plaintiff fails to prove a sufficient case for the jury; pro-

vided, that the offering of evidence after the overruling of

a motion for a nonsuit shall not be deemed or considered a

waiver of the exception taken by the defendant to the order

overruling such motion. (6) By the court when after ver-

dict or final submission the party entitled to judgment neg-

lects to demand and have the same entered for more than

six months." Section 3182: ''In every case, other than

those mentioned in the next preceding section, judgment

must be rendered on the merits." By reason of these pro-

visions, especially subdivision 5 of section 3181, it is ar-

gued that the direction of a verdict in favor of the defend-
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ant, when the plaintiff fails to prove a sufficient case for the

jury, can have no greater effect than the granting of a mo-

tion of nonsuit. * * * *

**********

In some respects the principles applying to a motion of

nonsuit also apply to a motion for a direction of a verdict.

In a general sense it may be said that both take the place

of a demurrer to the evidence and are governed by the same

principles. But a demurrer to the evidence was a submis-

sion of the case for final determination, which determina-

tion called for a judgment on the merits. Our Code has
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ither party upon the written consent of the other. (3) By
the court when the plaintiff fails to appear on the trial, and
the defendant appears and a k for the dismis al. ( 4) By
the court when upon the trial and before the final submission of the case the plaintiff abandons it. ( 5) By the court
upon motion of the defendant, when upon the trial the
plaintiff fails to prove a ufficient ca e for th jur ; provided, that the offering of evidence after the overruling of
a motion for a non uit shall not be deemed or considered a
waiver of the exception taken by the defendant to the order
overruling uch motion. (6) By the court when after verdict or final submi ion the part entitled to judgment neglects to demand and have the same entered for more than
six months.'' Section 3182: ''In every case, other than
those mentioned in the next preceding section judgment
must be rendered on the merits.'' By reason of these provision , e pecially nbdivision 5 of ection 3181, it is argued that the direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant, when the plaintiff fail to prove a ufficient case for the
jury, can have no greater effect than the granting of a motion of nonsuit. * * * *

provided under what circumstances a motion of nonsuit

may be granted, and that the granting of such a motion

shall not be an adjudication on merits, nor shall the over-

ruling of such a motion preclude the moving party from

thereafter offering evidence, as was the case on a demurrer

to evidence. The court may, at the close of plaintiff's evi-

dence, on plaintiff's motion, grant a voluntary, and on the

defendant's motion an involuntary, nonsuit. The court

may do the same thing at the close of all the evidence, and

before the case has been submitted for firial determination.

In each of such cases the judgment is not on the merits

The plaintiff, however, at the close of liis evidence may rest

and submit the case for final determination. The defend-

* * * * * * * * * *
In some re pect the principles applying to a motion of
nonsuit also apply to a motion for a direction of a verdict.
In a general sen e it may be said that both fake the place
of a demurrer to the evidence and are governed by the same
principle . But a demurrer to the evidence wa a ubmission of the case for final determination, which determination called for a judgment on the merits. Our Code has
provided under what circum tances a motion of nonsuit
may be granted and that the granting of such a motion
shall not be an adjudication on merit nor hall the overruling of such a motion preclude the movinO' party from
thereafter off rin evidence a wa the ca e on a d mnrrer
to evidence. Th court may at the lo e of plaintiff' evidence on I laintiff motion grant a voluntary and on the
defendant' motion an involuntary non uit. The court
may do the ame thing at the clo e of all the evidence and
before the a. e ha b n nhrnitteil f0r final <letermination.
In each of uch cases the judgment is not on the merit
The plaintiff howe-~ er t th lo of hi "iden may re t
and submit the case for final determination. The defend-
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ant may do likewise witliout offering any evidence. So, too,

at the close of all the evidence offered by both parties, the

plaintiff may still submit the case for final determination,

as also may the defendant. Wlienever a party ''rests" his

case, he indicates that he has produced all the evidence he

intends to offer, and submits the case, either finally, or sub-

ject to his right to afterwards offer rebutting evidence.

When both parties have "rested," they indicate a submis-

sion of the case for final determination. The determination

on such a submission is on the merits. If the facts are in

dispute, the case must be sent to the jury for their finding,

upon which a judgment on merits is entered accordingly.

If the facts are not in dispute, the determination presents

a mere question of law, to be decided by the court, upon

whose decision, or upon the rendition of a verdict directed

by him, a judgment is also entered on the merits. Upon

a final submission of the case, when there is no evidence to

sustain the case of the party having the affirmative, it is
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proper for the court to direct a verdict against him. It is

as proper for the court to direct a verdict against the plain-

tiff, in the absence of proof to establish a fact essential to

his case, as to direct a verdict against him when the proof,

either upon his own evidence or that of the defendant, con-

clusively establishes some affirmative defense. We do not

understand the statute to mean that the court is authorized

to direct a verdict in the one instance, but not in the other,

or that the court is unauthorized to direct a verdict in any

case. In the case in hand, upon the evidence adduced by

both parties, the case was submitted for final determina-

tion without the making of a motion of nonsuit or dismissal

by either party. Upon such a submission the defendant

urged that the facts were not in dispute, and that, on the

esta])lished facts, it, as matter of law, was entitled Lo a

judgment in its favor. On the other hand, the plaintiff

ui-ged that the facts were in dispute, and that the question

of the defendant's negligence was one of fact, and not of

law, and hence the determination of the case required a

finding by the jury. In such case the determination, wheth-

er made by the court as matter of law, or by tlie jury as

matter of fact, called for a judgment on the merits. We

are tliorefore of the opinion that the court was fully au-

thorized to direct such a verdict and to enter such a judg-
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ant may do likewise without offering any evidence. So, too,
at the close of all the evidence offered by both parties, the
plaintiff may still submit the case for final determination,
as also may the defendant. Whenever a party ''rests'' his
case, he indicates that he has produced all the evidence he
intends to offer, and submits the case, either finally, or subject to his right to afterwards offer rebutting evidence.
When both parties have ''rested,'' they indicate a submission of the ca e for final determination. The determination
on such a submission is on the merits . If the fa cts are in
dispute, the case must be sent to the jury for their finding,
upon which a judgment on merits is enter ed accordingly.
If the facts are not in dispute, the determination presents
a mere question of law, to be decided by the court, upon
whose decision, or upon the rendition of a verdict directed
by him, a judgment is also entered on the merits. Upon
a final ubmission of the case, when there is no evidence to
u tain the case of the party having the affir mative, it is
proper for the court to direct a verdict against him. It is
a I roper for the court to direct a verdict against the plaintiff, in the absence of proof to establish a fact essential to
hi ca , a to direct a verdict against him when the proof,
ith r upon his own evidence or that of the def endant, conclu. iv ly e tabli hes some affirmative defense. W e do not
un rstand the tatute to mean that the cour t is authorized
to dir t a Yerdi t in the one instance, but not in the other,
or that th ourt i unauthorized to direct a verdi ct in any
a . In tbe ca. e in hand, upon the eviden ce adduced by
b th parti . , the ca e was submitted for final determinati n without th making of~ motion of nonsuit or dismissal
by ith r I arty. Upon uch a submission the defendant
urge that the facts were not in dispute, and that, on the
t hli ·h d facts, it, as matter of law, was entitled Lo a
ju cl 0
nt i its favor. On the oth r hand, the plaintiff
urg ·cl that the factR were in dispute, and that the question
f thP dC'f Pn ant's negligence was one of fac t, and not of
la w ~md h n
the determination of the case required a
fln Jing} y th jury. In . uch ase the determination, wheth-·
·r mac10 hy tli ronrt as matt r of law, or by the jury as
r a1t«r >f fad ra11 cl fr
juigm nt on the merits. We
:n· 111£'r<•f' 1rc· lf 01
ini n that the court wa. fully autl1orizf'cl to <lir ·t . u<'h a er i t and to enter such a "judg-
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ment. Whether the ruling was erroneous remains to be

considered.

It is urged that the court erred in directing a verdict

because no grounds were stated for such action. This

court has repeatedly held that the particular grounds upon

which a motion for nonsuit is based must be stated in order

that the attention of the court and counsel may be called

thereto, and that the defects in the proof may be obviated

and corrected, if such defects admit of correction. Frank

V. Bullion-Beck, etc., M. Co., 19 Utah, 35, 56 Pac. 419 ; Skeen

V. 0. S. L. R. R. Co., 22 Utah, 413, 62 Pac. 1020 ; Leivis v.

Mining Co., 22 Utah, 51, 61 Pac. 860; Wild v. Union Pac.

Ry. Co., 23 Utah, 266, 63 Pac. 886, and other cases there

cited. From the above cases it will be seen that a judgment

of nonsuit in a number of them was reversed because the

grounds upon which the motion was based were not suffici-

ently specified, regardless of the question of the sufficiency

of the evidence to send the case to the jury. The general
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rule, when a motion is denied or an objection overruled,

the moving party is permitted, on appeal, to urge only

such grounds for a reversal as were specifically pointed

out or made by him before the trial court, but when the

motion or objection is sustained, because of the presump-

tion against error coming to his aid, a party is permitted,

on appeal, to defend the ruling on any ground inhering

in the record, was, either in effect or expressly, held, in a

number of cases in this jurisdiction, not applicable to a

motion of nonsuit. In the case of White v. Rio Grande

Western Ry. Co., 22 Utah, 138, 61 Pac. 568, it was expressly

decided that there is no difference with respect to the rule

requiring a specification of grounds when the motion is

denied and when the motion is sustained. In Mclntyre v.

Ajax Min. Co., 20 Utah, 332, 60 Pac. 552, this court held

that ''an appellate court will not sustain a motion for

nonsuit, except on the grounds alleged in the motion, ' ' and

approvinglv quoted the syllabus, in the case of Palmer v.

Marysville Dem. Puh. Co., 90 Cal. 168, 27 Pac. 21 that

''It is error for the trial court to grant a nonsuit, unless

the grounds therefor are called to the attention of the

trial judge and the plaintiff at the time the motion is made;

and, where none of the grounds upon which the nonsuit is

asked are sufficient to warrant the court in granting the
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ment. Whether the ruling was erroneous remains to be
considered.
It is urged that the court erred in directing a verdict
because no grounds were stated for such action. This
court has repeatedly held that the particular grounds upon
which a motion for nonsuit is ba ed must be stated in order
that the attention of the court and counsel may be called
thereto, and that the defects in the proof may be obviated
and corrected, if such defects admit of correction. Frank
v. Bullion-Beck, etc., M. Co., 19 Utah, 35, 56 Pac. 419 ; Skeen
v. 0. S. L. R. R. Co., 22 Utah, 413, 62 Pac. 1020; Lewis v.
Mining Co., 22 Utah, 51, 61 Pac. 860; Wild v. Union Pac.
Ry. Co., 23 Utah, 266, 63 Pac. 886, and other ca es there
cited. From the above ca es it will be een that a judgment
of non uit in a number of them wa re' er ed becau e the
ground upon which the motion wa ba ed were not sufficiently specified, regardle of the que tion of the sufficiency
of the evidence to send the case to the jury. The general
rule, when a motion is denied or an objection overruled,
the moving party is permitted, on appeal, to uro·e only
such grounds for a rever al as were specifically pointed
out or made by him before the trial court, but when the
motion or objection is su tained, because of the presumption again t error coming to hi aid, a party i permitted,
on appeal, to defend the ruling on any ground inhering
in the record, wa , either in effect or expre sl ~, held, in a
number of ca es in thi juri diction not applicable to a
motion of nonsuit. In the ase of White v. Rio Grande
West ern Ry. Co., 22 Utah, 138, 61 Pac. 568, it was expres ly
decided that there i no difference with re pect to the rule
requiring a pecification of grounds when the motion is
denied and when the motion i ustained. In IJ! clntyre v .
.Ajax 1J1in. Co., 20 Utah, 332, 60 Pac. 552, this court h Id
that ''an ap1 ellate court will not ustain a motion for
non uit, except on the ground alleged in the motion '' and
approvingly quoted the } llabu , in the case of Palm er v.
Marysville Dem. Pitb. Co., 90 al. 168, 27 Pac. 21 that
"It i error for the trial ourt to grant a nonsuit, unle s
the ground ther for are called to the attention of the
trial judge and the plaintiff at the time th motion i made;
and, where none of the grounds upon which the non uit is
asked are sufficient to warrant the court in granting the
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motion, the order granting it will be reversed, although

another gronnd, not specified in the motion, might have

warranted the order."

We think the reasons given by courts, requiring the

grounds upon which a motion for nonsuit is based to be

specified, in order that the court ma_y know upon what

question of law the case is asked to be taken from the jury,

and the party against whom the motion is directed may

be afforded opportunity to correct the defects, if they ad-

mit of correction, and can be obviated by additional evi-

dence, apply with equal force to a motion for a direction

of a verdict. If such opportunity should be afforded him

on a motion of nonsuit, which, if granted, would not be an

adjudication on the merits, and not a bar to another action,

for much stronger reasons should such opportunity be given

him on a motion for a direction of a verdict, which, if

granted, would be a bar to another action. * * *

* * * In the case of Tandercup v. Hansen, 8 S. D. 375,
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66 N. W. 1073, it was said:

"Where such a motion is made, the specific ground upon

which the motion is made must be stated. It is due to the

court and the opposing counsel, that their attention should

be called to the precise defect in the evidence, or the omis-

sion of evidence, that the party claims entitles him to the

direction of the verdict. It is due to the court to enable

it to pass understandingly upon the motion, and it is due

to counsel that he may, if possible, supply the defective

or omitted evidence if permitted to do so by the court."

The same doctrine is stated in 6 PI. & Pr. 699, in the fol-

lowing language:

"The motion to direct a verdict, and the judge in mak-

ing such direction, should specify the particular ground or

grounds which justify it."

We have not been referred to, nor have we seen, any

case holding to the contrary. This, however, does not mean

that the movant of the motion or the court is required to

state reasons supporting the grounds. If the grounds are

sulliciently specified to call attention to the particular de-

fects and the (luostion of law on which the case is taken

from the jury, that is all that is required. A mere general

statement that, under the evidence, the plaintiff is not
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motion, the order granting it will be reversed, although
another ground, not specified in the motion, might have
warranted the order.''
We think the reasons giYen by courts, requiring the
ground upon wh ich a motion for nonsuit i based to be
pecified, in order that the court may know upon what
que tion of law the case is a ked to be taken from the jury,
and th party again t whom the motion is directed may
be afforded opportunity to correct the defect s, if they admit of correction, and can be obviated by additional evidence, apply with equal force to a motion for a direction
of a verdict. If such opportunity . hould be afforded him
on a motion of nonsuit, which, if granted would not be an
a ju i ation on the merits, and not a bar t o another action,
fo r much tronO'er reasons should uch opportunity be given
him on a motion for a direction of a verdict, which, if
granted, would be a bar to another action. * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
* * * In the case of Tandercup v. H ansen, 8 S. D. 375,
N. W . 1073 it was said:
here such a motion is made, th e specific ground upon
\\hi h the motion i made must be stated. It is due to the
urt and the opposing counsel, that their attention hould
1 e alled to the preci e defect in the evidence, or the omis.-ion of evidence, that the I arty claims entitles him to th e
dir ction of the verdict. It is due to the court to enable
it to pas understandingly upon the motion, and it is due
to couns 1 that he ma. T' if pos ible, supply the defectiv
or omitted vid n if permitted to do so by the court.''
b
ame doctrin i ta_t d in 6 P l. & Pr. 699, in the fol lowi
lanO'uag :
''Th moti n to dire t a vercli t, and th judge in maki a .-u h dir ti n 1 u1d I cify the particular ground or
gr nn 1 whi h ju, ti f~ it."
\V , ]1av n t h ~n r f rr
t , nor have we
en, any
Thi , how v r, does not m an
oii n r the court is require t
th oTou 1 . If th ground a re
all tt ntion to the particula r der · ·t.· and th qu . ti
f law n whi h the a e i t · ken
fro tl1 • jnr;, th, t i.- 11 that i. r quir d. A mere g n ral
at ·nH·nt tl1 t, u
r th· n nc , th
l aintiff i not
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entitled to recover, or that the defendant is entitled to a

verdict, or that the plainiff has not made a sufficient case

to go to the jury, does not point to an\i;hing. If, however,

in a case of negligence a specification is made that the evi-

dence is insufficient to show negligence on the part of

the defendant, or that under the evidence the plaintiff is

conclusively shown to be guilty of contributory negligence,

or that he assumed the risk, etc., such a specification is

ordinarily sufficient. If a verdict is directed on the ground

that the evidence is insufficient to show negligence on the

part of the defendant, it sufficiently is made to appear on

what question of law the case was taken from the jury.

The making of such a specification ordinarily points out

the defect within the meaning of the adjudicated cases.

The court in such instance may give reasons why in his

opinion the e\ddence is insufficient to show such negligence.

Though the reasons given may be groundless, yet, if upon

an examination of the record the evidence is found insuffici-
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ent to show such negligence, the ruling must be upheld. The

rule is also qualified to the extent that, if it is otherwise

made manifest upon what question of law the case was

taken from the jury, and the defects upon which it was

based do not admit of correction, or could n<ot have been

cured had direct attention been called thereto, a failure to

specify grounds will not reverse the ruling. Daley v. Russ,

86 Cal. 114, 24 Pac. 867; Fontana v. Pac. Can. Co., 129 Cal.

51, 61 Pac. 580. It may, however, be urged that a request

to direct a verdict is a request to charge, and that a party

submitting requests is not required to state reasons or

grounds in sujDport of them. But a request to direct a ver-

dict is not a request to charge the jury. It is, in effect, a

motion to take the case from their consideration. When

a verdict is directed by the court, the jury is bound to

render the verdict as directed. In such instance the court

alone determines the case, and there is no occasion to in-

struct or charge the jury in respect of the law applicable to

the case.

"With these observations we now proceed to the question

in hand. At the conclusion of all the evidence, and after

both parties had rested, counsel for the defendant stated:

**I now move the court to instruct the jury to return a

verdict in favor of the defendant, no cause of action ; and.
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entitled to reco er, or that the defendant is entitled to a
verdict, or that the plainiff has not made a ufficient case
to go to the jury does not point to anything. If, however,
in a case of negligence a pecification is made that the evidence is insufficient to show negligen e on the part of
the defendant, or that under the e idence the I laintiff i
conclu ively shown to be guilty of contributory neo·ligence
r that he as urned the ri k, etc., uch a pecification is
ordinarily suffi ient. If a verdict is dire ted on the ground
that the evidence i in ufficient to how negligence on the
part of the defendant, it . ufficiently is made to appear on
what que tion of law the ca e was taken from the jury.
The making of u h a pecification ordinarily point out
the defect within the meaning of the adjudicated ca e .
The court in such in tance may give rea on wh in hi
opinion the evidence i in ufficient to how uch n egli ·ence.
Though the rea on given may be g oundle
yet, if upon
an examination of the record the evidence is found in ufficient to show uch negligence, the ruling mu t be upheld. The
rule is al o qualified to the extent that, if it is otherwi e
made manife t upon what que tion of law the case wa
taken from the jury, and +he defect upon which it wa
based do not admit of correction or could oot have been
cured had direct attention been called thereto, a failure to
specify grounds will not reverse the ruling. Daley v. Russ,
86 Cal. 114, 24 Pac. 867; Fontana Y. Pac. Can. Co., 129 Cal.
51, 61 Pac. 580. It may, howe er, be urged that a request
to direct a verdict is a reque t to charge and that a party
submitting reque t is not required to tate rea on or
grounds in upport of them. But a reque t to direct a verdict is not a reque t to char ·e the jury. It i , in eff ct a
motion to take the ca e from their con ideration. When
a verdict is direct d by the court the jur. is bound to
render the verdict a directed. In uch in tance the c urt
alone determines the ca e, and there i no occa ion to intruct or charge the jur3 in re pect of the law appli able to
the ca e.
With thes ob ervation we now proceed to the qu tion
in hand. At th conclu ion of all the evidenc and aft r
both partie had re te
oun 1 for the defendant tate :
' I now move the court to in truct the jury to r turn a
verdi t in fa or of the d f ndant no cau e of a tion · and
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in view of the elaborate discussion that has been had, I

am not inclined to argue it, unless the court desires to hear

further upon some particular question from us. If counsel

cares to argue it, I will replj^ to any suggestions that he

may have." It must be conceded that the motion itself

specifies no grounds, and were that all that was made to

appear, it would be very doubtful whether the question of

law upon which the verdict was asked to be directed was

sufficiently indicated. Counsel for plaintiff in reply to the

suggestion stated that he did not care to argue questions

which had already been argued. As disclosed by the rec-

ord, the questions referred to involved the doctrine of the

''turntable" cases, and its application to the facts in the

case. Counsel for plaintiff further stated that, under all

the circumstances of the case, whether the employees of

the defendant exercised due care in the premises was a

question of fact for the jury, and urged that the evidence

was conflicting as to whether the child caught hold of the
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car, or whether it was injured in some other way. The

court then observed that, if counsel desired to take the

position that there was such a conflict, he would exclude

the jury and permit counsel to argue it. The jury was

thereupon excluded, and the matter then discussed by coun-

sel for plaintiff. In that connection he also discussed the

question, and took the position that the employees were

guilty of negligence in not anticipating the return of the

child, and in failing to discover it after it had returned to

the yard. At the conclusion of plaintiff's discussion, the

court indicated that he did not care to hear from counsel

for the defendant, and stated that, in his opinion, the evi-

dence without dispute, showed that the plaintiff attempted

to get on the car, or was riding on the car, at the time the

injury was icflicted, and that, under the circumstances, he

was not entitled to recover. The jury was thereupon re-

called, and directed to return a verdict for the defendant.

The particulars upon which the verdict was directed were

theretofore called to the attention of counsel, and the ques-

tion of law upon which the verdict was directed sufficiently

indicated. If the defects were curable, plaintiff was in the

same position to cure them as though the motion itself had

specified the grounds.

This, then, brings us to the further point, made by the
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in view of the elaborate discussion that bas been bad, I
am not inclined to argue it, unless the court desires to bear
further upon some particular question from us. If counsel
care to argue it, I will reply to any suggestions that be
ay have." It must be conceded that the motion itself .
l cifies no grounds, and were that all that was made to''
appear, it would be very doubtful whether the question of
law upon which the verdict was asked to be directed was
ufficiently indicated. Counsel for plaintiff in reply to the
uo·gestion tated that he did not care to argue questions
which had already been argued. As disclosed by the record, the question. referred to involved the doctrine of the
"turntable" ca e , and its application to the facts in the
case. Counsel for plaintiff further stated that, under all
the circumstances of the ca e, whether the employees of
the defendant exercised due care in the premises was a
que ti on of fact for the jury, and urged that the evidence
was conflicting as to whether the child caught hold of the
ar, or whether it was injured in some other way. The
court th n observed that, if counsel desired to take the
po ition that there was such a conflict, he would exclude
the jury and permit counsel to argue it. The jury was
ther upon excluded, and the matter then discussed by couns 1 for plaintiff. In that connection he also di cussed the
que tion, and took the position that the employees were
guilty of n gligence in not anticipating the return of the
child, and in failing to discover it after it had returned to
the yard. At the conclu ion of plaintiff's discussion, the
court indi t d that he did not care to hear from counsel
for the d f ndant, and stated that, in his opinion, the evid
e without di ute, showed that the plaintiff attempted
to g t on th car, or was ridin 0 · on the car, at the time the
inj r y wa infli ted, and that, under the circum tances, he
wa not ntitled to r over. The jury was thereupon re11 d, an dir()rt to return a v rdict for the def ndant.
r h • pc r1 iC'nlar: upon wl1i h tb v rdict was directed were
tlH·r ·ioforc• <'allP<1 t th attention of counsel, and the qu si n f law upon wliif'h th v r i t was direct d ufficiently
in <l i ·n t <1. ff th
f f'1 : er cur ble, plain tiff was in the
arn" pu: ition t · ir th m . though the motion itself had
s c·i fie I tl1 ~ ground .
Thi , th ·n, bring us t the further point, made by the
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appellant, that the evidence was sufficient to send the case

to the jury on the question of the defendant's negligence.

In this case the presence of the plaintiff and his com-

panion, on their first visit to the yard, was discovered by

the defendant's employees. Instead of remaining passive

and inactive, the employees took sufficient affirmative ac-

tion in the premises to cause the removal of the children, i

In obedience to the direction given them they left the yard

and entered upon adjoining premises, and disappeared

from the sight of the employees. The employees gave the

matter sufficient attention to satisfy themselves that the

children had left the premises, and that they were no longer

in danger. Up to this point it is not contended that the

defendant's employees did not do all that due care re-

quired. Thereafter they directed their attention to their

work, and continued switching and moving cars about the

yard. In a few minutes the children, without the observa-

tion of the employees, again entered the yard and stood
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between the fence and the track several lots to the east

of the place where they had left the premises, and there

watched the car slowly approaching them. When it reached

them, they, without the knowledge of the defendant's em-

ployees, took hold of it and attempted to get on it. To

now hold with appellant's contention that the employees

ought to have anticipated that the children might return,

and that they were required to observe a lookout for them

before moving and switching the car from one track to

another, or to accompany it so as to warn the children

away or prevent them from getting on it, requires not only

a holding that the employees were in duty bound to use

care to discover the presence of trespassing children, and.

of wholly unauthorized intrusions of others, to the same

extent as to discover the presence of persons and children

who may, with knowledge on the part of the employees, be

rightfully about the premises, but also requires a holding

that the employees were required to use care to prevent

trespassing children from injuring themselves in the de-

fendant's yard. Upon the undisputed facts in the case the

law does not warrant such a holding. Though it should

be held that the employees, in the switching and moving

of cars about the yard, owed a duty in the premises to use

appellant, that the evidence was sufficient to end the ca e
to the jury on the question of the defendant's neglig nee.

* * * * * * * * * *
In this case the presence of the plaintiff and his companion, on their first visit to the yard, was discov red by
the defendant's employees. Instead of remaining I a sive
and ina tive, the employees took sufficient affirmative action in the premises to cause the removal of the children. 1
In obedience to the direction given them the left the yard ·
and entered upon adjoining premises, and disappeared
from the sight of the employees. The employee s gave the
matter sufficient attention to satisfy themselves that the
children had left the premises, and that they were no longer
in danger. Up to this point it is not contended that the
defendant's employees did not do all that due care required. Thereafter they directed their attention to their
work, and continued switching and moving cars about the
yard. In a few minute the children, without the observation of the employees, again entered the yard and stood
between the fence and the track several lots to the east
of the place where they had left the premi;:ies, and there
watched the car slowl approaching them. When it reached
them, they, without the knowledge of the defendant's employees, to ok hold of it and attempted to get on it. To
now hold with appellant' contention that the employees
·ought to have anticipated that the children might return,
and that the were required to observe a lookout for them
before moving and switching the car from one track to
another, or to accompany it o as to warn the children
away or prevent them from getting on it, requires not only
a holding that the employees were in duty bound to u e
care to di cover the pre ence of tre pas ing children, an ,.
of wholly unauthorized intru ions of others, to the sam<~
extent as to di cover the pre ence of person and childr n
who may, with knowledge on the part of the employees be
ri ·htfully about the pr mi , but al o r equir a holding
that the employ
w re r quired to u e are to prevent
tre a ing chil ren from injurin · them elve in the depon the undisputed fa t in th ca e the
fendant' yard.
law does not warrant uch a holding. Thouo-h it hould
be held that the m lo e , in the witching and movin
of cars about the yard, owed a duty in the premises to u e
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care in such operations, the evidence is insufficient to jus-

tify a finding that such operations were conducted in a neg-

ligent manner, or that the act of moving the car along the

track was the proximate cause of the injury. So far as

made to appear, the car was switched in the usual and ordi-

nary way from one track, and moved along another, at a

speed of from three to four miles an hour. The children

were not struck by the car. It was not the manner in which

the car was oj^erated that caused it to collide with plaintiff,

or that caused the plaintiff coming in contact with it. The

direct cause of his coming in contact with the car was his

taking hold of the car and attempting to ride on it with-

out the knowledge or consent of the defendant's employees.

While the child, because of its age, cannot be regarded a

conscious trespasser, nor held chargeable of contributory

negligence, nevertheless the consequences of its acts can-

not be charged to the defendant. The conduct of the child

was in no sense influenced or induced by any act or conduct
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on the part of the defendant or its employees, nor was the

injury occasioned because of any negligence on their part.

We are of the opinion that the court was justified in direct-

ing a verdict in favor of the defendant.

The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed,

with costs.

McCaety, C. J., and Feick, J., concur.

BOPP V. NEW YORK ELECTRIC VEHICLE TRANS-

PORTATION COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of New York. 1903.

177 New York, 33.

Vann, J.

At the close of the plaintiff's evidence in chief, each de-

fendant made a separate motion for a nonsuit and each

exc(*))1('(l to the action of the court in denying the motion.

Each defendant had the right to then withdraw from the

case and rest upon its exception. Neither did so. The Ve-

\\'\v\it Company ]>i('k(Ml ii]) the burden first, put in its evi-
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are in such operations, the evidence is insufficient to justify a finding that such operations were conducted in a negligent manner, or that the act of moving the car along the
track was the proximate cause of the injury. So far as
ma e to appear, the car was switched in the usual and ordinary way from one track, and moved along another, at a
peed of from three to four miles an hour. The children
were not struck by the car. It was not the manner in which
the car was op rated that caused it to collide with plaintiff,
or that cau ed the plaintiff coming in contact with it. The
direct au e of hi coming in contact with the car was his
taking hold of the car and attempting to ride on it without th knowledge or consent of the defendant's employees.
Whil th child, because of its age, cannot be regarded a
con iou tre pa ser, nor held chargeable of contributory
neo'li <Yence, nevertheless the consequences of its acts cannot he charged to the defendant. The conduct of the child
wa in no ense influenced or induced by any act or conduct
on the part of the defendant or its employees, nor was the
injury o a ioned bee a use of any negligence on their part.
We ar of the opinion that the court was justified in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant.
The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed,
with costs.
McCARTY, C. J., and FRrcK, J., concur.

BOPP V. NEW YORK ELECTRIC VEHICLE TRANSp RT TION COMP ANY.
Court of Appeals of New York. 1903.
177 New York, 33.
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dence and again moved for a nonsuit. Assuming that an

exception was taken to tlie denial of its motion, for the

second time it was in a situation to rely on its exception

and refuse to take any further part in the trial. It did

not do so. On the contrary, it continued to take an active

and aggressive part in the trial by cross-examining the wit-

nesses of its codefendant, thoroughly and at length. It

aided in developing the facts and attempted to defend it-

self against the allegations of the plaintiff and the effort

of the other defendant to fasten the responsibility upon

it alone. It did not succeed, and it now claims that all its

action, after its motions to nonsuit were denied, should go

for naught and be ignored upon the ground that the ques-

tion is the same as if it had withdrawn from the case at

that time. We do not think so. It did not remain in the

case for amusement, but for self-defense, and it could not

make further efforts to defend itself without running the

usual risks. The plaintiff had the right to rely upon any
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evidence in her favor, whether it was put in by herself or

by either defendant, and the Vehicle Company by failing

to withdraw when it had the right to and continuing to take

part in the trial, ran the risk that evidence tending to make

it liable would be received. The situation does not differ

in principle from the ordinary case where a sole defendant,

instead of withdrawing when he fails to secure a nonsuit,

continues to take part in the investigation to the end. In

so doing, even if his motion should have been granted when

made, the exception is undermined and becomes of no avail,

provided at the close of the whole case the evidence pre-

sents a question for the jury.

Thus in Jones v. Union Railway Company (18 App, Div.

267, 268) Judge Cullen said: "When the defendant enters

into its proof, the question never is, whether the plaintiff's

evidence is sufficient to justify the submission of the case

to the jury, but whether, on the whole case, there is a ques-

tion of fact as to the defendant's liability. If, at the close

of a plaintiff's case, the defendant is confident that no

eause of action has been made out, the only method of se-

curing a review of an erroneous ruling on the point is to

let the case stand without further evidence. If the defend-

ant enters upon its evidence, it takes the chances of supply-

ing the deficiencies of the plaintiff's case."

DISMISSAL, No .r -~

·1T, D rn

'TED \ ERDICT
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dence and again moved for a non uit.
urning that an
exception wa taken to th d nial of it motion, for the
econd time it was in a situation to r ly on it exception
and refu e to take any furth r I art in the trial. It did
not do so.
n the contrary, it ontinued to take an active
and agoT ive part in the trial b cros -examining the witne se of it codefendant tborouo·hly and at length . It
aided in d 'eloping the facts and attempted to def end itelf again t the allegation of the plaintiff and the effort
of the other defendant to fa ten the re pon ibilit upon
it alone. It did not u ceed, and it now laim that all its
action, after its motion to non uit were denied, hould go
for naught and be i nored upon the ground that the question is the ame a if it had withdrawn from the case at
that time. We do not think o. It did not remain in the
case for amu ement, but for self-defen e and it could not
make further effort to defend it elf without running the
usual ri ks. The plaintiff had the ri ht to rel upon any
e id nee in her favor whether it wa put in by her elf or
by either defendant and the \ ebicle Compan. by failing
to withdraw wh nit had the right to and continuing to take
part in the trial, ran th e ri k that evidence tending to make
it liable would be rec iv d. The ituation doe not differ
in principl from the ordinary ca e where a sole defendant,
in tead of withdrawing wh n he fail to ecure a non uit,
continue to take part in th investigation to the end. In
o doing even if hi motion hould have been granted when
made, the xception is und rmin d and becomes of no avail,
provided at the clo e of the whole ca e the vidence preent a que tion for th jury.
Tbu in Jones v. Union Raili ·ay Compa ny (1 App. Div.
267 26 ) Ju ge Cullen . aid: "When the def n ant enters
into it proof, the que ti n n ver i whether th plaintiff'
end nee is suffi ient to ju tif the ubmi ion of the ca e
o the jury but wheth r on the whole a e, th r i a que tion of fact a to the d f endant' liability. If at the clo e
of a plaintiff' ca e th d f ndant is confident that no
cau e of action has been made out, the only m th d of eurin a r iew of an erron ou ruling on he point i to
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So in Hopkins v. Clark (158 N. Y. 299, 304) we said

through Judge Bartlett: ''The rule laid down by the

Supreme Court of the United States seems the proper one,

to the effect that when a defendant, after the close of the

plaintiff's evidence, moves to dismiss, and, the motion be-

ing denied, excepts thereto, and then proceeds with his

case, and puts in evidence on his part, he thereby waives

the exception, and the overruling of the motion to dismiss

cannot be assigned as error."

Judge Martin relied upon the case last cited, when, speak-

ing for us all, he said: "Where after a motion to dismiss

at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, a defendant pro-

ceeds with his case and puts in evidence on his part, he

thereby waives the exception to the refusal to nonsuit when

the plaintiff rested." {Sigua Iron Co. v. Broivn, 171 N. Y.

488, 506).

The rule of the Federal courts was expressed by Chief

Justice Waite as follows: "It is undoubtedly true that a
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case may be presented in which the refusal to direct a ver-

dict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's testi-

mony will be good ground for the reversal of a judgment

on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, if the defendant rests

his case on such testimony and introduces none in his own

behalf ; but if he goes on with his defense and puts in testi-

mony of his own, and the jury, under proper instructions,

finds against him on the whole evidence, the judgment can-

not be reversed, in the absence of the defendant's testi-

mony, on account of the original refusal, even though it

would not have been wrong to give the instruction at the

time it was asked." {Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Cum-

mings, 106 U. S. 700, 701. See, also, Littlejohn v. Shaiv,

159 N. Y. 188, 191; Wangner v. Grimm, 169 N. Y. 421, 427;

Accident Insurance Co. v. Grandal, 120 U. S. 527; Northern

Pacific R. R. Co. v. Mares, 123 U. S. 710; Robertson v. Per-

kins, 129 U. S. 233 ; Columbia S P. S. R. R. Co. v. Haiv-

thorne, 144 U. S. 202, 206; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Daniels,

152 U. S. 684.)

In the cases cited the defendant ran the risk that his

own evidence might supply any defect in the plaintiff's

evidence. So, in this case, the Vehicle Company, by con-

timrmg to try its case, for that is what it did, ran the risk

tbut tiie evidence of its codefendant would supply the de-

[Chap. 10
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o in Hopkins v. Clark (158 N. Y. 299, 304) we said
through Judge Bartlett: ''The rule laid down by the
upreme Court of the United States seems the proper one,
to the effect that when a defendant, after the close of the
plaintiff's evidence, moves to dismiss, and, the motion being denied, excepts thereto, and then proceeds with his
case, and puts in evidence on his part, he thereby waives
the exception, and the overruling of the motion to dismiss
cannot be as igned as error.''
Judge Martin relied upon the case last cited, when, speaking for u all, he said: ''Where after motion to dismiss
at the clo e of the plaintiff's evidence, a defendant proceed with his case and puts in evidence on his part, he
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fects in the plaintiff's case against itself. It could not

keep on trying its case without abiding by the condition

of the evidence when all the testimony was in. At that

time there was a question for the jury as to its liability,

and hence its j^revious exceptions, taken when the evidence

did not present that question, became of no avail.

It did not let go of the case when it could have done so

in safety, but hung on until there was evidence enough to

warrant a vt^rdi-^t against it.

Courts sit to do justice according to the rules of law

after giving all parties an opportunity to be heard. The

Vehicle Company had its day in court and was fully heard.

No legal evidence was excluded and no incompetent evi-

dence was received to its injury. It took no exception to

the charge of the court. Under these circumstances public

business and private rights should not be delayed by grant-

ing a new trial on account of an error which was waived

by the subsequent course of the party now complaining.
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The Vehicle Company was not compelled to remain in

the case in order to get an exception when its second mo-

tion was not granted, because an effort to except, made at

the proper time and in the proj^er form, is an exception,

whether allowed by the court or not.

After considering all the exceptions taken by both de-

fendants we find none upon which a new trial should be

granted in behalf of either.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Gray, J. (dissenting).

**********

Haight, Maetin and "Wernee, JJ., concur with Vann, J. ;

Parker, Ch. J., and O'Brien, J., concur with Gray, J.

Judgment affirmed.

T. p.— 22

fects in the plaintiff' case against itself. It could not
keep on trying its ca e without abiding by the condition
of the evidence when all the te timony was in. At that
time there wa a que tion for the jury a to it liability,
and hence its pre iou exception , taken when the evidence
id not pre ent that question, became of no a ail.
It did not let go of the case when it could have done so
in afety, but bung on until there was evidence enough to
warrant a vurdi~t again t it.
ourt it to Lio ju tice according to the rule of law
after gi ing all partie an opportunity to be heard. The
Vehicle ompany had it day in court and was fully heard.
No legal e idence wa exch).ded and no in ompetent evidence was received to it injury. It took no exception to
the charge of the court. Under the e circum tance public
business and pri ate right hould not be delayed by granting a new trial on a count of an error which was waived
by the ub equent cour e of the party now complaining.
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the ca e in order to get an exception when it second motion wa not granted because an effort to except, made at
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wh ther allowed b tbe court or not.
After con idering all tbe exception taken by both defendant we find none upon which a new trial should be
Tant d in behalf of either.
The judgment hould be affirmed, with costs.
GRAY, J. (di enting) .
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and WERNER, J J., concur with VANN, J.;
PARKER,
h. J., and 0 'BRIEN, J., concur with GRAY, J.
Judgment affirmed.
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Section 3. Directed Verdict.

(a) Whe7i Proper.

SECTION

MEYER V. HOUCK.

3.

DIRECTED

v ERDICT.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 1892,

(a)

85 Iowa, 319.

When Proper.

The defendants are husband and wife. On the twenty-

seventh day of November, 1889, the defendant C. F. Houck

MEYER V. HOUCK.

executed and delivered to Calla Houck his promissory note

for about twelve hundred dollars, and a chattel mortgage

Suprerne Court of Iowa. 1892.

upon a stock of goods and merchandise, to secure the pay-

ment of the note. The mortgage was filed for record on the

fourth day of December, 1889, and duly recorded. On the

85 Iowa, 319.

seventh day of December, 1889, the plaintiffs commenced

an action against C. F. Houck upon an account for goods

sold and delivered to him, and sued out an attachment, and

caused the same to be levied upon the mortgaged goods.

Calla Houck intervened in the action, and claimed the goods

as mortgagee. The plaintiffs answered her petition of
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intervention by claiming that the mortgage was invalid

and void as to creditors of C. F. Houck, because it was

made with intent to defraud said creditors. There was a

trial by jury, and when the plaintiffs completed the intro-

duction of their evidence the intervenor moved the court

to direct the jury to return a verdict against the plaintiffs.

The motion was sustained, and the jury returned the ver-

dict as directed, upon which judgment was entered. The

plaintiffs appeal. — Affirmed.

Rothrock, J.

But it is further claimed that there was some evidence

tending to show that the transaction in question was fraud-

ulent, and that it was the duty of the court to submit the

case to tlie jury if there was any evidence, however slight.

It may ])e conceded that there was some evidence. There

are one or two facts which might be regarded as badges of

fraud; but, wlien weighed in tlie balance with the other

evidence, tliey do not constitute such a conflict as would

authorize a verdict for the plaintiffs. The rule of practice

The d fendants are hu band and wife. On the twentys venth day of November, 1889, the defendant C. F. Houck
ex ut d and delivered to Calla Houck his promissory note
for about twelve hundred dollars, and a chattel mortgage
upon a tock of good , and merchandise, to secure the paym nt of the note. The mortgage was filed for record on the
f rth day of December, 1889, and duly recorded. On the
enth day of De ember, 1889, the plaintiffs commenced
an a tion again t . F. Houck upon an account for goods
ld and delivered to him, and sued out an attachment, and
au d the ame to be levied upon the mortgaged goods.
alla Houck interven ed in the action, and claimed the goods
a mortcrag
The plaintiffs answered her petition of
inter ntion b3 laiming that the mortgage was invalid
n void as to creditors of C. F. Houck, because it was
ad with int nt to defraud said creditor . There was a
trial y jury, and when the plaintiffs completed the introu ti n of their vidence the intervenor moved the court
t dir ct the jury to return a verdict again t the plaintiffs.
Th
otion w
u tained, and the jury returned the veri ·t a direct , upon which judgment was entered. The
laintiff a I 1.ffirmed.
TIIRO K,

J.

* • • • • • • * • •
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in relation to directing verdicts which has prevailed in

this state is well understood. A motion to direct a verdict

for the defendant has been regarded as a demurrer to the

evidence, and it has always been held that such a motion

not only admits the truth of the fact found, but every fact

and conclusion which the evidence conduces to prove, or

which the jurj^ might have inferred therefrom in his favor.

The rule was stated in very nearly the foregoing language

in Jones v. Ireland, 4 Iowa, 63. And that practice has ob-

tained in this state up to the present time. There are a

multitude of cases adhering to the rule. It is unnecessary

to cite them. They will be found collected in McClain's

Digest (volume 2, pp. 335-338). The practice has been

that where there is what is called a "scintilla of evidence"

to be considered by the jury, it is error to direct a verdict.

The rule has been stated in various forms of expression, as

will be seen by an examination of the cases. In Way v.

Illinois Central R'y Co., 35 Iowa, 585, the following langu-
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age is employed: "Hence, under the statute, and our pre-

vious rulings, it follows that it is the duty of a nisi priiis

court in this state to submit the case to the jury upon the

evidence where it only tends even to prove it, although the

court should feel in duty bound to set aside a verdict for

the plaintiff if the jury should so find." It is further said

in that case that "in other states a different, and perhaps

better and more consistent rule obtains whereby the court

may direct the jury how to find, where it would set aside

a verdict otherwise." Citing Broivn v. R'y Co., 58 Me. 389;

Wilds V. Hudson River R'y Co., 24 N. Y. 430. In other

cases the statement of the rule has been modified, as in

Starry v. Dubuque & S. W. R'y Co., 51 Iowa, 419, in which

the district court directed a verdict for the defendant, this

court said: "Such being the case, it would have been the

duty of the court to set aside a verdict in favor of the

plaintiff. Why, then, occupy the valuable time of the court

at the public expense for the purpose of going through

a useless form and ceremony?" Language to the same ef-

fect will be found in the case of Botliwell v. C. M. (& St. P.

R'y Co., 59 Iowa, 192. After a thorough examination of ad-

judged cases, we have reached the conclusion that the prac-

tice should be changed so as to harmonize with that "better

and more consistent rule" referred to in Way v. R'y Co.,

DrsMrs. AL, NoN-SurT, DIRECTED VERDICT

339

in r lation to directing verdicts which has prevailed in
this stat is w 11 under tood. A motion to direct a verdict
for tll d £ ndant ha been regarded as a demurrer to the
evid nc , and it ha always been held that uch a motion
not only admit the truth of the fact found, but every fact
and conclu ion which th evidence conduces to prove, or
which the jury might hay inferred therefrom in his favor .
The rule wa tated in very nearly the foregoing language
in Jon e v. Ir land, 4 Iowa, 63. And that practice bas obtained in thi tate up to the present time. There are a
multitude of case adhering to the rule. It is unnecessary
to cite them. The will be found collected in McClain'
Dige t (volume 2, pp. 335-338) . The practice has been
that where th re is what i called a ''scintilla of evidence''
to be con i er d by the jur , it is error to direct a verdict.
The rule ha been tated in various forms of expression, as
will be se n by an examination of the ca es. In Way v.
Illinoi Central R 'y Co ., 35 Iowa, 585, the following language i mployed: ''Hence und r the statute, and our previou ruling , it follow that it is the duty of a nisi priits
court in this tate to ubmit the ca e to the jury upon the
evidence where it only tend even to prove it, although the
court should feel in duty bound to set a ide a verdict for
the plaintiff if the jury hould so find.'' It i further said
in that case that ''in other tates a different, and perhaps
better and more con i tent rule obtain whereby the court
may dir t the jur. how to find, where it would et a ide
a verdi t otherwi e. '' iting Brown v. R 'y Co., 58 J\!Ie. 3 ;
Wilds v. Hud on Ri1 er R'y Co., 24 N. Y. 430. In oth r
cases the tatement of the rule has been modified, as in
Starry v. Dubuque & S. W. R 'y Co., 51 Iowa, 419, in which
the di trict court dire ted a verdict for the defendant, thi
court aid: ''Such being the ca e, it would have been the
duty of th court to set a id a verdi t in fa or of the
plaintiff. vVh , then, ccup the valuable tim of the court
at the ublic expens for the purpo e of goino· throuO'h
au 1
form and cer mon ~" Lan uage to the me ffect will be found in th a of Bothwell v. C. ~f. & St. P.
R'y Co ., 59 Iowa 192. Af r a th rou ·h xamination of adju g d a , we have rea hed the conclu ion that the practi e houl b hang d o a to harmonize with that b tt r
and more con i t nt rule" referred to in Way v. R'y Co.,
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supra, which now obtains in England and in the United

States courts, and in nearly all the states of the Union.

The doctrine in England on this question is well stated in

the following language: "But there is in every case a pre-

liminary question, which is one of law, namely, whether

there is any e\^dence on which the jury could properly find

the verdict for the party on whom the onus of proof lies. If

there is not, the judge ought to withdraw the question from

tlie jury, and direct a nonsuit if the onus is on the plain-

tiff, or direct a verdict for the plaintiff if the onus is on the

defendant. It was formerly considered necessary in all

cases to leave the question to the jury if there was any

evidence, even a scintilla, in support of the case, but it is

now settled that the question for the judge (subject, of

course, to review) is, as is stated by Maule. J., in Jewell v.

Parr, 13 C. B. 916, 'not whether there is literally no evi-

dence, but whether there is none that ought reasonably to

satisfy the jury that the fact sought to be proved is es-
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tablished.' " Ryder v. Womhivell, L. R. 4 Exch. 32; The Di-

rectors, etc., of the Metropolitan R'y Co. v. Jackson, L. R.

3 App. Cas. 193; The Directors, etc., of the Dublin, W. S W.

R'y Co. v. Slatterly Id. 1155.

The rule, as stated by the supreme court of the United

States, is as follows: "The judges are no longer required

to submit a case to a jury merely because some evidence

has been introduced by the party having the burden of

proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that it

would tear rant the jury to proceed in finding a verdict in

favor of the party introducing such evidence. Decided

cases may be found where it is held that, if there is a

scintilla of evidence in support of a case, the judge is

bound to leave it to the jury; but the modern decisions have

established a more reasonable rule, to-wit: that before the

evidence is left to the jury there is or may be in every case

a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there

is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which

a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party

producing it upon whom the burden of proof is imposed."

Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278. See also. Improve-

ment Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 448; Pleasants v. Fant, 12

Wall. 120; Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 373; Merchants Bank v.

State Bank, 10 Wall. 637; Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wal). 201.
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itp ra, which now obtain in England and in the United
tate courts, and in nearly all the states of the Union.
The doctrine in England on this question is well stated in
the following langua£rn: ''But there is in every case a preliminary question, which is one of law, namely, whether
there is any evidence on which the jury could properly find
the verdict for the party on whom the onus of proof lies. If
there is not, the judge ought to withdraw the question from
the jury, and direct a nonsuit if the onus is on the plaintiff, or direct a verdict for the plaintiff if the onus is on the
defendant. It was form erly considered necessary in all
a e to 1 ave the question to the jury if there was any
idence, even a scintilla, in support of the case, but it is
now ettled that the question for the judge (subject, of
our , to revi w) is, as is stated by Maule. J., in Jewell v.
Parr, 13 C. B. 916, 'not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is none that ought reasonably to
ati fy the jury that the fact sought to be proved is establi hed.' '' Ryder v. W ombwell, L. R. 4 Exch. 32; The Directors, etc., of the M etropolitan R'y Co. v. Jackson, L. R.
pp. Cas. 193; The Directors, etc., of the Ditblin, T¥. db W.
R'y Co. v. Slatterly Id. 1155.
Th rul e, a tated by the supreme court of the United
tat , i a follows: ''The judges are no longer required
to ubmit a ca e to a jury merely because some evidence
ha been introduced by the party having the burden of
proof, unl
the vidence be of such a character that it
i ould warrant the jury to proceed in finding a verdict in
fa or of th I arty introducing such evidence. Decided
<· • , may b found where it is held that, if there is a
s ·int illa of viden in sup.port of a case, the judge is
b urn] t 1 av' it to th jury; but the modern deci ions have
:tahli.' li 1 m re r a onable rule, to-wit: that before the
•vi 1<>n<· i. l ft to the jury there is or may b in ever case
lffc•lirninary qu tion for the judge, not whether there
i: lit<'rally n vi n , but whether there is any upo which
a .iury c·c n prop rly pro ed to find a v rdict for the party
pnJrluc·ing it p n whom the burden of proof i irnpos d."
('()mmi ssionrirs v. lark, 4- U. S. 278.
e al o, Improvem nt 'o. v. llfil'l1son, 14 Wall. 448 ; Plea ant v. Fant, ~2
\\:ill. J_O; Parks v. Ros, 11 Tow. 373; Merchants Banlc v.
i 'la le 1 ank, 1
W 11. . 7; Iii krnan v . Jo nes, 9 Wa~J. 201.
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In Pleasants v. Fant, supra, the following language is

used: '*It is the duty of the court, in its relation to the

jury, to protect parties from unjust verdicts arising from

ignorance of the rules of law and of evidence, from im-

pulse of i^assion or prejudice, or from any other violation

of his lawful rights in the conduct of a trial. This is done

by making plain to them the issues they are to try; by

admitting only such evidence as is proper in these issues,

and rejecting all else; by instructing them in the rules of

law by which that eivdence is to be examined and applied;

and finally, when necessary, by setting aside a verdict which

is unsupported by evidence, or contrary to law. In the

discharge of this duty it is the province of the court, either

before or after verdict, to decide whether the plaintiff has

given evidence sufficient to support or justify a verdict in

his favor ; not whether on all the evidence the joreponderat-

ing weight is in his favor; that is the business of the jury.

But conceding to all the evidence offered the greatest pro-
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bative force which, according to the law of evidence, it is

fairly entitled to, is it sufficient to justify a verdict? If it

does not, then it is the duty of the court, after a verdict,

to set it aside, and grant a new trial. Must the court go

through the idle ceremony, in such a case, of submitting to

the jury the testimony on which the plaintiff relies when it

is clear to the judicial mind that, if the jury should find a

verdict in favor of jDlaintiff, that verdict would be set aside,

and a new trial had? Such a proposition is absurd, and

accordingly we hold the true principle to be that, if the

court is satisfied that, conceding all the inferences which

the jury could justifyably draw from the testimony, the

evidence is insufficient to warrant a verdict for the plain-

tiff, the court should say so to the jury." The same doc-

trine may be found in the following cases: Rahy v. Cell, 85

Pa. St. 80, in which it is said that "at one time, indeed, it

was the admitted doctrine that, if there was any, the least

evidence, — a mere scintilla, — the question must be submit-

ted to the jury. But that doctrine has been very justly ex-

ploded both in England and in this state." Wittkowsky v.

Wasson, 71 N. C. 451; Zettler v. City of Atlanta, QQ Ga.

195; Weis v. City of Madison, 75 Ind. 241; Dryden v. Brit-

ton, 19 Wis. 31; Baldiuin v. Shannon, 43 N. J. Law, 596.

Brown v. R'y Co., 58 Me. 384, in which it is said: "It would
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In Plea ants v. Fant, sitpra, the following language i
used : 'It i the duty of the court, in its relation to the
jury, to protect partie from unju t Yerdict ari in · from
ignorance of the rule of law and of ff\idenc , from impulse of pa ion or prejudice or from any other violation
of hi lawful rights in the conduct of a trial. Thi i done
by making plain to th m the i ue they are to try ; by
admitting onl uch evidence a is proper in the e i ue ,
and rejecting all el e ; by in tructing them in the rules of
law by which that ei,~d nee i to be examined and applied ;
and finally, when neces ary, by etting a idea verdict which
is unsupported by e idenc , or contrary to law. In the
discharge of tills duty it is the pro' ince of the court, either
before or after verdict, to decide whether the plaintiff has
given evidence sufficient to upport or ju tif a verdict in
his fa or; not whether on all the evi ence the preponderating weight i in hi faYor · that i the bu ine of the jury.
But conceding to all the evidence offered the greate t probative for ce which according to the law of evidence, it is
fairly entitled to, i it ufficient to ju tify a verdict If it
does not, then it i the duty of the court after a -verdict,
to set it a ide, and grant a new trial. :Mu t the court go
through the idle ceremon , in such a ca e, of submitting to
the jury the te timony on which the plaintiff relie when it
is clear to the judicial mind that, if the jury hould find a
verdict in favor of plaintiff that verdict would be set a ide,
and a new trial had~ Such a propo ition is ab urd, and
accordingly we hold the true principle to be that, if the
court i sati. fied that conceding all the inferences which
the jury could ju tifyably draw from the te timony, the
e idence i in uffi i nt to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff the court h uld ay o to the jury.'' The ame doctrine may b found in the following case : Raby v. Cell, 5
Pa. St. 0 in which it i said that ''at one time, indeed, it
wa the admitted doctrine that if there was any, the l east
evidence -a mere scintilla,- the que tion mu t be ubmitted to th jury. But that doctrine has been very ju tly exlo ed l oth in England and in thi tate." TVittkowsky v.
W a on 71 N. C. ±51; Zettler v. City of .Atlanta, 66 Ga.
195; TV eis v. City of Madison, 75 Ind. 241 · D ryden v. Britto n, 19 Wis. 31; Baldwin v. lwnnon, 43 N. J. L aw, 596.
Brown v. R'y Co., 58 Ie. 38± in hich it is said: "It would
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be absurd to send a cause to a jury when the verdict, if ren-

dered in favor of the plaintiff, would not be permitted to

stand. Wilds v. Hudson River R\j Co., 24 N. Y. 430, in

which it is said: "No legal principle compels him (the

judge) to allow a jury to render a merely idle verdict."

Brown v. Massachusetts M. S L. Insurance Co., 59 N. H.

298; Brooks v. Somerville, 106 Mass. 271; Ensminger v.

Mclntire, 23 Cal. 593; Morgan v, Durfee, 69 Mo. 469; Sim-

mons V. Chicago S T.R'y Co., 110 111. 340. We might cite

rtRrAL PRACTICE

be ab urd to send a cause to a jury when the ve rdict, if r endered in fayor of the plaintiff, would not be permitted to
tand. H ilds v. H udson Riz; er R'y Co., 24 N . Y. 430, in
which it is said: ''No legal principle compels him (the
judge) to allow a jury to render a merely idle verdict.''
Broi n v. Massachusetts "JJ1. & L. Insurance Co., 59 N. H.
298; Brooks v. Somer ville, 106 Mass. 271; Ensminger v.
Mcintire, 23 Cal. 593; "JJ!f organ v . Durfee, 69 :Mo. 469; S imrnons v. Chicago & T. R'y Co., 110 Ill. 340. We might cite
other adjudged cases to the same effect, but it is unnecesary. It will be seen from what we have cited that the
whole turn of legal thought in this country and in England
is contrary to the rule of practice which requires a court
to go on for several days with the trial of a case to a jury
when the verdict must in the end be either f or the defend··
ant, or be set aside if for the plaintiff. It is true there
are decision to be found in a few states in which a scintilla of evidence i allowed to go to the jury. But an examination of the later cases jn some of these states will
how that the rule has not been adhered to. W e have cited
nou o·h ca es to show that the great weight of modern authority i contrary to the rule which this court has adhered
to hough it has more than once intimated that the other
rule adopted by the large majority of courts of last resort
i bett r and more consi tent.
ur onclu. ion i that when a motion is made to direct
a v rdict, the trial judge should sustain the motion when.
n i ring all of the evidence, it clearly appears to him
that it w ul l b his duty to set aside a verdict if found
i favor of th 1 arty upo11 whom the burden of proof
i· .-t. . Tb
ado1 tion f thi rule is no abridgment of the
ri ·ht f trial by jury. ~ party a 0 ·ain t whom a verdict has
}p n lir t
hy lh ourt n have the ruling of the court
r i \ <l b x 1 lion and appeal ju t as well as he can if
th rul were th rwi , and he takes an appeal t o this
· mt fr man rder granti g an w trial after verdict. H e
ha . n right to insi t that th trial of his au e be continued
a. a m r idl form, or a mere exp rim nt, that ho may
hR v th rr ti(fration of , nrino- a verdict which must be
: t a : id
w0 hav s n,
urt v ry o· n rally now
" '" i;-rrnt <' · 11 f' li H 1n·oec•(•cl i ng <. ab: urd. Prohably thL court
lia.
Jon g fullf w cl lh • rul t
in a po. ition to de1

other adjudged cases to the same effect, but it is unneces-

sary. It will be seen from what we have cited that the

whole turn of legal thought in this country and in England

is contrary to the rule of practice which requires a court

to go on for several days with the trial of a case to a jury

when the verdict must in the end be either for the defend-

ant, or be set aside if for the plaintiff. It is true there

are decisions to be found in a few states in which a scin-

tilla of evidence is allowed to go to the jury. But an ex-
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amination of the later cases in some of these states will

show that the rule has not been adhered to. We have cited

enough cases to show that the great weight of modern au-

thority is contrary to the rule which this court has adhered

to, though it has more than once intimated that the other

rule adopted by the large majority of courts of last resort

is better and more consistent.

Our conclusion is that when a motion is made to direct

a verdict, the trial judge should sustain the motion when,

considering all of the evidence, it clearly appears to him

that it would be his duty to set aside a verdict if found

in favor of the party upon whom the burden of proof

rests. The adoi)tion of this rule is no abridgment of the

right of trial by jury. A party against whom a verdict has

been directed by the court can have the ruling of the court

reviewed by exception and appeal just as well as he can if

the rule were otherwise, and he takes an appeal to this

court from an order granting a new trial after verdict. He

has no right to insist that the trial of his cause be continued

as a mere idle form, or a mere experiment, that he may

have the gratification of securing a verdict which must be

sot aside. As wo have soon, courts very generally now

designate sudi a |)i-ocooding as absurd. Probably this court

has too huig folhnvod the rule to be in a position to de-

[Chap. 10
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nounce it in that way; but we think that, as the question

involves no more than the change of a mere rule of practice,

which will be of material advantage in the trial of cases in

the saving of the time of the trial courts, — time which

ought to be devoted to the transaction of legitimate busi-

ness, — and the saving of court expenses to the counties,

with no detriment to the rights of any one, it is high time

that this state should adopt the more consistent and logical

practice which now generally prevails elsewhere.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

McDonald v. metropolitan street railway

COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of New York. 1901,

167 New York, 66.

nounce it in that way; but we think that, as the que tion
involves no more than the change of a mere rule of practice,
which will be of material advantage in the trial of cases in
the saving of the time of the trial court ,-time which
ought to be devoted to the tran action of legitimate business,-and the saving of court expen es to the counties,
with no detriment to the rights of any one, it is high time
that this state hould adopt the more consistent and logical
practice which now generall prevails elsewhere.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Maetin", J.

This action was for personal injuries resulting in death

of the plaintiff's intestate, and was based upon the al-

leged negligence of the defendant. An appeal was allowed
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to this court upon the ground of an existing conflict in

the decisions of different departments of the Appellate

Division as to when a verdict may be directed where there

is an issue of fact, and because in this case an erroneous

principle was asserted which, if allowed to pass uncor-

rected, would be likely ''to introduce confusion into the

McDONALD V. 1\IIETROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY
COMPANY.

body of the law." {Sciolina v. Erie Preserving Co., 151 N.

Y. 50.) The court having directed a verdict, the appel-

Court of Appeals of New York.

1901.

lant is entitled to the most favorable inferences deducible

167 New York, 66.

from the evidence, and all disputed facts are to be treated

as established in her favor. {Laid v. Aetna Ins. Co., 147

N. Y. 478, 482 ; Higgins v. Eagleton, 155 N. Y. 466 ; Ten

Eyck V. Whitbeck, 156 N. Y. 341, 349; Bank of Mononga-

Jiela Valley v. Weston, 159 N. Y. 201, 208.)

If believed, the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses was

sufficient to justify the jury in finding the defendant negli-

gent and the plaintiff's intestate free from contributory

negligence. -The evidence of the defendant was in many

MARTIN, J.
This action was for personal injuries resulting in death
of the plaintiff' intestate, and was based upon the alleged negligence of the defendant. An appeal was allowed
to this court upon the ground of an existing conflict in
the decisions of different departments of the Appellate
Divi ion as to when a verdict may be directed where there
i an i sue of fact, and because in this case an erroneou
principle was asserted which, if allowed to pa s uncorrected, would be likely "to introduce confusion into the
body of the law." (Sciolina v. Erie P reserving Co ., 151 N.
Y. 50.) The court having directed a verdict the app 1lant i entitled to the mo t favorable inference d ducibl
from the evidence, and all di puted facts are to be treate l
a e tabli hed in her favor. (Ladd v. Aetna I ns . Co., 1±7
N. Y. 47 482; Higgin v. Eagleton, 155 N. Y. 466; T en
Eyck v . Tf hitbech, 156 N. -Y. 341, 349; Bank of Monongahela Valley v. TV eston 159 N. Y. 201, 20 .)
If b lie ed, the t timony of the plaintiff' witne e wa
ufficjent to ju tif the jury in findin · the def ndant negli. nt and th
laintiff . in tat fr e fr m
ntributory
n glig nee. -Th Yidonc of the defendant was in many
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respects in direct conflict, and if credited would have sus-

tained a verdict in its favor. Whether the defendant was

negligent, the plaintiff's intestate free from contributory

negligence, and the amount of damages, were submitted to

the jury. It, however, having agreed upon a general ver-

dict and failed to answer the questions submitted, the trial

judge withdrew them and directed a verdict for the defend-

ant. Upon the verdict so directed a judgment was entered.

Subsequently an appeal was taken to the Appellate Divi-

sion, where it was affirmed, and the plaintiff has now ap-

pealed to this court.

Although there was a direct and somewhat severe con-

flict in the evidence, the questions of negligence and con-

tributory negligence were clearly of fact, and were for the

jury and not for the court unless the right of trial by

jury is to be partially if not wholly abolished. It was

assumed below that the plaintiff's evidence established a

case which, undisputed, was sufficient to warrant a verdict
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in her favor. But the court said that at the close of the

defendant's evidence the plaintiff's case had been so far

overcome that a verdict in her favor would have been set

aside as against the weight of evidence. Upon that alleged

condition of the proof, it held that the trial court might

have properly submitted the case to the jury if it saw fit,

but that it was not required to as the verdict might have

been thus set aside. The practical result of that decision,

if sustained, is in every close case to vest in the trial court

authority to determine questions of fact, although the

parties have a right to a jury trial, if it thinks that the

weight of evidence is in favor of one and it directs a ver-

dict in his favor.

There have been statements by courts which seem to

lend some justification to that theory, but we think no

such broad principle has been intended and that no such

rule can 1)0 maintained either upon principle or authority.

The rule that a verdict may be directed whenever the

proof is such that a decision to the contrary might be set

aside as against the weight of evidence would be both un-

certain and delusive. There is no standard by which to

determine whori a verdict may be thus set aside. It de-

pends upon the disci'etion of the court. The result of set-

ting aside a verdict and the result of directing one are

re pect in direct conflict, and if credited would have sustained a verdict in its favor. Whether the defendant was
negligent, the plaintiff's intestate free from contributory
negligence, and the amount of damages, were submitted to
the jury. It, however, having agreed upon a general verdict and failed to answer the questions submitted, the trial
judge withdrew them and directed a verdict for the defendant. Upon the verdict so directed a judgment was entered.
ub equently an appeal was taken to the Appellate Diviion, where it was affirmed, and the plaintiff has now appealed to thi court.
Although there was a direct and somewhat severe conflict in the evidence, the questions of negligence and contributor. negligence were clearly of fact, and were for the
jury and not for the court unless the right of trial by
jury i to be partially if not wholly abolished. It was
a um d below that the plaintiff's evidence established a
case whi h, undisputed, was sufficient to warrant a verdict
in her favor. But the court said that at the clo se of the
d f ndant' evidence the plaintiff's case had been so far
ov r ome that a verdict in her favor would have been set
a id as ao·ainst the weight of evidence. Upon that alleged
ondition of the proof, it held that the trial court might
hav properly ubmitted the case to the jury if it saw fit,
but th t it wa not required to as the verdict might have
n thus et a ide . The practical result of that decision,
if u tain d, i in every close case to vest in the trial court
authority to etermine qu stions of fact, although the
parti . hav a right to a j1117 trial, if it thinks that the
w i 0 ·ht f vid nee is in favor of one and it directs a verrlict in hi. favor.
Th r hav be n statements bv courts which seem to
}Pn
. ome ju.· tifi ation to that theory, but we think no
, U(·h broad prin ipl ha. be n intended and that no such
r11lc c·<rn lw maintain d ither upon principle or authority.
'J 11<• nllP tl1at a v r ict may be directed wh never th
pr 1of' L· snch that a d i ion to the contrary mi ht be set
:i ·idc· :1 · agnin. t tl1P
iµ;lit of vi nee would be both un·1·rt :1i11 and cl ·ln .. ivr. r:rJicr is 110 standard by which to
d l<'n11irH· wl1Pn n VPn1ir-t rnav b , tbu . . t aide. It dep1·111l ttJHm tl1<: <li. c·rPti n f ti1 rourt. The r sult of
tvenli ·t an the r sult of directing one are
ting a ·j
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widely different and should not be controlled by the same

conditions or circumstances. In one case there is a re-

trial. In the other the judgment is final. One rests in

discretion; the other upon legal right. One involves a

mere matter of remedy or procedure. The other de-

termines substantive and substantial rights. Such a rule

would have no just principle upon which to rest.

While in many cases, even where the evidence is suffic-

ient to sustain it, a verdict may be properly set aside and a

new trial ordered, yet, that in every such case the trial

court may, whenever it sees fit, direct a verdict and thus

forever conclude the parties, has no basis in the law, which

confides to juries and not to courts the determination of

the facts in this class of cases.

We think it cannot be correctly said in any case where the

right of trial by jury exists and the evidence presents an

actual issue of fact, that the court may properly direct a

verdict. So long as a question of fact exists, it is for the
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jury and not for the court. If the evidence is insufficient,

or if that which has been introduced is conclusively an-

swered, so that, as a matter of law, no question of credi-

bility or issue of fact remains, then the question being one

of law, it is the duty of the court to determine it. But

whenever a plaintiff has established facts or circumstances

which would justify a finding in his favor, the right to

have the issue of fact determined by a jury continues, and

the case must ultimately be submitted to it.

The credibility of witnesses, the effect and weight of

conflicting and contradictory testimony, are all questions

of fact and not questions of law. If a court of review

having power to examine the facts is dissatisfied with a

verdict because against the weight or preponderance of

e\ddence, it may be set aside, but a new trial must be

granted before another jury so that the issue of fact may

be ultimately determined by the tribunal to which those

questions are confided. If there is no evidence to sustain

an opposite verdict, a trial court is justified in directing

one, not because it would have authority to set aside an

opposite one, but because there was an actual defect of

proof, and, hence, as a matter of law, the party was not

entitled to recover. {Colt v. Sixth Ave. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y.

671; BaglejfY. Bowe, 105 N. Y. 171, 179.)

widely different and should not be controlled by the ame
conditions or circumstance . In one ca e there is a retrial. In the other the judgment is final. One re ts in
discretion; the oth r upon legal right.
ne involves a
mere matter of remedy or procedure. The other determine ub tantive and sub tantial right .
uch a rule
would have no ju t principle upon which to re t.
While in many case , even where the evidence is sufficient to su tain it, a verdict may be properly set aside and a
t, that in every such ca e the trial
new trial ordered,
court may, whenever it see fit, direct a verdict and thus
fore er conclude the r artie , ha no ba i in the law, which
confide to jurie and not to courts the determination of
the facts in thi cla s of ca es.
We think it cannot be correctly aid in any ca e where the
right of trial b jury exi ts and tne evidence pre ents an
actual i ue of fact, that the court may properly direct a
er di ct. So long a a question of fact exi ts, it is for the
jury and not for the ourt. If the evidence i in ufficient~
or if that which has been introduced is conclu i ely anwered o that a a matter of law, no que tion of credibility or i ue of fact r mains, then the que tion being one
of law it i the duty of the court to determine it. But
whenever a plaintiff ha.
tabli hed facts or circum tances
which would ju tif a finding in his favor, th right to
have the i ue of fa t determined by a jury continues, and
the case mu t ultimat ly be ubmitted to it.
The credibility of witne se , the effect and weight of
onflicting and contradictor testimon , are all que tions
of fact and not qu tions of law. If a court of review
having power to examine the facts is di ati fied with a
verdict becau e 2. ·ain t the weight or preponderance of
evidence, it may b
t aside, but a new trial must be
ranted before anot}ier jury so that the i sue of fact may
be ultimat ly d t rmin
by the tribunal to which those
que tion are nfi 1 . If there is no e idence to u tain
an oppo ite ' rdi , a tri I court i ju tified in directing
on , not becau it w ul hav authority to t aside an
oppo ite on but
th r wa an actual defect of
proof and hen
a a a tt r of law th
arty wa not
entitled to recoY r. ( olt '. ixth Ave. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y.
671; Bagley v. Bowe, 105 . Y. 171, 179.)
T
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We are of the oiDinion that a plain issue of fact was pre-

sented for the jury; that the court erred in directing a

verdict; that the judgment and order should be reversed

and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.

Parker, Ch. J., Bartlett, Vann^ Cullen and Webner,

J J., concur ; Gray, J., dissents.

Judgment reversed, etc.

GILES V. GILES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1910.

204 Massachusetts, 383.

Knowlton, C. J. — This was a trial in the Superior Court
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* * * * * * * * * *
We are of the opinion that a plain issue of fact was presented for the jury; that the court erred in directing a
verdict; that the judgment and order should be reversed
and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
PARKER, h. J., BARTLETT, VANN, CuLLEN and WERNER,
J J., concur; GRAY, J., dissents.
Judgment reversed, etc.

upon three issues, framed upon an appeal from a decree

of the Probate Court allowing the will of Charles E. Giles.

The first issue presented the question whether the will was

duly executed. The second raised the question whether it

was procured by the undue influence of the petitioner. The

third issue was as follows: ''Was said instrument revoked

by the said Charles E. Giles subsequently to the date, exe-
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cution and publication thereof by the making, execution

GILES V. GILES.

and publication of another will which has been lost or de-

stroyed, and its contents cannot be proved so that it can

be propounded for probate?"

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

1910.

Upon the first issue, after testimony by the subscribing

witnesses tending to show that the will was properly exe-

204 Massachusetts, 383.

cuted, it was admitted in evidence, subject to the appellant's

exception, and at the close of the testimony the jury were

directed to return a verdict in favor of the petitioner. To

this direction the appellants excepted.

Tlie will was rightly admitted in evidence, and the testi-

mony well warranted a finding that it was duly executed,

ir. indeed, full credence was given to the testimony of these

witnesses, this conclusion followed almost necessarily. It

is true that two of the witnesses had little definite recollec-

tion of the transaction, apart from their knowledge that

llieir signatures to the clause of attestation were genqine,

KNOWLTON, C. J.-This was a trial in the Superior Court
upon three issues, framed upon an appeal from a decree
of the Probate Court allowing the will of Charles E. Giles.
The fir ti ue pre ented the question whether the will was
duly executed. The second raised the question whether it
wa procured by the undue influence of the ·petitioner. The
third i sue was as follows: ''Was said instrument revoked
by the aid Charles E. Giles subsequently to the date, exeution and publication thereof by the making, execution
and publication of another will which has been lost or detroy d, and it contents cannot be proved so that it can
be ropounded for probate~''
p n the fir t i sue, after testimony by the subscribing
witn . .
t nding to show that the will was properly exeut d it wa a mitted in vidence, ubject to the appellant's
x · pti n and at th clo. e of the testimony the jury were
lir drd to return a v rdict in favor of the petitioner. To
thi : lir rti n the J J llants excepted.
Th will wa ri btly admitted in evidence, and the testirno11.v \ ·11 warr nt d a
ding that it was duly ex cuted.
If i nrfo !d, fn11 ·r
n w s given to the testimony of these
wi tn<"'- : thi · · n lu. i n f 11 w d almo t nece sarily. It
i. tr11 · th< t t w f h
itn .
had little definite r ecollect i >n f th' tr·:rn. tion part fro th ir knowledge that
liei r . iguatur • t the lau e of attestation were gem:iin ,

ec. 3)
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and that they knew from their signing that tliey saw the exe-

cution of the will by the testator in the presence of the

three witnesses. While the jury, upon the facts, could not

have been expected to reach any other conclusion than that

which was recorded under the direction of the court, the

issue was one to be passed upon by a jury, which is the or-

dinary tribunal for the determination of questions of fact.

Where a proposition is only to be established by testimony

of witnesses, the judge cannot properly direct a jury to de-

cide that the fact is proved affirmatively by testimony. It

is for the jury to say whether the witnesses are entitled to

credit. Merchants' National Bank v. Haverhill Iron

Works, 159 Mass. 158; Commonwealth v. McNeese, 156

Mass. 231; Way v. Butterwortli, 106 Mass. 75; Whitteu

V. Haverhill, ante, 95. We know of no case in this Com-

monwealth in which it has been determined that a jury can

be directed to return a verdict, upon the oral testimony of

witnesses, in favor of a party who has the burden of prov-
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ing the facts to which they have testified. This direction

was erroneous and the exception must be sustained.

Verdict on the first issue set aside; verdict on the third

issue to stand. ^

lAccord: Haughton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., (1905) 165 Ind. 32, 73 N. E.

592; Wolff V. Cam] bell, (1892) 110 Mo. 114, 19 S. W. 622; Anniston Na-

tional Bank v. School Committee, (1897) 121 N. C. 107, 28 S. E. 134; Perkio-

men E. E. Co. v. Kremer, (1907) 218 Pa. St. 641, 67 Atl. 913.

On the other hand, there are many cases to be found where a directed verdict

for the party having the burden of proof, based on parol evidence, has been

approved. See Inhabitants of Woodstock v. Inhabitants of Canton, (1897)

AL,

No . . -

IT J DIRECTED

v ERDI

T

47

and that th y knew from th ir i ·ning that they aw the exeof th
cution of the will hy th te tator in th pr · n
thre witne e . \Vhil the ju1· ', upon the fact
ould n t
have been expected to reach any other conclu ion than that
which was r orded under the direction of th court, the
i ue was one to be I a ed upon by a jur T' which i the ordinary tribunal for the determination of que ti on of fact.
Where a propo ition i only to be establi b d b te timony
of witnes es, the judge cannot properly direct a jur to decide that the fact is proved affirmatively by te timony. It
i for the jury to ay whether the witne e,., are entitled to
credit. Merchants ' l'.ational Bank v. Ha erhill Iron
Work , 159 Ma . 15 ; Coni nonwealth . "JJf cN eese, 15
Ma . 231; Way v. Biitterworth, 106 l\1a . 75; Whitten
Y. Ha verhill, ante, 5.
We know of no ca e in this Commonwealth in which it ha been determined that a jury can
be directed to return a verdict upon the oral testimony of
witne e , in fa, or of a party who ha the bur len of proving the fact to which they have te ti:fied. Thi direction
wa rroneous and th xc ption mu t be u tained.

* * * * * * * * * *

91 Me. 62, 39 Atl. 281; Harding v. Eoman Catholic Church, (1906) 113 N. Y.

App. Div. 685; Israel v. Dav, (1907) 41 Colo. 52, 92 Pac. 698; Shumate v.

Evan, (1906) 127 Ga. 118, 56 S. E. 103; Hillis v. First National Bank, (1894)

54 Kan. 421, 38 Pac. 565; Murray v. Bush, (1902) 29 Wash. 662, 70 Pac.

DrsMr

L

\ erdict on the first i ue set a ide; verdict on the third
ue to tand. 1

133. This vrould seem to be the only logical rule in those jurisdictions where

the doctrine of Meyer v. Houck, {supra) is in force.

I.Accord: Hau hton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., ( 1905) 165 Ind. 32, 73 N. E.
592; Wolff . am1.bell, (1 92) llO Mo. 114 19 S. W. 622; Anniston National Bank v. chool ommittee (1 97) 121 N. C. 107, 2
. E. 134; Perkiomen R. R. o. v. Kr mer (1907) 21 Pa. t. 641 67 Atl. 913.
On the other hand, there are many ca e to be found where a directed verdict
for the party having the burden of proof, ba~ed on parol evidence ha been
approved.
ee Inhabitant of Wood tock v. Inhabitant of anton (1 97)
91 Me. 62, 39 Atl. '.? l · H artling v. Roman atho1ic Church, ( 1906) 113 . Y.
App. Div. 6 5 · I rael v. Day (1907 ) 41 Colo. 52, 92 P ac. 69 · humate v.
Ryan (190 ) 127 a. ll , .-6 • . E. 103; Hilli v. Fir t Rational Bank (1 94)
54 Kan. 421, 3 Pac. 56;; Murray v. B ush, (1902) ~9 Wa h. 66.... 70 Pac.
133. Thi would eem to be the onJy logical rule in tho e juri dictions where
the doctrine of foyer v. Houck, ( upra) is in force.
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(b) Effect of Requests hy Both Parties.

(b)

Effect of Requests by Both Parties.

EMPIRE STATE CATTLE COMPANY V. ATCHISON,

TOPEKA & SANTA FB RAILWAY COMPANY.

MINNESOTA AND DAKOTA CATTLE COMPANY V.

SAME.

Supreme Court of the United States. 1907,

EMPIRE STATE CATTLE COMPANY V. ATCHISON,
TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY.

210 United States, 1.

Me. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.

With the object of saving them from destruction by the

flood which engulfed portions of Kansas City on May 31

MINNESOTA AND DAKOTA CATTLE COMP ANY V.
SAME.

and the first week of June, 1903, more than three thousand

head of cattle belonging to the petitioners, which were in

Supreme Court of the United States.

1907.

the Kansas City stock yards, were driven and crowded

upon certain overhead viaducts in those yards. For about

seven days, until the subsidence of the flood, they were there

210 United States, 1.

detained and could not be properly fed and watered. Many

of them died and the remainder were greatly lessened in

value. These actions were brought by the petitioners to
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recover for the loss so sustained upon the ground that the

cattle were in the control of the defendant railway company

as a common carrier, and that the loss sustained was oc-

casioned by its negligence.

The railway company defended in each case upon the

ground that before the loss happened it had delivered the

cattle to a connecting carrier, but that if the cattle were

in its custody it was without fault, and the damage was

solely the result of an act of God, that is, the flood above re-

ferred to.

As the cases depended upon substantially similar facts

and involved identical questions of law, they were tried

together, and at the close of the evidence the trial court de-

nied a peremptory instruction asked on behalf of the plain-

tiffs, and gave one asked on behalf of the railway company.

135 Fed. Rep. 135.

While there was some contention in the argument as to

wliut took place concerning the requests for peremptory in-

structions, we think the bill of exceptions establishes that at

the close of the evidence the plaintiffs requested a per-

MR. J usTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.
With the object of saving them from destruction by the
flood which engulfed portions of Kansas City on May 31
and the :first week of June, 1903, more than three thousand
head of cattle belonging to the petitioners, which were in
the Kan as City stock yards, were driven and crowded
upon certain overhead viaducts in those yards. For about
e en days, until the subsidence of the flood, they were there
detained and could not be properly fed and watered. Many
of them died and the r emainder were greatly lessened in
value. These a ction were brought by the petitioners to
r cov r for the loss so sustained upon the ground that the
cattl were in the control of the defendant railway company
as a common carrier, and that the loss su stained was oca ioned by its n egligence.
Th railw
ompany defended in each case upon the
round that befor e the loss happened it had delivered the
attl to a connecting carrier, but that if the cattle were
in it u tody it was without fault, and the damage was
. 1 ly t h r sult of an act of God, that is, the flood above ref "rr d to.
: th
a. , depended upon substantially imilar facts
involv d identi al questions of law, they were tried
t g th r, an
t th los of the evidence the trial court deni 1 ,
r 1 pt ry i , truction a ked on b half of the plaintiff.· , nd g v on a sk d on behalf of the railway company.
l :,: .f11 d.
5.
.Vhil thc·n· w, .. · m ont ntion in th argument as to
\ l1·1t t (kph c· ('< iw •rni th requ ts for er mptory in: trndi<m · \: • thjnk tl1 bill of x
tions e tabli hes tbat at
tli · <'1 <' f th
vid · the plaintiffs requested a per-
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emptory instruction in their favor, and on its being refused

duly excepted and asked a number of special instructions,

which were each in turn refused, and exceptions were sepa-

rately reserved, and the court then granted a request for a

peremptory instruction in favor of the railway company,

to which the plaintiffs excepted.

On the writs of error which were prosecuted from the Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that court

affirmed the judgment on the ground that as both parties

had asked a peremptory instruction the facts were thereby

submitted to the trial judge, and hence the only inquiry

open was whether any evidence had been introduced which

tended to support the inferences of fact drawn by the

trial judge from the evidence. One of the members of the

Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judge Sanborn) did

not concur in the opinion of the court, because he deemed

that as the request for peremptory instruction made on

behalf of plaintiffs was followed by special requests seek-
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ing to have the jury determine the facts, the asking for a

peremptory instruction did not amount to a submission of

the facts to the court so as to exclude the right to have the

case go to the jury in accordance with the subsequent

special requests. He, nevertheless, concurred in the judg-

ment of affirmance, because, after examining the entire case,

he was of opinion that prejudicial error had not been com-

mitted, as the evidence was insufficient to have justified the

submission of the issues to the jury. 147 Fed. Eep. 457.

The cases are here because of the allowance of writs of

certiorari. They present similar questions of fact and law,

were argued together and are, therefore, embraced in one

opinion. The scope of the inquiry before us needs, at the

outset, to be accurately fixed. To do so requires us to

consider the question which gave rise to a division of opin-

ion in the Circuit Court of Appeals. If it be that the re-

quest by both parties for a peremptory instruction is to be

treated as a submission of the cause to the court, despite the

fact that the plaintiffs asked special instructions upon the

effect of the evidence then, as said in Beuttell v. Magone,

157 U. S. 154, **the facts having been thus submitted to the

court, we are limited in reviewing its action, to a considera-

tion of the correctness of the finding on the law and must

affirm if there be any evidence in support thereof." If, on

emptory in truction in their favor, and on its being refuseci
duly xcept d and a ked a number of pe ial instructions,
which were each in turn refused, and exceptions were separately re er ed and the court then granted a request for a
peremptory in truction in favor of the railway company,
to which the plaintiff excepted.
On the writs of error which were pro ecuted from the Circuit ourt of Appeal for the Eighth ircuit that court
affirmed the judgment on the ground that as both parties
had asked a peremptory instruction the facts were thereby
submitted to the trial judge, and hence the only inquiry
open was whether any evidence had been introduced which
tended to support the inferences of fact drawn by the
trial judge from the evidence. One of the members of the
ircuit Court of Appeal (Circuit Judge Sanborn) did
not concur in the opinion of the court, beca u e he deemed
that as the request for peremptory in truction made 1111
behalf of plaintiffs wa followed by pecial reque t ::;e9king to have the jury determine the facts, the a king for a
peremptory instruction did not amount to a ubmi sion nf
the facts to the court so a to exclude the right to have the
ca e go to the jury in a cordance with the sub equent
pecial reque t . He, ne ertheles , concurred in the judgment of affirmance, becau e, after examining the entire case,
he was of opinion that prejudicial error had not been committed, as the evidence wa in ufficient to have ju tified the
·ubmi ion of the i ues to the jury. 147 Fed. Rep. 457.
The ca
are here becau e of the allowance of writs of
certiorari. They pre ent imilar que tion of fact and law,
were argued together and are, therefore, embraeed in one
op1n1on. The scop of the inquiry before u needs, at the
outset, to be accurat 1 fixed. To do o requires us to
con id r the que tion which gaYe Ti e to a divi ion of opinion in the ir uit ourt of ppeal . If it be that the reque t b both par ti for a petemptory in tru ti on i to be
treated a a ubmi ion of the cau to th court de pite the
fact that th 1 laintiff a ked p ecial in tru tion upon the
effe t of the evidence th n as said in Beuttell v. }Jagone,
157 U. . 154, ' th fact having b en thus submitted to the
court, we are limit d in r viewing it action, to a con. id ration of the corr tne of the :findin on the law and must
affirm if there be any evi nee in up ort thereof.'' If, on
T
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the other hand, it be that, although the plaintiffs had re-

the other hand, it be that, although the plaintiffs had re-

quested a peremptory instruction, the right to go to the

jury was not waived in view of the other requested instruc-

tions, then our inquiry has a wider scope, that is, extends to

determining whether the special instructions asked were

rightly refused, either because of their inherent unsound-

ness or because, in any event, the evidence was not such as

would have justified the court in submitting the case to

the jury. It was settled in BeuUell v. Magone, supra, that

where both parties request a peremptory instruction and

do nothing more, they thereby assume the facts to be un-

disputed and in etfect submit to the trial judge the deter-

mination of the inferences proper to be drawn from them.

But nothing in that ruling sustains the view that a party

may not request a peremptory instruction, and yet, upon the

refusal of the court to give it, insist, by appropriate re-

quests, upon the submission of the case to the jury, where

the evidence is conflicting or the inferences to be drawn
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from the testimony are divergent. To hold the contrary

would unduly extend the doctrine of BeuUell v. Magone, by

causing it to embrace a case not within the ruling in that

case made. The distinction between a case like the one be-

fore us and that which was under consideration in BeuUell

V. Magone has been pointed out in several recent decisions

of Circuit Courts of Appeals. It was accurately noted in an

opinion delivered by Circuit Judge Severns, speaking for

the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Mina-

han V. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 138 Fed. Rep. 37, 41, and was

also lucidly stated in the concurring opinion of Shelby,

Circuit Judge, in McCormack v. National City Bank of

Waco, 142 Fed. Rep. 132, where, referring to BeuUell v.

Magone, he said (p. 133) :

''A party may believe that a certain fact which is proved

without conflict or dispute entitles him to a verdict. But

there may be evidence of other, but controverted facts,

which, if proved to the satisfaction of the jury, entitles him

to a verdict, regardless of the evidence on which he relies in

the first place. It cannot be that the practice would not

permit him to ask for peremptory instructions, and, if the

court refuses, to then ask for instruction submitting the

otlicr rjuestion to the jury. And if he has the right to do

tliis, no request for instructions that his opponent may ask

quested a peremptory in truction, the right to go to the
jury was not waived in view of the other requested instructions, then our inquiry has a wider scope, that is, extends to
determining whether the special instructions asked were
rightly refused, either because of their inherent unsoundness or becau e, in any event, the evidence was not such as
would have justified the court in submitting the case to
the jury. It was settled in Beuttell v. Mago ne, supra, that
where both parties request a peremptory instruction and
do nothing more, they thereby assume the facts to be undisputed and in effect submit to the trial judge the determination of the inferences proper to be drawn from them.
But nothing in that ruling sustains the view that a party
may not request a I eremptory instruction, and yet, upon the
refu al of the court to give it, insist, by appropriate request , upon the submission of the case to the jury, where
the evidence is conflicting or the inferences to be drawn
from the testimony are divergent. To hold the contrary
would unduly extend the doctrine of Beuttell v. Magone, by
causing it to embrace a case not within the ruling in that
ca e made. The distinction between a case like the one befor u and that which was under consideration in B euttell
v. Magone has been pointed out in several recent decisions
of ircuit Courts of Appeals. It was accurately noted in an
opinion delivered by Circuit Judge Severns, speaking for
th
ircuit ourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Minahan v. Gr ind Trunk Ry. Co., 138 Fed. Rep. 37, 41, and was
al o lu i ly tated in the concurring opinion of Shelby,
•ir uit Ju lg , in JYlcCormack v. National City Bank of
TVaco, 142 Fed.
p . 132, where, referring to Beuttell v.
"lvlagone, he aid ( . 1 3):
part may b ]iev that a certain fact which is proved
wit11 ut
nfli t or di ute entitle him to a verdict. But
t11 r may b
o.E other, but controvert d fact ,
w}1if'h, if pr v
ati faction of the jury, entitles him
t a vPr iet r <,.ar 1 , f th vidence on which he relies in
li<• fir. ·t pla . It a ot e that the practic would not
iwnnit liim t a. k f r
r m tory in tru tion , and, if the
rt r ·fu ·c·., t th n a k f r in truction ubmittino- the
,11H·r 1w·. lion to th j 11 r. ' ·
n if ]10 ha. th right to d
lii : ,
r Jll .. t f r in . tru tion that his oppon nt may ask
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can deprive him of the right. There is nothing in Beuttell

V. Magone, supra., that conflicts with this view when the

announcement of the court is applied to the facts of the

case as stated in the opinion.

"In New York there are many cases showing conformity

to the practice announced in Beuttell v. Magone, but they

clearly recognize the right of a party who has asked for per-

emptory instructions to go to the jury on controverted ques-

tions of fact if he asks the court to submit such questions to

the jury. Kirtz v. Peck, 113 N. Y. 226; S. C, 21 N. E. 130;

Sutter v. Vanderveer, 122 N. Y. 652; S. C, 25 N. E. 907.

"The fact that each party asks for a peremptory instruc-

tion to find in his favor does not submit the issues of fact

to the court so as to deprive the party of the right to ask

other instructions, and to except to the refusal to give them,

nor does it deprive him of the right to have questions of

fact submitted to the jury if issues are joined on which con-

flicting evidence has been offered. Minahan v. G. T. W. Ry.
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Co., (C. C. A.), 138 Fed. Rep. 37."

From this it follows that the action of the trial court in

giving the peremptory instruction to return a verdict for

the railway company cannot be sustained merely because of

the request made by both parties for a peremptory instruc-

tion in view of the special requests asked on behalf of the

plaintiffs. The correctness, therefore, of the action of the

court in giving the peremptorj^ instruction depends, not

upon the mere requests which were made on that subject,

but upon whether the state of the proof was such as to have

authorized the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion,

to decline to submit the cause to the jury. That is to

say, the validity of the peremptory instruction must de-

pend upon whether the evidence was so undisputed or was

of such a conclusive character as would have made it the

duty of the court to set aside the verdicts if the cases had

been given to the jury and verdicts returned in favor of the

plaintiff. McGuire v. Blount, 199 U. S. 142, 148, and cases

cited; Marande v. Texas d P. R. Co., 184 U. S. 191, and

cases cited ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Pool, 160 U. S. 440, and

cases cited.

To dispose of this question requires us to consider some-

what in detail the origin of the controversy, the contracts of

shipment from which the controversy arose and the proof

can deprive him of the right. There is nothing in Beuttell
Y. 1'1agone, suz;ra ; that conflict with thi
view when the
announcement of the court is applied to the facts of the
ca e as stated in the opinion.
"In New York there are many cases showing conformity
to the practice announced in B euttell v. Magone, but they
clearly recognize the right of a party who has a ked for peremptory instructions to go to the jury on controverted questions of fact if he asks the court to submit uch que tions to
the jury. Kirtz v. Peck, 113 N. Y. 226; S. 0., 21 N. E. 130;
Sutter v. Vanderveer, 122 N. Y. 652; S. 0., 25 N. E. 907.
''The fact that each party a ks for a peremptory instruction to find in his favor doe not submit the i ues of fact
to the court so as to deprive the party of the right to a k
other instructions, and to e:s:cept to the refu al to give them,
nor does it depri' e bim of the right to ha' e questions of
fact submitted to the jurv if is ues are joined on which conflicting evidence ha been offered. Minahan . G. T. W. Ry.
Co., (C. C. A.), 138 Fed. Rep. 37."
From this it follows that the action of the trial court in
giving the peremptory instruction to return a verdict for
the railwa company cannot be sustained merel becau e of
the request made by both partie for a peremptory instruction in view of the special requests asked on behalf of the
plaintiff . The correctne , therefore, of the a tion of the
.ourt in giving the peremptory instruction depend , not
upon the mere reque ts which were made on that ubject,
but upon whether the state of the proof was uch as to have
authorized the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
to decline to submit the cau e to the jury. That is to
say, the validity of the peremptory in truction must dep nd upon whether the evidence was so undisput d or wa
of such a con lu iY chara ter a would have made it the
duty of the court to set aside the verdicts if the ca e had
been given to the jury and verdict returned in fa or of the
plaintiff. llJcGilire v. Bloiint, 199 U. S. 142, 14 and ca es
ited · A1ara1lde . Te a ct P. R. Co., 184 U. . 191 and
a e cited· ourhern Pacific Co. v. Pool, 160 U. . 4±0 and
ca es cited.
To di po e of thi que tion requires us to con ider omewhat in detail the ori()'in of th ontro-ver y th
ntracts of
shipment f.[om which the contro ersy aro e and the proof
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which is embodied in the bill of exceptions relied on to

justify the inference of liability on the part of the railway

company.

* * * As we think the undisputed proof to which we

have referred not only established the existence of the

necessity for the change of route, but also, beyond dispute,

demonstrated that there was an entire absence of all negli-

gence in selecting that route, we are clearly of opinion that

no liability was entailed simply by reason of the change,

even if that change could in law be treated as a concurring

and proximate cause of the damages which subsequently

resulted.

Affirmed.

WOLF V. CHICAGO SIGN PRINTING COUP ANY.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1908.

233 Illinois, 501.

Me. Justice Caetweight delivered the opinion of the

court:
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Fred W. Wolf, appellee, brought this suit in assumpsit in

which i~ embodied in the bill of exceptions relied on to
justify the inference of liability on the part of the railway
ompany.

* * * * * * * * * *
* * * As we think the undisputed proof to which we
have referred not only established the existence of the
necessity for the change of route, but also, beyond dispute,
lemonstrated that there was an entire absence of all neglio·ence in selecting that route, we are clearly of opinion that
n liability was entailed simply by reason of the change,
c ,,. n if that change could in law be treated as a concurring
and proximate cause of the damages which subsequently
r ulted.

Affirmed.

the circuit court of Cook county against the Chicago Sign

Printing Company, appellant, and his declaration consisted

of the common counts, to which a plea of the general issue

was filed. There was a jury trial, and at the close of all

the evidence the defendant moved the court to direct a ver-

dict in its favor. The court denied the motion and the de-

fondant excepted. The plaintiff then moved the court to

direct a verdict in his favor, and the court granted the mo-

tion and instructed the jury to find the issues for the plain-

WOLF V. CHICAGO SIGN PRINTING COlIPANY.

tiff and assess his damages at $4,000, with interest thereon

at five per cent from August 19, 1902. The defendant ex-

cef)ted to the granting of the motion and giving the instruc-

Supreme Court of Illinois.

1908.

tion. A verdict was returned, in accordance with the di-

rection of the court, for $4,716.66, and the court, after

233 Illinois, 501.

()V(!rruling motions for a new trial and in arrest of judg-

ment, entered judgment on the verdict. The Branch Ap-

MR. J u sTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the op1n10n of the
ourt:
r W. Wolf, appellee, brought this suit in assumpsit in
jr uit court of Cook county aa·ainst the Chicago Sign
1 rinbn
ompany, appellant, and hi declaration consisted
of th o mon ounts, to which a plea of the general issue
wa fil l. Th r e w s a jury trial, and at the close of all
th, viden th d f ndant moved the court to direct averli c·t in it f av r. The court denied the motion and the def0n cl ant XC' pt d. Th plaintiff then mov d the court to
ilir ic·L a Y r 11 ·tin bi. favor, and the court granted the mo1ion n 1 in : tru t d th jury to find the is ues for the plain1i ff and a:. , s bi . d·:tm a cr s t $4,000, with int r t thereon
(It fi\' ] >Pr nt f rom Augu. t 19, 1902. The def ndant exe<'pt ·cl to Ll1 grant ing f th motion and givino- the instruct ion. A v<·rcli t \\ n: r turn
in a
rdan e with the dirC'"1 ion of tl1 • ·onrt, f r $4 716. 6, and the court, after
11 \' 1•1T11li11 g m i ion .' f r a n w tri 1 nd in arr
t of judg111 «111, enL r
j d<rm nt n th v r i t.
The Bran h Ap-
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pellate Court for the First District affirmed the judgment.

The defendant is a corporation with a capital stock of

$5,000. In 1902 Ernest Salmstein was president and Albert

H. Ernecke was secretary and treasurer of the corpora-

tion. The stockholders had considered the question of in-

creasing the capital stock from $5,000 to $25,000, and Salm-

stein and Ernecke had tried to induce the plaintiff to sub-

scribe for part of the increase, but no proceedings had been

taken for such increase. On August 18, 1902, Ernecke ob-

tained from plaintiff a check, payable to the defendant, for

$4,000, and the proceeds were received by the defendant

the next day. The suit was for the money represented by

the check, with interest, and the disputed question of fact

was whether the money was loaned by plaintiff to defend-

ant or was a partial payment upon an agreement to sub-

scribe for $9,500 of capital stock when an increase should be

effected. At the time the check was delivered the follow-

ing receipt was left with the plaintiff :
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"Chicago, 8-18, 1902.

"Eeceived of Mr. Fred W. Wolf the sum of four thou-

sand dollars ($4,000) account Chicago Sign Printing Co.

A. H. Ernecke,

Secy, and Treas. Chicago Sign Printing Co.

"$4,000.00. 8-18, 1902.

"The above amount is part payment on stock in above con-

cern to be issued shortly.

A. H. Ernecke."

The evidence for the defendant was that this entire paper

expressed the agreement between the parties and that it

was all written when the check was given. The evidence for

the plaintiff was that he had refused to take any stock, but

agreed to and did loan the money to the corporation ; that

the receipt was written, and that the recital that the money

was part payment on stock was added without his knowl-

edge by Ernecke and the paper was left lying on the plain-

tiff's table. * * *

The assignment of error to which the argument is de-

voted is that the court erred in instructing the jury to re-

turn a verdict for the plaintiff, and especially in directing

an assessment of interest from the date of the check. In

answer to the argument on that question it is contended

that each party having moved the court to direct a verdict

"J, P. 99-
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p ·11ate Court for the Fir t District affirmed the judgment.
The def ndant i a corporation with a capital tock of
$5,000. In 1902 Ernest Salmstein was pre ident and Albert
H. Ernecke wa
retary and trea ur r of the corporation. The tockhold r had considered th qu tion of increa ing the capital stock from $5,006 to $25,000, and Salm.stein and Ernecke had tried to induce th plaintiff to subscribe for part of the increase, but no proceeding had been
tak n for such increa e. On August 18, 1902, Erne ke obtained from plaintiff a check, payable to the defendant, for
$4,000, and the proceed were received by the defendant
the next day. The uit was for the money repr ented by
the check, with intere t, and the di I uted que tion of fact
was whether the money was loaned by plaintiff to defendant or was a partial payment upon an agreement to subcribe for $9,500 of capital stock when an increa e should be
effected. At the time the check was delivered the followjng receipt was left with the plaintiff:
''Chicago, 8-18, 1902.
"Received of Mr. Fred W. Wolf the sum of four thouand dollars ($4,000) account Chicago Sign Printing Co.
A. H. Ernecke,
Secy. and Treas. Chicago Sign Pr in ting Co.
"$4,000.00.
-18, 1902.
''The above amount is part payment on to k in above concern to be issued shortly.
A. H. Ernecke. ''
The evidence for the defendant was that thi ntire paper
expressed the agreement between the I arties and that it
was all written when the check was given. The evidence for
the plaintiff was that he had refused to take any tock, but
agreed to and did loan the money to the corporation ; that
the receipt was written, and that the recital that th money
was part pa ·ment on tock was add d without hi knowled O'e by Ernecke and the paper was left lying on th laintiff 's table. * * *
The as ignment f rror to which th aro·um nt i devot i that th ourt rred in in tru tin · th jur to r turn a verdi t for t
laintiff and e I ially in irectino·
an a
m nt of int r t fro th dat f th h k. In
an w r to th aro·u nt on that que tion it i contend d
that each party having moved the court to direct a verdict
T. p __ ')!>-

354
354 Trial Practice [Oiiap. 10

in favor of such party, they waived the right to submit any

question to the jury and elected to submit the case to the

court for its decision, both upon the law and the facts.

Section 60 of the Practice act provides for the waiver of

a jury trial and a trial by the court of both matters of law

and fact in case both parties shall so agree, and in the

event of such agreement section 61 provides for submitting

written propositions to be held as the law in the decision of

the case, and section 82 provides for taking exceptions to

decisions of the court either relating to receiving improper

or rejecting proper testimony or to the final judgment upon

the law and evidence. There was no such waiver of a jury

trial in this case, and if the right to a verdict of the jury

upon the facts was waived it was only by implication, and

this court has not recognized any waiver of the kind insisted

upon here.

When the practice of demurring to the evidence fell into

disuse and that of making a motion that the court direct a
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verdict was substituted, some difference arose in the de-

cisions of the different courts as to the nature and effect of

such a motion, but the ground of the motion and the prac-

tice have been thoroughly settled in this State. The motion

to direct a verdict raises only a question of law as to the

legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict against

the party making the motion. {Angus v. Chicago Trust

and Savings Bank, 170 111. 298 ; RacJi' v. Chicago City Rail-

ivay Co., 173 id. 289; Marshall v. Grosse Clothing Co., 184

id. 421; Martin v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co.,

194 id. 138.) In the event of an adverse ruling on the motion

to direct a verdict, an exception preserves the question of

law for the consideration of an appellate tribunal. The

submission of a question of fact to the jury does not waive

the question of law already passed upon by the court whore

the rights of the party have been properly preserved.

{Chicago Union Traction Co. v. O'Donnell, 211 111. 349;

Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Swift, 213 id. 307 ; Chicago

Teryyiinal Transfer Railroad Co. v. Schiavone, 216 id. 275.)

Some courts have held that where both parties ask the trial

court to direct the verdict it amounts to a request that the

court shall find the facts and a waiver of any right to the

judgment of the jury upon controverted questions of fact-

Tho Supreme Court of the United States held to that doc-
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in favor of such party, they waived the right to submit any
question to the jury and elected to submit the ease to the
court for its deci ion, both upon the law and tho facts.
Section 60 of the Practice act provides for the waiver of
a jury trial and a trial by the court of both matter s of law
and fact in case both parties shall so agree, and in the
eYent of such agreement ection 61 provides for submitting
writt n propo ition to be held as the law in the decision of
th a e, and section 82 provide for taking exceptions to
d i ions of the court either relating to receiving improper
or rej ting proper testimony or to the fina l judgment upon
the law and evidence. There was no such waiver of a jury
t ri al in thi case, and if the right to a verdict of the jury
ur on the facts wa waived it was only by implication, and
thi court has not recognized any waiver of the kind insisted
ur on here.
vVh n the practice of demurring t o the evidence fell into
di u e and that of making a motion that the court direct a
verdict was ub stituted, some difference aro se in the deci ion of the different courts as to the na ture and effect of
uch a motion, but the ground of the m otion and the practice have been thoroughly settled in this State. The motion
to direct a verdict raises only a question of law as to the
1 gal sufficiency of the evidence t o sustain a ver dict against
th party making the motion. (Angiis v. Chicago Trust
and Savings Bank, 170 Ill. 298; Rack v. Chicago Cit y Raili ay Co., 173 id. 2 9; Marshall v. Gro
e Clothing Co., 184
id. 421; Martin v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co.,
1 4 id. 13 . ) In the event of an adverse ruling on the motion
t direct a v rdict, an exception pres r ves the ques tion of
la for th con id ration of an appella te tribunal. The
;-ubmis ion of a qu tion of fact to the jury does not wa i e
th u . tion of law alrea y I a
d upon by the cour t wher
th ri ght
f tl e party bav been prop r ly pr r d.
( 'liicago Uni n Traction Co . v. O'D onn ll, 211 Ill. 34. ;
llli11ois ' ntral Railroad Co. v. Swift, 213 id. 307 ; Chicag o
rfl prminal Tran .'/ r Railroad Co . v. S hiavone, S16 id. 275.)
~ orn · r nrt. hav h l th t h re both p ar tie a k the trial
·o lrl t
1r d th v rtli t it a ount to a r qu st that th P.
c· J ut slnll fin t11 f t.
a waiv r of any right to the
ju ]CJ' ·n r th) jury u n c ntr v rt d qu stion of f t.
rl L ~ u re c 'ourt of the United tat es held to that doc1
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trine in Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154, and saia that by

making the motion both parties affirmed that there was no

disputed question of fact which could operate to deflect or

control the question of law, and that this was necessarily a

request that the court find the facts. That decision has, of

course, been followed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and

there is a formidable list of cases in which it has been ap-

plied by those courts. In New York, if any party asks the

court to direct a verdict and his motion is denied, he must

then ask the court for leave to go to the jury upon questions

of fact, and it is held that there is no question for the jury

unless such a request is made. Accordingly, it is there held,

that if both parties ask the court to direct a verdict, and the

court grants the motion of one party and the other makes no

request to be allowed to go to the jury on questions of fact

but acquiesces in the determination of such questions by

the court, he has waived all objection to the mode of trial.

In Thompson v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 270, it is said that the
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effect of a request by each party for a direction of a verdict

in his favor clothes the court with the functions of a jury,

and the courts declare that the request by both parties for

the direction of a verdict amounts to the submission of the

whole case to the trial judge, and his decision upon the facts

has the same effect as if the jury had found a verdict after

the case was submitted to them. [Adams v. Roscoe Lumber

Co., 159 N. Y. 176; Smith v. Weston, id. 194; Clason v.

Baldivin, 46 N. E. Rep. 322; Sigua Iron Co. v. Brown, 64

id. 194.) It will readily be seen that such a rule would not

be in harmony with our decisions, and to say that a request

to the court to decide a pure question of law clothes the

court with power to decide controverted questions of fact

would be both illogical and inconsistent with the nature of

the motion. Under our practice a request to withdraw a

case from the jury could scarcely be converted into an ap-

plication to the court to take the place of the jury and de-

cide disputed questions of fact. After the court refuses to

withdraw the case from the jury it is not requisite, in our

practice, for the party to ask the court to allow the jury to

decide it, which the court has already done by denying the

motion. When one party asks the court to direct a verdict

in his favor, the fact that the other party makes a similar

motion cannot in any way affect the rights of the first party.
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trine in Beuttell v. "JJ1agone, 157 U. S. 154, and aia that by
making the motion both parties affirmed that th re was no
disputed que tion of fact which could operate to , fleet or
control the que tion of law, and that thi wa nee ssarily a
request that the court :find the facts. That deci ion has, of
course, been follow d by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and
there is a formidable li t of cases in which it has been applied by those court . In New York, if any party asks the
court to direct a verdict and his motion is denied, he mu t
then ask the court for 1 ave to go to the jury upon questions
of fact, and it i h ld that there is no que tion for the jury
unless such a reque tis made . Accordingly, it i there held
that if both parti ~ ask the court to dire ct a verdict, and the
court grants the motion of one party and the other makes no
request to be allow d to go to the jury on que tions of fact
but acquiesces in the determination of such questions by
the court, he has waived all objecti9n to the mode of trial.
In Thomp on v. Simp son, 128 N. Y. 270, it is said that the
effect of a reque t by each party for a direction of a verdict
in his favor clothes the court with the functions of a jury,
and the courts declare that the request by both parties for
th direction of a verdict amounts to the submission of the
whole case to the trial judO'e, and his decision upon the facts
has the same effect as if the jury had found a verdict after
the case wa ubmitted to them. (Adanis v. Roscoe Lumber
Co., 159 N. Y. 176; Smith v. Weston, id. 194; Clason v.
Baldwin, 46 N. E. R p. 322; Sigua Iron Co. v. Brown, 64
id. 194.) It will readily be seen that such a rule would not
be in harmony with our decisions, and to say that a reque t
to the court to decid a pure question of law clothes the
court with pow r to decide controverted questions of fact
would be both illogical and inconsistent with the nature of
the motion. Under our practice a request to withdraw a.
ca e from the jury ould car ly be converted into an appli ati n to the court to take the place of the jury and dei
i I ut qu ti n of fact. After the court refu e to
withdraw th a e fr m th jury it i not requi ite in our
pra ti
for tb party to a k th our t to allow the jur. to
d ci e it whi h t
urt ba s alr ady
n by d n~ 'in o· th
m tion. Wh n on
arty a k th court to dir ct av rdi t
~n hi fa, or th f ct that th
ther I arty mak s a similar
m ti n annot in any ay affect the rights of th :fir t party.
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If that were true, no party could make a motion for a direct-

ed verdict without waiving his right to trial by jury if his

opjoonent chose to make the same motion. The decisions

relied upon to establish the doctrine that if both parties ask

the court to decide a question of law they each waive the

right to trial by jury of controverted questions of fact are

inapplicable to the practice in this State, and the fact that

each party in this case asked the court to direct a verdict

did not amount to a submission of controverted questions of

fact to the court.

* * * If the jury should believe the plaintiff and con-

clude that the transaction was a loan of the money, then,

under the statute, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover

five per cent from the time the money was loaned; but if

the jury credited the evidence for the defendant and con-

cluded that the transaction was an agreement to take stock,

there could be no recovery of interest until the arrange-

ment was repudiated by the plaintiff and a demand made
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for tlie return of the money. The plaintiff would only be

entitled to interest from the time that he refused to carry

out the agreement and take the stock. The court was not

authorized to decide that disputed question of fact and to

direct a verdict including interest from the date of the

check. The defendant was entitled to the verdict of the jury

on that question.

The judgments of the Appellate Court and Circuit Court

are reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit

Court.

Reversed and remanded.

(c) When Motion to he Made.

RAINGER V. BOSTON MUTUAL LIFE ASSOCIATION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1897.

167 Massachusetts, 109.

Contract, upon a policy of insurance for $1,000, issued by

tlie defendant on the life of Fred S. Eainger, and payable

tu the plaintiff, who was his wife. The answer set up,
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If that were true, no party could make a motion for a directed verdict without waiving his right to trial by jury if his
opponent chose to make the same motion. The decisions
relied upon to establish the doctrine that if both parties ask
the court to decide a question of law they each waive the
right to trial by jury of controverted questions of fact are
inapplicable to the practice in this State, and the fact that
each party in this case asked the court to direct a verdict
did not amount to a submission of controverted questions of
fact to the court.
* * * * * * * * * *
* * * If the jury should believe the plaintiff and conclude that the transaction was a loan of the money, then,
under the tatute, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover
five p r cent from the time the money was loaned ; but if
the jury credited the evidence for the defendant and con·
clud d that the transaction was an agreement to take stock,
th re ould be no r ecovery of interest until the arrangem nt was repudiated by the plaintiff and a demand made
for the return of the money. The plaintiff would only be
entitl d to interest from the time that he refused to carry
out th agreement and take the stock. The court was not
authorized to decide that di puted question of fact and to
dir ct a verdict including interest from the date of the
b ·k. The defendant was entitled to the verdict of the jury
on that que tion.
The judgments of the Appellate Court and Circuit Court
ar reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit
ourt.

Reversed and remanded.

(c)
A

G 1.J

V. B

When 11.fotion to be Made.
T NM TUAL LIFE ASSOCIATION.

Suvreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
167
1

1897.

M assachiisetts, 109'.

n t rnc•t, u on a p 1i y of in urance for $1,000, is ued by
th dPf<·rnl· i o t11 lif .f r d S. Raino-er, and payable
tu he Jaintif.f, who was his wife. The answer set up,
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among other defences, false and fraudulent representations

by Eainger in bis application for insurance. Trial in the

Superior Court, before Dewey, J., who directed the jury to

return a verdict for the defendant ; and the plaintiff alleged

exceptions. The facts material to the jDoints decided ap-

pear in the opinion.

Morton, J.

The plaintiff further contends that it was not within the

DISMISSAL, NoN-S

the defendant at the time when and under the circumstances

is: ''At the close of the evidence arguments were made by

counsel, and the presiding justice charged the jury. After

the jury had deliberated upon the case for nearly six hours,

they were called back into court. The foreman stated that

they were unable to agree, and the presiding justice direct-

ed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, to which

the plaintiff duly excepted." So far as appears from the
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exceptions this took place in open court, and, if so, it is

clear that the presiding justice had a right to call back the

jury and direct them to return a verdict as he did. He did

not lose his control over the jury because they had retired

to a side room, under his direction, to deliberate on their

verdict, and in the further conduct of the trial he could re-

call them and give them such additional directions or in-

structions as the case seemed to him to require. Kidlherg

V. O'Donnell, 158 Mass. 405; Merrift v. Neiv York, New

Haven & Hartford Railroad, 164 Mass. 440.

Exceptions overruled.

DrnE

TED VERDICT
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among other defences, false an fraudulent repre entations
by Rainger in his application for in urance. Trial in the
Superior Court, b fore Dewey, J ., who directed the jury to
return a verdict for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged
exception . The facts material to the points decided appear in the opinion.

power of the judge to order the jury to return a verdict for

which he did. All that the exceptions state on this point

IT,

MORTON,

J.

* * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * *
The plaintiff further contends that it was not within the
power of the judge to order the jury to return a verdict for
the defendant at the time when and under the circum tances
which he did. All that the exceptions tate on thi point
is: ''At the close of the evidence argument were made by
counsel, and the pre iding justice charged the jury. After
the jury had deliberated upon the case for nearly six hours,
they were called back into court. The foreman stated that
they were unable to agree, and the presiding justice direct·ed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, to which
the plaintiff duly excepted.'' So far as appears from the
exceptions this took place in open court, and, if so, it is
clear that the presiding justice had a right to call back the
jury and direct them to return a verdict as he did. He did
not lose his control over the jury because they had retired
to a side room, under his direction, to deliberate on their
verdict, and in the further conduct of the trial he could recall them and give them such additional direction or instructions as the case seemed to him to require. K ullberg
v. 0 'Donnell, 158 Mass. 405; ll1 erritt v. New York, N eic
Haven & Hartford Railroad, 164 Mass. 440.
Exceptions overruled.

:358
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( d)

(d) Poiver of Court to Compel Verdict.

Power of Court to Compel Verdict.

CAHILL V. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, & ST. PAUL

RAILWAY COMPANY.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh

Circuit. 1896.

CAHILL V. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, & ST. PAUL
RAILWAY CONIPANY.

20 Circuit Court of Appeals, 184.

Before Woods and Jenkins, Circuit Judges, and Gross

CUP, District Judge.

Woods, Circuit Judge. This is an action on the case for

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit. 1896.

personal injury suffered by Maria Cahill, the plaintiff in

20 Circuit Court of Appeals, 184.

error, who, when attempting, afoot, to cross a switching

track of the defendant in error at the Union Stock Yards,

in Chicago, was struck and run over by a backing engine,

whereby she lost both feet, and suffered other serious bodily

injuries. * * *

* * * The Court below directed a verdict for the de-

fendant. * * *

While we have treated the judgment in this case as if it
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had been rendered upon a verdict of the jury delivered in

accordance with the court's peremptory direction, the fact

is not literally so. The record shows that the jurors, at

the conclusion of the charge, refused to render a verdict

for the defendant, severally stating that they could not

conscientiously do so, whereupon the court said: "Very

well. You may retire to your room, and return with such a

verdict as you may find." The jury accordingly retired,

but were recalled into court at a later hour, and directed

again to return a verdict for the defendant; but, one juror

still holding out, counsel for the plaintiff was permitted to

stipulate of record that a judgment of dismissal might be

entered, to have the same force and effect, and none other,

than a verdict for the defendant under the direction of the

court, but that plaintiff should be considered as excepting

to such direction, and also to such order of dismissal, and

tliereupon tlie court ordered such dismissal, and the plain-

tiff thereupon excepted to such ruling. The stipulation

should not have been accepted. The authority and duty of

a judge to direct a verdict foi- one party or the other, when,

Before WooDs and JENKINS, Circuit Judges, and GROSS·
c P, Di trict Judge.
WooD , Circuit Judge. This i an action on the case for
personal injury uffered by J\1aria Cahill, the plaintiff in
error, who, when attempting, afoot, to cross a switching
track of the defendant in error at the Union Stock Yards,
in Chicago, wa struck and run over by a backing engine,
whereby she lost both feet, and suffered other serious bodily
injuries. * * *
* * * The Court below directed a verdict for the def ndant. * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
While we have treated the jndo·ment in this case a if it
had b n rendered upon a verdict of the jury delivered in
a ordan e with the court's peremptory direction, the fact
is not lit rally o. Tbe record shows that the jurors, at
the conclu ion of the charge, refu ed to r nder a verdict
for the
f ndant, everally tating that they could not
n i ntiou ly do so, whereupon the court said: ''Very
w 11.
ou may retire to your room, and return with such a
v rdi t
ou may find .'' The jury accordingly retired,
ut wer r alled into court at a lat r hour, and directed
agajn to r ,,turn a v rdi t for the d fe dant; but, one juror
. till 11 1 jury ut, oun el for the laintiff was p rmitt d to
.· ti} ula
f r
r that a judo·m nt of di mi al might b
<'nt n: ] t h v th , ( m f r and eff t, and n n oth r
th n a v nli ·t f r th
f n a t und r the dir tion of the
<· rt 1 nt th t le inti ff . h ul b
on. id r
a . pti.ng
t . uf'h dir din nd , l. o t . uh rd r f i mi .. al, and
1hPr<;np rn tl1 court rel r d u h di mi. al, and th plaini ff tl1c·rc·111H>
x pt
to sn h ruling. The . ti nla ti on
sh nl l n< t l1a\ • b ·n r J t cl . Th authority and ut. f
a ju ]g t rlin·c·1 a y0rclif't rnr n party r the oth r wli n,
1

7
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in his opinion, the state of the evidence requires it, is

beyond dispute ; and it is not for jurors to disobey, nor for

attorneys to object, except in the orderly way necessary to

save the right to prosecute a writ of error. The conduct of

the juror in this instance was in the highest degree repre-

hensible, and might well have subjected him, and any who

encouraged him to persist in his course, to punishment for

contempt. His conduct was in violation of law, subversive

of authority, and obstructive of the orderly administration

of justice. In fact, by his course he put in jeopardy the in-

terests which he assumed to protect, because it is only by

treating the case as if the verdict directed had been re-

turned that we have been able to review the judgment and

to order a new trial. We deem it proper to observe here

that it is not essential that there be a written verdict signed

by jurors or by a foreman, and we have no doubt that, in

cases where the court thinks it right to do so, it may an-

nounce its conclusion in the presence of the jury and of the
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parties or their representatives, and direct the entry of a

verdict without asking the formal assent of the jury. Until

a case has been submitted to the jury for its decision upon

disputed facts, the authority of the court, for all the pur-

poses of the trial, is, at every step, necessarily absolute;

and its ruling upon every proposition, including the ques-

tion whether, upon the evidence, the case is one for the

jury, must be conclusive until, upon writ of error, it shall

be set aside. That remedy is provided by law, and pre-

sumably will be eifective and adequate, if there be just

ground for invoking it. Certainly the obstinacy of a con-

ceited juror is not likely to prove a wholesome substitute.

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded, with in-

structions to grant a new trial.

[Jenkins, J., dissented on other grounds.]

DISMISSAL, NoN-SurT, DIRECTED VERDICT
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in his opinion, the state of the evidence requires it, i
beyond di pute; and it is not for jurors to di obey, nor for
attorneys to object, except in the orderly way nece ary to
save the right to pros cute a writ of error. The onduct of
the juror in this instance was in the highest degree reprehensible, and might well have subjected him, and any who
encouraged him to persist in his cour e, to puni hment for
contempt. His conduct was in violation of law, ubver ive
of authority, and obstructive of the orderly admini tration
of justice. In fact, by hi course he put in jeopardy the interests which he a sumed to protect, because it is only by
treating the case as if the verdict directed had been returned that we have been able to review the judgment and
to order a new trial. We deem it pro1 er to ob erve here
that it is not es ential that there be a written ver ict signed
by jurors or by a fore an, and we have no doubt that, in
cases where the court think it right to do o, it may announce its conclusion in the presence of the jury and of the
parties or their representatives, and direct the entry of a
verdict without asking the formal a ent of the jury. Until
a case ha een ubmitted to the jury for its deci ion upon
disputed fact s, the authority of the court, for all the purpo es of the trial, is, at every step, necessaril ab olute;
and its ruling upon every proposition, including the question whether, upon the evidence, the ca e i one for the
jury, mu t be conclu i' e until upon writ of error, it shall
e set asid . That remed3 i provided by law and preumably will be effective and adequate, if there be ju t
ground for invoking it.
ertainly th ob tina y of a coneited juror is not likely to prove a whole ome ub. titute.
The judgment i rever ed and the ca e remanded, with inruction to grant a new trial.
[JENKINS., J., dissented on other grounds.]

CHAPTER XI.

INSTRUCTING THE JURY.

Section 1, Questions of Law and Fact.

CHAPTER XI.

(a) General Theory of Division of Functions Between

Court and Jury.

STATE V. WRIGHT.

INSTRUCTING THE JURY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1863.

53 Maine, 328.

The defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of mur-

SECTION 1.

der in the first degree, at the October term, 1863, Walton,

J., presiding.

QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT.

The case came before this Court on exceptions which

appear in the opinion.

Wai^ton, J. — The most important question raised by the

(a)

General Theory of Di1 ision o.f Functions Between
Court and J ury.
1

bill of exceptions in this case is whether, in the trial of

criminal cases, the jury may rightfully disregard the in-

structions of the Court, in matters of law, ana, if they think

STATE V. WRIGHT.

the instructions wrong, convict or acquit contrary to such

instructions. In other words, whether they are the ulti-
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mate, rightful and paramount judges of the law as well as

the facts.

Supreme Judicial Court of- Maine.
58 Maine, 328.

1863.

Our conclusion is that such a doctrine cannot be main-

tained; that it is contrary to the fundamental maxims of

the common law; contrary'' to the uniform practice of the

highest courts of judicature in Great Britain, where our

jury system originated and matured; contrary to a vast

preponderance of judicial authority in this country; con-

trary to the spirit and meaning of the constitution of the

United States and of this State; contrary to a fair inter-

pretation of our legislative enactment, authorizing the res-

ervation of qnostions of law for the decision of the law

court, and the alk)wance of exceptions; contrary to reason

and fitness, in withdrawing the interpretation of the laws

360

The defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of murder in the first degree, at the October term, 1863, WALTON)
J. presiding.
The ca e ieame before this Court on exceptions which
appear in the opinion.
WALTON, J.-The most important question raised by the
bill of exceptions in this case is whether, in the trial of
riminal cases, the jury may rightfully disregard the Hltructions of the Court, in matters of law, anu, if they think
the in truction wrong, convict or acquit contrary to such
in tructions. In other words, whether they are the ultimat rightful and paramount judges of the law as well as
th facts.
ur on lu ion is that such a doctrine cannot be maintained· that it is contrary to the fundamental maxims of
th ommon law; contrary to the uniform practice of the
highe. t court of judicature in Great Britain, wher our
j ry sy. tern originat d and matured; contrary to a vast
pr pond ran of judi ial authority in this country; contrary t tb pirit an meaning of the con titution of the
it cl , 'tat s and of this State; contrary to a fair interpr t tion of o r 1 gi. lativ e adm nt, authorizino- the re orv ti n of r1n<'. tions f law for the d i ion of the law
r nrt ncl tho allowanr £ . eption ; o trary to rea on
fitn " . , j withdr win th interpretation of the laws

360
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from those who make it the business and the study of their

lives to understand them, and committing it to a class of

men who, being drawn from non-professional life for occa-

sional and temporary service only, possess no such qualifi-

cations, and whose decisions would be certain to be con-

flicting in all doubtful cases, and would therefore lead to

endless confusion and perpetual uncertainty.

1. It is contrary to the fundamental maxims of the com-

mon law. It was very early provided that the jury should

not entangle themselves with questions of law, but confine

themselves simply and exclusively to facts. This rule is

expressed in the well known maxim, ad questionem facti

non respondent judices, ad questionem legis non respondent

juratores. It is the office of the judge to instruct the jury

in points of law — of the jury to decide on matter of fact.

Broom's Legal Maxims, 77. ''An invaluable principle of

jurisprudence," says Mr. Forsyth, in his History of Trial

by Jury, "which, more than anything else, has upheld the
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character and maintained the efficiency of English juries,

as tribunals for judicial investigation of truth." The

author says it is impossible to uphold the doctrine that the

jury are in any case to give a verdict according to their

own view of the law ; that it is founded on a confusion be-

tween the ideas of power and right. ''The law," continues

he, "cannot depend on the verdict of a jury, whose office is

simply to find the truth of disputed facts; and yet such

must be the result if they may decide contrary to what the

judge, the authorized expounder of the law, lays down for

their guidance. This would introduce the most miserable

uncertainty as to our rights and liberties, the misera ser-

vitus of vagum, jus, and be the most fatal blow that could

be struck at the existence of trial by jury." Fors}i;h's

History of Trial by Jury, 259, 265.

2. It is contrary to the uniform practice of the highest

Courts of judicature in England. Mr. Forsyth, after as-

signing as a reason for the unpopularity and final disuse of

juries in Scandinavia and Germany, that they carried in

their very constitution the element of their own destruction,

in this, that the whole judicial power, — the right to deter-

mine the law as well as the fact, — was in their hands, says:

"Far otherwise has been the case in England. Here the jury

never usurped the functions of the judge. They were orig-

INSTRUCTING THE JURY
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from those who make it the busine and the study of their
lives to understand them, and committing it to a class of
men who, being drawn from non-profes ional life for occasional and temporary service only, pos e s no uch qualifications, and whose deci ions would be certain to be conflicting in all doubtful cases, and would therefore lead to
endless confusion and perpetual uncertainty.
1. It is contrary to the fundamental maxims of the common law. It was very early provided that the jury should
not entangle themselves with questions of law, but confine
themselves simply and exclusively to fact . This rule is
expressed in the well known maxim, ad questioneni f acti
non respondent judices, ad qiiestioneni legis non respondent
juratores. It is the office of the judge to in truct the jury
in points of law-of the jury to decide on matter of fact.
Broom's Legal Maxims, 77. "An invaluable principle of
jurisprudence,'' a s 1\1r. Forsyth, in his History of Trial
by Jury, ''which more than anything else, ha upheld the
character and maintained the efficiency of English juries,
as tribunals for judicial investigation of truth.'' The
author says it is impossible to uphold the doctrine that the
jur are in any case to give a verdict according to their
own iew of the law· that it i founded on a onfu ion between the ideas of power and right. "The law," continues
he, ''cannot depend on the verdict of a jury, who e office is
simply to find the truth of di puted facts; and yet such
mu t be the result if they may decide contrary to what the
jud<>'e, the authorized expounder of the law, lays down for
their guidance. This would introduce the most mi erable
uncertainty as to our rights and liberties, the misera servitus of vagum jus, and be the mo t fatal blow that could
be tru k at the exi tence of trial by jury.'' For yth'
Hi tor. of Trial by Jury, 259, 265.
2. It is contrary to the itnifonn practice of the highe t
Courts of judicatiire in England. :Mr. Forsyth, after asigning a a r a on for the unpopularit and final di u e of
jurie in candina\ ia and G rman. that they carried in
their ver. con titution the element of their own destruction,
in thi that the wh 1 judi ial power -the ri<>'ht to det rmine th law a well a the fact -was in th ir hands ays:
"Far otherwi e ha b nth ca e in England. Here the jury
never usurped the functions of the judge. TheY. were orig-
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inally called in to aid the court with information upon ques-

tions of fact, in order that the law might be properly ap-

plied; and this has continued to be their province to the

present day. * * * Hence it is that the English jury flour-

ishes still in all its pristine vigor, while what are improper-

ly called the old juries of the continent have either sunk

into decay or been totally abolished." Trial by July, 11, 12.

Parties have often endeavored to appeal from the court

to the jury in matters of law, especially in state prosecu-

tions for treason and libel ; but it is believed that no Eng-

lish case can be found in which such an appeal has been

sanctioned by the court.

In 1784 the Dean of St. Asaph was indicted for a libel.

Lord Erskine defended him and insisted that the jury had

a right to pass upon the whole issue, including the law as

well as the fact. Being overruled by Mr. Justice Buller,

he moved for a new trial for misdirection ; and in support

of his motion is said to have made one of the most capti-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

vating arguments ever listened to in Westminister Hall.

But he did not succeed. The judges were unanimously

against him.

Lord Mansfield, in delivering judgment, declared that

in matters of law the judge ought to direct the jury, and

the jury ought to follow the direction; that this practice

ought not to be shaken by general theoretical arguments or

popular declamation; that the jury do not know and are

not presumed to know the law; that they do not under-

stand the language in which it is conceived, or the meaning

of the terms in which it is expressed; and have no rule to

go by but their passions and feelings ; that if they should

happen to be right it would be by chance only; that to bo

free is to live under a government of law; that if the law

is to be in every case what twelve men who shall happen to

l)e the jury shall be inclined to think, liable to no review,

subject to no control, under all the pojoular prejudices of

the day, no man could tell, no counsel could advise, what

the result would be; that such a doctrine was contrary to

judicial practice, contrary to the fundamental principles

constituting trials by jury, contrary to reason and fitness,

and lie was glad that he was not bound to subscribe to such

an absurdity. 3 T. K., 428, note.

[ Cltap. 11

inally called in to aid the court with information upon questions of fact, in order that the law might be properly applied; and this has continued to be their province to the
present day. * * * Hence it is that the English jury flourishes still in all its pristine vigor, while what are improperly cal1ed the old juries of the continent have either sunk
into decay or been totally abolished." Trial by July, 11, 12.
Parties have often endeavored to appeal from the court
to the jury in matters of law, especially in state prosecutions for treason and libel; but it is believed that no English case can be found in which such an appeal has been
sanctioned by the court.

* *

.*

* * * * * * *

In 1784 the Dean of St. Asaph was indicted for a libel.
Lord ERSKINE defended him and insisted that the jury had
a right to pass upon the whole issue, including the law as
well as the fact. Being overruled by Mr. Justice BuLLER,
he moved for a new trial for misdirection; and in support
of his motion is said to have made one of the most captivating arguments ever listened to in W estminister Hall.
But he did not succeed. The judges were unanimously
against him.
Lord MANSFIELD, in delivering judgment, declared that
in matters of law the judge ought to direct the jury, and
the jury ought to follow the direction; that this practice
ought not to be shaken by O'eneral theoretical arguments or
popular declamation; that the jury do not know and are
not presumed to know the law; that they do not understand the language in which it is conceived, or the meaning
of the terms in which it is expre sed; and have no rule to
go by but their passions ·and feelinO' ; that if they should
happen to be rio·ht it would b by hance only; that to be
fr e i to live und r a go ' rnment of law; that if the law
i. to be in ev ry case what tw lv men who hall happ n to
h th jury . hall b inclined to thinl, Jiabl to no r ,Ti w,
. ubj t to no control, und r all the popular prejudices of
un 1 could advi e, what
th0 ay, no man could t 11, r
tli r . 1t w uld b ; that u h a do trine wa ontrary to
C'ontrary to th fundam ntal I rin iple
juclfrial pra ti
c· n.- tjtuti O' tri
y jury, contrary to r a on and fitne ,
anrl h \ .· la th t h w s not b und to sub ribe to u h
au al surdity.
T. R., 428, note.
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3. It is contrary to a vast preponderance of judicial

authority in this country. Before the revolution the doc-

trine seems to have met with some favor. It was undoubt-

edly believed that in the then condition of things it would

be safer for the colonies that the power of determining the

law should be vested in the jury than to leave it in the

hands of the judges. And even after the revolution the

doctrine seems to have obtained some currency that in all

cases, civil as well as criminal, the jury had a right to

determine the law as well as the facts. In a case tried in

the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1794, the full

Court instructed the jury that they had a right *'to deter-

mine the law as well as the fact in controversy." This

was in a civil suit. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall., 4.

But this mode of administering justice could not con-

tinue. The federal courts soon discovered that however

useful such a doctrine might have been to us as colonies,

it was wholly incompatible with our new and improved
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system of government under the federal constitution. It

was seen that to concede such a power to the jury would

deprive the Judges of the Supreme Court of that supremacy

in matters of law which the constitution had wisely con-

ferred upon them.

In a case before Mr. Justice Baldwin, of the Supreme

Court of the United States, a man by the name of Shive was

tried for counterfeiting notes of the United States Bank.

His counsel gravely argued to the jury that they ought to

acquit his client on the ground that the act chartering the

bank was unconstitutional and void, and that to counter-

feit the bills of such an institution was no crime. True, he

said, the Supreme Court of the United States had decided

otherwise, and, as it was composed of very respectable

gentlemen, he would not deny that their opinion was en.

titled to some consideration ; but he contended that, never-

theless, it was the right and the duty of the jury to revise

the decision, and if in their judgment it was wrong to dis-

regard it.

Judge Baldwin at once saw the absurdity of such a doc-

trine. ''Should you assume and exercise this power," said

he, in his charge to the jury, ''your opinion does not be-

come a supreme law; no one is bound by it; other juries

will decide for themselves, and you could not expect that
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3. It is contrary to a vast preponderance of judicial
authority in this country. Before the revolution the doctrine seem to have met with some favor. It was undoubtedly believed that in the then condition of things it would
be safer for the colonies that the power of determining the
law should be vested in the jury than to leave it in the
hand of the judges. And even after the revolution the
doctrine seems to have obtained some currency that in all
cases, civil as well as criminal, the jury had a right to
determine the law as well a the facts. In a case tried in
the Supreme Court of the United tate , in 1794, the full
Court instructed the jury that they had a right ''to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.'' This
was in a civil suit. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall., 4.
But this mode of administering justice could not continue. The federal courts soon discovered that however
useful such a doctrine might have been to us as colonie ,
it was wholly incompatible with our new and improved
s stem of government under the federal constitution. It
was seen that to concede uch a power to the jury would
deprive the Judges of the Supreme Court of that supremacy
in matters of law which the constitution had wisely conferred upon them.
In a case before Mr. Justice BALDWIN, of the Supreme
Court of the United States, a man by the name of Shive was
tried for counterfeiting notes of the United States Bank.
His counsel gravely argued to the jury that they ought to
acquit hi client on the ground that the act chartering the
bank wa unconstitutional and void, and that to counterfeit the bills of such an institution was no crime. True, he
said, the Supreme Court of the United States had decided
otherwise, and, as it wa compo ed of very re pe table
gentlemen, he would not deny that their opinion was en . .
titled to some iconsideration; but he on tend d that, nevertheles , it wa the right and the duty of the jury to revise
the deci ion, and if in their judgment it wa wrong to di regard it.
Judge BALDWIN at on saw the ab urdity of u h a o _
trine. '' h u1d ou a um and x r i e thi pow r '' aid
he in hi har()'e to th jur. ''. our o inion d e not
ome a upreme law; no on i
ound by it· oth r jurie
will decide for_ th m elv , and you could not expe t that
1

364
364 Trial Practice [Chap. 11

courts would look to your verdict for the construction of

the constitution as to the acts of the legislative or judicial

departments of the government; nor that you have the

power of declaring what the law is, what acts are criminal,

what are innocent, as a rule of action for your fellow citi-

zens or the court. If juries once exercise this power we

are without a constitution or laws. One jury has the same

power as another. You cannot bind those who may take

your places. What you declare constitutional to-day an-

other may declare unconstitutional to-morrow. We shall

cease to have a government of law when what is the law

depends on the arbitrary and fluctuating opinions of judges

and jurors, instead of the standard of the constitution, ex-

pounded by the tribunal to which has been referred all

eases arising under the constitution, laws and treaties of

the United States." United States v. Shive, 1 Bald., 512.

In United States v. Battiste, 2 Sum., 243, Judge Story

charged the jury that it was their duty to follow the law as
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it was laid down by the Court. '^I deny," said he, "that

in any case, civil or criminal, they have the moral right to

decide the law according to their own notions or pleasure.

On the contrary, I hold it a most sacred constitutional

right of every party accused of a crime tliat the jury

should respond as to the facts, and the Court as to the

law. It is the duty of the Court to instruct the jury as to

the law, and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law as

it is laid down by the Court."

4. It is unconstitutional. The constitution of the United

States confers upon tlie Judges of the Supreme Court the

power to adjudicate and finally determine all questions of

law properly brouglit before them. To allow juries to re-

vise, and, if they think proper, overrule these adjudica-

tions, would deprive them of their final and authoritative

character, and tliiis destroy the constitutional functions of

the Court.

The Supreme Court of the United States and of this

State have decided that prohibitory liquor laws, like the

one now in force in this State, are constitutional. Is it

witiiiii the legitimate power of eacli successive jury im-
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courts would look to your verdict for the construction of
the constitution as to the acts of the legislative or judi,cial
departm nts of the government; nor that you have the
lower of declaring what the law is, what acts are criminal,
what are innoc nt, as a rule of action for your fellow citizens or the court. If juries once exercise thi power we
are without a constitution or laws. One jury has the same
pow r as another. You cannot bind those who may take
your place . What you declare constitutional to-day another may declare unconstitutional to-morrow. We shall
cease to have a government of law when what is the law
depends on the arbitrary and fluctuating opinion of judges
and jurors, in t ad of the standard of the constitution, expounded by the tribunal to which has been referred all
cases arising und er the constitution, laws and treaties of
the United State . " Unitecl States v . Shive, 1 Bald., 512.
In Unit ed States v . Battiste, 2 Sum., 243, Judge STORY
charg cl the jury that it was their duty to follow the law as
it wa laid down by the Court. "I deny," aid he, "that
in any ca e: civil or criminal, they have the moral rio·ht to
decide the law according to their own notion or pl a ure.
On the contrary, I hold it a most sacred constitutional
ri ht of v ry party a1 cused of a crime that the jury
should re ond as to the facts, and the Court as to the
law. It is the dut:'i"· f the Conrt to instruct the jury as to
the law, and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law as
it is laid down by the ourt.''

pannelled to try a liquor case, to reconsider that question,

* * * * * * * * * *

and, if they think proper, overrule those decisions? Is
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each successive jury impannelled to try a person charged

with counterfeiting our national currency, to be told that

they may rightfully disregard the decisions of the Supreme

Court of the United States and the rulings of the presiding

Judge, if they, in the exercise of their own judgment, think

them wrong, and acquit the defendant upon the ground that

the Act of Congress authorizing our national banks is un-

constitutional? Every intelligent mind must perceive that

it is impossible to maintain such a doctrine.

Law should be certain. It is the rule by which we are

to govern our conduct. To enable us to do so we must

know what the law is. Doubtful points ought therefore to

be settled, not for the purpose of a single trial only, but

finally and definitely. If each successive jury may decide

the law for itself, how will doubtful points ever become

settled? They will be bound by no precedents. They may not

only disregard the instructions of the presiding Judge, and

the verdicts of all former juries, but they may also disre-
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gard the decisions of the law court. They will be authorized

to construe statutes, declare the meaning of teclmieal terms,

and pass upon the constitutionality of legislative and con-

gressional enactments, and acquit or convict according to

their own view of the law. In doubtful cases — cases where

authoritative expositions of the law are most needed — we

should undoubtedly have conflicting verdicts, and the law

would remain in perpetual uncertainty.

Difficult and important questions of law arise in criminal

as well as civil suits. There is scarcely an Act of Congress,

or of our State Legislature, the construction, interpreta-

tion or validity of which may not be brought in question in

a criminal prosecution. Technical terms are to be ex-

plained, conflicting provisions reconciled, their prospective

or retrospective operations ascertained, their effect to re-

peal or restore former statutes considered, and their .con-

stitutionality determined. To do this often requires much

time, careful thought, the examination of numerous au-

thorities, and a familiarity with the law as a science whicii

a lifetime ot preparatory study is scarcely sufficient to

supply.

Juries are generally composed of upright men, willing

and_ anxious to discharge their duty to the best of their

ability. But they are drawn froyn. non-professional life.
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each successive jury impannelled to tr. a per on charged
with counterfeiting our national curr ncy to be told that
they ma. rightfull. di r gard the deci i n f the Suprem -'
Court of the United tate and the ruling f the pr iding
Judge if they in the exerci e of their own judinnent, think
them wrono· and acquit the defendant upon the ground that
the A t of ont;re authorizing our national banks is uncon titutional ~ Every intelligent mind must per eive that
it is impo ible to maintain such a doctrine.
Law should be certain. It is the rule by which we are
to govern our conduct. To enable u t d . o we must
know what the law is. Doubtful point ought th refore to
be settled, not for the purpose of a ingl trial only but
finally and definitely. If each succe ive jury may decide
the law for it elf how will doubtful oint ever becom
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and lack the advantage of a legal education. When a cause

is finally committed to them they are put under duress of

an officer, and are not allowed to separate till their con-

sideration of the case is closed. They are not allowed the

use of books, not even the statutes which they may be re-

quired to construe. Twelve men thus situated may be ad-

mirably qualified to weigh evidence and determine facts,

and may be justly entitled to all the encomiums passed

upon them in that respect; but it is impossible to believe

they constitute a suitable tribunal for the determination of

important and intricate questions of law.

^'The founders of our constitution," said Chief Justice

Shaw, (5 Gray, 235,) "understood, what every reflecting

man must understand, from the nature of the law, in its

fundamental principles, and in its comprehensive details,

that it is a science, requiring a long course of preparatory

training, of profound study and active practice, to be ex-

pected of no one who has not dedicated his life to its pur-
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suit; they well understood that no safe system of juris-

prudence could be established, that no judiciary depart-

ment of government could be constituted without bringing

into its service jurists thus trained and qualified. The

judiciary department was intended to be permanent and

co-extensive with the other departments of government,

and, as far as practicable, independent of them ; and there-

fore, it is not competent for the Legislature to take the

power of deciding the law from this judiciary department,

and vest it in other bodies of men, juries, occasionally and

temporarily called to attend courts, for the performance

of very important duties indeed, but duties very different

from those of judges, and requiring different qualifica-

tions."

Origin of the doctrine. The doctrine that the jury are

judges of the law in criminal cases originated in a contro-

versy in relation to the law of libel. The doctrine of im-

plied malice, which, when applied to homicides, lias been

resisted by some of the best judicial minds in this country

and in England, was exceedingly distasteful to the defend-

ants, when applied to libels. The Judges, (in England,)

formerly lield tliat the cliaracter of the publication,— that

is, whether it was or was not libellous, was to be deter-

and lack the advantage of a legal education. When a cause
is :finally committed to them they are put under duress of
an officer, and are not allowed to separate till their consideration of the case is closed. They are not allowed the
use of books, not even the statutes which they may be required to construe. Twelve men thus situated may be admirably qualified to weigh evidence and determine facts,
and may be justly entitled to all the encomiums passed
upon them in that respect; but it is impossible to believe
they constitute a suitable tribunal for the determination of
important and intricate questions of law.
''The founders of our constitution,'' said Chief Justice
SHAW, (5 Gray, 235,) "understood, what every reflecting
man must under stand, from the nature of the law, in its
fundamental principles, and in its comprehensive details,
that it is a 1cience, r equiring a long course of preparatory
training, of profound study and active practice, to be expected of no one who has not d edicated his life to its pu rsuit; they well under stood that no safe system of jurisprudence could be established, that no judiciary department of government could be constituted without bringing
into its service jurists thus trained and qualified. The
judiciary department was intended to be permanent and
co-extensive with the other departments of government,
and, as far as practicable, independ ent of them; and therefore, it i not competent for the Legislature to take the
power of deciding the law from this judiciary department,
and ve t it in other bodies of men, juries, occasionally and
temporarily called to attend courts, for the performance
of ver y important duties indeed, but duties very different
from those of judges, and r equiring different qualifications. ''

* * * * * * * * * *
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mined by the Court; and, if the Court declared it to be

libellous, then malice was implied and need not be proved;

and, what was still more objectionable, the Judges were in

the habit of directing the jury to return a verdict of guilty

upon proof of publication and the truth of the innuendos,

without telling the jury whether the paper was or was not

a libel, and without permitting the jury to determine that

question for themselves ; and then putting the defendant to

the trouble and expense of moving in arrest of judgment, or

suing out a writ of error, if he thought the publication

innocent. Thus, in the trial of the Dean of St. Asaph, for

publishing a very harmless pamphlet, entitled a dialogue

between a gentleman and a farmer, written by Sir William

Jones, Mr. Justice Buller told the jury that it was no part

of their duty to form any opinion as to the character of

the i)amplilet, or the motives of the defendant in publish-

ing it, and did not himself express any opinion upon these

points; and, after long and vexatious litigation, judgment
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was finally arrested, because not a single sentence in the

whole pamphlet could be pointed out that was libellous. If

the Judge had told the jury that the pamphlet was not

libellous, or had allowed them to determine that question

for themselves, or had allowed them to pass upon the ques-

tion of malice, the defendant would have been acquitted at

the trial. This manner of trying libel suits led to a contro-

versy in relation to the law of libel, which lasted for more

than half a century in England ; and finally resulted in an

Act of Parliament, known in history as "Fox's Libel Act,"

declaring the right of the jury to pass upon the whole

issue, and the duty of the Court to give their opinion and

direction to the jury, as in other criminal cases. But this

Act has never been construed in England as giving the jury

the right to determine the law, even in libel suits. "The

judge is the judge of the law in libel as in all other cases,"

said the Court in Rex v. Burdett, 4 Barn. & Aid., 131. It was

passed to correct the practice of requiring the jury to re-

turn a general verdict of guilty without the sanction of

the judge's opinion that it was one warranted by law.

In the course of this controversy the argument was in-

vented and urged with great plausibility by Lord Erskine,

that, in all cases tried under the general issue, the jury had

a right to determine the law as well as the facts. But tnis
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min d by the Court; and, if the Court de la red it to be
libellou , then malic was implied and need not be rove?;
and what was still more obj ctionabl , the Judge were in
the habit of directing the jury to return a verdict of guilty
upon proof of publication and the truth of the innitendos,
without telling the jury wh tber the paper wa or wa not
a libel and without permitting the jury to determine that
question for them elves; and then putting the defendant to
the trouble and expense of moving in arre t of judgment or
suing out a writ of error, if he thought the publication
innocent. Thus, in the trial of the Dean of St. A aph, for
publishing a very harmles pamphlet, entitled a dialogue
between a gentleman and a farmer, written by Sir William
Jones, Mr. Justice BuLLER told the jury that it was no part
of their duty to form any opinion as to the character of
the pamphlet, or the motives of the def ndant in publi hing it and did not him elf expre s any opinion upon these
points; and, after long and vexatious litigation, judgment
was finally arrested, beicau e not a single sentence in the
whole pamphlet could be pointed out that was libellous. If
the Judge had told the jury that the pamphlet was not
libellous or had allowed them to determine that que tion
for tbemselves, or had allowed them to pa s upon the question of malice, the defendant would have been acquitted at
the trial. This manner of trying libel suits led to a controversy in relation to the law of libel, which la te"d for more
than half a centur_r in England; and finally resulted in an
Act of Parliament, known in hi tory as "Fox's Libel Act,"
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upon the whole
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doctrine never met with favor in England. The principal

ground relied upon was, not that the jury were judges of

the law, but that the malicious intent with which a libel is

always charged to have been made, is a question of fact

and not a question of law; and the judges were charged

with invading the province of the jury, not in withholding

from them the decision of questions of law, but in with-

holding from them the decision of a question of fact; and

it was upon this ground that the advocates of the right of

the jury to pass upon the whole issue in libel suits, and to

have the opinion of the Court whether the facts, if proved,

would or would not warrant a verdict of guilty, finally

triumphed.

In this country the right of the jury to pass upon the

whole issue in prosecutions for libel is universally ad-

mitted. In this and many other States it is secured by con-

stitutional provisions. In many of the constitutions it is

provided that the jury may do this ''under the direction
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of the Court," or "after having received the direction of

the Court." The latter is the form of expression in tliis

State. Upon these and similar provisions the question has

been frequently raised, whether the jury are bound to fol-

low the directions of the Court in matters of law, or are at

liberty to disregard them, and determine the law for them-

selves. "Upon this point," asys Mr. Greenleaf, "the

decisions are not entirely uniform ; and some of them are

not perfectly clear from the want of discriminating between

the power possessed by the jury to find a general verdict,

contrary to the direction of the Court in a matter of law,

without being accountable for so doing, and their right

so to do, without a violation of their oath and duty. But

the weight of opinion is vastly against the right of the jury

in any case, to disregard the law as stated to them by the

Court; and. on the contrary, is in favor of their duty to be

governed by such rules as the Court may declare to be the

law of the land; the meaning of the constitutional pro-

visions being merely this, that the jury are the sole judges

of all the facts involved in the issue, and of the application

of the law to the particular case." 3 Green]., Ev., sec. 179.

We thus see that the doctrine that the jury are judges

of the law as well as the facts in criminal cases, is con-

trary to the fundamental principles of the common law,
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doctrine never met with favor in England. The principal
ground relied upon was, not that the jury were judges of
the law, but that the malicious intent with which a libel is
alway charged to have been made, is a question of fact
and not a question of law; and the judges were charged
with invading the province of the jury, not in withholding
from them the decision of questions of law, but in withholding from them the decision of a question of fact; and
it was upon this ground that the advocates of the right of
the jury to pass upon the whole issue in libel suits, and to
have the opinion of the Court whether the facts, if proved,
would or would not warrant a verdict of guilty, :finally
triumphed.
In this country the right of the jury to pass upon the
whole issue in prosecutions for libel is universally a..imitted. In this and many other States it is secured by constitutional provisions. In many of the constitutions it is
provided that the jury may do this "under the direction
of the Court,'' or ''after having received the direction of
the Court.'' The latter is the form of expression in this
State. Upon these and similar provisions the question has
been frequ ently raised, whether the jury are bound to fol low the directions of the Court in matters of law, or are at
liberty to disregard them, and determine the law for themselve . "Upon this point," asys Mr. Greenleaf, "the
deci ion are not entirely uniform; and some of them ar e
not perfectly clear from the want of discriminating between
the power po ses ed by the jury to find a general verdi·ct,
ntrary to the direction of the Court in a matter of law,
without bein accountable- for so doing, and their right
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contrary to a vast preponderance of judicial authority, con-

trary to reason and fitness ; and, if allowed to prevail, will

destroy the constitutional functions of the judicial depart-

ment of the government. Whether under the provisions of

our State constitution they may do so in prosecutions for

libel, we express no opinion ; but in all other criminal pros-

ecutions we have no hesitation in saying it is the duty of

the jury to be governed by the law as it is laid down by the

court. We fully concur in the opinion expressed by Chief

Justice Shaw, (5 Gray, 198,) that, ''the true glory and ex-

cellence of trial by jury is this : that the power of deciding

fact and law is wisely divided; that the authority to decide

questions of law is placed in a body well qualified, by a

suitable course of training, to decide all questions of law;

and another body, well qualified for the duty, is charged

with deciding all questions of fact, definitively; and whilst

each, within its own sphere, performs the duty entrusted

to it, such a trial affords the best possible security for a
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safe administration of justice and the security of public

and private rights."

**********

Exceptions overruled.

Judgment on the verdict.

Appleton, C. J., Cutting, Kext, Dickeesox, Baekows

and Danfoeth, J. J., concurred.

(b) Questions of Law Not to he Submitted to the Jury.

AARON V. MISSOURI AND KANSAS TELEPHONE

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1911.

84 Kansas, 117.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Johnston, C. J.: The appellees, Michael Aaron and

Jeanette Aaron, recovered a judgment for $10,000 against

the appellant, the ^Missouri and Kansas Telephone Com-

pany, for the violation of its duty to their son, Walter,

T. p.— 24
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contrary to a vast pr ponderan e of judicial authority contrary to rea on and fitne ; and if allowed to preYail, will
destro the con titutional function of the judicial de1 artment of the go-\ ernment. Whether under the provi i n of
our State constitution they may do so in pro ecution for
libel we expre no opinion; but in all other criminal pro ecution we have no hesitation in saying it is the dut of
the jury to be governed by the law as it is laid down by the
court. We fully concur in the opinion exp re ed by hief
Justice SHAW, (5 Gray, 198,) that, "the true glory and excellence of trial by jury is this: that the power of deciding
fact and law is wi ely diYided; that the authority to ecide
que tions of law is placed in a body well qualified by a
uitable course of training, to decide all que tion of law;
and another body well qualified for the dut , is charged
with deciding all que tions of fact, definitivel ; and whiL t
each, within its own phere, perform the dut entrusted
to it, such a trial affords the best possible ecurity for a
safe administration of justice and the securit of public
and private rights."
* * ~ * * * * * * •
E xceptions overruled.
J itdgnient on th e erdict.
APPLETON, c. J., CUTTING, KENT, DICKERSOJ.. BARROW!:
and DANFORTH, J. J., concurred.
J

(b)

Questions of Law Not to be Subniitted to the J it ry .

AARON V. MI SOUR! AND KANSAS TELEPHONE
COMPANY.
Suprem e Court of Kansa . 1911.
84 Kan as 117.

The opinion of th c ur wa deli Ye red y
JORN TO};
. . Th a1 J 11
fi ha 1 aron and
J an tte Aaron, re Y r 1 a jud ment for . ,0 a ain . t
th app llant th
Ii
nri and Kan a T 1 l hon
ompany f r tb_ Yiolation f it duty to their on Walter
1
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through which he lost his life. The action was brought

against the appellant and the Delaware Mutual Telephone

Company, of Lansing, but before the case was submitted

to the jury the Delaware Mutual Telephone Company was

dismissed from the case. In the petition it was alleged

that Walter Aaron was an employee of the Delaware com-

pany, which, under contract with appellant, had two wires

upon the poles of appellant, and that it was the duty of

appellant to have proper poles and maintain them in a safe

condition for its own operatives as well as those of the

Delaware company who found it necessary to climb and

work upon them; that appellant had planted new poles

along the line and had removed its own wires from the old

and attached them to the new poles; that Walter Aaron

came along afterward and was transferring the two wires

of the Delaware company from the old to the new poles,

and that when he had climbed an old pole for that purpose

and had stripped the wires from that pole, to which he was
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strapped, it broke and fell, crushing and killing him. * * *

The testimony included two written contracts between

appellant and the Delaware company relating to an inter-

change of business, the connections to be made, the use of

telephones and switchboards, the maintenance of lines, the

placing of the wires of one on the poles of the other and fix-

ing the compensation for such use, a provision releasing one

from loss or damage caused by wires or fixtures, and con-

taining other stipulations as to the duties of each company

and its obligations to the other.

In submitting the case to the jury the court instructed

"that if you believe from the evidence in this case that it

was the duty of the Missouri and Kansas Telephone Com-

pany, under a contract with the Delaware Mutual Tele-

phone Company, to maintain the line of poles in question,

including the particular pole in question, in a reasonably

safe condition for the linemen of the Delaware Mutual

Telephone Company to climb and operate upon; that it

failed so to do, and because thereof the death of Walter

Aaron was caused, without fault on his part, then I instruct

you sliall find for the plaintiffs," etc. * * *

The duty of appellant to the Delaware company in re-

spoct to the maintenance of the poles, including the one

through which he lost his life. The action was brought
against the appellant and the Delaware Mutual Telephone
Company, of Lansing, but before the case was submitted
to the jury the Delaware Mutual Telephone Company was
dismis ed from the case. In the petition it was alleged
that Walter Aaron was an employee of the Delaware company, which, under contract with appellant, had two wires
upon the poles of appellant, and that it was the duty of
appellant to have proper poles and maintain them in a safe
condition for its own operatives as well as those of the
Delaware company who found it necessary to climb and
work upon them; that appellant had planted new poles
along the line and had removed its own wires from the old
and attached them to the new poles; that Walter Aaron
came along afterward and was transferring the two wires
of the Delaware company fr om the old to the new poles,
and that when he had climbed an old pole for that purpose
and had stripped the wires from that pole, to whi1ch he was
strapped, it broke and fell, crushing and killing him. * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
The testimony included two written contracts between
appellant and the Delaware company relating to an interchange of business, the connections to be made, the use of
telephones and switchboards, the maintenance of lines, the
placing of the wires of one on the poles of the other and fixing the compensation for such use, a provision releasing one
from lo or damage caused by wires or fixtures, and containing other stipulations as to the duties of eaich company
and it obli 0 ·ation to the other.
In ubmitting the case to the jury the court instructed
''that if you believe from th vidence in this case that it
wa the duty of the Mi ouri and y ·an as T 1 phone Company, un er a contract with th D lawar Mutual Teleh n
m ny to maintain the line of pole in question,
inC'lud ing th
a rti ular pol in u tion, in a rea onably
. af ron<li ti n for th lin men of the D laware Mutual
T 1 pl on
~ m n y to li b and
erat upon; that it
f · il Pd . o t d
nd
au th r of th d ath of Walter
aro wa. c·, 11 .· 1, without fault on hi part, th n I in tru t
y u : l1nl l find f r tl1 laintiff " tc. * * *
'r li<' dntv f ~q Plhrnt t th r D la war
m1 an. in ref t e l 1 , indu<lin 0 · th one
p(;ct to the aint ·na
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which fell, depended mainly npon the terms of the con-

tracts between these companies. The contracts were in

writing, and their meaning and effect w^ere questions of

law, exclusively within the province of the court. To send

the jury to a written contract to find the respective duties

and obligations of the contracting parties was to leave the

jury to decide the law as well as the facts. It was the

province of the jury to determine all questions of fact in-

volved in the case, after the court had advised them as to

the governing rules of law and instructed them how to

apply those rules to the facts brought out in the testimony.

To impose on the jury the task of interpreting a contract

and of determining the duty and responsibility of appellant

under the contract is to require them to perform a function

which belongs to the court alone — a duty which it can not

surrender or evade. In Belil v. Keepers, 37 Kan. 64, it was

ruled that "when a written instrument is admitted in evi-

dence, it then becomes the duty of the court to construe
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and determine its legal effect, the relation of the parties

thereto, and to include such determination in the instruc-

tions to the jurv." (Syl. Par. 2; see, also, Broivn v. Trust

Co., 71 Kan. 134.)

The duty of appellant to one employed by and working

for another company is not only a matter of law, but it is

one of vital consequence in the action. The instruction was

little less objectionable than would have been one that if

the jury believed the appellant was responsible for the in-

jury and death the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. The

instructions required the jury to cover the entire field, in-

cluding the province of the court, and left them to deter-

mine both the law and the facts. It has been held that the

failure of the court to define the issues in a case and state

them to the jury is error, and likewise it has been decided

that to send the jury to the pleadings to learn the issues

or contentions of the parties is reversible error. (Railroad

Co. V. Eagan, 64 Kan. 421; Stevens v. Maxwell, 65 Kan.

835; Railroad Co. v. Dalton, 66 Kan. 799.) The duty of

the court to define to the jury the issues made by the plead-

ings is no more imperative than to determine the questions

of law arising in the case and to state them to the jury. It is

in fact a greater departure from good practice to leave the

jury to interpret written contracts and determine their

IN TR CTING THE JURY
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which fell, depended mainly upon the terms of the contract between th e companie . The ontract were in
writing, and their m aning an effect were que tions of
law, exclusively within the province f the court. To end
the jury to a written contract to find the respective dutie
and obligation of the ontracting partie was to leave th
jury to de ·ide the law a well as the faicts. It was the
province of the jury to determine all que tions of fact involved in the ca e, after the court had adYised them a to
the governing rule of law and in tructed them how to
apply those rule to the facts brouo-ht out in the te timony.
To impo e on the jur the ta k of interpreting a contract
and of determining the duty and respon ibility of appellant
under the contra t i to require them to erf orm a function
which belongs to the ourt alone-a duty which it can not
urrender or evade. In Belil v . Ke epers, 37 Kan. 64, it was
ruled that "when a written in trum nt i admitted in evidence, it then becomes the dut. of the court to con true
and determine it legal effect, the r lation of the partie
thereto, and to include uch determination in the in tructions to the jury." (Syl. Par. 2; see, al o, Brown v. Trust
Co., 71 Kan. 134.)
The duty of appellant to one emplo~1 e d by and working
for another com any is not only a matter of law, but it i
one of vital con equ n e in the action. The in truction wa
little le objectionable than would have been one that if
the jury believed th appellant was re pon ible for the injury and death the laintiff were entitled to recover. The
in truction required the jury to cover th entire field, inluding the province of the court, and left them to det rmine both the law an the fact . It a b en held that the
failure of the ourt to d fine the i u in a ca e and ta te
them to th jury is rror and likewi e i+ ha been d cid d
that to nd t e jur to the pleadin°· to learn the i ues
or contention of th I arti i rever ible error. (Railrorid
Co. v . Eagan, 64 Kan. 421 · te ·en
. Ma l ·ell 5 I{an.
835; Railroad o. v . Dalton 66 Kan. 79 .) The dub of
the court to d fine t the jury th i ue made by the 1 i adin i no more imperative than to
t rmin the que ti n
of law ari ing in the ca and to tate th m to the jur.. It i
in fa t a o-r ater d arture from good practice to lea e the
jury to in!erpr t writt n contracts and determine their
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effect on the relations and obligations of the parties than

to leave them to ascertain the effect of the pleadings or the

issues which they present.

For the error of the court in submitting the case to the

jury the case is reversed and the cause remanded for a new

trial.

BAKER V. SUMMERS.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1903.

201 Illinois, 52.

[Chap. 11
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ffect on the relation and obligations of the parties than
to leave them to ascertain the effect of the pleadings or the
i sues which they present.
* * * * * * * * * *
For the error of the court in submitting the case to the
jury the case is reversed and the cause remanded for a new
trial.

Mr. Justice Cartwright delivered the opinion of the

court.

The second instruction told the jury that they should find

the issues for the plaintiff if she had establish-ed, by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence, the material allegations of any

of the counts in the amended declaration. There was no

instruction telling the jury what the material allegations of

the several counts were, and what were the material allega-

BAI{ER V. SUMMERS.

tions was a matter of law for the court. Although it is a
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practice not to be commended for the 'Court to refer the

Sup reme Co'Urt of Illinois.

1903.

jury to the declaration for the issues, it has not been con-

sidered error to make such reference where the instruction

201 Illinois, 52.

requires proof of the averments of the declaration. The

proper method is for the court to inform the jury, by tiie

instructions, in a clear and concise manner, as to what ma-

terial facts must be found to authorize a recovery. The

averments in the declaration which would be clear to a

lawyer would often be obscure and unintelligible to the

average juryman. (Moshier v. Kitchell, 87 111. 18.) Where

the jury are not only referred to the declaration to deter-

mine the issues, but are instructed to find a verdict for the

plaintiff if the material allegations of the declaration are

proved, they are left to decide, as a matter of law, what

are the material allegations, and might conclude that some

allegation essential and material in the law was not ma-

MR. J usTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the
court.
* * * * * * * * * *
The second instruction told the jury that they should find
the is ue for the plaintiff if she had establi hed, by a preponderance of the evidence, the material alle 0 ·ations of any
of the counts in the amended declaration. There was no
instruction telling the jury what the material alleo·ation of
the everal count were, and what were the material allegation wa a matter of law for the court. Although it is a
pra ti e not to be commended for the 'court to refer the
jury to th d laration for the i ue. , it ha not been conider
rror to make uch r f r nee wh re the in tru fa.on
r quir I r of of th averment of th declaration. The
pro r metl10 l i. for the ourt to inform the jury, by tile
in tru ti n, , in
l ar and on i. e mann r, as to what mat ri 1 f t.. mu t b f und to authoriz a r covery. The
av rm ~nt. in tl
laration hich would b 1 ar to a
] w. r w uld oft n be bscur and unint llj ·ibl to the
,._ v r g juryman. (1110 hier v. Kitchell 7 Ill. 1 .) Wh re
th ' jnr) ar
ot only r f rr d to th d 1 ration t
t ri
th j .• u . ut are jn tru t d to find a v rdi t for the
1 intiff if th m t ri 1 all g ti n f the d I ration are
r v c1 th ·~,r r ] ft t d i
a matt r of law, what
r ~ th mat ri 1 all g ti
an micrbt on lu that ome
all gation . . tial
material in the law wa not ma1
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terial or necessai^y to be proved to justify a recovery; and

such an instruction as this was liehl to be undoubtedly

erroneous in Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad

V. Bailey, 145 111. 159.

**********

The judgments of the Appellate and Circuit Courts are

reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court.

Reversed and remanded.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY

COMPANY V. WOODSON.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1909.

!NSTRP TI G THE

J

373

RY

terial or nece ary to be pro-,Ted to ju tify a reco\ ery; and
such an instruction as thi, wa h lr1 to be undoul tedly
erroneous in Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad
v . Bailey, 145 Ill. 159.

* * * * * * * * * *
The judgment of the ppellate and ircuit ourt are
reversed and the cause i remanded to the Circuit Court.
Reversed and remanded.

79 Kansas, 567.

[Arthur Woodson, on June 27, 1905, while a passenger

on one of defendant's trains, got into an altercation with

a Pullman porter, in the course of which Woodson stabbed

the porter, under circumstances not clearly disclosed. Soon

afterwards the conductor of the train arrested Woodson,

put him. off the train at Ottawa and had him locked up in

ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY
COMPANY V. WOODSON.
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the county jail. Subsequently Woodson was tried for the

assault and acquitted. This action was brought for false

imprisonment.]^

Supreme Coitrt of Kansas.

1909.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Graves, J.: The arrest and detention of the plaintiff,

79 Kansas, 567.

prior to July 1, 1905, was without a complaint or warrant.

Wlien the arrest >eomplained of was made the plaintiff was

not engaged in the commission of any offense whatever.

He was quietly seated in a chair, like other passengers.

The defendant interposed the defense that the conductor,

when the arrest was made by him, had probable cause to

believe that a felony had been committed, and this belief,

if honestly and in good faith entertained, justified the ar-

rest, whether the felony had been committed or not. As

indicated by this issue, the pivotal question in the case was

whether this alleged probable cause existed or not. This

question could not be intelligently determined by the jury

unless they understood what in law constitutes probable

iStatement of facts condensed by the editor.

[Arthur Woodson, on June 27, 1905, while a vas enger
on one of defendant's trains, got into an altercation with
a Pullman porter, in the cour e of which vVood on tabbed
the porter, under circum tan e not cl arly di lo ed. Soon
afterwards the conductor of the train arre ted Wood on,
put him off the train at Ottawa and had him locked up in
the county jail. Sub equently Wood on was tried for the
assault and acquitted. This action was brought for false
imprisonment. ]1
The opinion of the court \Va delivered b
GRAVES, J.:
The arrest and detention of the plaintiff
prior to July 1, 1905 was without a complaint or warrant.
When the arrest •Complained of was made the plaintiff wa
not engaged in the commi ion of any offen e whatever.
H wa quietly eat d in a hair like other pa nger .
The defendant interpo ed the defen e that the condu tor
when the arre t wa made by him, had probable cau to
b li ve that a f Jon. had b en committed, and thi beli f
if hone tly and in o· d faith entertain d, ju tifi d the arre t, wheth r the felony had be n committed or not. As
indi ated by thi i u the ivotal question in the case wa
whether thi all o·ed probabl can e exi ted or not. This
qn tion could n t be int lli ntl.r deter ined by the jury
unl
they und r tood what in law con titutes probable
lStatement o! facts condensed by the editor.
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cause. It was the duty of the court to define this phrase

cau e. It wa the dut3 of the court to define this phrase
clearly, so that the evidence cou]d be easily applied to such
definition by the jury . The only instruction given by the
court upon thi question, reads:
''If the plaintiff was a passenger on one of the passenger
trains of the defendant company, and the conductor of said
train arre ted the plaintiff and removed him from said
train at Ottawa, a station on aid road, or removed plaintiff from the train and then caused his arrest and imprisonment, the defendant company would be liable for said arrest and imprisonment if said arre t and imprisonment was
false; that is, wrongfully made under the circumstances of
the case.''
When is an arre t legally false or wrongful l Vvhen may
a conductor on a passenger-train, ·w ithout a warrant, rightfull imprison a pas enger while such pas ·enger is 1conducting him elf in a quiet and orderly manner and there
are no reasonable grounds to apprehend misconduct on his
art~ The an wer given by the law to the las t question is:
When the conductor has probable cause for believing that
the pas enger has committed a felony, and acts in good
faith upon such belief. \iVhat in a legal sens constitutes
probable cause. What is a felony~ These questions involve both law and fact, and are vital to the i ue I r ented
in thi ca e. The jury are not supposed to know the law,
and th y hould b cl arly advi ed by the court as to the
law which ·overn the .case on trial. Thi wa not done,
but th law and th fact were both ubmitted to the jury for
their d terminatjon. * * * * *
B au e of the rron ou and mi leading chara ter of the
in tru tion. gjv n, '*' * * * the judO'ment of th district
urt i. r Y r. , with ire tion. to ()'rant a new trial and
pro d in a ordance with the views herein ex pr ssed.
1

clearly, so that the evidence could be easily applied to such

definition by the jury. The only instruction given by the

court upon this question, reads :

'*If the plaintiff was a passenger on one of the passenger

trains of the defendant company, and the conductor of said

train arrested the plaintiff and removed him from said

train at Ottawa, a station on said road, or removed plain-

tiff from the train and then caused his arrest and imprison-

ment, the defendant company would be liable for said ar-

rest and imprisonment if said arrest and imprisonment was

false ; that is, wrongfully made under the circumstances of

the case."

Wlien is an arrest legally false or wrongfun When may

a conductor on a passenger-train, without a warrant, right-

fully imprison a passenger while such passenger is 'Con-

ducting himself in a quiet and orderly manner and there

are no reasonable grounds to apprehend misconduct on his
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part? The answer given by the law to the last question is :

\Vhen the conductor has probable cause for believing that

the passenger has committed a felony, and acts in good

faith upon such belief. What in a legal sense constitutes

probable cause. What is a felony? These questions in-

volve both law and fact, and are vital to the issue presented

in this case. The jury are not supposed to know the law,

and they should be clearly advised by the court as to the

law which governs the case on trial. This was not done,

but the law and the fact were both submitted to the jury for

their determination. *****

Because of the erroneous and misleading character of the

instructions given, * * * * the judgment of the district

court is reversed, with directions to grant a new trial and

proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed.

[Chap. 11

y

I
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MITCHELL V. TOWN OF FOND DU LAC.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1871.

61 Illinois, 174.

MITCHELL V. TOWN OF FOND DU LAO.

Mr. Justice McAllister delivered the opinion of the

Supreme Court of Illinois.

court.

1871.

This was assumpsit, brought by appellant as adminis-

trator of the estate of William Mitchell, deceased, against

61 Illinois, 174.

appellee, to recover for the support and maintenance by the

intestate in his lifetime of one Eliza McFerren, from the

23d of March, 1857, to the 23d of January, 1858, said Eliza

being an alleged pauper and resident of the said township.

The first instruction on behalf of appellee is as follows :

"If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the person,

Eliza McFerren, was boarded and lodged and furnished

with clothing by William Mitchell (whose administrator

brings suit) from the 1st day of March, A. D. 1857, until

his death in 1858, yet, unless they further believe, from the

evidence, that during that time the said Eliza McFerren
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was a pauper for whose support the defendant was legally

liable, or for whose support the defendant had, by its proper

officer, contracted to pay the said William Mitchell for dur-

ing said time, they will find for the defendant."

This instruction submits to the determination of the jury

two questions of law, without an}' aid from the court, viz. :

First — What shall constitute the legal liability of a town

to support a pauper?

Second — Wlio is the proper officer to make a binding con-

tract on the part of the town for such support by another ?

The impropriety of leaving questions of law to the deter-

mination of the jury has been so often decided by the courts

that the citation of authorities seems unnecessary.

The court should have instructed the jury as to what

facts were indispensable to create the legal liability of the

town for the support of the person in question, and then

told them that if such facts were not established by the evi-

dence, to find for the defendant; and should likewise have

informed the jury who the proper officer to bind the town

for such support was, and what would be necessarv to con-

MR. JusTICE McALLISTER delivered the op1n1on of the
court.
This was assump it, brought by appellant as administrator of the estate of William l\fit.chell, deceased, against
appellee, to recover for the upport and maintenance by the
intestate in hi lifetime of one Eliza McFerren, from the
23d of March, 1857, to the 23d of January, 1858, said Eliza
being an alleged pauper and resident of the aid township.
* * * * * * * * * *
The first instruction on behalf of appellee is as follows:
"If the jury believe from the evidence, that the per on
Eliza ~1cFerren wa boarded and lodged and furni hed
with clothing by William Mitchell (whose administrator
brings suit) from the 1st day of l\1arch, A. D. 1857 until
his death in 1858, yet, unle they further believe from the
evidence that during that time the said Eliza M Ferren
was a pauper for who e upport the defendant wa legall
liable, or for who e support the defendant had, by its proper
officer, contracted to pay the aid William Mitchell for during said time, they will find for the defendant.''
This instruction submits to the determination of the jury
two question of law, without any aid from the court, viz.:
First-What shall constitute the legal liability of a town
to support a pauper 1
Second-Who is the proper officer to make a binding contract on the part of the town for such support b. another.
The impropriet. of leavino- que tion of law to the determination of the jur. ha been o often decided b. the courts
that the itation of authoritie eems unnece ary.
The court hould have in tru ted the jury a to what
fact were indi p n able to r ate the le al liability of the
town for the up ort of the per on in que tion and then
told them that if uch fad were not tabli hed by the evinc to find for th d f ndant · and . hould lik wi e have
inf rm d th junT wh th J r I r om r to bin the town
for uch UPI ort wa and what ·would be nece ary to con-
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stitute a contract express or implied, and then left it for

them to say whether such officer acted in the premises, and

if he did nothing to create a contract within the definition

given, that then they should find for the defendant. A

majority of the court think the instruction erroneous.

For this error, the judgment of the court below must be

reversed and the cause remanded.

[Chap. 11

TRIAL PRACTICE

stitute a contract expre or implied, and then left it for
them to say whether such officer acted in the premises, and
if he did n:-othing to create a contract within the definition
given, that then they hould find for the defendant. A
majority of the ourt think the in truction erroneous.
For this error the judgment of the court below must be
reversed and the cause remand d.
J udgnient reversed.
1

Judgment reversed.

WTNCHELL V. TOWN OF CAMTLLUS.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New

York. 1905.

109 New York Appellate Division, 341.

Williams, J. :

The judgment and order should be reversed upon ques-

tions of law only and a new trial granted, with costs to the

appellant to abide event.

The action is to recover damages for negligence in per-

mitting a sluiceway across a highway under the traveled
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part thereof to become filled up so as to set back surface

water accustomed to flow through the same upon the plain-

WINCHELL V. TOWN OF CAl\fILLUS.

tiff's premises.

In 1890 the Highway Law (Chap. 568) was passed, and

by section 180 of that law the statute of 1881 was repealed

to take effect on March 1, 1891. (Id. Sec. 183). Substan-

Appellate Division of th e Supreme Court of New
York. 1905.

tially the same provision was substituted for it, however,

by section 16 of that law, Vviiich is as follows: ''Every

109 New York Appellate Division, 341.

town shall be liable for all damages to x>erson or property

sustained by reason of any defect in its highways or

bridges, existing because of the neglect of any commis-

sioner of highways of such town." The basis of the ngat

to recover is here plainly stated to be the neglect of the

commissioner and not the town.

The trial court read this section to the jury, and then

made the following statement to them: "Now, it is the

WILLIAMS,

J.:

The judo·ment and ord r should be reversed upon questions of law only and a ne-\\" trial <>'ranted, with co ts to the
appellant to abide event.
The action is to recover dam a ·e for n gli ·ence in permitting a luic way acroRs a highw~y under the traveled
part tb reof to b ome filled up so a to set back surface
water a cu. tomed to flow through tbe ame upon the plaintiff' premi. e .

* * * * * * * * * *
In 1 90 th lJjghway Law ( .lJap. 568) wa pa sed, and
hy s tion 1 0 of that Jaw tlie , tatnt f 1 1 wa repeal d
t take ff t on Mar h 1, 891. (Id. S c. 18 ). SubstantiaJly th am pr Vi ion Ya , . nh titut d f l' it, however
h. . 1 ti n 1
f that Jn , which i a follow : "Every
town .. hall
1iahl for all damag s t p r on or propert)
: n . c in cl by r •a
f ny
f t in it hio·hways or
hriclg ' R, xi. ing b rau.
of th
t of an
ommis·ion r of 11i ~lw:a _\·.· f , n h town."
h ba. l' of the r1(J'ut
to r r·) r i. 11 r lJ]aiu]y .'lat cl to b th n g1 ct of th
<· mmi : .. ion r ancl n t t1J to n.
Th tri·1l <' urt r ·cl thi:. tin to th jury, and th n
a
t
f ll wing ·t· t
nt to them: ''Now, it is the
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contention of the defendant in this case, that the defects

therein referred to only relate to the defects in the traveled

portions of the highway, or defects affecting the traveler.

Now, that contention is one which I leave with you with

other matters; as a matter of fact to determine."

This statement in the charge was excepted to by the de-

fendant's counsel, and the court was requested to charge

that the defect complained of in the case was not one con-

templated by section 16 of the Highway Law, but the court

declined so to charge.

The court did charge that no recovery could be had ex-

cept under the provision of this section. The jury evident-

ly found as matter of fact that the defect complained of was

within the provisions of this section. Otherwise they could

not have rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.

"We are unable to perceive how the legal meaning or

effect of a statute can be a question of fact for a jury. We

had supposed it was always a question of law for the
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court. There was no dispute in this case as to what the

defect was claimed to be, the stopping up of a sluiceway

under the traveled part of the highway, and the damage re-

sulting was not to a traveler on the highway, but to an

adjacent property owner, the setting of surface water back

upon his land, and damaging the same.

The highway was in no way obstructed or interfered with

so far as travel along the same was concerned. The de-

fendant's contention was that the defects referred to in the

statute related only to the traveled portion of the highway

and affecting the traveler, and the court was asked to con-

strue the statute and to instruct the jury as to its meaning

so they could follow those instructions in considering the

evidence and deciding the case. The court declined to do

this and left the jury to construe the statute as a matter

of fact and not of law.

We think it was the duty of the court to pass upon ques-

tions of law, and that it could not properly refuse to do so.

Very likely if tlie jury decided the law properly, as a ques-

tion of fact, the defendant was not prejudiced, but we think

they went wrong, and held the defendant liable under this

section, when it was not liable at all.
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contention of the defendant in thi ca e, that the defects
therein referred to only r late to the defect in the traveled
p ortions of the highwa , or defect affecting the traveler.
Now, that contention is one whi h I leave with you with
other matters; a a matter of fact to determine.''
This tatement in the charge was excepted to by the def endant' coun el, and the court was reque ted to charge
that the defect complained of in the case wa not one contemplated by section 16 of the Highway Law, but the cour t
de lined so to charg .
The court did charge that no rooovery could be had exept under the provi ion of thi ection. The jury evidently found as matter off act that the defect complained of was
' ithin the provision of thi ection. Otherwi e they could
not ha-\ e rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.
We are unable to perceive how the legal meaning or
effect of a statute can be a question of fact for a jury. We
had suppo ed it wa alway a que tion of law for the
court. There wa no di pute in this case as to what the
defect was claimed to be the stopping up of a luiceway
under the traveled part of the highwa. and the damage resulting was not to a traveler on the highway but to an
adjacent property owner the etting of urface water back
upon his land, and damaging the ame.
The highwa wa in no way obstructed or interfered with
so far as travel along the same was concerned. The defendant's contention was that the defect ref erred to in the
statute related only to the trav led portion of the hi()"hway
and affecting the traveler and the court was a ked to construe the tatute and to in trunt the jury a to it meaning
so they ·011ld follow tho e in tructions in on idering the
evidence and d cidin()' th ca e. The court d dined to do
thi and left the jury to con true the statute as a matter
of fact and no of law.
We think it wa th duty of the court to pa s upon que tions of law and that it ou1 not properly refu e to do so.
Very likel~ if th jnr. de i
the law roperly a a que tion of fact, th d f lant a not pr judiced but we think
they w nt wron°', and h 1 th
f n ant liable under thi
ction, when it wa not lia 1 at all.

* * * * * * • * * •
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There was clearly no legal right to recover in this action,

and it was erroneously submitted to the jury.

The motions for nonsuit should have been granted.

All concurred, except McLennan, P. J., who dissented in

an opinion in which Spring, J., concurred.

DIDDLE V. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1909.

[Chap. 11

There was dearly no legal right t9 recover in this action,
and it was erroneously submitted to the jury.
The motions for nonsuit should have been granted.
All concurred, except McLENNAN, P. J., who dissented in
an opinion in which SPRING, J., concurred.

65 West Virginia, 170.

POFFENBARGER, JudgC :

Thomas D. Diddle, insured for the benefit of his wife,

Lydia Diddle, in the Continental Casualty Company, for

$2,000.00, was struck by a railway water column, while

riding on a railway engine, and killed. His wife brought

this action on the policy and recovered a judgment for the

DIDDLE V. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY.

sum of $2,049.30. The defense was predicated on a limited

liability clause in the policy, reading as follows: ''Where

the accident or injury results from voluntary exposure to

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

1909.

unnecessary danger or obvious risk or injury, or from the

65 West Virginia, 170.
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intentional act of the Insured or of any other per-

son; * * * * or (2) where the accidental injury re-

sults from or is received while quarreling, fighting or

violating the law; * * * * then and in all cases re-

ferred to in this Part III, the amount payable shall

be one-tenth of the amount which otherwise would be

payable under this policy, anything in this policy to the

contrary notwithstanding, and subject otherwise to all the

conditions in this policy contained." Deeming this clause

applicable and controlling, under the circumstances attend-

ing the death of the assured, the insurance company tend-

ered the beneficiary $200.00, one-tenth of the amount of the

policy, less $20.00, due it on account of unpaid premium,

which she refused.

The following facts are disclosed by the evidence: The

insured was a car-repairer in the shops of the Chesapeake

and Ohio Railway Company at Pluntington. In the even-

PoFFENBARGER, Judge:
Thomas D. Diddle, insured for the benefit of his wife,
Lydia Diddle, in the Continental Casualty Company, for
$2,000.00, was struck by a railway water column, while
riding on a railway engine, and killed. His wife brought
this action on the policy and recovered a judgment for the
sum of $2,049.30. The defense was predicated on a limited
liability clau e in the policy, reading as follows: "Where
the accident or injury results from voluntary exposure to
unn ces ary danger or obvious risk or injury, or from the
intentional act of the Insured or of any other person; * * * * or (2) where the accidental injury results from or is received while quarreling, fighting or
violating the law; * * * * then and in all cases ref rred to in this Part III, the amount payable shall
be one-tenth of the amount which otherwise would be
payable u der thi poli y, anythin in this policy to the
c ntrary notwith tandinO', and subject otherwise to all the
n iti s in this poli y ontained." Deeming this clause
]e and ntrollino-, under the circumstan es attenda ]j
ing th d ath of th a. sur d, th in ura e company t nd·r 1 t11
n ficiary $20 .00, on -t nth of the am unt of the
p lic·y; ] . $2 .0 , due it on ac ount of unpaid premium,
wlii ·h .. 11 r f . ed.
* * ~ * * * * * * •
r1
f ]]owing fa i ar di lo ed by the evid nee: The
in . nr d W e.' a r -r air r int e h s of the Ch sap ake
a
i
ailway
pany at Iluntington. In the even1
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ing of the day he was killed, after the completion of his

work, he came out of the shop, walked down tlie railway

track in a westerly direction a short distan-ce, passing the

water column, standing midway between two railway tracks,

about nine feet apart, and stepped on one of two engines,

drawing a train of cars over a switch from the west bound

track to the east bound track, as he had often done be-

fore. Instead of getting into the cab of the engine, he

stood on the step on the outside, holding to a hand-grip,

while his body projected or swung from the side of it, and

was riding in that way, or he was in the act of climbing into

the cab and before he had accomplished it, the engine came

to the water column and his body came into violent contact

with it. * * * *

Over the objection of the defendant, the court gave one

instruction for the plaintiff in which the jury were told,

first, that the boarding of the engine was not a violation

of the statute, making it criminal to jump on or off of
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trains; and, second, that they might find a verdict for the

jilaintiff if they believed from the facts, circumstances and

evidence that the water tank was a dangerous obstruction,

unless they should further believe that the danger was

known to tlie insured and could have been reasonably ex-

pected by him. The court erred in giving the instruction,

since the second proposition, involved in it, submitted to

the jury a matter which it was the duty of the court to pass

upon and declare as a matter of law. Upon the admitted

and uncontroverted facts, disclosed by the evidence, the

danger and risk were palpably obvious. The insured was

bound to know it. The law did not permit him to say, nor

the jury to find, that he did not know it, or to excuse him

because, though having opportunity for deliberation and

voluntary action," he did not make use of the faculty of

sight, which would have revealed to him the danger and

the risk. There was no basis in the evidence for a finding

in favor of the plaintiff. Under such circumstances, it is

error to give an instruction telling the jury they may so

find. Kuyliendall v. Fisher, 61 W. Va. 87, 102; Parker v.

Bmlding & Loan Ass'n, 55 W. Va. 134.

For the errors aforesaid, the judgment will be reversed,

the verdict set aside and the case remanded for a new trial.
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ing of the day he was killed, after th completion of hi:
work, he came out of the hop, walke down the railway
track in a westerly direction a short distance, passing the
water column, standing midway between two railway tra k ,
about nine feet apart, and tepp d on one of two engine
drawing a train of cars over a switch from the we t bound
track t~ the east bound track, as he had often done before. Instead of getting into the cab of the engine, he
stood on the step on the outside, holding to a hand-grip,
while his body projected or swung from the side of it, and
was riding in that way, or he wa in the act of climbing into
the cab and before he had accomplished it, the engine came
to the water column and his body came into violent contact
with it. * * * *

* * * * * * * * * *
Over the objection of the def end ant, the court gave one
in truction for the plaintiff in which the jury were told,
first, that the boarding of the engine was not a violation
of the statute, making it criminal to jump on or off of
trains; and, second, that they might find a verdict for the
plaintiff if they believed from the facts, circumstances and
eYidence that the water tank was a dangerou obstruction,
unless the~T should further believe that the danger Wtls
known to the insured and could have been reasonably ex1 ected by bim. The court erred in giving the instruction,
since the " ond propo ition, in-volved in it, submitted to
tbe jury a matter which it was the duty of the court to pass
uvon and de lare as a matter of law. Upon the admitted
and uncontrov rted fact , di closed b the evidence, the
danger and ri k were palpably obviou . The insured was
bound to know it. The law did not permit him to say, nor
tbe jury to find , that he did not know it, or to excuse him
because th ugh having opportunit~ for deliberation and
voluntar. a tion,· he did not make use of the faculty of
i()"ht, whi. h would hav·e revealed to him th dan er and
th ri k. Tb re was no ba i in the e idence for a :findin
in favor of the plaintiff.
nd r uch ircum tance it is
rror to O"ive an in tru tion t lling th jury they may so
find. K iiykendall v . Fi, he1·, 1 W. a. 7, 102; Parker v.
flm'lding & Loan A s n
W. \ a. 1. 4.
For th rror. afor . aid, th jud 0 ·m nt will be rever ed
th 'erdict- t a ide an th ase remanded for a new trial
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(c) Questions of Fact Not to he Taken From the Jury.

STANDAED COTTON MILLS V. CHEATHAM.

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1906,

( c)

Questions of Fact Not to be Taken From the Jury .

125 Georgia, 649.

Beck, J. The petition of Cheatham contained substan-

STANDARD COTTON MILLS V. CHEATHAM.

tially the following allegations; that he was employed by

the Standard Cotton Mills to work at certain machines

called '^ carders," which were operated by a belt from a

Suprerne Court of Georgia.

1906.

pulley, and it was a part of his duty to clean the machines

by opening certain lids thereon, placing his hand inside of

125 Georgia, 649.

the same, and taking therefrom accumulations of trash and

lint called "strippings." In order to clean the carders

it was necessary to stop them, and this was done by switch-

ing the belt from the tight pulley, upon which it worked, to

a loose pulley. Plaintiff alleges that he had stopped the

machines in the manner described, and had opened the lid

and placed his hand inside of one of the carders, when

the belt slipped from the loose pulley on to the tight one,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the machine started, caught his hand, and mangled it se-

verely * * *

Movant also complains that the court erred in chargfng

the jury as follows: ''If the carder machine was stopped

by slipping the belt from the tight to the loose pulley, and

that was the proper way to stop the machine and keep it

stopped until the operator himself slipped the belt from

the loose to the tight pulley, if the plaintiff did not know

or ought to have known to the contrary, he would have the

right to presume tliat Ihe belt, once shifted from the tight

to the loose pulley, and the machine thereby stopped, would

remain stopped until again started. That I charge you

as correct law, gentlemen, provided the defect was one that

the plaintiff could not have discovered by the exercise of

ordinary diligence." It is alleged that this portion of the

charge was error, "because it was a question for the jury

to determine whether the plaintiff would have the right

to presume that the belt would stay shifted when once

BECK, J.
The petition of Cheatham contained substantially the following allegations; that he was employed by
the Standard Cotton Mills to work at certain machines
called ''carders,'' which were operated by a belt from a
pulley, and it was a part of his duty to clean the machines
by opening certain lids thereon, placing his hand inside of
the same, and taking therefrom accumulations of tra h and
lint called '' strippings.''
In order to clean the carders
it was neces ary to stop them, and this was done by switching the belt from the tight pulley, upon which it worked, to
a loo e pulley. Plaintiff alleges that he had ~topped the
ma hine in the manner deseribed, and had opened the lid
and placed his hand inside of one of the carders, when
the belt slipped from the loo e pulley on to the tight one,
the machine started, caught his hand, and mangled it severely * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
Movant also complains that the court erred in chargrng
the jurv as follow : ''If the carder machine was stopped
by li pinO' the belt from the tight to the loose pulley, and
that was the proper way to stop the machine and keep it
stopp d until the operator hims lf slipp d the belt from
th loo. e to the tjO'ht pulley, if the plaintiff did not know
or ought to have known to the contrary, h would hav the
ri 0 ·ht to presume tlln t t ue lwlt, once sJ dfted from the tight
t the loo~e pulley, and the machine thereby topped, would
That I charg you
r main stopped until aO'ain start d.
a c rr0rt Jaw, g ntlemen, provid <l the defe t wa on that
th plaintiff ould not have di covered by the exer i e of
or<li n, r. ' dilig nc . "
It i all g d that thi ortion of the
c·harg<>
. rror "1 c u it wa a qu tion for th jury
t lP n · m
lwtl1 r th
laintiff w ul h " the riO'ht
t pr m
that th
lt would tay shift d when once
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shifted, considering all the facts before them." And this

point seem? to be well taken. In charging as here alleged,

the trial court went directly in the teeth of the statute

which declares that it is error for a trial judge to express

or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been

proved (Civil Code, Sec. 4334). We cannot imagine a

more direct invasion of the province of the jury than for

the court to instruct them that as to one of the facts ma-

terial to be considered by the jury in passing upon the

question as to whether or not the plaintiff himself was

guilty of negligence, "he would have the right to presume

that the belt, once shifted from the tight to the loose pulley,

and the machine thereby stopped, would remain stopped

until again started." This did not fall far short of in-

structing them that if the plaintiff took certain precautions

while inserting his hand into a dangerous machine, he havl

the right to presume that the precautionary measure so

taken would be equivalent to the exercise of due care and
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caution in guarding against an injury that might be brought

about by the machine being set in motion. In brief, the

court attempted to and did in one breath deal with and

dispose of a vital question of fact. If any presumption

at all arose as to what would be the effect of shifting the

belt in question from the tight to the loose pulley, it was

a presumption of fact, and should have been left for the

jury's consideration alone, unaided by the court.

**********

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except

Fish, C. J., absent.

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY

V. JOHNSON.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1906.

221 Illinois, 42.

Mr. Chief Justice Cartwright delivered tiie opinion of

the court :

This is an action on the case brought by appellee, as ad-
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hifted con iderin all the fact before them." And thi
point '"' eem ~ to be well taken. In charging as here alle()'ed,
the trial court went directly in the teeth of the tatute
which declares that it is error for a trial judge to ex1 re
or intimate hi opinion a to what has or ha not been
pro ed ( ivil Code, ec. 4334).
We annot imagine a
more direct inva ion of the pro-~ ince of the jury than for
the court to in truct them that as to one of the facts material to be con idered by the jury in pa ing upon the
que tion a to whether or not the plaintiff him elf was
guilty of negliO'ence "he would have the right to pre ume
that the beJt on e hifted from the tight to the loo e pulley,
and the machine thereby topped, would remain topped
until again tarted.''
Thi did not fall far ho rt of intructing them that if the plaintiff took certain precautions
while in erting hi hand into a dangerous ma hine he ha 1
the right to pre ume that the precautionary mea ure so
taken would be equivalent to the exerci e of due care and
caution in guarding again t an injury that might be brought
about by the ma~hine bein°· set in motion.
In brief the
court attempted to and did in one breath deal with and
di po e of a vital que ti on of fact.
If any pre umption
at all arose a to what would be the effect of hifting the
belt in question from the tight to the loo e pulley, it was
a pre umption of fact, and hould have been left for the
jury's con ideration al on unaided by the court.
* * * * * * * * * *
J udgm ent rever ed.
All the Justices concur, except
FrsH, " J., absent.

ILLINOI

EKTR L R ILROAD
\.J HN ON.

Supreme Court of Illi nois.
221 Illinoi
MR. CHrnF

J
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ministratrix of the estate of her son, Carl Eobert George

Johnson, in the circuit court of Cook coiintv, to recover

damages from appellant for causing his death.

The declaration alleged that the deceased, who was a

minor, became a passenger on November 3, 1900, on one of

defendant's trains, in the front car next tc the engine, at

West Pullman station, to be carried to Pullman station;

that the train arrived at Pullman station about 7 :45 in the

evening; that at Pullman station was an elevated plat-

form between the tracks for north-boujad and south-bound

trains for the use of passengers; feat when the train

stopped at Pullman the deceased leit the car at the forward

end, as was cutsomary and as directed by defendant; that

the train and car had passed by and beyond said elevated

platform, and on leaving the car deceased found himself

on the ground a few feet north of the elevated platform

between said tracks, with the engine and cars on the east

side and a vacant space on the west and a high picket fence
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across the platform on the south; that the depot and exit

were on the west west, and as the deceased went from the

place where he alighted, in a westerly and southerly direc-

tion, toward the gates, using due care, one of the locomo-

tive engines of the defendant going in a southerly direction

on the south-bound track struck and killed him. The plea

was the general issue, and upon a tiial the jury returned

a verdict finding the defendant guilty and assessing plain-

tiff's damages at $5000. Judgment was entered on the

verdict, and the judgment was affirmed by the Appellat<

Court for the First District.

The instruction given at the request of the plaintiff which

purported to state the relative duties of the parties, the

theory of the plaintiff and ground for recovery alleged in

the declaration, and the amount of damages which might be

awarded, was as follows:

"The jury are instructed, as a matter of law, that if you

find, from the evidence, that the defendant corporation was

engaged in the business of transporting passengers and

freight, for hire, upon a railroad o])erated by said company,

then the law denominated the defendant a common carrier.

The court instructs the jury that common carriers of per-

sons are required to do all that human care, vigilance and
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ministratrix of the estate of her son, Carl Robert George
Johnson, in the circuit court of Cook county, to recover
damages from appellant for causing his death.
The declaration alleged that the deceased, who was a
minor, became a passenger on November 3, 1900, on one of
defendant's trains, in the front car next tc the engine, at
West Pullman station, to be carried to Pullman station;
that the train arTived at Pullman station about 7 :45 in the
evening; that at Pullman station was an elevated platform between the tracks for north-bou.nd and south-bound
trains for the use of passengerc; fL;.at when the train
stopped at Pullman the deceased le-it the car at the forward
end, as wa~ cutsomary anJ as directed by defendant; that
the train and car had passed by and beyond said elevated
platform, 8,nd on leaving the car deceased found himself
on the ground a few feet north of the elevated platform
between said tracks, with the engine and cars on the east
side and a vacant space on the west and a high picket fence
across the platform on the south; that the depot and exit
were on the west west, and as the deceased went from the
place where he alighted, in a westerly and southerly direction, toward the gates, using due care, one of the locomotive engineE: of the defendant going in a southerly direction
on the south-bound track struck an-1_killed him. The plea
was the general is ue, and upon a tlial the jury returned
a verdict :finding the defendant guilty and assessing plai.atiff 's damage at $5000.
Judgment wa entered on the
verdict, and the judirrnent was affirmed by the Appellat<
Court for the First District.
* * * * * * * * * *
The jnstruction given at the request of the plaintiff which
purport d to state the relative duties of the parties, the
th ory of the plaintiff and o-round for re overy alleged in
th d c]aration, and the amount of damages which might be
award 1. wa a follow :
''The jury ar in tru ted, as a matter of law, that if you
finrl f · m tb~ vi n , that the d fendant corporation was
g g
in the business of transporting passenger and
frPi ght, for hir upon a rai]r d operat d by said company:
th n th law d n minat d tb d fendant a common carrier.
Th r rt in. trurt. th jury th t , ommon carriers "f pers .' ar r uired to do all that human car , vigilance and
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foresight can reasonably do, in view of the character and

mode of conveyance adopted, to prevent accidents to pas-

sengers. So, too, persons who become passengers must

at all times exercise ordinary care and caution for their

own safety. And if the jury believe, from the evidence in

this case, that the defendant was at the time of the acci-

dent a common carrier, and if you further believe, from the

evidence, that the deceased was a pasesnger on the defend-

ant's train and in the exercise of due care on his part, if

the jury so believe from preponderance of the evidence,

and that the defendant carelessly or negligently operated

its said train or car by running the same past the station

platform, so as to cause the deceased to alight upon the

ground and tracks of the defendant instead of upon the

platform where the passengers are usually unloaded, and

that by reason of such negligent acts, if any are proven

by the preponderance of the evidence in the case, of the

defendant, their agents, and employees, the deceased, Carl
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Robert George Johnson, while exercising due care for his

safety, if you so find from the preponderance of the evi-

dence, was struck by an engine controlled and operated by

the defendant and was then and there killed, then you may

find the defendant guilty, and assess the plaintiff dam-

ages at such reasonable sum as she may be entitled to re-

cover under all the facts and circumstances proved in the

case, not exceeding $5000."

The instruction was erroneous in three respects. It was

proved, and not disputed, that the train ran three or four

feet past the north end of the platform, and that deceased

alighted upon the ground instead of on the platform where

passengers were usually unloaded. The questions in dis-

pute were whether the act of defendant in running past the

platform constituted negligence on its part, and whether

such act caused the deceased to alight upon the ground at

an improper place, or whether he was negligent in going

down the steps where he did. They were questions of

fact for the jury to determine from the evidence, and it

was the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether

the act of the defendant was negligent and whether tlie de-

cased was J^ilty of negligence. No other act of the de-

fendant was alleged and no other fact stated in the declar-

ation which could have been construed to be a negligent

fore igbt can reasonably do, in view of the character and
mode of conYeyan e adopted, to pre ent accidents to pas·enger . So, too, per ons who become passengers must
at all time exerci e ordinary care and caution for their
own afety. And if the jury believe, from the evidence in
thi a e, that the defendant wa at the time of the accident a common carrier, and if you further believe, from the
evidence that the decea ed was a pase nger on the defendant's train and in the exerci e of due care on his part, if
the jury so believe from preponderance of the evidence,
and that the defendant carele 1 or negligently operated
it aid train or car Ly running the same pa t the station
platform, so a to cau e the decea ed to alight upon the
round and tr~k of the defendant instead of upon the
1 latform where the pa en ·er are u ually unloaded, and
that by rea on of uch negligent act , if any are proven
by the preponderance of the evidence in the case, of the
defendant their ao·ent and employee , the de eased, Carl
Rob rt George Johnson, while exercising due care for his
safety if you so find from the preponderance of the evidence ''as struck by an engine controlled and operated by
the defendant and was then and there killed, then you may
find the defendant guilty, and a ses the plaintiff damages at such rea onable sum a he may be entitled to reover under all the facts and circum tances proved in the
a e not exceeding $5000.''
The in truction wa erroneous in three respects. It was
pro ed and not di puted that the train ran three or four
feet pa t the north end of the platform and that deceased
alighted upon the Tound in tead of on the platform where
pa nger were u ually unloaded. The questions in dispute were whether the a t of def ndant in running pa t the
platform on ti tut d neglicrence on it part, and whether
such act cau d th decea ed to alight upon the ground at
an im rop r place or whether he wa ne ligent in going
down +he t
where he did.
They were que tion of
fa t for the jury to determine from the evidence, and it
wa the ex lu i e ro-,Tince of the jury to determine whether
the a t of the d f <mdant wa nea-li<Y nt and whether the <lea ed wa P~ilty f n li n . No ther act of the def ndant wa alle ed an no ther fa t . tat d in the declaration whi h- could have been con tru d to be a negligent

384
884 Trial Peactice [Chap. 11

one, and the court could not say that either of the parties

was negligent as a matter of law. The Appellate Court,

in considering whether the evidence warranted the jury

in finding the defendant guilty of negligence which caused

the injury, expressed no opinion as to whether the running

of the train past the station platform constituted negli-

gence or not, but held that the defendant was negligent

in the management of the south-bound train, saying that it

was the duty of the engineer to have been on the lookout

for the north-bound train; that he must have known his

train was late; that he ran the train at the rate of from

twelve to fifteen miles an hour, and that the evidence tended

to show he did not exercise the required degree of care in

the operation of his train so as to be able to stop for the

safet}^ of passengers getting on or off the north-bound

train. There was no averment in the declaration as to

the speed of the south-bound train or failure to keep a look-

out, or mismanagement of it in any respect. The crossing
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place for passengers was south of the platform, more than

three hundred feet distant, and where the train would have

come to a full stop ; and if the question as to the manage-

ment of the south-bound train had been submitted to the

jury, they would doubtless have considered the question

whether the engineer had, or ought to have had, any rea-

son to expect that a person would be on the track at the

north end of the platform. It appears, however, that

such questions were not submitted, and that the verdict was

based on the negligent character of the act in running past

the platform. On that question the instruction assumed

both that the act was a careless and negligent one, and that

it caused the deceased to alight upon the ground on the

tracks of the defendant instead of upon the platform, and

it afterwards refers to the acts as ''such negligent acts."

The plaintiff was entitled to recover if the jury should de-

cide that the act of the defendant was negligent, that it

caused the injury, and that the deceased was in the exer-

cise of ordinary .care; but it was the exclusive province of

the jury to determine those facts, and they should have

been submitted to the jury for determination without any

intimation or assumption as to the proper conclusion. In

the case of Chicago and NortJiwestern Raihvay Co. v. Mo-

randa, 108 111. 576, the CQurt said : "Where there is evidence
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one, and the court could not say that either of the parties
was negligent as a matter of law.
The Appellate Court,
in considering whether the evidence warranted the jury
in finding the defendant guilty of negligence which caused
the injury, expressed no opinion as to whether the running
of the train past the station platform constituted neglit:;ence or not, but held that the defendant was negligent
i the management of the south-bound train, saying that it
as the duty of the engineer to have been on the lookout
for the north-bound train; that he must have known his
train was late; that he ran the train at the rate of from
twelve to fifteen miles an hour, and that the evidence tended
to show he did not exercise the required degree of care in
the operation of his train so as to be able to stop for the
safety of passengers getting on or off the north-bound
train.
There was no averment in the declaration as to
the speed of the south-bound train or failure to keep a lookout, or mismanagement of it in any respect. The crossing
place for passengers was south of the platform, more than
three hundred feet distant, and where the train would have
come to a full stop; and if the question as to the management of the south-bound train had been submitted to the
jury, they would doubtless have considered the question
whether the engineer had, or ougbt to have had, any Yeason to expect that a person would be on the track at the
north end of the platform.
It appear , however, that
such questions were not submitted, and that the verdict was
ba.. d rm the negligent character of the act in running past
th platform.
On that question the instruction assumed
both that the act wa a carele s and negligent one, and that
it cau ed the d ea d to alio-ht upon the ground on the
ra le of th d fendant jn tead of u on the platform, and
it ft rward r fer to the a t a " uch neglio· nt acts."
Th plaintiff was entitl d to r cov r if the jury hould de·i
tb t th a t of the d f endant wa neglio- nt, that it
cau. d th injur. , an that th d
ed wa in the exer.
f r lin ry car ; but it wa th e In ive province of
fa t.' and they should have
h ~ jnr.v t a t rmjn th
h n .· ih itLd to th jury f r d t rmination without any
i1 1imaii n or a.\ 11m1 b n a t th pr p r
n lu ion. In
i Ii(' r·a .
f Ch iraga and orthw . ·tern Railway Co. v. J.lloro urla, 1 Tll. 57 , th .. c ut i : " lier th re is evid n e
1

1
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before a jury upon which it is legally admissible there may

be difference of opinion, it is error to allow any opinion of

judge or court to be obtruded upon the jurors to influence

their determination." Where the evidentiary facts will

justify different conclusions the question of negligence is

one of fact, and instructions should alwaj^s be dra\\Ti so as

to state th^ law upon a supposed or hn^othetical state of

facts, leaving the jury to find the fact. Instructions as-

suming the existence of any material fact have always been

condemned. {Sherman v. Dutch, 16 111. 283; Michigan

Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad Co. v. Shelton,

66 id. 424; Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v.

O'Connor, 119 id. 586; Swigart v. Hawley, 140 id. 186; Illi-

nois Central Railroad Co. v. Griffin, 184 id. 9; Allmendin-

ger v. McHie, 189 id. 308; Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago

and St. Louis Railway Co. v. Banfil, 206 id. 553.) Under this

instruction, when the jury found that the train was run

past the platform, they would understand that the court
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regarded such act to be a careless and negligent operation

of the train, and that it caused the deceased to get off the

train at the place where he did. It did not call upon the

jury, as it should have done, to decide whether the act con-

stituted negligence on the part of the defendant.

Because of the material and prejudicial errors which

have been pointed out, the judgments of the Appellate

Court and circuit court are reversed and the cause is re-

manded to the circuit court.

Reversed and remanded.

BUTTRAM V. JACKSON.

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1860,

32 Georgia, 409.

The questions in this case arise out of the following state

of facts:

Some time in December in 1857, Ira G. Jackson sold to

Andrew J. Buttram a mule, and received in payment there-

T. p.— 25
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before a jury upon which it is 1 gally admi ible there ma·y
be difference of opinion, it is error to allow any opinion of
judge or court to be obtruded upon the jurors to influence
their determination.,.,
Where the evidentiary facts will
justify different onclusions the que tion of n li crence is
one of fact, and in tructions should alway be dra\\-rn o a~
to tate th~ law upon a upposed or hypoth tical tate of
fact , leaving the jury to find the fa t.
Instruction a suming the exi tence of any material fact have alway been
condemned.
( hennan v. Dutch, 16 Ill. 283; llf ichigan
outhern and Northern I ndiana Railroad Co . v. Shelton,
66 id. 424; Chicago and Ea tern Illinois Railroad Co. v .
0 'Connor, 119 i . 586; Swigart v. Hawley, 140 id. 186; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Griffin, 184 id. 9; All11iendinger v. McHie, 1 9 id. 308; Pitt burg, Cincinnati, Chicago
and St. Loitis Rail'l ay Co. v . Banfil, 206 id. 553.) Under thi"'
instruction, when the jury found that the train wa run
past the pJatform, the would under tand that the court
regarded such act to be a carele and negligent operation
of the train, and that it caused the decea ed to get off the
train at the place where he did. It did not call upon the
jury, as it should have done, to decide whether the act contituted negligence on the part of the defendant.
* ~ * * * * * * * ~
Because of the material and prejudicial errors which
have been pointed out, the judgments of the Appellate
Court and ircuit court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.
Reversed and remanded.

BUTTRAM V. JA KSON.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

1860.

32 Georgia, 409.

The que tion in this case ari e out of th following state
of fa t
Som tim in
mber in 1 57 Ira . Ja k on old t
Andre' J. Buttram a mule, and recei din paym nt thereT. P.-25 -
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for two promissory notes, given by one D. H. Harris, one

of the notes dated 10th November, 1857, and due twelve

months after date, payable to said Buttram, or bearer, for

the Slim of $30.00 ; the other dated 22d October, 1857, and

due 25th December, 1858, payable to Martha McElreath, or

bearer, for $40.00.

On the 22d January, 1859, Jackson instituted suit in

Carroll Superior Court, against Buttram, to recover the

value of the mule, alleging, in one count of his declaration,

that Buttram, at the time of the trade, warranted the notes

to be good, and that Harris was perfectly solvent, and that

if the notes were not paid by Harris at their maturity, he,

Buttram, would pay the amount due on the same, whereas,

in truth and in fact, Harris was insolvent at the time, and

afterwards absconded, and went to parts unknown.

The defendant pleaded the general issue.

When the testimony and argument had closed, the pre-

siding judge charged the jury, "that if the defendant told
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the plaintiff, at the time of trading him the notes on Harris,

that he considered Harris good, but that he would not be

bound, yet he was bound, if Harris was not good at that

time, if Jackson took the notes on such representation, al-

though there was no guaranty by defendant to stand good

for the notes, the notes being taken by Jackson, who was

ignorant of the condition of Harris at the time, whose con-

dition was known to Buttram."

By the Court. — Jenkins, J., delivering the opinion.

Error was further assigned, in the grounds of the motion

for a new trial against the charge of the Court as set forth

in the statement.

In that charge the presiding judge deemed it necessary,

in order to facilitate the application of the law by the jury

to the case, to advert to certain facts claimed bj^ one party

to have been proven, but the proof of which was denied by

the other. This practice is not objectionable; indeed, it is

sometimes necessary, to enable the jury to understand

clearly the relation existing between the law and the facts

of the case; but the utmost caution should be observed to

'f RIAL
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for two promi ory notes, giYen by one D. H. Harris, one
of the notes dated 10th November, 1857, and due twelve
months after date, payable to said Buttram, or bearer, for
the sum of $30.00; the other dated 22d October, 1857, and
due 25th December, 1858, payable to Martha M.cElreath, o:i:
bearer, for $40.00.
On the 22d January, 1859, Jackson instituted suit in
Carroll Superior Court, against Buttram, to recover the
value of the mule, alleging, in one count of his declaration,
that Buttram, at the time of the trade, warranted the notes
to be good, and that Harris was perfectly solvent, and that
if the notes were not paid by Harris at their maturity, he,
Buttram, would pay the amount due on the same, whereas,
in truth and in fact, Harris was insolvent at the time, and
afterwards absconded, and went to parts unknown.
The defendant pleaded the general issue.
* * * * * * * * * *
When the testimony and argument had closed, the preiding judge charged the jury, ''that if the defendant told
the plaintiff, at the time of trading him the notes on Harris,
that he considered Harris good, but that he would not be
bound, yet he was bound, if Harris was not good at that
time, if Jack on took the notes on such representation, although there was no guaranty by defendant to stand good
for the notes, the notes being taken by Jackson, who was
ignorant of the condition of Harris at the tim~, whose condition was known to Buttram.''

* * * * * * * * * *
By the Court.-JENKINS, J., delivering the opinion.
* * * * * * * * * *
Error was furth r a signed, in tb e ground of the motion
for a new trial again t the char 0 ·e of the Court as set for th
1 th tatement.
In that "haro·e the pre iding judge deemed it nee s ary,
in or r to fa iJitat the appli ation of the law by the jury
t th a. e, to adv rt to rta]n fa t laim d by one party
t h v
en prov n ut th proof of whi h wa denied by
h other. Thi ra ti e i not obj tionable; ind ed, it is
n m tim n
ary, to enable the jury to und r tand
<'1 rly the r lation xi ting betw n the law and the facts
f the case; but the utmost caution should be observed to

Sec. 1]
Sec. 1] Instructing the Juey 387

guard the jury against the inference, that the judge con-

siders any disputed fact to have been proven.

Juries are usually very open to influence from the Bench,

and it is right that they should be so; but that influence

should never be extended to their conclusions, in matters of

fact. A careful analysis of the charge under review makes

it apparent that the judge put his reference to some of the

facts hypothetically, as ''*/ the defendant told the plain-

tiff," etc., 'S/ Harris was not good at that time," etc.,

whilst his reference to other facts was in terms which as-

sume that they were incontestably proven, as ''Jackson,

who was ignorant of the condition of Harris, at the time,

and whose condition ivas Jinoivn to Buttram," etc. The

hypothetical is the proper form of putting facts in such

cases, because it distinctly puts the jury on the inquiry as to

those facts ; but in relation to other facts, put positively be-

fore them, put as facts ascertained in the same connection,

in the same sentence, they are much less apt to feel the ne-
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cessity of inquiry. Indeed, these different modes of treat-

ing different facts, would seem to give a double assurance,

that they are relieved from the necessity of scrutinizing the

evidence for the proof of some of them : 1st. Because the

judge has treated them as proven. 2nd. Because he has

cautiously treated others as doubtful. We think there was

error in this * * *

The judgment of the Court, therefore, must be reversed

and a new trial ordered.

Let the judgment he reversed.

(d) Comments by the Court on the Weight of the

Evidence.

NEW YORK FIREMEN INSURANCE COMPANY

V. WALDEN.

Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of

Errors in the State of New York. 1815.

12 Johnson, 513.

This cause came up from the Supreme Court on a writ of

error.

387
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guard the jury again t the inference, that the judge considers any disputed faict to have been proven.
Juries are usually very open to influence from the Bench,
and it is right that they should be so; but that influence
should never be extended to their conclu ion , in matters of
fact. A careful anal sis of the charge under review make·
it apparent that the judge put his reference to ome of the
facts hypothetically, as ''if the defendant told the plaintiff," etc., "if Harris was not good at that time," etc.,
whilst his reference to other facts was in terms which assume that they were incontestably proven, a ''Jackson
who was ignorant of the condition of Harris, at the time,
and whose condition was known to Buttram, '' etc.
The
hypothetical is the proper form of putting facts in such
cases, beicause it distinctly puts the jury on the inquiry as to
those fact ; but in relation to other facts, put positively before them, put as facts ascertained in the same connection,
in the same sentence, they are much less apt to feel the necessity of inquiry. Indeed, the e different modes of treating different facts, would eem to give a double assurance,
that they are relieved from the necessity of scrutinizing the
evidence for the proof of some of them: 1st. Becau e the
judge has treated them as proven. 2nd. Because he has
cautiously treated others as doubtful. We think there was
error in this * * *
The judgment of the Court, therefore, mu t be reversed
and a new trial ordered.
Let the judgrnent be reversed.

(d) Comments by the Court on the Weight of the
E idence.

NEW YORK FIRE11EN IN URAN E COMP ANY
V. WALDEN.
Court for the Trial of !?npeachments and the Correction of
Errors in the State of New Y orli . 1 15.
12 J ohn on, 513.

This cause came up from the Supreme
error.

ourt on a writ of

388

there was a concealment of certain letters and matters, rela-

tive to the conduct and character of the master, which were

material to the risk, and ought to have been disclosed to

the plaintiffs in error, at the time the policy was under-

written. * * * 2. That under the circumstances of -the

case, the policy did not protect the ship against the barratry

of Cartwright, the master ; and that there was not sufficient

evidence of barratry to entitle the plaintiffs below to re-

cover on that ground * * *. 3. That the materialty of the

concealment was a question of fact, and ought to have been

left to the jury. * * *

The Chancellor. This case comes up upon a bill of ex-

ceptions, and we are accordingly to be confined to the ob-

jections taken at the trial, and appearing on the face of the

bill. The question is, whether there was error in the

charge which the learned judge delivered to the jury. This

charge was, ''that the several matters given in evidence on
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the part of the plaintiffs, were, in his opinion, conclusive

evidence of the barratry of the master of the vessel, on the

voyage; and that the plaintiffs were not bound to communi-

cate, or disclose, to the defendants, any of the letters, mat-

ters, or circumstances, which were, at the time of the insur-

ance, in their possession, relative to the master; and tli;^

the matters given in evidence, on the part of the defend-

ants, were not sufficient to maintain the issue on their part,

or; to bar the action of the plaintiffs; and that if the jury

agreed with him in opinion, they ought to find a verdict for

the plaintiffs;" and with that charge, he left the matter to

the jury.

The counsel went at large into the discussion of the ques-

tion, whether the assured were bound to communicate to

the underwriters, at the .time they applied for insurance,

the letters and other knowledge they possessed of the im-

proper conduct of the master. But it appears to me that

this question is not for the. decision of tliis Court, because,

wlietlier the circumstances relative to the master ought to

have been disclosed, depends upon the question, whether

those circumstances were material to the risk; and the ma-

teriality is a question of fact for a jury and not a question

of law for the Court. It is a well-settled principle in the

[ Ch8:P· 11

• * * * * * * * * •

388 Trial Practice [Chap. 11

For the plaintiffs in error, it was contended. 1. That
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For the plaintiffs in error, it was contended. 1. That
there was a concealment of certain letters and matters, relative to the conduct and character of the master, which were
material to the risk, and ought to have been ·disclosed to
the plaintiffs in error, at the time the policy was underwritten. * * * 2. That under the circumstances of .the
case, the poli1cy did not protect the ship against the barratry
of Cartwright, the master; and that there was not sufficient
evidence of barratry to entitle the plaintiffs below to recover on that ground * * *. 3. That the materialty of ·the
concealment was a question of fact, and ought to have been
left to the jury. * * *
THE CHANCELLOR. This case comes up upon a bill of exceptions, and we are aocordingly to be confined to the objections taken at ·the trial, and appearing on the face of the
bill.
The question is, whether there was error in the
charge which the learned judge delivered to the jury. This
charge was, "that the several matters given in ·evidence on
the part of the plaintiffs, were, in his opinion, conclusive
evidence of the barratry of the master of the vessel, on the
voyage; ·and that the plaintiffs were not bound to communicate, or di close, to the defendants, any of the letters, matter , or circumstances, which were, at the time of the insurance, in their possession, relative to the master; and th : >
the matters given in evidence, on the part of the def endant , were not sufficient to maintain the i sue on their part,
r to bar the action of the plaintiffs; and th at if the jur.,
ao-r d with him in opinion, they ouo·ht to find a verdict for
th I laintiffs;'' and with that charge, he left the matter to
th jury.
The oun. 1 w nt at large into the discussion of the question, wh th r the as ured were bound to co muni at to
th und rwrit rs, at th .time they applied for insurance,
th 1 tt r. nd other knowl dg th y po e ed of th impr l r ndu t of th mast r. But it appears to m that
thi s qn "'tl n is not f r th .d ci ion of thi
ourt, be aus ,
wl 1 ·tli r th
ir um tanc r lativ to th m t r ou()'ht to
Ji v h n di . lo. d, d p nd upon the u tion, whether
th i. ·e> irr·11 .· t
. w r mat ri 1 to th ri k; a d .the mat riali . is a qu ti n £fa t f r a j ry and not a qu tion
f 1 w f r the
urt. It i a w 11- ttl d .principle in the
1
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law of insurance, that what facts, in the knowledge of the

assured, are material, and necessary to be commnnicated

to the underwriter, when insurance is asked for, is for a

jury to determine; and I will briefly notice a few cases, in

illustration of this point. My whole opinion will rest upon

the admission and the solidity of this principle.

**********

It is thus settled, (as far as authority goes,) beyond all

doubt or contradiction, that, whether the matters not dis-

closed in this case were material, was a question that ought

to have been submitted to the consideration and decision of

the jury; and here, I apprehend, lies the error committed

by the learned judge, that he has given a binding direction

to the jury, upon matter of fact, as if it had been matter of

law. It appears to me, that the true and necessary con-

struction of the charge, as stated in the bill, is, that it was

a positive direction, in point of law, as to the materiality of

the non-disclosure, and that it must have been so received
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and obeyed by the jury. If the charge had been intended

as a mere opinion to the jury, on a matter of fact, on which

they were to exercise their judgment, the jury would, un-

doubtedly, have been told, that the defence in the case

rested upon the question of the materiality of the letters

and facts not disclosed, and that it was for them to judge,

from the evidence, whether the disclosure would have va-

ried the premium, or increased the risk, in respect of the

barratry of the master; and that if the jury should be of

opinion that the facts not disclosed were in that sense ma-

terial, they must find for the defendants; and that, if

they thought otherwise, they must find for the plaintiffs.

This would have been the language of a charge suited to

the submission of such a point; and we have an example

of this species of charge (if, indeed, an example can be

wanting) in the bill of exceptions taken in the case of

Smith V. Carrington, (4 Cranch, 64.) If, then, the judge

had deemed it proper to add his own opinion on that fact,

for the assistance or satisfaction of the jury, it might have

been done with utility, and with safety. But the charge,

as stated in the case, is not of this nature, but it is in the

usual style and language of a direction of the Court, on

matter of law. The precedent of a bill of exceptions,

which was cited from Buller's N. P. 317, and which is given
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law of insurance, that what fact in the knowledO' of the
assured, are material, and ne e ar. to be ommunicated
to the underwriter, wh n in urance is a ked for, i for a
jury to determine; and I will briefly noti e a f w ca es in
illu tration of this point. My whole opinion will rest upon
the admis ion and the olidity of this principle.

* * * * * * * * * *
It is thus ettled, (as far as authority goes,) beyond all
doubt or contradiction, that, whether the matter not disclosed in this ca e were material, was a question that ought
to have been submitted to t.he consideration and decision of
the jury; and here, I ap1 rehend, lie the rror committed
by the learned judge that he has given a bindinO' direction
to the jury, upon matter of fact, as if it had been matter of
law. It app.e ars to m , that the true and nece ary construction of the .charge, a tated in the bill, isJ that it wa
a positive direction, in point of law, as to the materiality of
the non-disclosure, and that it must have been so received
and obeyed by the jurv. If the charge had been intended
as a mere opinion to the jury, on a matter of fa t, on which
they were to exerci e their judgment, the jury would, undoubtedly, have been told, that the def nee in the ca e
re t d upon the que ti n of the materiality of the letters
and fa t not disclosed and that it was for them to judg ,
from the evidence, whether the disclosure would have varied the premium, or increased the ri k in re pect of the
barratry of the ma ter; and that if the jury hould be of
o inion that the facts not disclosed were in that sen e mat rial, they mu t find for the defendants; and that if
the. thought otherwise, they mu t find for th plaintiff .
Thi would hav been th language of a charo·e uited to
the ubmi. i n of uch a point; and we have an
ampl
of thi peci s of harg (if, indeed, an exampl an be
wantin ) in the bill of x I tion tak n in th
a
of
niith . arrington, ( 4 ran h 64.)
If then the judo·
hi own 01 inion on that fa t
ha d me i l r p r t a
for the a i tan
r ati fa tion of th jury it mio·ht ha\
be n don with utility an wi th . af t~- .
ut th har
a tat d in th a
i not of thi natur but it i in tlw
u ual st le an lan~u o· of a lir ction f th
ourt on
matt _r of law.
Th
r c d nt of a ill of x
tion
which was cited from ull r' N. . 317, and which i giv n
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as for misdirection, is in the language of the charge in this

case. "And the said chief justice did then and there (says

the precedent) declare and deliver his opinion to the jury,

that the said several matters so produced and proved, on

the part of the defendants, were not, upon the whole case,

sufficient to bar the plaintiff of his action; and, with that

direction, left the same to the jury." There is a preced-

ent of a bill of exceptions given in 3 Burr. 1742., and which

was taken to a charge on the subject of search-warrants,

made by Lord Camden, when Ch. J. of the C. B., and the

language of this very authentic precedent is almost in the

very words of the one before us: "And the said chief jus-

tice did then and there declare and deliver his opinion to

the jury, that the said several matters so produced and

proved, on the part of the defendants, were not, upon the

whole case, sufficient to bar the action, and, with that opin-

ion, left the same to the jury."

In this case, from Burrow, it was never doubted but that
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the opinion of the chief justice, so stated in that bill, was

taken and received as a direction in point of law ; and if the

charge in the case before us is not to be deemed of that

character, it will be impossible, hereafter, to discriminate

between a charge containing a positive direction in point of

law, and mere advice on a matter of fact. I shall not en-

ter into any minute criticism on words. No one who con-

sults the precedents can well be at a loss for the meaning

of this charge. The language of the learned judge was,

that the plaintiffs were not hound or required to make the

disclosure; that the matters offered in evidence were not

su-fficient to bar the action, and nothing was said about the

weight of evidence for the consideration of the jury. If

even it was doubtful, by the bill, whether the charge was in-

tended as direction, or otherwise, the result of my opinion

would be the same ; because, when the judge interposes his

opinion to the jury, on a point of fact, it ought not to be

left in doubt in what light they are to receive his charge.

In order to preserve a just balance between the distinct

powers of the Court and the jury, and that the parties may

enjoy, in unimpaired vigor, their constitutional right of

having tlie law decided by the Court, and of having the fact

der-ided by the jury, every charge should distinguish clearly

between the law and the fact, so that the jury cannot misun-
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as for misdirection, is in the language of the charge in this
case. ' i.nd the said chief justice did then and there (say~
the precedent) declare and deliver his opinion to the jury,
that the said several matter so produced and proved, on
the part of the defendants, were not, upon the whole ca~e,
uffi ient to bar the plaintiff of his action; and, with that
direction left the same to the jury.'' There is a precednt of a bill of exceptions given in 3 Burr. 1742., and which
wa taken to a charge on the subject of search-warrants,
made by Lord Camden, when Ch. J. of the C. B., and the
language of this 'ery authentic prec dent is almost in the
ver words of the one before us: ''And the said chief justice did then and there declare and deliver his opinion to
the jur , that the said seYeral matters so produced and
proved, on the part of the defendants, were not, upon the
whole case, sufficient to bar the action, and, with that opinion, left the same to the jury.''
In this case, from Burrow, it was never doubted but that
the opinion of the chief justice, so stated in that bill, was
taken and received a a direction in point of law; and if the
charge in the case before us is not to be deemed of that
character, it will be impossible, hereafter, to discriminate
between a charge containing a po iti' e direction in point of
law and mere advice on a matter of fa>Ct. I shall not enter into any minute criticism on words.
No one who consult th pr ced nt can well b at a loss for the meaning
of this charge. The language of the learned judge was,
that the plaintiffs were not bound or reqitired to make the
di lo ure; that the matt rs off red in evidence were not
sitfficient to bar the a tion, and nothing was aid about the
w eight of P-vidence for the con ideration of the jury.
If
e en it wa doubtful, by the ill, whether the char e was int n d as direction, or otherVi ise, the re ult of my opinion
w uld b th a
; b cau , wh n the judcre interpo
his
l>ini n to th jury on a oint of fact, it ouo·ht not to be
l ft i d ubt in wh t light th y are to re iv hi harcre.
a ju t balan b t
n th di tin h
n rel r t
f th
n th j1uy, and that th parti may
•njoy i uni
ir
vigor, th ir on titutional rio·ht of
hav1 g tl10 law d f'id d by th Court a d of havinO' the fa t
cl ('i 1 < b. th . ir. v r. haro- h uld disti ui h 1 arly
etw en th l w a d th fa t o that the jury annot mi un-
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derstand their rights or their duty, nor mistake the opinion

of the judge upon matter of fact, for his direction in point

of law. The distinction is all important to the jury. The

direction of the judge, in the one case, is obligatory upon

their consciences, and so they will, and so they ought to,

regard it; but his opinion, in the other case, is mere ad-

vice, and the jury are bound to decide for themselves, not-

withstanding the opinion of the judge, and to follow that

opinion no farther than it corresponds with the conclusions

of their own judgment. Unless this distinction be kept stead-

ily in view, and be defined with all possible precision, the

trial by jury may, in time, be broken down, and rendered

nominal and useless.

I am far from wishing to restrain the judges of the

Courts of law from expressing freely their opinions to the

jury on matters of fact, and still less from interfering with

their power of controlling the mistaken verdicts of juries,

by a liberal exercise of the discretion of awarding new
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trials. No man can be more deeply sensible of the value

and salutary tendency of this judicial aid and discretion,

and none, certainly, can possess higher confidence in the

character and wisdom of the Court whose judgment is now

under review. All that I feel it my duty to contend for is,

that whenever the judge delivers his opinion to the jury on

a matter of fact, it shall be delivered as mere opinion, and

not as direction, and that the jury shall be left to under-

stand, clearly that fJiei/ are to decide the fact, upon their

own view of the evidence, and that the judge interposes his

opinion only to aid them in cases of difficulty, or to inspire

them with confidence in cases of doubt. It is for this prin-

ciple that I feel solicitous, and not for anything that may

have taken place in this particular cause. The case before

us is, comparatively, of trifling consequence; but the dis-

tinction I have suggested goes to the very root and es-

sence of trial by jury, and may, indeed, become of ines-

timable value, and, perhaps, of perilous struggle, when the

present generation shall have ceased to exist.

I am disposed to hand to posterity the institution of

juries as perfect, in all respects, as we now enjoy it; for I

believe it may, in times hereafter, be found to be no incon-

siderable security against the systematic influence and ty-

ranny of party spirit, in inferior tribunals.

INSTRUCTING THE JURY

391

derstand th ir rights or their duty, nor mistake the opinion
of the judge upon matter of fact, for hi dir ti n in point
of law. The distinietion is all important to the jury. The
direction of the judge, in the one case, i obli ·atory upon
their consciences, and so they will, and o they ought to,
regard it; but his opinion, in the other ca e, i mere advice, and the jury are bound to decide for th m eh es notwithstanding the opinion of the judge, and to follow that
opinion no farther than it corresponds with the conclu ions
of their own judgment. Unless this distinction be kept steadily in view, and be defined with all po ible pre i ion, the
trial by jury may, in time, be broken down, and rendered
nominal and u ele s.
I am far from wi hing to re. train the jud ·e of the
Courts of law from expre ing freely their opinion to the
jury on matters of fact and still less from interfering with
their power of controlling the mistaken verd~cts of juries,
by a liberal exercise of the discretion of awarding new
trials. No man can be more deeply sen ibl of the value
and salutary tendency of this judicial aid and di cretion,
and none, certainly, can po e s higher confidence in the
character and wisdom of the ourt whose judgment is now
under review. All that I f el it my duty to contend for is,
that whenever the judge delivers his opinion to the jury on
a matter of fact, it hall be delivered as mere opinion, and
not as direction, and that the jury shall be left to understand, clearly that they ar to decide the fa t, upon their
own view of the evid nee, and that the judge interpo e his
opinion only to aid them in ca es of difficulty or to in pire
them with confidence in case of doubt. It i for thi principle that I feel solicitou , and not for an; thing that may
have taken place in thi parti ular cau e. Th ca e before
us is, comparativ ly, of trifling con equence; but the distinction I have u ·ge t d ·oe to the ver. root and e ence of trial by jury and ay indeed become of in timabl 'alue and p rha
of erilou trua-gle when the
pr ent a- n ration hall hav c a ed t exi t.
I am di po d to han t po terity the in titution of
juries a p rf t in all r p t , a we now enjoy it· for I
b lieve it may in ti
h r aft r be found to b no in oniderable ecurity aO'ain t th y tematic influence and tyranny of party spirit, in inferior tribunals.
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I am, accordingly, of opinion, that the judgment of the

Supreme Court be reversed, and that the cause be re-

manded, with directions that a venire de novo be awarded.

A majority of the Court being of this opinion, it was

thereupon ordered and adjudged, that the judgment of the

Supreme Court be reversed, and that a venire de novo be

awarded, for the trial of the issue joined between the par-

ties in the said Court ; and that the costs in this Court abide

the final decision of the cause.

Judgment of reversal.

ST. LOUIS, lEON MOUNTAIN AND SOUTHERN

RAILWAY V. VICKERS.

Supreme Court of the United States. 1887.

122 United States, 360.

The defendant in error sued the plaintiff in error in a

[Chap. 11
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* * * * * * * * *

I am, accordingly, of opinion, that the judgment of the
Supreme Court be reversed, and that the cause be remanded, with directions that a venire de nova be awarded.
A majority of the Court being of this opinion, it was
thereupon ordered and adjudged, that the judgment of the
Supreme Court be reversed, and that a venire de nova be
awarded, for the trial of the issue joined between the parties in the said Court; and that the costs in this Court abide
the final decision of the ca use.
Judgment of reversal.

state court of Arkansas to recover damages for personal

injuries sustained by him while a passenger on one of the

trains of the company. * * *
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The case was tried before a jury. * * *

The assignments of error were the following:

1. The court erred in instructing the jury as follows;

*' Counsel for the plaintiff told you that you might find a

verdict for plaintiff for any sum from one cent to $25,000.

This is true in one sense. You have the power to render

ST. LOUIS, IRON :MOUNTAIN AND SOUTHERN
RAILWAY V. VICKERS.

a verdict for one cent or for $25,000, but a verdict for either

of these sums would obviously be a false verdict, for if the

Supreme Court of the United States.

1887.

plaintiff is entitled to a verdict at all, and upon this point

you will probably have no difficulty, as the evidence clearly

shows negligence and consequent liability on the defend-

122 United States, 360.

ant, though this is a question of fact exclusively within

your province to determine — I say, if plaintiff is entitled to

a A'crdict at all he is entitled to recover more than one cent,

and it is equally clear that $25,000 would be greatly in ex-

cess of what he ought to recover."

The defendant in error sued the plaintiff in error in a
tate court of Arkansas to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained by him while a passenger on one of the
trains of the company. * * *
Tb case wa tried before a jury. * * *
The a signments of error were the following:
1. The court rred in in tructing the jury as follows:
'' Coun 1 for th plaintiff told you that you might find a
v rdi t for plaintiff for any sum from one cent to $25,000.
Thi. i true in one sen e. You have the power to render
av rdi t for one cent or for $25,000, but a verdict for either
f th
sum would obviously be a fal e verdi t, for if the
Jaintiff is ntitled to a verdict at all, and upon tbi point
y u will pro ably have no difficulty, a the evid nc ] arly
show: n g ]i O' n e and consequent liability on th defendn tho gh this is a question of fact
lu ively within
y nr provinc t d t rmin - I ay, if laintiff i. entitl d to
a Y r lid at 11 he i , ntitl d t r r v r mor th n n c nt,
c
<l it i. qn ll y C'l ar that $25 0 0 would be gr atly in exf whc t h lJO'ht io r
r."
r
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Mk. John F. Dh^lon for plaintiff in error.

The constitution of Arkansas, Art. VII, Sec. 23, provides

that * 'judges shall not charge juries with regard to mat-

ters of fact, but shall declare the law, and in jury trials

shall reduce their charge or instructions to writing on the

request of either party."

In this case the matters of fact in issue were the alleged

negligence of the defendant and contributory negligence

of the plaintiff.

We submit that this constitutional provision should be

followed by the Federal courts sitting as courts of common

law in the state of Arkansas; and that this case is to be

distinguished from Nudd v. Burroivs, 91 U. S. 426, and

Indianapolis Railroad v. Horst, 93 IT. S. 291.

Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of this court

in Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, said: ''The practice

in this respect differs in different states. In some of them

the court neither sums up the evidence in a charge to the
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jury nor expresses an opinion upon a question of fact. Its

charge is strictly confined to questions of law, lea\dng the

evidence to be discussed by counsel, and the facts to be de-

cided by the jury without commentary or opinion by the

court. But in most of the states the practice is otherwise ;

and they have adopted the usage of the English courts of

justice, where the judge always sums uj) the evidence, and

points out the conclusions which in his opinion ought to be

drawn from it ; submitting them, however, to the considera-

tion and judgment of the jury. It is not necessary to in-

quire which of these modes of proceeding most conduces

to the purposes of justice. It is sufficient to say that either

of them may be adopted under the laws of Congress. And

as it is desirable that the practice in the courts of the

United States should conform as nearly as practicable to

that of the state in which they are sitting, that mode of

proceeding is perhaps to be preferred which, from long

established usage and practice, has become the law of the

courts of the state."

It is submitted that the act of Congress of June 1, 1872,

17 Stat. 197, Sec. 5, should be construed in harmony with

this decision.

It has been repeatedly held in Arkansas that it is error

MR. JOHN F. DILLON for laintiff in error.
The constitution of Arkansas, Art. VII, Sec. 23, provides
that "judges shall not charge juries with regard to matter of fact, but shall declare the law, and in jury trials
shall reduce their charge or instructions to writing on the
request of either party.''
In this case the matters of fact in issue were the alleged
negligence of the defendant and contributory negligence
of the plaintiff.
We submit that this constitutional provision should be
followed by the Federal court sitting as courts of common
law in the state of Arkan as; and that this case is to be
distinguished from Nudd v . Burroi s, 91 U. S. 426, and
Indianapolis Railroad v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291.
hief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of this court
in Mitch ell v. H annony, 13 How. 115, said.: "The practice
in this respect differs in different stales. In some of them
the court neither sums up the evidence in a charge to the
jury nor expresses an opinion upon a question of fact. Its
charge is strictly confined to questions of law, leaving the
evidence to be discussed by coun el, and the facts to be decided by the jury without commentary or opinion by the
court. But in mo t of the states the practice is otherwi e;
and they have adopted the usage of the Engli h courts of
ju tice, where the judge always urns up the evidence, and
points out the condu ions which in his opinion ought to be
drawn from it; submitting them, however, to the con ideration and judgment of the jury. It is not necessary to inquire which of these modes of proceeding most conduces
to the purposes of justice. It is ufficient to ay that either
of them may be adopted under the laws of Congre . And
as it is de irable that the practice in the courts of the
United State should conform as nearly a practi able to
that of the state in which they are ittinO', that mo e of
pro eedin is perhaps to be preferred which, from long
e tabli hed u a e and practice, has become the law of the
court of the tat . ''
It is uhmitted that the a t of Congress of June 1, 1872,
17 ~tat. 197 ec. 5, should be construed in harmony with
thi deci ion.
It has been repeatedly held in Arkansas that it is error
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to assume, in the instructions to the jury, the existence of

the facts in issue. Montgomery v. Erwin, 24 Ark. 540;

Floyd V. Bids, 14 Ark. 286 (S. C. 58 Am. Dec. 374) ; State

Bank v. McGuire, 14 Ark. 537; Atkins v. State, 16 A^k. 568,

593; Armistead v. Brooke, 18 Ark. 521; Burr v. Williams,

20 Ark. 171. And that an instruction should not be given

which intimates to the jury the opinion of the court as to

the weight of the evidence. BandolpJi v. McCains' Admin-

istrator, 34 Ark. 696.

Mr. F. W. Compton for defendant in error submitted on

his brief.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the

court.

This judgment is affirmed on the authority of Vickshurg

and Meridian Bailroad Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545 ; Nudd

V. Burrows, 91 U. S. 426, 441; Indianapolis etc. Bailroad v.

Horst, 93 U. S. 291, 299. A state constitution cannot, any

more than a state statute, prohibit the judges of the courts
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of the United States from charging juries with regard to

matters of fact.

Affirmed.

KLEUTSCH V. SECURITY MUTUAL LIFE INSUR-

ANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Nebraska. 1904,

72 Nebraska, 75.

Baknes, J. Augusta 0. Kleutsch, by her guardian and

next friend, and Katherine Kleutsch Mills, commenced an

action in the district court for Lancaster County, against

the Security Mutual Life Insurance Company of Lincoln,

Nebraska, on a policy issued l)y that company on the life

[Chap. 11
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to a ume, in the in tructions to the jury, the existence of
the facts in issue.
Montgomery v. Erwin, 24 Ark. 540;
Floyd v . Ricks, 14 Ark. 286 (S. C. 58 Am. Dec. 374); State
Bank v . ll1cGuire, 14 Ark. 537; Atkins v . State, 16 Ajk. 568,
593; Armistead v. Brooke, 18 Ark. 521; Burr v. vf1illiams,
20 Ark. 171. And that an instruction should not be given
which intimates to the jury the opinion of the court as to
the weight of the evidence. Randolph v. McCains' Administrator, 34 Ark. 696.
Mr. F. vV. Compton for defendant in error submitted on
bis brief.
MR. CHIEF JusTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the
court.
This judgment is affirmed on the authority of Vicksburg
and Meridian Railroad Co. v . Putnam, 118 U. S. 545; Nudd
v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 426, 441; Indianapolis etc. Railroad v.
Hor st, 93 U. S. 291, 299. A state constitution cannot, any
more than a state statute, prohibit the judges of the courts
of the United States from charging juries with regard to
matters of fact.
Affirmed.

of one George W. Kleutsch, the plaintiffs being the bene-

ficiaries. The case was first tried before his honor, Judge

TTolmes, and a verdict returned in favor of the plaintiffs for

the amount named in the policy. This verdict was set

nsirlo nnd a now trial granted, and from that order the

lilaiiitiffs prosecute error. The case was again tried be-

KLEUTSCH V. SECURITY MUTUAL LIFE
ANCE COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Nebraska.

INSUR~

1904.

72 N ebra ka, 75.

BARNES, J. Augu ta 0. J{l ut h, by her guardian and
next fri nd and Kath rin IG ut. h Mills, comm n ed an
a tion jn th distri t c urt for Lan a t r County acrain t
th ~ rurity Mutual Ljf Insuran e om any of Lin oln,
bra. ka n a oliry i. n by that oom any on the life
of n G r e W. IG ut. h, th plaintiff b inO' the benefki ari . . The cas wa. first tri db fore hi hon r, Jndg
lT ]m .
d av r i tr turn din favor of th plaintiff for
th
m unt na
in th poli y. Thi verdict was s t
~ t: iclp , nd a n w tri l gr nt \d and from that order the
plaintiffs prosecute error. The case was again tried be.
T

·
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fore his honor, Judge Cornish, and a verdict again re-

turned for the plaintiffs. From an order demdng a new

trial and a judgment on the verdict, the defendant prose-

cutes error. * * *

**********

We come now to consider the assignments of error pre-

sented by the defendant company. It appears that on the

second trial the court instructed the jury as follows :

'*In this case the burden of proof is upon the plaintiffs

to establish by a preponderance of evidence the payment of

the second premium on the policy in suit, which premium

was due November 28, 1900, and on which a grace of 30 days

in pajTuent was allowed by the terms of the policy. To

prove payment the plaintiffs produced the defendant's re-

ceipt for the same. A receipt is evidence of a high grade,

to be overcome only by clear and convincing testimony.

On the other hand it constitutes only prima facie evidence

of what it contains, and it is entirely competent and proper
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for the defendant company to show that the payment in

fact was not made, and that the receipt was issued by mis-

take."

Defendant contends that this instruction was erroneous ;

that it was wrong in this, that the court should not have

told the jury that ''a receipt is evidence of high grade, to

be overcome only by clear and convincing testimony."

And it would seem that by this statement the court called

the attention of the jury directly to this part of the testi-

mony; in fact, singled it out, commented on its character

and weight, and stated that it could only be overcome by

clear and convincing evidence. This must have left the

impression that the testimony of the defendant's witnesses,

by which they attempted to explain the existence of the re-

ceipt, how it came to be issued, and in which they stated

positively that the premium which it represented was never

paid, was not e\Tdence of such a high grade as the receipt

itself, and the jury might therefore well conclude that the

prima facie evidence of pa^Tnent, to-wit, the receipt itself,

was not overcome thereby. Wliatever may be the rule in

other jurisdictions, we have frequently held that it was

error to single out and to direct the attention of the jury

to any particular part of the evidence, and comment on its

weight or probative force. In Smith v. Gardner, 36 Neb,
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741, the question involved was, whether a certain promis-

sory note had been paid. After the death of one of the

defendants, the note was found among her papers. The

plaintiff testified positively that the note had never been

paid, but that the deceased had obtained possession of it on

the pretence of examining it, and thereafter fraudulently

refused to surrender it. The trial court gave iJie following

instruction: ''You are further instructed that the posses-

sion of the note by Margaret Green is a strong circumstance

to show pa;\Tiient unless explained by the plaintiffs in the

action." The court, speaking through Post, J., held this

instruction error, and in commenting thereon said :

''We think the giving of the above instruction was error.

"We do not question the soundness of the proposition that

possession of a note by the maker thereof after maturity is

prima facie evidence of payment, but what is denominated a

presumption of payment in such a case is a mere logical

inference from the fact of possession, and may be strong or
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weak, according to the circumstances of the particular case.

* * * Possession of the note by the deceased at the time

of her death is not only a circumstance tending to prove

pajTnent, but from which payment would ordinarily be the

logical inference. It is therefore proper in such a case to

instruct the jury that possession is presumptive or prima

facie evidence of payment, which will, if uncontradicted or

unexplained, warrant a verdict in favor of the party alleg-

ing it. But the force of such presumption must always de-

pend upon the circumstances of the case. It is therefore

error to advise the jury that possession of a note by the

maker raises a strong presumption of payment or is a

strong circumstance to prove payment."

In Smith v. Meyers, 52 Neb. 70, which was an action for

criminal conversation, the trial court refused to instruct the

jury that, "if you find from the evidence that the plaintiff

continued to live with his wife after he has heard of her

alleged illicit connection with the defendant, the jury is jus-

tified in concluding that the plaintiff has condoned the of-

fense of the wife, and this circumstance is entitled to great

weight in considering the question of damages the plaintiff

has sustained by the wrongful conduct of the defendant,

provided the jury shall believe that the defendant has, in

fact, committed any wrong against the plaintiff."
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This was assigned as error, and in determining that ques-

tion the court said:

''This instruction was properly refused, because loss of

comfort and society of the wife were not the only injuries

for which compensatory damages could be awarded.

Again, it was not the province of the court to tell the jury

what circumstance was 'entitled to great weight.' It was

for the jury alone to determine the weight to be given the

testimony."

**********

In Show V. Locke, 3 Neb. (Unof.) 176, it was said: "Com-

plaint is next made that the trial court should not have

instructed the jury as follows : 'The jury are instructed that

cumstances in determining which witness is entitled to

credit.' This is complained of because it did not confine

the attention of the jury to the surrounding circumstances
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proved at the trial, and also because it sought to instruct

them what weight to attach to these circumstances. De-

fendant in error replies that the instruction complained of

was just as good for one party as the other and did not

prejudice plaintiff in error; and also says that the cases

cited by plaintiff in error are not in point on a general in-

struction, such as the one complained of. * * * We are

constrained to think that the learned trial judge erred in

expressing an opinion as to the degree of weight to be at-

tached to the surrounding circumstances in determining the

credibility of witnesses."

In First Nat. Bank v. Loivrey, 36 Neb. 290, where the is-

sue was fraud, the jury was told that certain matters par-

ticularly mentioned by the instruction were strong evi-

dence of secret trust, and this was held prejudicial because

of the singling out of particular evidence on one side. The

same rule is announced in Gillet v. Phelps, 12 Wis. 437 ; Wil-

cox V. Young, QQ Mich. 687. See also Davis v. Lambert,

69 Neb. 242.

It thus appears that we are fully committed to the rule

that it is error to single out a particular part of the evi-

dence and express an opinion as to its weight, its strength

or its probative force. In the case at bar the only ques-

tion in issue was, whether or not the premium on the policy
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• • • • • • • • • *

where the testimony of witnesses is irreconcilably conflict-

ing they should give great weight to the surrounding cir-
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in suit liad been paid for the year 1900. The plaintiffs

produced the receipt in question as their proof of such pay-

ment. The defendant produced the officers of the com-

I^any who had charge of its business, as witnesses, and es-

pecially its secretary who, it was claimed, had executed and

delivered the receipt, in order to explain its existence and

overcome its effect. This witness testified positively that

the receipt was made out by mistake and enclosed in a let-

ter to the assured, which contained the policy as changed;

that it was intended to evidence the payment of the full

amount of the premium for the year 1899. In addition to

such positive statement, the witness. gave evidence of facts

surrounding the issuance of the policy, which at least

tended to corroborate his further statement that the pre-

mium for the year in question was never paid. With the

evidence in this condition, the jury Were told that the re-

ceipt was a "high grade" of evidence "to be overcome only

by clear and convincing testimony." It is true that this
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was followed by a fairly correct statement of the law ; and

yet we are unable to say that the jury were not influenced

to the defendant's prejudice thereby. The instruction ap-

pears to fall within the rule announced in the cases above

cited, and is not distinguishable from the instructions there-

in condemned. It thus clearlj^ appears that the court

erred in giving the instruction quoted.

As the case will be tried again, it is neither necessary nor

proper for us to comment on the weight of the evidence, or

discuss any of the other assignments of error contained in

the record. For the giving of the instruction complained

of, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the

cause remanded for a new trial.

Reversed.

STATE V. DICK.

Supreme Court of North Carolina. 1664,

60 North Carolina, 440.

Manly, J. In looking into the record in this case, two

errors appear to have been committed on the trial, for one

TRIAL PRACTICE

[0.hap. 11
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The plaintiffs
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amount of the premium for the year 1899. In addition to
such positive statement, the witness .gave evidence of facts
surrounding the issuance of the policy, which at least
tended t o corroborate his further statement that the premium for the year in question was never paid. With the
evidence in this condition, the jury were told that the receipt was a "high grade" of evidence "to be overcome only
by dear and convincing testimony.'' It is true that this
was followed by a fairly correct statement of the law; and
yet we are unable to say that the jury were not influenced
to the defendant's prejudice thereby. The instruction appears to fall within the rule announced in the cases above
cited, and is not d1stinguishable from the instructions therein condemned.
It thus clearly appears that the court
erred in giving the instruction quoted.
As the case will be tried again, it is neither necessary nor
proper for us to comment on the weight of the evidence, or
di cu any of the other assignments of error contained in
the re ord. For the giving of the instruction complained
of, th judgm nt of the district court is reversed and the
cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed.
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of whicL, at any rate, the prisoner is entitled to a venire de

novo.

On the trial, a question arose as to the withdrawal of

certain confessions of the prisoner. The Court declined

withdrawing them, but remarked to the solicitor for the

State, that, after the other evidence already given in the

cause, he, the solicitor, might withdraw them, if he chose to

do so, which the Solicitor declined. This seems to us, to

be an expression of opinion, on the part of the Judge, tliat

the case was sufficiently proved without the aid of the con-

fessions. This is not directly asserted, but is a matter of

inference plainly from the manner in which the expedient

of withdrawing the testimony is suggested. ''After the

other evidence, already given in the cause, the Solicitor

might withdraw," etc. The sense, which we attribute to

this language, is that, which his Honor himself seems to

have ascribed to it; for he takes pains to explain to ^ the

jury, that they were not bound, by any opinion or judg-
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ment of his, as to the facts. He endeavored to obviate the

effect of his opinion, by announcing, in distinct terms, the

jury's independency of him in all matters of fact pertain-

ing to the issue; but this it was not practicable for him to

do. The opinion had been expressed, and was incapable of

being recalled.

The statute declares, that "no Judge, in delivering a

charge to the petit jury, shall give an opinion whether a

fact is fully or sufficiently proved, such matters being the

true office and province of a jury. ' '

The object is not to inform the jury of their province,

but to guard them against any invasion of it.

The division of our Courts of record into two depart-

ments — the one, for the judging of the law, the other, for

judging of the facts — is a matter lying on the surface of our

judicature, and is known to everybody. It was not infor-

mation on this subject the Legislature intended to furnish ;

but their purpose was to lay down an inflexible rule of

practice — that the Judge of the law should not undertake

to de^cide the facts. If he can not do so directly, he can

not indirectly; if not explicitly, he can not by inuendo.

What we take to be the inadvertence of the Judge, there-

fore, was not cured of its illicit character by the informa-

tion which he immediately conveyed. Knowledge on the
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part of the jury, of their proper province, is not the criter-

ion for determining the propriety or impropriety of an

opinion from the Judge, as to the sufficiency of the proofs.

It is the same, whether the jury know their rights or not.

The provision of the law in question, has been in exist-

ence since 1796. On the various occasions, when the law

has been digested and re-enacted, it has been continued in

the same words ; and the interpretation which we now give

it, is that which has been given it from the beginning. The

Judge can not properly express an opinion, whether a fact

pertinent to the issue, is sufficiently or insufficiently proved.

Many questions of fact, especially inquiries into mental

capacity, and frauds, require as much experience, science,

and acumen, as the abstruser questions of law; and yet

their decision is left by law in the hands of the compara-

tively inexperienced and unlearned. This, we suppose,

has been to maintain undisturbed and inviolate, that popu-

lar arbiter of rights, the trial by jury, which was, without
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some such provision, constantly in danger, from the will of

the Judge acting upon men mostly passive in their natures,

and disposed to shift off responsibility; and in danger also,

from the ever-active principle, that power is always steal-

ing from the many to the few. We impute no intentional

wrong to the Judge who tried this case below. The error

is one of those casualties, which may happen to the most

circumspect in the progress of a trial on the circuit. When

once committed, however, it was irrevocable, and the pris-

iner was entitled to have his case tried by another jury.

**********

This opinion is to be certified to the Superior Court, to

the end, that it may take further proceedings according to

law.

COMMONWEALTH V. BARRY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1864.

9 Allen, 276.

Indictment for keeping and maintaining a tenement in

School Street in Boston, used for the illegal sale and il-
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legal keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors.

At the trial in tlie superior court, before Vose, J., all the

witnesses were policemen, two of them being officers whose

daily beat included School Street. The defendant's coun-

sel, in his argument to the jury, commented with some se-

verity upon their testimony, as the testimony of policemen.

The judge in his charge told the jury that the same rules

were applicable to policemen as to all other witnesses, in

determining the credit to be given to their testimony; that

in very many of the cases which had been tried at the pres-

ent term of the court policemen had been the principal wit-

nesses, and he thought the jury would agree with him in the

opinion that in all these cases they had manifested great in-

telligence, and testified with apparent candor and impar-

tiality.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant

alleged exceptions.

BiGELow, C. J. Upon mature consideration we have

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

come to the conclusion that we cannot give our sanction to

the instructions under which this case was submitted to the

jury. Viewed in either of the two aspects of which they

are susceptible, it appears to us that they cannot be sup-

ported, consistently with the rules of law.

If they are to be regarded only as an expression of opin-

ion by the court concerning the credibility of certain wit-

nesses who had testified in other cases than the one on trial,

they were clearly of a nature to mislead the jury. The

implication from the language of the court is direct and

positive, that the jury might properly infer that the wit-

nesses in support of this prosecution were entitled to credit

for the reason that other persons engaged in the same occu-

imtion had testified with candor and impartiality in the

trial of other cases. The objection to this instruction is

twofold. In the first place, it authorized the jury to draw

an inference which was not a legitimate deduction from

the premises. It by no means follows naturally or logical-

ly that witnesses employed in the same or similar occupa-

tions will testify on all occasions with equal fairness and

impartiality. In the next place, the instructions gave the

jury to understand that they might travel beyond the case

as proved before them, to seek for corroboration and sup-

port of the testimony adduced in behalf of the prosecution

T. p.— 26
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daily beat included School Street. The defendant's coun·el, in his argument to the jury, commented with some severity upon their testimony, as the testimony of policemen.
The judge in his charge told the jury that the same rules
were applicable to policemen as to all other witnes es, in
determining the credit to be given to their testimony; that
in very many of the cases which had been tried at the present term of the court policemen had been the principal witnesses, and he thought the jury would agree with him in the
opinion that in all these cases they had manifested great intelligence, and testified with apparent candor and impartiality.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant
alleged exceptions.
BIGELOW, C. J.
Upon mature consideration we have
rome to the conclusion that we cannot give our sanction to
the instructions under which this case was submitted to the
jury. Viewed in either of the two aspects of which they
are susceptible it appears to us that they cannot be sup1 orted, con istently with the rules of law.
If they are to be regarded only as an expres ion of opinion by the court concerning the credibility of certain witne ses who had testified in other ca es than the one on trial,
they were clearly of a nature to mislead the jury.
The
implication from the language of the court is direct and
Io itive, that the jury might properly infer that the witn es in upport of this prosecution were entitled to credit
for the rea on that other per ons engaged in the same occupation had te tified with candor and impartiality in the
trial of other ca es.
The objection to thi in truction i
tw fold . Jn the first place it authorized the jury to draw
an inf rence whi h was not a le 0 ·itimate d du tion from
th pr mi e . It by no m an follow naturally or logical1. that witn .
em1 loyed in the am or imilar occupati n will te tif> on all occa ion with equal fairnes and
im1 artiality. In th n xt plain the in tru tion gave th
jnry to un r tand that they mio-ht travel yond th ca
n. proved b(lfor th m to e k for corroboration and upp rt of th t ti on ad uced in behalf of the prosecution
T
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in facts which not only were not proved, but which could

not have been properly offered in evidence by the govern-

ment. Nor is this the whole extent of the objection. The

facts thus introduced into the case were submitted to the

jury with a distinct expression of opinion by the court as

to the effect to be given to them, at a stage of the trial when

the defendant could not controvert them, and without any

opportunity being given to his counsel to address the jury

on the weight which was due to them. Such a course of

proceeding is certainly unusual, and, as we think, does not

accord with the due and orderly conduct of a criminal trial.

But in another aspect it seems to us that the instruc-

tions were objectionable. The credibility of the witnesses

who had testified in support of the charge in the indictment

was a fact which it was the exclusive province of the jury

to determine. As essentially affecting their bias, and the

credit to be given to their testimony, their occupation and

connection with the origin of the prosecution against the
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defendant might be important elements, and, within proper

limits, proper subjects of comment by counsel, and of con-

sideration by the jury. If the instructions are to be con-

strued, as we think they fairly may be, as the expression of

the opinion of the court on the degree of credit to whicti

these witnesses were entitled, the court exceeded its author-

ity in stating such opinion to the jury. By Gen. Sts. c.

172, Sec. 15, the duty of charging the jury in criminal cases

is specially enjoined upon the court. By Gen. Sts. c. 115,

Sec. 5, which is applicable alike to civil and criminal trials,

the rule is prescribed by which courts are to be guided in

the performance of this duty. It must be admitted that

this provision of the statute is not expressed in terms which

are free from ambiguity. But although there is a seeming

repugnancy in the two branches of the section, we think

that they are susceptible of a reasonable interpretation,

which will give full force and effect to both of them, and

at the same time carry out what seems to have been the

manifest purpose of the legislature. It is clear beyond

controversy, that the first clause contains a distinct and ab-

solute prohibition, that the "courts shall not charge juries

with respect to matters of fact." To reconcile this with

the clause that follows, which provides that the courts

"may state the testimony and the law," the prohibition

in facts which not only were not proved, but which could
not have been properly offered in evidence by the gove:rument. Nor is this the whole extent of the objection. The
facts thus introduced into the case were submitted to the
jury with a distinct expression of opinion by the court as
to the effect to be given to them, at a stage of the trial when
the defendant 1could not controvert them, and without any
opportunity being given to his counsel to address the jury
on the weight which was due to them.
Such a course of
proceeding is certainly unusual, and, as we think, does not
accord with the due and orderly conduct of a criminal trial.
But in another aspect it seems to us that the instructions were objectionable. The credibility of the witnesses
who had testified in support of the charge in the indiictment
was a fact which it was the exclusive province of the jury
to determine. As essentially affecting their bias, and the
credit to be given to their testimony, their occupation and
connection with the origin of the prosecution against the
defendant might be important elements, and, within proper
limits, proper subjects of comment by counsel, and of consideration by the jury. If the instructions are to be construed, as we think they fairly may be, a the expression of
the opinion of the court on the degree of credit to wh1cll
the e witnesses were entitled, the court exceeded its authority in stating such opinion to the jury. By Gen. Sts. c.
172, Sec. 15, the duty of charging the jury in criminal cases
is specially enjoined upon the court. By Gen. Sts. c. 115,
ec. 5, which is applicable alike to civil and criminal trials,
the rule is pr scrib d by which court are to be guided in
the performance of this duty. It must be admitted that
this provi ion of the tatut i not ex1 res din terms which
are fr e from ambiguity. But althou h there is a seeming
repugnan y in tb two branches of th
tion, we think
th t th y are su
tibJe of a r a ona 1 interpretation,
whi h will ive full for c and ffect to both of them, and
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must be regarded as a restraint only on tlie expression of

an opinion b}^ the court on the question whether a particu-

lar fact or series of facts involved in the issue of a case is

or is not established by the evidence. In other words, it

is to be construed so as to prevent courts from interfering

with the province of juries by anj^ statement of their own

judgment or conclusion upon matters of fact. This con-

struction effectually accomplishes the great object of

guarding against any bias or undue influence which might

be created in the minds of jurors if the weight of the opin-

ion of the court should be permitted to be thrown into the

scale in deciding upon issues of fact. But further than

this the legislature did not intend to go. The statute was

not designed to deprive the court of all the power to deal

with the facts proved. On the contrary, the last clause

of the section very clearly contemplates that the duty of the

court may not be fully discharged by a mere statement of

the law. By providing that the court may also state the
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testimony, the manifest purpose of the legislature was to

recognize and affirm the power and authority of the court,

to be exercised according to its discretion, to sum up the

evidence, to state its legal effect and bearing on the issues,

and to indicate its proper application under the rules of

law.

In the case at bar, the court exceeded the limit prescribed

by the statute. If the language used by the court was in-

tended to be applicable to the witnesses who had testified

in behalf of the prosecution, it was an expression of opinion

as to their credibility. As this was a matter of fact,

within the exclusive province of the jury to determine, such

expression of opinion went beyond a ''statement of the

testimony," and trenched on prohibited ground, being a

charge to the jury "with respect to matters of fact."

We have already said that the occupation of a witness, in

connection with other facts, may have a material bearing on

the credibility of his testimony in a particular case. But

we feel bound to add that we do not intend to express an

opinion on the question whether in the case at bar there

was any valid ground for calling in question the veracity or

candor of the witnesses whom the defendant's counsel

sought to impeach. No such point seems to have been

raised at the trial, nor are the facts bearing upon it stated
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must be regarded as a restraint only on the expression of
an opinion by the court on the question whether a particular fact or series of facts invol ed in the issue of a case is
or is not establi hed by the e\ idence. In other words, it
is to be constru d so as to prevent courts from interfering
with the pro ince of juries by any statement of their own
judgment or conclu ion upon matters of fact.
This construction effectually accomplishes the great object of
guarding again t any bias or undue influence which might
be created in the minds of jurors if the weight of the opinion of the court should be permitted to be thrown into the
cale in deciding upon issues of fact.
But further than
this the legislature did not intend to go. The statute was
not designed to depriYe the court of all the power to deal
with the facts proved.
On the contrary, the last clause
of the section very clearly -contemplates that the duty of the
court may not be fully discharged ·by a mere statement of
the law. By providing that the court may also state the
testimony, the manifest purpose of the legislature was to
recognize and affirm the power and authority of the court,
to be exercised according to its discretion, to sum up the
evidence, to state its legal effect and bearing on the issues,
and to indicate its proper application under the rules of
law.
In the case at bar, the court exceeded the limit prescribed
by the statute. If the language used by the court was intended to be applicable to the witnesses who had testified
in behalf of the prosecution, it was an expression of opinion
as to their credibility.
As this was a matter of fact,
within the exclu ive province of the jury to determine su h
expression of opinion went beyond a ''statement of the
testimon. , '' and trench d on prohibited ground, being a
charge to the jury ''with re pect to matters of fact.''
We have already aid that the occupation of .a witness in
conne tion with other facts may ha e a material bearing on
the redibilit of hi te timony in a particular case. But
we feel bound to add that w do not int nd to xpre an
opinion on the que tion whether in the case at bar th re
was any valid ground for callinO' in que tion the veracit or
candor of the witne
whom the defendant's cou~ el
N su h point eems to have b en
sou ht to impeach.
raised at the trial, nor are the facts bearing upon it stated

404
404 Tkial Pkactice [Chap. 11

in the exceptions. The inference from the course of the

trial, especially from the line of argument which the coun-

sel for the defendant was permitted to take, and from the

instructions to the jury, is, that the ground on which the

impeachment of the witnesses was placed was deemed to

have been proper matter for the consideration of the jury.

Exceptions sustained.^

1 Summing up evidence. The judge may sum up the evidence without in-

fringing the rule against commenting upon the weight jf the evidence, and

in so doing he may properly ' ' state, analyze, compare and explain the evi-

[Chap. 11
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in the exceptions. The inference from the course of the
trial, especially from the line of argument which the counsel for the defendant was permitted to take, and from the
instructions to the jury, is, that the ground on which the
impeachment of the witnesses was placed was deemed to
have been proper matter for the consideration of the jury.
Exceptions sustained. 1

dence. " Hamlin v. Treat, (1895) 87 Me. 311, 32 Atl. 909. Some state con-

stitutions couple with the prohibition against charging on the facts an ex-

press permission for the judge to state the evidence. Thus, the constitution

of Tennessee, Art. 6, Sec. 9, provides: "Judges shall not charge juries with

respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and declare the law. ' '

The California constitution has identically the same provision. Art. VI,

Sec, 19.

Section 2. Scope of Insteuctions.
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(a) Relation to Pleadings and Evidence.

JACKSONVILLE, TAMPA & KEY WEST RAILWAY

COMPANY V. NEFP.

1 Sitmming up evidence.
The judge may sum up the evidence without infringing the rule against commenting upon the weight .af the evidence, and
in so doing he may properly ''state, analyze, compare and explain the evidence. '' Hamlin v. Treat, (1895) 87 Me. 311, 32 Atl. 909.
Some state constitutions couple with the prohibition against charging on the facts an express permission for the judge to state the evidence.
Thus, the constitution
of Tennessee, Art. 6, Sec. 9, provides: "Judges shall not charge juries with
respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and declare the law.''
The California constitution has identically the same provision.
Art. VI,
Sec. 19.

Supreme Court of Florida. 1891.

28 Florida, 373.

Mabry, J. :

The appellee, Neff, in April, 1887, sued the appel-

lant railway company in the Circuit Court for Clay

County, Florida, for $5,000 damages for the destruction of

certain property of appellee by fire, caused by the alleged

SECTION

2.

ScoPE OF INSTRUCTIONS.

es-cape of sparks from a locomotive engine under the con-

trol of appellant * * *

(a)

Tlie third point calls in question the correctness of the

Relation to Pleadings and Evidence.

second charge given for plaintiff below. This charge is

ns follows: "That if the jury believe from the evidence

that without fault or neglect of the plaintiff, defendant's

employes negligently permitted a lot of loose dry hay to

JACKSONVILLE, TAMPA & KEY WEST RAILWAY
COMP ANY V. NEFF.

remain for some time prior to the 18th of March, A. D,

Supreme Court of Florida.

1891.

28 Florida, 37 3.

J.:
The appellee, Neff, in April, 1887, sued the appellant railway com} any in the Circuit Court for Clay
fiounty, F lo rida, for $5,000 damages for the destruction of
r·Prtain ropcrty of a p llee by fire, caused by th alleged
<:; ap
of ~ ark from a locomotive engine under the control of appellant * * *
MABRY,

* * * * • * • * * *

Tli

thi d point alls in question the corre tness of thP
rh rg given for plaintiff b low.
This charO'e is
;i. · fol1 w. : "That if th
jury believe from the evidence
th~1t with ut f ult r n gl t f the pl intiff, def ndant's
}Jlo. 8 n g-lig ntJy p rmitt
a Jot of loo· dry hay to
r ain for s me time prior to the 18th of March, A. D.

R<·<·onc1
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1887, exposed in a box car near plaintiff's property whicli

was set on fire on said day, and that tlie employes of said

defendant railroad comiDany negligently permitted said fire

to be communicated from said car so left exposed by said

employes to plaintiff's said property, and to burn and de-

stroy the same, the verdict should be for the plaintiff."

This charge was excepted to by defendant below. The ob-

jection urged by appellant to this charge is, that "it has no

relation whatever to the issues raised by the pleadings, and

the jury were thereby instructed that if a loss resulted to

the plaintiff by reason of a cause of action of which no

mention was made in the pleadings, they should find for

the plaintiff."* * *

The declaration contains but one count, and the gist of

the action as therein stated is, that the defendant company

so neglected and unskill fully managed its engine and the

fire and the burning matter therein contained, and said en-

gine was so insufficiently and improperly constructed, that
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sparks from said fire and portions of said burning matter

escaped and flew from said engine to and upon a building

in which plaintift's property was situated, whereby said

building and property were burned and totally destroyed.

Issue was joined upon all the pleas of defendant. The ob-

ject of pleading is to ascertain with certainty and precision,

the matters of fact which are affirmed on the one hand and

denied on the other, and which are mutually proposed and

accepted by the parties for decision. It is clear that plain-

tiff's cause of action is based upon the negligent construc-

tion or negligent use of defendant's locomotive engine,

whereby sparks and burning matter escaped from it and

caused the fire. The question submitted by the pleadings

is whether or not defendant caused the fire by reason of a

defective engine or the unskillful management of the en-

gine. The negligence of defendant submitted to the jury

for investigation by the charge under consideration con-

sists not in causing the fire, but in allowing loose dry hay

to remain in a box near plaintiff's property, and in negli-

gently permitting fire to be communicated from said car to

plaintiff's property. The origin of the fire is lost sight

of in this charge, and under it the jury were authorized

to find for the plaintiff although the defendant did not in

any way cause the fire, provided they believed that it neg-
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18 7, exposed in a box car near plaintiff' I ropert. which
was set on fire on aid day, an that the e plo .Te of aid
defendant railroad company negligently permitt cl . aid fire
to be communicated from said car o left xpo d by said
employ to plaintiff's aid property, and to burn and detroy the same, the v rdict should be for the I lain tiff.''
Thi charge was excepted to by defendant b low. The objection urged by appellant to this charge is, that ''it has no
relation whatever to the is ues raised by the pleadings, and
the jury were thereby instructed that if a lo s resulted to
the plaintiff by reason of a cause of action of which no
mention was made in the pleadings, they should find for
the plaintiff." * * *
The declaration contain but one count, and the gi t of
the action as therein stated is, that the defendant companY,
so neglected and un killfully managed its engine and the
fire and the burnin · matter therein contained, and said engine was so insufficiently and improperly constructed, that
sparks from said fire and portions of said burning matter
es-caped and flew fr om said engine to and upon a building
in which plaintift 's; property was situated, whereby said
building and property were burned and totally de troyed.
Issue was joined upon all the pleas of defendant. The object of pleading is to a certain with certainty and preci ion,
the matters of fact which are affirmed on the one hand and
denied on the other, and which are mutually propo ed and
accepted by the parties for deci ion. It is clear that plaintiff's cause of action is based upon the negligent con truction or negligent u e of defendant's lo,comotive engine,
whereby sparks and burning matter escaped from it and
cau d the fire . The que tion submitted by th 11 adings
i whether or not defendant caused the fire by rea on of a
d f ctive engin or the un killful management of the eno·ine. The n glig nee of d fendant submitted to the jury
for inve ti_ ·ation b. the charge under con ideration ondn hay
i t not in can. in°· the fire but in allowi g 1
to remain in a box n ar plaintiff' propert. and in neglicr ntl., p rmittin°· fire to be communicated from aid car to
1ilaintiff' I roperty.
The origin of the fire i lo t i ht
of in this harge and under it the jury were authoriz d
to find for the plaintiff althouo·h the d fendant did not in
any way ca?se the fire, provided they believed that it neg-
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ligently permitted loose dry hay to remain in the car near

plaintiff's property, and negligently permitted the fire to

be communicated from said car to plaintiff's property and

destroy it. If it be conceded that this charge embodies a

good cause of action against the defendant, it is evident

that it is not contained within the issues made by the plead-

ings. Appellee contends, however, that his right to re-

cover is co-extensive with the case made by the evidence

introduced on the trial, and the trial judge was authorized

to go outside of the issues joined between the parties and

instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff to the extent jus-

tified by the evidence. Respectable authorities hold that

the pleadings are merely to notify the opposite party of

the ground of action or defense, and where a party fails to

object to evidence because it is not relevant to the issues,

the court is justified in instructing the jury upon the whole

evidence, and is not confined in his instructions to the issues

made in the pleadings. The correct view, we think, is that
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the instructions must be confined to the issues made by the

pleadings; and this rule has been recognized in our state.

In the case of Porter v. Ferguson, 4 Fla., 102, an action of

assumpsit was instituted by Ferguson against Porter, based

upon' a verbal agreement by which the former undertook

to make and send to the latter, who was a merchant at Key

AVest, arrowroot to be shipped thence to New Orleans, and

Porter promised to receive the arrowroot and ship it to

New Orleans for sale in that market, and to account to

Ferguson for the proceeds. The declaration further

averred that in pursuance of such agreement and under-

standing, Ferguson shipped to Porter 1725 pounds of ar-

rowroot worth $140, which was received by him, but con-

trary to said agreement and understanding he shipped it ta

Charleston and it got lost at sea, by reason whereof the

defendant became liable to pay plaintiff the value of said

arrowroot. The plea was non assumpsit. The following

instruction was given for the plaintiff on the trial of that

cause, viz.: ''If the jury believe from the testimony that

it was the usage of trade for consignees for shijmient at

Key West to insure on goods of others sent to tliem for

sliipment, without instructions as to insurance, and that

J. Y. Porter sliippod the arrowroot in question without in-

suring it, and it was lost at sea, lie was liable for the loss,

ligently per mitted loos dry hay to remain in the car near
plaintiff's propert)r, and negligently permitted the fire to
be communicated from aid car to ! lain tiff's property and
destroy it. If it be conceded that this charge embodies a
good cause of action against the defendant, it is evident
that it is not contained within the i ues made by the pleadings.
Appellee contend , however, that his r ight to recover is co-extensive with the case made by the evidence
introduced on the trial, and the trial judge was authorized
to go outside of the issues joined between the parties and
instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff to the extent justified by the evidence. Respectable author ities hold that
the pleadings are merely to notify the opposite p arty of
the ground of action or defense, and where a party fails to
object to evidence because it is not relevant t o the issues,
the court is justified in instructing the jury upon the whole
evidence, and is not confined in his instructions to the issues
made in the pleadings. The correct view, we think, is that
the jn tructions must be confined to the issues made by the
pleading ; and this rule has been recognized in our state.
In t_he ca e of Porter v. Ferguson, 4 Fla., 102, an action of
as umpsit was instituted by Ferguson against P ort er , based
u on a verbal agreement by which the former undertook
to make and send to the latter, who was a merchant at K~y
We t, arrowroot to be shipped thence to New Orleans, and
Porter promi ed to receive the arrowroot and ship it to
New Orleans for ale in that market, and t o account to
Fergu on for the proceeds.
The declaration further
av rred that in pur uance of such agreement and understandin F rgu. on hipped to Port r 1725 pound of arr wroot w rth $140, whi h wa received by him, but con~
trary to aid agr m nt and under tanding he hi p d it to.
bar] st
and it O'Ot lo t at s a, by r a on whereof the
lia bl to pay plaintiff the value of aid
d f n
arr wroot. Th pl a wa non a umpsit. Th followincr
in tru tion wa i n for th plaintiff n the trial of that
n.
iz.: ''If the jnnr beli v fr m th t timony that
it w . th u. aO' f tra
f r
f r hi1 ment at
Y " .'t to ]n: nr
n ~nod .
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ort r . l1i T Nl t]1 arr wr tin qu . ti n with ut inuring it, an<l it wa. ] t at . , , 1i wa. Ji bl f r the loss,
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and they ought to find for plaintiff." In spealdng of this

charge this conrt says: "Now, what has this instruction

to do with the issue which the jury were sworn to try? The

instruction directs the attention of the jury to a breach of

the contract or agreement, when the breach is not put in

issue by any plea — a breach, too, which is not alleged in the

declaration. The breach alleged is for shipping to Char-

leston, when he was bound by his undertaking to ship to

New Orleans, whereby the goods were lost — the deviation

is the gist of the breach ; the negligence or omission to ef-

fect an insurance on the goods against the perils of the sea,

which, by the usage of trade, he should have done is not

charged. Whether the instruction is or is not correct in

point of law, is here not necessary to be decided — it was not

in issue, and therefore, irrelevant, and should not have been

given; and if it tended to mislead the jury, and withdraw

their minds from the consideration of the true issue it is
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erroneous. In the case of McKay v. Friehele, 8 Fla., 21,

the court in speaking of the relevancy of instructions to the

issues says: "In order to determine the correctness and

appropriateness of an instruction which may be given to

the jury, resort must always be had to the evidence upon

which the instruction is based. That evidence, whether

parol or documentary, is to be found only in the 'bill of

exceptions, ' whose peculiar office it is to give the incidents

occurring in the progress of the trial, from the joining of

the issue to the rendition of the verdict. It may be laid

down as a general rule, subject to but one exception, that

wherever the error complained of is predicated upon the

instructions of the court below, the whole evidence, or, at

least, so much thereof as forms the basis of the instruction,

must appear in the 'bill of exceptions' accompanying the

record of the cause. The exception alluded to is where

the instruction is manifestly without the limits of the issue

joined between the parties, and is likely to mislead the jury

in making up their verdict. In such case, no reference to

the evidence can be of any avail in determining the cor-

rectness of the instructions, and the court may pronounce

upon it even in the absence of the bill of exceptions, pro-

vided it be properly attested bv the signature of the judge

below." * * * '

The judge who presided at the trial of this case pre-
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and they ought to find for plaintiff.'' In speaking of this
charge this court a
''Now, what has this in truction
to do with the is ue whi h the jur were sworn to try1 The
instruction directs the attention of the jury to a breach of
the contract or agreem nt when the breach is not put in
issue by any plea-a breach, too, which is not alleged in the
declaration. The brea h alleged is for shipping to harleston, when he was bound bv his undertaking to ship to
New Orleans, whereby the goods were lost-the deviation
is the gist of the breach; the negligence or omission to effect an insurance on the goods again t the perils of the sea,
which, by the usage of trade he should have done is not
charged. Whether the instruction is or is not correct in
point of law i here not nece ary to be decided-it was not
in issue, and therefore irrelevant and should not ha-\ e been
given; and if it tend d to mislead the jury, and withdraw
their minds from the con ideration of the true i ue it is
erroneous. In the a e of McKay v. F riebele, 8 Fla., 21,
the court in speaking of the r levancy of instructions to the
issues says : ''In order to determine the correctne s and
appropriateness of an instru tion which may be given to
the jury, resort mus~ always be had to the evidence upon
which the instruction i ba ed.
That evidence, whether
parol or documentary i to be found only in the 'bill of
exceptions,' who e peculiar office it is to give the incidents
of the trial, from the joining of
oc urring in the pro T
the issue to the rendition of the verdict. It may be laid
down as a o·eneral rule, subject to but one exception, that
~herever the error complained of is predicated upon the
instruction of the court below, the whole evidence or, at
lea t so mu h thereof a forms the ba is of the in truction
must appear in the 'bill of exceptions' accompanying the
re ord of the cau e. The exception alluded to i where
the in truction i ma if tly without the limit of the i u
join db tween the arti
and is likely to mi 1 a the jur.
in making up their v rdict. In such a e no ref ren e to
the evidence can be of any avail in determinino· the corr ctne of th in tru tion and the court may pronounce
upon it even in th ab nee of the bill of exception provi
it e ro rly att t d by the i<Ynature of the judge
b l°' . " * * *
The judg who
d at the trial of thi a e pre·
T

:
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sented by instructions to the jury defendant's liability un-

der the issues raised by the pleadings, but the second in-

struction presented a view of the case not embraced in the

issues and was calculated to mislead the jury in their ver-

dict. We cannot say that the jury did not base their find-

ings against defendant under this instruction. The view

of this charge, that defendant is liable if its employes neg-

ligently permitted fire to escape from the car to plaintiff's

property, would call for further consideration, even if the

charge were not obnoxious to the rule above pointed out.

Our decision is based, however, upon the view that the in-

struction under consideration was without the limit of the

issues joined between the parties and was likely to mislead

the jury in making up their verdict, and was for this reason

erroneous.

For the error in giving the second charge in behalf of the

plaintiff below, the judgment is reversed, and a new trial

awarded.^
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1 To the same effect see Knnst v. City of Grafton (1910) 67 W. Va. 20,

67 S. E. 74; W. L. Moodey & Co. v. Eowland (1907) 100 Tex. 363, 99 S. W.

1112; Latourette v. Meldrum (1907) 49 Ore. 397, 90 Pac. 503; Goldman v.

New York, N. H. & H. E. K. Co. (1910) 83 Conn. 59, 75 Atl. 148.

HANSON V. KLINE.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 1907,

136 Iowa, 101.

Action at law to recover damages arising out of false rep-

resentations in connection with an exchange of properties.

The defendants, additional to Kline, are W. E. Gray and
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sented by instructions to the jury defendant's liability under the issues raised by the pleadings, but the second instruction presented a Yiew of the case not embraced in the
issues and was calculated to mislead the jury in their verdict. We cannot say that the jury did not base their findings against defendant under this instruction.
The view
of this charge, that defendant is liable if its employes negligently permitted fire to e cape from the car to plaintiff's
property, would call for further consideration, even if the
charge were not obnoxious to the rule above pointed out.
Our decision is based, however, upon the view that the instruction under consideration was without the limit of the
issues joined between the parties and was likely to mislead
the jury in making up their verdict, and was for this reason
erroneous.

* * * * * * * * *

~

For the error in giving the second charge in behalf of the
plaintiff below, the judgment is reversed, and a new trial
awarded. 1

J. E. Gray, and at the time in question all the parties lived

in Rockwell Oity, Calhoun county. The petition alleges

that in July, 1904. plaintiff was the owner of a stock of mer-

chandise in Rockwell City, valued by him at $2,000, which

ho was induced by the defendants Gray to trade to the de-

1 To the same effect see Kun t v. City of Grafton (1910) 67 W. Va. 20,
67 S. E. 74; W. L. Moodey & Co. v. Rowland (1907) 100 Tex. 363, 99 S. W.
1112; Latourette v. Meldrum (1907) 49 Ore. 397, 90 Pac. 503· Goldman v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co. (1910) 83 Conn. 59, 75 Atl. 148.

fendant Kline for a farm of one hundred and sixty acres

situated in Hayes county, Nebraska. The specific aver-

HANSON V. KLINE.
Supreme Coitrt of Iowa.

1907.

136 1 owa, 101.

Action at law to recover damages arisinO' out of false reprrs ntations in connection with an xchange of propertie .
rrh clrfcndanti;;, additional to Kline, are W. E. Gray and
.J. B. Gray, and at th tim in qu stion all the l arties. liv d
in R rkw01l Citv, fiall1oun ounty.
The
tition all ge
1
tl1nt jn .J u1~ ] 904. 1 laintiff' a. the own r of a sto k of mer<·]1, nrli : P in Roc·ly
11 f1ity, valn rd hy him at $2,000, whi h
11<' wn: incln<'rrl hy t1w lcfcnclanti;; Gray to trad to the d f :n<lv.nt l.(lin 1 • for a fnrm f n hunclr d an
ixty a r .
• 1 un l d in TT yes ronnty,
chra. ka.
The . pe ific aver-
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nent is that defendants entered into a conspiracy to bring

about such trade by false representations respecting the

Nebraska farm, and that, pursuant thereto, the farm was

falsely represented, and the trade thereby accomplished,

greatly to his damage. The defendants answered separ-

ately, and each denied the charge of fraud as contained in

the petition. On the trial plaintiff had a verdict as against

all the defendants jointly, on which judgment was entered,

and the defendants appeal. — Reversed and remanded.

Bishop, J. The theory of the petition was that the rep-

resentations claimed to have been made by defendants

were made as from personal knowledge — such is the dis-

tinct allegation. In a request presented, the defendant

asked that the jury be instruced that if the false representa-

tions were made as alleged, but that it was stated to plain-

tiff at the time that they were made on information derived

from others, and not on personal knowledge, then plaintiff

could not recover. The request was refused, and the jury
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was instructed strictly on the theory of the petition ; that is,

they were told that if defendants in representing the condi-

tion of the farm did so as of their own personal knowledge,

and so stated to plaintiff, and the representation was false,

and plaintiff relied on such representation to his damage,

the defendant would be liable. And, contra, if the rep-

resentations were not so made as alleged, then plaintiff

could not recover. The jury was not otherwise instructed

on the subject. We think here was error. Should it be

conceded that the instruction given correctly stated the law

applicable to the case, the defendants were entitled to a ver-

dict. This is so because there was no evidence on which

to base a finding to the contrary, but, as we have seen,

plaintiff himself declares that in making the representa-

tions alleged defendants expressly disavowed any and all

personal knowledge. Hence the proof did not meet the

issue. Accordingly, we must go ba^ck to the query: Did

the instruction correctly state the law applicable to the

case? If we are to judge alone from the issues made in

pleading, the answer must be in the afhrmative. If we are

to judge from the issues as developed on the trial, then the

call for a negative answer is imperative. We say issues

developed on the trial, because it is plain that plaintiff did

not go into the trial relying upon representations made as

INSTRU CTING THE JURY
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rr ent is that defendants entered into a conspiracy to bring
about su~h trade b fal e repre entations re pectinO' the
Nebraska farm and that, pur uant thereto th farm was
falsely repre ented, and the trade thereby accomplished,
greatly to his damage.
The defendants answered separ-·
~tely, and each denied the charge of fraud a
ontained in
the petiti0n. On the trial plaintiff had a verdict as against
all the d f endants jointly, on which judgment was entered,
and the defendants ap eal.-Rerersed and remanded.
BISHOP, J.
The theory of the petition was that the representations claimed to have b en made by defendants
were made as from per onal knowledge-such is the distinct allegation.
In a request presented the defendant
a ked that the jury be instruced that if the false repre entations were made as all ged, but that it wa stated to plaintiff at the time that they were made on information derived
from others, and not on personal knowledge, then plaintiff
could not recover. The request was refu ed, and the jury
wa in tructed trictl. on the theory of the petition; that is,
they were told that if defendants in representing the condition of the farm did so as of their own personal knowledge,
and so stated to plaintiff, and the repre entation was false,
and plaintiff relied on such representation to his damage,
the defendant would be liable.
And, contra, if the representations were not so made as alleged, then plaintiff
could not recover. The jury was not otherwise in tructed
on the subje t. We think here was error. Should it be
conceded that the instruction gi' en correctly stated the law
applicable to tl e a e, the defendan t were entitled to averdi t. This is so because there was no evidence on which
to ba e a nnding to the contrary, but, as we have seen,
plaintiff him elf declares that in makinO' the representation alleged d fendants e...~ ressly di avowed an and all
er onal knowl Jo· . H nee the proof did not meet the
i ·ue.
c ordin o·1,\T e mu t go ba,,..k to th qu ry: Did
the in trnction corr tly tat the law ap lica 1 to the
a e' If we ar to judge alone from the i u made in
pl ading th an wcr mu. t l e in the affirmative. If we are
to judO'e fr m the i . n a. 1 Y lo el on th trial then the
all f r a n O'afr'\T a . ·wer i. imper tiY . \V av i u
d velop d on th trial b au. it i I lain that plai~tiff di
not go intQ the trial relying upon representations made as

410
410 Trial Peactice [Chap. 11

of the personal knowledge of the defendants. At the very

outset, he testified that defendants denied having any per-

sonal knowledge. And it is evident that from beginning

to end the defendants did not consider that they were called

npon to face the strict issue as made by the pleadings.

Plaintiff did rely on representations professedly made on

information and belief, and defendants trained their forces

accordingly. This being true, there arises the further

question whether or not it was competent for the court, and

its duty, to disregard the strict issue as made in the plead-

ings, and instruct according as the parties had made the is-

sue on the trial. That it was competent for the court to

do so we have no doubt. Beach v. Wakefield, 107 Iowa,

567; Fenner v. Crips, 109 Iowa, 455. So, also, we think

it was its duty to do so, and, in view, of the case presented

by the record, that failure amounted to error. Under our

system, it is left for the parties to frame the issues, and,

if they proceed without objection — and such is the case
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here — to the trial of an issue not presented by the plead-

ings, it amounts to a consent to try such issue. The issue

is then rightfully in the case. Mitchell v. Joyce, 76 Iowa,

449; Bank v. Boesch, 90 Iowa, 47; Beach v. Wakefield,

supra; Erickson v. Fisher, 51 Minn. 300 (53 N. W. 638).

And, the issue being rightfully in the case, the court must

instruct upon it. Potter v. Railway, 46 Iowa, 399; Hill v.

Aultmann, 68 Iowa, 630. We must presume that the court

was fully advised of the shift in the issue. Attention to

the course of the trial as it proceeded was its duty. More-

over, there was before it the request for instruction pre-

sented by defendants, and, while not adequately stating the

law it was sufficient to arrest attention and call for a proper

instruction on the subject. Kinyon v. Railway, 118 Iowa,

349. We may add that as the issue made by the pleadings

respecting the subject-matter under discussion was, in ef-

fect, withdrawn by the parties, such issue should not in any

event have been presented to the jury. Lumber Co. v.

Raymond, 76 Iowa, 225; Erickson v. Barber, 83 Iowa, 367.

For the reasons pointed out in this opinion, the judgment

api)eal('d from must be, and it is, reversed, and the cause

is ordered remanded for a new trial.^

1 To the Rame cfFort see Mitchell v. Samford (1910) 149 Mo. App. 72, 130

S. W. 99; Johnson v. Caughren (1909) 55 Wash. 125, 104 Pac. 170; Central
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of the personal knowledge of the defendants. At the very
outset, he testified that defendants denied having any personal knowledge. And it is evident that from beginning
to end the defendants did not consider that they were called
upon to face the strict issue as made by the pleadings.
Plaintiff did rely on representations professedly made on
information and belief, and defendants trained their forces
This being true, there arises the further
accordingly.
question whether or not it was competent for the eourt, and
its duty, to disregard the strict issue as made in the pleadings, and instruct according as the parties had made the issue on the trial. That it was competent for the court to
do so we have no doubt. Beach v . Wakefield, 107 Iowa,
So, also, we think
567; Fenn er v . Grips, 109 Iowa, 455.
it was its duty to do so, and, in view, of the case presented
by the record, that failure amounted to error. Under our
system, it is left for the parties to frame the issues, and,
if they proceed without objection-and such is the case
here-to the trial of an issue not presented by the pleadings, it amounts to a consent to try such issue. The issue
i then rightfully in the case. Mitchell v. Joyce, 76 Iowa,
449; Bank v. Boesch, 90 Iowa, 47; Beach v . Wakefield,
supra; Erickson v . Fisher, 51 Minn. 300 (53 N. W. 638).
And, the issue being rightfully in the case, the court must
in truct upon it. P otter v . Railway, 46 Iowa, 399; Hill v.
A ultrnann, 68 Iowa, 630. We must presume that the court
was fully advi ed of the shift in the issue. Attention to
the course of the trial as it proceeded was its duty. Moreover, there wa before it the request for instruction prent d by defendant ' and, while not adequately stating the
law it was suffi ient to arrest attention and call for a proper
in, tru tion on the ubject. J(inyon v . Railway, 118 Iowa,
. 4.. We may add that as the issue made by the pleadincrs
r . p ding th ubj ct-matter under di cu ion was, ii:,. eff t, with rawn by the parties, u h i ue hould not in any
' nt hav be n pr nted to t e jury.
Lumber Co. v.
Rr11rmond, 7 owa, 225; Erick on v . Barber, 83 Iowa, 367.
I< r th r a ons p int d out in this opinion, the judgment
J>lH> l • fr m mu. t
, and it is, revers ed, and the cause
i.
r r d r manded for a new trial. 1
1 To th
same fTert A e Mitrh ll v. nmford (1910) 149 Mo. App. 72, 130
. W. 99; J obnson v. augbren (1909) 55 Wash. 125, 104 Pac. 170; Central
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R. R. & Banking Co. v. Attaway (1892) 90 Ga. 656, 16 S. E. 956; Brusie v.

Peck Bros. & Co. (1892) 135 N. Y. 622, 32 N. E. 76; Flanders v. Cottrell

(1875) 36 Wis. 564.

In Schwaninger v. McNeeley & Co. (1906) 44 Wash. 447, 87 Pac. 514, the

court said: "When evidence is received without objection upon any particu-

lar ground not covered by the complaint, the court may assume that the

complaint is as broad as the evidence when charging the jury, and the com-

plaint will be deemed amended to conform with the evidence and charge,

since the amendment could have been made as of course at the trial. ' '

But in Budd v. Hoffheimer (1873) 52 Mo. 297, it was held that if a party

wishes an instruction upon a matter duly proved but not alleged in his

pleading, he must first ask leave to amend his pleading to conform with
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R. R. & Banking Co. v. Attaway (1 92) 90 Ga. 656, 16 S. E. 956 · Brusie v.
Peck Bro . & o. (1 92) 135 N. Y. 622, 32 N. E. 76; Flanders v. Cottrell
(1875) 36 Wi . . 564.
In Schwaninger v. McKeeley & Co. (1906) 44 Wash. 447, 87 Pac. 514, the
court said: '' Wben evidence is received without objection upon any particular ground not covered by the complaint, the court may as urne that the
co~plain~ is as broad as the evidence when charging the jury, and the comp_larnt will be deemed amended to conform with the evidence and charge,
srnce the amendment could have been made as of course at the trial.''
But in Budd v. Hoffheimer (1873) 52 Mo. 297, it was held that if a party
wishes an instruction upon a matter duly proved but not alleged in his
pleading, he must first ask leave to amend his pleading to conform with
the proof, and unless he does so such an instruction is properly refu ed.

the proof, and unless he does so such an instruction is properly refused.

OWENSBORO WAGON COMPANY V. BOLING.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1908,

32 Kentucky Law Reporter, 816.

NUNN, J. * * *

The petition was sufficient and stated a cause
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of action. It was alleged that appellee lost his hand by

OWENSBORO WAGON COMP ANY V. BOLING.

the negligence of appellant's servants superior in author-

ity to him, and particularlized the acts and omissions which

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

constituted the negligence — i. e., that he was raised on a

1908.

farm, was only 18 years old and had never worked with

machinery before he was employed by appellant, of which

32 Kentucky Law Reporter, 816.

fa'Ct he informed appellant's superintendent at the time he

employed him ; that the rip saw, at which he was placed to

perform labor, was defectively constructed in the fasten-

ings and bolts that held it ; that it was left unguarded, mth

nothing to keep his hand from coming in contact with it;

and that defendant failed to furnish him a reasonably safe

place in which to perform his labor. Appellant filed an

answer, controverting all the affirmative matter contained

in the petition, and pleaded contributory negligence on the

part of appellee. The testimony showed that appellee was,

at the time of his emplojTnent by appellant, only 18 years of

age, and had had no experience in working with machinery,

and that he informed appellant's superintendent of this

fact ; that he was put to off-bearing lumber from a rip saw,

and after he had worked 8 days, but not consecutively, he

was directed by the foreman, who had authority to do so,

NuNN,J. * • •
The petition was sufficient and stated a cause
of action. It was alleged that appellee lost his hand by
the negli()'ence of appellant's servants superior in authority to him, and particularlized the acts and omi sions which
con ti tuted the negligence-i. e., that he was raised on a
farm, was only 18 years old and had neve:i· worked with
machinery before he was employed by appellant, of which
faiet he informed app llant's superintend nt at the time he
employed h·m; that the rip saw, at which he was placed to
perform labor, was defe tively con tructed in the fastenings and bolts that held it; that it was left unguarded, with
nothing to keep his hand from coming in contact with it;
and that d f endant faj] ed to furni "h him a r ea onabl. safe
place in which to perform hi labor.
Appellant filed an
an w r, contro erting all the affirmative matter ontained
in the petition, and plead d co tributory negligence on the
part of app ll e. Th te. timony ho-wed that a1 pell wa
at th time of hi employm nt b. a ellant onl 1 ) ars of
a 5 , and had bad no xp ri n i
rking with ma hin ry,
nperintend nt of this
an that he inform d a1 p llant'
fa t · that he wa ut t ff-b rino· lumb r from a rip saw~
and aft r he ha w rke l
ay. but not on uti ly he
U
ir t d b th for file. n,
ho had authority to do so,
7

T
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to remove the belt, by the use of a lever, from the pulley

which operated the saw to a loose pulley called the "idler,"

to raise the table, under and through which the saw re-

volved, and then to remove two taps, or screws, which were

situated about 4 and 6 inches from the saw, for the purpose

of oiling the machine. In attempting to comply with the

directions of the foreman and at the moment he undertook

to remove the oil caps, for some reason not explained, the

saw cut off his hand.

**********

There was no testimony introduced tending to show that

this rip saw or its attachments were defective or out of re-

pair. The only thing that tended in the least to show this

was a statement by appellee that the tap, or screw, failed to

move, and if it did it is more than probable it was because

of his inexperience, especially when all the evidence shows

that it was in proper repair and condition. There was no

testimony introduced by appellee showing that the saw
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was improperly guarded. Appellant's testimony showed

that it could not have been guarded or made safer than it

was. There was no proof that the place at which appellee

worked could have been made safe and still have operated

the saws. The building in which the saws were located was

a large one, and contained many saws of different kinds,

and a number of people were working therein. There was

no testimony introduced showing or tending to show any

negligence or dereliction of duty upon the part of appellant,

other than failing to warn and instruct appellee with refer-

ence to the dangers incident to his duties and how to avoid

same. Yet the court gave eight instructions in which he sub-

mitted to the jury all, or about all, the different acts of

negligence alleged in the petition. This was calculated to

r-onfuse and mislead the jury. As stated, there was but one

issue made by the testimony, and the court should have sub-

mitted to the jury that issue only.

*****

**#

The case is reversed, and remanded for further

proceedings consistent herewith.

TRIAL

f

RACTICE

[Chap. 11

to remove the belt, by the use of a lever, from the pulley
which operated the saw to a loose pulley called the "idler,"
to raise the table, under and through which the saw re\Tol ed, and then to remove two taps, or screws, which were
ituated about 4 and 6 inches from the saw, for the purpose
of oiling the machine. In attempting t o comply with the
Erections of the foreman and at the moment he undertook
to remove the oil caps, for some reason not explained, the
aw cut off his hand.

* * * • * • • • * *

There wa s no testimony introduced t ending to show that
this rip saw or its attachments were defective or out of repair. T he onl y thing that tended in the least to show this
was a statement by appellee that the tap, or screw, failed to
move, and if it did it is more than probable it was because
of his inexperience, especially when all the evidence shows
that it was in proper repair and condition. There was no
te t imony introduced by appellee showing that the saw
was improperly guarded. Appellant's t estimony showed
that it could not have been guarded or made saf er than it
wa . There was no proof that the place at which appellee
work d could have been made safe and still have operated
the aws. The building in which the aw were located was
a large one, and contained many saws of different kinds,
and a number of peopl were workincr therein. There was
no testimony introduced showing or tending t o show any
neglicrence or dereliction of duty upon the part of appellant,
oth r than failing to warn and in truct appellee with refern e to the danger. incident to his duties and how to avoid
. am . Y t the ourt gave igb - in truction in which he subrni tt d to the jury all or ahout all, the different act s of
n0gligenr alleg d in th petition. Thi wa calculated to
··onfn. e ancl misl ad the jury. As tated, th re was but one
i: ·nr ma 1 by the t stimony and the court. hould have subrniti cl to th jury that i sue only. * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * *
* The ca. e js r versed, and remanded f or further
proceeding. consistent herewith.
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DOUDA V. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC

RAILWAY COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 1909.

141 Iowa, 82.

DOUDA V. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC
RAILWAY COMPANY.

Ladd, J. — Plaintiff's employment at the time of his injury

was that of eieaning out clinkers from the fire boxes of de-

Supreme Court of Io wa. 1909.

fendant's engines in its roundhouse at Cedar Rapids. The

usual method of performing this work was to drop the

"dump" by means of a bar from outside the wheels of the

141 I OWO:, 82.

engine while it was standing over the ash pit, and to re-

place the dumping mechanism in the same way. But in this

particular instance the plaintiff thought it necessary to

crawl under the engine into the ash pit in order to close the

dump. He advised the "hostler" in charge of the engine,

who was in the engineer's cab, of his intention to go under,

having had the engine moved to what he considered a proper

place for that purpose, and then proceeded to crawl, feet

first, through the narrow opening between the drive wheels
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and above the side bar or connecting rod. When his body

was part way through, the engine moved backwards, and

the consequent rising of the side bar pinched or crushed the

plaintiff causing the injuries of which he complains. There

was a question under the evidence as to whether plaintiff

was not guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to

go under the engine at all or in attempting to go under it

in the manner above described, but there is no complaint as

to the instructions with reference to contributory negli-

gence, and that feature of the case may be passed without

further notice.

The defendant is alleged to have been negligent in two

respects: (1) in that its hostler in charge of the engine,

with knowledge that plaintiff was under it, without warn-

ing him started, moved, or permitted the engine to move;

and (2) the engine was unsafe and defective, in that it

would start forward without the lever being moved or

steam being turned on or any action of the person in

charge, and defendant, knowing this and plaintiff's posi-

tion, took no precaution to prevent this, but allowed the

engine to move, and thereby injure him. The evidence

LADD, J.-PJaintiff 's employment at the time of his injur}
was that of cleaning out clinkers from the fire boxe of defendant's engine in its roundhouse at Cedar Rapid . The
usual method of performing this work was to drop the
''dump'' by means of a bar from outside the wheels of the
engine while it wa standing over the ash pit, and to replace the dumping mechani min the same way. But in this
particular in tance the plaintiff thought it nece sary to
crawl under the engine into the ash pit in order to close the
dump. He advised the ''hostler'' in charge of the engine,
who was in the engineer's cab, of his intention to go under,
having had the engine moved to what he considered a proper
place for that purpo e, and then proceeded to crawl, feet
fir t, through the narrow opBning between the dri' e wheel
and above the side bar or connecting rod. When hi body
wa part wa. through, the engine moved backward , and
the consequent rising of the ide bar pinched or crushed the
plaintiff cau ing the injuries of which he complains. There
was a question under the evidence as to whether plaintiff
was not guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to
O'O under the engine at all or in attempting to go under it
in the manner above de cribed but there i no complaint a
to the in tru ction with reference to contributory negligence and that feature of the case may be pa ed without
further notice.
The d fendant i all ()' d to have been neg1i nt in two
re pect : (1) in that it ho. tler in charµ: of the en ine.
with knowled e that I lain tiff wa . under it, without warning him tarted. mov cl, or p rmitted th engi to move;
and (2) the en~in wa Jn af and def tive in that it
would . tart forwa d witl out b lev·er b in moved or
team b in;r turn d on or an. action of the per on in
har ·e and d f n ant, knowing thi and plaintiff . po. ition took no prera11ti n to pre' nt this, bnt all w
th
engine to move. and thereby injure him. The evidence
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failed to point out any defect in tlie engine, or that it had

ever started before without steam being turned on, or that

defendant had any reason to anticipate such an occur-

rence. Nevertheless the jury was instructed that if they

found ''that said locomotive was unsafe and defective, in

that it would start after being stopped without moving the

lever therefor or turning on the steam for the purpose of

starting it, and that it would with the knowledge of de-

fendant or its emi3loyes in charge thereof start without any

action on the part of those in charge thereof, and the de-

fendant took no precaution or safeguards to prevent its

said movements, and that said locomotive was by reason

thereof and the careless and negligent acts of the person

in charge thereof, without notice or warning or signal to

the plaintiff, started and permitted to run upon the body of

plaintiff while under said engine and doing said work, and

tlmt by reason thereof plaintiff was injured," then, if such

injuries were without fault of plaintiff contributing there-
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to, plaintiff was entitled to recover. Even though this in-

struction be conceded to be correct in the abstract, the evi-

dence was not such as to authorize it. There was nothing

in the record to charge the employees operating the engine

with knowledge of any defect therein or to indicate any

information concerning it on defendant's part. Even if

the engine be conceded to have been defective, this was not

shown to have been apparent or discoverable on reasonable

inspection, nor does it appear from the evidence that the

defect had existed prior to that night, or that defendant

was negligent in failing to discover and repair it or in using

it in the condition it was in. So that, even though it might

be inferred from the moving of this locomotive engine with-

out the application of steam or other agency, if it did so

move, that it was then out of repair, there is no basis in

the evidence on which to found a charge of negligence

against the defendant, unless the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-

tur be applied, and this under the peculiar facts of this

case was precluded by a previous instruction, "that the

accident occurred will not of itself show negligence on

the part of defendant, but you should determine the ques-

tion (defendant's negligence) from all the facts and cir-

cumstances before you." Nor does the instruction first

quoted proceed on the theory that such doctrine is applic-

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 11

fajled to point out any defect in the engine, or that it had
ever started before without steam being turned on, or that
defendant had any reason to anticipate such an occurrence. Nevertheless the jury was instructed that if they
found "that said locomotive was unsafe and defective, in
that it would start after being stopped without moving the
lever therefor or turning on the steam for the purpose of
starting it, and that it would with the knowledge of defendant or its employes in charge thereof start without any
action on the part of those in charge thereof, and the d·efendant took no precaution or safeguards to prevent its
said movements, and that said locomotive was by reason
thereof and the careless and negligent acts of the person
in charge thereof, without notice or warning or signal to
the plaintiff, started and permitted to run upon the body of
plaintiff while under said engine and doing said work, and
that by reason thereof plaintiff was injured,'' then, if such
injuries were without fault of plaintiff contributing thereto, plaintiff was entitled to recover. Even though this instruction be conceded to be correct in the abstract, the evidence was not such as to authorize it. There was nothing
in the record to charge the employees operating the engine
with knowledge of any defect therein or to indicate any
information concerning it on defendant 's part. Even if
the engine be conceded to have been defective, this was not
shown to have been apparent or discoverable on reasonable
in pection, nor does it appear from the evidence that the
defect had existed prior to that night, or that defendant
was negljg nt in failing to discover and repair it or in using
it in the condition it was in. · So that, even thouo-h it might
be inferred from th moving of this locomotive engine without the application of team or other agency, if it did so
move, that it wa then out of r pair, there is no basis in
th
vid n e on which to found a char e of n glio-ence
f ndant unl ss the doctrine of res ip a loquigain. t th
tur
a]1pli d, and thi.s under the p culiar fa t of this
wa pr lu d by a pr viou in truction, ''that the
nt or urr d will n t of its 1f show neo-lig nee on
art f d f ndant, but you hould d t rmin the que ( f <lant' n o-]io- n ) fr m all th fa t and circn . tan , h f 1 you.'' N r do
th in tru ti on first
qu ted proce d on the theory that such doctrine is applic-
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able, but exacts specific findings from tlie evidence constitut-

ing the elements of negligence alleged. *****

For the reasons pointed out, the judgment of the trial

court is reversed.

BUYKEN V. LEWIS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Washington. 1909.

INSTRUCTING

THE

JURY

415

able, but exacts specific finding from the evidence constituting the elements of negligence alleged. * * • • •

* * * * * * * * * *
For the reasons pointed out, the judgment of the trial
court is reversed.

51 Washington, 627.

RuDKiN, C. J. — This was an action in trespass to re-

cover damages for sluicing down and removing earth from

a certain lot in the city of Seattle owned by the plaintiffs.

The defendant admitted the commission of the acts com-

plained of, though not in manner and form as alleged, and

pleaded by way of justification that the sluicing was done

pursuant to a verbal contract between the plaintiffs and the

BUYKEN V. LEWIS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.

defendant which was afterward reduced to writing and

signed by the defendant, though not by the plaintiffs. The

Supreme Court of Washington.

1909.

reply denied the plea of justification as set forth in the an-

swer. The cause was submitted to a jury under instruc-
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tions from the court, and a verdict in favor of the plain-

51 Washington, 627.

tiffs in the sum of $1,500 was returned. From a judgment

on this verdict, the defendant has appealed.

The principal assignment of error arises out of the

following charge of the court, which was duly excepted to :

*'If you find from the evidence that there was no such

contract as alleged by the defendant in its affirmative de-

fense, which is exhibit No. 2 in the case, but do find from

the evidence that the acts performed by the defendant upon

the said premises of the plaintiffs were performed with

the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, then I instruct

you that the plaintiffs cannot recover for such acts even

though in your opinion the plaintiffs have been damaged

thereby, unless you find froyn the evidence that defendant

negligently or carelessly performed the acts and hy reason

of such negligence and careless performance the plaintiffs

had been damaged."

RunKIN, C. J.-This was an action in trespass to recover damages for sluicing down and removing earth from
a certain lot in the city of Seattle bwned by the plaintiffs.
The defendant admitted the commission of the acts complained of, though not in manner and form as alleged, and
pleaded by way of justification that the sluicing was done
pursuant to a verbal contract between the plaintiff and the
def ndant which was afterward reduced to writing and
signed by the defendant, though not by the plaintiffs. The
reply denied the plea of justification as et forth in the answer. The cause was submitted to a jury under instructions from the court and a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. in the sum of $1,500 was returned. From a judgment
on this verdict, the defendant has app aled.
The principal a ignment of error arises out of the
following char()'e of the court which was duly excepted to:
''If you find from the evidence that there was no such
contract a alleged by the defendant in its affirmative d fen e whi h is exhibit No. 2 in the case, but do find from
the evid nee that th acts performed by the de~endant upon
the said premi es of the plaintiffs were performe-1 with
the knowl dge and con ent of the plaintiffs, then I instruct
you that t e plaintiff cannot recover for such acts even
thou ·h in . our opini
th
lain tiff have been dama ~ed
th reb. unl s yoit find from the evidence that def enrlant
negligently or carele ly performed the acts and !1y reason
of such negligence and careless performa;nce the plaintiff:;
had been d_amaged."

416
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The latter part of this instruction is clearly without the

issues presented by the pleadings. The action was prose-

cuted by the respondents solely on the theory that the acts

complained of were committed without their knowledge or

consent and against their will, and all their testimony was

directed toward establishing the allegations of the com-

plaint and proving the amount of the resultant damages.

The testimony on the part of the appellant, on the other

hand, was in support of its affirmative defense, and in re-

duction of the claim for damages. The question of negli-

gence in the prosecution of the work was not an issue in

the case under the pleadings, nor was it made an issue

at any stage of the trial. There was no claim that any

particular act committed by the appellant was negligently

or carelessly committed, nor was there any attempt to

segregate damages resulting from negligence from dam-

ages resulting from other and independent causes. The

instruction was therefore erroneous, and calls for a re-
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versal of the judgment unless we are able to say that the

error was not prejudicial, and this we cannot do. There

was a direct conflict in the testimony, and the right of re-

covery was questionable at least. The jury may have found

that the acts committed by the appellant were so com-

mitted with the knowledge and consent of the respondents,

but that damages resulted from the performance of the

work in a manner the jury deemed negligent. Under such

circumstances, it is incumbent on this court to order a

new trial. Bernliard v. Reeves, 6 Wash. 424, 33 Pac. 873;

Comegys v. American Lumber Co., 8 Wash. 661, 36 Pac.

]087;"irir&?/ v. Rainier-Grand Hotel Co., 28 Wash. 705, 69

Pac. 378. In Comegys v. American Lumber Co., supra,

the court said:

''This instruction, although a correct statement of the

law in a proper case, was not pertinent to the issues to be

determined by the jury. The plaintiff in his complaint had

htatod the facts constituting his cause of action in ac-

cordance with the requirements of the code, and the cause

of action stated was based upon an express contract, and

could not be proved by showing that the defendant was

guilty of a tort. The question as to whether the defendant

had converted the property of the plaintiff to its own use,

and was, therefore, liable for its value, was not in issue,

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 11

The latter part of this instruction is clearly without the
issues presented by the pleadings. The action was prosecuted by the respondents solely on the theory that the acts
complained of were committed without their knowledge or
consent and against their will, and all their testimony was
directed toward establishing the allegations of the complaint and proving the amount of the resultant damages.
The testimony on the part of the appellant, on the other
hand, was in support of its affirmative defense, and in reduction of the claim for damages. The question of negligence in the prosecution of the work was not an issue in
the case under the pleadings, nor was it made an issue
at any stage of the trial. There was no claim that any
particular act committed by the appellant was negligently
or carelessly committed, nor was there any attempt to
segregate damages resulting from negligence from damages resulting from other and independent causes. The
instruction was therefore erroneous, and calls for a rever al of the judgment unless we are able to say that the
error was not prejudicial, and this we cannot do. There
was a direct conflict in the testimony, and the right of recovery was questionable at least. The jury may have found
that the acts committed by the appellant were so committed with the knowledge and consent of the respondents,
but that damages resulted from the performance of the
work in a manner the jury deemed n egliO'ent. Under such
cir umstances, it is incumbent on this court to order a
n w trial. Bernhard v . Reeves, 6 Wash. 424, 33 Pa.c. 873;
Com gys v. American Lumber Co., 8 Wa h. 661, 36 Pac.
1087; Kirby v. Rainier-Grand Hotel Co., 28 Wash. 705, 69
Pac. 378. In Comegys v. American Lumber Co., supra,
the ourt said:
"Thi in struction, althouo-h a correct statement of the
law in a proper case, was not p rtinent to th is ue to be
t rmin d by the jury. The plaintiff in his complaint had
i:,
t cl th fa ts constituti g his cau
of a tion in acrd nr with the r quir m nts of th cod , an the cause
f di n stat
was a. d upon an x re s ontract, and
11ld not 1 e
rov d hy , bowing that th d f ndant was
gnil . f a tort. Th qu . ti n as to wh th r th def ndant
l 1n<l e nv rt t pr p rt of th plaintiff to it own use,
£ r. its value, was not in i ue,
w ·, therefore, lia

E-C.
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and should not have been submitted to the jury. It is not

in accordance with either the letter or spirit of the code

to permit a plaintiff to allege one state of facts in his

complaint and to recover by proof of an entirely different

state of facts at the trial."

The appellant further contends that the court erred in

ruling on the competency of one of the witnesses, and in

refusing to grant a new trial for insufficiency of the evi-

dence to justify the verdict. The former of these assign-

ments is without merit and the latter is obviated by the

reversal of the judgment on other grounds.

For error in the instructions of the court, the judgment

is reversed and a new trial ordered.

Chadwick^ Fullerton, Mount, and Crow, J. J., concur.

KAERER V. CITY OF DETROIT.

Supreme Court of Michigan. 1905.

142 Michigan, 331.

[The plaintiff was injured by running his automobile
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into an excavation in the street at the intersection of Mack

~]
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and hould not have been submitted to the jury. It is not
in ac ordance with either the letter or spirit of the code
to permit a plaintiff to allege one state of facts in his
complaint and to recover by proof of an entirely different
~tate of facts at the trial."
The appellant further contends that the court erred in
ruling on the competency of one of the witnesse , and in
r fusing to grant a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. The former of these as i~n
rnents is without merit and the latter is obviated by the
reversal of the judgment on other ground .
For error in the instructions of the court, the judgment
i · reversed and a new trial ordered.
CHADWICK, FULLERTON, MouNT, and CRow, J. J., concur.

avenue and Grand Boulevard, while he was driving north

up the boulevard at night. He saw a red light, but think-

ing it was in the west curb of the boulevard he tried to pass

to the east of it, putting on power for the purpose and

proceeding at the rate of 8 or 10 miles an hour. In fact

the light was at the west end of a trench which extended

KARRER V. CITY OF DETROIT.

from the east almost across the boulevard. When the

plaintiff discovered the trench he was going too fast to

Supreme Court of Michigan.

stop his car, which went into the excavation.]^

1905.

Hooker, j, ***********

142 Michigan, 331.

The court also said to the jury:

"The plaintiff in this case desires me to say that the

boulevard is used especially for fast riding and for the use

of automobiles, and I think, gentlemen of the jury, you

may take that in consideration, if your own experience

satisfies you of that. I don't remember what the ordi-

1 Statement of facts by the editor.

T. P.— 27

[The plaintiff was injured by running hi automobile
into an excavation in the street at the intersection of :Mack
avenue and Grand Boulevard, while he was driving north
up the boulevard at night. He saw a red light, but thinking it was in the west curb of the boulevard he tried to pa
to the east of it, putting on · power for the purpo e and
proceeding at the rate of 8 or 10 miles an hour. In fact
the light was at the west end of a trench which extended
from the east almost across the boulevard. When the
plaintiff discovered the trench he was goinO' too fast to
top his car, which went into the excavation.]1
HooKER, J.
• • * • * * • * • • •

• • * • • * * • • •

The court also said to the jury:
"Th plaintiff in thi a e d ir me to say that the
bou1 var i u ed esp ia 11. for fa t ridinO' and for the u e
of automobile and I think
ntl men of the jury you
ma take that in con id ration if your own experience
ati fi
you of that. I don't remember what the ordi1

tatement of facts by the editor.
T. P.-27
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nance is relative to that particular part of the street, but

doubtless some of you do, and you may have your own ex-

perience with reference to the using of the boulevard for

that purpose; but I think the whole question, gentlemen,

as to the degree of care, becomes a question for you rather

than for the court."

This was in effect allowing the personal knowledge of the

jurors to have the weight of evidence in the case. It con-

templated not only their determination as to the use of

the boulevard from their personal observation, but also

the character of the ordinances relating thereto. This was

erroneous.

The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered.

MooEE, C. J., and Carpentek and Montgomery, J. J.,

concurred with Hooker, J.

(b) Emphasis and Disregard of Portions of Evidence.

[Chap. 11

TRIAL PRACTICE

nance is relative to that particular part of the street, but
doubtless some of you do, and you may have your own experience with reference to the using of the boulevard for
that purpose; but I think the whole question, gentlemen,
as to the degree of care, becomes a question for you rather
than for the court.''
This was in effect allowing the personal knowledge of the
jurors to have the weight of evidence in the case. It contemplated not only their determination as to the use of
the boulevard from their personal observation, but also
the character of the ordinances relating thereto. This was
erroneous.

TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS V. YOCH.

Appellate Court of Illinois. 1908.
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133 Illinois Appellate, 32.

Mr. Presiding Justice Creighton delivered the opinion

of the court.

This was an action in case, in the Circuit Court of St.

The judgment is reversed and a new trial ordered.
MooRE, C. J., and CARPENTER and MONTGOMERY, J. J.,
concurred with HooKER, J.

Clair county, by appellants against appellees, to recover

damages alleged to have resulted to appellants' school

house and premises by reason of the failure of appellees

to leave proper and sufficient support for the "superin-

cumbent soil" upon which tlie school house stood. Trial

by jury. Verdict in favor of appellees. Judgment in favor

of appellees in bar of action and for costs, and ordering

execution to issue therefor.

(b)

Emphasis and Disregard of Portions of Evidence.

The court gave to the jury the following erroneous in-

structions on behalf of appellee:

''The court instructs the jury that if you believe, from

TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS V. YOCH .
.Appellate Court of Illinois.

1908.

133 Illinois .Appellate, 32.

MR. PRESIDING JusTICE CREIGHTON delivered the op1n10n
of the court.
This was an action in ca e, in the Circuit Court of St.
Clair county, by appellants again t appellee , to r cover
damages alleged to have r ulted to appellant ' chool
by r a on of the failure of a ell
hou e and pr mi
to 1 av
ro1 r and uffi i nt upport for the '' up rincum nt i.l'' upon whi h th
hool hou e stood. Trial
l y jury. V r ict in favor of a
Ile s. J udgm nt in favor
f ap 11
in bar of a tion and for costs, and ordering
x ution to i ue ther for.

* * * * * • • * • *

Th court gave to the jury the following erroneous int ru r i n . n ha1f f a
11 e :
'·The court in tructs the jury that if you believe, from

Sec. 2]
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the evidence, that the pillars in said mine and the roof in

said mine are intact and in good condition under the plain-

tiffs' premises and for a distance of three hundred feet

beyond and adjacent to plaintiffs' premises, then yot! have

a right to take this fact into consideration in determining

the question whether the defendants have caused any sub-

sidence of the surface of plaintiffs' land, as alleged in

plaintiffs' declaration, or one count thereof, if you believe

from the evidence there has been any subsidence in such

surface.

********** )f

The instruction first above quoted contains all the vices

of that class of instructions so often condemned by the

INSTRUCTING THE JURY

419

the evidence, that the pillars in said mine and the roof in
said mine are intact and in good condition under the plaintiffs' premises and for a distance of three hundred feet
beyond and adjacent to plaintiffs' premi e then yon ha Ye
a right to take this fact into con ideration in determining
the question whether the defendants have caused any subsidence of the surface of plaintiffs' land, as alleged in
plaintiffs' declaration, or one count thereof, if you believe
from the evidence there has been any subsidence in such
surface.

courts of this State. It singles out particular facts from

the other facts in evidence and specially directs the atten-

tion of the jury to them. This instruction bore upon a

close and controverted issue of fact in the case and it was

equally as important in an honest effort to arrive at a just
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verdict that the jury should take each and every other

pertinent fact in evidence ''into consideration in determin-

ing the question whether the defendants have caused any

subsidence of the surface of plaintiffs' land," as it was

to take the facts particularly singled out in this instruc-

tion. All the evidence admitted bearing upon that issue,

was admitted for the consideration of the jury, and it was

error to make any detached portion of it or to make any

fact which any detached portion of it might tend to prove,

more prominent than any other part of the evidence, or

other pertinent fact. This instruction gave undue prom-

inence to the facts specified, and magnified their import-

ance, and tended to divert the minds of the jury from the

main issue.

Counsel suggest in support of this instruction that:

''While it is a well-settled and long-established rule that

an instruction should not single out and call attention of

the jury to one alleged fact more than another, yet this

rule is subject to another one, that each party is entitled to

an instruction h}T)othetically outlining the evidence and

state of the case upon which he relies for obtaining a ver-

dict, and directing the jury to find for the party in whose

favor they find the facts constituting the cause of action

or the defense," and cite; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Math,

The instruction first above quoted contains all the vices
of that class of instructions so often condemned by the
courts of this State. It singles out particular fact from
the other facts in evidence and pecially directs the attention of the jury to them. Thi in truction bore upon a
close and controverted issue of fact in the case and it was
equally as important in an hone t effort to arrive at a just
verdict that the jury should take each and every other
pertinent fact in evidence "into con ideration in determining the question whether the defendants have caused any
subsidence of the surface of plaintiffs' land,'' as it was
to take the fact particularly singled out in this in truction. All the evidence admitted bearing upon that issue,
was admitted for the consideration of the jury, and it was
error to make any detached portion of it or to make any
fact which any detached portion of it might tend to prove,
more prominent than any other part of the evidence, or
other pertinent fact. This instruction gave undue prominence to the facts specified, and magnified their import~
ance, and tended to divert the mind of the jury from the
main is ue.
Counsel ugge t in support of this in truction that:
"While it is a well- ettled and long-e tabli hed rule that
an in truction bould not sin le out an call attention of
the jury to one all ged fact more than anoth r, yet this
rule is subject to another on , that ea h party i ntitled to
an in truction hypothetically outlining the evidence and
state of the ca e upon which he reli f r o taininO' a verdict, and directinO' th jury to find for the arty in who e
favor the find the fa t con titutin th au e of action
or the defense," and cite: Chicago City Ry. Co. v. !Yiath,

420
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114 111. App. 353, and West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v.

Dougherty, 170 111. 379. The instruction in the case at bar

is not of the class of instructions discussed in either of

the cases cited. It does not hypothetically outline either

the evidence or the facts of a full defense and direct the

jury to find in favor of the defendants in case they find the

hypothesis proven by the evidence, as in Chicago City Ry.

Co. V. Math, supra. What it does is to unduly emphasize

one feature of a supposed defense. ********

For and on account of the errors in this opinion noted,

the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the

cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

TAUBERT V. TAUBERT.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. 1908.

103 Minnesota, 247.

Start, C. J.

This is an action brought by a young man seventeen
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years old, by his guardian, against his mother, to recover

damages for personal injuries which he claims to have sus-

[Chap. 11

TRIAL PRACTICE

114 Ill. App. 353, and West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v.
Dougherty, 170 Ill. 379. The instruction in the case at bar
is not of the class of instructions discussed in either of
the cases cited. It does not hypothetically outline either
the evidence or the facts of a full defense and direct the
jury to find in favor of the defendants in case they find the
hypothe is proven by the evidence, as in Chicago City Ry.
Co. v. ]JI ath, supra. What it does is to unduly emphasize
one feature of a supposed defense. * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
For and on account of the errors in this opinion noted,
the judgment of the <Arcuit Court is reversed and the
ca use remanded.
Reversed and remanded.

tained while in her employ by reason of her negligence.

Verdict for the plaintiff for $5,000. The defendant appeals

from an order of the district court of the county of Henne-

pin denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict or for a new trial. The record discloses the fact

that the action was defended by an indemnity company,

TAUBERT V. TAUBERT.

wliich had issued its policy to the defendant.

The assignments of error raise two general questions:

(a) Was the defendant entitled to a directed verdict in

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

her favor? (b) If not, was she entitled to a new trial for

1908.

errors in the instructions of the trial court to the jury?

103 ~Iinnesota, 247.

2. Tliis brings us to the question whether the defend-

ant is entitled to a new trial on account of alleged errors

in the charge of the court to the jury. The defendant urges

START,

C. J.

Thi is an action brought by a young man seventeen
year old, by his guardian, against his mother, to recover
damaO'es for personal injurie which he claims to have sustain d while in her employ by reason of her negligence.
V rdi t for the plaintiff for $5,000. The defendant appeals
frorn an order of the di trict ·court of the county of Hennepin l n~ ing her motion for judITTnent notwithstandin the
v rdi t or for a new trial. The record di clos s th fact
that th action was defended by an indemnity company,
whirh bad i. u d it policy to the d fendant.
rrh as ignm nts of error rai e two O'eneral qu tions:
( ) W a. th d fendant entitl d to a dir cted
rdict in
h r favor 1 ( ) If not was b entitl d to a n w trial for
rr r. in th in tru tion of tb trial court to the jury1
* * * * * * * * * *
2. Thi. brings us to the question wbether th d f ndant i .' Pntitl t a new trial on account of all O' d errors
in th charge of the court to th jury. The defendant urges
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several errors in the instructions; but we find it neces-

sary to consider only one of them.

The court charged the jury that: "If you believe the

plaintiff's testimony, believe that it is true, and believe that

it measures up to the law as I have defined it to you, he

would be entitled to recover, although every other wit-

ness in the case had lied." It is claimed that this was

prejudicial error. It was certainly error, for the reason

that it violated the well-settled rule that it is error for a

trial court in its instructions to a jury to single out the

testimony of a designated witness and lay particular stress

upon it, in cases where the evidence is contradictory. 11

Enc. PI. & Pr. 185; State v. Yates, 99 Minn. 461, 109 N. VV.

1070. See Wilkinson v. City of Crookston, 75 Minn. 184, 77

N. W. 797, and Harriott v. Holmes, 77 Minn. 215, 79 N. W.

1003. The reason for the rule is obvious. Each party to

an action is entitled to have all the evidence relevant to

the issues considered fairly by the jury, and this right is
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seriously prejudiced, if not defeated, when the court singles

out and isolates the testimony of a particular party or wit-

ness and gives to it undue importance.

It is, however, urged by the plaintiff that the instruc-

tion, even if erroneous, was not prejudicial, when read in

connection with the entire charge. It is true that the jury

were instructed that they should give fair consideration to

all of the testimony in the case; but the instruction com-

plained of was given near the close of the charge, and it

was terse, clear, specific, and mandatory in case the jury

believed the plaintiff's testimony. It in effect invited the

jury to first inquire whether the plaintiff's testimony was

true, and directed them that, if they so found, they need

not concern themselves about the other testimony in the

case, for the reason that if the plaintiff had told the truth

he was entitled to recover. Some of the issues of fact in

this case were close ones under the evidence, and we are

of the opinion that the instruction was not only erroneous,

but i3rejudicial, and for this reason a new trial must be

granted.

So ordered.
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se eral errors in the instructions; but we find it necesdary to con ider only one of them.
The court charged the jury that : ''If you believe the
plaintiff's testimony, believe that it is true, and believe that
it mea ures up to the law as I have defined it to you, he
would be entitled to recover, although every other witnes in the case had lied.'' It is claimed that this was
prejudicial error. It was certainly error, for the reason
that it violated the well-settled rule that it is error for a
trial court in its in tructions to a jury to ingle out the
testimony of a designated witness and lay particula.r stress
upon it, in cases where the evidence is contradictory. 11
Enc. Pl. & Pr. 185; State v. Yates, 99 Minn. 461, 109 N. W.
1070. See Wilkinson v. City of Crookston, 75 ~Minn. 184, 77
N. W. 797, and Harriott v . Holnies, 77 :Minn. 2±5, 79 N. W.
1003. The reason for the rule is obvious. Each party to
an action is entitled to have all the evidence relevant to
the issues considered fairly by the jury, and this right is
seriously prejudiced, if not defeated, when the court singles
out and isolate the testimony of a particular party or witness and gi' es to it undue importance.
It i , however, urged by the plaintiff that the instruction, even if erroneous, was not prejudicial, when read in
·onnection with the entire charge. It is true that the jury
were instructed that they should give fair consideration to
all of the testimony in the case; but the instruction complained of was given near the clo e of the charge, and it
wa terse, clear, specific, and mandatory in case the jury
believed the plaintiff's testimony. It in effect invited the
jury to first inquire whether the plaintiff's te timony wa
true, and directed them that, if they so found, they need
not concern themselves about the other testimon in the
ca e, for th reason that if the plaintiff had told the truth
he wa entitled to recover. Some of the i sues of fact in
thi ca e were clo e ones under the e idence, and we are
of the opinion that the instruction wa not only erron ou ,
but prejudicial, and for this reason a new trial must be
granted.
o ordered.
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M 'BRIDE V. DES MOINES CITY RAILWAY

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 1907,

134 Iowa, 398.

M'BRIDE V. DES MOINES CITY RAILWAY
COMPANY.

McLain, C. J. — The facts appearing in the record which

are essential to the determination of the questions of law

Supreme Court of Iowa.

1907.

raised on this appeal are as follows: Plaintiff's intestate

was a member of the paid fire department of the city of

Des Moines, and in response to a fire alarm, about half

134 Iowa, 398.

past ten in the morning, with eight other members of the

department, he started on a hose wagon from the fire

station on Eighth street going north. One Nagle was the

driver of the wagon. Plaintiff's intestate rode in his proper

place on a running board or step on the west side of the

wagon, facing east and near the rear end. As the wagon

approached the crossing of Grand avenue running east and

west, on which there was a double track of defendant's

railway, the driver saw a car coming from the west, and
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without checking the speed of the wagon drove on across

the track on which the car was approaching. The car

struck the rear wheel on the west side of the wagon, and

deceased was violently thrown to the pavement and his

skull was fractured. From this injury he died within a

few hours.

1. After stating very elaborately and in great detail the

claims of the parties as to the facts bearing upon the ques-

tion of the negligence of the defendant's motorman, in

charge of the car which collided with the hose wagon on

which plaintiff's intestate was riding, and defining negli-

gence, the court instructed the ju^y to consider '^ whether

or not the motorman having charge of the running and

operating of the car in question was negligent or not in

not stopping or checking the speed of the car before the

collision with the fire hose wagon occurred"; and he then

proceeded to detail a variety of circumstances which the

evidence for plaintiff tended to establish, such as the clear-

ness and calmness of the day, the ringing of the bell on

the hose wagon, and the distance at which such bell might

McLAIN, C. J.-The facts appearing in the record which
are essential to the determination of the questions of law
raised on this appeal are as follows: Plaintiff's intestate
was a member of the paid fire department of the city of
Des Moines, and in response to a fire alarm, about half
past ten in the morning, with eight other members of the
department, he started on a hose wagon from the fire
station on Eighth street going north. One Nagle was the
driver of the wagon. Plaintiff's intestate rode in his proper
place on a running board or step on the west side of the
wagon, facing east and near the rear end. As the wagon
a pp roached the crossing of Grand a venue running east and
west, on which there was a double track of defendant's
railway, the driver saw a car coming from the west, and
without checking the speed of the wagon drove on across
the track on which the car was approaching. The car
struck the rear wheel on the west side of the wagon, and
deceased was violently thrown to the pavement and his
skull was fractur ed. From this injury he died within a
few hour .
1. After stating very elaborately and in great detail the
claims of the parties as to the fact bearing upon the question of the neo-ligence of the defendant's motorman, in
char e of the car which collided with the ho e wagon on
which plaintiff's intestate was riding, and definino- negligence, the court instructed th jury to con ider ''whether
or not th motorman havino- charge of th runnino- and
o rating of the ar jn question was neo·li nt or not in
n t , topping or h kino- the peed of the car before th
olli ion with the fire ho wagon o curred''; and he th n
pr
1 <l to
tail a vari ty of i rcum tanc whi h th
vid n f r pl intiff t nd d to establi h u h a th cl arn . s and lmn s. of th day, th rin in of the bell on
the hose w gon, and th di. tance at which such bell might
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be beard, the rate of speed of the wagon, etc., none of which

were controlling on the question of the motorman's negli-

gence. And he concluded the instruction with this sen-

tence :

''After carefully considering these facts, if they be facts,

and all other facts and circumstances proved on the trial,

if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that

the motorman by the use of the means at his command

could have stopped the car, or checked the speed thereof,

in time to have avoided the accident, and that ho failed to

do so, that would be negligence on his part; and his negli-

gence, if he was so negligent, would be the negligence of

the defendant, and your verdict should be for the plaintiff,

unless you find the deceased, B. McBride, was negligent,

and that his own negligence contributed to his injury in any

degree, in which case you would find for the defendant."

The first objection urged to this instruction as a whole

is that therein the court called to the attention of the jury
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the facts which the evidence tended to establish favorable

to plaintiff's recovery, and omitted special reference to

those relating to defendant 's theory of the accident. This

objection we think was well taken. An instruction was

asked on behalf of defendant, calling attention to other cir-

cumstances which the evidence tended to establish, which

should have been considered as bearing on the motorman's

negligence, and which were favorable to defendant's con-

tentions in the case. It was clearly improper for the court

to thus emphasize the circumstances from which negli-

gence might be inferred, and omit any reference to cir-

cumstances tending to support the opposite inference. Per-

haps the court might properly have omitted to catalogue

the circumstances which the testimony tended to establish

bearing on the question of negligence, and simply have re-

ferred in a general way to the facts and circumstances

proved on the trial. But in suggesting to the jury that

they should take into consideration some of the circum-

stances which were favorable to the plaintiff, and omitting

reference to others favorable to defendant, he put the case

unfairly to the jury.

Another serious objection to the instruction is that the

portion thereof above set out withdraws from the jury the
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be heard, the rate of speed of the wagon, etc., none of which
were controlling on the question of the motorman's negligence. And he concluded the instruction with this sentence:
''After carefully considering these facts, if they be facts,
and all other facts and circumstances proved on the trial,
jf you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that
the motorman by the use of the means at his command
could have stopped the car, or checked the speed thereof,
in time to have avoided the accident, and that he failed to
do so, that would be negligence on his part; and his negligence, if he was so negligent, would be the negligence of
the defendant, and your verdict should be for the plaintiff,
unless you find the decea ed, B. J\{cBride, was negligent,
and that hi own negligen e contributed to hi injury in any
degree, in which case you would find for the defendant.''
The first objection urged to this instruction as a whole
is that therein the court called to the attention of the jury
the facts which the evidence tended to establish favorable
to plaintiff's recovery, and omitted special reference to
those relating to defendant's theory of the accident. This
objection we think was well taken. An instruction was
a ked on behalf of defendant, calling attention to other cirum tances which the evidence tended to establi h, which
hould have been con idered as bearing on the motorman's
negligence, and which were favorable to defendant's contentions in the case. It was clearly improper for the court
to thus emphasize the circumstances from which negligence mi ·ht be inferred, and omit any reference to circumstances tending to support the opposite inference. Perhaps the court might properly have omitted to catalogue
the circum tance which the te timony tended to e tabli h
hearin on the que tion of negligence, and impl_ have referred in a general way to the facts and circum tances
proved on the trial. But in ugO"esting to the jur. that
they bould take into con i er at] on ome of the cir um. tances which were fa orabl to th plaintiff and omitting
ref rence to others favorable to defendant he put the case
unfairly to the jury.
Another serious o jection to the in truction i that the
portion thereof above set out withdraws from the jury the
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question whether the motorman was negligent in not stop-

ping the car or checking the speed thereof in time to have

avoided the accident. There could be no question under

the evidence as to the ability of the motorman by the use

of the means at his command to stop the car or check the

speed thereof in time to have avoided the accident, if he

had endeavored to do so a sufficient length of time before

the accident occurred, nor was there any doubt that he

failed to stop the car or check its speed so as to prevent

the result of a collision ; and the court specifically instructs

the jury that this ability on the part of the motorman and

his failure to act constituted negligence. The real ques-

tion in the case was, not whether the motorman could have

stopped the car, but whether he was negligent in not doing

so; and this was a question for the jury, and not for the

court. Had the evidence shown without controversy that

the motorman, in the exercise of care, could and should

have anticipated the collision long enough beforehand to
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enable him to stop the car or check its speed so as to avoid

the accident, then the instruction might have been correct.

But the facts were in dispute. There were circumstances

supporting either conclusion, and the question of negli-

gence should have been left to the jury.

It is no answer to this position to say that in the first

part of the instruction the jury were told that they must

consider whether or not the motorman was negligent in not

stopping or checking the speed of the car. After this gen-

eral statement, the court proceeded to enumerate a large

number of circumstances indicating that the motorman was

negligent, and then told the jury that if these circum-

stances were found to be established, and they believed

from these and other circumstances proved on the trial

that the motorman could have stopped the car, he was

negligent. It was not the physical ability of the motor-

man to stop or check the speed of the car that was in ques-

tion, but his failure to use due care. The instructions as

a whole are lengthy and intricate in their statements, and

the one now specially under consideration is particularly

obscure, and the bald statement at its conclusion that the

motorman was negligent if he could have stopped or

checked the speed of the car in time to avoid the accident,
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question whether the motorman was negligent in not stopping the car or checking the speed thereof in time to have
avoided the accident. There could be no question under
the evidence as to the ability of the motorman by the use
of the means at his command to stop the car or check the
speed thereof in time to have avoided the accident, if he
had endeavored to do so a sufficient length of time before
the accident occurred, nor was there any doubt that he
failed to stop the car or check its speed so as to prevent
the result of a collision; and the court specifically instructs
the jury that this ability on the part of the motorman and
his failure to act constituted negligence. The real question in the case was, not whether the motorman could have
stopped the car, but whether he was negligent in not doing
so; and this was a question for the jury, and not for the
court. Had the evidence shown without controversy that
the motorman, in the exercise of care, could and should
have anticipated the collision long enough beforehand to
enable him to stop the car or check its speed so as to avoid
the accid ent, then the instruction might have been correct.
But the facts were in dispute. There were circumstances
supporting either conclusion, and the question of negligen e . hould have been left to the jury.
It is no answer to this position to say that in the first
part of the instruction the jury were told that they must
on ider whether or not the motorman was negligent in not
. toppin or cbeckjng the speed of the car. After this general statement, the court proceeded to enumerate a large
number of circumstances indicatjng that the motorman was
negli ent, and then told the jury that if these circumstan es were found to be established, and they believed
from these and other circumstances proved on the trial
th t the motorman could have stopped the car, he was
n o·lio-ent. It wa. not the physi al ability of the motorman to stop or check the speed of the car that wa in question, hut hi. fanure to u. e due care. The in tructions as
a wh le ar lcnO'tby an intri ate in their tat m nts, and
the on now . p cially under consid ration is parti ularly
oh:rnr , nd th hald tat ment at its on lusion that the
mot rman was n glig- t if he ould hav stopped or
ch •eked the p
f th car in time to avoid the accident,
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and failed to do so, may very well have been seized upon

by the jury as the solution of the whole difficulty. We

reach the conclusion that in the two respects pointed out

the instruction was erroneous and misleading.

For the errors pointed out in the first division of this

opinion, the judgment is reversed.

SEABOAED & ROANOKE EAILROAD COMPANY V.

JOYNER'S ADM'R.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 1895.

425
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and failed to do so, may very well have been seized upon
by the jury as the solution of the whole difficulty. We
reach the conclusion that in the two respects pointed out
the instruction was erroneous and misleading.
• * * * * * * * * *
For the errors pointed out in the first division of this
opinion, the judgment is reversed.

92 Virginia, 354.

Keith, P., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action of trespass on the case, brought in the

Circuit Court of the county of Southampton by Joyner's

administrator against the Seaboard and Roanoke Rail-

road Company, to recover damages for the death of the

plaintiff's intestate, caused, as alleged, by the negligence

of the defendant company. * * *

Nor is there any error in the refusal of the court to
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grant the instruction asked for by the plaintiff in error, and

SEABOARD & ROANOKE RAILROAD COMP ANY V.
JOYNER'S ADM:'R.

set out in Bill of Exceptions No. 3, which is in the follow-

ing words:

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

1895.

''The court instructs the jury that if they believe from

92 Virginia, 354.

the evidence that Sinclair Joyner went upon the track of

the defendant company without its consent, and placed

himself thereon in such a position as to be struck by a

train, then the said Joyner was a trespasser, and guilty of

such contributory negligence as will prevent a recovery by

his administrator in this action, unless the jury further be-

lieve that the accident was caused by the willful negli-

gence of the company."

It will be observed that the hypothetical case upon which

this instruction is predicated omits any reference to evi-

dence upon the part of both plaintiff and defendant tend-

P., delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action of trespass on the case, brought in the
Circuit Court of the county of Southampton by Joyner's
administrator against the Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad Company, to recover damages for the death of the
plaintiff's intestate, caused, as alleged, by the negligence
of the defendant company. * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
Nor is there any error in the refusal of the court to
grant the instruction asked for by the plaintiff in error and
set out in Bill of Exceptions No. 3, which is in the following words:
''The court instructs the jury that if they believe from
the evidence that Sinclair Joyner went upon the track of
the defendant company without its con nt, and placed
himself thereon in uch a po ition a to be struck by a
train, then the aid J oyn r was a tre pa ser, and guilty of
"'uch contributory n o-li<>' nee a will prevent a recov ry by
his admini trator in this action, unle s the jury further believe that the a cident was cau ed by the willful negligence of the company.''
It will b ob r d that the h othetical ca e upon which
this instru tion is predi ated omit an. reference to evidence upon the part of both plaintiff and defendant tend.
KEITH,
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ing to prove that before the accident occurred the engineer

became aware of the dangerous position of Joyner. The

engineer himself admits that, when he had approached to

within sixty yards of Joyner, he recognized that the object

near the track was not an abandoned tie, as he had sup-

posed, but a man, and that as soon as he made the dis-

covery he used all proper efforts to avert the catastrophe.

The evidence upon the part of the defendant in error tends

to prove that when at a much greater distance from the

body of the deceased, warning of danger was given, which

it was the duty of the engineer to heed, but did not. In any

aspect of the case, whether in that presented by the plain-

tiff or defendant, here was a most material fact for the

consideration of the jury, upon their determination of

which, under proper instructions, depends their reaching

a just conclusion in this case. There may be a state of

facts under which the instruction as presented would be

good law, but, upon the evidence set out in this record, its
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tendency was to mislead the jury, and it was properly re-

jected by the court.

We think the judgment of the Circuit Court is without

error, and should be affirmed.

BOYCE V. CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD

COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of Missouri. 1906.

120 Missouri Appeals, 168.

Broaddus, p. J. — This is a suit for damages for negli-

gence. The facts of the case are as follows. On the even-

ing of October 16, 1903, the plaintiff, in company with her

danghter-in-law, Mrs. Dorothy Boyce, started to go to the

opera house in the town of Odessa. They took the usual

route on the south side of Mason street, which crosses the

defendant's track at its station. When they got to de-

fendant's tracks, they stopped and waited for a passenger

[Chap. 11
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ing to prove that before the accident occurred the engineer
became aware of the dangerous position of Joyner. The
engineer himself admits that, when he had approached to
within sixty yards of Joyner, he recognized that the object
near the track was not an abandoned tie, as he had supposed, but a man, and that as soon as he made the discovery he used all proper efforts to avert the catastrophe.
The evidence upon the part of the defendant in error tends
to prove that when at a much greater distance from the
body of the deceased, warning of danger was given, which
it was the duty of the engineer to heed, but did not. In any
aspect of the case, whether in that presented by the plaintiff or defendant, here was a most material fact for the
con ideration of the jury, upon their determination of
which, under proper instructions, depends their reaching
a just conclusion in this case. There may be a state of
fa cts under which the instruction as presented would be
good law, but, upon the evidence set out in this record, its
tendency was to mislead the jury, and it was properly rejected by the court.
* * * * * * • • * *
We think the judgment of the Circuit Court is without
error, and should be affirmed.

BOYCE V. CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD
COMPANY.
Court of Appeals of Nlissouri.

1906.

120 Missouri Appeals, 168.

P. J.-Thi i a uit for damao-es for necrliµ; nr . Th fa t of th
a ar a follow . On the venin of 0 tob r 16, 190. , tb plaintiff, in company with h r
c1anght r-in-law, Mrs. Dorothy Boyce, tart
to o to the
op0ra h u in th town of Od a. Th v took the u ual
rout on the outh . ide of Ma. on tr et, ~hi h cro s the
<l f nclant' track at it . taf on. When th y '-"ot t def p 11 ant'. track., they topp d an
waited for a pass nger
BROADDUS,
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train to go by. They also saw a freight train standing on

the passing track, which was cut in two to allow the passing

of traffic on the street, which crossed the track parallel

with the sidewalk, and to enable foot passengers to con-

tinue their journey. At this opening of the train they

saw a man dressed in overalls with a railroad lantern in

his hand, who appeared to be connected with the train, who

told them they ''could cross if they wanted to." Where-

upon plaintiff started to cross the tracks, at which time

the train began to move, which alarmed her, and in order

to prevent being crushed between the cars when they came

together she got off the sidewalk onto the streetway, trod

upon a stone, fell to the ground, but got up in time to

get out of the way of the mo\dng cars. She did not dis-

cover that she was injured until she got to the opera house,

when she says she felt a pain in her ankle, which according

to the evidence turned out to be a severe sprain.

The defendant asked an instruction, which was refused,
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to the effect that if the woman, who was with plaintiff, saw

that the train was about to move and warned her not to

proceed, and that thereafter she persisted in attempting to

cross the track ahead of the moving train, the finding should

be for defendant. The vice of the instruction is that it

singles out particular facts, to the exclusion of other facts,
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train to go by. They also saw a freight train standing on
the passing track, which was cut in two to allow the passing
of traffic on the street, which cro ed the tra k parallel
with the idewalk, and to nable foot I a enger to continue their journey. At this opening of the train they
aw a man dressed in overalls with a railroad lantern in
hi hand, who appeared to be connected with the train who
told them they ''could cro s if th y wanted to.'' Whereupon plaintiff tarted to cro the tracks, at which time
the train began to move which alarmed her and in order
to prevent being cru bed between the cars when they came
together she got off the sidewalk onto the treetway, trod
upon a stone, fell to the ground, but got up in time to
get out of the way of the moving cars. She did not di cover that she was injured until she got to the opera hou e
when she says she felt a pain in her ankle, which according
to the evidence turned out to be a s-evere sprain. * * * *

upon which the jury are authorized to find a verdict. This

left out of consideration the fact that plaintiff had already

started to make the passage and, such being the case, it

was a question for the jury to say whether it was safest for

her to proceed or turn back. We all know from experi-

ence that in case of danger it is sometimes a question

whether it is safer to proceed or to retreat. And the law

will not place a strict construction upon the acts of a per-

son in such a situation because of want of time for deliber-

ation, and because the imminence of peril is calculated to

confuse the judgment. It was a question for the jury to

say whether she acted in a reasonable and prudent manner

under the circumstances.

[Reversed on other grounds.]

* * * * * * * * * *
The defendant a ked an instruction, which wa refu ed,
to the effect that if the woman who was with plaintiff saw
that the train wa about to move and warned her not to
proceed, and that thereafter he per i ted in attempting to
cros the track ahead of the moving train the :finding hould
be for defendant. The vice of the in truction i that it
singles out particular facts to the exclusion of other facts,
upon which the jury are authorized to find a verdi t. Thi
left out of con ideration the fact that plaintiff had already
~tarted to make the pa age and, uch bein
the ca e it
was a que tion for the jury to ay whether it wa afe t for
her to proceed or turn back. We all know from experi•nce that in ca e of danger it i
ometimes a que tion
whether it i afer to proc ed or to retr at. And the law
will not pla a trict con. truction upon th act of a peron in u h a ituation becau e of want of time for delib ration and hecau e the i minence of peril i al ulated t
~onfu e th jud()'m nt. It wa a que ti on for the jury to
ay wheth r . b act din a reasona le and prudent manner
under th cir um tance .

• •

* *

* * • •

[Reversed on other ground .]
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LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OP VIRGINIA V.

HAIRSTON.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 1908.

108 Virginia, 832.

LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY OF VIRGINIA V.
HAIRSTON.

Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of the city of

Roanoke in an action of assumpsit. Judgment for the

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

1908.

plaintiff. Defendant assigns error.

Reversed.

(Instructions given on motion of the plaintiffs.)

108 Virginia, 832.

*'(1). The court instructs the jury, that although you

may believe from the evidence that the deceased was found

the evening of his death, having convulsions, and that he

continued to have them until he died, and that strychnine

was found in his stomach, this alone is not suflficient to

prove suicide. The defendant company must go further

and show that the deceased intentionally and willfully for

the purpose of committing suicide, took strychnine, and

this must be shown by such evidence as will exclude every
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reasonable supposition of accidental death, and unless this

is so shown from all the evidence you must find for the

plaintiff on the issue of suicide.

Keith, P., delivered the opinion of the court.

S. W. Hairston, as the next friend of certan infants, re-

covered a judgment against the Life Insurance Company

of Virginia in the Circuit Court of the city of Roanoke;

and upon the petition of the defendant company the record

is now before us to review certain rulings of the trial

court.

On the 6th of February, 1906, the company issued a

policy of insurance upon the life of David Peter Willis,

the father of the infant plaintiffs, in consideration of the

application for said policy, which is made a part thereof,

and upon condition that the quarterly annual premium of

$20.41 should be paid in advance on the delivery of said

policy, which the declaration alleges was duly paid. It is

also averred that Willis died on the 23rd of March, 1906,

while the policy was in force; that due proof of his death

Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of the city of
Roanoke in an action of assumpsit. Judgment for the
. plaintiff. Defendant assigns error.
Reversed.
(Instructions given on motion of the plaintiffs.)
"(1). The court instructs the jury, that although you
may believe from the evidence that the deceased was found
the evening of his death, having convulsions, and that he
continued to have them until he died, and that strychnine
was found in his stomach, this alone is not sufficient to
prove suicide. The defendant company must go further
and show that the deceased intentionally and willfully for
the purpose of committing suicide, took strychnine, and
this must be shown by such evidence as will exclude every
reasonable supposition of accidental death, and unless this
is so shown from all the evidence you must find for the
plaintiff on the issue of suicide.
* * * * * * * * * *
KEITH, P., delivered the opinion of the court.
S. W. Hairston, as the next friend of certan infants, recovered a judgment against the Life Insurance Company
of Virginia in the Circuit .Court of the city of Roanoke;
and upon the petition of the defendant company the record
is now before us to review certain rulings of the trial
court.
On the 6th of February, 1906, the company issu d a
policy of insuran e upon the lif of David P ter Willis,
the f th r of th infant plaintiff , in con id ration of the
appli ati n for aid poli y, whi h i made a part thereof,
a d up n
ition that th quart rly annual preminPL of
$2 .4 bou]d be p id in adv n on the deliv ry of aid
p li y, which the d claration all
s wa.., duly paid. It i
also averre that Willi di d on th 23rd of Mar h, 1906,
while the policy was in force; that due proof of his death
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had been furnished the defendant; that all the conditions

of the policy had been complied with ; and that, neverthe-

less, the defendant refused to pay it.

We come now to the instructions given and refused at

the trial.

Instruction No. 1 given on behalf of the plaintiff is

erroneous, in this, that it is predicated upon only a por-

tion of the facts shown in evidence, bearing upon the ques-

tion of suicide. It is proper for the court to tell the jury

what is the law as applied to a hypothetical statement of

facts, but that statement must present the case shown in

evidence fairly to the jury. The instruction under consid-

eration tells the jury, that if the deceased on the evening

of his death was found in convulsions which continued until

he died, and that strychnine was discovered in his stomach,

this alone is not sufficient to prove suicide. Another in-

struction then might have been given presenting another

part of the evidence, in which the jury might with pro-
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priety be told that it was insufficient to warrant a con-

viction; while, if all the facts had been grouped in one

instruction, a wholly different conclusion should have been

reached.

The tendency of such a method of presenting the facts

of a case to the jury is to distract and mislead them, and

the court should content itself with giving the jury general

principles of law and leaving them to apply those prin-

ciples to the facts in evidence before them, or else it should

be careful, if it prefers to present a hypothetical case to

the jury, to put before the jurors all the facts bearing upon

the issue which the evidence proves or tends to prove.

**********

The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, the

verdict of the jury set aside, and the case remanded for a

trial to be had in accordance with the views herein ex-

pressed.

Reversed.
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bad been furnished the defendant; that all the conditions
of tbe policy had been complied with; and that, nevertheless, the defendant refused to pay it.

* * * * * * * * * •
We come now to the instructions given and refused at
the trial.
Instru ction No. 1 given on behalf of the plaintiff is
erroneous, in this, that it is predicated upon only a portion of the facts shown in evidence, bearing upon the question of suicide. It is proper for the court to tell the jury
what is the law as applied to a hypothetical statement of
facts, but that statement must present the case shown in
evidence fairly to the jury. The instruction under consideration tells the jury, that if the deceased on the evening
of his death was found in convul ions which continued until
he died, and that strychnine was discovered in bi stomach,
this alone is not sufficient to prove suicide. Another instruction then might have been given presenting another
part of the evidence, in which the jury might with propriety be told that it was insufficient to warrant a conviction; while, if all the facts had been grouped in one
instruction, a wholly different conclusion should have been
reached.
The tendency of such a method of presenting the facts
of a case to the jury is to di tract and mislead them, and
the court should content itself with giving the jury genera]
principle of law and leaving them to apply those principle to the facts in evidence before them, or else it should
be careful, if it prefers to present a hypothetical case to
the jury, to put before the jurors all the facts bearing upon
the is ue which th evidence proves or tends to prove.

* * * * * * * * * *
The judcrment of the circuit court mu t be rever ed the
v rdict of the jury set aside, and the case reman ed for a
trial to be had in accordance with the view herein expre sed.
Reversed.
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Section. 3. Form of Instructions.

MUEPHY V. CENTRAL OF GEOEGIA EAILWAY

3.

SECTION.

COMPANY.

FORM OF INSTRUCTIONS.

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1910,

135 Georgia, 194.

Beck, J. The dispute between the parties in this case

is over a strip of land 20 feet in width and about 1,381 feet

MURPHY V. CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RAILWAY
COMPANY.

in length extending from Glenn street on the north to

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Shelton street on the south, in the City of Atlanta, the

1910.

issue being as to whether the same constitutes the eastern

edge of a 100-foot right of way of the defendant railroad

135 Georgia, 194.

company or the western third of a 60-foot public road for

said distance. The plaintiff, in 1881, acquired title to the

lands l.^'ing east of and abutting on the strip of land in dis-

pute. He alleged, that at that time this 20-foot strip was

a road traveled by the public, and had been so used for

more than twenty years; that in 1884, upon petition of

citizens, the commissioners of roads and revenues of Ful-
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ton county passed an order formally opening and accept-

ing the same as a public road ; that upon the passing of

this order the petitioner and other abutting landowners on

the east, desiring that the road in front of their property

should be 60 feet in width, dedicated an additional 40-foot

strip for that purpose, adjoining said 20-foot road; that

the county authorities took charge of and worked the entire

60-foot road ; and that the same has ever since been a pub-

lic road. A short time prior to the bringing of this suit

the defendant railroad company began changing the grade

of the 20-foot strip in question and laying its tracks there-

on, and the plaintiff filed suit to enjoin any further inter-

ference with the alleged 60-foot road in front of his lands

and the use of any portion of same by the defendant as

its right of way.

It is complained that the court erred in refusing a writ-

ten request to give in charge to the jury the following:

"Any uninterrupted use by the public generally of lands

BECK, J.
The dispute between the parties in this case
is over a strip of land 20 feet in width and about 1,381 feet
in length extending from Glenn street on the north to
Shelton street on the south, in the City of Atlanta 1 the
issue being as to whether the same constitutes the eastern
edge of a 100-foot right of way of the defendant railroad
company or the western third of a 60-f oot public road for
said distance. The plaintiff, in 1881, acquired title to the
lands lying east of and abutting on the strip of land in dispute. He alleged, that at that time this 20-foot strip was
a road traveled by the public, and had been so used for
more than twenty years; that in 1884, upon petition of
citizens, the commissioners of roads and revenues of Fulton county passed an order formally opening and accepting the same as a public road; that upon the passing of
this order the petitioner and other abutting landowners on
the east, desiring that the road in front of their property
should be 60 feet in width, dedicated an additional 40-foot
strip for that purpose, adjoining said 20-foot road; that
the county authorities took _charge of and worked the entire
60-foot road; and that the same has ever since been a public road. A short time prior to the bringing of this suit
the defendant railroad company began changing the 0 Tade
of th 20-foot strip in question and laying its tracks th reon, and th plaintiff filed suit to njoin ny furth r interf ren e with the alleged 60-foot road in front of hi lands
and th use of any portion of same by the defendant as
its right f way.

. ........
~

It i complain d that the ourt erred in refusinO' a writt to o-iv i
harO'e to t e jury the following:
''Any uninterrupted use y the public generally of lands
t 'n r qu

~
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as a roadway for a period of time extending througli 20

years, accompanied by acceptance by public authorities,

gives a prescriptive right to the public to such road or

highway." We do not think that the failure of the court

to instruct the jury in the language of the request was

error. It is manifest that the charge which the court re-

fused to give is ambiguous. It is susceptible of two con-

structions. First, it might be construed to mean that an

uninterrupted use by the public generally of lands as a

roadway for a period of time extending through twenty

years, accompanied by acceptance by the public authorities

extending through that period of time, from the beginning

to the end thereof, would give a prescriptive right to the

public to such road. Second, it might be construed to

mean that an uninterrupted use by the public generally of

the strip of land in question as a roadway for a period of

time extending through 20 years and acceptance by the

public authorities at any time within that 20 years, even
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at or near the close of that period, would give a prescrip-

tive right to the public to such road. These two construc-

tions embody very different statements of the law upon the

question involved. If the first construction which might

have been placed upon the written request was the state-

ment of the law desired by counsel offering the request to

charge, then the principle embodied in the request was suf-

ficiently covered by the charge as given; and as the court

might fairly have placed this construction upon the written

request, he should not be held to have committed error in

refusing to give another charge upon a subject which was

already sufficiently covered by his charge as given. If

counsel had desired a charge laying down the doctrine as

stated in the second eonstruction of the written request, he

should have framed it in terms more aptly embodying the

principle which he sought to have incorporated in the

court's instructions.

**********

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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· s a roadway for a period of time extending through 20
a compani
by a eptan e b r public authorities,
o-ives a prescriptive right to the public to su h road or
highway.'' We do not think that the failure of the court
to instruct the jury in the language of the reque t was
error. It i manifest that the charge which the court refused to gi e is ambiguous. It is su ceptible of two contruction . First, it might be construed to mean that an
uninterrupted use by the public generally of land as a
roadway for a period of time extending through twenty
years, accompanied by acceptance by the public authorities
extending through that period of time, from the beginning
to the end thereof, would give a prescriptive right to the
public to such road. Second, it might be construed to
mean that an uninterrupted use by the public generally of
the strip of land in que tion as a roadway for a period of
time extending through 20 years and acceptance by the
I ublic authorities at any time within that 20 years, even
at or near the close of that period, would give a prescriptive right to the public to uch road. These two constructions embody very different statement of the law upon the
c1uestion involved. If the first con truction which might
have been placed upon the written reque t wa the statement of the law d(\ ired by counsel offering the request to
char e, then th principle embodied in the reque t was suf:fi iently covered by the charge as given; and a the court
mio-ht fairly have placed thi con truction upon the written
r que t, he hould not be held to have committed error in
r fu ing to gi another charge upon a subject which was
already ufficiently covered by hi charge as given. If
coun el had de ired a harge laying down the doctrine as
tat d in the second con truction of the written reque t he
should have framed it in t rms more aptly embodying the
rinciple which he sought to have incorporated in the
court's instructions.

~·ears,

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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PARKER V. NATIONAL MUTUAL BUILDING &

LOAN ASSOCIATION.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1904.

55 West Virginia, 134.

PARKER V. NATIONAL MUTUAL BUILDING &
LOAN ASSOCIATION.

PoFFENBARGER, President :

**********

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

1904.

Bill of exceptions No. 4 contains all the instructions in

the record. The argument and references in the bill of ex-

ceptions seem to proceed upon the theory of two instruc-

55 West Virginia, 134.

tions. "Whether given as one or as two is unimportant.

The matter is set out in the bill of exceptions as follows:

PoFFEN.BARGER, President:

**The court instructs the jury that where an agent is em-

ployed to sell real estate for his principal if the agent was

the procuring cause of the sale of said real estate the agent

is entitled to his commissions, without regard to the extent

of his exertions, and although the contract commenced by

said agent was consummated by the principal himself or

through the intervention of another; and the court further
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instructs the jury that where a broker or agent employed

to negotiate a sale procures a customer for the sale of the

said property on the terms proposed by the owner and the

principal takes the further proceedings out of the hands

of the broker, and completes the sale himself, the agent is

nevertheless entitled to his commissions, and the principal

cannot deprive him of his rights to compensation by a dis-

charge before the sale is consummated, and this is true

where the principal completes the contract with the cus-

tomer presented by the broker on different terms from

those stipulated to the broker."

The legal propositions stated by these instructions are

no doubt correct, but they are purely abstract. They make

no reference whatever to the evidence, nor do they submit

to the jury the finding from the evidence of the facts giving

rise to the law enunciated in them. One of them says:

"Where a broker or agent employed to negotiate a sale

procures a customer for the sale of said property on the

terms proposed by the owner, and the principal takes the

further proceedings out of the hands of the broker,"

Bill of exceptions No. 4 contains all the instructions in
the record. The argument and references in the bill of ex~
ceptions seem to proceed upon the theory of two instructions. Whether given as one or as two is unimportant.
The matter is set out in the bill of exceptions as follows:
''The court instructs the jury that where an agent is employed to sell real estate for his principal if the agent was
the procuring cause of the sale of said real estate the agent
is entitled to his commissions, without regard to the extent
of his exertions, and although the contract commenced by
said agent was consummated by the principal himself or
through the intervention of another; and the court further
instructs the jury that where a broker or agent employed
to negotiate a sale procures a customer for the sale of the
said property on the terms proposed by the owner and the
principal takes the further proceedings out of the hands
of the broker, and completes the sale himself, the agent is
nevertheless entitled. to his commissions, and the principal
cannot deprive him of his rights to compensation by a discharge before the sale is _consummated, and this is true
where the principal completes the contract with the customer presented by the broker on different terms from
those stipulated to the broker."
The 1 gal pro po i tions stated by these instructions are
no doubt correct, but they are purely abstract. They make
no r ference whatever to the evid nee, nor do they submit
to th jury th :fi dino- from the evidence of the facts giving
ri e to t e law nu ciated in them. One of them says:
"Wh r a brok r or agent employe to neo-otiate a sale
procur a u tom r for the sale of said property on the
t rm. pro o ed y the owner, and the principal tak s the
further proceedings out of the hands of the broker,''
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etc., the broker is entitled to his commission. Had the

court given this instruction in the concrete instead of the

abstract form it would have said: **If the jury believe

from the evidence that the defendant employed the plain-

tiff to sell the property mentioned in the evidence at a cer-

tain price, and agreed to pay him, in case he made such

sale, a commission, and, in pursuance thereof, the plaintiff

procured a customer for the sale of the property on the

terms fixed by the defendant, and the defendant prevented

him from making the sale by interfering and consummating

the sale himself with the customer, they should find for the

plaintiff." This would have directed the minds of the jury

to the facts necessary to be ascertained by them in order

to reach a proper conclusion. An instruction for the de-

fendant embodying the same proposition of law might have

been given, and in it the jury would have been told, in sub-

stance, that if the plaintiff, acting under such contract of

employment, failed to procure such a purchaser, they
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should find for the defendant. Instructions should apply

the law to the facts in the case. ''It is not the proper

course for the judge to lay down the general principles of

law applicable to a case, and leave the jury to apply them ;

but it is his duty to inform them what the law is as ap-

plicable to the facts of the case. An instruction, however

pertinent and applicable it may be, is abstract unless it

be made to apply, in express terms, either to the attitude

of the parties or to the very facts in issue." Blashfield on

Instr. s. 92. ''It is not the province of the judge to impress

any particular view of the facts upon the jury, but it is

his province to make his charge so directly applicable to

the facts as to enable the jury to render a correct verdict.

To leave as little room as possible for them to make mis-

takes in applying the law to the facts, which they may be

very liable to do when they have only general abstract

propositions given to them in charge, there ought, if pos-

sible, to be no room for misunderstanding the charge or its

application, and to this end it ought to be specific and di-

rect." East Tennessee V. (§ G. R. Co. v. Toppins, 10 Lea.

(Tenn.) 64. "Courts should apply the principles to the

facts in evidence, stating the facts hypothetically." Blash-

field on Instr. s. 92.

T. p.— 28

etc., the broker is entitled to his commis ion. Had the
court given this instruction in the concrete in tead of the
abstract form it would have said: ''If the jury believe
from the evidence that the defendant employed the plaintiff to sell the property mentioned in the evidence at a certain price, and agreed to pay him, in case he made uch
ale, a commission, and, in pursuance thereof, the plaintiff
procured a customer for the sale of the property on the
terms fixed by the defendant, and the defendant prevented
him from making the sale by interfering and consummating
the sale himself with the customer, they hould find for the
plaintiff.'' This would have directed the mind of the jury
to the facts necessary to be ascertained by them in order
to reach a proper conclu ion. An instruction for the defendant embodying the same proposition of law might have
been given, and in it the jury would h~ve been told, in ub·tance, that if the plaintiff, acting under such contract of
employment, failed to procure such a purcha er, they
should find for the defendant. Instruction should apply
the law to the facts in the case. "It is not the proper
course for the judge to lay down the general principles of
law applicable to a case, and leave the jury to apply them;
but it is his dut. to inform them what the law is as applicable to the fact of the case. An in truction, how ver
pertinent and applicable it may be, is ab tract unle it
be made to apply, in expre s terms, either to the attitud
of the partie or to the very facts in issue.'' Bla. hfield on
Instr. . 92. ''It i not the province of the judo·e to impre
any particular view of the facts upon the jury but it i
hi province to make his charge so directly applicable to
the fact as to enable the jury to render a correct verdict.
To lea e a littl room as po ible for them to make mi tak in applying the law to the fa ts whi h the. may be
Y r.r liable to do wh n th . have onl." O' neral ab tra t
pro1 o itio
i en to th m in har e, tb r ou ht if pos. ible, to b no room for mi und r tandi O' th charge or it
a pli ation, and to this end it ought to
pe ific and dir ct." En. t T enne see V. & G. R. Co. v. Toppinc,, 10 L a.
(T nn.) 64. " our . sboul apply the principl , to the
fact in vi en , . tating the facts hypothetically.'' Bla hfi 1 on In tr. . 92.
T. P.-2
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Whether the legal proposition should have been in both

forms, or only one of them, depends upon whether or not,

looking at the evidence introduced, the court could say

there was room or ground for either of the two conclusions

presented, dependent upon an issue of fact to be deter-

mined by the jury. If there is no evidence whatever upon

which one of the conclusions may stand, there is no reason

for giving an instruction embodying the hypothesis upon

which it is based, nor can the court do so except at the risk

of confusing and misleading the jury. The statement of

the principle without any application of it to the facts or

direction to the jury as to what facts they should look for

in the evidence, is even more likely to mislead for the

reason that, in the effort to apply it, they are called upon

by the court to wrestle with both the law and the facts and

form for themselves the hypothesis upon which the con-

clusion depends, and it leaves room for the jury to form

two, where there may be no evidence whatever to support
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one of them. That is exactly what has occurred here. No

evidence of the performance of the contract proved was be-

fore the jury. The instructions raised and presented to the

jury a question which had no root or foundation in the evi-

dence. Hence, it could perform no function except to mis-

lead the jury.

On account of the misleading character of the instruc-

tions given and the want of sufficient evidence to support

the verdict, the judgment must be reversed, the verdict set

aside, a new trial granted, and the case remanded.

Reversed.

WEST KENTUCKY COAL COMPANY V. DAVIS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1910.

138 Kentucky, 667.

Opinion of the court by Wm. Rogers Clay, Commissioner.

Reversing.

Whether the legal proposition should have been in both
forms, or only one of them, depends upon wbether or not,
looking at the evidence introduced, the court could say
there was room or ground for either of the two conclusions
presented, dependent upon an issue of fact to be determined by the jury. If there is no evidence whatever upon
which one of the conclusions may stand, there is no reason
for giving an instruction embodying the hypothesis upon
which it is based, nor can the court do so except at the risk
of confusing and misleading the jury. The statement of
the principle without any application of it to the facts or
direction to the jury as to what facts they should look for
in the evidence, is even more likely to mislead for the
reason that, in the effort to apply it, they are called upon
by the court to wrestle with both the law and the facts and
form for themselves the hypothesis upon which the conclusion depends, and it leaves room for the jury to form
two, where there may be no evidence whatever to support
one of them. That is exactly what has occurred here. No
evidence of the performance of the contract proved was before the jury. The instructions raised and presented to the
jury a question which had no root or foundation in the evidence. Hence, it could perform no function except to mislead the jury.
• * * * * * * * * *
On account of the misleading character of the instructions given and the want of sufficient evidence to support
the verdict, the judgment must be reversed, the verdict set
aside, a new trial granted, ·and the case remanded.
Reversed.

WEST KENTUCKY COAL COMP ANY V. DAVIS.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

1910.

138 J( entucky, 667.

Opinj n of the court by WM. RoaERS CL
rs1ng.

Y,

Commis ioner.
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Appellee, J. B. Davis, instituted this action against ap-

pellant, West Kentucky Coal Company, to recov^er dim^'ges

for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by appel-

lant's negligence. The trial in the lower court resulted in

a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee for the sum of

$1,600. To reverse that judgment this appeal is prose-

cuted.

The appellant is a corporation operating a coal mine

near the town of Sturgis, Union county, Ky. It also owns

and operates a mine at Wheatcroft, and at one or two

other places. In connection with these mines it owns and

operates a railroad. Under appellant's tipple, there are

three railroad tracks upon which cars are transported and

placed for the purpose of loading. These tracks are known

as tracks Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The engine which appellant

operates was taken daily down track No. 1 to the scale-

house; thence it was run up track No. 2 to the tipple for

the purpose of coaling before beginning its regular opera-
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tions for the day. On the occasion in question, those in

charge of the engine backed it down to the scale house on

track No. 1; thence up track No. 2, where appellee was at

work at the tipple. It was appellee's duty to check the

cars, and see that they were properly loaded. When the

engine arrived at the tipple, it pushed the car which ap-

pellee was loading out of the way, placed its tender upon

the tipple, and received its coal. It then went back, placed

a partially loaded car in. position, and proceeded to the

scale-house. It was standing there when appellee resumed

his labors of loading the car on track No. 2. According to

its usual custom, the engine then started up track No. 1,

pushing an empty car. While it was proceeding in the

direction of appellee, the car which the latter was loading

on track No. 2 became unmanageable. When this took

place, appellee's assistant jumped upon the car for the

purpose of stopping it. Appellee stepped back and moved

up the track for the purpose of notif>dng the tipple men to

stop the machinery. There was a distance of four or five

feet between tracks No. 1 and No. 2. When appellee rose

up and stepped backward to give the tipple man the re-

quired notice, he came in contact with the car which was

being pushed by the engine up track No. 1, and was in-
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Appellee, J. B. Davis, instituted this action against appellant, West Kentucky Coal Company, to recover d .-3.m~ges
for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by appellant's negligence. The trial in the lower court resulted in
a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee for the sum of
$1,600. To reverse that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The appellant is a corporation operating a coal mine
near the town of Sturgis, Union county, Ky. It also owns
and operates a mine at Wheatcroft, and at one or two
other places. In connection with these mines it owns and
operates a railroad. Under appellant's tipple, there are
three railroad tracks upon which cars are transported and
placed for the purpose of loading. These tracks are known
as tracks Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The engine whi~h appellant
operates was taken daily down track No. 1 to the scalehouse; thence it was run up track No. 2 to the tipple for
the purpose of coaling before beginning its regular operations for the day. On the occasion in que tion, those in
charge of the engine backed it down to the scale house on
track No. 1; thence up track No. 2, where appellee was at
work at the tipple. It was appellee's duty to check the
cars, and see that they were properly loaded. When the
engine arrived at the tipple, it pushed the car which appellee was loading out of the way, placed its tender upon
the tipple, and received its coal. It then went back, placed
a partially loaded car in. position, and proceeded to the
cale-house. It was standing there when appellee resumed
his labors of loading the car on track No. 2. According to
its usual cu tom, the engine then started up track No. 1.
pushing an empty car. While it was proceeding in the
direction of appellee, the car whi h the latter was loading
on track No. 2 be ame unmanageable. When thi took
place, a p llee 's as i tant jumped upon the car for the
purpose of toppino- it. Appell e tepped back and moved
up the track for the purpose of notifyi.no- th ti ple men to
stop the machiner. . There was a di ta ce of four or five
feet between track No. 1 and No. 2. When appellee ro e
up and tepped backward to o-ive the tipple man the required notice be cam in contact with the car wbi h was
being pu h d by the engine up track No. 1, and was in-
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jured. The evidence shows that there was a flagman on

the front end of the car that was being pushed by the

engine. His testimony is to the effect that appellee backed

into the car so suddenly that it was impossible to stop the

train after his peril was discovered. There was evidence

to the effect that the whistle was not blown nor the bell

rung as the engine approached the place of accident.

**********

The instructions complained of are as follows:

**(1) Gentlemen of the jury, the court instructs you

that it was the duty of the defendant's employee in charge

of the engine and cars attached thereto at the time and

place in question to exercise ordinary care, as hereinafter

defined, in running and operating the same so as to pre-

vent injury to its employes; so, if you shall believe from

the evidence that defendant's said employes in charge of

said engine and cars failed to exercise such care as above

required, but negligently ran said cars against the plain-
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tiff, thereby injuring him, while plaintiif was exercising

ordinary care, as hereinafter defined, for his own safety,

if he was then doing so, then in that event you should find

for the plaintiff and award to him such an amount in dam-

ages as will fairly and reasonably compensate him on ac-

count of any mental and physical suffering endured by

him as a direct result of such injury, if any, and also for

the reasonable value of the time necessarily lost from his

business on account thereof, if any, and also for any per-

manent reduction in his power to earn money, if any, as

was the direct result of such injury, not exceeding the sum

of $2,000, the amount claimed in the petition. But unless

you shall so find and believe from the evidence as above

required, you must find for the defendant."

''(4) The court further instructs you that it was like-

wise the duty of the plaintiff performing his duties and

doing the work in question to exercise ordinary care for

his own safety, and, although you may believe from the

evidence that the defendant's said employe was at said

time negligent and careless, yet if you shall also believe

from the evidence that plaintiff at said time when he was

injured was also careless or negligent, and that but for his

own carelessness or negligence the accident and injury

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 11

jured. The evidence shows that there was a flagman on
the front end of the car that was being pushed by the
engine. His testimony is to the effect that appellee backed
into the car so suddenly that it was impos ible to stop the
train after his peril was discovered. There was evidence
to the effect that the whistle was not blown nor the bell
rung as the engine approached the place of accident.
* * * * * * * * * *
The instructions complained of are as follows:
"(1) Gentlemen of the jury, the court instructs you
that it was the duty of the defendant's employee in charge
of the engine and cars attached thereto at the time and
place in question to exercise ordinary care, as hereinafter
defined, in running and operating the same so as to prevent injury to its employes; so, if you shall believe from
the evidence that defendant's said employes in charge of
said engine and cars failed to exercise such care as above
required, but negligently ran said cars against the plaintiff, thereby injuring him, while plaintiff was exercising
ordinary care, as hereinafter defined, for his own safety,
if he wa then doing so, then in that event you should find
for the plaintiff and award to him such an amount in damages as will fairly and reasonably compensate him on account of any mental and physical suffering endured by
him as a direct result of such injury, if any, and also for
the reasonable value of the time nece ssarily lost from his
business on account thereof, if any, and also for any permanent r duction in his power to earn money, if any, as
was the dir t re ult of such injury, not ex eedino- the sum
of $2,000, th amount claimed in the petition. But unless
you shall so find and believe from the evidence as above
r quir d, you mu t find for the defendant.''
" ( 4) Th ourt further instructs you that it was likewise the duty of th plaintiff performinO' his duti and
oing th work in que tion to ex r i e ordinary care for
hi own afety, and, althouo-h you may b li ve from the
that th d f ndant' said mploye wa at said
nt and
r 1 , yet if you shall also believe
jd nc that plaintiff at aid ti
wh n he wa
inj r d w . al
ar 1
r n Ii nt, a d that but for his
o n careles n ss or neglig nc th accident and injury
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would not have occurred, then in that event you should find

for the defendant."

It will be observed that the instructions complained of

do not present to the jury the reciprocal duties of appellant

and apjDellee. They are so general and abstract in form

as to make the jury the judges of both the law and the

facts. Smith v. Cornett, 38 S. W. 689, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 818 ;

C. N. 0. (& T. P. Rij. Co. V. EilVs Adm'r, 89 S. W. 523, 28

Ky. Law Rep. 530. The jury may have concluded that cer-

tain acts constitute negligence, when, as a matter of fact,

such was not the case. That this conclusion is sound may

be gathered from the fact that one witness was permitted

to testify that the car which struck appellee was not

equipped with a fender or pilot ; indeed, much stress is laid

upon this fact in appellee's brief. Doubtless it was com-

mented upon by counsel in their argument to the jury. We

can not, then, say that the jury were not influenced by this

fact in returning a verdict in favor of appellee. Certainly
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the failure of appellant to e-quip the car in question with a

fender or pilot was not negligence. To so hold would be

to impose upon appellant a greater liability than has ever

been imposed upon ordinary railroads, and would almost

defeat the practical operation of its engines and cars.

Nor do we think the failure of appellant to offer more

specific instructions than those given deprived it of its

right to complain. The rule is that in civil cases the court

is only required to give such instructions as are offered by

the parties. If, however, an instruction offered is defective

in form or substance, the court should prepare, or direct

the preparation of a proper instruction on the point at-

tempted to be covered bv the instruction offered. L. & N.

R. R. Co. V. Barrod, lis Ky. 877, 75 S. W. 233, 25 Ky.

Law Rep. 250; A^ico^a Bros. v. Hurst, 88 S. W. 1081, 28 Ky.

Law Rep. 87.^

But when no instructions are requested by either party,

and the court on its own motion undertakes to instruct the

jury, the instructions so far as they go should present cor-

rectly the law of the case. Soitth Corinqton £ Cincinnati

Street By. Co. v. Core, 96 S. W. 562, 29 Ky. Law Rep.

836 ; Sivope v. Scliafer, 4 S. W. 300, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 160 ;

Turner, Jr. v. Terrill, 97 S. W. 396, 30 Ky. Law. Rep. 89.
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would not have occurred, then in that event you should find
for the defendant.''
It will be ob erved that the in tructions complained of
do not present to the jury the reciprocal dutie of appellant
and appelle . They are so general and ab tract in form
as to make the jury the judges of both the law and the
fact . Smith v . Cornett, 3 S. W. 68 18 Ky. Law Rep. 18;
C. N. 0. ct T. P. Ry. Co. v. Hill's Adm'r, 89 S. W. 523, 2
Ky. Law Rep. 530. The jur may have concluded that certain acts constitute negligence, when as a matter of fact,
such was not the ca e. That thi conclusion is ound may
be gathered from the fact that one witness wa permitted
to testify that the car which struck appellee was not
equipped with a fender or pilot; indeed, much tress is laid
upon this fact in app llee 's brief. Doubtless it was commented upon by coun el in their argument to the jury. We
can not, then, say that the jury were not influenced by this
fact in returning a verdict in favor of appellee. Certainly
the failure of appellant to equip the car in que tion with a
fender or pilot was not negligence. To so hold would be
to impose upon appellant a greater liability than ha ever
been imposed upon ordinary railroad , and would almo t
defeat the practical operation of its engines and cars.
Nor do we think the failure of appellant to offer more
specific instruction than tho e given deprived it of its
right to complain. The rule is that in civil ca es the court
i only required to give such in tru tions as are offered by
the partie . If, however an in truction offered is defective
in form or substance, the court hould prepare or direct
the preparation of a proper in truction on the point attempted to be overed by the in truction offered. L. cf; N.
R. R. Co. v. Harrod, 115 Ky. 877, 75 . W .... 33 5 Ky.
Law Rep. 250; Nicola Bros. v. Hurst, 88 S. W. 10 1, 28 Ky.
Law Rep. 7. 1
But wh n no in truction are requested by either party
and the court on its own motion und rtakes to in truct the
jury the in tructions so far a they go hould pre ent coroidh orin.qton d!; Cincinnati
r tl th law of the ca e.
treet Ry. Co. v. Core, 96 . W. 56..... 29 Ky. Law Rep.
36; Swope v. Schafer, 4 S . W. 300 9 Ky. Law Rep. 160;
Turner, Jr. v. Terrill, 97 S. W. 396, 30 Ky. Law. Rep. 89.

438
438 Trial Practice [Chap. 11

Upon the next trial of the case the court will instruct

the jury as follows :

"It was the duty of the defendant's agents in charge of

its engine and cars on the occasion in question to give rea-

sonable warning of the approach of the train by blowing

the whistle or ringing the bell, and to keep a reasonable

lookout in front of the train as it was moved. It was the

duty of the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to watch

for the approaching train and keep out of its way. If you

believe from the evidence that a reasonable warning of the

approach of the train was not given or a reasonable look-

out was not kept, and that by reason of this plaintiff was

struck and injured by one of defendant's cars, while exer-

cising ordinary care for his own safety, you will find for

the plaintiff. Unless you so believe, you will find for the

defendant.

"(2) Although you may believe from the evidence that

defendant's agents in charge of said train failed to give
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reasonable warning of its approach and failed to keep a

reasonable lookout, yet if you believe from the evidence

that the plaintiff himself failed to exercise ordinary care

to discover the approach of the train and to keep out of

its way, and that such failure on his part, if any, so con-

tributed to his injury that but for said failure his injury,

if any, would not have been received, you will find for de-

fendant.

** (3) If you believe from the evidence that a reasonable

lookout was kept, and that reasonable warning of the ap-

proach of the train was given, and that plaintiff went upon

the track so close to the approaching train that the injury

to him could not be avoided by the exercise of ordinary

care upon the part of those in charge of the train after they

perceived his danger, or could have perceived it by the

exercise of ordinary care, you will find for the defendant.

"(4) Reasonable or ordinary care is such care as an

ordinarily prudent person will usually exercise under cir-

cumstances the same or similar to those proven in this

case.

*'(5) If you find for the plaintiff, you will award him

such sum in damages as you may believe from the evidence

will fairly comijensate him for his mental or physical suf-
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Upon the next trial of the case the court will instruct
the jury as f ollows :
" I t was the duty of the def ndant's agents in charge of
its engine and cars on the occa ion in question to give reasonable warning of the approach of the t r ain by blowing
the whistle or ringing the bell, and to keep a reasonable
lookout in front of the train as it was moved. It was the
duty of the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to watch
for the approaching train and keep out of its way. If you
believe fr om the evidence that a rea onable warning of the
approach of t he train was not given or a reasonable lookout was not kept, and that by reason of this plaintiff was
str u ck a nd injured by one of defendant's cars, while exercising ordinary care for his own safety, you will find for
the plaintiff. Unless you so believe, y ou will find for the
defendant.
' ' (2) Although you may believe from the evidence that
def endant's agents in charge of said train fail ed to give
reasonable warning of its approach and fa iled to keep a
reasonable lookout, yet if you believe from the evidence
that the plaintiff himself failed to exercise ordinary care
to discover the approach of the train and to keep out of
its way, and that such failure on his part, if any, so contributed to his injury that but for said failure his injury,
if any, would not have been received, you will find for defendant.
"(3 ) If you believe from the evidence that a reasonable
lookout was kept, and that reasonable warning of the approach of the train wa given, and that plaintiff went upon
the track so Io to the approaching train that the injury
to him could not be avoided by the exerci e of ordinary
care upon th part of tho e in harO'e of the train after they
p r i ed hi dan Q' r, or could have perceived it by t he
x r 1, e of ordinary care, you will find for th def ndant.
'' ( 4) R a onable or rdinary care is such care a an
or linavily prudent person will u ually x rci under cirum. tance th same or jmilar to tho
prov n in this
ca · .
f yon fincl for th
la]ntiff, you will award h]m
" ( 5)
: nr·h . n 1n rfamag . a. you may h Ji ve from th vidence
\vill fairly <·mnprn: at him for hi . ment l or hy. i al suf-
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f ering, if any ; for his loss of time, if any ; and for the per-

manent imi^airment, if any, of his power to earn money,

which you may believe from the evidence was the proxi-

mate result of his injury, if any ; not exceeding in all, how-

ever, the sum of $2,000."

No other instructions will be given.

The judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for a

new trial consistent with this opinion.

1 In Kansas City, Mexico and Orient Ry. Co. v. Loosley (1907) 76 Kan. 103,

90 Pac. 990, the court said: "The defendant claims the court erred in re-

fusing its request. The plaintiff argues that the instruction tendered wa^

c. 3]
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fering, if any; for his loss of time, if any; and for the permanent impairment, if any, of his power to earn money,
which you may believe from the evidence was the proximate result of his injury, if any; not exceeding in all, however, t4e sum of $2,000. ''
No other in tructions will be given.
The judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for a
new trial consistent with this opinion.

faulty and hence was properly refused. For present purposes it may be

conceded that this is true. it may further be conceded that without a re-

quest the court was not obliged to instruct upon the matter involved. But if

a defective request actually brings to the court's notice an important prin-

ciple of law which ought to be stated to enable the jury to render an intelli-

gent verdict, it may be prejudicial error to disregard it; and if an attempt

be made by an instruction to submit the subject defectively covered by the
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request to the consideration of the jury, it should be sufficiently explicit and

comprehensive to cover fairly the field of the request."

STATE V. LEGG.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1906,

59 West Virginia, 315.

Sanders, Judge:

1 In Kan as City, Mexico and Orient Ry. Co. v. Loosley (1907) 76 Kan. 103,
90 Pac. 990, the court . aid: ''The defendant claims the court erred in refusing its request.
The pla infrff argues that the instruction tendered waifauJty and hence was properly refused.
For present purposes it may be
conceded that this is true.
lt may further be onceded that without a request the court was not obliged to instruct upon the matter involved.
But if
a defective reque t actually brings to the court's notice an important principle of law which ought to be stated to enable the jury to render an intelligent verdict, it may be prejudicial error to disregard it; and if an attempt
be made by an in truction to submit the subject defectively cover d by the
request to the consideratiou of the jury, it bould be sufficiently explicit and
comprehensive to cover fairly the field of the r_equest.''

This writ of error is to a judgment of the circuit court

of Clay county, convicting the defendant, Sarah Ann Legg,

of the murder of her husband, Jay Legg, and sentencing

her to be hanged.

As to instructions Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5. By these instruc-

tions it is undertaken to define reasonable doubt. We see

STATE V. LEGG.

no objection to these instructions as such. They seem to

define reasonable doubt correctly, and no objection to their

correctness is pointed out. But it is urged that the court

erred in gi\'ing them, because they are upon the sams point,

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

1906.

and for the same purpose, and that a continued re])etition

59 West Virginia, 315.

of instructions upon a single point is calculated to preju-

dice tin defendant. It was entirely unnecessary to repeat

these instructions. It is manifestly improper to do so.

Judge :
This writ of error is to a judgment of the circuit court
of Clay county, convicting the defendant, Sarah Ann Legg
of the murder of her husband, Jay Legg, and sentencing
her to be hanged.
SANDERS,

* * * * * • • * • •
As to instructions Nos. 2 3, 4 and 5. By these instruction it i undertaken to define reasonable doubt. We ee
no obje tion to the e in tructions as such. They ~·eem to
define r a. onable dou t corre tl. and no objection to their
correctn . is pointed out. But it is ur ed that tbe court
err a in giving the because t ey ar upon the am·~ oint,
and for the same pur o , and that a continued repetition
of instructions upon a sinO'le point i calculated to prejuii tbt d f ndant. It wa ntir ly unnece ar to r p at
the e in tructions. It i manife tly improper to do o.
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The purpose of instructing a jury is to aid them in arriving

at a proper verdict, and not to confuse them, and in order

to be of aid, instructions should not be repeated, but when

once given, presenting a particular theory of a case, no

other instruction presenting the same theory should be

given, because to do so is to destroy the very purpose for

which instructions are given, and to mystify and confuse

the jury. It is true these instructions present the defini-

tion in different language, but there is no necessity for it

to be defined more than once. Four long instructions upon

reasonable doubt, which has never yet been defined or made

clearer than the words themselves import, can certainly be

of no service to a jury. The practice of repeating instruc-

tions should be condemned. It is wrong to do this, and

thereby prominently impress a single feature of a case

upon a juror. Either of these instructions would have been

sufficient, but as to whether or not the repetition of them is

reversible error, we will not determine, because, on other
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grounds the judgment will have to be reversed, and upon

a second trial, the necessity for this criticism can be

obviated.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and a new

trial awarded the defendant.

Reversed.^

1 Bepetition not error vnlr.^s jury misled. Tn Gran v. Houston (1895)

45 Nebr. 813, 64 N. W. 245, the court said: "While there may have been

repetitions which were not necessities, or which in the opinion of counsel

or this court were unnecessary, yet there were none which tended, nor did

they as a whole tend, to mislead the jury, nor can we believe the jury was

misled by them, hence there was no prejudice to the rights of plaintiff in

error, and the action of the court, the grounds for this complaint, furnishes

TRIAL PRACTICE
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The purpose of instructing a jury is to aid them in arriving
at a proper verdict, and not to confuse them, and in order
to be of aid, instructions should not be repeated, but when
once given, presenting a particular theory of a case, no
other instruction presentino- the same theory should be
given, because to do so is to destroy the very purpose for
which instructions are given, and to mystify and confuse
the jury. It is true these instructions present the definition in different language, but there is no necessity for it
to be defined more than once. Four long instructions upon
reasonable doubt, which has never yet been defined or made
clearer than the words themselves import, can certainly be
of no service to a jury. The practice . of repeating instructions should be condemned. It is wrong to do this, and
thereby prominently impress a single feature of a case
upon a juror. Either of these instructions would have been
sufficient, but as to whether or not the repetition of them is
reversible error, we will not determine, because, on other
grounds the judgment will have to be reversed, and upon
a second trial, the necessity for this criticism can be
obviated.

no tenable reason for a reversal of the case."

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and a new
trial awarded the defendant.
Reversed. 1
1

Repetition not error uriless jury misled.

In Gran v .. Houston (1895)

45 Nebr. 813, 64 N. W. 245, the court sajd : ''While there may have been

repetitions which were not nece sities, or which in the opinion of counsel
or this court were unnece ary, yet there were none which tended, nor did
they as a whole tend, to mislead the jury, nor can we believe the jury was
mjs]ed by them, hence there n'a no prejudice to the ri hts of plaintiff in
error, and the action of the court, the grounds for this complaint, furnishe~
no tenable reason for a reversal of the case.''
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CITY OF CHICAGO V. MOORE.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1891.

CITY OF CHICAGO V. MOORE.

139 Illinois, 201.

Mr. Justice Shope delivered the opinion of the court:

This was a suit for personal injury, alleged to have been

Supreme Court of Illinois.

1891.

received by defendant because of a defective sidewalk over

and upon which she was passing with due care and caution,

139 Illinois, 201.

and which appellant was required to keep in safe repair

and condition. The trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff,

which, on appeal to the Appellate Court, was afiRrmed.

Counsel for appellant have, seemingly, filed in this court

their brief filed in the Appellate Court, containing an elab-

orate discussion of the facts, which must in this court be

deemed as being settled adversely to their contention by

the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The first point made which we will consider is that, the

court erred in refusing all instructions asked, and giving

one prepared by the court in lieu thereof. It is insisted
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with great earnestness, that under the practice in this State,

and under the statute, the respective parties have the right

to have instructions given or refused by the court as asked

by them, and that it is error for the court to refuse an in-

struction containing a correct proposition of law applicable

to the facts, although an instruction embodying every ma-

terial phase thereof be given in an instruction or instruc-

tions prepared by the court. It is said ''that there is no

place under our law for instructions by the court sua

sponte, except when counsel have failed to present proper

instructions, and the justice of the case demands that the

judge supply the omission." The contrary to this conten-

tion has been so repeatedly held, and the practice of giving

a charge prepared by the court, and containing all of the

material points covered by the instructions asked, has been

so often commended by this court, that the question ought

to be regarded as settled in this state. Hill ef al v. Parsons

et al, 110 111. Ill ; Haucliett v. Kimhark et al, 118 id. 132 ;

Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Pulrer, 126 id. 329.

In the latter case, in speaking of this practice, we said :

MR. JusTICE SHOPE delivered tbe opinion of the court:
This was a suit for personal injury, alleged to have been
re eived by defendant because of a defective sidewalk over
and upon which he wa pa ing with due care and caution,
and which appellant was r equired to keep in safe repair
and condition. The trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff,
which, on appeal to the Appellate Court, was affirmed.
Coun el for appellant have seemin ly filed in thi court
their brief filed in the Appellate Court, containing an elaborate di cussion of the facts, which must in thi court be
deemed as being settled adversely to their contention by
the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The first point made which we will con ider is that the
ourt erred in refusing all instruction asked and giving
one prepared by the court in lieu ther of. It is in isted
with great earne tne s that under the practice in this State,
and under the statute the respective parties have the right
to have instructions given or refused by the court as asked
by them, and that it is error for the court to refu e an instru tion containing a correct proposition of law applicable
to the facts, althou h an instruction embodying every material phase thereof be given in an in truction or in tructions prepared by the court. It is said "that there is n
pla e under our law for in. truction by the court sua
ponte, xcept when coun el have failed to pre ent proper
in tructions, and tb justice of the case demand that the
judO'e supply the omis ion." The contrary to thi contention has been so re eatedly held and th practi e of o-iving
a charge prepare b, the court, and containing all of the
material point cov re 1 y th in truction a ked ha be n
urt that the que tion ought
o often commend d b. thi
ttl d in tbi tate. Hill et al . Par ons
to be re ·arded a
et al, 110 Ill. 111; Hau hett v . Kinibark et al ll id. 132;
Birmingham F ire In . Co . v . Puli er, 1_6 id. 329.
In· the latter case, in speaking of this practice, we said:
0
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"The propriety of the practice thus adopted is challenged,

the proposition contended for seeming to be, that in this

State the functions of the court in the matter of instruct-

ing a jury are practically limited to giving or refusing the

written instructions asked by counsel. Such, clearly, is not

the case. True, he may, if he sees fit, limit himself to giv-

ing the instructions submitted by the counsel which proper-

ly state the law, and then, even though the law be inade-

quately given to the jury, no error can ordinarily be predi-

cated upon such action, because if counsel had deemed

other instructions necessary, they might and should have

asked them. But where the judge sees proper to do so, it

is competent for him to prepare his own charge to the jury,

but if he does so, he should embody in it, either literally or

in substance, all proper instructions asked by counsel."

See, also, Chicago and loiva Railroad Co. v. Lane, 30 111.

App. 443.

The statute prescribes that the court charging the jury
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shall instruct as to the law, only, (Practice act, sec. 51,)

and that no judge shall instruct a petit jury unless the in-

structions be reduced to writing. (Practice act, sec. 52.)

Section 54 provides, that when instructions are asked

"which the judge can not give," he shall mark the same

refused, "and such as he approves he shall write on the

margin thereof, given," and he is then prohibited from

qualifying, modifying or explaining the same, otherwise

than in writing. The court must see that the instructions

given to the jury, not only separately, but as a whole, con-

form to the rules of law and practice in our courts. It by

no means follows, because an instruction contains a correct

proposition of law, that it must meet the approval of the

judge, and must therefore be given. Each party to the

litigation has a right to demand that the law applicable to

his case shall be given with accuracy and clearness to the

jury. But this is all that he has a right to demand, and it

was early held, under this statute, that the court might re-

fuse erroneous instructions, modify them, or give instruc-

tions of its own, as it might deem expedient, {Vanlanding-

ham V. Huston, 4 Gilm. 125,) and such has been the uniform

holding ever since. And it has been so repeatedly held that

it is not error to refuse instructions, however applicable

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 11

''The propriety of the practice t hus adopted is challenged,
the proposition contended for seeming to be, that in this
State the functions of the court in the matter of instructing a jury are practically limited to giving or refusing the
written instructions asked by counsel. Such, clearly, is not
the case. True, he may, if he sees fit, limit himself to giving the instructions submitted by the counsel which properly state the law, and then, even though the law be inadequately given to the jury, no error can ordinarily be predicated upon such action, because if counsel had deemed
other in tn1Ctions necessary, they might and should have
asked them. But where the judge sees proper to do so, it
is competent for him to prepare his own charge to tile jury,
but if he does so, he should embody in it, either literally or
in sub tance, all proper instructions asked by counsel.''
See, also, Chicago and Iowa Railroad Co. v. Lane, 30 Ill.
App. 443.
The statute prescribes that the court charging the jury
shall instruct as to the law, only, (Practice act, sec. 51,)
and that no judge shall instruct a petit jury unless the instructions be reduced to writing. (Practice act, sec. 52.)
Section 54 provides, that when instructions are asked
"which the judge can not give," he shall mark the same
refused, "and uch as he approves he shall write on the
margin thereof, given,'' and he is then prohibited from
qualifying, modifying or explaining the same, otherwise
than in writing. The court must see that the instructions
given to the jury, not only s parately, but as a whole, conform to the rules of law and. practice in our courts. It by
no means follows, because an in truction contains a correct
propo ition of law, that it must meet the approval of the
judg , and must th ref ore be given. Each partv to the
]jt]o-ation ha a rio-ht to demand that the law appli able to
hi .
. hall be gi en with ac uracy and clearness to the
jury. But thi is all that h ha a right to demand, and it
wa. arly ld, und r this tatut , that the court mi.O'ht refu .· rr n u. in tru tion , modify them, or give instructi . of it own, a it io-ht d m ex edient, (Vanlandinghnrn . Ilii.. ton, 4 Gilm. 125,) an . uch has been the u iform
h Jdjng v r . inc . An it ha been so repeat dly h Id that
it is not error to refuse instructions, however applicable

~
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and pertinent, wlien the material parts are given in other

instructions, that the citation of authority seems unneces-

sary. Here appellant asked seventeen instructions. A care-

ful consideration of them will show, as it is conceded, that

the instruction prepared and given by the court contained

every important or material proposition embodied therein,

except the fourth instruction asked and refused, in respect

of which, as we shall see hereafter, appellant has no cause

of complaint. If the jury were accurately instructed in re-

spect of each proposition contained in the instructions

asked, proper to be given, the party can not be heard to

complain.

It is, however, said, that the instructions prepared by

the counsel presented the questions sharply and incisively,

while those of the court are more moderate in expression

and less forceful. This may be conceded without affecting

the result. As said by the Appellate Court: ''The instruc-

tions handed up come to the judge from partisan hands,
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and have been drawn as carefully as the skill of a lawyer

can accomplish it to present a partisan view, or to convey

a hint, suggestion or intimation of advantage to his client.

The same legal rule may be stated in a differently arranged

combination of words by the judge, and be, as it is very

likely to be, coldly impartial, and entirely colorless in its

statements of facts on which it is based." The utmost

care should be taken by the judge to include within the

charge every i^roposition of law applicable to the facts of

the case embraced within the instructions asked, and such

others as he may deem necessary to the attainment of jus-

tice. His language should be clear and impartial, and con-

vey to the jury the law of the case in terms they will com-

])rehend. When this is done the practice is to be com-

mended, rather than the other, which too freqently leaves

the mind of the juror in uncertainty as to what is meant by

the disjointed, and, to his mind, disconnected and conflict-

ing, propositions of law, and which embarrass and mislead

him perhaps quite as often as they lead him to correct con-

olusions.

**********

Finding no error in this record for which the judgment

should be reversed, it is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.^
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and pertin nt wb n the material part are O'ff n in oth r
in tru tions, that the citation of authority e m unn
ar y. Here appellant a ked event en in truction . A ar ful consideration of them will bow, a it i conced d that
the in truction prepared and given by the ourt ontain
very important or material propo ition embodied therein
xcept the fourth instruc ion a ked and refu. e , in re p ct
f which, as we shall see hereafter, appellant ha no au e
of complaint. If the jury were accurately instructed in r ·pect of each propo ition contained in the in truction
a ked proper to be given, the party can not be heard to
complain.
It is, however, said, that the in truction prepared by
the coun el pre ented the que tions sharply and inci ively
while tho e of the court are more moderate in expres ion
and le s forceful. This ma. be conceded without affecting
the result. As said b the Appellate Court: ''The in tructions banded up come to the judge from partisan hand ,
and have been drawn as carefully as the kill of a lawyer
can ac ompli. h it to pre ent a parti an vi w, or to convey
a hint, suo·o·e tion or intimation of advantacre to his client.
Tb ame l gal rule may be tated in a differ ntly arranged
ombination of words by the judge, and be a it i very
likely to b , coldly impartial, and entirely colorle in its
. tatem nt of facts on which it is ba ed. ' The utmo t
are hould be taken by the judge to include within the
rharge e-v ry propo ition of law applicable to the fact of
the ase eml raced within the in truction a ked and uch
other a he may deem nece ary to the attainment of ju tic . Hi . Ian uage houl 1 be clear and impartial and convey to the jury the law of the ca. e in t rm th y will com1 r h n . Wh n thi i done the ra ti
i to be comm nd
rath r than th
th r which too fr q ntly l a
th mind of the juror in unc rtainty a to what i meant by
the di jointe , and to hi
ind i conne t d and confli tin propositi n of law, and which rnharra an mi lead
him rhaps quite a oft n a th y I ad him to orrect con<'lu ion .
Findin no rror in thi re or
hould e reY r d, it i affirm

f r whi b the judinnent

Judgment affinned.J.
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1 A number of courts have declaretl that the practice of charging the jury

in the language of the court instead of in the language of counsel, is decidedly

preferable, even where the requested charges are unexceptionable in law when

separately examined, for the reason that thereby the charge can be made more

orderly and harmonious and is freed from the partisan spirit and want of

proper perspective which instructions usually show when prepared by coun-

sel. Eosenstein v. Fair Haven v. Westville E. E. Co. (1905) 78 Conn. 29,

60 Atl. 1061; Kinney v. Ferguson (1894) 101 Mich. 178, 59 N. W. 401.

On the other hand, some courts hold that the court is bound to give a cor-

rect instruction in the language of the request. Thus, in Morrison v. Fair-

mont & Clarksburg Traction Co. (1906) 60 W. Va. 441, 55 S. E. 669, the court

said : "A party is entitled to an instruction in his own language, if it cor-

rectly propounds the law applicable to the case, and is not misleading and

there are facts in evidence to support it. State v. Evans, 30 W. Va. 417;

Jordan v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312. Where such instructions are asked

a court should, without hesitation, give them. It is a right a party has

to couch his instructions in his own language, and when he has done so, if

they fulfill the legal requirements, they should be given. But while this is
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true, yet what should be the effect after verdict, where such instruction is

refused, but modified and given? Can we say that it is reversible error for

the court to make a slight or immaterial change in an instruction? Must in-

structions be given literally as offered, and if this is not done, must we over-

throw the verdict? We cannot so hold. While such an instruction should be

given, yet a verdict will not be set aside where this is not done, when it

is modified and given, if we can clearly see that the instruction as modified

is the same in legal effect as the one offered."

And in some states it is provided by statute that the court shall instruct

in the language of the request when such request is correct in law. Ala-

bama, Code, 1903, <$ 5364; North Dakota, Eev. Codes, 1905, $ 7021; South
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1 A number of courts have declared that the practice of charging the jury
in the language of the court instead of in t he language of counsel, is decidedly
preferable, even where the requested charges are unexceptionable in law wbe:G
.eparately examined, for the reason that thereby the charge can be made moTe
orderly and harmonious and is freed from the partisan spirit and want of
proper perspective which instructions usually show when prepared by counsel.
Rosenstein v. Fair Haven v. Westville R. R. Co. (1905) 78 Conn. 29,
60 Atl. 1061; Kinney v. Ferguson (1 94) 101 Mich. 178, 59 N. W. 401.
On the other band, some courts bold that the comt is bound to give a correct instruction in the language of the request.
Thus, in Morrison v. Fairmont & Clarksburg Traction Co. (1906) 60 W. Va. 4:41, 55 S. E. 669, the court
said: ''A paTty is entitled to an instruction in his own language, if it correctly propounds the law applicable to the case, and is not mi leading and
there are facts in evidence to support it.
State v. Evans, 30 W. Va. 417;
Jordan v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312.
Where such instructions are asked
a court should, without hesitation, give them.
It is a right a paTty bas
to couch his instructions in his own language, and when he has done so, if
they fulfill the legal requirements, they should be given.
But while this is
true, yet what should be the effect after verdict, where such instruction is
refused, but modifi ed an<l giYen ~
Can we say that it is reversible error for
the court to make a slight or immaterial change in an in struction~
Must instructions be given liter ally as offered, and if this is not done, must we overthrow the verdicH
We cannot so hold.
While such an in stru ction should be
given, yet a verdict will not be set aside where this is not done, when it
is modified and given , if "·e can clearly see that the instruction as modified
is the "'ame in legal effect as the one offered .''
And in some states it is provided by statute that the court shall instruct
in the lan guage of the r equest when such request is correct in law.
Alaha ma, Co<le, 1903, § 5364; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1905, § 7021; South
Dakota, Code Civ. Pro., 1903, § 256.

Dakota, Code Civ. Pro., 1903, $ 256.

KLOFSKI V. RAILROAD SUPPLY COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1908.

235 Illinois, 146.

Me. Justice Vickees delivered the opinion of the court:

The second count in the declaration alleges that appellant

carelessly and negligently employed an incompetent and

reckless servant and permitted such incompetent servant

to operate and manage ladles filled with molten metal ; that

KLOFSKI V. RAILROAD SUPPLY COMPANY.

such incompetency of the said servant was, or ought to

have heen, known to appellant and was unknown to appel-

Sup renie Court of Illinois.

1908.

lee, hy means whereof the appellee was injured, as afore-

said, through the incompetency, recklessness and careless-

ness of said servant of appellant. The gist of the second

235 Illinois, 146.

count of the declaration is, that appellant, with notice,

delivered the opinion of the court:
* * * * * * * * * *
Th . c nd ount in th de laration alleg that app llant
carele. , ]y and ne<Ylig ntly mployed an incompetent and
r kl , . s rvant and permitt d su h in ompet nt servant
t op rat n mana<Y ]ad1e filled with molt n m ta1; that
.·n<'li in mp t n y of th
aid servant w s, or ou ht to
baY 1 n, known to a
llant and was unknown to appel1 1 ~y m ans h r f th app 11 wa inJur d, as aforeic1 thr 10'h th rn mp t n y, r kl ne and carelessf , ail , rv n t f a p 11 n t. Th o-i t of the cond
l ration is, tb t appellant, with notice,
c u t r the
MR. J usTICE VrcKERS
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negligGntly employed an incompetent servant to handle a

ladle full of molten metal, by means whereof the appellant,

by its said servant, carelessly caused the said metal to spill

upon the ground and explode against the appellee.

**********

It is next urged by appellant that the court erred in giv-

ing instruction No. 4. That instruction is as follows :

*'It was the duty of the defendant to use reasonable care

to learn and know whether its servants were competent and

fit for their work, so that it would be reasonably safe for

the defendant's other servants to work with them without

being exposed to unnecessary danger to life or limb by

reasons of incompetency, if any; and if defendant's servant

known as 'Scotty' was incompetent for his work, and if by

reason thereof other servants of defendant were exposed

to unnecessary dangf^r to life and limb, and if defendant by

reasonable care would have known of such incompetency

and danger, if any, before the alleged injury to plaintiff, in
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time by reasonable care to prevent such danger, then it was

defendant's duty to use reasonable care not to expose the

plaintiff to the danger, if any, of working with such in-

competent servant, if any."

Appellant concedes that this instruction states a correct

proposition of law as far as it goes, but contends that under

the evidence in this case the instruction should have gone

further and explained to the jury that if appellee had knowl-

edge, or equal means of knowledge, with appellant of the in-

competency of the servant "Scotty" and made no objec-

tion to working with him, appellee would assume the risk

of injury that might result from such incompetency. This

criticism cannot be sustained. The instruction under con-

sideration does not purport to state all the facts upon

which a right of recovery depends. It does not conclude

with a direction to find a verdict for appellee, and does not,

therefore, fall within a class of instructions often con-

demned by this court which conclude with a direction to

find a verdict for a particular party without stating all the

essential facts to support such conclusion. It is unneces-

sary, and aften impracticable, to state the whole law of a

case in one instruction. Efforts to do so are more likely to

confuse than enlighten the jury. Besides, the liability to
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ne<rli ently mployed an incompetent ervant to handle a
lad]e full of molten metal, by means whereof th a pellant,
y it aid ervant, carelessly cau ed th aid m tal to spill
upon the ground and explode a ain t the a pellee.

• • * * * * * * * *
It i next urged by appellant that the court erred in givin instru tion No. 4. That in truction is a follow :
' It was the duty of the defendant to u e rea onable care
to learn and know whether its servants were competent and
fit for their work so that it would be rea onabl~ afe for
the d fendant 's other servant to work with them without
being exposed to unnece ary danger to life or limb by
rea ons of in ompetenc if an ; and if d fendant 's en ant
known as 'Scotty' was incompetent for his work, and if by
rea on thereof other ervant of defendant were exposed
to unnece ary dangP-r to life and limb, and if defendant by
rea onable care would have known of such incompetency
and danger if any, before the alleged injury to plaintiff, in
time by reasonable care to pr vent such danger, then it wa
def ndant' duty to u se rea onable care not to expose th
plaintiff to the dang r if any, of working with such incompetent servant, if any."
ppellant concede that this instruction tates a correct
propo ition of law a far a it goe , but ontend that under
the evidence in this case the in truction hould have gone
further and explain d to the jury that if a1 pellee ha knowledge, or equal mean of knowl dge with appellant of the in~ompeten ">' of the ervant ''Scott '' and made no objection to working with him appeJl e woul a ume the risk
of injury that mi ht re ult from uch incomp ten y. Thi
critici m annot be u tained. The in tru tion under connot ~ urport t . tat all th fa t upon
id ration do
which a rio-ht of recover. d 1 d . It doe not c n lude
witb a dir ti on to fin a Yer i t for a
11
and doe no
th refor fall within a cla
of in tru ti n oft n onlu
ith a ir tion to
demned y thi court which
find a v r i t for a par ti ular I rty ith ut statin all the
ntial fa t to u ort u h onclu ion. It i unn e ar. and aft ]mpra ti a 1 t tate the wh l law f a
ca in one in tru ti n. Effort to d o ar m r lik 1. to
confuse than nli 0 ht n th jury. B id
the Ii bility to
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commit error is minimized by stating the law applicable to

a particular question or particular parts of the case in

separate instructions. This court has often had occasion

to announce the familiar rule that instructions are to be

considered as a series, and, when so considered, if, as a

whole, they state the law correctly that is sufficient. The

jury were informed by other instructions in the series of

the effect the facts omitted from this one would have upon

Mie relative rights of the parties. Instruction No. 36 given

on behalf uf appellant advises the jury that appellee could

not recover under the second count of his declaration unless

he proved that he did not know, and by the exercise of

reasonable diligence would not have known, that the ser-

vant "Scotty" was incompetent, careless and reckless. Ap-

pellant had the full benefit of the doctrine of the assump-

tion of risk, so far as it applied, resulting from the in-

competency and carelessness of the fellow servant of the

appellee by instructions 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 30, 33, 35, 36 and
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38 given at its instance by the court.

There being no reversible error in this record the judg-

ment of the Appellate Court for the First District is af-

firmed.

Judgment affirmed.

McDIVITT V. DES MOINES CITY RAILWAY COM-

PANY.

Supreme Court of loiva. 1909.

141 Iowa, 689,

Evans, J. — * * *

The appellant complains further that the instructions of

the court were contradictory, and that, although the court

held the deceased to have been guilty of contributory negli-

gence, it nevertheless laid upon the plaintilY the burden of

proving freedom from contributory negligence before she

[fihap. 11
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commit error is minimized by stating the law applicable to
ct particular question or particular parts of the case in
c- eparate instructions. This court has often had occasion
to announce the familiar rule that instructions are to be
considered as a series, and, when so considered, if, as a
whole, they state the law correctly that is sufficient. The
jury were informed by other instructions in the series of
the effect the facts omitted from this one would have upon
the relative rights of the p arties. Instruction No. 36 given
on behalf of appellant advises the jury that appellee could
not recover und er the second count of his declaration unless
he proved that he did no t know, and by the exercise of
reasonable diligence would not have known, that the serYant "Scotty" was incompetent, careless and reckless. Appellant had the full benefit of the doctrine of the assumption of risk, so far a s it applied, resulting from the incompetency and carelessness of the fellow servant of the
appellee by instructions 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 30, 33, 35, 36 and
38 given at it instance by the court.
* * * * * * * * * *
There being no reversible error in this record the judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

McDIVITT V. DES MOIN.E S CITY RAILWAY COMPANY.
Sup renie (Jourt of Iowa.

1909.

141 Iowa, 689.
'.JVANS,

J.- • * •
• • * * • • • • • •

Th ap Dant complains fur ther that th instructions of
th
urt w r contradi t or y, and that, although the court
h 1 th d c as d to have en gujlty f ontributory neglig r it n
rth 1 ss laid upon th plaintiff th burden of
r ving freedom from contributory negli5 nee before she
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could recover even upon the theory of the ''last clear

chance. ' '

After a statement of the issues, the court presented its

instructions in paragraphs numbered from 1 to 19, inclu-

sive. The first six are as follows:

(1) The burden of proof is ujDon the plaintiff to estab-

lish by preponderance of the evidence each of the follow-

ing propositions: First, that the deceased, Edith Mc-

Divitt Lawson, was struck and injured by the defendant's

car about the time, at the place, and substantially in the

manner alleged in plaintiff's petition; second, that said

decedent was not g^i^^ty of negligence causing or contrib-

uting to her said injury; third, that the defendant was

guilty of negligence substantially as alleged by plaintiff

and hereafter in these instructions more fully specified;

fourth, that said injuries so received by decedent were the

direct and approximate result of the negligence of the de-

fendant; fifth, that the estate of decedent has been dam-
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aged in some amount thereby. If you find affirmatively

as to each and all of the above propositions, then your

verdict will be for the plaintiff. If you fail to find affir-

matively as to any one of the above propositions, your

verdict will be for the defendant.

**********

(4) The undisputed evidence in this case shows that

the deceased approached the railway track of defendant,

and, after having so approached the railway track of de-

fendant, waited for the west-bound car to pass her, and

that, after such car had passed, decedent immediately pro-

ceeded across the north track, and the mtervenmg space

of almost five feet between the north and south tracks, and

stopped in front of an east-bound car on the south track,

there passing, and was struck by said car without taking

any precautions to avoid the accident. You are instruc-

ted as a matter of law that this action of decedent would

constitute negligence, and plaintiff cannot recover unless

you find as hereinafter instructed. The only question

therefore which you have submitted to you for considera-

tion is whether or not the defendant's employees in charge

of the east-bound car, which came in contact with the de-

ceased, were guilty of the negligence charged in failing to

avoid the injury which resulted in the death of decedent
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could recover even upon the theory of the ''last clear
chance."
After a tatement of the issues, the court presented it
in truction in parao-raph numbered from 1 t 19, incluive. The first six are as follows:
( 1) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish by preponderance of the evidence each of the following· propo itions: First, that the decea ed, Edith ~1c
Divitt Lawson, was truck and injured by the defendant'
car about the time, at the place, and substantially in the
manner alleged in plaintiff's petition; second, that said
decedent was not guilty of negligence causing or contributing to her said injury; third, that the defendant was
guilty of negligence sub tantially as alleged by plaintiff
and hereafter in the e in tructions more fully specified;
fourth, that aid injurie o received by decedent were the
direct and approximate re ult of the neglig nee of the defendant· fifth, that the e tate of decedent has been damaged in ome amount thereby. If you find affirmatively
as to each and all of the above propositions, then your
verdict will be for the plaintiff. If ou fail to find affirma tivel as to any one of the above propo itions, your
verdict will be for the defendant.
* * * * * * * * * *
( 4) The undisputed evidence in this ca e hows that
the deceased approached the railway track of defendant
and, after having so approached the railwa track of defendant, waited for the we t-bound car to 1 a, her an
that, after uch car had pas ed, decedent immediately proceeded aero s the north track, and the int rvemng pa
of almo t five feet between the north and outh tracks, and
stor ped in front of an ea t-bound car on the south track,
there pa ino-, and was tn10k by said car without t ki g
any pre aution to a oid the accident. You ar in tr ted a a matt r of law that thi action of decedent woul<l
con titut ne Ii ence and plaintiff can ot recov r un] ..
you find
her inaft r i tructed. The o ly qu ti n
therefore which you have n mitted to you for on._i eration i wh th r or n t the defendant
mplo
, in charoof th a t-boun
ar, hi h came in contact wi h t 1 d cea d wer o-uilt, of th neglig nc harge in ailin:--.· t
avoid the _injury which result d in th death f dee dent
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after the deceased stepped from behind the west-bound

ear and onto the south track of defendant, and she was

seen by the motorman in a position of danger * * *

(6) You have been heretofore instructed, gentlemen,

that the decedent was negligent in going upon the track in

front of the east-bound car, which struck her; but you are

further instructed that, while the law holds that plaintiff

cannot recover on account of the contributory negligence

of the decedent in stepping in front of the east-bound car

in the manner in which she did, yet if, after the motorman

saw her in a place of danger or about to step upon the

track in front of the approaching car, he negligently fail-

ed to stop said car within a reasonable time or distance

under the circumstances shown by the testimony, and

such failure was the direct and proximate cause of the in-

jury which resulted in the death of decedent, then your

verdict will be for the plaintiff.

From an examination of instruction 1, it will be ob-
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served that the jury was instructed, expressly, that, if it

failed to find that the decedent was not guilty of contrib-

utory negligence, the verdict must be for the defendant.

Instructions 4 and 6 expressly stated to the jury that the

decedent was guilty of contributory negligence. This pre-

sents the alleged contradiction of which appellant com-

plains. It is contended by appellee that instructions 4

and 6 expressly state to the jury that the plaintiff may re-

cover notwithstanding contributory negligence, and this

contention is correct; but this does not eliminate the con-

tradiction in the instructions. Appellee contends that the

instructions must be considered as a whole, and this is

true. It is argiied also, that the error in the first instruc-

tion is cured by the statement in the fourth and sixth; but

it is cured only in the form of a contradiction. Our pre-

vious cases cited by appellee are not in point. It has been

held that where an instruction is ambiguous, or where

standing alone, it is erroneous because of some omission,

it may be cured by other instructions that are clear upon

the omitted or ambiguous point; but where an instruction

is free from ambiguity, and is aflirmatively erroneous, the

error is not cured by a contradiction contained in another

instruction. There is no way in such case to determine

which instruction the jury may follow. The question pre-

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 11

after the deceased stepped from behind the west-bound
car and onto the south track of defendant, and she was
seen by the motorman in a position of danger * * *
( 6) You have been heretofore instructed, gentlemen,
that the decedent was negligent in going upon the track in
front of the east-bound car, which struck her; but you are
further instructed that, while the law holds that plaintiff
cannot recover on account of the contributory negligence
of the decedent in stepping in front of the east-bound car
in the manner in which she did, yet if, after the motorman
saw her in a place of danger or about to step upon the
track in front of the approaching car, he negligently failed to stop said car within a reasonable time or distance
under the circumstances shown by the testimony, and
such failure was the direct and proximate cause of the injury which resulted in the death of decedent, then your
verdict will be for the plaintiff.
From an examination of instruction 1, it will be observed that the jury was instructed, expressly, that, if it
failed to find that the decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence, the verdict must be for the defendant.
Instructions 4 and 6 expressly stated to the jury that the
decedent was guilty of contributory negligence. This presents the alleged contradiction of which appellant complains. It is contended by appellee that instructions 4
and 6 expre sly state to the jury that the plaintiff may recover notwithstanding contributory negligence, and this
cont ntion is correct; but this does not eliminate the contradiction in the instructions. Appellee contends that the
in tructions mu t be considered as a whole, and this is
tru . It i arm d also, that the error in the first instruction is cur d by the tatement in the fourth and sixth; but
it i cur d only in the form of a contradiction. Our previou. as . it d by appellee are not in point. It has been
h 1 that where an in truction is ambicruou , · or where
standinp; alone, it i erroneou becau of some omission,
it ma be ur d hv oth r instru tion that are cl ar upon
th , o{nitte or ambiguou point; but where an instruction
is fr from amhignity, and is affirmatively erron ous, the
rr >r i. n ot rur d hv a ontradirti n rontain in another
jn . trurti n. Th r .is no way in su h ase to determine
whi h instruction th jury may follow. The question pre-
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sented in this case is almost parallel with Christy v. City

Raihvay Company, 126 Iowa, 428, and the cases therein

cited. The error in this case was somewhat emphasized

by the sixteenth instruction, which contains the following:

"Contributory negligence is such negligence as contrib-

utes to an injury" — a definition which was quite unneces-

sary in view of the withdrawal of the question from the

consideration of the jury. The natural effect of it would

be to impress the jury that the question was still in the

case, and to emphasize the error contained in instruction

The judgment below is reversed, and cause remanded

for a new trial. — Reversed.

Section 4. Requests for Instructions.

CENTRAL RAILROAD V. HARRIS.

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1886.
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· nted in this case is almost parallel with Christy v. City
Railway Company, 126 Iowa, 428, and the ca e therein
~ited. The error in this case was somewhat emphasized
by the sixteenth instruction, which contains the following:
'Contributory negligence is such negligence as contributes to an injury"-a definition which was quite unneces·ary in view of the withdrawal of the que tion from the
consideration of the jury. The natural effect of it would
be to impress the jury that the question was still in the
case, and to emphasize the error contained in instruction
1.

76 Georgia, 501.

Lucinda Harris brought suit against the Central Rail-

road to recover damages for the killing of her husband.
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The testimony for the plaintiff tended to show that the

The judgment below is reversed, and cause remanded
for a new trial.-Reversed.

husband was in the depot in the city of Atlanta ; that he

walked alongside the train to go beyond the engine, which

projected from the depot into a street-crossing at its end;

that he undertook to cross the track at the street-crossing,

when the train started rapidly without giving any signal

and ran over him.

**********

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for one

SECTION

4.

REQUESTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

thousand dollars. The defendant moved for a new trial

upon the following grounds:

CENTRAL RAILROAD V. HARRIS.

**********

(2) Because the court failed entirely to put before the

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1886.

jury the main defense relied upon by the defendant, and

to sustain which abundant evidence had been introduced,

76 Georgia, 501.

T. p.— 29

Lucinda Harris brought suit again t the Central Railroad to recover damages for the killing of her hu band.
The testimony for the plaintiff tended to show that the
husband wa in the depot in the cit3 of Atlanta; that h
walked along ide the train to go beyond the engine, which
projected from the depot into a street-cro .. ino- at it end;
that he undertook to cro s the track at the tr et-cro ino-,
when the train started rapidly without giving any ignal
and ran over him.
* * * • * * * * * *
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for one
thou. and dollar . The def ndant mo ed for a new trial
upon the following ground :
* * * * * * * * • •
(2) Becau th court faile
ntir ly to ut before the
jur. th main d f n e reli d upon
th defendant an
to sustain which abundant
i ence had been introduced,
T. P.-9
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to-wit, that defendant had boarded the passenger train in

the depot without having purchased a ticket, and without

having any intention of leaving the city thereon, but simp-

ly to say good-bye to a crowd of colored servants on their

way to Florida, and that he had attempted to jump from

said train when in motion, and from a platform having no

steps attached thereto by which to descend to the ground,

and having a railing extending around the entire plat-

form to prevent persons from getting on and off the car

to which it was attached, at that end. The charge of the

court failed to call the attention of the jury in any way

to these facts, but singled out the one element of negli-

gence arising from the failure, if such failure existed, to

toll the bell on crossing Pryor street.

Jackson, Chief Justice.

The very able and distinguished counsel for defendant

in error saw the force of this exception to the charge, and

endeavored to meet it by the reply that the counsel for
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the plaintiff in error could not use the exception, because

he did not call the attention of the court to the omission of

which he now complains, and cited decisions of this court

bearing upon the necessity of his doing so before he could

take advantage of the omission.

"We think, however, that the cases cited, and the princi-

ples on which they rest, do not apply to the clear omission

to notice in the charge a plain defence of the company

arising out of his evidence so as not to escape the obser-

vation of the judge, but to omissions to expand the charge,

so as to make more clear the point on which he has

charged substantially, but not as fully as would have been

done had attention been called to it. The courts will not

allow a party to lie in wait for the judge when he charges

substantially the law covering the case, and then object to

the insufficiency of a portion of it; but in every case, the

law of it must be given in substance to the jury, because if

it is not given, the general verdict they give is not upon

the law, the law of the case, but on facts without instruc-

tions on the law of the case. The ship is at sea without

chart or pilot, and can never reach the port to which it is

bound without their guidance. The verdict can never be

a legal verdict unless instructions on the law of the case

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 11

to-wit, that defendant had boarded the passenger train in
the depot without having purcha ed a ticket, and without
having any intention of leaving the city thereon, but simply to ay good-bye t o a crowd of colored ser vants on their
way to Florida, and that he had attempted to jump from
said train when in motion, and from a platform having no
teps attached thereto by which to descend to the ground,
and having a railing extending around the entire platform to prevent persons from getting on and off the car
to whi h it was attached, at that end. The charge of the
court failed to call the attention of the jury in any way
to these facts, but singled out the one element of negligence arising from tbe failure, if such failure existed, to
toll the bell on cros ing Pryor street.

* * * * * * * * * •
JACKSON, Chief Justice.
The very able and distinguished counsel for defendant
in error saw the force of this exception to the charge, and
ndeavored to meet it by the reply that the counsel for
the plaintiff in error could not use the exception, becau e
he did not call the attention of the court to the omission of
which he now complains, and cited decisions of this court
bearing upon the neces ity of his doing so before he could
take advantage of the omission.
We think, however, that the cases cited, and the principles on which they rest, do not apply to the clear omission
to notice in the charge a plain defenc of th company
arising out of his eviden e so as not to e cape the ob ervation of the judge, but to omi ion to expand the char 0 ·e,
o a to make mor clear the point on which he ha
bar()' d substantially, but not as fully a would have been
don had att ntion b en call
to it. Th court will not
allo a party to li in wait for the judo- wh n h charge .
. ub. tantially the law cov rino- the ca e, and th n object to
th in . uffi i n y of a portion of it; but in every case. t.h
law of it mu. t b giv n in sub tance t th jury, b caus if
jt is not niv n, tl
n ral v rdict they ive i not upon
h law, the law of th cas , but on facts without in truc1ion . n th law f the c e. Th ship i at sea without
c·hart r pilot, and n n v r r a h the port to whi h it is
} un with ut th it gui an . The v rdict can never be
a 1 gal verdi t unless instructions on the law of the case

Sec. 4]
Sec. 4] Instructing the Jury 451

be given by him who presides for that pur^Dose. The omis-

sion to cover the case substantially must always set it

aside.

An so this court has often ruled. In the case of Har-

din, Executor vs. Almand, 64th Ga. 582, the 8th head-note

lays down the rule thus: "Where the case is fully cov-

ered by the general charge, the failure to instruct the

jury on a particular branch of it is not error in the ab-

sence of a request." The case at bar is not fully covered,

in that it ignores one defence, and makes an act of negli-

gence in the company affect that defence, if meant to be

alluded to at all, which act could not have possibly affec-

ted it.

So from an early date this court has uniformly held that

the law of the case must be given to the jury to the extent

of covering the substantial issues made by the evidence,

whether requested or not, or attention be called to it or

not; otherwise the verdict will be set aside.
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be given by him who pre ides for that purpos The omi sion to cover the case substantially mu t always set it
aside.
An so this court has often ruled. In the a e of Har din, E xecutor vs. Al11iand, 64th Ga. 582, the 8th head-not
lays down the rule thus: "Where the case i fully covered by the general charge, the failure to instruct the
jury on a particular branch of it is not error in the absence of a request.'' The case at bar is not fully covered,
in that it ignores one defence, and makes an act of negligence in the company affect that defence, if meant to be
alluded to at all, which act could not have pos ibly affected it.
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**********

In all these cases, it is believed, from an examination of

each, the principle is clearly deducible that without any

request of counsel or reminder of the court by counsel, the

instructions of the court must substantially embrace the

rule of law on the issues between the parties which the

evidence makes. If that be done substantially, then there

is a line of decisions cited by counsel for the defendant

in error, to the effect that if the charge be not full enough

or clear enough or omits something that would put one

side or the other more fairly before the jury than the

charge given does, then the notice of the court must be

called thereto, or the party complaining will not be heard

here. If there be any exception to this general rule in

this court from 11th Ga. down to 69th, it is very scarce,

and will be found approximating closely to the rule laid

down, if not clearly within it.

**********

The judgment is reversed solely because the court in

the charge ignored the defence set up by the defendant be-

low, that plaintiff's husband's own negligence — his own

rash act — in jumping from the cars killed him, without

any negligence at all of the defendant which contributed

So from an early date this court has uniformly held that
the law of the case must be given to the jury to the extent
of covering the substantial issues made by the evidence,
whether requested or not, or attention be called to it or
not; otherwise the verdict will be set aside.

* * * * * * * * * *
In all these cases, it is believed, from an examination of
each, the principle is clearly deducible that without an.
request of counsel or r eminder of the court by coun el, the
instructions of the court must substantiall embrace the
rule of law on the is ues between the parties which the
evidence makes. If that be done sub tantially, then there
is a line of deci ions cited by coun el for the defendant
in error, to the effect that if the charge be not full enough
or clear enough or omits something that would ut ne
side or the other more fairly before the jury than the
charge given does, then the notice of the court mu t be
called thereto, or the part. omplainino- will not
hear
here. If there be any exception to tbi general rul in
this court from 11th Ga. down to 6 th it is very car
and will be found ap roximatincr clo ely to the rule laid
down, if not clearly within it.

* • • • * • • • • •

The judgment is r ver ed solely e ause the ourt in
the charg ignor d th a f nee t up . th d f n n b low that laintiff' hu band' own ne lig n e-hi own
rash act-in ju ino- from t
cars kill d him with ut
any negligence at all of the defendant which contributed
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to that act of his, — the only negligence proved being the

neglect to ring the bell, which did not affect in the least

the disastrous result of the rashness of the deceased.

Judgment reversed}

\ Accord: Owen v. Owen (1867) 22 Iowa, 270; Capital City Brick &

[Chap. l l

TRIAL PRACTICE

to that act of his,-the only negligence proved being the
neglect to ring the bell, which did not affect in the least
the disastrous result of the rashness of the deceased.
Judgment reversed. 1

Pipe Co. V. Des Moines (1907) 136 Iowa, 243, 113 N. W. 835; York Park

Bldg. Ass'n V. Barnes (1894) 39 Neb. 834, 58 N. W. 440.

MORGAN V. MULHALL.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1908,

Owen v. Owen (1867) 22 Iowa, 270; Capital City Brick &
1 Accord:
Pipe Co. v. Des Moines (1907) 136 Iowa, 243, 113 N. W. 835; York Park
Bldg. Ass 'n v. Barnes (1894) 39 Neb. 834, 58 N. W. 440.

214 Missouri, 451.

Lamm, J. — Suing Mulhall, Ernest Morgan hj his next

friend asked $20,000 damages, grounding his right of ac-

tion on a negligent shooting and wounding. At a trial

with the aid of a jury, he got a verdict of $5,000. From

a judgment entered, defendant appeals.

The petition follows:

''The plaintiff' for his cause of action showeth to the

MORGAN V. MULHALL.

court that on the 24th day of May, 1905, upon the petition
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of said Ernest Morgan the said circuit court did appoint

Joseph Morgan as his next friend to commence and prose-

Supreme Court of Missouri.

1908.

cute this suit, and said Joseph Morgan has consented in

writing to act as such next best friend for said purpose.

214 Missouri, 451.

"And the plaintiff further showeth to the court that on

the 18th day of June, 1904, in said city of St. Louis and

on the grounds of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition

Company, the defendant by shooting into a crowd of peo-

ple negligently shot the plaintiff, Ernest Morgan, with a

])istol * * *

Defendant stood mute and neither prayed nor got any

instructions whatever. Plaintiff asked none on the trial

issue of negligence nor on issues relating to the defence.

Pie asked and got two — one on the measure of damages, the

other a rule of law relating to the credibility of the wit-

nesses and the weight of their testimony. In this state

of the record, defendant does not contend the instructions

LAMM, J.-Suing Mulhall, Ernest Morgan by his next
friend asked $20,000 damages, grounding his right of action on a negligent shooting and wounding. At a trial
with the aid of a jury, he got a verdict of $5,000. From
a judgment entered, defendant appeals.
The petition follows:
"The plaintiff for his cause of action showeth to the
court that on the 24th day of May, 1905, upon the petition
of said Ernest Morgan the said circuit court did appoint
Joseph Morgan as his next friend to commence and proseu te this suit, and said Jo eph Morgan has consented in
writing to act as such next best friend for said purpose.
"And the plaintiff further showeth to the court that on
the 18th day of June, 1904, in said city of St. Louis and
on th
rounds of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition
ompany, the defendant by shooting into a crowd of people n o·li ntly shot the plaintiff, Ernest Morgan, with a
J istol * * *
f ndant stood mute and neither prayed nor got any
in. trurti n. what v r. Plaintiff a k d non on th trial
f n glig nc nor on i u
r latinO' to the defence.
k d n g t t o-on n th mea ur of damag , the
r a rul of law r lati g to the credibility of the witand th w ight of th ir t timony. In this state
of the record, d fendant does not contend the instructions
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given were bad law in and of themselves, but his counsel in-

sist it was error to not give instructions bearing upon the

issues and announcing rules of law by which the jury

could be guided to a just verdict on them.

**********

(b) An excellent law writer states the general doctrine

in civil cases to be: '*It is then, a general rule of pro-

cedure, subject, in this country, to a few statutory inno-

vations, that mere non-direction, partial or total, is not

ground of new trial, unless specific instructions, good in

point of law and appropriate to the evidence, were reques-

ted and refused. A party cannot, by merely excepting to a

charge, make it the foundation for an assignment of er-

ror, that it is indefinite or incomplete." (2 Thompson on

Trials, sec. 2341). Judge Thompson supports his text by

a wealth of authorities in a note, adding: ''The English

rule seems to be that non-direction, where specific direc-

tion is not requested, is no ground of a new trial, unless it
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produce a verdict against the evidence." (Citing Ford

V. Lacey, 30 L. J. (Exch.) 351; Railroad v. Braid, 1 Moore,

P. C. Cas. (N. S.) 101.)

To question that general rule in Missouri at this late day

would be to spin cobwebs before the eyes of justice and

mischievously unsettle the law. This is so because our stat-

ute on procedure in civil cases does not contemplate in-

structions whether or no. Parties litigant have their op-

tion to ask or not ask for them. That statute ordains (R.

S. 1899, sec. 748) : "When the evidence is concluded, and

before the case is argued or submitted to the jury or to the

court sitting as a jury, either party may move the court to

give instructions on any point of law arising in the cause,

which shall be in writing and shall be given or refused. The

court may of its own motion give like instructions, and such

instructions as shall be given by the court on its own motion

or the motion of counsel shall be carried by the jury to their

room for their guidance to a correct verdict according to

the law and evidence; which instructions shall be returned

by the jury into court at the conclusion of the deliberations

of such jury, and filed by the clerk and kept as a part of the

record in such case."

In construing that section, the better view is that it is

permissive, not mandatory. Doubtless it conduces to the

lNSTR lTCTJNG THE
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gi en were bad law in and of them elve , but hi coun el insist it was error to not give in truction bearing upon the
issues and announcing rules of law by which the jury
could be guided to a ju t verdict on them.

* * * * * * * * * *
(b) An excellent law writer states the general doctrine
in civil cases to be: ''It is then, a general rule of procedure, subject, in this country, to a few tatutory innovations, that mere non-direction, partial or total, is not
ground of new trial, unle specific in truction , goo1l in
point of law and appropriate to the evidence, were reque ted and refused. A arty cannot, by merely excepting to a
charge, make it the foundation for an a ignment of error, that it is indefinite or incomplete." (2 Thomp on on
Trials, sec. 2341). Judge Thompson upport his text by
a wealth of authoritie in a note, adding: "The English
rule seems to be that non-direction, where specific direction is not reque ted, is no ground of a new trial unle it
produce a verdict again t the evidence." (Citing Ford
v. Lacey, 30 L. J. (Exch.) 351; Railroad v. Braid, 1 Moore,
P. C. Ca . (N. S.) 101.)
To que tion that general rule in Missouri at this late day
would be to spin cobwebs before the eyes of justice and
mischievously unsettle the law. This is so becau e our statute on procedure in civil cases does not contemplate intruction whether or no. Parties litigant have their option to ask or not a. k for them. That tatute ordain (R.
S. 1899, ec. 748): "When the evidence i concluded and
before the case is argued or submitted to the jury or to the
court itting as a jury either part_ may move the court to
give in truction on an point of law ari ing in the catre
which shall be in writing and hall be iven or refu e . Th
court may of it own motion ive like in truction and su h
instruction as hall b given y the court on it own motio
or th motion of oun el hall be carried by the jury to their
room for their guidance to a correc ver ict a ordinO' to
the law and evid n · whi h i truction hall be r turn d
b. th jur. into ourt at th on lu ion of the deliberation
of u h j iry, an fil db. th 1 rk and k pt as a part of th
record in u h ca e. ''
In con truing that e tion the better view is that it is
permissive, not mandatory. Doubtless it conduces to the
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science of jurisprudence and the orderly administration of

the law to have instructions defining the issues, putting it

to the jury to find the fact and declaring the law on the fact

when found, but it is within the knowledge of the profession

(and our decisions show) that cases are not infrequently

tried, nisi, without them. That mere non-direction is not

misdirection is a familiar, settled rule of appellate proce-

dure. Under that rule, before appellant can predicate re-

versible error on what a trial court does not say to the jury,

he must first put the court in the wrong by asking it to say

something, or else the court in trying to cover the case by

instructions holds a false voice, or omits in general instruc-

tions essential elements of the case. [Tetherow v. Rail-

road, 98 Mo. 74; Coleman v. Drane, 116 Mo. 1. c. 394; Brown-

ing V. Railroad, 124 Mo. 55; Nolan v. Johns, 126 Mo. 159;

Wilson V. Railroad, 122 Mo. App. 1. c. 672, et seq., and cases

cited; Nugent v. Armour Packing Co., 208 Mo. 1. c. 500;

Flaherty v. Railroad, 207 Mo. 1. c. 339.)
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Here, manifestly, appellant was as much to blame as the

court or respondent for the omission to instruct on vital is-

sues ; for he by his silence joined in the general silence and

made it more profound. At most it was common error, if

any, and error common to all is not reversible error. Ho

who does not speak when he should, will not be heard to

speak when he would.

The premises considered, we have nothing to do but look

to the record and see if it supports the verdict. We find

ample testimony to support it.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered.

All concur.^

y Accord: Stuckey v. Fritsrhe (1890) 77 Wis. 329, 46 N. W. 59; Osgood

V. Skinner (1904) 211 111. 229, 71 N. E. 869; Palatine Tnp. Co. v. Santa Fe

Meroantile Co. (190.5) 13 N. Mex. 241, 82 Pac. 363; Womaek v. Circle (1877)

29 Gratt (Va.) 192; Texas & Pacifiic Ry. Co. v. Volk (1894) 151 U. S. 73.
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science of jurisprudence and the orderly administration of
the law to have instructions defining the issues, putting it
to the jury to find the fact and declaring the law on the fact
when found, but it is within the knowledge of the profession
(and our decisions show) that cases are not infrequently
tried, nisi, without them. That mere non-direction is not
mi sdirection is a familiar, settled rule of appellate procedure. Under that rule, before appellant can predicate reversible error on what a trial court does not say to the jury,
he must first put the court in the wrong by asking it to say
something, or else the court in trying to cover the case by
instructions holds a faL e voice, or omits in general instructions e ential elements of the case. (Tetherow v . Railroad, 98 :Mo. 74; Coleman v . Drane, 116 Mo. 1. c. 394; Browning v . Railroad, 124 ~ifo. 55; Nolan v . Johns, 126 Mo. 159;
Wilson v . Railroad, 122 Mo. App. 1. c. 672, et seq., and cases
ited; Nugent v . Armoitr Packing Co., 208 Mo. 1. c. 500;
Flaherty v . Railroad, 207 Mo. 1. c. 339.)
Here, manifestly, appellant was as much to blame as the
court or re pondent for the omission to instruct on vital issues; for he by his silence joined in the general silence ann
made it more profound. At most it was common error, if
any, and error common to all is not reversible error. H c
who does not speak when he should, will not be heard to
peak when he would.
The premises considered, we have nothing to do but look
to the record and see if it upports the verdict. We find
ampl testimony to support it.
AccordinO'ly, the judo·ment is affirmed. It is so ordered.
All con ur. 1
1 Accord: Stuckey v. Fritf'cbe (1890) 77 Wjs. 329, 46 N . W. 59; Osgood
v. Skinn r (1904) 211 Jll. 229, 71 N. E. 69; Palatine TnF. o. v. anta Fe
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CHICAGO CITY EAILWAY COMPANY V. SANDUSKY.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1902.

CHICAGO CITY RAILWAY COMPANY V. SANDUSKY.

198 Illinois, 400.

Me. Justice Boggs delivered the opinion of the court :

Between eight and nine o'clock in the evening of April

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1902.

18, 1898, a cable car which the appellant company was opera-

ting northwardly along its tracks in State street, in the

198

Illinois, 400.

city of Chicago, collided with a junk wagon in which the ap-

pellee was riding and threw him from his seat to the surface

of the paved street, and thereby inflicted injuries upon his

person for which he was awarded judgment in the sum of

$1,000 in an action on the case which he instituted against

the company in the superior court of Cook county. On ap-

peal perfected by the company to the Appellate Court for

the First District the judgment was affirmed, and the cause

is before us on a further appeal in the same behalf.

After the plaintiff had rested his case, and while the de-

fendant was adducing its evidence, the court called the at-
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torneys for the parties and read to them the following order

which the court had drawn and entered in the case: ''It is

ordered at this time, while the witnesses on the part of the

defendant are being examined, that the instructions to be

tendered to, examined or given by the court to the jury be

limited to twenty-four, — twelve on the part of the plaintiff

and twelve on the part of the defendant, — and that no in-

struction in excess of said numbers will be received or ex-

amined by the court or given to the jury." The defendant

excepted to the order, and, afterwards, to the decision of

the court in refusing to give or examine twenty instructions

presented in a body, in addition to the twelve handed up

under the order of the court. The appellant company, in

recognition of the rule but under protest, presented twelve

instructions to be given or refused by the court under the

rule, and also presented twenty additional instructions. The

court declined to examine or pass upon any of the twenty

additional instructions, for the reason they were each in

excess of the number of twelve limited by the rule. Counsel

MR. J USTICE BOGGS delivered the opinion of the court:
Between eight and nine o'clock iu the evening of April
18, 1898, a cable car which the appellant company was operating northwardly along its tracks in State street, in the
city of Chicago colli ed with a junk wagon in which the appellee was riding and threw him from his seat to the urface
of the paved treet, and thereby inflicted injurie upon hi
person for which he was awarded judgment in the sum of
$1,000 in an action on the case which he instituted against
the compan. in the uperior court of Cook col1nty. On appeal perfected by the company to the Appellate ourt for
the First District the judgment was affirmed, and the cause
is befo re us on a further appeal in the same behalf.

* * * * * * * * * *
After the plaintiff had rested his case, and while the defendant wa adducing its evidence, the court called the attorneys for the parties and read to them the following order
which the court had drawn and entered in the ca e: "It i
ordered at thi time, while the witnesses on the part of th
defendant are being examined, that the instruction to be
tendered to, examined or given by the court to the jury b
limited to twenty-four -twelve on tbe part of th plaintiff
and twelve on the part of the defendant -and that no instruction in excess of said numbers will be rrc i d or examined by the court or given to the jury." The d fendant
except d to the 01 der, and, afterwards to the de i i n f
the court in refu in · to ive or examine twent in tru ti n.
pre nted in a ody in addition to the twelve banded up
under the order of the court. The appellant compan. in
recognition of the rul but und r I rote t, pre ented twelve
in truction to be ()'iv n or r fu ed by the court und r the
rule, and al o pre entecl twenty additional instru tion . Th
court declined to
amin or pa upon any of the twenty
additional in truction for th rea on they were each in
excess of the number of twelve limited by the rule. Counsel
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for appellant preserved exceptions to this ruling of the

court.

So far as we are advised, the power of a trial court to

limit requests for instructions to an arbitrary number from

each litigant has never received the consideration of a court

of review. The power of the judge to prescribe a reason-

able rule regulating the presentation of instructions to be

given or refused is everywhere conceded. Rules that in-

structions will not be considered if presented after the be-

ginning of the argument to the jury, or during the course of

the argument to the jury, or during the course of the gen-

eral charge, or after the judge has concluded his general

charge, or after the cause has gone to the jury, or after the

jury had come in and disagreed, have been sustained, (11

Ency. of PI. & Pr. 240; Prindiville v. People, 42 111. 217.)

In Prindiville v. People, supra, the rule had been adopted

by the trial court requiring that the instructions should be

presented before the commencement of the argument of the
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cause. The appellant presented additional instructions

while the attorney for the People was making his closing

argument to the jury, and they were refused under the rule.

The instructions were not embodied in the bill of exceptions,

and we held we could not know but that the court ought to

have refused them independently of the rule, and therefore

did not determine whether the rule under consideration

was reasonable. We there indulged in the following ob-

servations, (p. 222) which meet our approval, viz.: "The

dispatch of business, the rights of litigants, jurors and wit-

nesses, all require that the time of the court shall not be

unnecessarily consumed in the trial of causes, and to avoid

such consequences courts must be invested with power to

adopt all reasonable rules for the practice of their courts.

Ever since the adoption of the statute requiring all instruc-

tions to be reduced to writing before they are given, it is

believed that similar rules have been in force in all of the

circuit courts in th» State. They have varied slightly in

their requirements, but all are designed to attain the same

end. The rule which is believed to have most generally ob-

tained requires all instructions to be furnished the court by

the commencement of the closing argument. That, it seems

to us, is well calculated to meet the convenience of both

parties and the court and to economize time, and can in no

TRIAL PRACTICE.

[Chap. 11

for appellant preserved exceptions to this ruling of the
court.
So far as we are advised, the power of a trial court to
limit requests for instructions to an arbitrary number from
·ach litigant has never received the consideration of a court
of review. The power of the judge to prescribe a reasonable rule regulating the presentation of instructions to be
given or refused is everywhere conceded. Rules that instructions will not be considered if presented after the beginning of the argument to the jury, or during the course of
the argument to the jury, or during the course of the general charge, or after the. judge has concluded his general
charge, or after the cause has gone to the jury, or after the
jury had come in and disagreed, have been sustained. (11
Ency. of PL & Pr. 240; Prindiville v. People, 42 Ill. 217.)
In Prindiville v. People, supra, the rule had been adopted
by the trial court requiring that the instructions should be
presented before the commencement of the argument of the
cause. The appellant presented additional instructions
while the attorney for the People was making his closing
argument to the jur3, and they were refused under the rule.
The in tructions were not embodied in the bill of exceptions,
and we held we ·c ould not know but that the court ought to
have refused them independently of the rule, and therefore
did not determine whether the rule under consideration
wa rea onable. We there indulged in the following ohser ation , ( . 222) which meet our approval, viz.: "The
di patch of u in , the rights of litiO'ant , juror and witne s, all require that the time of the court shall not be
unn ces arily con urned in the trial of causes, and to avoid
su h con equenc courts m·u st be invested with power to
ado11t all rea onable rules for the practice of their courts.
Ev r since the adoption of the tatute requirinO' all in tructi
to be reduced to writing fore th y ar O'iven it is
b Ji v d that simi.lar rules hav been in force in all of the
ir uit urt in the- State. They have ari d lightly in
th ir r quir m nts, but all are de igned to attain th same
. Th rul whi h i b li v d to h v mo t gen rally obtain d r quir all in. tructi. n to b furni h th ourt y
t
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t 11, i. w 11 r·kul::\t cl t m t th
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urt and to conomize time, and can in no
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way hinder or prevent the attainment of a fair trial by both

parties. So far as our observation has extended such a

rule has operated well. It gives ample time after the close

of the evidence and the case fully opened to the jury for both

parties to prepare their instructions, and the court, being

thus apprised of the legal propositions they have assumed,

has, after the instructions are thus presented, usually ample

time for their examination and to determine upon their cor-

rectness. It is essential that the court shall exercise such

power, through reasonable and proper rules, as shall enable

him to dispatch business at least so fast as the proper ad-

ministration of justice may require."

We do not wish, however, to bQ understood to hold that

another mode or manner of regulating the presentation of

instructions than that referred to may not be adopted. We

are inclined, however, to regard as unreasonable a hard and

fast rule that instructions shall be limited to a given num-

ber. It is the prolixity and confusing character of the
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charge, as a whole, that rules of this character are designed

to obviate. Restriction in point of number, only, of the in-

structions will not remove the evil. A number of concise,

clear instructions, each of which is confined to a distinct

branch or phase of the contention or distinct proposition of

law, is preferable to one long, diffuse and complicated

instruction, which includes within its range all or several

of the propositions or phases of the case and attempts to

advise the jury as to different and independent legal propo-

sitions. A general charge, consistins: of instructions of the

latter character, though not exceeding the number permit-

ted by the rule, would be more objectionable, from every

proper point of view, than a charge composed of instruc-

tions which, though short and clear and of a character to

enlighten the jury, exceeded the number allowed by the

rule. It is unreasonable to a!5<sumo that each of the par-

ties needs the same number of instructions. The issues in

behalf of one may make a number of instructions necessary

while the jury need little information as to those for the

other party. The judge could not, by a general rule appli-

cable to all cases or classes of cases or causes of action, de-

termine and specify, in advance of the hearing, the number

of instructions proper and requisite to be used in all cases.

If the court should wait until the conclusion of the evidence
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way hinder or prevent the attainment of a fair trial by both
parties. So far as our ob ervation has extended uch a
rule has operated well. It gives ample time after the close
of thee idence and the case fully opened to the jury for both
parties to prepare their in tructions, and the court, beino·
thu apr ri ed of the legal propositions they have a sumed,
ba , after the in truction are thus presented, usually ample
time for their examination and to determine upon their correctness. It is essential that the court shall exercise such
power, through reasonable and proper rules, as shall enable
him to dispatch bu ine s at least so fast as the proper admini tration of justice may require."
We do not wish however, to b understood to hold that
another mode or manner of regulating the presentation of
instruction than that referred to may not be adopted. We
are in lined, however, to regard a unrea onable a hard and
fa t rule that in tructions shall be limited to a given number. It is the prolixity and confu ing character of the
charo·e as a whole that rules of thi character are de igned
to ob\ iate. Re triction in point of number, only, of the instructions will not remove the evil. A number of concise,
clear in tructions, each of which i confined to a di tinct
branch or pha e of the contention or distinct propo ition of
law, is preferable to one long diffu e and complicated
in truction which includes within its range all or everal
of the propo ition or pha es of the ca e and attempt to
adYi e the jury as to different and ind endent legal propo·ition . A general charg . con i ting of in truction of the
latter character, though not exceeding the number permitted by the rule, would h mor ol jectionable from ever
proper point of view, than a charge compo ed of instructions which, thouo·h hort and clear and of a character to
e liO'hten the jury exceeded the number allow d by the
rul . It i. unr aRonahlP to R 11mP t mt each of the part] needs the ame number of in tru tions. The i u i
ehalf of on ma make a numb r of in truction nece ary
whil th jury· ne 1 little informatio a to t o e for th
oth r art. . Th ju e could not by a O' n ral rule appliof ca ..e or can. e of action de·able t all a. or la
termine and I cify in a 1vance of the he rin , the number
of in tructions proper and requi ite to be u ed in all ca es.
If the court hould wait until the conclu ion of the evidence
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m the cause and then determine the number of instructions

he would consider, the rule would be unreasonable in its

operation upon counsel, in that it would interfere with or

prohibit the practice, adopted by many careful and compe-

tent lawyers, of preparing their instructions in advance of

the trial. The court may refuse instructions which are but

repititions of others of the series which he has given, and

thus the number of instructions may be restricted to the

propositions of law really involved; and any rule which

would authorize the refusal of an instruction otherwise

proper to be given, on the ground, alone, that as many in-

structions as the rule allowed had been given, could not be

defended. 5 ,

But the cause will not be reversed because of the error

of the court in adopting the rule. The bill of exceptions

contains the instructions which the court refused to ex-

amine. Counsel for appellant, in their brief, point out but

one instruction among the twenty which the court refused
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to consider, which, in the view of counsel, was necessary to

advise the jury as to any principle of law important to the

defense to the action. The substance of this instruction

was, that in arriving at a conclusion as to the truth of the

statements made by any witness the jury might consider

the improbable character of such statements. The fifth in-

struction given in behalf of the plaintiff below correctly

stated the proposition of law referred to in the instruction

which was not passed upon. It was not necessary it should

have been repeated. As it is not complained that any other

of the instructions which were refused under the rule were

necessary to the proper presentation of the defense, the

judgment should not be reversed for the error in adopting

the rule.

The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed}

1 In Sidway v. Missouri Land & Live Stock Co. (1901) 163 Mo. 342, 376,

the court said: "Next for consideration are the instructions, respecting which

v,-e say that nine and one-half printed pages of instructions is too much for an

average jury to digest and understand. The only effect of such a midti-

plicity of instructionp would be rot to instruct the jury but to confuse and

mislead them; make their verdict mere (jvessworJc. The changes rung on all

tho phases of this case, and some not of this case, by this vast array of in-

structions, reminds one of what Judge Scott used to say was 'like the mvdti-

ydication table set to music' We have remonstrated with the trial courts

for years about the great impropriety and frequent injustice resulting from

writing or giving instructions by the acre, but without avail, and so resort
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in the cau e and then determine the number of instruction!5
he would consider, the rule would be unreasonable in its
operation upon coun el, in that it would interfere with or
prohibit the practice, adopted by many careful and competent lawyers, of preparing their instructions in advance of
the trial. The court may refuse instructions which are but
repititions of others of the series which he has given, and
thus the number of instructions may be restricted to the
propositions of law really involved; and any rule which
would authorize the refusal of an instruction otherwise
proper to be given, on the ground, alone, that as many instructions as the rule allowed had been given, could not be
defended.
ao . ··
But the cause will not be reversed because of the error
of the court in adopting the rule. The bill of exceptions
contain the instructions which the court refused to examine. Counsel for appellant, in their brief, point out but
one instruction among the twenty which the court refused
to con ider, which, in the view of counsel, was necessary to
advi e the jury as to any principle of law important to the
defense to the action. The substance of this instruction
wa , that in arriving at a conclusion as to the truth of the
tatements made by any witness the jury might consider
the improbable character of such statements. The fifth instruction given in behalf of the plaintiff below correctly
stated the propo ition of law referred to in the in truction
which was not passed upon. It was not necessary it should
have been repeated. As it is not complained that any other
of the instruction which were refu ed under the rule were
necessary to the proper . presentation of the defense, the
jud ment should not be r ver ed for the error in adopting
the rule.
The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. 1
1 In Sid way v. Missouri Land & Live Stock Co. (1901) 163 Mo. 342, 376,
the court said: ''Next for consi fora ti on are the instructions, respecting which
l';e say that nine and one-half print d pag s of in tructions is too much for an
avC'rage jury to digest and un(l r tand.
The only effect of such a multiplirity of in trnctionP wot1ld be rot to in truct the jury but to confuse and
mfalead th m; make their vedict mere g1iessworlc.
Tb changes rung on all
tho ph:i . <'S of this case, mid om e not of this case, by this vast &.rray of in.·tructions, r minds one of what Jndg
cott used to ay was 'like the multiriliration table set to music.'
We have remon trated with the trial courts
for y arc, nhont the great impropri ty anc1 freqn nt inju tice resulting from
writing or giving instructions by the acre, but without avail, and so resort
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must be had to more drastic measures. We therefore hold that the great

number of instructions given in this instance, of itself, warrants a reversal

459
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must be had to more drastic measure .
We therefore hold that the great
number of instructions given in this instance, of itself, warrants a reverlilal
of the judgment.''

of the judgment."

CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY V.

STOCK.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 1905,

104 Virginia, 97.

Keith, P., delivered the opinion of the court.

The eleventh assignment of error is a novel one. After

CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAIL\VAY COMPANY V.

the jury had been instructed, plaintiff in error presented

STO K.

the following request to the court :

''The defendant prays the court that should the hypo-

thesis of the facts whereon the several instructions pro-

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

1905.

pounded by it be incorrect, or should the said instructions

104 Virginia, 97.

be inartificially or incorrectly expressed, or should the con-

clusion of law therein announced be incorrectly stated, that

the court will so amend the same as to accord with the facts

and law of this case, to the end that the jury may be duly
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instructed on the phases of the case at bar presented by the

said instructions."

Which the court refused. * * *

This court has held in numerous cases that a trial court is

bound to give any instruction asked for by either party

which correctly expounds the law upon the e\'idence before

the jury. "But if such instruction does not correctly ex-

pound the law, the court, as a general rule, may refuse to

give it, and is not bound to modify it or give any other in-

struction in its place. This principle is founded on good

reasons, and is sustained by much authority. A party can-

not, by asking for an erroneous instruction, devolve upon

the court the duty of charging the jury on the law of the

case. An instruction, as asked for, may be so equivocal,

that to give or refuse it might mislead the jury, and thus

it might have all the effect of an erroneous instruction. In

such a case, it would be proper for the court to modify the

instruction so as to make it plain." Rosenbaums v.

P., delivered the opinion of the court.
* * * * * * * * * *
The eleventh a ignment of error is a novel one. After
the jury had been in tructed, plaintiff in error presented
the following request to the court:
''The defendant prays the court that should the hypothesis of the fact whereon the everal instruction propounded b. it be incorrect, or should the said in tructions
be inarti:ficiall or incorrectly expre sed, or hould the con·lu ion of law therein announced be incorrectly tated, that
the court will o amend the ame a to accord with the facts
and law of this ca e, to the end that the jury may be duly
instructed on the phases of the case at bar presented by the
aid in tructions. ''
Which the court refused. * * *
This court has held in numerou ca es that a trial court is
bound to give any in truction a ked for by either party
which correctly expound the law upon the evidence before
the jury. "But if such instruction does not correctly expound the law, the court, a a general rule, may refu e to
give it, and i not bound to modif it or give any other intru tion in it place. This principl i founded on good
reason and i u tained b. much authority. A party cannot, by a kino· for an erroneou in truction, devol e upon
the court th duty of bar ·in the jury on th law of the
a . An in tru tion, a a k d for, may be o equi o al
that t oive or r fu it mio·bt mi I ad the jury and thu
it mio-ht ha all th ff t f an erroneou in truction. In
uch a a
it would b rop r for the court to modifv the
in truction so as to make it plain.'' Rosenbaun;s v.
KEITH,
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Weeden, etc., 18 Gratt. 799, 98 Am. Dec. 737 ; B. d 0. R. Co.

V. Polly, Woods £ Co., 14 Gratt. 448; Peshine v. Shepper-

son, 17 Gratt. 472, 94 Am. Dec. 468.

It cannot be doubted that, if the instruction correctly

states the law, and there be sufficient evidence to support

the verdict, it should be given. It is equally plain that if

it does not correctly state the law, it should not be given.

The sole question is as to the duty of the court to amend an

instruction offered by counsel. The rule as stated in Ro-

senhaums v. Weeden, supra, and approved in numerous de-

cisions of this court, is that when an instruction offered is

equivocal, so that either to give or refuse it might mislead

the jury, the duty is imposed upon the court so to modify

it as to make it plain ; that if it be right, it should be given ;

if it be wrong, it should be rejected; if it be equivocal, it

should be amended. By what test is a court to measure

the duty thus imposed, and how is a jury to be misled by an

instruction which the court declines to give? An equivocal
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instruction of course should not be given, because an

equivocal instruction is an inaccurate expression of the law,

and for that reason should be refused. To say that a jury

may be misled by a refusal to give an instruction, and there-

fore the instruction should be amended and given, is to

prescribe a rule so vague and indefinite as to embarrass

rather than to assist trial courts in the performance of their

duty. It is the duty of juries to respect the instructions

given them. It is not to be supposed that they have any

knowledge with respect to those which the court refuses

to give; and finally, if it be conceded that the offer of in-

structions, their discussion, and the judgment of the court

upon them, take place in the presence of the jurors, it is an

impeachment of their integrity, or of their intelligence, to

assume that they were influenced or misled by what has oc-

curred.

But however this may be, we know of no authority, in this

court or elsewhere, wliich imposes ui)on trial courts the bur-

den sought to be placed upon them by the ''prayer" under

consideration.

The rule which prevails in other jurisdictions is thus

stated Blashfield on Instruction to Juries, sec. 137, and is

supported by the great weight of authority: "In order to

entitle a party to insist that a requested instruction be giv-

TRIAL PRACTICE.

[Chap. 11

Weeden, etc., 18 Gratt. 799, 98 Am. Dec. 737; B. & 0. R. Co.
v. Polly, Woods & Co., 14 Gratt. 448; Peshine v . Shepperson, 17 Gratt. 472, 94 Am. Dec. 468.
It cannot be doubted that, if the instruction correctly
states the law, and there be sufficient evidence to support
the verdict, it s_bould be gi~Ten. It is eq"Qally plain that if
it does not correctly state the law, it should not be given.
The sole question is as to the duty of the court to amend an
instruction offered by counsel. The rule as stated in Rosenbaums v . Weed en , supra, and approved in numerou deci ions of this coHrt, is that when an instruction offered is
equivocal, so that either to give or refuse it might mi lead
the jury, the duty is imposed upon the court so to modify
it as to make it plain; that if it be right, it should be given;
if it be wrong, it should be rejected; if it be equivocal, it
should be amended. By what test is a court to measure
the duty thus impos d, and bow is a jury to be misled by a n
instruction which the court declines to give1 An equivocal
in truction of course should not be given, becau e an
equivocal instruction is an inaccurate expression of the law,
and for that reason should be refused. To say that a jury
may be mi led by a refusal to give an instruction, and therefore the instruction should
amended and given, is to
prescribe a rule so vague and indefinite as to embarrass
rather than to a si t trial courts in the performance of their
dut . It i the duty of jurie to respect the instructions
given them. It is not to be supposed that they have any
knowledge with respect to tho e which the court refuse
to give; and :finally, if it be conceded that the offer of instructions, tb ir di cus ion·, and the judgment of the court
upon them, take place jn the pr sence of the juror , it i an
im a hment of their inteO'rity, or o.f their intellio· nee, to
as ume that th y were influ need or mi led by what has ocurred.
ut howev r this ma .. b , w know of no authority, in thi
<'Ourt or l.
h r , which impo.
ipon trial ourt the burd n . ou;-!,ht to b place upon th m by the ''pra er'' und r
ron:i c1 ration.
Th rul which pr vail. in th r juri di tion i thu
t t c1 la:hfi 1 on In trn ti on to J uri , ec. 137 an is
lJ rkd h. th o-rrat w i 0 ·ht of authority: ''In order to
ntitl a party to in i t that a r qu te in tru tion be oiv-

oe
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en to the jury, such instruction must be correct both in form

and substance, and such that the court might give to the

jury without modification or omission. If the instruction,

as requested, is objectionable in any respect, its refusal is

not error. A party cannot complain that the court did not,

of its own motiuu, modify and correct the request and then

give it as corrected. No such duty rests upon the court."

**********

Reversed.

Section 5. Cautionary Instructions.

(a) Admissions.

en to the jury, such instruction must be correct both in form
and sub tan e, and such that the court might give to the
jury without modification or omission. If the in tru ·tio11.
as requested, i objectionable in any respect, it refu. al is
not error. A party cannot complain that the eourt d1u not,
of it~ own m ti vu, mod1ty and correct the reque t and then
give it as corrected. No such duty rests upon the court."

• • • • • * • • * •

SCURLOCK V. CITY OF BOONE.

Reversed.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 1909.

142 Iowa, 580.

Evans, C. J. — The plaintiff was a resident of the defend-

ant city. On February 26, 1907, she claims to have fallen

upon one of the sidewalks by reason of a loose board there-

on. The claim is that her grandson, who was walking at
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her side, stepped upon one end of the board, whereby the

other end was thrown up against the plaintiff in such a way

SECTION 5. CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS.

as to cause her to fall. It is claimed that she suffered in-

ternal injuries either by the fall or by the blow from the

board. It was claimed at the time of trial that she was then

(a)

Admissions.

in a poor state of health, and one of the issues of fact in

dispute was whether her then condition was caused by the

SCURLOCK V. CITY OF BOONE.

accident complained of.

II. It appeared from the testimony on behalf of the

plaintiff that prior to the accident she had always maintain-

Supreme Court of Iowa.

1909.

ed good health. On Ijehalf of the defendant, Mrs. Miller

and Mrs. Ball, her daughter, both testified that on one oc-

142 Iowa, 580.

casion, about two years previous, the plaintiff called at their

home at Ames, and that she stated to them at that time

that she was in very poor health. T. L. Jones, one of the

city council, testified also that prior to the accident the

EvANS, C. J.-The plaintiff wa a resident of the defendant city. On February 26, 1907, she claims to have fallen
upon one of the idewalks by reason of a loose board thereon. The claim i that her grand on, who wa walking at
her ide, stepped upon one end of the board, whereby the
other end was thrown up again t the plaintiff in uch a way
as to cause her to fall. It is claimed that she uffered internal injuries either by the fall or by the blow from the
board. It wa claimed at the time of trial that he wa then
in a poor tate of health, and one of the i ue of fact in
di pute wa wh ther her then condition was cau ed by the
a cident complained of.
* * * • • * • • • •
II. It app ared from the testimony on
half of the
plaintiff that rior to th ac ident he bad alwa.- m intained ood h altb.
n
half of th d f ndant Mr . ]\filler
and Mr . all her aught r both t tifi d that on one oca ion, about two. ars pr iou th plaintiff all d at th ir
borne at Ame , and that he tat d to them at that time
that . be wa in 'ery po r b al th. T. L. Jon , one of the
city council, ~estified also that prior to the accident the
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plaintiff had frequently told him that she was not well.

None of this testimony was denied by the plaintiff, either

directly or indirectly; nor did she refer to it in any way in

her rebuttal testimony. The court gave to the jury the fol-

lowing instruction. " (IS^^) There is some evidence in this

ease with respect to an admission by the plaintiff in regard

to the condition of her health at a time prior to the acci-

dent. Verbal admissions, consisting of mere representa-

tions of oral statements, made a long time before, are sub-

ject to much imperfection and mistakes, for the reason that

the person making them may not have expressed her own

meaning, or the witness may not have understood her, or,

by not giving her exact language, may have changed the

meaning of what was actually said, and this is especially

true where a long time has elapsed since the alleged ad-

mission was made. Such evidence should therefore be re-

ceived by you with caution." This instruction is earnestly

challenged by the appellant. We are constrained to hold
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that it can not be sustained. This court has heretofore ap-

proved the rule on this point as laid down by Greenleaf. 1

Greenleaf, section 200; Martin v. Town of Algona, 40 Iowa,

?m; Allen V. Kirk, 81 Iowa, 670.

It will be observed that the instruction under considera-

tion, through probable oversight, falls short of stating the

Greenleaf rule. As set forth in the Martin case, supra, the

following should have been added: ''But when such admis-

sions are deliberately made or often repeated, and are cor-

rectly given, they are often the most satisfactory evidence,

and the jury should consider all the circumstances under

which they were made and give them such weight as they

are justly entitled to receive." This latter proviso gives

a proper balance to the rule. An instruction substantially

in the form of the one under consideration was condemned

by this court in Hawes v. B., C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa,

315. See, also, Castner v. Railway Co., 126 Iowa, 586. The

natural effect of the court's instruction as given was to

minimize unduly the testimony of the defendant on the sub-

ject referred to, and this is especially so in view of the fact

that the plaintiff' neither denied the statements attributed to

her, nor denied recollection of them, nor offered any ex-

planation.

Tho tendency of this instruction to minimize the evidence

plaintiff had frequently told him that she was not well.
None of this testimony was denied by the plaintiff, either
directly or indirectly; nor did she refer to it in any way in
her rebuttal testimony. The court gave to the jury the following instruction. '' ( 12-1/2 ) There is some evidence in this
case with respect to an admission by the plaintiff in regard
to the condition of her health at a time prior to the accident. Verbal admissions, consisting of mere representations of oral statements, made a long time before, are subject to much imperfection and mistakes, for the reason that
the person making them may not have expressed her own
meaning, or the witness may not have understood her, or,
by not giving her exact language, may have changed the
meaning of what was actually said, and this is especially
true where a long time has elapsed since the alleged admission was made. Such evidence should therefore be received by you with caution.'' This instruction is earnestly
challenged by the appellant. We are constrained to hold
that it can not be sustained. This court has heretofore approved the rule on this point as laid down by Greenleaf. 1
Greenleaf, section 200; iv.lartin v. Town of Algona, 40 Iowa,
392; Allen v. Kirk, 81 Iowa, 670.
It will be observed that the instruction under consideration, through probable oversight, falls short of stating the
Greenleaf rule. As set forth in the Martin case, supra, the
following should have been added: ''But when such admissions are deliberately made or often repeated, and are corre tly given, they are often the most satisfactory evidence,
and the jury should consider all the circumstances under
which they were made and give them such weight as they
are ju tly entitl d to receive.'' Thi latter provi o O'ives
a proper balance to the rule. An instruction ubstantially
in the form of the one under consideration was condemned
by thi . ourt in Hawes v. B., C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa,
. 5.
, al o, Ca tner v. Railway Co., 126 Iowa, 586. The
natur 1 ff t of th court's in truction a given was to
mm1m1z unduly the testimony of the def ndant on the subj t r f rr d to, and thi i
p ially so in view of the fact
th at th )J1 intiff n ith rd ni d th tatem nt attributed to
h r n r
nie r c lle tion of them, nor offer d any ex11
, y of this in truction to minimize the evidenc0
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referred to was further empliasized by the use of the word

"some" in the first sentence. This court has heretofore

condemned the use of this word in this connection, in that

its tendency is to belittle the evidence referred to. State

V. Donovan, 61 Iowa, 369; State v. Borland, 103 Iowa, 174;

State V. Rutledge, 135 Iowa, 581. We feel constrained

therefore to hold that defendant's exception to this instruc-

tion must be sustained.

**********

For the error pointed out in instruction 121/2 the judg-

ment below must be reversed.''-

-i. Accord: Allen v. Kirk (1891) 81 Iowa, 658, 47 N. W. 906; Stewart v.

De Loach (1890) 86 Ga. 729, 12 S. E. 1067; Tozer v. Hershey (1870) 15

Minn. 257; Haven v. Markstrum (1886) 67 Wis. 493, 30 N. W. 720.

KAUFFMAN V. MAIER.
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referred to was further em ha ized by the u e of the word
''some'' in the first senten e. Thi ourt has heretofore
condemned the use of this word in thi connection, in that
its tendency is to belittle the evid nee referred to. State
v. Donovan, 61 Iowa, 369; State v. Dorland, 103 Iowa, 174;
State v. Riitledge, 135 Iowa, 581. We feel constrained
therefore to hold that defendant's exception to thi instruction must be sustained.

* * * * * * * * * •
For the error pointed out in instruction 121/2 the judgment below must be reversed. 1

Supreme Court of California. 1892.

94 California, 269.

Harrison, J. — The plaintiff brought this action against
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the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries

alleged to have resulted from their negligence. He was in

Allen v. Kirk (1891) 81 Iowa, 658, 47 N. W. 906; Stewart v.
1 Accord:
De Loach (1890) 86 Ga. 729, 12 S. E. 1067; Tozer v. Hershey (1870) 15
Minn. 257; Haven v. Mark trum (1886) 67 Wis. 493, 30 N. W. 720.

their employ at the time of the injury, and the negligence

charged upon them was their permitting the shaft of a

wheel to protrude into the room where he was at work, by

reason of which his sleeve was caught upon the jagged end

of the shaft, causing him to be carried around it, whereby

his arm was so injured as to require amputation. The

plaintiff recovered judgment in the court below, and a new

KAUFFMAN V. MAIER.

trial was granted upon the motion of the defendants, and

from this order the plaintiff has appealed. In their state-

ment upon the motion for a new trial, the defendants have

Supreme Court of California.

1892.

assigned various errors of law on the part of the court, as

well as many particulars in which the evidence is claimed

94 California, 269.

to be insufficient.

**********

5. Evidence was given at the trial tending to show that

shortly after the injury the plaintiff had made statements

HARRISON, J.-The plaintiff brought this action against
the defendants to reco er damages for personal injuries
alleged to have re ulted from their negligence. He was in
their employ at the time of the injury, and the negligence
harged upon them was their permitting the shaft of a
wheel to protrude into the room where he was at work, by
rea on of which his sleeve wa caught upon the jagged end
of the shaft, cau ing him to be carried around it, whereby
hi arm was o injur d as to require amputation. The
plaintiff recovered judgment in the court below and a new
trial was granted upon the motion of the defendants, and
from this order the plaintiff ha appealed. In their statement upon the motion for a new trial, the defendant have
a igned various errors of law on the part of the court, as
well a many parti ulars in which the evidence is claimed
to be in ufficient.

* • • • • * • • • •

5. Evidence was given at the trial tending to show that
hortly after the injury the plaintiff had made statements
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to the effect had it was the result of his own fault, and that

the accident had been brought about by a different cause

from that shown at the present trial. In its instructions

to the jury, the court said: ''The court instructs the jury

that although parol proof of the verbal admissions of a

party to a suit, when it appears that the admissions were

understandingly and deliberately made, often afford satis-

factory evidence, yet, as a general rule, the statements of

the witnesses as to the verbal admissions of a party should

be reviewed by the jury with great caution, as that kind of

evidence is subject to much imperfection and mistake. The

party himself may have been misinformed, or may not have

clearly expressed his meaning or the witness may have mis-

understood him ; and it frequently happens that the witness,

by unintentionally altering a few expressions really used,

gives an effect to the statement completely at variance with

what the party did actually say. But it is the province of

the jury to weigh such evidence, and give it the considera-
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tion to which it is entitled, in view of all the other evidence

in the case."

In thus instructing the jury, the court disregarded the

provision of the constitution that ''judges shall not charge

juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the

testimony and declare the law."

While it is a matter of common knowledge that the

statements of a witness as to the verbal admissions of

another are liable to be erroneous, and for that reason

should be received with caution, yet such conclusion is only

an inference of fact which must be made by the jury, and

is not a presumption or a conclusion of law to be declared

by the court. The reasons which are to be urged in favor

of receiving such statements with caution are based upon

human experience, and vary in strength and conclusive-

ness with the facts and circumstances of each case, and

their sufficiency in any particular case is an inference

which the reason of the jury makes from those facts and

circumstances ; but there is no rule of law which directs the

jury to invariably make such an inference from the mere

fact that the proof of the admission is by oral testimony.

That deduction called a presumption which the law ex-

pressly directs to be made from particular facts is uniform,

and not dependent upon the varying conditions and circum-

TRIAL PRACTICE.
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to the effect had it was the result of his own fault, and that
the accident had been brought about by a different cause
from that shown at the present trial. In its instructions
to the jury, the court said: ''The court instructs the jury
that although parol proof of the verbal admissions of a
party to a suit, when it appears that the admissions were
understandingly and deliberately made, often afford satisfactory evidence, yet, as a general rule, the statements of
the witnesses as to the verbal admissions of a party should
be reviewed by the jury with great caution, as that kind of
evidence is subject to much imperfection and mistake. The
party himself may have been misinformed, or may not have
clearly expressed his meaning or the witness may have misunderstood him; and it frequently happens that the witness,
by unintentionally altering a few expressions really used,
gives an effect to the statement completely at variance with
what the party did actually say. But it is the province of
the jury to weigh such evidence, and give it the consideration to which it is entitled, in view of all the other evidence
in the case.''
In thus instructing the jury, the court disregarded the
provision of the constitution that ''judges shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the
testimony and declare the law."
While it is a matter of common knowledge that the
statements of a witness as to the verbal admissions of
another are liable to be erroneous, and for that reason
should be received with caution, yet such conclusion is only
an inference of fact which must be made by the jury, and
is not a presumption or a conclusion of law to be declared
by the court. The reasons which are to be urged in favor
of receiving such statements with caution are based upon
human experi nee, and vary in strength and conclusiven ss with the facts and circumstances of each case, and
th ir suffi ien y in any particular case is an inference
wbi h th reason of the jury makes from those facts and
cir umsta c s; but there is no rul . of law which directs the
jury to i variably make such an inference from the mere
fa t that th proof of the admis ion is by oral testimony.
That d
tion called a presum tion which the law exr sly ir t. to
made from particular fa ts is uniform,
and not d p ndent upon the varying conditions and circum-
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stances of individual cases. To weigh the evidence and

find the facts in any case is the province of the jury, and

that province is invaded by the court whenever it instructs

them that any particular evidence which has been laid be-

fore them is or is not entitled to receive weight or con-

sideration from them. {People v. Walden, 51 Cal. 588;

People V. Fong Ching, 78 Cal. 173 ; Mauro v. Piatt, 62 111.

450; Commonwealth v. Galligan, 113 Mass. 202; McNeil v.

Barney, 51 Cal. 603; People v. Dick, 34 Cal. 666.)

The instruction above quoted is, in substance, an argu-

ment to the jury with ''respect to matters of fact" that

had been presented at the trial, and a comment by the court

upon the weight which they should give to that testimony.

Whether the facts and circumstances proved in the case

were sufficient to cause the reason of the jury to make this

inference was fair matter of argument for the counsel of

the respective parties; but the court forsook its judicial

position when it assumed the office of commenting upon the
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weight and credibility of this evidence. The closing para-

graph in the instruction, to the effect that it was for the

jury to give to the evidence the consideration to which it

was entitled, did not obviate the error, as by its remarks

the court had, in substance, said to them that as matter of

law the evidence was not entitled to any great considera-

tion.

The order is affirmed.

Sharpstein, J., Garoutte, J., and McFarland, J., con-

curred.^

1 Accord'. Knowles v. Nixon (1896) 17 Mont. 473, 43 Pac. 628; Johnson

V. Stone (1892) 69 Miss. 826, 13 So. 850.
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stances of individual cases. To weigh the evidence and
find the facts in any case is the province of the jury, and
that province is invaded by the court when ever it instruct
them that any particular evidence which has been laid before them is or is not entitled to receive weight or consideration from them. (People v. Walden, 51 Cal. 588;
People v. Fong Ching, 78 Cal. 173; l.!fauro v. Platt, 62 Ill.
450; Commonw ealth v. Galligan, 113 Mass. 202; McNeil v .
Barney, 51 Cal. 603; People v. Dick, 34 Cal. 666.)
The instruction above quoted is, in substance, an argument to the jury with "respect to matters of fact" that
had been pre ented at the trial, and a comment by the court
upon the weight which they should give to that testimony.
Whether the facts and circumstances proved in the case
were sufficient to cause the reason of the jury to make this
inference was fair matter of argument for the counsel of
the respective parties; but the court forsook its judicial
position when it assumed the office of commenting upon the
weight and credibility of this evidence. The closing paragraph in the instruction, to the effect that it was for the
jury to give to the evidence the consideration to which it
was entitled, did not obviate the error, as by its remarks
the court had, in substance, said to them that as matter of
law the evidence was not entitled to any great consideration.
The order is affirmed.
SHARPSTEIN, J., GAROUTTE, J., and McFARLAND, J., concurred.1
1 Accord:
Knowles v. Nixon (1896) 17 Mont. 473, 43 Pac. 628; Johnson
v. Stone (1892) 69 Miss. 826, 13 So. 850.
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(b) Burden of Proof.

CRABTREE V. REED.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1869,

(b)

50 Illinois, 206.

Burden of Proof.

Mb. Chief Justice Breese delivered the opinion of the

CRABTREE V. REED.

court:

The only question between the parties to this record was,

as to the value of a mule the appellee acknowledged he had

Suprerne Court of Illinois.

struck with a heavy stick, and which belonged to the appel-

1869.

lant, causing its death.

50 Illinois, 206.

The action was case, for killing the mule, and the court,

on behalf of defendant, instructed the jury that the burden

of proof rested upon the plaintiff, and that he was bound

to maintain, by a clear preponderance of evidence, the alle-

gations in the declaration, and that unless they find such

a preponderance, they will find for the defendant. Though

the defendant had admitted he struck the mule in disciplin-

ing him, he not having been broke to work, and that from
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the blow the mule died, he contested the fact of killing be-

fore the jury, and under the above instruction, the jury

found for him.

This instruction must certainly have misled the jury.

The law is not, in such a case, that there shall be a clear

preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiff to en-

title him to recover. It is sufficient, if the evidence creates

probabilities in his favor — that the weight of the evidence

inclines to his side.

For this error the judgment must be reversed and the

cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

MB.

CHIEF

JusTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the

court:
The only question between the parties to this record was,
as to the value of a mule the appellee acknowledged he had
struck with a heavy stick, and which belonged to the appellant, causing its death.
The action was case, for killing the mule, and the court,
on behalf of defendant, instructed the jury that the burden
of proof rested upon the plaintiff, and that he was bound
to maintain, by a clear preponderance of evidence, the allegations in the declaration, and that unless they find such
a preponderance, they will find for the defendant. Though
the defendant had admitted he struck the mule in disciplining him, he not having been broke to work, and that from
the blow the mule died, he contested the fact of killing before the jury, and under the above instruction, the jury
found for him.
This instruction must certainly have misled the jury.
The law is not, in such a case, that there shall be a clear
preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiff to entitle him to recover. It is sufficient, if the evidence creates
probabilities in his favor-that the weight of the evidence
inclines to his side.
For thi error the judgment must be reversed and th
ause remanded.
Judgm.e nt reversed.

Sec. 5]
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ALTSCHULER V. COBURN.

Supreme Court of Nebraska. 1894.

38 Nebraska, 881.

ALTSCHULER V. COBURN.

Post, J.

This was an action of replevin in the district court of

Douglas county in which the plaintiff in error, Marguerite

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

1894.

Altschuler, sought to recover certain personal prop-

**********

38 Nebraska, 881.

6. Exception was taken to the following instruction:

"The burden of proof in this case is on the plaintiff to

show by a preiDonderance of the testimony her right to the

possession of the property in controversy at the commence-

ment of this suit, and unless she has satisfied you by a fair

preponderance of the testimony of her right to such posses-

sion, she cannot recover in this action." The criticism of

the instruction is directed to the expression "fair pre-

ponderance" of the evidence used therein. In support of

this exception we are referred by counsel to Search v. Mil-
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ler, 9 Neb. 26, and Marx v. Kilpatrick, 25 Neb. 118, in which

the expression "clear preponderance of the evidence" is

condemned. But in Dunbar v. Briggs, 18 Neb. 94, an in-

struction was approved which required a counter-claim to

be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

The last case is in point and decisive of the question pre-

sented by this exception. In the opinion of the writer, any

attempt to qualify that term by subtle distinctions between

a clear preponderance and a fair preponderance of the

evidence is to be deprecated as an unnecessary refinement

and tending to confuse rather than enlighten the average

mind. "Preponderance" is defined by Webster thus: "An

outweighing; superiority of weight." There can be no pre-

ponderance while the evidence is evenly balanced, hut

when the scale inclines toward one side, we know the weight

or superiority of evidence is with that party. Manifestly

there can be no such outweighing unless there is both a

clear preponderance and a fair preponderance. As well

might we attempt to apply degrees of comparison to the

PosT, J.
This was an action of replevin in the district court of
Douglas county in which the plaintiff in error, Marguerite
Altschuler, sought to recover certain personal proprty. * * * *
* * • * * * * * * *
6. Exception was taken to the following instruction:
''The burden of proof in this case is on the plaintiff to
·bow by a preponderance of the testimony her right to the
po session of the property in controversy at the commencement of this suit, and unless she has satisfied you by a fair
preponderance of the testimony of her right to such possesion, she cannot recover in this action.'' The criticism of
the instruction is directed to the expression ''fair preponderance '' of the evidence used therein. In support of
this exception we are referred by counsel to Search v . Miller, 9 Neb. 26, and Marx v. Kilpatrick, 25 Neb.118, in which
the expression ''clear preponderance of the evidence'' is
ondemned. But in Dunbar v. Briggs, 18 Neb. 94, an in-truction was approved which required a counter-claim to
be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
The last case is in point and decisive of the question preented by this exception. In the opinion of the writer, an.
attempt to qualify that term by subtle distinction betw en
a clear preponderance and a fair preponderance of the
evidence is to be deprecated as an nnn ces ary re:finem nt
and tending to confu e rath r than enlirrhten .the averaa-e
mind. ''Preponderance'' i defined by Webster thu : ''An
outweighing; sup riority of wei ·ht.'' Th r can be no preponderance while the e idence is evenly balanced but
when t e cale incline toward one side we know thew i()'ht
or superiority of evidence is with that party. Manif . tly
there an be no su h outw i bing unl
there i
oth a
clear r pond ran
and a fair preponderance. As w 1l
might we attempt to apply degrees of comparison to the
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term ''equilibrium" by holding the evidence in one case

more evenly balanced than in another. Applicable in this

connection is the language used in Stephen's General View

of the Criminal Law, p. 262, with reference to the term

"reasonable doubt," where it is said that an attempt to

give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is "try-

ing to count what is not number, and measure what is not

space."

**********

We find no prejudicial error in the record and the judg-

ment is accordingly

Affirmed,

(c) Positive and Negative Testimony.

IN EE ESTATE OF WHARTON.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 1907,

132 Iowa, 714.

This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of

[Chap. 11

TRIAL PRACTICE

term ''equilibrium'' by holding the evidence in one case
more evenly balanced than in another. Applicable in this
connection is the language used in Stephen's General View
of the Criminal Law, p. 262, with reference to the term
"reasonable doubt," where it is said that an attempt to
give a specific meaning to the word ''reasonable'' is ''trying to count what is not number, and measure what is not
space.''
* * * * * * * * * *
We find no prejudicial error in the record and the judgment is accordingly
.Affirmed.

Stephen Wharton, deceased, offered for probate by A. M.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Harrah, devisee, who is also named as executor, to act

without bond, and contested by George Wharton, his son,

and Esther Wharton, his widow, who, having been adjudged

insane, is represented by a guardian. The grounds of con-

test were want of mental capacity, and undue influence.

There was a special finding of want of mental capacity by

the jury, a general verdict in favor of contestants, and a

( c)

Positive and N e_qa.tive Testimony.

judgment entered on such verdict, denying and refusing

admission of the will to probate. Proponent appeals.

Affirmed.

IN RE ESTATE OF WHARTON.

McClain, C. J. — Many errors are assigned as to the

action of the trial court, and it will only be possible to dis-

Supreme Court of Iowa.

1907.

cuss those which seem to this court to be of controlling im-

portance.

**#*»«4<'***

132 Iowa, 714.

VI. Another instruction is complained of which direct-

ed the jury that, other things being equal, affirmative testi-

This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of
Stephen Wharton, deceased, offered for probate by A. M.
Harrah, devisee, who is also named as executor, to act
without bond, and contested by George Wharton, his son,
and E ther Wharton, his widow, who, havin<Y been adjudged
insane, i represented by a guardian. The ground of conte t were want of mental ·capacity, and undue influence.
There was a spe ial finding of want of mental capacity by
th jury, a o·eneral verdict in favor of contestant , and a
judgm nt nt red on such verdict, denying and refu ing
admi ion of the will to probate. Proponent a.pp als .
.Affirmed.
1-f LAIN, C. J.-Many errors are assigned a to the
d ] n of the trial court, and it will only be po ible to dis(u." tho which seem to this court to be of controlling imp rtan .

\ . An th r in tru tion i omplained of which directth jury th t, oth r thing b ing ectual, affirmative testi-

Sec. 5]
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mony is in general entitled to more weight than negative

testimony, and that, if a witness testifies that he did see

certain things, and another witness of equal credibility tes-

tifies that he did not see such things, then if everything else

is equal and such witnesses on either side are of equal cred-

ibility, the witness testifying negatively is entitled to less

credit than the one testifying affirmatively. It is said that

this rule, which certainly has some support in our decisions,

has been discredited in Stanley v. Cedar Rapids & Marion

City R. Co., 119 Iowa, 526, 533, and Selensky v. Chicago G.

W. R. Co., 120 Iowa, 113, 116. But in each of these cases

the instruction asked to this general effect was held proper-

ly refused, because witnesses who gave the so-called nega-

tive evidence, or some of them, were in as good a position

to hear the sounds and signals referred to in the testimony

of the witnesses giving the affirmative evidence as the latter

were. But the instruction given in this case is not open

to any such objection, and, under the evidence to which the
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instruction could have been understood by the jury as

having reference, there was no error in giving it.

**********

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

'i Accord: Loiiisville, New Albany & Chicago Ey. Co. v. Shires (1884) 108

111. 617; Jones v. Casler (1894) 139 Ind. 382, 38 iST. E. 812.

McLEAN V. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of New Jersey. 1003.

69 Neiv Jersey Laiv, 57.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Fort, J. — This was an action for damages alleged to

have resulted from an injury caused by the train of the

defendant company running into a wagon of the plaintiff,

in which the plaintiff was. at the crossing of the said com-

lNSTRU CTI .. G THE
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mony is in general entitled to more wei ·ht than neo-ative
testimony, and that, if a witne s testifie · that he did see
ertain thing and another witne s of equal credibility teshfie that h did not ee such thino· , then if everythin · else
i equal and such witnesses on either ide are of equal credibility the wit e te tifyin · negati ely i entitled to le
credit than the one te tifying affirmatively. It i aid that
this rule, which certainly ha ome support in our deci ion ,
has been discredited in Stanley v. Cedar Rapids & n,f arion
City R. Co., 119 Iowa, 526, 533, and Selensky v . Chicago G.
W. R. Co., 120 Iowa 11 , 116. But in each of the e ca es
the instruction a ked to this ·eneral effect wa held properly refused, becau e witne e who gave the so-called negative evidence, or some of them, were in as good a po ition
to hear the sound and signal referred to in the te timony
of the witne e giving the affirmative evidence a the latter
were. But the instruction given in thi ca e i not open
to any such objection, and, under the e idence to which the
in truction could ha-ve been under tood b the jury as
having reference there was no error in giving it.
* * * * * * * * * *
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

pany, at or near Soho, in Essex county.

****#***'#»

Another alleged error was on account of the refusal of

1 Accord:
Loui ville, Tew Albany & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Shires (1884) 108
Ill. 617; Jones v. Casler (1894) 139 Ind. 382, 38 N. E. 812.

the trial judge to charge the following request: ''That

McLEAN \ . ERIE RAILROAD C01'1P ANY.
Supreme Coi1,rt of New Jersey.
69

New Jersey Law,

1903.

57.

The opinion of the court wa delivered by
FoRT, J.-Thi wa an action for damag;
all o-e to
1 ave re ulted from an injur. cau ed b. the train of the
defendant com1 any running- into a wagon of the p1:=rintiff
in which the plain.ti.ff "a . at the cro ing of the aid company at or near oho in E . sex county.
* * * * * * * * * •
Another alleo·ed error wa on account of the refu al of
the trial jud e to charO'e th followinO' r quest: ' Tba t
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affirmative evidence of the ringing of the bell and blowing

of the whistle is generally entitled to more weight than

evidence that it was not noticed or heard." We are unable

to see upon what principle a judge is justified in stating to

a jury that one piece of evidence, which is legitimate, is

not to be treated by the jury the same as other evidence in

the cause. It is for the jury to say whether the testimony

of a witness having an equal opportunit}^ to hear and whose

hearing is equally good, and who testifies that he did not

hear the blowing of a whistle or the ringing of a bell, not-

withstanding he listened, shall or shall not be given equal

credit with the testimony of a witness, similarly situated,

who testifies that he did hear.

There was no error in the refusal of the trial judge to

charge the request excepted to.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.^

1 Accord: Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. O'Neill (1906) 127 Ga. 685,

56 S. E. 986; St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. v. Brock (1904) 69 Kan.
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448, 77 Pac. 86,

(d) Credibility of Witnesses.

CLINE V. LINDSEY.

Supreme Court of Indiana. 1886.

110 Indiana, 337.

[Chap. 11

TRIAL PRACTICE.

affirmative evidence of the ringing of the bell and blowing
of the whistle is generally entitled to more weight than
evidence that it was not noticed or heard.'' We are unable
to see upon what principle a judge is justified in stating to
a jury that one piece of evidence, which is legitimate, is
not to be treated by the jury the same as other evidence in
the cause. It is for the jury to say whether the testimony
of a witness having an equal opportunity to hear and whose
hearing i s equally good, and who testifies that he did not
hear the blowing of a whistle or the ringing of a bell, notwithstanding he listened, shall or shall not be given equal
credit with the testimony of a witness, similarly situated,
who testifies that he did hear.
There was no error in the refusal of the trial judge to
harge the request excepted to.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. 1

ZoLLARs, J. — Lewis J. Cline died on the 26th day of Janu-

ary, 3884. By his last will, executed on the 22d day of that

month, he bequeathed all of his property to appellants,

children of a brother.

1 Accord:
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. 0 'Neill (1906) 127 Ga. 685,
56 S. E. 9 6; St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. v. Brock (1904) 69 Kan.
448, 77 Pac. 86.

Appellees brought this action to set aside that will on the

ground that at the time it was executed, the testator was

a person of unsound mind, and hence incapable of making a

valid will. With the will out of the way, appellees and the

father of appellants are entitled to the property left by

Lewis J. nine, as his heirs at law, being his brothers, sis-

ter, and the descondants of deceased sisters.

( d)

Upon a verdict of tlio jury in favor of appellees, the

Credibility of Witnesses.

court ])elc)w, over ajipollants' motion for a new trial, set

CLINE V. LINDSEY.
Supreme Court of Indiana.

1886.

110 Indiana, 337.

line died on the 26th day of J anuary, J884. By hi la t will, executed on the 22d day of that
month, h b queath d all of his property to appellants,
c·hildren of a brother.
Pl elle . br ught this action to set a ide that will on the
ground that at th tim it wa execut d, the te tator was
a p r . on of nn ound mind, and h nee in apable of making a
valid will. With the will out of th way, appelle s and the
fath r of app IJantF; ar
ntitl d to th prop rty left by
L wi . .T. lin , a . l1i s h i r. at 1 w, h in o- hi brotherR, RlR·
t r, c nrl th0 lP . rrnrlantR of <le a a , i. t rs.
u n a v r lict r tl1 .inry in favor of a1 p n es, the
· urt 1> ·1 w v r c l p ll ant ' motion f r
n w trjal, set
ZoLLARS ,

.T.-I ewL J.

I
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aside the will. Appellants ask for a reversal of the judg

ment upon the alleged error of the court in charging the

jury.

Our attention is first called to the twentieth instruction

given by the court. It is as follows :

'"20th. In weighing the testimony of witnesses, the jury

should consider their capacity to understand the facts about

which they testify, their opportunity of knowing the mental

condition of the testator. The testimony of the testator's

neighbors, who have long been acquainted with him, and

have had frequent intercourse with him, and whose atten-

tion has been particularly called to the testator, who have

had frequent opportunities of observing his mind, is en-

titled to greater weight than that of a witness of equal

sagacity, whose opportunities were more limited. The

facts upon which the witnesses' opinions are based have

been given you, and of these you are the judges, weighing

the facts as they have been given, in order to determine the
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condition of the testator's mind. You are to weigh each

particular incident and fact stated to you by the witnesses,

and to determine from the whole whether or not the tes-

tator, at the time of the execution of the will, was or was

not of sound mind. You are to take into consideration the

will itself and its provisions, its unjustness or hardships,

if any exist, to determine the soundness or unsoundness of

the testator's mind."

The objection urged to the instruction by appellants'

counsel is, that the court thereby invaded the province of

the jury by charging, as a matter of law, that the testi-

mony of the testator's neighbors, who had long been ac-

quainted with him, etc., was entitled to more weight than

the testimony of other witnesses of equal sagacity, whose

opportunities had been more limited.

Considered without reference to any other charge that

may have been given, the above instruction, in our judg-

ment, is open to the objection urged against it.

It may be true, as a matter of fact, that the testimony of

the neighbors of the testator, who had the advantages and

opportunities named, was entitled to more weight than the

testimony of other witnesses of equal sagacity, who had had

less opportunities because of less acquaintance with the

testator. But that was a fact to be determined by the jury

INSTRUCTING THE Ju1w
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aside the will. Appellants a k for a reversal of the judg ·
ment upon the alleged error of the court in charging the
JUry.
Our attention is first called to the twentieth instruction
given by the court. It is as follows:
''20th. In weighing the testimony of witnesses, the jury
should consider their capacity to under tand the facts about
which they testify, their opportunity of knowing the mental
condition of the testator. The te timony of the testator'
neighbors, who have long been acquainted with him, and
have had frequent intercour e with him, and who e attention has been particularly called to the te tator, who have
had frequent opportunities of ob erving his mind, is entitled to greater weight than that of a witnes of equal
agacity, whose opportunities were more limited. The
facts upon which the witne e ' opinions are ba ed have
been given you, and of these you are the judges, weighing
the facts as they have been given, in order to determine the
condition of the testator's mind. You are to weigh each
particular incident and fact stated to you by the witne ses,
a.nd to determine from the whole whether or not the testator, at the time of the execution of the will wa or was
not of sound mind. You are to take into consideration the
will it elf and its provision , its unjustness or hard hip ,
if any exist, to determine the oundness or unsoundness of
the testator' mind.''
The objection urged to the instruction by appellants'
counsel is, that the court thereby invaded the province of
the jury by charging, as a matter of law, that the te timony of the testator's neighbor , who had long been acquainted with him etc., wa entitled to more weight than
the te timony of other witnes e of equal sagacity, who
opportunitie had been more limited.
on ider d without reference to any other charg that
may have been given the above instruction, in our judg.
m nt, i open to the obj ction urged against it.
It may b tru a a
tt r of fact, that th t timonv of
th n i ·h or of th t ta tor who ha th ad ya tao-e ~an
opportuniti named wa entitled to more w ight than the
t . timon f th r witn
of ual ag-a ity who had had
l
011 rtuniti . h ca u.
f 1 . a qua in tan
with th
t . tat r. But hat wa a f ct t
det rmin by the jury
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as a fact, and not by the court as a question of law.

The instruction, it will be observed, leaves out of view

the essential element of credibility. The neighbors of the

testator may have had greater opportunities and may have

been of equal sagacity with other witnesses having had less

opportunities, and yet be less worthy of credence.

Nor does it follow necessarily, and as a matter of law,

that the testimony of one of two witnesses, of equal

sagacity, is entitled to greater weight simply because he

may have had more acquaintance with, and more frequent

opportunities to observe, the person whose sanity is in

question. The witness who has had less acquaintance, and

less opportunities, may yet be the most reliable witness, be-

cause of some special training, experience, or habit of

closely observing persons whom he meets. In all such cases

it is for the jury to determine for themselves to what wit-

ness they will give the most credence. They have a right

to consider the fact that some of the witnesses may have
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tiad greater opportunities than others. The court may in-

struct them that they have such right, but it ought not to

invade their province, and undertake to determine for them

what witness is the most reliable.

The latter jjortion of the instruction, in which the jury

were charged that they should weigh the facts given by the

witnesses as the facts upon which they based their opinions,

does not relieve the instruction from the objection urged

by appellants' counsel. In the first place, the charge di-

recting the jury that the testimony of the one class of wit-

nesses was entitled to the greater weight is general, and

embraces all that those witnesses testified to; and, in the

second place, it was impossible for the non-expert wit-

nesses, giving their opinions as to the insanity of the tes-

tator, to state to the jurj^ everything upon which those

opinions were based. If they could have stated everything

upon which they based their opinions, the opinions would

have been incompetent. The rule which allows such opin-

ions, is a rule of necessity, and rests upon the proposition

that there may be something about the looks, deportment,

etc., of a person which may contribute to the conclusion that

he is of unsound mind, whicli can not be described in words

1)V tlio witness. Cartilage T. P. Co. v. Andrews, 102 Ind.

138 (52 Am. R. 653).

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 11

as a fact, and not by the court as -a question of law.
The instruction, it will be observed, leaves out of view
the essential element of credibility. The neighbors of the
t.estator may have had greater opportunities and may have
been of equal sagacity with other witnesses having had less
opportunities, and yet be less worthy of credence.
Nor does it follow necessarily, and as a matter of law,
that the testimony of one of two witnesses, of equal
sagacity, is entitled to greater weight simply because he
may have had more acquaintance with, and more frequent
opportunitie to observe 1 the person whose sanity is in
question. The witness who has had less acquaintance, and
less opportunities, may yet be the most reliable witness, because of some special training, experience, or habit of
closely observing persons w horn he meets. In all such cases
it is for the jury to determine for themselves to what witness they will give the most credence. They have a right
to con ider the fact that some of the witnesses may have
had greater opportunities than others. The court may intruct them that they have such right, but it ought not to
invade their province, and undertake to determine for them
what witness is the most reliable.
The latter portion of the instruction, in which the jury
were charged that they should weigh the facts given by the
witnesses a the facts upon which they based their opinions,
does not relieve the instruction from the objection urged
by appellants' counsel. In the :first place, the charge directing the jury that the testimony of the one class of witne. s s wa ntitled to the greater weight is general, and
mbra e all that those witnesses testified to; and, in the
, econd plac , it was impossible for the non-expert witn es, giving their opinions as to the insanity of the te tator, to tate to the jury everythin()' upon which those
opinions were ba d. If they could have stated everything
upon which th y based their opinions, the opinions would
ha be n incompetent. Th rule which allow such opinions i s a rule of n ce ity, and re ts u on the proposition
that th r may be something about th look , deportment,
.. t . of a per on which may ontri1mt to th conclusion that
hC' i : of un. ouncl mind, whirh f'Etn not b d ribed in word.
b. tl10 witn . s. Cartlwge T. P. Co. v. Andrews} 102 Ind.
J,, (5..., Am. R. 65. ).
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That the instruction was erroneous, because the court

thereby invaded the province of the jury, by directing them

that the testimony of one class of witnesses was entitled to

more weight than the testimony of another class, is well

settled by our cases. Fulivider v. Ingels, 87 Ind. 414, and

cases there cited ; Voss v. Prier, 71 Ind. 129 ; Dodd v. Moore,

91 Ind. 522, and cases there cited; Works v. Stevens, 76 Ind.

181; Woolen v. Wliitacre, 91 Ind. 502, and cases there cited;

Nelson v. Vorce, 55 Ind. 455; Goodiuin v. State, 96 Ind. 550

(569), and cases there cited; Unruh v. State, ex rel., 105

Ind. 117, and cases there cited; Morris v. State, ex rel., 101

Ind. 560, and cases there cited ; Bird v. State, 107 Ind. 154,

and cases there cited ; Vanvalkenherg v. Vanvalkenherg, 90

Ind. 433.

A part of one of the instructions approved in the case

of Bush V. Megee, 36 Ind. 69 (84), is similar to the instruc-

tion here condemned, but the probability is that in that

case the attention of the court was not called to the objec-
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tions urged here.

The instruction as given is erroneous, but it does not

follow that because of the error of the court in giving it,

the judgment must be reversed.

It appears here that an erroneous instruction was given,

but it is not shown by the record that the giving of it was

prejudicial to appellants. The evidence is not in the record,

nor is there anything in the record showing, or tending to

show, that the witnesses spoken of in the charge as the

neighbors of the testator, were witnesses below in behalf

of appellees. For aught that is shown by the record, they

may have been called by appellants, and may have testi-

fied in their behalf, that the testator was a person of sound

mind, and hence capable of making the will.

Upon the whole case, we think that the judgment ought

to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

473
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That the instruction was erroneou , becau e the court
thereby invaded the province of the jury, by directing them
that the te timony of one class of witne e wa entitled to
more weight than the testimony of another cla s, is well
settled by our ca es. Fulu ider v. Ingels, 7 Ind. 414, and
case there cited; Voss v . Prier, 71Ind.129; Dodd v. Moore,
91 Ind. 522, and ca es there cited; W arks v. Ste ens, 76 Ind.
181; Woolen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502, and ca e there cited;
Nelson v. Vorce, 55 Ind. 455; Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550
( 569), and ca e there cited; Unruh v. State, ex rel., 105
nd. 117, and ca es there cited; It-I orris v. State, ex rel., 101
Ind. 560, and cases there cited · Bird v . State, 107 Ind. 154,
and case there cited; Van alkenberg v. Vanvalkenberg, 90
Ind. 433.
A part of one of the in tructions approved in the ca e
of Rush v. "flt! egee, 36 Ind. 69 ( 4) is imilar to the instruction here condemned, but the probability is that in that
ca e the attention of the court was not called to the objection urged here.
The in. truction a given i erroneous but it does not
follow that becau e of the error of the court in giving it,
the judgment must be reversed.

* * * * * * * * * *
It appear here that an erroneou in truction wa given
but it i not hown by the record that the giving of it wa
prejudicial to appellant . The evidence i not in the record
nor is there anythin · in the record bowing or tending to
how that the wi tne e po ken of in the char ·e as the
n i hbor of the t ta tor -were witn . e below in behalf
of appellee . For aught that i hown by the record, th y
may have been called by appellant and may ha
te tified in their behalf that th te tator wa a p r on of sound
mind, and h nee apahle of making the will.

* * * * * * • *
Upon the whole ca
to be affirmed.

"

~

*

think that the ju :ment ought

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
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GUSTAFSON V. SEATTLE TRACTION COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Washington. 1902.

28 Washington, 227.

GUSTAFSON V. SEATTLE TRACTION COMPANY.

Eeavis, C. J. — Action for damages for personal injuries.

* * * The court, on the submission of the cause, gave the

following instruction:

Supreme Court of Washington.

1902.

''There has been some expert testimony given in this

case. The court instructs you that all evidence given as to

28 Washington, 227.

the opinion of a witness should be considered — of the opin-

ion, mark you, of a witness — should be considered and

weighed by you with caution. You are to carefully sep-

arate, if a witness is introduced as an expert, what he tes-

tifies to as a fact, and what he testifies as to his opinion.

As to facts that he testifies to that came under his observa-

tion, of course, his testimony is to be weighed the same as

any testimony of any witness who is credible, or whom you

find to be credible, who testifies to what he saw, to what he

heard, or to what he knew. But when the testimony of the
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witness entered the domain of opinion, then his testimony

should be weighed and considered by you with caution.

Wliile the testimony of experts is competent, its weight and

credibility is a matter entirely for your consideration. Such

testimony should be carefully considered with reference to

the supposed or proven facts upon which the opinion of

the expert or experts are founded."

The giving of this instruction is assigned as error preju-

dicial to the defendant. It is urged that the instruction ap-

plied particularly to the expert witness introduced by de-

fendant, and thus singled out his testimony, and directed

that it be weighed with caution. Relative to the proper

instruction in the submission of expert testimony to the

jury, there is apparently much confusion, when the reported

cases are examined, and some of them are seeminglj'- irre-

concilable. Rogers, Expert Testimony (2d ed.), s 206,

states tlie different theories:

" (1) That expert testimony is to be considered like any

other testimony in the case, and tried by the same tests.

(2) That expert testimony is to be received with caution.

REAVIS, C. J.-Action for damages for personal injuries.
* * * The court, on the submission of the cause, gave the
following instruction:
"There ha been some expert testimony given in this
case. The court instructs you that all evidence given as to
the opinion of a witness should be considered-of the opinion, mark you, of a witness-should be considered and
weighed by you with caution. You are to carefully separate, if a witness is introduced as an expert, what he testifies to as a fact, and what he te stifies as to his opinion.
As to facts that he testifies to that came under his observation, of course, his testimony is to be weighed the same as
any t e timony of any witness who is credible, or whom you
:find to be credible, who testifies to what he saw, to what he
heard, or to what he knew. But when the testimony of the
witness entered the domain of opinion, then his testimony
should be weighed and considered by you with caution.
While the testimony of experts is competent, its weight and
credibility is a matter entirely for your consideration. Such
testimony should be carefully considered with reference to
the suppo ed or proven facts upon which the opinion of
the expert or expert are founded.''
The givinO' of thi instruction is assigned as error preju dicial to th defendant. It is urged that the instruction applied parti ularly to the xpert witnes introduced by def ndant, and tbus sinO'led out his te timony, and directed
tb t it
w ighed with aution. Relative to the proper
jn, tru tion in the u mi ion of expert t stimony to the
jury, th re i appar ntly mu h confusion, when the reported
. ar x min d, and om of th m ar s emingly irrenri]ah1 . Ro er. Ex rt Testimony (2d ed.), s 206,
llff r nt th ori
'' ( ) That ex rt t sti ony is to be considered like any
th r t stimony in the c , and tri d by th ame te ts.
(2) bat exp rt t . ti ony is to be received with caution.
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(3) That expert testimony is entitled to little weight. (4)

That expert testimony is entitled to great weight."

From an examination of the authorities, it would seem

that some confusion arises when the probative value of

opinion evidence and its competency, as legal propositions,

are under discussion, and when it is commingled with what

should be the proper instructions given to the jury. The

great weight of legal opinion seems to be that opinion evi-

dence is less reliable, less valuable, than evidence of facts.

This view is frequently expressed by eminent jurists.

Judge MiLLEK in Middlings Purifier Company v. Christian,

4 Dill. 448; also Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Michigan, 459;

Grigshy v. Clear Lake Water Co., 40 Cal., 396; Hayes v.

Wells, 34 Md. 512. But it does not necessarily follow that

such expressions of the value of expert testimony, although

correct and the general view, should be embodied in instruc-

tions to a jury. It certainly cannot be laid down as a gen-

eral rule to be given to a jury that expert testimony is of
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great value or little value. In fact, it may sometimes be of

great value, and sometimes valueless. It depends on a

variety of circumstances which ought to be considered,

among which the most important are the extent of the

knowledge of the expert, his opportunities for observation,

and his skill and experience. It would seem then that the

first view is correct; that is, that such testimony is to be

considered and weighed by the same tests as other testi-

mony, although it may be appropriate for the court, ac-

cording to the nature of the trial and the evidence, to ex-

iJain something of the nature of expert testimony, and to

define the difference between the witness who testifies to

facts and one who testifies to his opinion; and perhaps all

of the instruction under consideration cannot be said to be

objectionable. But the court, in the instruction, applies it

principally to one witness, and, after an injunction to care-

fully weigh, adds that this must be done with caution, and

repeats in the instruction that this testimony must be con-

sidered •with caution. The contention of counsel for appel-

lant that the use of the word ''caution" repeated in the

connection in which it was placed, tended to single out and

impair the weight of the evidence given by the expert, seems

reasonable; and, under the distinction between the func-

tions of the court and those of the jury, fundamental in the
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(3) That expert testimony is ntitl t littl wei ·ht. (4)
That expert testimony is entitl to great w igbt. ''
From an examination of the authoritie , it would e m
that some confusion aris
when the probativ value of
cpinion evidence and its competency, as legal propo ition ,
are under discussion, and when it is commingled with what
should be the proper instructions gi en to the jury. The
great weight of legal opinion seem to be that opinion evidence is less reliable, less valuable, than evidence of facts.
This view is frequently expre sed by eminent jurist .
Judge MILLER in Middlings Purifier Company v. Christian,
4 Dill. 448; also Beai~bien v . Cicotte, 1:... JYfichigan, 459;
Grigsby v. Clear Lake Water Co., 40 Cal., 396; Hayes v.
Wells, 34 Md. 512. But it does not nece arily follow that
such expressions of the value of expert testimony, althou()'h
correct and the general view, hould be embodied in in tructions to a jury. It certainly cannot be laid down as a gen eral rule to be given to a jury that expert testimony i of
great value or little value. In fact, it may sometimes be of
great value, and sometimes valuele . It depend on a
variety of circumstances which ought to be con idered,
among which the most important are the extent of the
knowledge of the expert, his opportunities for observation,
and his skill and experience. It would seem then that the
£r t view is correct; that is, that such te timony is to be
con idered and weighed by the same test a other te timony, although it may be appropriate for the court, actording to the nature of the trial and the evidence, to ex1 lain something of the nature of expert te timony and to
define the difference between the witnes who te tifies to
fact and one who te tifies to hi opinion; and perhaps all
of the instruction under consideration cannot b aid to be
objectionable. But the court, in the in tru tion applie it
principally to one witne , and after an injunction to carefull w igh, add that thi
u t be d ne wit aution and
r peat in the in tru tion that thi t e timony mu t be conidered with cauti n. The ont ntion of coun 1 for appellant that the u e of the word '' au i '' rep ated in th
· nnection in which it a plac d t nd to in°·le out an
impair thew i ·ht f th eYi n gi'i n b)T the ex ert eem
r a onal 1 · and un r th
i tin tion 1 tw n the functi n of the court and tho
f th jury, fun amental in the
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trial of law cases, the competency of evidence must be de-

termined by the court, and its weight by the jury. The

word "caution" in the sense used here and in other in-

structions of similar import, has been deemed in other

jurisdictions sufficiently prejudicial to reverse the case.

Atchison, etc., R. R. Co, v. Thul, 32 Kan. 255 (4 Pac. 352,

49 Am. Rep. 484) ; PeoiJle v. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348 (65 N.'

W. 203, 61 Am. St. Rep. 326) ; Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v.

Whitehead, 71 Miss. 451 (15 South. 890, 42 Am. St. Rep.

472) ; Weston v. Brown, 30 Neb. 609 (46 N. W. 826) ; State

V. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414; Burney v. Torrey, 100 Ala. 157

(14 South. 685, 46 Am. St. Rep. 33) ; Eggers v. Eggers, 57

Ind. 461; Pannell v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. St. 260. It is

true, a contrary ruling has been made by some of the

courts. See United States v. Pendergast, 32 Fed. 198;

Whitaker v. Parker, 42 Iowa, 585; People v. Perriman, 72

Mich. 184 (40 N. W, 425). The last case seems to have

been disapproved in People v. Seaman, supra.
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For error in this instruction, the judgment is reversed,

and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Hadley, Fullerton, White and Mount, J. J., concur.

HIGGINS V. WREN.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. 1900,

79 Minnesota, 462.

Action in the district court for Wright county to recover

$200, and interest, damages for the conversion of a note

and mortgage. Lizzie Stowell intervened. The case was

tried before Giddings, J., and a jury, which rendered a ver-

dict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant and the

intervener for $263. From an order denying a motion for

a new trial, the intervener appealed. Reversed.
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trial of law cases, the competency of evidence mugt be determined by the court, and its weight by the jury. The
word "caution" in the sense used here and in other instructions of similar import, has been deemed in other
jurisdictions sufficiently prejudicial to reverse the case.
Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Thitl, 32 I{an. 255 ( 4 Pac. 35~;
49 Am. Rep. 484); People v . Seaman, 107 Mich. 348 (65 N.
W. 203, 61 Am. St. Rep. 326); Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v.
White-head, 71 Miss. 451 (15 South. 890, 42 Am. St. Rep.
472); Weston v. Brown, 30 Neb. 609 (46 N. W. 826); State
v. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414; Burney v. Torrey, 100 Ala. 157
(14 South. 685, 46 Am. St. Rep. 33); Eggers v. Eggers, 57
Ind. 461; Pannell v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. St. 260. It is
true, a contrary ruling has been made by some of the
courts. See Unit ed States v. Pendergast, 32 Fed. 198;
Whitaker v. Parker, 42 Iowa, 585; People v . Ferriman, 72
Mich. 184 ( 40 N. W. 425). The last case seems to have
been disapproved in P eople v. Seaman, supra.
For error in this instruction, the judgment is reversed,
and the cause remanded for a new trial.
HADLEY, FULLERTON, WHITE and MouNT, J. J., concur.

Collins, J.

On the trial of this cause there was testimony received

tending to impeach one of the defendants who had testi-

fied as a witness, as unworthy of credit, on the ground of

general bad reputation for truth and veracity in the neigh-

HIGGINS V. WREN.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. ·1900.
79

Minnesota, 462.

Action in the district court for Wright county to recover
$200 and interest, damages for the conver ion of a note
an 1 morto-age. Lizzie Stowell intervened. The ca e was
trie before Giddino-s, J., and a jury, which rendered a ver1irt in favor of plaintiff and a 0 ·ainst d f ndant and the
intPrv nor for $..,63. From an order denyinO' a motion for
a new trial the intervenor appealed. Reversed .
..1 0LLINS, J.
n the trial of this cause there was t stimony received
trn cling to imp a h on of th d f ndants who ·h~d testifi cl aR n witn ss as unworthy of r dit, on the ground of
g ncral ad reputation for truth and veracity in the neigh-
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borhood wherein he resided. The court subsequently

charged the jury as follows:

"If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that

the reputation of any witness in this case for truth and

veracity in the neighborhood where they reside is bad, then

the jury have a right to disregard his whole testimony, and

treat it as untrue." At this point defendant's counsel

called special attention to the words ''treat it as untrue,"

and thereupon the court resumed thus: "That is, you

have a right to treat his testimony as untrue; that is, you

liave the right — the law does not require that you must,

but that you have the right — to treat it as untrue, except

where it is corroborated by other creditable evidence, or

by facts and circumstances proved on the trial."

To this part of the charge counsel reserved an exception.

We are of the opinion that this statement of the law was

altogether too broad. This instruction authorized the jury

to wholly disregard and reject all of the testimony given by
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the witness if satisfied that his general reputation for truth

and veracity was bad in the neighborhood in which he re-

sided, no matter how truthful all or a part of such testimony

might in itself, and standing alone, appear to be. It is

true that this language was taken bodily from a well-known

work on instructions to juries, but the author cites no au-

thority in support of it. Nor do we find any. We are of

opinion that the instruction upon this point approved in

State V. Miller, 53 Iowa, 209, 4 N. W. 1083, is one which

will be better understood and much better serve the pur-

pose, as follows:

"Where it is shown that the reputation for truth of a

witness is bad, his evidence is not necessarily destroyed,

but it is to be considered under all the circumstances de-

scribed in the evidence, and given such weight as the jury

believe it entitled to, and to be disregarded if they believe

it entitled to no weight."

The successful impeachment of a witness merely affects

his credibility.

Order reversed.
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borhood wh rein he resided. The court subsequently
charg d the jury a follows:
''If the jury believe from the evidence in thi ca e that
the reputation of any witness in this case for truth and
veracity in tbe neighborhood where they reside is bad, then
the jury have a right to disregard his whole te timony, and
treat it as untrue.'' At this point defendant's counsel
called special attention to the words ''treat it as untrue,''
and thereupon the court resumed thu : ''That i , you
have a right to treat his testimony as untrue; that is, you
have the right-the law does not require that you must,
but that you have the right-to treat it as untrue, except
where it is corroborated by other creditable evidence, or
by facts and cir cum tances proved on the trial.''
To this part of the charge counsel reserved an exception.
We are of the opinion that this statement of the law was
altogether too broad. This instruction authorized the jury
to wholly disregard and reject all of the testimony given by
the witness if satisfied that his general reputation for truth
and veracity was bad in the neighbor hood in which he reided, no matter how truthful all or a part of such t estimony
might in itself, and standing alone, appear to be. It is
true that this language was taken bodily from a well-known
work on instructions to juries, but the author cites no authority in upport of it. Nor do we find any. We are of
opinion that the in truction upon this point approved in
State v. Miller, 53 Iowa, 209, 4 N. W. 1083, i one which
will be better understood and much better serve the purpo e, a fallows:
"Wh re it is shown that the reputation for truth of a
witn s is bad his vid n e is not nee aril de tro. e ,
but it i to be con id red under all the circum tance decribed in the vidence, and o·iven u h wei()'ht a the iun·
helieve it ntitled to and to b di regard d if the. belie
it entitled to no wei()'ht."
The uc . ful impeachment of a witnes merely affe t
his credibility.
Order reversed.
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FIFER V. RITTER.

Supreme Court of Indiana. 1902,

FIFER V. RITTER.

159 Indiana, 8,

Hadley, J. * * *

Supreme Court of Indiana.

**********

1902.

Complaint is made of certain instructions given to the

jury. Number two informed the jury that they were the

159 Indiana, B.

exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of

the weight of their testimony, and that in determining

HADLEY,

these things they must take into consideration the interest,

the appearance upon the witness stand, the intelligence, the

opportunities for learning the truth concerning the things

testified about, the apparent candor and correctness of the

statements as compared with the usual and ordinary nature

of things. The particular assault upon the instruction is

directed against the word must, as being an encroachment

upon the absolute and exclusive right of the jury. We can

not adopt this view. Must is here employed in the sense of
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duty, and the term is equivalent to telling the jury that it

was their duty to consider the matters enumerated in esti-

mating the credibility and weight of the testimony. And

it clearly was their duty. It was unquestionably their duty

to decide the case according to the weight, — that is accord-

ing to the convincing force, of the evidence, honestly ar-

rived at, and just as plainly their duty to test the value of

the testimony of each witness by such tests as common ex-

perience has proved to be reliable. Will any one say that

a juror may discharge his duty by closing his eyes to the

manner, conduct, and appearance of witnesses while de-

livering their testimony, and giving to the naked words of

each witness full and equal probative force? The com-

petency of evidence is one thing, and its weight another.

Competency is purely a question of law for the court to

declare. Its weight is a question for the jury to deter-

mine. So when a judge tells the jury that it is proper for

them to consider the interest, manner, etc., of the witnesses,

as it is usually phrased, he is but ruling as he may rightly

rule that snch evidence is competent; and, in searching for

the fact established by the evidence, it is the duty of the

J. * * *

* * * * * * * * ~ •
Complaint is made of certain instructions given to the
jury. Number two informed the jury that they were the
exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of
the weight of their testimony, and that in determining
these things they must take into consideration the interest,
the appearance upon the witness stand, the intelligence, the
opportunities for learning the truth concerning the things
testified about, the apparent candor and correctness of the
.. tatements as compared with the usual and ordinary nature
of things. The particular assault upon the instruction is
directed against the word miist, as being an encroachment
npon the absolute and exclusive right of the jury. We can
not adopt this view. Must is here employed in the sense of
duty, and the term is equivalent to telling the jury that it
was their duty to consider the matters enumerated in estimating the credibility and weight of the testimony. And
it clearly was their duty. It was unquestionably their duty
to decide the case according to the weio-ht,-that is according to the convincing force, of the evidence, honestly arrived at, and just as plainly their duty to test the value of
the te timony of each witness by such tests as common exp ri nee has proved to be reliable. Will any one say that
a juror may di charge hi duty by closing his eyes to the
anner, onduct, and appearance of witnesses while de liv ring tl ir te timony, and giving to the naked words of
a h witn
full and equal probative force' The com1 t n y of vid nee i on thing, and its weight another.
mp t n . j
ur ly a qu stion of law for the court to
<l • lar . It w i ht i a qu tion for the jury to determ1n .
o wh n a judo- t ll th jury that it is proper for
Lh m to n, jd r th int rest, mann r, et ., of the witnes es,
L it i. rnmall y phra. d, h i. but rulino- a h may rightly
rnl th t . u h vi :I n i.
mp t nt; an , in earching for
th fact esta Ii hed by the evidence, it i the duty of the
i
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jury to consider all competent evidence that may throw

light upon the truth, and it is no less essential to a correct

result, and quite as much the jury's duty to consider facts

and circumstances properly before them, which go to dis-

credit a witness or to strengthen his testimony, as it is to

consider the statements made by the witnesses. The cases

of Woollen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502, Unruh v. State, ex rel.,

105 Ind. 117, Duvall v. Kenton, 127 Ind. 178, and perhaps

some others, so far as they may seem to hold to a different

rule, are no longer authorities upon the question here in-

volved. That which seems the more reasonable view ex-

pressed above, and which follows Deal v. State, 140 Ind.

354, 366, Newport v. State, 140 Ind. 299, 302, Smith v. State,

142 Ind. 288, and Keesier v. State, 154 Ind. 242, may now

be said to be the approved rule.

We find no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed.

(e) Falsus in Una, Falsus in Omnibus.
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CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY V.

KELLY.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1904.

210 Illinois, 449.

Me. Justice Hand delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action on the case brought by the appellee

to recover damages for the death of his intestate, Joseph

G. Kelly, occasioned, as is alleged, by the negligence of the

479
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jury to consider all competent evidence that may throw
light upon the truth, and it is no less es ential to a correct
re ult, and quite as much the jury's duty to con ider facts
and circumstances properly before them, which go to discredit a witness or to strengthen his testimony, as it is to
consider the statements made by the witne ses. The cases
of Woollen v. JVhitacre, 91 Ind. 502, Unruh v. State, ex rel.,
105 Ind. 117, Duvall v. Kenton, 127 Ind. 178, and perhaps
aome others, so far as they may seem to hold to a different
rule, are no longer authorities upon the question here involved. That which eems the more reasonable view expre ed above, and which follows Deal v. State, 140 Ind.
354, 366, Newport v. State, 140 Ind. 299, 302, Srnith v. State,
142 Ind. 288, and K eesier v. State, 154 Ind. 242, may now
be said to be the approved rule.
* * * * * * * • * •
We find no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed.

appellant in failing to stop its train, upon which Kelly

was a passenger, at Braidwood station a sufficient length

of time to enable Kelly to alight therefrom with safety, by

means whereof said Kelly, while in the exercise of due

care for his own safety and while attempting to leave said

train at said station, was thrown beneath the wheels of said

train and run over and killod. The case was tried before

the court and a jury, and the jury returned a verdict

(e) Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus.

CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMP ANY V.
KELLY.
Supreme Court of Illinois.

1904.

210 Illinois, 449.

MR. J usTICE HAND delivered the opinion of the court:
Thi was an action on the case brought by the appellee
to recover damage for the death of hi inte tate Jo eph
G. Kelly, occa ion d, as i alle d bu th negli n e of the
appellant in failin to top it train, upon whi h Kelly
was a pa enger at Braidwood tation a uffici nt len()'th
of time to enable I\: lly t ali 0 ·ht therefrom with af ty by
m an whereof said I\: 11. while in the exer i
of du
care for his own saf t~ and while attempting t l aY ai<l
train at said tation wa thrown beneath the wh l f ai
train an<l run ov r an killPn. The a e was tri
b fore
the court ~nd a jury, and the jury returned a erdi t
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against the appellant for the sum of $4000, upon which ver-

dict the court, after overruling a motion for a new trial,

rendered judgment in favor of the appellee, which judg-

ment has been affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Sec-

ond District, and the record has been brought to this court

by appeal for further review.

The intestate of appellee, on the evening of November

15, 1900, boarded appellant's train at Joliet and paid his

fare to Braidwood. The train arrived at Braidwood a lit-

tle after eleven o^clock P. M., when Kelly arose from his

seat in the smoking car, shook hands with a friend with

whom he had been talking, and started for the rear door of

the car to get off the train. The testimony of appellee

tended to show that the train stopped from twelve to thirty

seconds; that it started before Kelly had time to get off, and

that in attempting to get off, the motion of the train caused

him to lose his balance and he was thrown down and run

over by the train and killed ; while the testimony of the ap-
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pellant tended to show that the train stopped from two to

three minutes, during which time the engine took water;

that the deceased had ample time in which to alight from

the train in safety, and that he lost his life by reason of his

own negligence in attempting to leave the train while it

was in motion and after it had stopped a sufficient length

of time for him to alight therefrom in safety.

There was upon the question of the length of time the

train stopped at the Braidwood station, — which was a ma-

terial question, — a sharp conflict in the evidence, and in

that state of the record it was important that the jury

should have been correctly instructed as to the law of the

case, especially as to the rule which should govern them

in weighing the evidence of the respective witnesses. On

belialf of the appellee the court gave to the jury the fol-

lowing instruction, the giving of which has been assigned

as error:

"If the jury believe, from the evidence in this case, that

any witness who testified in the case has willfully sworn

falsely as to any matter or tiling material to the issues in

this case, then the jury are at liberty to disregard the

entire testimony of such witness, except in so far as it may

have been corroborated by other credible evidence which

against the appellant for the sum of $4000, upon which verdict the court, after overruling a motion for a new trial,
rendered judgment in favor of the appellee, which judgment has been affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Second District, and the record has been brought to this court
Ly appeal for further review.
The intestate of appellee, on the evening of November
15, 1900, boarded appellant's train at Joliet and paid his
fare to Braidwood. The train arrived at Braidwood a little after eleven oJclock P. M., when Kelly arose from his
eat in the smoking car, shook hands with a friend with
whom he had been talking, and started for the rear door of
the car to get off the train. The testimony of appellee
tended to show that the train stopped from twelve to thirty
econds; that it started before Kelly had time to get off, and
that in attempting to get off, the motion of the train caused
him to lose his balance and he was thrown down and run
over by the train and killed; while the testimony of the a ppellant tended to show that the train stopped from two to
thr e minutes, during which time the engine took water;
that the deceased had ample time in which to alight from
the train in safety, and that he lost his life by reason of hia
own negligence in attempting to leave the train while it
wa in motion and after it had stopped a sufficient length
of time for him to alight therefrom in safety.
There was upon the question of the length of time the
train topped at the Braidwood tation,-which was a mat rial question,-a harp conflict in the evidence, and in
that tate of the record it was important that the jury
. bould have b en orrectly instructed a to the law of the
, sp cially as to the rule which should govern them
ju w iO'hinO' the evid nee of the re p ctive witnesses. On
1> h alf of th app 11 e the court gave to the jury the foll win in. huction, the giving of which has been assigned
a s error:
''If th jury believe, from the evid nee in thi case, that
an. wit
who t stifi d in th ase has willfully sworn
f al: ly a. t any matt r or thinO' material to th issue in
th i. r a: then th jury ar at lib rty to disr gard the
niir, t e. ii mony of n h witn , xcept in so far as it may
la
n corroborat
by oth r credible evidence which
1
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they do believe, or by facts and circumstances proved on

the trial."

It has been repeatedly announced as the law of this State,

that the jury are at liberty to disregard the evidence of a

witness who upon the trial has willfully sworn falsely to

a material fact, except in so far as such witness has been

corroborated by other credible evidence or by facts and cir-

cumstances proven upon the trial. {Crahtree v. Hagen-

baugh, 25 111. 233 ; Swan v. People, 98 id. 610 ; Hoge v. Peo-

ple, 117 id. 35; Bevelot v. Lestrade, 153 id. 625.) The in-

struction is much broader than the rule announced in the

foregoing cases, as it informed the jury they were at lib-

erty to disregard the testimony of any witness who had

willfully sworn falsely to any matter or thing material to

the issues, except in so far as such witness had been cor-

roborated by other credible evidence ivhicJi they do believe,

the effect of which was to eliminate from the consideration

of the jury the evidence of any witness, if any such there
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were, who had willfully sworn falsely upon a material mat-

ter, even though he were corroborated by other credible

evidence, unless the jury believed such other credible evi-

dence to be true. If the jury may disregard the testimony

of such a witness unless he is corroborated by other credible

evidence which they believe, then the jury may disregard

the evidence of such a witness even though lie be corrobo-

rated by other credible evidence, whicli would be in viola-

tion of the rule established by this court. It is not the duty

of the jury to accept as true the testimony of a witness who

has testified willfully falsely as to a material fact simply

because he is corroborated by other credible evidence, but

when such witness has been corroborated by other credible

evidence it is the duty of the jury to consider his testimony

in connection with such corroborating evidence and the

other evidence in the case, and to give to it such weight

as they may be of opinion it is entitled to receive at their

hands. The error in the instruction under consideration

is found in this : that it permits the jury to refuse to con-

sider the testimony of a witness who has willfully sworn

falsely with reference to a material fact, although he is

corroborated by other credible evidence, unless the jury be-

lieve the other credible evidence to be true. Credible evi-

dence is not evidence which is necessarily true, but is evi-
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th y do b liev , or by fact and circumstances proved on
th trial.''
It has been repeatedly announced as the law of thi State,
that the jury are at liberty to di regard the e id nee of a
witne s who upon the trial has willfull
worn fal ely to
a material fact, except in so far a such witne has been
corroborated by other credible eviden e or b fact. and circumstances proven upon the trial. (Crabtree v . Hagenbaugh, 25 Ill. 233; Swan v. People, 98 id. 610; Hoge v . P eople, 117 id. 5; B evelot v. Lestrade, 153 id. 625.) The intruction is mu h broader than the rule announced in the
foregoing ca es, as it informed the jury the were at librty to di regard the testimony of any witne s who had
willfully sworn fal ely to any matter or thing mat rial to
the i ue , except in so far a uch witne s had been corroborated by other credible evidence which they do believe,
the effect of which was to eliminat~ from the con ideration
of the jury the evidence of any witne , if any such there
were, who bad willfully sworn fal ely upon a material matter, even though he were corroborated by other credible
evidence, unles the jury believed such other redible evidence to be true. If the jury ma di regar the te timony
of uch a witne s unl s be i corroborated by other credible
evidence which they believe, then the jur}~ may di reo-ard
the evidence of such a witness even thou ·h h be corroborated by other credible evidence whi ch would be in violation of the rule establi hed by tbi court. It i not the duty
of the jury to accept as true the teshmon r of a witne who
has testified willfully fal ely as to a material fa t imply
becau e be i corroborated by other credible vid n e but
when such witne ha been orroborat d by th r redible
evidence it i the duty of the jury to con id r hi. t timony
in connection with ucb corroborating Yid n
and th
oth r evid nee in the a e, and to give to it . u ·h w ia-ht
a thev ma
e of o inion it i entitled t r iv at th ir
hand .· The error i the in truction und r
n. i l rati n
ni found in thi : that it p rmits the jur. to r fn t
wbo ha willfull "worn
r th t timonv of a witn
f al. h with r f r · n
t a
at rial fa t, althou~h _b i
rr borat d b. th r er ible vid n , unl
th iurr beJi y the otb r r dibl vi nee to b
'U .
r ihle 'idence i not evid n whi h is nece arily true, but i evi0

T
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dence worthy of belief, — that is, worthy to be considered

by the jury. If it were held the jury were not to consider

the evidence of a witness who had willfully sworn falsely

to a material fact unless he was corroborated by other

credible evidence, and then only when they believe such

credible evidence to be true, it would, in effect, be to hold

that the testimony of such a witness is only to be consid-

ered by the jury after they have become satisfied of the

truth of the facts testified to by the corroborating wit-

nesses. If this were the rule, the jury would have reached

a conclusion as to the truth of the matter about which the

witness testified before they would be required to consider

the evidence of the witness, which would make the con-

sideration of the testimony of such witness unnecessary,

even though his testimony were corroborated by other

credible evidence.

"VVe are of the opinion the instruction is in conflict with

a long established rule of evidence in force in this State
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and that the giving thereof constituted reversible error.

The judgment of the Appellate and circuit courts will be

reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for a

new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

CAMERON V. WENTWORTH.

Supreme Court of Montana. 1899.

23 Montana, 70.

Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff brought two separate actions in claim and de-

livery to recover possession of two certain race horses. By

consent, the two suits were consolidated for the purposes

of trial. Plaintiff recovered a verdict, and judgment was

entered in his favor. Defendant Wentworth moved for a

new trial, which motion was granted. Plaintiff appeals

[ · hap. 11
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dence worthy of belief,-that is, worthy to be considered
by the jury. If it were held the jury were not to consider
the evidence of a witness who had willfully sworn falsely
to a material fact unless he was corroborated by other
credible evidence, and then only when they believe such
credible evidence to be true, it would, in effect, be to hold
that the testimony of such a witness is only to be considered by the jury after they have become satisfied of the
truth of the facts testified to by the corroborating witnesses. If this were the rule, the jury would have reached
a conclusion as to the truth of the matter about which the
witness testified before they would be required to consider
the evidence of the witness, which would make the consideration of the testimony of such witness unnecessary,
even though his testimony were corroborated by other
credible evidence.
vVe are of the opinion the instruction is in conflict with
a long established rule of evidence in force in this State
and that the giving thereof constituted reversible error.
The judgment of the Appellate and circuit courts will be
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for a
new trial.
Reversed and remanded.

from the order granting a new trial.

1. One of the grounds upon which the court granted

the motion for a new trial was its error in giving the fol-

lowing instruction.

CAMERON V. WENTWORTH.
Supreme Court of Montana.

1899.

23 Montana, 70.

MR. J usTrcE I-I UNT delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff brought two separate actions in claim and deion of two certain race horse . By
liv ry to recov r po
on nt, the two suit were con olidated for the purpose"
of trial. Plaintiff re overed a verdict, and judgment was
nt r d in his favor. Defendant Wentworth moved for a
n w trial, whi h motion was ranted. Plaintiff appeals
fr m th rd r ranting a new trial.
n of the grounds upon which the court granted
th m tion for a new trial wa its error in giving the following ine.truction.

Sec. 5]
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"It is the duty of tlie jury, in passing upon the cred-

ibility of the testimony of several witnesses, to reconcile

all the different parts of the testimony, if possible. It is

only in cases where it is probable that a witness has de-

liberately and intentionally testified falsely as to some ma-

terial matter, and is not corroborated by other evidence,

that the jury is warranted in disregarding his entire testi-

mony. Although a witness may be mistaken as to some

of his evidence, it does not follow, as a matter of law, that

he has wilfully told an untruth, or that the jury would

have the right to reject his entire testimony."

Plaintiff contends that the word "probable" was used

for "palpable" by mistake, and that the error, if any was

not calculated to mislead the jury. This argument is

premised upon the assumption that if "palpable" had

been used, the instruction would have been a correct state-

ment of the law, — an assumption which respondent seems

to have regarded as well taken, and which, for the moment,
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we will not disturb.

It is undoubtedly the rule that, where a witness has

willfully sworn falsely as to any material matter upon the

trial, the jury is at liberty to discard his entire testimony,

except in so far as it has been corroborated by other cred-

ible evidence ; but we do not understand the right to so dis-

card testimony follows, if it be merely probable that the

witness has willfully sworn falsely. In other words, there

must be a belief in the minds of the jury that a witness has

actually and knowingly testified falsely as to some material

matter before they are at liberty to eliminate his testimony

entirely; but a belief that an actual fact exists requires

a considerably stronger support than does a belief that it

probably exists. If a witness has palpably sworn falsely,

it is almost self-evident that he has done so. The range

of probability is passed over, and it has become more than

likely that he has testified falsely, knowingly and intention-

ally. Therefore, where perjury is palpable, there need

be no extended discussion upon which to base a finding that

the witness has willfully testified falsely, — the jury may at

once act upon the fact so obviously or palpably demon-

strated. But to say that a jury can discard testimony, if

they conclude that a witness has probably perjured him-

self, is to authorize deliberation, not upon the question of

INSTRUCTING THE JURY
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''It is the duty of the jury, in pa sing upon the credibility of the testimony of several witne
, to reconcile
all the different part of the testimony, if po sible. It is
only in cases where it is probable that a witne s has deliberately and intentionally testified fal ely as to some material matter, and is not corroborated by other evidenc ,
that the jury is warranted in disregarding his entire te timony. Although a witness may be mi taken a to some
of his evidence, it does not follow, as a matter of law, that
he has wilfully told an untruth, or that the jury would
have the right to reject his entire testimony."
Plaintiff contends that the word "probable" was used
for ''palpable'' by mistake, and that the error, if any wa ·
not calculated to mislead the jury. Thi argument is
premised upon the a sumption that if "palpable" had
been used, the instruction would have been a correct statement of the law,-an a umption which re pondent seem
to have regarded as well taken, and which, for the moment,
we will not disturb.
It is undoubtedly the rule that, where a witness has
willfully sworn fal ely as to any material matter upon the
trial, the jury is at liberty to di card his entire testimony,
except in so far as it has been corroborated by other credible evidence; but we do not understand the right to so disard testimony follows, if it be merely probable that the
witness has willfully sworn falsely. In other words, there
mu t be a b lief in the mind of the jury that a witnes has
actually and knowingly testified fal ely as to some material
matter before they are at liberty to eliminate his testimony
entirely; but a belief that an actual fact exi ts requires
a considerably stronger support than doe a belief that it
probably exi ts. If a witnes ha palpably worn fal ely,
it is almost elf-evident that he has done so. The range
of probability is pas ed over and it ha b ome mor than
likely that he has te tified f al ely, knowinO'ly and intentionIp ble there need
ally. Therefore where I erjur i
be no ext nd d di cu sion up n which to ba e a findin.cr that
the witn s ha willfully te tifi d fal l_r -the j ry a. at
once act u on the fa t so obvious! or pal a ly d montrated. But to a that jury an dL ard t tim y if
they con lud that a witne ha probably p rjure himelf, is to authorize deliberation, not upon the question of
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whether he has iviUfidly sworn falsely, but upon whether it

is likely he has done so. So, although the jury might not

say they believed the witness did willfully testify falsely,

yet, if they could say that it was probable or likely that

he did so testify, nevertheless the right to discard the en-

tire testimony would exist. Reasoning along this line

carries us to where it is easily seen that a jury would di-

verge in their consideration of evidence, and too often over-

look the necessity for belief in existing facts, amid meta-

physical gropings for probabilities, to enable them to

ignore testimony. They should not be allowed to do this;

for if, in their judgment, probability of perjury alone exists,

they cannot legally give that effect to evidence which they

may, if, in their judgment, the fact of perjury exists as

demonstrable beyond a mere probability that it exists.

Therefore, to expressly authorize a jury to act, in discard-

ing testimony, on probability, is wrong. It becomes an au-

thorization to them to judge of the effect of evidence arbi-
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trarih% and weakens, if it does not break down, the force

of that other and salutary rule which always confines the

power of a jury to form a judgment upon evidence within

the exercise of legal discretion, and in subordination to the

rules of evidence.

But it is our opinion that the premise which would regard

the instruction as sound, if it had read ''palpable" instead

of "probable," is false and unsound, and that the instruc-

tion would still be inherently bad with the word "palpable"

imported into it, for the reason that it circumscribes the

power of the jury in giving effect to evidence by limiting

their right to discard the testimony of a witness to those

instances only where it is palpable the witness has willfully

sworn falsely, and is not corroborated by other evidence.

No such principle can find favor where the jury are the

exclusive judges of the credibility of a witness, and where

they are authorized to ignore his testimony, if willfully

false, and not corroborated. It may be that a jury, after

full consideration of all a witness has testified to, will be-

lieve he has perjured himself, yet it may not have been

readily observed at all on the trial that the witness will-

fully swore falsely. Now, under such conditions, the jury

have as clear a right to discard his testimony as they

would Imvo had if it had been palpable that the witness

was willfully falsifying; for the test necessarily is: has the

TRIAL PRACTICE
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whether he has willfully worn falsely, but upon whether it
is likely he has done so. So, although the jury might not
say they believed the witness did willfully testify falsely,
yet, if they could say that it was probable or likely that
he did so testify, nevertheless the right to discard the entire testimony would exist. Reasoning along this line
carrie u to where it is easily seen that a jury would diverge in their con ideration of evidence, and too often overlook the necessity for belief in existing fact , amid metaphysical groping for probabilities, to enable them to
ignor testimony. They should not be allowed to do this;
for if in their jud<Yment, probability of perjury alone exists,
they cannot legally gi' e that effect to evidence which they
may, if, in their judgment, the fact of perjury exi ts as
demon trable beyond a mere probability that it exists.
Therefore, to exp re ly authorize a jury to act, in di carding te timony, on probability, is wrong. It becomes an authorization to them to judge of the effect of evidence arbitrarily, and weaken , if it does not break down, the force
of that other and salutary rule which always confines the
power of a jury to form a judgment upon evidence within
t11 e exer ci e of legal discretion, and in subordination to the
rule of evidence.
But it i our opinion that the premise wbich would rEgard
the in truction a sound, if it had read "palpable" instead
of "probable," i fal e and unsound, and that the instruction would still b inherently bad with the word ''palpable''
imported into it, for the reason that it circumscribe th~
w r of the jury in o-ivino· effect to evid nee by limiting
th ir rio·ht to di card the te timony of a witne s to tho e
in t ance on ly wh re it i p alp a ble the witne s has wi.llfu11 .
. worn faL ly, and i not corroborated by other vic1 nee .
an find favor where the jury ar the
. u h prin ipl
0xrlu i judge of the redibility of a witn s , and wh re
th r ar authoriz d to io·nore his t tim ny, if willf11 lly
faL· e, and not corrohorat d. It may b that a jury aft r
ha t tifi d to, will b fu ll on . icler tion of an witn
]i v hr h a .
rjur d him lf, . t it may not hav b en
l' n<1il y
1. rv a t all n th tri l that th witne. willf dlv .' wor f l. Iv. Now und r u h c nditio , th Jnry
he v. as rl ar a ~·i ~ht t
li. car hi t tjmony a th y
w ul r1 l H1YP hac1 if it had h n p lpah1 that th witn s."
wa
iHfull_ f aL ifying; for the te t nece arily is: has the
T
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witness willfully sworn falsely as to any material matter?

and this is to be ascertained by the jury as a fact, deducible

from other facts or circumstances connected with the trial

and before them for consideration. But, in sifting and

weighing the evidence, if the fact is found, whether it has

manifested itself palpably, or whether it has been arrived

at by processes of reasoning uj^on other facts or circum-

stances, is absolutely immaterial in its effect upon the

power of the jury to discard the testimony.

We therefore disapprove of the instruction from the two

standpoints discussed. It is essentially erroneous, and the

text of Mr. Sackett (page 35), which gives it as the law,

finds no support in any lang-uage used by the court in Gott-

lieb V. Hart man, 3 Colo. 53, which is cited as authority for

its doctrine. It follows that the action of the court below

in granting a new trial must be affirmed.

Another ground for granting a new trial was the refusal

of the court to give the following instruction requested by
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defendant: "You are further instructed that a witness

who testifies falsely in one part of his testimony is to be

distrusted in other parts of his testimony." The instruc-

tion offered is substantially the language of Subdi\dsion 3

of Section 3390 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which pro-

vides that the jury are to be instructed on all proper occa-

sions "that a witness false in one part of his testimony is

to be distrusted in others." Presumably the case was one

where the court should have given the instruction re-

quested, or the substance of it, by way of caution to the

jury upon effect of evidence. And we can readily under-

stand the aid furnished to a jury by declaring to them the

principle meant to be enunciated by the statute, that a wit-

ness who has willfully testified falsely as to any material

matter must be distrusted as to other parts of his testi-

mony. The statute is not applicable, however, to uninten-

tional errors, or evidence given upon immaterial matters,

and without intent to deceive. Its sense is to require the

jury to distrust only a witness who willfully swears falsely

as to material matters ; and we are of opinion that it ought

always to be given with the words "willfully" and "ma-

terial" expressed as qualifications of the rule it declares.

The statute (Sec. 3390, supra) came to us from Cali-

fornia (Code Civ. Proc. Cal. Sec. 2061), where it has been

interpreted as applicable only to a witness who is willfully

I NSTR CTING THE JURY

witness willfully sworn falsely as to any material matter
and tlii i to be a certained by the jur a a fact, ducible
from other fact or circum tance conne ted with the trial
and before them for con ideration. But in ifting and
weighing the evidence, if the fact is found, whether it ha·
manife ted it elf palpably, or whether it has been arrived
at by proce es of rea oning upon other facts or circumtances, is ab olutely immaterial in it eff ct upon the
power of the jury to di card the testimony.
We therefore di approve of the instruction from the two
standpoints discu ed. It is e sentially erroneous, and the
text of :Mr. Sackett (page 35), which gives it a the law,
finds no support in any language u ed by the court in Gottlieb v. H artm.an, 3 olo. 53, which i cited a authority for
its doctrine. It follows that the action of the court below
in granting a new trial must be affirmed.
Another ground for granting a new trial was the refu al
of the court to give the following instruction reque ted by
defendant: "You are further in tructed that a witne '
who te ti:fies fal ely in one part of his te timony i to be
di tru ted in other part of his testimony." The instruction offered is ub tantiall the language of Subdivi ion 3
of ection 3390 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which proYides that the jury are to be instructed on all proper occaion
that a witne s false in one part of his te timony i
to be di trusted in others." Presumably the ca e wa one
where the court hould have given the in truction r eque ted, or the substance of it, by way of caution to the
jur.r upon effect of evidence. And we can readil. nndertand the aid furnished to a jury by declaring to them the
principle meant to be enun iated by the tatute, that a witne s who has willfully te ti:fied fal el. a to any mat rial
matter mu t be di tru t d as to other part of hi te timon . The statute i not applicable howev r to unintenti nal error or evidence gi en upon immat rial matt r "'
and without int nt to d eive. It en e i t r quir th
jury to i tru t onl. a witn
who willfull. w ar fal l~T
a to mat rial matter · an 1 we are of opinion that it ouo-ht
alwa
to be o-iv n with th word "willfully an
material'' e:s:r r
ed
uali:fication of th rule it d clare .
The ta tut (
. 0, . i1pra cam to u from alifornia ( ode iv. ro
al.
r. ~061 , wh r i h . h Pn
interpreted as appHca l only to a witne who is willfully
1-.
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false in a material manner [People v. Hicks, 53 Cal 351;

People V. Soto, 59 Cal. 367) ; and, while it has been held in

that state that the word "false" is not the equivalent of

"mistake", and that the word "willfully" does not change

the effect of the instruction as offered [People v. Sprague,

53 Cal. 491; People v. Righetti, 66 Cal. 184, 4 Pac. 1063,

1185; White v. Disher, 67 Cal. 402, 7 Pac. 826), nevertheless

we are satisfied that the meaning should be made perfectly

clear by avoiding the opportunity for misunderstanding

that may reasonably exist by adopting the construction of

the supreme court of California announced in the cases

heretofore cited and followed in State v. Kyle, 14 Wash.

550, 45 Pac. 147, holding that the qualifying words need

not be expressed.

As a statute affecting the province of the jury in weigh-

ing evidence, it requires them to view with distrust the tes-

timony of a witness who willfully swears falsely as to a

material matter. They must distrust such a witness, and,
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under their general power of passing upon the credibility

to be attached to each witness, they 7nag discard such tes-

timony entirely, except in so far as it is corroborated by

other credible evidence. [People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179,

48 Pac. 75.)

The order granting a new trial must be affirmed.

Affir7ned.

WARD V. BROWN.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1903.

53 West Virginia, 227.

POFFENBARGER, JudgC :

* * * The court, on its own motion, gave the following:

"The court instructs the jury, that they are the judges of

the evidence and the weight to be given thereto and of the

credibility of witnesses testifying in this case; that if they

TRIAL PRACTICE
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false in a material manner (People v. Hicks, 53 Cal. 354;
People v . Soto, 59 Cal. 367); and, while it has been held in
that state that the word ''false'' is not the equivalent of
"mistake", and that the word "willfully" does not change
the effect of the instruction as offered (People v. Sp1·ague,
53 Cal. 491; People v. Righetti, 66 Cal. 184, 4 Pac. 1063,
1185; White v . Disher, 67 Cal. 402, 7 Pac. 826), nevertheless
we are atisfied that the meaning should be made perfectly
clear by avoiding the opportunity for misunderstanding
that may reasonably exist by adopting the construction of
the supreme court of California announced in the cases
heretofore cited and followed in State v. J(yle, 14 Wash.
550, 45 Pac. 147, holding that the qualifying words need
not be expressed.
As a statute affecting the province of the jury in weighing evidence, it requires them to view with distrust the testimony of a witness who willfully swears falsely as to a
material matter. They must distrust such a witness, and,
under their gen ral power of passing upon the credibilit.Y
to be attached to each witness, they may discard such testimony entirely, except in so far as it is corroborated by
other credible evidence. (P eo ple v. Diirrant, 116 Cal. 179,
48 Pac. 75.)

* * * * * * * * * *

believe that any witness has testified falsely in this case as

The order granting a new trial must be affirmed.
Affirmed.

WARD V. BROWN.
Supreme Court of Appeals of W est Virginia.

1903.

53 West Virginia, 227.
OFFENBAR ER,

Jud ·e:

* * * * • * • * * •

* * *

h ourt, on it own m tion, av the followinp-:
' rrh (' urt in tru t th jury, tba t they ar the jud es of
th vi n an th w j ·ht to
iv n th r to and of the
n <lihi1i
f witn
s t tifyino- in thi a ; that if th y
b li v that any wit
ha. t ti.fi d fal ely in this casP. a~
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to any matters in issue, that then the jury have the right

to disregard such false testimony or give to it and all the

evidence of such witness such weight as the jury may in

their opinion believe it was entitled to." The action of the

court in giving this instruction is also complained of, it

being insisted that the jury should not have been told that

they might give to the false testimony such weight as they

might think it entitled to. Instructions of this class have

been carefully considered in State v. Thompson, 21 W. Va.

741, in which the following was approved as a correct

enunciation of the law: *'If the jury believe from the evi-

dence that any witness who has testified in this case has

knowingly and willfully testified falsely to any material

fact in the case, they may disregard the whole testimony

of such witness, or they may give such weight to the evi-

dence of such witness on other points as they may think it

entitled to. The jury are the exclusive judges of the weight

of the testimony." In Thompson on Trials, section 2,425,
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this instruction is approved as a good model. It is diffi-

cult to see, however, how the jury could believe testimony

which they had found to be false could be entitled to any

weight, and the court told them they could give only such

weight as they might believe it entitled to. They were not

directed to give it any weight. The instruction left it wholly

dependent upon whether they believed it entitled to any

weight. But the instruction is bad in this, that it does not

inform the jury that they may reject the whole of the tes-

timony of the witness who willfully testifies falsely as to

material matters.

**********

For the errors noted, the decree entered in this cause on

the 29th day of April, 1899, by the circuit court of Kanawha

County, must be reversed, the verdict of the jury set aside

and a new trial of the issue awarded.

Reversed, remanded.

INSTRUCTING THE

Ju:ay

4 i

to any matters in i sue, that then the jury have the right
to disregard such false testimony or give to it and all the
evidence of such witne s such weight as the jury may in
their opinion believe it was entitled to.'' The action of the
court in giving this instruction i al o complained of, it
being insist d that the jury should not have been told that
they might give to the false testimony such weight as they
might think it entitled to. Instruction of thi la have
been carefully con idered in State v. Thompson, 21 W. Va.
741, in which the following wa approved as a correct
enunciation of the law: "If the jury believe from the evidence that any witne who has testified in thi ca e ha'
knowingly and willfully te tified falsely to any material
fact in the case, they may disregard the whole testimony
of such witne
or they may gi e uch weight to the evidence of such witne s on other point a they may think it
entitled to. The jury are the e:xclu ive judge of the weight
of the testimony.'' In Thompson on Trial , ection 2,425,
this instru tion i approved a a good model. It is diffiult to see, howe er, how the jury could believe te timony
"hich the had found to be fal e could be entitled to any
weight, and the court told them they could give onl uch
weight as they might belie e it entitled to. They were not
directed to give it any weight. The in truction left it wholly
d pendent upon whether they believed it entitled to any
w ight. But the in truction i bad in thi , that it does not
inform the jur that the ma reject the whole of the testimony of the witness who willfully testifie falsely as to
material matters.
For the errors noted, the decree entered in thi cause on
the 29th da of April, 1 99, by the circuit court f Kanawha
County, mu t be reversed, th verdict of the jury t a. id
and a new trial of the i sue awarded.
Reversed, rernanded.

CHAPTER XIL

ARGUMENT AND CONDUCT OF COUNSEL.

OHAPTER Xll.

BALDWIN'S APPEAL FROM PEOBATE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. 1878.

44 Connecticut, 37.

ARGUMENT AND CONDUCT OF COUNSEL.

Appeal from a decree of a probate court disallowing the

will of Sarah Baldwin ; taken to the Superior Court in New

BALDWIN'S APPEAL FROM PROBATE.

Haven County. The appellant was a devisee and legatee

under the will. The case was tried to the jury, on the

issue of the soundness or unsoundness of the mind of the

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

testratrix, before Sanford, J.

1878.

After the evidence on both sides had been introduced,

one of the counsel for the appellant, while making the

44 Connecticiit, 37.

opening argument, proposed to read to the jury from the

decisions of courts in this country and in England, where

wills had been sustained notwithstanding the objections

which had been made to them founded upon the alleged tes-

tamentary incapacity of their makers, for the purpose of

showing that the facts set forth in such cases were not in-
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consistent with the legal signification of soundness of mind,

as applied to the making of wills. The counsel for the ap-

pellee objected to such reading, on the ground that it would

divert the attention of the jury from the case on trial, and

tliat the jury had no right to be influenced by what other

courts or juries had done or decided in any other case. The

court overruled the objection, and allowed the cases to be

read.

The jury having returned a verdict for the appellant,

sustaining the will, the appellee moved for a new trial for

error in the above ruling of the court. Other questions

were made, which it is not necessary to state, as they were

not considered by the court.

Caepenter, J. On one point in this case we feel con-

488

Appeal from a decree of a probate court disallowing the
will of Sarah Baldwin; taken to the Superior Court in New
Haven County. The appellant was a devisee ·a nd legatee
under the will. The case was tried to the jury, on the
j , ue of the soundness or unsoundness of the mind of the
te tratrix, before Sanford, J.
After the evidence on both sides had been introduced,
one of the counsel for the appeJlant, while making the
opening argument, proposed to read to the jury from the
d cisions of courts in this , ...ountry and in England, where
will had been sustained notwithstanding the objections
which had been made to them founded upon the alleged testamentary incapacity of their makers, for the purpose of
. howing that the facts set forth in such cases were not incon i tent with the legal sjgnification of soundness of mind,
a appli d to the making of wills. The counsel for the appell e objected to such reading, on the ground that it would
divert the attention of the jury from the case on trial, and
tJ1at the jury had no right to be influenced by what other
ourts or jurie had done or -d cided in any other case. The
court overruJed the objection, and allowed the cases to be
r ad.
Tb jury havincr returned a verdict for the appellant,
. u. taining the will, th app 11 moved for a new trial for
Jrror in tb abo e ruling of the court. 0th r qu tions
w r mad , whi h it i. not ne e sary to tate, a th y were
not c n. id r d by th court.
* * * * * * * * * *
CARPE NTER, J.
On one point in this case we feel con-

1

488

hap. 12]
Chap. 12] Argument and Conduct of Counsel 489

strained to grant a new trial. Some of the other questions

discussed are not free from doubt ; but in respect to them

we express no opinion, as they will not necessarily arise

upon another trial.

The counsel for the appellant were permitted, against

the objection of the appellee, to read to the jury, from

books, 'Cases decided in other states and in England, ''for

the purpose," as it is stated in the motion, '*of showing

that the facts as set forth in such cases were not incon-

sistent with the legal signification of 'soundness of mind,'

as applied to the making of wills."

The duties of the court and of the jury in the trial of

civil causes are distinct and clearly defined. It is the duty

of the court to declare the law to the jury ; and that carries

with it a corresponding obligation on the part of the jury

to receive the law only from the court. They have no right

to receive the law from books, nor from counsel, nor are

they permitted to act upon their own notions of law, but

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the law as laid down by the court is to be the law of the

case for them.

It is also the duty of the court to decide what evidence

may and what may not go to the jury ; and the law declares

that all evidence submitted to the jury shall be under the

sanction of an oath. It is the duty of the jury therefore to

hear and consider onl}^ such evidence as the court permits

to be given, and such only as is under oath.

Whether the matter read to the jury be regarded as mat-

ter of law, as a statement of facts, or as a mixture of law

and fact, it is equally objectionable. If as matter of law,

then the jury were re^ceiving the law, which was to guide

their deliberations, from an unauthorized and dangerous

source. If as matter of fact, then the jury were listening

to evidence which was not only irrelevant, and could have

no legitimate bearing upon the question before them, but

it was admitted after the evidence was closed and the argu-

ment commenced, and without any legal sanction whatever,

not even being subjected to the test of a cross-examination.

If regarded as a mixture of law and fa^ct, then all the ob-

jections which may be urged against it when viewed as law

or fact, apply in full force. In whatever aspect viewed

its tendency was bad, diverting the minds of the jury from

ARGUMENT AND CoNDUCT OF CouNSEL
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strained to grant a new trial. Some of the other question.
discu sed are not free from doubt· but in re pect to them
we express no opinion, as they will not nece arily arise
upon another trial.
The counsel for the appellant were permitted, against
the objection of the appellee, to read to the jury, from
books, cases decided in other states and in England, "for
the purpose,'' as it is stated in the motion, ''of howin <:r
that the facts as set forth in such cases were not inconi tent with the legal signification of 'soundne s of mind '
a applied to the making of will . ''
The duties of the court and of the jury in the trial of
ivil ause are di tinct and clearly defined. It i the duty
of the court to declare the law to the jury; and that carrie
with it a corresponding ohligation on the part of the jury
to receive the law onl from the court. They have no right
to receive the law from book , nor from coun el nor are
they permitted to act upon their own notions of law, but
the law as laid down by the court is to be the law of the
a e for them.
It i also the duty of the court to decide what evidence
may and what may not go to the jur ; and the law declare
that all evidence submitted to the jur. shall be under the
auction of an oath. It is the dut of the jury therefore to
hear and consider only such evidence as the court permits
to be gii; en, and uch onl as i under oath.
Whether the matter read to the jury be regarded as matter of law, as a statement of fact or a a mixture of law
and fact, it is equally objectionable. If as matter of law
then the jury were receiving the law, which wa to guid
their deliberation , from an unauthorized and dano·erou
source. If a matt r of fa t, th n the jury were Ii t nincr
to vidence which was not only irrel Yant and could hai;no legitimate bearing upon the que tion before th m but
it wa admitt d aft r the evidenc wa lo d and the ar
ment commenced and without any legal an tion whatever
not even in ubject d to the te t of a cro -examination.
If regarded a. a mixture of law and faict then all the o j ction which rnay b urged acrain. t it wh n vi wed as law
or fa t, apply in full fore . In whatever a pect viewed
its tendency was ad divertin th minds of the jury from

490
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tile real question they were to try, and the legitimate and

proper evidence in the case.

This is not the ordinary case of reading an authority

to the court upon a question of law in the presence of the

jury, as the counsel for the appellant seems to intimate.

The motion shows that it was proposed to read the cases

to the jury. The reading was objected to *'on the ground

that it would divert the attention of the jury from the case

on trial, and that the jury had no right to be influenced

by what other courts or juries had done or decided in any

other case." The court, in overruling this objection, must

have caused the jury to understand that it was proper for

them to consider the facts stated in those cases, and the

action of the courts and juries thereon, in connection with

the evidence in this case in making up their verdict, and

they may have been, and probably were, influenced thereby.

Whatever effect they had, whether much or little, was im-

proper and tended to prejudice the appellee.
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The view we take of this question is in harmony with

the law as laid down elsewhere. Ashworth v. Kittridge, 12

Cush. 193; Commo'invealth v. Wilson, 3 Gray, 337; Wash-

hum V. Cuddihy, 8 Gray, 430; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11

Mich. 501; People v. Anderson, 44 Cal. 65; Carter v. The

State, 2 Carter's Ind. R., 617.

We advise a new trial.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY

V.REAUME.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1908.

32 Kentucky Law Reporter, 946.

Opinion of the court by Judge Carroll, reversing.

Appellee, who was a passenger on one of appellant's

trains, was injured by the derailment of the train at a

point near Zion station, on the line of its railroad between

Cincinnati and Louisville. In an action brought by her to

recover damages for injuries received, the jury returned

TRIAL PRACTICE
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the real question they were to try, and the legitimate and
proper evidence in the case.
This is not tile ordinary case of reading an authority
to tho court upon a question of law in the pre ence of the
jury. as the counsel for the appellant seems to intimate.
rrhe pJotion shows that it was pro1 osed to read the cases
to the jury. The reading was objected to "on the ground
that it would divert the attention of the jury from the case
on trial, and that the jury had no right to be influenced
by what other courts or juries had done or decided in any
other case.'' The court, in overruling this objection, must
have caused the jury to understand that it was proper for
them to consider the facts stated in those cases, and the
action of the courts and juries thereon, in connection with
the evidence in this case in makincr up their verdict, and
they may have been, and probably were, influenced thereby.
Whatever effect they had, whether much or little, was improper and tended to prejudice the appellee.
The view we take of this question is in harmony with
the law as laid down elsewhere. Ashworth v. Kittridge, 12
Cu h. 193; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 3 Gray, 337; Washb1irn v . Cuddihy, 8 Gray, 430; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11
Mich. 501; People v. Anderson, 44 Cal. 65; Carter v. The
State, 2 Carter's Ind. R., 617.
We advise a new trial.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

a verdict in her favor for ten thousand dollars.

LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY
V. REAUME.
Court of Appeal of J( entucky. 1908.
32

Kentitcky Law R porter, 946.

inion of the ourt by J udO'
ARROLL, reversin .
Ap 11 e, who wa a la nO' r n on of appellant's
tr in. , wa. injur d by th d railm nt of th train at a
J int
ar Zi
st tion, on tb lin f it railroad b tween
1
inrinn ti and Louisvill . In an rtion brou 0 ·ht b. h r to
r (•ov r damag . f r inj ui
r c iv d, th jury r turned
a \' r i t in h r fav r for t n th u and dollars.
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* * * Much is also said about the misconduct of appel-

lee's counsel in continuing to ask questions that the trial

court had ruled incompetent. It is improper for counsel

to persist in asking questions that the court has ruled to

be incompetent, the purpose being to impress the jury with

the importance of the facts that have been excluded from

their consideration. When the court has sustained an ob-

jection to a question, it is the privilege of counsel to make

an avowal as to what the witness would say if permitted to

answer, and this avowal he has the right to have put in

record for the purpose of an appeal. But the question ex-

cluded should not be again asked the same witness in like

or a different form, unless it be that the objection was made

to the question because of the form in which it was put. If

this is the ground upon which the objection is based, coun-

sel should, of course, be permitted to ask the question in

proper form, so that the objection may go to the competency

or relevancy of it. As an illustration of the manner in
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which counsel for appellee sought to get before the jury

incompetent evidence, he rei:)eatedly asked, in different

forms and ways — if the railroad company had not settled

or attempted to settle with other persons injured in the

same wreck; and also concerning the condition of the

health of appellee's father and other members of her fam-

ily. A party will not be permitted, by indirect means, to

acquaint the jury with facts which he is not allowed to

bring to their notice by direct evidence. If this practice

was permitted to go Avithout criticism, or could be indulged

in, without suffering the penalty of reversal, the trial judge,

after exhausting all other means, could not, unless he felt

inclined to resort to contempt proceedings, prevent the

mind of the jury from being prejudiced by the efforts of

counsel to put before them, in an indirect way, evidence that

was incompetent. Skilled counsel in resorting to practices

of this character, have in view the effect that it will pro-

duce on the jury and their expectations are too frequently

well founded, as it is difficult for a jury to escape from

being impressed in some manner by the insistence with

whicli damaging, but incompetent, evidence is offered and

the objections of adverse counsel to it sustained. If a

practice of this kind is persistently indulged in by counsel,

although the trial judge repeatedly tried to prevent it, it

OF

CouNsEL

491

* * * Mu h is also said about the misconduct of appellee 's coun el in continuing to ask questions that the trial
court had rul d incompetent. It is improper for counsel
to persi t in asking questions that the court ha ruled to
be incompetent, the purpose being to impress the jury with
the importance of the facts that have been excluded from
their consideration. When the court has sustained an obj ction to a que tion, it is the privilege of couns 1 to make
an aYowal as to what the witness would say if permitted to
answer, and this avowal he has the right to have put in
record for the purpo e of an appeal. But the question excluded should not be again asked the same witness in like
or a different form, unles it be that the objection was made
to the question becau e 8f the foTm in which it was put. If
this is the ground upon which the objection is ba ed, counsel hould, of cour e, be permitted to ask the question in
proper form, so that the objection may go to the competency
or relevanc of it. As an illustration of the manner in
which coumsel for appellee sought to get before the jury
incompetent evidence, he repeatedly asked, in different
forms and way -if the railroad company had not ettled
or attempted to settle with other persons injured in the
ame wreck; and also concerning the con di ti on of the
health of appell o's father and other members of her fam·
ily. A party ''ill not be permitted, by indirect mean , to
acquaint the jury with facts which he is not allowed to
bring to their noti. e by direct evidence. If this practice
was permitted to go without critici m, or could be indulged
in, without uffering the penalty of rm er al, the trial judge,
after exhausting all other means, could not unle he felt
inclined to resort to contempt proceedings pre nt the
mind of the jury from being prejudiced by the effort of
counsel to put b fore them, in an indir ct way, eviden e that
wa in om1 etent. killed oun 1 in re orting to practi es
of thi chara t r, have in view the eff ct that it will produce on th jur> and th ir XI tation are too fr qu ntly
well foun d, as it i diffi ult for a jury to
ap from
bein impre
1 in
me mann r by the in i t nc with
which amaO'inO' ut in o petent
id nc i off r
and
the obje tion of adY r
oun el to it u tain d. If a
ractic of thi kin i p T . i. t ntly indulO'ed in b. coun 1
at dly tried to pre ent it, it
a1thou 0 ·h the t~ial judi:; r
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would as surely be grounds for reversal as any other sub-

stantial error that a party might commit in the trial of a

■case. The orderly conduct of the trial, the professional

and personal deportment of counsel, the examination of wit-

nesses, and all other matters connected with the proceed-

ings are under the control of the trial judge, and he has

ample power and authority to enforce his rulings and to

prevent counsel from disobeying them. But, the trial judge

is often reluctant to resort to extreme measures in dealing

with attorneys engaged in the trial of a case, and is content

to sustain objections that are made, and let the disapproved

conduct pass with this, or a slight reprimand, that at times

is unheeded, but this court will not permit the non-action

of the trial judge, or rather his failure to take such action

as may be necessary to effectually restrain counsel to pre-

judice the rights of one of the parties, but will take such

action as to it, under all the circumstances, seems right

and i:>roper. The distinguished counsel who tried the case
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for appellee, has since died. He was an able, resourceful

and zealous lawyer. His experience on the bench, where he

presided with honor and dignity, well qualified him to un-

derstand and appreciate when counsel, in the trial of a case,

were overstepping the bounds of propriety, and he must have

known, as did the excellent judge before whom this case was

tried, that the evidence he was trying to get before the jury

was wholly irrelevant and incompetent. Except for the fact

that this case, on a retrial, will be conducted by other coun-

sel, and our failure to call attention to the misconduct of

former counsel might leave the impression that it was not

open to criticism, we would not, under the circumstances,

direct attention to it.

TRIAL PRACTICE
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would as surely be grounds for reversal as any other subtantial error that a party might commit in the trial of a
case. The orderly conduct of the trial, the prof es ion al
and personal deportment of counsel, the examination of witnesses, and all other matters connected with the proceeding are under the control of the trial judge, and he has
ample power and authority to enforce his rulings and to
prevent counsel fr om disobeying them. But, the trial judge
i often reluctant to resort to extreme measures in dealing
with attorneys engaged in the trial of a case, and is content
to sustain objectjon that are made, and let the disappToved
conduct pass with this, or a slight reprimand, that at times
i unheeded, but this court will not permit the non-action
of the trial judge, or rather his failure to take such action
as may be nN·0ssary to effectually restrain counsel to prejudice the rights of one of the parties, but will take such
action as to it, under all the circumstances, seems right
and proper. TL.e distinguished counsel who tried the case
for appellee, has since died. He was an able, resourceful
and zealous lawyer. His experience on the bench, where be
presided with honor and dignity, well qualified him to under tand and appreciate when counsel, in the trial of a case,
were over tepping the bounds of propriety, and he mu t have
known, as did the excellent judge before whom this case was
tried, that the evidence he was trying to get before the jury
was wholly irrelevant and incompetent. Excer t for the fact
that this ca e, on a retrial, will be conducted by other counel, and our failure to call attention to the misconduct of
former coun. el mio·ht leave tbe impression that it wa. not
open to criticism, we would not, under the circum tances,
direct attention to it.

• • * • * • * • • •
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WAGONER V. HAZLE TOWNSHIP.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 1906.

215 Pennsylvania State, 219.

WAGONER V. HAZLE TOWNSHIP.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Mestrezat, May 7, 1906.

The proximate cause of Mrs. Wagoner's injuries was

the hole or opening in the bridge, and if the jury found, as

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

1906.

they did, that the hole was caused by the negligence of the

defendant township, its liability necessarily followed.

215 Pennsylvania State, 219.

The question of Mrs. Wagoner's contributory negligence

was for the jury. The facts were not undisjrated. The

plaintiffs claim that after the wheel of the wagon had gone

into the opening in the bridge she attempted to alight

from the wagon, and was in the act of doing so at the

time it was struck by the car of the Lehigh Traction Com-

pany, and that her conduct in no way contributed to her

injuries. What she did on that occasion, and whether she

acted with the prudence required of her, were for the jury.

Prior to the present action the plaintiffs brought suit
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against the Lehigh Traction Company to recover damages

for the same injuries, and obtained a verdict of $6,000. The

case, on appeal, was heard by this court last year, and the

judgment was reversed and a new trial was awarded. On

the trial of the present action the counsel for the plaintiff

in the presence of the jury and where they could distinctly

hear it, made the following offer: ''We now offer in evi-

dence the record in that case, for the purpose of show-

ing that the jury gave the plaintiff a verdict of six thous-

and dollars, and that the case was appealed to the Supreme

Court and that the Supreme Court reversed the judgment

of the court below, practically saying that it was not re-

sponsible, but that the township was bound to keep its own

road in repair." Thereupon the defendant's counsel said:

"We object and move that a juror be withdrawn, because

of the statement made by the attorney for the plaintiff, in

full voice before the jury, as to the amount of the other

verdict." The court declined to withdraw a juror and the

defendant excepted to the ruling. We think the court com-

mitted error ft)r which the judgment must be reversed.

Opinion by Mr. Ju tice MEsTREZAT, May 7, 1906.
The proximate cause of Mrs. Wagoner's injurie wa
the hole or opening in the bridge, and if the jury found, as
they did that the hole was caused by the negligence of the
defendant township, its liability necessarily followed.

* * * * * • • * * *
The question of M1·s. Wagoner's contributory negligence
was for the jury. The facts were not undi put ed. The
plaintiffs claim that after the wheel of the wagon had gone
into the opening in the bridge she attempted to alight
from the wagon, and was in the act of doing 0 at the
time it was struck by the car of the Lehigh Traction Company, and that her conduct in no way contributed to her
injuries. What she did on that occasion, and whether she
acted with the prudence required of her, were for the jury.
Prior to the present action the plaintiff brought uit
against the Lehigh Traction Company to recover dama e
for the same injuries, and obtained a verdict of $6,000. The
case, on appeal, was heard by this court last year and the
judgment was reversed and a new trial was awarded. On
the trial of the present action the counsel for the plaintiff
in the pre ence of the jury and where they could di tinctly
hear it, made the following offer: ''We now offer in evidence the record in that ca e, for the purpo e of sho ing that the jur gave the plaintiff a verdi t of ix thou. and dollars, and that the ca e was app aled to the Supr me
ourt and that the Supreme ourt rever d the judgment
of th court below, practically saying that it wa not responsible but that the town hip wa bound to ke p it own
road in repair." Thereupon th
efen a t' c un el aid:
"We obj ct and move that a juror b withdrawn. can,
of th tat
nt mad by th attorney for th plaintiff in
full Yoic b fore th jury a, to th amount of the oth r
verdi t.'' The court d lin d to withdraw a juror and th
def en ant ex epte to th rulino-. W think th ourt om.
mitted error f-or which the judgment must be re ersed.

494

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 12

494 Trial Peactice [Chap. 12

The offer was clearly incompetent, and the only purpose

it could serve, or effect it could have, would be to place

before the jury the amount of the large verdict in the Le-

high Traction Company case. The counsel should not have

made the otfer, and after he had made it, it was the duty

of the court to protect the defendant against its effect. The

purpose of the offer was obvious, and its effect would be

equally apparent. Such conduct on the part of counsel is

different from an unintentional or inadvertent remark to

a jury which does the opposite party no injury. When

such remarks are made they may or may not have an in-

fluence upon the jury, but there can be no question about

the effect upon the tribunal of an offer to show what a

former jury, dealing with the same facts, had determined

as to the amount of damages due the plaintiffs for the

injuries which they sustained. It was a criterion for the

jury in considering the case which they evidently would

accept, and which no language of the trial judge could
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drive from their minds. The offer got before the jury what

was clearly incompetent and what manifestly would, to

some extent at least, control their verdict. The only way to

remedy the wrong was to w^ithdraw a juror and compel the

plaintiffs to submit the cause to another jury, uninfluenced

by such wholly irrelevant and incompetent matter.

When an attorney in the trial of a cause willfully and in-

tentionally makes an offer of wholly irrelevant and in-

competent evidence, or makes improper statements as to

the facts in his address to the jury, clearly unsupported by

any evidence, which are prejudicial and harmful to the

opposite party, it is the plain duty of the trial judge, of

his own motion, to act promptly and effectively by repri-

manding counsel and withdrawing a juror and continuing

the cause at the costs of the -client. In no other way can

justice be administered and the rights of the injured party

be protected. The imposition of the costs will remind the

client that he has an attorney unfaithful to him as well

as to the court. The obligation of fidelity to the court

wliich an attorney assumes on his admission to the bar

is ever thereafter with him, and when he attempts to de-

foat the justice of a cause by interjecting into the trial

wholly foreign and irrelevant matter for the manifest pur-

The offer was clearly incompetent, and the only purpose
it could serve, or effect it could have, would be to place
before the jury the amount of the large verdict in the Lehigh Traction Company ·case. The counsel should not have
made the offer, and after he had made it, it was the duty
of the court to protect the defendant against its effect. The
purpose of the offer was obvious, and its effect would be
equally apparent. Such conduct on the part of counsel is
different from an unintentional or inadvertent remark to
a jury which does the opposite party no injury. When
such remarks are made they may or may not have an influenc e upon the jury, but there can be no question about
the effect upon the tribunal of an offer to show what a
former jury, dealing with the same f acts, had determined
as to the amount of damages due the plaintjffs for the
injuries whi.ch they sustained. It was a criterion for the
jury in considering the case which they evidently would
accept and which no language of the trial judge could
drive from their minds. The offer got before the jury what
was clearly incompetent and what manifestly would, to
some extent at least, control their verdict. The only way to
remedy the wrong was to withdraw a juror and compel the
plaintiffs to submit the cause to another jury, uninfluenced
by such wholly irrelevant and in ompetent matter.
* * * * * * * * * *
When an attorney in the trial of a cause willfully and intentionally makes an off er of wholly irrelevant and inompetent evidence, or makes improper statements as to
the fa ts in hi address to the jury, clearly unsupported by
any evidence, which are prejudi ial and harmful to the
oppo. ite party, it is the plain duty of th trial jud()"e, of
hi. own motion, to act promptly and ff tively by r primanding counsel and withdrawing a juror and continuing
th au e at th o ts of the di nt. In no oth r way can
ju. ti b administ r d and the ri ·hts of the injured party
e prot t d. Tbe im
ition of th o t will r mind the
li nt that h has an attorn . unfaithful to him as well
a. t h
urt. Tb
hligation of :fid lity to th court
hirh an att rn y
n hi admi jou to the bar
i:
r th r aft r with him, and wh n h att m1 t to def at th jn. ti
f a ans by int rj ting into th trial
w lJ llv f r ign a d irr I v nt matter f r the manif st pur-
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pose of misleading the jury, he fails to observe the duty

required of him as an attorney and his conduct should re-

ceive the condemnation of the court. This condemnation

can and should be made effective.

The ninth assignment of error is sustained and the judg-

ment of the court below is reversed with a venire facias de

novo.

M'CARTHY V. SPRING VALLEY COAL COMPANY.

ARGUMENT AND

o

DU T OF OouNSEL

4 5

pose of mi leadin · the jur , he fail to o rye the duty
required of him a · an att rn y· and hi con<lu t hould reeive the condenmati n of the ourt. This ond mnation
an and hould be mad eff tive.
The ninth a ignm nt of error i ustained and the judgment of the court below i r versed with a enire facia de
n o.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1908.

232 Illinois, 473.

This is an action on the case in the circuit court of Bureau

county to recover damages for personal injury sustained in

the appellant's coal mine. * * *

Me. Justice Dunn delivered the opinion of the court:

Complaint is made of the conduct of counsel for the ap-

M'OARTHY V. SPRING VALLEY COAL

OMP ANY.

pellee in the course of the trial. The counsel who made

the opening statement to the jury began: ''In this case

Patrick McCarthy, thirty-three years of age, with a wife

Supreme Coi1,rt of Illinois.

1908.
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and five children," when he was interrupted with an objec-

tion, which the court sustained. In cross-examining one

232 Illinois, 473.

of appellant's witnesses in regard to the taking of a writ-

ten statement of a witness for the appellee at the offi'ce of

appellant, appellee's counsel asked if Mr. Bayne, the attor-

ney of the Aetna Insurance Company, was present. On

objection the question was withdrawn, counsel saying that

he meant Mr. Bayne, the attorney for The Spring Valley

Coal Company. Several objections were also made in the

course of the argument of appellee's counsel to the jury.

The statement to the jury that the appellee had a wife

and five children was manifestly improper. Its only object

could have been to enhance the damages by getting before

the jury, in this improper and unprofessional manner, facts

calculated to arouse their s^Tupathy, which counsel knew

could not in any legitimate way be brought to their atten-

tion. To admit evidence of such facts is error. {Jones &

This is an action on the ca e in the circuit court of Bureau
county to recover damage for personal injury u tained in
the appellant's coal mine. * * *
MR. J usTICE DuNN delivered the opinion of the court:
* * * * * * * * * *
Complaint is made of the conduct of coun el for the ap1 ellee in the cour e of the trial. The coun el who made
the 01 ening stvtement to the jury began: "In this ca e
Patrick ~1cCarthy thirt. -three years of ao·e, with a wife
and fh e children, " when he was interrupted with an objecti n, which the court sustained. In cross-examining one
of apr llant's witne e in regard to the taking of a written statement of a witne for the appellee at th offi, e of
ar pellant appellee' coun 1 a ked if d:r. Bayne the attorney of the Aetna Insurance Company, was pre ent. On
objection the question wa withdrawn coun el ayin that
he meant Mr. Bayn th attorney for The prino- '\ all )
•oal ompauy. SeYeral objection w re al o mad in th .
cour e of thn argum nt of app llee's coun el to th jury.
The tatement to th jur. that the a I 11 e had a wif
and five chHdren wa manif tly improp r. It only o j t
b! e tin b f re
·•oul haYe be n to nhan e the dama
th jury, in this impro1 r and un rofe i al mann r fact
al 11::lt
to ri.r u e their ympathy
hi h coun 1 knew
uld not in any legitimat way b brouo-ht to th ir att nti m. To admit evid nee of such facts i error. (Jone &
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Adams Co. v. George, 227 111. 64.) The fact once lodged in

the minds of the jury could not be erased by an instruction,

and appellee by this statement secured the benefit of the

fact to the same extent as if he had introduced evidence

to prove it.

The question in which Mr. Bayne was referred to as the

attorney of the Aetna Insurance Company was also justly

subject to criticism. The question asked was as follows:

''At the time that this statement was taken from Luke

Frain at the office of The Spring Valley Coal Company,

was Mr. Bayne, the attorney for the Aetna Insurance Com-

pany, there?" It is as strange as it is unfortunate that

this question should have been asked through mere inad-

vertence, as stated in appellee's brief. It is strange that with

the name of appellant in counsel's mouth, the name of Mr.

Bayne, who was then present assisting in the trial as attor-

ney for the appellant, should have associated itself in coun-

sel's mind and speech with the name of the Aetna Insurance
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Company as attorney instead of with the name of the ap-

pellant. The question and the circumstances were well

adapted to intimate strongly to the jury that the appellant

was insured against liability for accidents of this character,

and that the party which would have to respond for any

judgment which might be rendered was the Aetna Insur-

ance Company. Evidence of this character was not compe-

tent. The intimation may not have been true, and it is un-

fortunate that the suggestion should have been inadvert-

ently made. The only effect it could have would be to con-

vey an improper impression to the jury.

The Appellate Court required a remittitur of $2000 from

the judgment as the alternative of a reversal on account of

the effect on the minds of the jury of the improper state-

ment in regard to appellee's wife and children. Such re-

mittitur does not, however, cure the error. {Jones S

Adams Co. v. George, supra.) It is impossible to tell the

effect, on the verdict, of the impressions wrongfully con-

veyed to the jury's mind by the improper conduct of coun-

sel.

The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded

for a new trial.

Reversed and remanaed.
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Adams Co. v. George, 227 Ill. 64.) The fact once lodged in
the minds of the jury could not be erased by an instruction,
and appellee by this statement secured the benefit of the
fact to the same extent as if he had introduced evidence
to prove it.
The question jn which Mr. Bayne was referred to as the
attorney of the Aetna Insurance Company was also justly
subject to criticism. The question asked was as follows:
''At the time that this statement was taken from Luke
Frain at the office of The Spring Valley Coal Company,
was Mr. Bayne, the attorney for the Aetna Insurance Company, there~" It is as strange as it is unfortunate that
this question should have been asked through mere inadvertence, as stated in appellee 's brief. It is strange that with
the name of appellant in counsel's mouth, the name of Mr.
Bayne, who was then present assisting in the trial as attorney for the appellant, should have associated itself in counsel's mind and speech with the name of the Aetna Insurance
Company as attorney instead of with the name of the appellant. The question and the circumstances were well
adapted to intimate strongly to the jury that the appellant
was insured against liability for accidents of this ·character,
and that the party which would have to respond for any
judgment which might be rendered was the Aetna Insurance Company. Evidence of this character was not compe~
tent. The intimation may not have been true, and it is unfortunate that the sugge tion should have been inadvertently made. The only effect it could have would be to convey an improper impression to the jury.
·
• • * * * * • * * *
The Appellate Court required a remittitur of $2000 from
the judorm nt as the alternative of a rever al on account of
the eff ct on the minds of the jury of the improper statem nt in regard to appellee' wife and children. Such remittitur does not, however, cure the error.
(Jones &
.Adam,s Co. v. George, supra.) It is impo sible to tell the
effe t, on the verdi t, of the impre ions wrongfully convey d to the jury's mind by the improper conduct of counsel.
The jud()'m nt will be reversed and the cause remanded
for a new trial.
Reversed and remanaed.

Chap. 12]

ARGUl\IE ... T AND CoNDUCT OF CouNSEL

497

Chap. 12] Argument and Conduct of Counsel 497

BEOWN V. SWINEFORD.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 1878.

BROWN V. SWINEFORD.

44 Wisconsin, 282,

Action for an assault and battery.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Ryan, C. J. * * *

1878.

**********

44 Wisconsin, 282.

II. Following for once a bad practice, the learned coun-

sel for the respondent, in closing the argument of the case

to the jury, forgot himself so far as to exceed the limits of

professional freedom of discussion.

It appears by the bill of exceptions, that he waived the

opening argument to the jury. A very strict rule might

hold this to give the other side the right to close. If sucli

a waiver should still leave the closing argument to the

plaintiff, it certainly confined it to a strict reply to the de-

fendant's argument, excluding general discussion of the

case. The sole object of all argument is the elucidation of

the truth, greatly aided in matters of fact, as well as in
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matters of law, by full and fair forensic discussion. And

this is always imperiled when either party, by any practice,

is able to present his views of the case to the jury without

opportunity of the other to comment on them. And if the

party entitled to the opening argument, relying on the

strength of his case without discussion, waive the right to

open, he waives the right to discuss the case generally, and

should not be permitted to do so out of his order, and after

the mouth of the other party is closed. His close, if per-

mitted to close the argument, should be limited to com-

ments on the argument of the other side. This is essential

to the fairness and usefulness of juridical discussion at the

bar.

It sufficiently appears in the present case, that the

learned counsel for the plaintiff did not properly confine his

closing argument to a reply. It is very doubtful if that

alone would be error sufficient to reverse the judgment, if

an exception had been taken by the appellant, which does

not appear to be the case. But the learned counsel went

hevond the le£>Mtimate scope of all argument, by stating

and commenting on facts not in evidence.

T. p.— 32

Action for an assault and battery.
RYAN' c. J. * * *
* * * * • • * • • •
II. Following for once a bad practice the learned ounsel for the respondent, in closing the argument of the ca r
to the jur , forgot him elf so far as to exceed the limit of
I rof es ional freed om of di cussion.
It appears by the bill of exceptions, that he waived the
opening argument to the jury. A ery trict rule migbt
hold thi to gi e the other side the right to close. If u h
a waiver should till leave the clo ing argument to the
plaintiff, it certainl onfined it to a strict reply to the defendant argument, excluding general di cu ion of the
ca e. The sole object of all argument i the elucidation of
the truth greatl) aided in matters of fact, as well a in
matter of law by full and fair foren iic di cu ion. And
thi i always imperiled when either party by any practice,
i abl to pre ent his views of the case to the jury without
opportunit of the other to comment on them. illd if the
part3 entitled to the opening argument rel. -ing on the
trength of his ca e without discu ion waiYe the right to
open he waives the right to discu the ca e gen erall>-· and
hould not be permitted to do so out of hi, order, and after
the mouth of the other party is lo ed. Hi lo e if p rmitted to close the argument hould be limit
to c mment on the argument of the other ide. Thi i.
ntial
to the fairness and usefulne s of juridical di n ion at the
bar.
It ufficiently appears in the pr . nt ca._e that th
learned coun el for the plaintiff did no pro rl> nfin hi.
clo in argu ent to a r ply. It i v ry doubtful if that
alone would le rr r uffi i nt t r Yer. the ."u<lg·1
t, if
an exception had b n taken . the app Hant which doe
not app ar to 1 th a . But th 1 arn
r 1n 1 w nt
b ond the l ~dtimat , cop
f all arO'um nt y tating
and commenti:og on fa t not in 'id nee.
T . .-32
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In actions of tort, calling for exemplary damages, evi-

dence of the pecuniary ability of the defendant to pay them

is admissible. Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67; Barnes v. Mar-

tin, 15 Wis. 240. This appears to be, as Mr. Justice Cole

remarks in Birchard v. Booth, a fair corollary of the rule

of exemplary damages. Perhaps the corollary is not bet-

ter founded in principle than the rule; but the court takes

them as it finds them established.

It appeared in evidence, that the appellant was an officer

of a railroad company, and that the locus in quo was within

depot grounds of the company. No evidence appears to

have been given of the ability of the appellant to pay ex-

emplary damages. The learned counsel appears to have

undertaken to supply this want of evidence, by comment-

ing to the jury upon the appellant's connection with the

railroad company, and the wealth and power of the com-

pany as a great corporation, and the defendant's ability,

from his connection with it, to pay any judgment which
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might be rendered against him. The bill of exceptions

states, that "no record was kept of these remarks, and

the court is unable to state more specifically the substances

of the language used." But enough appears to show, not

that the learned counsel commented on facts not in evi-

dence, but in effect testified to the facts himself. It was

in effect telling the jury that the appellant's position with

the corporation gave him the ability to pay large damages,

and nearly — if not quite — that they might measure the

damages by the wealth of the railroad company itself.

Amongst other evidence of the appellant's ability to pay,

it might undoubtedly have been shown that he received

large emoluments from his position in the railroad com-

pany; and possibly that the railroad company had assumed

the appellant's tort and the payment of the judgment. And

it was not the duty or the right of counsel, was not within

the proper scope of professional discussion, to assume the

facts as proven, or to state them to the jury as existing;

founding his argument pro tanto upon them. And this

was the more marked in the present case, because it was

made for the first time in what should have been a mere

reply; and still more, because the court below had already

admonished counsel to confine himself to the evidence, and

not to go outside of the record.

In actions of tort, calling for exemplary damages, evidence. of the pecuniary ability of the defendant to pay them
is admissible. Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67; Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240. This appears to be, as Mr. Justice Cole
remarks in Bircha1·d v. Booth, a fair corollary of the rule
of exemplary damages. Perhaps the corollary is not better founded in principle than the rule; but the court takes
them as it finds them established.
It appeared in evidence, that the appellant was an officer
of a railroad company, and that the locus in quo was within
depot grounds of the company. No evidence appears to
have been given of the ability of the appellant to pay exemplary damages. The learned counsel appears to have
undertaken to supply this want of evidence, by commenting to the jury upon the appellant's connection with the
railroad company, and the wealth and power of the company as a great corporation, and the defendant's ability,
from his connection with it, to pay any judgment which
might be rendered against him. The bill of exceptions
tates, that ''no record was kept of these remarks, and
the court is unable to state more specifically the substance
of the language used.'' But enough appears to show, not
that the learned counsel commented on facts not in evidence, but in effect testified to the facts himself. It was
in effect telling the jury that ·the appellant' position with
the corporation gave him the ability to pay large damage ,
and nearly-if not quite-that they might measure the
damages by the wealth of the railroad company it elf.
Amongst other evidence of the appellant's ability to pay,
it might undoubtedly have been shown that he received
laro-e emoluments from his po ition in the railroad company; and possibly that the railroad ompany had a sumed
the appellant' tort and the paym nt of the judgment. And
it wa not th duty or the ri<>'ht of coun 1 wa not within
th
rop r ope of rofe ional di u ion, to a ume the
fa t. a
rov n, or to tate th m to th jur. a xi tino- ·
f ndi a- hi aro-u nt pro tanto upon th m. And thi
wa. th mor markr<l in th
r . nt ca , b au it wa.
mad for th :fir t tim in what should hav b en a mere
r ly; an<1 still m r 1 ran s th ourt b low had Jr ady
ad ni :li l r nn . 1 to ron finr him. 1f to th evid nc , and
-+

"'°" ,. , . .

"", +. . . ~;:JI"\,....~~"" "

..... l"\l"\l""\"\'.. ;J

Uhap. 12]
Chap. 12] Trial Peactice 499

The appellant took his exceptions; and his counsel now

supports it by numerous cases, some of which are — as far

as they go — admirable discussions of professional ethics,

and all of which are well worth the attention of the bar. All

of them support the rule now adopted by this court, that it

is error sufficient to reverse a judgment, for counsel, againsi

objection, to state facts pertinent to the issue and not in

evidence, or to assume arguendo such facts to be in the

case when they are not. Some of the cases go further, and

reverse judgments for imputation by counsel of facts not

pertinent to the issue, but calculated to prejudice the case.

Tucker v. Eenniker, 41 N. H. 317; State v. Smith, 75 N. C.

306; Ferguson v. State, 49 Ind. 33; Hennies v. Vogel, Sup.

Court III, 7 Cent. L. J., 18.

There are cases in conflict with those which support this

rule. But, in the judgment of this court, the rule is sup-

ported by the weight of authority and by principle.

Doubtless the circuit court can, as it did in this case,
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charge the jury to disregard all statements of fact not in

evidence. But it is not so certain that a jury will do so.

Verdicts are too often found against evidence and without

evidence, to warrant so great a reliance on the discrimin-

ation of juries. And, without notes of the evidence, it may

be often difficult for juries to discriminate between the

statements of fact by counsel, following the evidence and

outside of it. It is sufficient that the extra-professional

statements of counsel may gravely prejudice the jury and

alTect the verdict.

The profession of the law is instituted for the adminis-

tration of justice. The duties of the bench and bar differ

in kind, not in purpose. The duty of both alike is to es-

tablish the truth and to apply the law to it. It is essential

to the proper administration of justice, frail and uncer-

tain at best, that all that can be said for each party, in the

determination of fact and law, should be heard. Forensic

strife is but a method, and a mighty one, to ascertain tlie

truth and the law governing the truth. It is the duty of

counsel to make the most of the case which his client is able

to give him ; but counsel is out of his duty and his riglit,

and outside of the prin-ciple and object of his profession,

when he travels out of his client's case and assumes to sup-

ply its deficiencies. Therefore is it that the nice sense of

TRIAL PRACTICE
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The appellant took his e ·ception ; and his coun el now
upports it by nnmerous cases, some of which are-as far
as they go-admirable di cu sions of profe ional ethi
and all of which are well worth the attention of the bar. All
of them support the rule now adopte by this court, that it
is error sufficient to re er e a judgment, for counsel, again. 1
objection, to state facts pertinent to the i ue and not in
evidence, or to a sume arguendo such fact to be in the
case when they are not. Some of the ca e go further and
reverse judgments for imputation by coun el of fact not
pertinent to the i ue, but calculated to prejudice the ca e.
Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N. H. 317; State v. Smith, 75 N. C.
306; Ferguson v . State, 49 Ind. 33; Hennies v. Vogel, Sup.
Court Ill., 7 Cent. L. J., 18.
There are cases in confJi. t with tho e which upport thi
rule. But, in the judgment of this court, the rule is supported by the weight of authority and by principle.
Doubtless the circuit court can, a it did in this ca e
charge the jury to disregard all statement of fact not in
evidence. But it is not so certain that a jury will do o.
Verdicts are too often found again t eYid nee and without
evidence, to warrant so great a reliance on the di crimination of juries. And without note of the evidence it may
be often difficult for jurie to di. criminate between the
. tatements of fact by coun el, following the evidence and
out · ide of it. It is ufficient that the extra-profe ional
tatements of coun el may gravely prejudice the jury and
aff ct the verdi t.
The profe sion of the law is in titute for the admini tration of ju tice. The duties of the ben h and bar diff r
in kind, not in purpo e. The dut. of both alike i to
tablish the truth and to ap 1. the law to it. It i e ential
to the proper admini tration of ju. tice, frail and unc rtain at best that all that can be aid for each party in the
determination of fact and law . bou]
hear l. F ren. i
strife i but a method and a mio-hty on to a certain the
truth and the law ov rninn th truth.
It i th uty f
counsel to make th mo t of the ca e whi h hi li nt i al le
to i e him; but oun el i out of hi du y an hi rio·ht,
and out id of the prin.ci le and obje t of hi
rof
when h traY 1 out of hi lient ca e an a um to u ply it de:fi iencie . Ther fore is it that the nice sense of
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the profession regards with such distrust and aversion the

testimony of a lawyer in favor of his client. It is the

duty and right of counsel to indulge in all fair argument

in favor of the right of his client ; but is outside of his duty

and his right when he appeals to prejudice irrelevant to

the case. Properly, prejudice has no more sanction at the

bar than on the bench. But an advocate may make him-

self the alter ego of his client, and indulge in prejudice in

his favor. He may even share his client's prejudices

against his adversary, as far as they rest on the facts in

his case. But he has neither duty nor right to appeal to

their prejudices, just or unjust, against his adversary,

dehors the very case he has to try. The very fullest free-

dom of speech within the duty of his profession should be

accorded to 'Counsel; but it is license, not freedom of

speech, to travel out of the record, basing his arguments

on facts not appearing, and appealing to prejudices irrele-

vant to the case and outside of the proof. It may some-
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times be a very difficult and delicate duty to confine coun-

sel to a legitimate course of argument. But, like other

difficult and delicate duties, it must be performed by those

upon whom the law imposes it. It is the duty of the cir-

cuit courts, in jury trials, to interfere in all proper cases of

their own motion. This is due to truth and justice. And

if counsel persevere in arguing upon pertinent facts not

before the jury, or appealing to prejudices foreign to the

case in evidence, exception may be taken by the other side,

which may be good ground for a new trial, or for a re-

versal in this court.

It is with regret that the court is obliged to hold that

both appear to have been done in this case. It was no fair

inference for argument that, because the appellant was

the servant of a wealthy railroad company, he himself was

wealthy; or that the jury might take into consideration, in

assessing damages, the power, wealth and influence of the

corporation. Popular prejudice against great corpora-

tions is, perhaps, a sufficient difficulty in the way of the

administration of justice, in cases in which such corpora-

tions themselves are parties; it is intolerable that it should

be extended to their servants. For all that appears in

this case, the apjx'llant may be as poor as Job in his down-

fall. Ilis wealth, if he had it, was legitimate subject of
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the profession regard with such distrust and aversion the
testimony of a lawyer in favor of his client.
It is the
duty and right of counsel to indulge in all fair argument
in favor of the right of his client; but is outside of his duty
and his right when he appeals to prejudice irrelevant to
the case. Properly, prejudice has no more sanction at the
bar than on the bench. But an advocate may make himelf the alter ego of his ·client, and indulge in prejudice in
his favor.
He may even share his client's prejudices
against his adversary, as far as they rest on the facts in
his case. But he has neither duty nor right to appeal to
their prejudices, just or unjust, against his adversary,
dehors the very case he has to try. The very fullest freedom of speech within the duty of his profession should be
accorded to •Counsel; but it is license, not freedom of
speech, h travel out of the record, basing his arguments
on fact not appearing, and appealing to prejudices irrelevant to the case and outside of the proof. It may sometimes be a very difficult and delicate duty to confine counsel to a legitimate course of argument.
But, like other
difficult and delicate duties, it must be performed by those
11pon whom the law imposes it. It is the duty of the circuit courts, in jury trials, to interfere in all proper Cases of
thefr own motion. This is due to truth and justice. And
if counsel per. evere in arguing upon pertinent facts not
before the jury, or appealing to prejudices foreign to the
ase in evi ence. exception may be taken by the other side,
which may be good ground for a new trial, or for a reversal in thj s court.
It is with regret that the court is obliged to hold that
both appear to have been done in this case. It wa no fair
infer n e for ar um nt that, be.cause the appellant wa
the servant f a wealthy railroad company, he him elf was
wealthy; or that the jury might take into con id ration, in
. . in()' amag . , th
ower, wealth and influenc of the
or oration.
Popular rejudice a ain t <YT at orporations is, perbap , a uffi ient diffi u]ty ]n the way f the
admini tration of ju ti , in ases in which u h coq ration th m. ]v are parti ; it i intol r le that it hould
h xtrnclrcl t th ir . rvant .
For all that app ar in
thh; a. th ap llant may b a poor a Job in his downfall.
i w alth, if h had it, wa 1 gi.timat ubj .ct of
1
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evidence, not legitimate subject of argument, without evi-

dence. And his fortune or misfortune in being the ser-

vant of a corporation was legitimate ground for no appeal

against him in a court of justice.

It is to the honor of the bar that this is the first time that

this question has come before this court. Yet it is not

to be ignored that the practice here condemned has some-

times been indulged in. And it is, perhaps, not to be re-

gretted that the question has first come here in the case

of an eminent member of the bar; a gentleman of high

character, personal and professional, known to every mem-

ber of this court; whose professional ability needs no ad-

ventitious aid, and who probably fell into this error cas-

ually and inadvertently. His professional standing shields

him from personal censure, while it will give emphasis to

the rule laid down.

By the Court. — The judgment is reversed, and the cause

remanded to the court below for a new triaL
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TOLEDO, ST. LOUIS & WESTERN RAILROAD

COMPANY V. BURR.

Supreme Court of Ohio. 1910.

82 Ohio State, 129.

This action was originally commenced in the court of

common pleas of Henry ^county, Ohio, by Burr & Jeakle

and The Ohio German Fire Insurance Company as plain-

tiffs, against The Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad

AND
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evidence, not legitimate subject of argument, with ut evidence.
And hi fortune or misfortune in bein · the ervant of a corporation was 1 o·itimat ground for no ap1 eal
again t him in a court of justi ·e.
It i to tlJ honor of the bar that thi i the fir t time that
this que tion ha co e before this court.
r et it i. not
to be iO'nored that the pra tice here condemned ha
metime be n indulged in. And it is, perhap , not to be regretted that the question ha fir st come here in th ca
of an eminent member of the bar; a gentl man of hi O'h
character, per onal and prof ssional, known to every member of this .court; who e profe ional ability need no adventitious aid, and who probably f 11 into thi rror ca ually and inadvertently. His profe sional standing shield
him from personal cen ure, while it will give empba. i. to
the rule laid down.
By the Coi1,rt.-The judgment is rever ed, and the cau
remanded to the court below for a new trial.

Company as defendant, to recover damages from said rail-

road company for the destruction by fire— alleged to have

been commnr^<ited by sparks emitted from one of defend-

ant's locomotive engines — of a sawmill owned by said Burr

& Jeakle and insured by them in The Ohio German Fire

Insurance Company. * * *

Crew, J. — The only error assigned in this case which

need be specially considered in this opinion, is that of the

alleged misconduct of counsel in the argument of the 'Case

TOLEDO, ST. LOUIS & WESTERN RAILRO \.D
OMPANY V. BURR.

to the jury. Upon the argument of this cause in the

S upreme Coi1,rt of Ohio .
82

1910.

Ohio State, 129.

This action wa originaHy commenc d in the court of
common ple
of Henry , ounty Ohio by Burr & J akle
and The Ohio German Fire Insurance om1 any a, 1 laintiff aO'ain t The Tol do, St. Loui & We. tern Railr ad
Co~pa~y as d~f ndant, to re ov r damag s from aid railroad company for th d struction b. fire-all
t ha' e
been ommm_.;.,,ated by park rnitte from on f f ndant's locomoti,· ngine -of a wmill own d b. aid urr
& J eakl and insur d by them in The hi G rman Fire
Insur an
m any. * * *
CREW J .-The onl
rr r a . jO'n d in thi ca
wbi h
n
b p ially con· id r d in thi o in i n i tha f th
all g d mi condn t of coun 1 in tb argnm nt f tb • a
to the jury.
Upon the argum nt of this cause in the

502
502 Trial Peactice [Chap. V2

court of common pleas one of the counsel for plaintiffs

stated to the jury among other things, "that within thirty

days after the occurrence of this fire, Mr. Schmettau, as

counsel for the defendant, made an offer of settlement,

and that offer was repeated as late as the day of the com-

mencement of this trial." To this statement the defend-

ant by its counsel then and there excepted. And there-

upon, to quote from the record, "counsel who had made

the statement, stated to the jury that he withdrew the

statement objected to," and the court then instructed the

jury as follows: "Gentlemen of the jury, it becomes my

duty to say to you on this question that here is absolutely

no evidence in this case that either party ever wanted to

settle or that any attempt was ever made to settle; and

I will say to you further, as a matter of law, that if the

parties had gotten together in an effort to settle this case,

the law wouldn't permit such effort to settle to be given to

the jury in evidence; it is your duty to disregard abso-
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lutely the whole of any statement by any counsel to the ef-

fect that any effort was made to settle this case or any

other case." And thereupon the argument proceeded.

That the statements thus made by counsel transcended the

bounds of ligitimate argument and were grossly improper,

is both obvious and conceded, but it is claimed that any

prejudicial effect which such statements may have had was

removed or cured by the subsequent action of court and

counsel. This conclusion, we think, by no means follows,

nor does it affirmatively appear in this case that such con-

clusion is justified by the facts. Wliile it is true that

courts of last resort have frequently, though not uni-

formly, held the rule to be, that the prejudi.ce, if any, re-

sulting from the misconduct of counsel in argument to

the jury mav be eliminated or cured by the prompt with-

drawal of the objectionable statements made by counsel,

accompanied by an instruction from the court to the jury

to disregard sunh statements, yet this rule, so far as our

examination of the authorities has disclosed, is recognized

and applied by the courts in those cases only, where it is

made to appear by the record from a consideration of the

character of th'^ statements made, that their nreiiidicial

o^^ocf hn=; probnljlv boori n^'orte^^ hv snoh witlulrnwal and

instruction. As remarked ])y Sliauck, J., in Cleveland,
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ourt of common pleas one of the counsel for plain tiffs
stated to the jury among other things, ''that within thirt)'
days after the occurrence of this fire, Mr. Schmettau , a .·
counsel for the defendant, m :H1e an offer of settlement,
and that offer was repeated a s late as the day of the commencement of this trial.''
To this statement the defendant by its coum,el then and there excepted.
And thereupon, to quote from the re.cord, ''counsel who had made
the statement, stated to the jury that he withdrew th e
statement objected to,'' and the court then instructed the
jury as follows: "Gentlemen of the jury, it becomes my
duty to say to you on this question that here is absolutely
no evidence in this Gase that either party ever wanted to
settle or that any attempt was ever made t o settle; and
I ·will say to you further, as a matter of law, that if the
partie had O'otten together in an effort to settle this case,
the law wouldn't permit such effort to settle t o be given to
the jury in evidence; it is your duty to disregard absolutely the whole of any statement by any counsel to the effect that any effort was made to settle this case or any
other case.''
And thereupon the argument pr oceeded.
That the statements thus made by counsel transcended the
bound of Hgitimate argument and were grossly improper,
is both obvious and conceded, but it is claimed t hat any
prejudi ial effect which such statement may have had wa s
removed or cured by the subsequ nt action of co urt and
ounsel.
This conclu ion, we think, by no means f ollow ,
nor doe it affirmatively appear in this case that such conlu ion i justified by the facts.
While it is true th at
ourt of last re. ort hav fr quently, though not uniformly, h Jd the rule to br, that the prejudi1ne, if any, r e. ulting from tli mi. condu t of conns l in arO'um nt t o
th jury mav he 1iminatrd or cur d by the prompt with dra al of the ol jertionabl statem nt mad b.
un s 1.
a rompani d by an instruction from the ourt to the jury
to di Rr gard ~mrh tat ment., . t tJ1iR ru l . so far as nr
~ amination of the authoriti s has di srlo secl, i. re OO'niz cl
ancl appli rl h. th
ourts in those rft- R only wh r it is
m 1 to apprar by the r ie•or l from Ft ron. i 1 ration of th P
<'han1C'ter of thn sfat m0nt R ma<lr. that their nreinilirial
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Painesville & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Pritschau, 69 Ohio

St., 447: *'It is due to differences in the character of the

misconduct rather than to differences of opinion in re-

viewing courts that it has in some cases been held that the

effect of the misconduct may be eliminated by instructions,

and in others that it cannot be." When we consider, in

the present case, that there was no direct evidence estab-

lishing th.^ oriirin of this fire, and that upon the whole of

the evidence adduced on the trial the question of defend-

ant's negligence and consequent liability was at best a

very close question of fact involved in much uncertainty

and doubt, the harmful and extremely prejudicial effect of

a statement by counsel to the jury, that soon after the fire

the railroad company had offered to settle the loss, and

that such offer had been renewed on the very day the trial

commenced, becomes at once perfectly apparent. And

the attempted Avithdrawal of these statements from the

jury was, we think, wholly impotent to rid them of the mis-
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chievous inference that they were nevertheless true; and

was utterly ineffectual to dislodge or remove from the

minds of the jurors the harmful impression, which such

statements were calculated, and ob^dously intended, to

produce. No other rational conclusion can be reached in

this case than that plaintiff's counsel by the making of such

statements intended thereby and in that way to get before

the jury a fact which he was not entitled to, and one which

from considerations of public policy the law forbade

should be mentioned on the trial; and this, for the sole

and obvious purpose of inducing in the minds of the jury

the impression or belief, that the railroad company in mak-

ing such offer of settlement had, indirectly at least, con-

fessed and admitted its liability. Manifestly this was the

purpose of counsel's statements, and we think it impos-

sible to say in this case that su-eh was not their effect.

While it should perhaps be said, that after objection made,

court and counsel did all in their power to counteract and

overcome the effect of these improper and prejudicial

statements, yet the mischief had been done, the poison had

been injected, and that which thereafter O'ccurred was not,

in our judgment, a sufficient antidote. It is the policy of

the law to encourage the settlomont of legal controversies,

and hence it does not permit an offer of compromise to be

Pa,ine ville ct Ea tern Railroad Co. v. Pritschait, 69 hio
St., 447: "It is due to differences in the character of the
misconduct rather than to differences of opinion in re' iewing courts that it has in some cases been held that the
ff ect of the miscondu t may be eliminated by in truction. ,
and in others that it cannot be.'' When we consider, in
the present case. that there was no direct evidence e tablishing thi' orig-in of this fire, and that upon the whole of
the evidence adduced on the trial the question of defendant's negligence and consequent liability was at best a
very close question of foot involved in much uncertainty
and doubt, the harmful and extremel prejudicial effect of
a statement by counsel to the jury, that soon after the fire
the railroad company had offered to ettle the lo
and
that such offer had been renewed on the very day the trial
commenced becomes at once perfectly apparent.
And
the attempted withdrawal of these statements from the
jury was, we think, wholly impotent to rid them of the mi chievous inference that they were nevertheless true; and
was utterly ineffectual to dislodge or remove from the
minds of the jurors the harmful impression, which such
.· tatements were calculated and obYiously intended to
I roduce.
No other rational conclusion can be reached in
this case than that plaintiff's counsel b the making of uch
statements intended thereby and in that way to get before
J;he jury a fa ct which he was not entitled to, and one whid1
from considerations of public policy the law forbade
should be mentioned on the trial; and this for the sole
and obvious purpose of inducing in the mind of t e jury
the impression or belief t at the railroad com an. in making such offer of settlement had, indir tl r at 1 a t, onfessed and admitted it liability. J\fanife tly thi wa the
purpo e of coun el's tatements, and we think it i.._._._ .., "' ..,
sible to say in this ca e that uch wa not th ir ffe t.
While it should perhap be aid, that after o j dion ad
ourt and counsel did all in th ir power t c un t ·a t a
overcom the effect of t e e impro er and r ju i i 1
tat ments yet the mi chi f had been don the oi on ha
be n inj ected and that which thereafter 0 1 curred wa n t
in ur judgment. a uffi ient antidot . It i th poli y of
the law to encourag the . ettlem nt of l al c ntT v r . i ._,
and h nee it do s not permit an offer of comprom· to be
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given in evidence as an acknowledgment or admission of

the party making it, and this salutary rule, which is

grounded upon considerations of public policy, just as im-

peratively forbids that the fact that such offer was made

shall be mentioned or commented upon by counsel in argu-

ment to the jury, and when it is, unless it shall clearly ap-

pear from the record in the particular case that the verdict

of the jury was not affected thereby, the misconduct is such

as to require in the due administration of justice, that a new

trial be granted therefor. The view that misconduct of

counsel, such as is complained of in this case is sufficient to

warrant and require the granting of a new trial unless it be

made to appear that the verdict of the jury was not in any

manner influenced thereby, is fully supported by the several

cases cited in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error, and

by many others.

Judgments of the circuit court and of the court of com-

mon pleas reversed, and cause remanded to the latter court

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

for a re-trial according to lau).

Speae, Davis, Shauck and Price, JJ., concur.

FERTIG V. STATE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1898.
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·iven in evidence as an acknowledgment or admission of
the party making it, and this salutary rule, which is
grounded upon considerations of public policy, just as imperatively forbids that the fad that such offer was made
, hall be mentioned or commented upon by counsel in argument to the jury, and when it is, unless it shall clearly appear from the record in the particular case that the verdict
of the jury was not affected thereby, the misconduct is such
as to require in the due administration of justice, that a new
trial be granted therefor.
The view that misconduct of
counsel, such as is complained of in this case is sufficient to
warrant and require the granting of a new trial unless it be
made to appear that the verdict of the jury was not in any
manner influenced thereby, is fully supported by the several
cases cited in the brief of coun el for plaintiff in error, and
by many others.

100 Wisconsin, 301.

Maeshall, J. The errors assigned on behalf of plaintiff

in error will be considered in their order and are as fol-

lows: * * * (2) permitting the prosecuting attorney to

use improper language, detrimental to the accused, in clos-

ing his argument to the jury; * * *

2. The prosecuting attorney was pennitted to say, in

closing the case to the jury, roplyirig to remarks of the at-

* * * * * * * * * *
Jitdgm ent of the circitit coiirt and of the court of com,mon pleas rever:-ed. and crmc;e remanded to th e latter court
for a re-trial according to la11 .
SPEAR, DAVIS, SHAUCK and PmcE, JJ., concur.

torney for the ar-cused regarding the testimony of William

Spauiding: "What would counsel have him do? Come

here and shower bouquets on the assassin of his brother?

Crown him with a wreath of laurels?" And also permit-

FERTIG V. STATE.

Supre me Court of TVi con in,
1

100

1898.

TVi consin, 301.

MARSHALL, J. Th rron; a. igned on behalf of plaintiff
jn error will be con. i<lere<l in th i.r order and are as follow : * * * (2) permitting the TffO , ruting attorney to
u. improp r ]angnag-e, d triment l to th a cu d, in closjng hi. argument to the j11r~r ~ * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
2. Th pro ruting att rn y wa l rmjtt d to ay, in
rlosing tl1 ra. to tl10 jnry·, r0plying to rrmark of the att rne.r for th ar·rn . cl rrg:anling the tc.· timony of William
Rp ulcling: "\,Vliat onld onns l ha - hjm do~
Com
h r anc1 . h w r bo lqnrt. on the a .. a .. in f his broth r~
row him with a wr ath f laur 1. ~"
nd als permit-
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ting the district attorney to say, in substance, that there was

murder in the heart of the accused as he proceeded to and

effected the homicide, — that he had murder in his heart, in

his eye, and in his brain; that he stood where the tracks in-

dicated to get a good aim; the object of his vengeance was

coming, sitting on the wood in full view; he (the accused)

was a crack shot and knew it; he cocked his gun, drew the

bead on the deceased, and the deed was done, and a son and

brother was sent to his Maker without a moment's warning,

by the act of an assassin, — as vile an act as ever happened

on earth ; so foul that it would be worthy of the vicegerent

of the monarch of hell. That such language, with the earn-

estness with which we may well assume the words were ut-

tered in the closing moments of an important trial, was

highly calculated to carry the jury along the line of thought

which it indicated, that is, that the accused was guilty, can-

not be doubted ; but whether it was outside the case, or tend-

ed unfairly to influence the jury, and to swerve them from
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the duty of deciding the case on the evidence, and that alone,

in the light of the law governing the subject, is quite an-

other question. So long as counsel did not depart from

the evidence produced, but confined his argument to rea-

soning from that up to the conclusion that it established

guilt, however eloquently and persuasively he may have

handled his subject, it was not only legitimate but commend-

able. Within the record in this regard, the field is broad,

and the license of the advocate, and duty as well, permits

him to say with the utmost freedom what the evidence tends

to prove, and that it convinces him, and should convince the

jurors as well, of the fact in issue. As said in People v.

Hess, 85 Mich. 128: ''To deny to a prosecuting officer that

privilege, would be to deny him the right to pla.ce before

the jury the logic of the testimony which leads his mind to

the inevitable conclusion of guilt, and which he has a right

to presume will load them to the same conclusion, if they

view it as he docs." That does not mean that a prosecut-

ing officer may express his opinion independent of the evi-

dence that the accused is guilty, or his opinion of guilt,

which may or may not be based on the evidence, but that he

may state from the record, upon which the issue is to be sub-

mitted to the jury, that it establishes guilt. To do the

latter is but to state the evidence, draw inferences there-

12]
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ting the di trict attorney to say, in substance, that th re wa .
murder in the heart of the accu ed as he proceeded to and
effected the homi ide,-that be had murd r in hi heart, in
his eye, and in hjs brain; that he stood where the tracks indicated to get a good aim; the object of hi 'engean e wa.
coming, sitting on the wood in full view; he (the a cu ed)
was a crack hot and knew it; he cocked hi gun dr w th
bead on the decea ed, and the deed was done and a on an<l
brother was sent to his J\{aker without a moment's warnin ,
by the act of an a a , in,-as vile an act as ever happened
on earth; so foul that it would be worthy of th e vicegerent
of the monarch of hell. That such language with the earnestness with which we may well assume the word. were uttered in the clo ing moment of an important trial, wa.
highl calculated to carry the jury along the lin of thought
which it indicated, that is, that the accused wa guilty, cannot be doubted; but whether it was out ide the ca e, or tenrled unfairly to influence the jury, and to swerve them from
the duty of deciding the case on the evidence, and that alone,
in the light of the law governing the subject i quite another question.
So long as counsel did not depart from
the evidence produced, but confined his argument to reasoning from that up to the condu ion that it e tabli hed
guilt, however eloquently and persuasively he may have
handled his subject, it was not only legitimate but commendable. Within the record in this regard, the field i broad
and the licen e of the advocate, and dut~ a well, i1ermits
him to say with the utmo t freedom what the evidence tend.
to prove, and that it convinces him and honld con .,. inc the
jurors as well of the fact in issue. As aid in People v .
H ess, 85 M~ich. 128: "To deny to a pro e uting offi r that
pri il o-e, would be to deny him the ri 0 ·ht to J ]ai::; b for
the jury the loO'ic of the te timony which lead hi mi
to
the inevitable concln. i n of uilt, and whi h he ha , a ri'°")h t
to presume will lea<l th m to the sam onrlu ion. if th y
vi w it a he dor~." That doe ot ean that a pro cutin offi er mar rxpre.. l1i opinion in pend nt of th vidence that the a u ed i guilty, r his or ini n of guilt,
whi h ma or m:rv n 1 e a ed on th vid nc 1 nt that h
may state. fr m tl; r
r , UI o w11i,nh th i . . ue i. to b nl1mitted to the jury that it e. tabli. h
·uilt.
To do th
latter is but t tat the vid nc
raw inf ren . ther 1
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from, and proceed, reasoning naturally from step to step

up to the logical conclusion, and state it, all being legitimate

parts of legitimate argument; and if the introduction and

discussion lead to such conclusion, though stated with great

earnestness and with strong feeling and conviction, so long

as the advocate keeps within the record, the accused has no

legitimate ground of complaint. That appears to be what

was done in this case. There is nothing to indicate that the

district attorney asserted that the accused was a murderer

or assassin, except with reference to the offense for which

he was being tried, and as he drew that conclusion from the^

evidence. It was the inevitable conclusion of the line of

argument pursued by the prosecutor, from the evidence,

and could not have been otherwise understood by the jury.

It is quite unlike Scott v. State, 91 Wis. 552, where the dis-

trict attorney spoke of the accused as a thief, not with refer-

ence to the offense for which he was on trial, but as a fact

tending to establish guilt of that offense.
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As to remarks made in repl.y to those of the attorney for

plaintiff in error, regarding William Spaulding, it is suf-

ficient to say that in using the term "assassin" it is quite

clear that the district attorney was speaking from the evi-

dence in the case as he viewed it, and that the jury must

have so understood him. He had a right to assume that the

evidence produced on the part of the state was true, and that

it established what it tended to establish, and that it pointed

most strongly to the guilt of the accused as charged. To

address the jury accordingly can hardly be said to have

been such an abuse of the privilege of counsel for the state,

and so prejudicial to the accused, as to warrant a reversal

of the judgment. True, harsh and violent language should

not be used by counsel, certainly in criminal prosecutions,

though whether language be harsh and abusive depends

largely upon the evidence in the 'Case, but in the absence of

some manifest abuse of the privilege of legitimate argu-

ment, clearly working prejudice to the accused, it cannot be

considered reversible error. In Spnlin v. People, '[?>! 111.

538, whore the evidence on the part of the state established

the guilt of the accused, the court held that, assuming the

truthfulness of the people's evidence, which assumption the

prosecuting attorney had a right to make on the argument,

it was not such an abuse of the privilege of counsel in argu-

from, and proceed, reasoning naturally from step to step
up to the logical conclusion, and state it, all being legitimate
parts of legitimate argument; and if the introduction and
discussion lead to such conclusion, though stated with great
earnestness and with strong feeling and conviction, so long
as the advocate keeps within the reieord, the accused has no
legitimate ground of complaint. That appears to be what
was done in this case. There is nothing to indicate that the
district attorney asserted that the accused was a murderer
or assassin, except with reference to the offense for which
he was being tried, and as he drew that conclusion from the
evidence. It was the inevitable conclusion of the line of
argument pursued by the prosooutor, from the evidence,
and could not have been otherwise understood by the jury.
It is quite unlike Scott v. State, 91 Wis. 552, where the district attorney spoke of the accused as a thief, not with reference to the offen e for which he was on trial, but as a fact
tending to estabUsh guilt of that offense.
As to remarks made in reply to those of the attorney for
plaintiff in error, regarding vVilliam Spaulding, it is sufficient to say that in using the term "assas in" it is quite
clear that the district attorney was speaking from the evidence in the case as he viewed it, and that the jury must
have so understood him. He had a right to assume that the
evidence produced on the part of the state wa. true, and that
it established what it tended to establish, and that it pointed
most strongly to the guilt of the accused as ieharged. To
address the jury accordinO']y can hardl. be said to have
been such an abn e of the privilege of oun el for the state,
and so pr judicial to the accused, a to warrant a reversal
of the jud()'ment. True, harsh and violent lan()'ua()'e should
not be u d by c uns 1, certainly in criminal pros cutions,
thouO'h wheth r languaO'e be harsh and abu ive depend
larg ly upon the vid nr in the 1ca e, but in the ab ence of
som manif . t abu. of th privil ge of 1 gitimate argum nt r] arly worldno- prejudice to the ac u ed, it annot be
con. idPr d r ' rsible rror. In Spnhn v. People, 1. 7 Ill.
5. whrr th evid nc n the part of the tate tabli hed
h gnilt f the a us d, th ourt h ld that, a . urning th
truthfuln . . f th p opl 's vid n
whi ha s mption the
pr
ting ttorn y had a right to mak on th arO'ument,
it was not su h an abu c of the privil ge of •counsel in argu-
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ment to the jury, to speak of the accused, with reference

to the offense for which they were on trial as robbers and

burglars, as to work a reversal on that ground. So we may

say it was not an abuse of the rules of legitimate argument,

in this case, to speak of the accused, from the evidence of

the state, as a murderer.

**********

ARGUMENT A :rn CoNnu T OF CouNSEL

507

ment to the jury, to speak of the accu d, with r fer nc
n<l
to the offen e for which they were on trial a robb r
burglars, as to work a re ersal on that ground.
o we may
ay it was not an abuse of the rules of legitimate argum
in this case, to speak of the accu d, from the evidence of
the state, as a murderer.

nt

* * * * * * * * * *
By the court. * • * The judgment is affirmed.

By the court. * * * The judgment is affirmed.

GERMAN-AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY

V. HARPER.

Supreme Court of Arkansas. 1902.

70 Arkansas, 305.

Wood, J. Appellees sued upon an insurance policy which

contained this clause: "$2,000 total concurrent insurance

permitted, including this policy." Subsequent to the is-

suance of this policy, appellees took a policy in another com-

GERMAN-AMERICAN INSURANCE COMP ANY
V. HARPER.

pany for $2,000, which it was conceded avoided the policy

sued on, unless the appellant had notice of the additional in-
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surance before the loss, and failed to object to such insur-

ance. Appellant conceded that if its local agent had notice

Supreme Court of .Arkansas.

of the additional insurance, and failed to object thereto, the

forfeiture was waived. Appellant's local agent testified

1902.

that he had no notice of the additional insurance before the

70 .Arkansas, -305.

loss. Witnesses for appellees testified that he had such

notice. The issue was sharply drawn on this question of

fact. Marshall, the witness upon whom appellant relied

to establish the want of notice of the current insurance, re-

sided and was the local agent at Fort Smith. The cause

was being tried, on change of venue, at Greenwood. James

Brizzolara, one of the attorneys for appellees, in the first or

opening argument to the jury, used this language: "Gen-

tlemen of the jury, if you knew Marshall's business meth-

ods, you would say, 'God save the plaintiffs, and God save

all those who deal with him.' " Appellant objected to this

remark of counsel, and the court said to the jury: "Col.

Brizzolara 's remark is entirely imj^roper, and should not

Woon, J. Appellees sued upon an insurance policy which
contained this clause: "$2,000 total concurrent insurance
permitted, including this policy."
Sub'"'equent to the is. uance of this policy, appellees took a polic in another coml any for $~,000, which it was conceded avoided the policy
ued on, unless the appellant had notice of the additional inurance before the loss, and failed to object to such in urance. App llant conceded that if its local agent had notice
f the additional in urance, and failed to object thereto, the
forfeiture ·wa waived.
Appellant's local agent te ti:fied
that he had no notiice of the additional in urance before the
loss.
Witne ses for appellees te tified that h ha
uch
notice.
The issue was harply drawn on thi ue tion of
fact.
Marshall, the witne s upon whom ap ellant reli d
to establi h the want of notice of the ieurrent in uran e re, ided and was the local ag nt at Fort Smith.
The au e
was being tried, on change of venu at Greenwood. Jam
Brizzolara, one of the attorney for ap1 ell
in the fir t or
opening ar '.1lll1ent to the jury u . ed thi language: "~ ntl men of the jury, if you knew 1\Iar. hall bu ine method. , you woul
ay 'God ave th plaintiff
nd
d a e
1l tho e who d al with him.' "
. -: Pl ellant o j te t thi
remark f cou . 1, Rn th c nrt , ai t th jury: '' ol.
rizzolara.' r marl i ntirel im1 r I r and should not
l
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have been made, and I now instruct you to pay no atten-

tion to it in making up your verdict, and it must not be con-

sidered by you. and give it no weight, but your duty is to

consider the evidence admitted by the court in the progress

of the trial." Coh Brizzolara was not a witness in the case.

There was no evidence as to Marshall's business methods,

— no impeachment of his business integrity or efficiency,

nor of his moral character in the community where he lived.

The rule of procedure to which this court is committed is

very well expressed in Rudolph v. Landwerlen, 92 lud. 34,

40, where it is said: "Very many abuses in argument may

be sufficiently corrected by the instructions of the court to

the jury, and a large discretion as to the refusing of new

trials because of such violations belongs to trial courts, and

this court will not interfere because of an abuse in argu-

ment which was sufficiently counteracted by the action of

tlie trial court in the premises ; but it will interfere where,

notwithstanding the efforts of the trial court to correct the
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abuse, the irregularity appears to be such as to prevent a

fair trial, and the particular circumstances of each case will

guide this court to its decision," In Chicago, B. & Q. Uy.

Co. V. Kellogg, 76 N. W. Rep. 462, it is said: "If the trans-

gression be flagrant, — if the offensive remark has stricken

deep, and is of such a character that neither rebuke nor re-

traction can entirely destroy its sinister influence, — a new

trial should be promptly awarded, regardless of the want

of objection or exception." In the language of Judge

Mulkey in Quinn v. People, 123 111. 333: "As well might

one attempt to brush off with the hand a stain of ink from a

piece of white linen" as to eradicate from the jury the im-

pression that was created by the remarks of Col. Brizzolara.

The appellant was wholly dependent upon the testimony of

Marshall to sustain its contention. He testified that he

bad no knowledge and had not acquiesced in the additional

insurance. In this statement he was in direct conflict with

several witnesses for appellees, yet it was the jury's pro-

vince to believe him in preference to all the rest. This the

jurors would not likely have done, even without the deroga-

torv statements of counsel. Still, they might have done so,

and it is not for thi-^ r-ourt to sav that they would not have

given more weight to his evidence than the other witnesses,

TRIAL PRACTICE
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have been made, and I now in tru t you to pay no attention to it in making up your Yerdict, and it must not be con. idered by . ou, and give it no weight, but your duty is to
con ider the eYidence admitted by the court in the progress
of the trial.'' Col. Brizzolara was not a witness in the case.
There was no evidence as to Marshall' business methods
-no impeachment of his bu ine interrrity or efficiency,
nor of his moral character in the community where he lived.

• * * * * * * * * *
The rule of procedure to which this court is committed is
very well expressed in Rudolph v . Landwerlen, 92 Ind. 34,
40, where it is said: ''Very many abuses in argument may
be sufficiently correded by the instructions of the court to
the jury, and a large discretion as to the refusing of new
trials becau e of such violations belong to trial courts, and
tbi court will not interfere because of an abuse in argument which was sufficiently counteracted by the action of
the trial court in the premi es; but it will interfere where,
notwith tanding the efforts of the trial court to correr't the
abuse, the irregularity appears to be uch as to prevent a
!air trial, and the particular circum tance of each case will
guide thi court to it decision." In Chicago, B. di; Q. Ry.
Co. v. Kellogg, 76 N. W. Rep. 462, it i said: "If the transgre ion be flagrant,-if the offensive remark has stricken
deep, and is of s11ch a character that neither rebuke nor retraiction can entirely destroy its sinister influence,-a new
trial should be promptly awarded, regardless of the want
of objection or ex eption."
In the langua e of Judge
Mulkey in Qitinn v . People, 123 Ill. 333: ''A well might
on att mpt to brush off with the hand a tain of ink from a
pi e of white lin en" a to eradicat from th jury the impre ion that wa reat d by the remarks of l. Brizzolara.
Th Pl llant wa wh lly d pendent upon th te timony of
~far hall t . u tain it
ont ntion.
He t . tifi <l that he
l1·1d n0 lmowl <lg an<l had not a qui c d in th additional
in . nranre. Jn this stat m nt he wa in dir d confli t' ith
ral wi n . . ~ for appell , y t it wa. th jury' proYinr t h li0Y bim in pref r nr t all th re t. Thi th
.i11r r wonl 1 not ]ik l.' hav done, v n with011t th <l roo-ai rv . tat m0nt. of ronn. l.
tilL th y irrht have n . o,
nn<l it i. nnt f0r 1l1i <>mnt to R~Y th, t the.
ould not hav
gt\' n m re w ight to hi evid ll{' than the oth r witnesse ,
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had it not been for the improper remarks. These remarks

were gravely prejudicial. True, they were not made un-

der the sanction of an oath as a witness. But the state-

ment of matters of fact by counsel of high character and

excellent standing in the profession might be as read-

ily accepted and believed by the jurors, and make as

profound and ineradicable impression upon their minds,

as if they had been uttered under oath. The remarks

of the learned counsel, if not directly, certainly by insinua-

tion conveyed to the jury a knowledge on his part of Mar-

shall's business methods which were so inefficient or disre-

putable as to make him untrustworthy, and one whom all

having business in his line should shun. The statement of

counsel that an acquaintance with Marshall's business meth-

ods would make ihe jurors feel like imploring the Almight>

to save plaintiffs and all who had dealings with him was

well calculated to make the jury regard him as entirely un-

reliable, to say the least. We cannot see how it is pos-
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sible for the jury not to have been prejudiced, notwithstand-

ing all the commendable efforts of the presiding judge to

prevent such result. The only 'Cure for such prejudice is a

new trial. For that purpose the judgment is reversed, and

the cause remanded.

EiDDicK, J., dissenting. '

MUHPHY'S EXECUTOR V. HOAGLAND.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1908.

32 Kentucky Law Reporter, 839.

Opinion of the court by Judge Lassing, reversing.

This is a contest over the will of John, commonly known

as *' Pat" Murphy. * * *

**********

Appellant also complains of the misconduct of counsel

for the contestants during the progress of the trial. Dur-

ing the course of the cross-examination of the witness, ^far-
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had it not been for the improper remark . These remark
w re gravely I rejudi ial.
True, th y " re not ad under the anction of an oath as a witne .
ut the tatement of matter of fact by counsel of high haracter and
excellent tanding in the profes ion might be a readily aocepted and believ d by the juror , and make a
profound and ineradicable impre ion upon their mind ,
as if they had been uttered undeT oath.
The remark
of the learned counsel, if not directly, certainly by in inuation conve ed to the jury a know ledge on hi I art of Marhall 's business methods which were so inefficient or di reputable as to make him untrustworthy, and one whom all
having business in his line hould hun. The tatement of
coun el that an acquaintance with far hall's bu iness method would make the jurors feel like imploring the AJmight)·
to a e plaintiff and all who had dealing with him wa
well calculated to make the jur regard him a entirely unreliable to a the lea t.
We cannot ee how it i po ible for the jur not to have been prejudiced notwith tanding all the commendable effort of the pre. iding judge to
reYent such re ult. The only •cure for uch prejudice i a
new trial. For that purpo e the judgment i reversed, and
the cause remanded.
RmnrcK, J., dissenting.

garet Devereaux, counsel for contestants asked this ques-

tion: *'Do you know how many of the jurors wanted to

MURPHY'S EXECUTOR V. HOAGLAND.
Court of Appeals of K entitcky.
32 Kentu cky L ai

1908.

R eporter, 839.

Opinion of the court by Judge L I.1:"G, re r in
Thi i a conte t
r lt "' ill of John ommonl known
a 'Pat ' f urp h . * * ·

* * * * * * * * • *
Appellant al. o com lain . of the mi c nduct of c un 1
for the conte tant durinO' the pr O'Te
f th t ial.
ing the our e of th ro - xamin tion of th witn . ,
o-aret D vereaux. c nn. l f T ont tant a k d thi
tion: ''Do you know h w any of th jur r want
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break it," (referring to the will of John Murphy at the

last trial thereof), and continued, ''Don't jou know, as a

matter of fact, that eight stood for breaking the will?"

This question was at once objected to by counsel for the

propounder and the objection was sustained. The learned

counsel must have known that any question which referred

to the result or the partial result of a former trial of the

case was very improper, in fact inexcusable. Propoun-

der 's counsel could not permit the question to go unnoticed,

and the very fact that he objected, but served to emphasize

it's importance in the minds of the jurors. They may

have, and doubtless did, attach much importance to the

question which was asked and objected to by counsel for the

propounder, and even though it was excluded by the court,

the jurors, being sensible and intelligent men, could not rid

their minds of the information which this question gave

them, to-wit: That eight jurors had, on a previous trial,

stood for breaking the will. They no doubt reasoned amon^^
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themselves that had this not been true, the propounder

would not have objected to its being asked, and, being taken

as true, it was in fact stating to the jury that, while you are

to try this case according to the evidence, we want you to

know that, at least, eight jurors on a former trial believed

that the will should not be permitted to stand.

In the case of the Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Jolly,

27 Ky. Law Rep., 119, counsel, in closing his argument in

the lower court, used this language: "That this action had

been in the courts some four or five years, and that the

railroad company was furnished with lawyers and steno-

graphers for the purpose of catching at every little thing

to take the case to the Court of Appeals again, in order to

defeat the claim by reversing it, it having lieretofore been

reversed in the Court of Appeals on a technicality," and

other similar statements. On appeal this court said:

''When counsel, in the heat of argument, oversteps the

bounds and objection is made by the opposing side, the

court should exclude the improper matter. The remarks

of appellee's counsel that this lady had obtained a judg-

ment on the former trial; that it had been appealed from

and reversed by this court upon a toiphnicality, and that ap-

pellant was then preparing, witli the assistance of skilled

lawyers and stenographers, to appeal from any verdict
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break it," (referring to the will of John Murphy at the
last trial thereof), and continued, ''Don't you know, as a
matter of fact, that eight stood for breaking the wilB"
This question was at once objected to by counsel for the
propounder and the obj ection was sustained. The learned
counsel must have known that any question which referred
to the result or the partial result of a former trial of the
case was very jmproper, in fact inexcusable.
Propounder 's counsel could not permit the question to go unnoticed,
and the very faict that he objected, but served to emphasize
it's importance in the minds of the jurors.
They may
hav~, and doubtless did, attach much importance to the
que tion which was asked and objected to by counsel for the
propounder, and even though it was excluded by the court,
the jurors, being sen ible and intelligent men, could not rid
their minds of the information which this question gave
them, to-wit: That eight jnrors had, on a previous trial,
stood for breaking the will. They no doubt reasoned amon 0·
themselves that had this not been true, the propounder
would not have objected to its being asked, and, being taken
as true, it was in fact stating to the jury that, while you an=to try this case according to the evidence, we want you to
know that, at lea t. eight juror s on former trial believe<l
that the will should not be permitted to stand.
In the ca e of the Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. J ally,
27 Ky. Law Rep., 119, counsel, in clo ing his argument in
the lower ~ourt, used this language : "That thi aiction had
been in the courts some four or five years, and that th
railroad company was furnished with lawyers and stenograph r for the purpose of catching at every little thiner
to t ke the a e to the Colirt of Appeal again, in ord r to
defeat the claim by reversing it, it havin h r tofore been
r v r ed in the ourt of Appeals on a technicality,'' and
th r , jmilar tat m nt. .
On appeal thi con t aid:
'' Wh n oun. 1, in the heat of argum nt, over teps the
b u d, an obj ction i made by the op osinO' id , th
h ul x Jud tb iroprop r matt r . The remarks
ell
oun 1 that thj lady had obtain d a judcrm :nt n th f rm r tri 1; that it had
n app al d from
c n 1 r Vf\r .
:i hy tbi
urt n1 on a tr,nhni ality, an that l 11 nt wa. th n pr paring, ith th a .. i tan of killed
lawy r s an . t n graphers to a p al from any verdict
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that might be rendered and obtain another reversal, were

improper. ' '

And in the case of the L., H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Morgan,

23 Ky. Law Rep., 121, appellee's counsel had used this lan-

guage: "The railroad can appeal this case, but the plain-

tiff, Morgan, is a poor man and has no money to appeal

with, and will have to accept what you do, but the railroad

has money to appeal this case, and it will do so.' '

And this court, in passing upon that case on review here,

said: "There is a latitude allowed in oral argument, but

it should not extend as far as was done in the quotation."

In each of these cases above referred to the judgment was

reversed because of improper argument and other errors.

For the reasons given the judgment is reversed and cause

remanded, for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

WILLIAMS V. BROOKLYN ELEVATED RAILROAD

COMPANY.
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Court of Appeals of Neiv York. 1891.

126 Neiv York, 96.

This action was brought to recover damages to plaintiff's

premises in Brooklyn, caused by the erection and operation

of defendant's elevated railroad upon the street in front of

them.

Andrews, J. * * *

*#«♦**♦***

that might be rendered and obtain another reversal were
'
improper.''
And in the case of the L., H. cf St. L. Ry. Co. v. Morgan,
23 Ky. Law Rep. L .. 1, appellee 's coun el had u ed thi language: 'The railroad can appeal this ca e, but the laintiff, Morgan, is a poor man and has no money to appeal
with, and will ha re to accept what you do, but the railroad
has money to appeal this case, and it will do so.' '
And this court, in passing upon that case on review here,
said: ''There is a latitude allowed in oral argument, but
it should not extend a far as was done in the notation.''
In each of these ca e above referred to the judgment wa
reversed because of improper argument and other errors.

* * * * * * * * *
For the reasons given the judgment is re ersed and cau e
remanded, for further proceedings consistent with thi
op1n10n.
~

The counsel for the plaintiff, in his address to the jury,

after referring to "the utter disregard of the rights of the

private citizens by corporations," proceeded to read from a

newspaper, "The New York Tribune," an article headed

"Only a Boy Peddler," purporting to be an account of the

death of a boy, "a little fellow fifteen years old, a Rouman-

ian, a stranger in this great city (New York), selling collar

VILLIAMS V. BROOKLYN ELEVATED RAILROAD
C01vIPANY.

buttons and pocket combs from a modest tray, to help sup-

Court of Appeals of New Yark.

1891.

126 New Yark, 96.

This action was brouo-ht to recover damage to plaintiff
premi es in Brooklyn, au d by the erection and 01 ration
of defendant's elevated railroad upon the str tin front of
them.
ANDREW

J. * * •
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port his mother and eight brothers and sisters," caused by

his touching an electric wire which, the article stated, had

been left swinging for months from a pole near which the

boy had taken his stand. This was made by the writer

the text for comment on the neglect of the city officials in

failing to take effective measures to have electric wires

placed under ground, and the article concluded with the

statement: *'It is shameful that where such perils are in

question there sliould be procrastination, shiftlessness and

incompetency which would not be tolerated in a private

business."

When the counsel for the plaintiff commenced reading

the article the defendant's counsel interposed and objected

to the reading, and asked the court to prevent it. The court

overruled the objection, and the defendant's counsel ex-

cepted. The plaintiff's counsel then resumed the reading,

and was reminded by the court that the reading was under

exception, but the counsel proceeded and read the remainder
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of the article.

It is the privilege of counsel in addressing a jury to com-

ment upon every pertinent matter of fact bearing upon

the questions which the jury have to decide. This privilege

it is most important to preserve and it ought not to be

narrowed by any close construction, but should be inter-

preted in the largest sense. The right of counsel to address

the jury upon the facts is of public as well as private

consequence, for its exercise has always proved one of the

most effective aids in the ascertainment of truth by juries

in 'Courts of justice, and this concerns the very highest

interest of the state. The jury system would fail much

more frequently than it now does if freedom of advocacy

should be unduly hampered and counsel should be prevented

from exercising within the four corners of the evidence

the widest latitude by way of comment, denunciation or

appeal in advocating his cause. This privilege is not be-

yond regulation by the court. It is subject to be controlled

by the trial judge in the exercise of a sound discretion, to

prevent undue prolixity, waste of time, or unseemly critic-

ism. The privilege of counsel, however, does not justify

the introduction in his summing up of matters wholly im-

material and irrelevant to the matter to be decided, and

wliich the jury have no right to consider in arriving at their

port his mother and eight brothers and sisters,'' caused by
his touching an electric wire which, the article stated, had
been left swinging for months from a pole near which the
boy had taken his stand.
This was made by the writer
the text for comment on the neglect of the city officials in
failing to take effective measures to have electric wires
placed under ground, and thE article concluded with the
tatement: "It jg shameful that where such perils are in
question there hould b rrrocrastination, shiftlessness and
incompetency which would not be tolerated in a private
business.''
When the counsel for the plaintiff commenced reading
the article the defendant's counsel interposed and objected
- to the reading 1 and asked the court to prevent it. The court
overruled the objection, and the defendant's counsel exepted. The plaintiff's counsel then resumed the reading,
and was reminded by th& court that the reading was under
exception, but the counsel proceeded and read the remainder
of the article.
It is the privilege of counsel in addressing a jury to comment upon every pertinent matter of fact bearing upon
the questions wh]ch the jury have to decide. This privilege
it is most important to preserve and it ought not to be
narrowed by any close construction, but should be interpreted in the largest sense. The right of counsel to address
the jury upon the facts is of public as well as private
on equence, for its exerci e has alway proved one of the
mo t effective aids in the ascertainment of truth by jurie
in courts of justice, and this concerns the very highe t
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more frequ ntly than it now does if freedom of advocacy
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fr m exer i ing within the four corners of the evidence
th wid t latitude by way of comment, d nunciation or
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by th trial judo· in the x r is of a ound di r tion, to
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verdict. The jury are sworn to render their verdict upon

the evidence. The law sedulously guards against the intro-

duction of irrelevant or incompetent evidence, by which

the rights of a r^arty may be prejudiced. The purpose of

these salutary rules might be defeated if jurors were al-

lowed to consider facts not in evidence, and the privilege of

counsel can never operate as a license to state to a jury

facts not in evidence, or to present considerations which

have no legitimate bearing upon the case and which the

jury would have no right to consider. ^Yhere counsel in

summing up proceeds to dilate upon facts not in evidence

or to press upon the jury considerations which the jury

would have no right to regard, it is, we conceive, the plain

duty of the court, upon objection made, to interpose, and a

refusal of the court to interpose, where otherwise the right

of the party would prejudiced, would be legal error. There

are many cases sustaining this conclusion. Among them

are Mitchum v. State of Georgia (11 Geo. 6J6) ; Tucl-er v.
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Henniker (41 N. H. 317) ; Rolfe v. Rumford (66 Me. 564).

The reading by counsel in summing up to the jury of tlie

newspaper article ' ' Only a Boy Peddler, ' ' was wholly irre-

levant to the case. It could have been read for no purpose

except to influence the jury against corporations and to

lead them, under the influence of a just anger ex^cited by

the incident narrated, to give liberal damages to the plain-

tiif in the case on trial. The refusal of the court to inter-

fere, under the circumstances of this case, was legal error.

The privilege of counsel and the largest liberality in con-

struing it did not authorize such a totally irrelevant and

prejudicial proceeding. The counsel also, during the sum-

ming up, read a passage from the opinion of this court in

the Lahr case (104 N. Y. 291), after objection taken by the

defendant's counsel had been overruled by the court. It is

not important to consider the exception to this ruling, as

the appellant is entitled to a reversal for the reason already

stated. It may be observed, however, that it is the function

of the judge to instruct the jury upon the law, and where

counsel undertake to read the law to the jury, the judge

may properly interpose to prevent it ; but if the judge sees

fit to permit this to be done and the law is correctly laid

down in the decision or book used by counsel, it would

not, we think, constitute legal error or be ground of ex-
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' rdi t. The jury are worn to render t.h ir verdi t upon
the eviden e. The law sedulously guard again t th intr auction of irrelevant or incompetent evidence, by whi h
the rights of a rJarty may be prejudiced. The purpose of
the e salutary rules might be defeated if juror were allowed to consider facts not in eviden e, and the privilege of
coun el can never operate as a lie nse to tate to a jury
facts not in evidence, or to present consideration whi h
haYe no legitimate bearing upon the a e and whi h the
jury would have no riaht to consider. Where conn el in
umming up proceed to dilate upon facts not in e\ iden e
or to press upon the jury con ideration which the jur
would have no right to regard, it i , we conceive, the plain
duty of the court, upon objection made, to interpo e and a
refu al of the court to interpo e, wh re otherwi e the right
of the party would prejudiced, would be legal error. There
are many ca es sustaining this conclusion. Among them
are Mitchum v . State of Georgia (11 Geo. 61G); Tncker v .
Henniker (41 N. H. 317); Rolfe v. Rumford (66 Me. 564).
The reading by counsel in summing up to th~ jur. of the
newspaper article ''Only a Boy Peddler,'' was wholly irrelevant to the ca e. It could have been read for no purpo e
except to influence the jury again t corporation and to
lead them, under the influence of a ju t anger eX•Ci t d by
the incident narrated, to give liberal damage to the plaintiff in the ca e on trial. The refu al of th court to interfere, under the circumstances of this ca · e wa le 0 ·al rror.
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ception by the other party, although snch a practice is not

to be encouraged. If, however, the reading from a de-

cision was to bring before the jury the facts of the case

decided, or the amount of the verdict, or the comments

of the judge on the facts, to influence the jury in deciding

upon the facts in the case on trial, or in fixing the amotint

of damages, then dearly the reading ought not to be permit-

ted.

We think the judgment in this case should be reversed

upon the exception taken to the reading of the newspaper

article.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.

All concur.

Judgment reversed.

WILKINSON V. PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1907.

226 Illinois, 135.

Mr. Justice Wilkin delivered the opinion of the court:
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eption by the other party, although such a practice is not
to be encouraged. If, however, the reading from a deci ion was to bring before the jur the fa ct of the case
decided, or the amount of the verdict, or the comments
of the judge on the facts, to influence the jury in deciding
upon the facts in the case on trial, or in fixing the amohnt
of damages, then dearly the reading ought not to be permitted.
We think the judgment in this case should be reversed
upon the exception taken to the reading of the newspaper
nrticle .
.Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.
All concur.
Judgment reversed.
T
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It appears that an action on the case had been brought

l)y one Rose Strang against the Lake Street Elevated Rail-

road Company for personal injuries, in wliich the defend-

ant and others testified on behalf of the plaintiff. The suit

resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintitf. William

Elmore Foster and Joseph B. David, who were attorneys

for the railroad company, were engaged with one L. L.

Austin, a claim agent, and Thomas McGuire, a detective,

WILKINSON V. PEOPLE.

in endeavoring to obtain affidavits in support of a motion

for a new trial, and claiming to have learned from the

defendant that his testimony in the ^case was not true, after

Sup reme Coiirt of Illinois. 1907.

some preliminary conversations a meeting was arranged

for the 22nd of April, 1904, in the office of Foster, at which

226 Illinois, 135.

Foster, McGuire, David, Miss Neville, (a stenographer,)

and the defendant were present. Conversations then took

place as to the testimony given by Wilkinson upon the trial

of the personal injury case, at which time it is claimed the

MR. J usTICE WILKIN delivered the opinion of the court:
* * * * * * * * * *
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writing set up in the indictment as an affidavit was read to

the defendant. The defendant, together with Rose Strang

and others, was subsequently indicted in the criminal court

of Cook county for having conspired to extort money from

the said elevated railroad company, upon the trial of which

it is charged the defendant committed the perjury at-

tempted to be assigned.

As above stated, Josex)h B. David was one of the attor-

neys for the elevated railroad company in the personal

injury case and testified on behalf of the People in this

case. He swears he was also special counsel for the People

in the trial of the conspiracy case, and appears prominently

in the argument of this -case * * *

**********

It is insisted that the judgment below should be reversed

because one of the attorneys who appears as counsel for

the People and argued the case orally in this court was

a leading and material witness on behalf of the prosecution
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in the court below. In justification of his conduct it is in-

sisted that there is no law in this State, statutory or other-

wise, forbidding an attorney to be a witness and at the

same time an attorney in a case. Doubtless that is true;

but courts have generally condemned the practice as one

which should be discountenanced and of doubtful profes-

sional propriety. We said, speaking by Justice Breese, in

Morgan v. Roberts, 38 111. 65, on page 85: ''We are not

advised that it is contrary to any statute or to any maxim

of the common law to make the attorney in a cause a wit-

ness in the cause he is managing. This is a matter which

appeals to the professional pride of an attorney and his

sense of his true position and duty. In the English courts,

in several cases, it was held that an attorney cannot appear

in the same cause in the double capacity of witness and

advocate, and it has been so ruled in Pennsvlvania and

in Iowa, on the circuit. In Indiana it was held by Judge

McDonald, now United States district judge, that an at-

torney in a cause could not be permitted to testify to the

general merits of the ease. In Frear v. Drinlrr, 8 Pa. St.

Rep. 521. the court said that it was a hiirhly indecent prac-

tice for an attornev to cross-examine witnesses, address the

jury and give evidence himself to contradict the witness:

that it was a practice to be discountenanced by court and

writing set up in the indictment as an affida' it wa read to
the defendant. The def ndant, together ' ith Ro
iranO'
and others, wa uh equently indicted in the criminal urt
of ook county f or having con pired to extort mon from
the said ele' at d r ailroad compan , upon th trial of whi,J1
it is charged the defendant committed the I erjury attempted to be a igned.
As above sta ted, J o eph B . David was one of the attorneys for the elevated railroad company in the per onal
injury case and testified on behalf of the People in thi
ca e. H e wear he wa al o special coun el for the People
in the trial of the con pirac ca e, and appear prominentl>
in the argument of this ca e * * *
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counsel ; that it was sometimes indispensable that an attor-

ney, to prevent injustice, should give evidence for his client.

It, however, leads to abuse. But at the same time there was

no law to prevent it. All the court can do is to discounten-

ance the practice, and, when the evidence is indispensable,

to recommend to the counsel to withdraw from the cause.

This subject has engaged the attention of other courts and

of this court, and however indecent it may be in practice

for an attorney retained in a case and managing it, to be

a witness also, we cannot say he is incompetent, and must

leave him to his own convictions of what is right and pro-

per under such circumstances." And again, in Ross v.

Demoss, 45 111. 447, Justice Lawrence said: ''On the trial

below the evidence was conflicting, but it seems to prepon-

derate in favor of the decree. The weight of the evidence

of Garner is somewhat impaired from the fact that he was

proved to have been one of the attorneys in the case, and

had a conditional fee, dependent on the result of the suit.
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It is of doubtful professional propriety for an attorney

to become a witness for his client without first entirely

withdrawing from any further connection with the case,

and an attorney occupying the attitude of both witness

and attorney for his client subjects his testimony to critic-

ism, if not suspicion ; but where the half of a valuable farm

depends upon his evidence he places himself in an unpro-

fessional position and must not be surprised if his evidence

is impaired. While the profession is an honorable one, its

members should not forget that even they may so act as to

lose public confidence and general respect."

The foregoing language of eminent judges of this court

was used in civil cases and is peculiarly applicable to this

case, in which the People are generally understood to be

represented by public officers. Here the witness first ap-

peared as an attorney for the Lake Street Elevated Rail-

road Company in the personal injury case, and was promi-

nent in procuring affidavits in support of the motion for a

new trial, and one of which he attempted to obtain from

the defendant, Wilkinson. He next appeared, he says, as

special counsel for the People in the prosecution of the

conspiracy case, and while he may not have actively ap-

peared in the prosecution of this case on the trial below, it

is quite apparent that he had more or less to do with shap-

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 12

counsel; that it was sometimes indispensable that an attorney, to prevent injustice, should give evidence for his client.
It, however, leads to abuse. But at the same time there was
no law to prevent it. All the court can do is to discountenance the practice, and, when the evidence is indispensable,
to recommend to the counsel to withdraw from the cause.
This subject has engaged the attention of other ,courts and
of this court, and however indecent it may be in practice
for an attorney retained in a case and managing it, to be
a witness also, we cannot say he is incompetent, and must
leave him to his own convictions of what is right and proper under such circumstances.'' And again, in Ross v.
D emoss, 45 Ill. 447, Justice Lawrence said: "On the trial
below the evidence was conflicting, but it seems to preponderate in favor of the decree. The weight of the evidence
of Garner is somewhat impaired from the fact that he was
proved to have been one of the attorneys in the case, and
had a conditional fee, dependent on the result of the suit.
It is of doubtful professional propriety for an attorney
to become a witness for his client without :first entirely
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ing the course of the prosecution, and voluntarily, as we

have already said, appeared as a prominent witness in the

case. There is substantial ground for the inference that he

regarded the litigation throughout as between the elevated

railroad company and the defendant or defendants, rather

than as by the People for the enforcement of public rights.

The fact that he does appear in this record in the unenvi-

able attitude of a willing witness and a zealous attorney

should not, perhaps, work a reversal of the judgment be-

low if the record were in all other respects free from error,

but we cannot overlook such professional impropriety when

our attention is called to it.

Other grounds of reversal urged have received consider-

ation, but we think they are without substantial merit.

For the errors indicated the judgment below will be re-

versed.

Judgment reversed.

Mr. Justice Carter, dissenting.
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CAMPBELL V. MAHER.

Supreme Court of Indiana. 1885.

105 Indiana, 383.

Elliott, J.

In the course of his argument to the jury the counsel for

the appellee said: ''The record in this case shows that the

plaintiff was not willing to try this case at his home in
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ing the cour e of the prosecuti n, and voluntaril v a. w
have already aid, appeared a a I romin nt witne:. in th
case. Th re i ub tantial ground for the infer nc that h
regarded th litigation throughout a etw en th 1 vat f1
railroad ompany and the defendant or d f ndant rath r
than as by the People for the enforcement of pul li right. .
Th fact that he doe appear in thi record in th unenYiable attitude of a willing witne and a z alou attorn :
. hould not, perhap , work a rever al of th judo·m nt b low if the record were in all other respe ts free from error
but we cannot overlook such profe sional impropriety when
our attention is called to it.
Other grounds of reversal urged have received con ideration, but we think they are without substantial merit.
For the errors indicated the judgment below will be reersed.
_Judgment reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CARTER, dissenting.

Daviess county, among his neighbors, but has brought the

case to Pike county on a change of venue, among strang-

ers." The appellant objected, and the court, as the record

recites, "remarked that it was not improper for counsel to

refer to matters which were disclosed by the record, since

the whole record was before the jury, but that the argument

of counsel had gone too far, and should be limited to the

record." lYliat followed is thus exhibited in the record:

CAMPBELL V. MAHER.

"And thereupon counsel for the plaintiff resumed his seat,

and the counsel for the defendant again turned to the jury,

Supreme Court of Indiana.

1885.

and, resuming his argument, said: 'The court says T may

105 Indiana, 383.

ELLIOTT, J.
In the course of his argument to the jury the conn. Al for
th a1 pellee said: "The record in thi case show that th
laintiff wa not willing to tr~T thi. ca at hi h
in
Davi ss ounty among bis n io-hbor but ha. b · u:--ht th
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refer to the record. Gentlemen, the record of this case

shows that the cause was brought from Daviess .county to

this county on the motion of the plaintiff.' To which

statement the plaintiff's counsel again objected, and again

assigned in support of his objection the reasons assigned

by him in support of the objection to argument of defend-

ant's counsel herein above set out, but the court overruled

said objection, to which the plaintiff's counsel excepted,

whereupon the defendant's counsel again turned to the

jury and said: 'Gentlemen of the jury, I have only stated

to you what the record in this cause shows to be true, and

the court has decided that I have a riglit to do this.' "

The trial court was unquestionably wrong in ruling that

everything that appears in the record is the subject of

argument to the jury, for there are many things which

the record discloses that the jury have no right to consider.

Juries, as every one knows, are sworn to try the case ''ac-

cording to the law and the evidence," and an argument
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must be confined to the evidence and the law. AYhere a

party secures a legal right according to law, the fact that

he has secured it can not be used to his prejudice. A change

of venue is a legal right, and where it is awarded by the

court in conformity to law, it can not be used to the pre-

judice of the party by wiiom it was obtained, nor can it

be commented on in argument. It would be a perversion of

law to permit the exercise of a legal right, under the order

of the court, to be made the subject of consideration by a

jury. We need not, however, discuss this question further

for it is settled against the appellee by authority. Farnian

V. Lauman, 73 Ind, 568.

The comments of counsel were not mere general, fugitive

statements, but they were reiterated, and they were also

sanctioned by the ruling of the court, so that there was a

deliberate and emphatic presentation of an improper sub-

ject to the jury, and unless we can ascertain from the record

that no harm resulted, we must reverse. The record does

not enable us to declare that the appellant was not injured,

for the case is a close one upon the evidence, and we can

not say tliat the misconduct of the appellee's counsel did the

appellant no injury. There are cases where a reversal will

not be adjudged, although there is some misconduct in argu-

ment. Shular v. State, ante, p. 289, and authorities cited;

refer to the record. Gentlemen, the record of this case
shows that the cause was brought from Daviess .county Lo
thi county on the motion of the plaintiff.' To which
tatement the pJaintiff 's counsel again objeded, and again
as igned in support of his objection the reasons assigned
by him in support of the objection to argument of defendant's coun el herein above set out, but the court overruled
aid objection, to which the plaintiff's counsel excepted,
whereupon the defendant's counsel again turned to the
jury and said: 'Gentlemen of the jury, I have only stated
to you what the record in this cause shows to be true, and
the court has decided that I have a right to do this.' ''
The trial court was unquestionably wrong in ruling that
everything that appears in the re,cord is the subject of
argument to the jury, for there are many things which
the record discloses that the jury have no right to consider.
Juries, as every one knows, are sworn to try the case •'according to the law and the evidence, " and an argument
must be confined to the evidence and the law. \Vhere a
party secures a legal right according to law, the fact that
he has ecured it can not be used to his prejudice. A change
of venue is a legal right, and where it is awarded by the
court in conformity to law, it can not be used to the prejudice of the party by whom it was obtained, nor can it
be comment d on in argument. It would be a perversion uf
law to I ermit the exercise of a legal right, under the order
of the court, to be made the subject of consideration by a
jury. We need not, however, discu s this question further
for it i
ttled against the appellee by authority. Fannwi
v. Laitman, 73 Ind. 568.
Th comm nts of couns 1 w r not mer general, fugitive
. tat m nt. , but they ere reiterated, and they w re also
a ti n d by the rulin of the court, so that th re was a
d lib r t and mphatic pres ntation of an i pr 1 er . ubj ·t to th jur , an unl s we an a c rtain from tl1 r ord
th t n he rm r ult d,
mu t r v r e. The r
r l does
n t al 1 u. to d Jar that the appellant wa not injured,
f r th a. i a 1 s n upon th vid nc , and w can
n t . a)r that th mi. ondu t of th a pell 's couns 1 di the
p llant no i jnry. Th r ar ·ea s wh r a r versal will
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ljud ], 1th n h th r i som mi. ondu tin ar<Yut. hular v. Statr, ant , p. 2 , and authorities Hed;
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''Misconduct of Counsel in Argument," 14 Cent. L. J. 406.

This is not such a case.

OF

CouNSEL

51.

Misconduct of oun el in Argument," 14 Cent. L. J. 406.
This is not such a ca e.
Judgment reversed.

Judgment reversed.

HANSELL-ELCOCK FOUNDEY COMPANY V. CLARK.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1905.

214 Illinois, 399.

Me. Chief Justice Ricks delivered the opinion of the

court :

HANSELL-ELCOCK FOUNDRY COMP ANY V. CLARK.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court

for the First District affirming a judgment of the superior

Supreme Court of Illinois.

1905 .

court of Cook county for $8,000 in favor of appellee, against

appellant, for damages for personal injuries sustained by

the appellee while in appellant's employ. Appellee, at the

.214

Illinois, 399.

time of the injury, July 16, 1901, was a structural iron

worker in appellant's service, engaged in the construction of

the St. Cecilia school building, — a three-story structure in

the city of Chicago, — and while so engaged was struck by

a large iron beam, sustaining the injuries for which this
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suit was brought.

The court limited the time of the argument to forty-five

minutes for each side, but extended the time seven minutes

for defendant's counsel, at their request, but refused to

grant further extension although requested so to do, and

this refusal of the court is also assigned as error. It is

earnestly insisted by counsel for appellant that because of

this limitation they were unduly hampered in the presenta-

tion of the case to the jury. We have always held this

question to be one within the sound discretion of the trial

court, but that where it appears that the discretion has

manifestly been abused this court would reverse the case

for such error. In cases of this character each side should

have ample time to present its case to the jury and to thor-

oughly argue the facts. The bare possibility of compromis-

ing the rights of either the plaintiff or defendant because

of not allowing counsel ample time in which to present a

client's cause should be carefully guarded against. Under

MR. CHIEF J usTICE RrnKs delivered the op1n1on of the
ourt :
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court
for the Fir t Di trict affirming a judgment of the superior
court of Cook count for $8 000 in favor of appellee against
appellant, for damages for personal injuries u tained by
the appellee while in appellant's employ. Appellee, at the
time of the injury, July 16, 1901, was a tructural iron
i,,yorker in appellant's ervice engaged in the construction of
he St. Cecilia school building -a three-story structure in
the city of Chicago,-and while so en°·aged wa struck by
a large iron beam, su taining the injuries for which this
suit was brought.

* * * * * * * * * *
The court limited the time of the argument to forty-five
minutes for each ide, but extended the time seven minute
for defendant's conn el, at their request, but refu ed to
grant further exten ion although reque t d o to do and
thi refu al of the court i al o a i ·n d a error. It i
earne tly in i ted by coun el for app llant that be au e of
this limitation they were unduly hamp red in the re ntation of the ca e to the jur.. . We ave alway h 1 thi
que tion to be one within the sound di cretion of th trial
ourt but that where it a pear that th di r tion ha
manif tly b en abu e thi
urt would rev r · the •Ca
for u h errGr. In ca e of thi hara t r a h ide hould
have ample time to pr ent it a to th jury and to thorouo-hly argue the fact . Th bar p ibi1ity of c
r mi ino- the ri ht of eitb r the plaintiff r d f nda t b au e
of not allowino- oun 1 am 1 time in w i h to pre nt a
cli nt' cause should be carefully guard d against. Under
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our system of jurisprudence the power of the jury is so

great, trial courts should be liberal in their allowance to

counsel of time in which to review and argue the evidence.

The trial court, however, who hears the case is in a far bet-

ter position to judge as to the time proper to be given

counsel for argument than can be a court of review, and

we are not disposed to reverse a case, for the reason alone,

that the time allowed counsel for argument was too short,

unless we are thoroughly satisfied the complaining party

has in fact been wronged by an undue limitation. In this

case we think the trial court might very properly have

granted counsel more time for argument, but we do not

think we would be justified in reversing the case on the

simple ground that the limitation was unjust. But seven

witnesses testified for appellee and nine for appellant. The

record shows that the examination of the witnesses began

on the 17th of March, 1903, and that upon the convening

of the court on the 19th the verdict of the jury was returned.
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But five witnesses on each side testified as to the condition

and scene of the accident. We cannot say from a review

of the evidence that the time allotted counsel for argument

was manifestly too short.

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

[Chap. 12

ur s Tstem of jurisprudence the power of the jury is so
great, trial courts hould be liberal in tbeir allowance to
counsel of time in which to review and argue the evidence.
The trial court, however, who hears the case is in a far better po ition to judge as to the time proper to be given
rounsel for argument than can be a court of review, and
we are not disposed to reverse a case, for the reason alone,
that the time allowed counsel for argument was too short,
unless we are thoroughly satisfied the complaining party
has in fact been wronged by an undue limitation. In this
case we think the trial court might very properl3T have
granted counsel more time for argument, but we do not
think we would be justified in reversing the case on th€
imple ground that the limitation was unjust. But seven
witnesses te tified for appellee and nine for appellant. The
record shows that the e~r amination of the witnesses began
on the 17th of March, 1903, and that upon the convening
of the court on the 10t11 the verdict of the jury was returned.
But five witnes es on each side testified as to the condition
and scene of the accident. We cannot say from a review
of the evidence that the time allotted ·counsel for argument
was manifestly too short.

* * * * * * * * * *
The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

CHAPTER XIII.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES.

Section 1. Pukpose, Scope and Effect.

CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COM-

CHAPTER XIII.

PANY V. DUNLEAVY.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1889,

129 Illinois, 132.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES.

Mr. Justice Bailey delivered the opinion of the Court :

This was an action on the case, brought by Annie Dun-

SECTION 1. PURPOSE, ScoPE AND EFFECT.

leavy, administratrix of the estate of John Dimleavy, de-

ceased, against the Chicago and Nortliwestern Railway

Company, to recover damages under the statute for the

death of the plaintiff's intestate. The declaration consisted

CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMP ANY V. DUNLEAVY.

of nine counts, to the fifth, sixth and seventh of which a

demurrer was sustained. To the remaining counts the de-

fendant pleaded not guilty, and on trial before the court

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1889.

and a ,iury, the issues were found for the plaintiff and her

damages assessed at $1800, and for that sum and costs, the

129 Illinois, 132.

court, after denying the defendant's motion for a new trial,
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gave judgment for the plaintiff. Said judgment was af-

firmed by the Appellate Court on appeal, and by a further

appeal the record is now brought to this court.

The first count of the declaration alleges that the defend-

ant, on the 26th day of July, 1886, by its servants, ran one

of its locomotive engines with a train of freight cars thereto

attached, from east to west over one of its tracks under a

viaduct at Blue Island avenue, in the city of Chicago ; that

the plaintiff's intestate was then and there in the employ

of said city cleaning and painting the iron columns, etc.,

of said viaduct, and that "the said train was, by and

through the negligence, carelessness and improper conduct

of the said defendant, through its servants in the premises,

run at a high and dangerous rate of speed," and that while

being so run, it was driven against and upon said Dun-

521

MR. JUSTICE BAILEY delivered the opinion of the Court:
This was an action on the case, brought by Annie Dunleavy, administratrix of the estate of John Dunleavy deceased, against the Chicago and Northwestern Railway
Company to recover damages under the tatute for the
death of the plaintiff's intestate. The declaration con isted
of nine counts, to the fifth, sixth and seventh of which a
demurrer was su tained. To the remaining counts the defendant pleaded not guilty, and on trial before the court
and a jur , the issues were found for the plaintiff and her
damages a sesse<l at $1800, and for that smn and costs the
court, after denying the def end ant's motion for a new trial,
gave judgment for the plaintiff. Said judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court on appeal, and by a furth r
appeal the record is now brought to thi •court.
The first count of the declaration alleges that the defendant on the 26th day of Jul. , 1886, by it. er Tant ran one
of its locomotive engines with a train of frei ht car thereto
attached, from east to west over one of it tra ks under a
viaduct at Blue I sland a nue in the city of Chica o; that
the plaintiff's intestate was th .n and th er in the em pl .
of aid ity cleaning and ainting th iron colllinn
tc.,
of said viaduct, and tl at "the aid train was, by and
through the negligence, ,carele. ne and im r per onduct
r i. 1
f th aid defendant thr ugh it . er ant. in t
run at a high and danp; rou rate of p ed," and that while
being so run it was driven a ain t and upon said DunJ

521
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leavy, whereby he was instantly killed. The second count

alleges that the defendant, through its servants, "so care-

lessly, improperly and unskillfully managed and conducted

said engine and train, that the said John Dunleavy was

forcibly knocked down by said engine and train" and

thrown under the wheels of the train and instantly killed.

The third count sets up an ordinance of said city requiring

the bell of each locomotive engine to be rung continually

while running within the city, and alleging that the defend-

ant's servants in charge of said train failed to comply with

said ordinance, and that in consequence of such failure said

Dunleavj'- was killed. The fourth count is substantially like

the second. The eighth count alleges that the engineer and

fireman could, by looking, have seen Dunleavy standing at

his work, and by sounding a whistle have given him notice

of the approach of a train, but that they failed to sound

the whistle, and that in consequence of such failure said

Dunleavy was killed. The ninth count alleges substantially
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the same act of negligence as the eighth, though in different

language. Each count alleges in proper form that Dun-

leavy at the time he was killed, was in the exercise of due

care.

At the close of the trial the counsel for the defendant

asked the court to instruct the jury that the evidence in the

case was insufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff,

and that their verdict should therefore be for the defendant.

This instruction the court refused to give, and such refusal

is assigned for error.

The next questions to be considered are those which

relate to the special findings of the jury. Upon this branch

of the case it is urged, first, that the court improperly re-

fused to submit certain questions of fact to the jury; second,

that certain of the questions of fact submitted were not

properly answered; and third, that the special findings of

fact are inconsistent with the general verdict. The statute

under which special findings may be required is but recent,

?ind the rules of practice thereby established have never be-

fore been presented to this court for its consideration. We

must therefore look mainly to the statute itself for our

guide in determining the propositions now raised. The

statute is as follows:
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leavy wb reby he wa instantly killed. The second count
allege that the defendant, through its servants, ''so carele sly, improperly and unskillfully managed and conducted
aid engine and train, that the said John Dunleavy was
forcibly knocked down by said engine and train'' and
thrown under the wheels of the train and instantly killed.
The third count sets up an ordinance of aid city requiring
the bell of each locomotive engine to be rung continually
while running within the city, and alleging that the defendant's sen ants in charge of said train failed to •Comply with
said ordinance, and that in con equence of such failure said
Dunleavy was killed. The fourth count is substantially like
the second. The eighth count alleges that the engineer and
fireman could, by looking, have seen Dunleavy standing at
his work, and by sounding a whistle have given him notice
of the approach of a train, but that they failed to sound
the i.vhi ·tle, and that in consequence of such failure said
Dunleavy was killed. The ninth count alleges substantially
the same act of negligence as the eighth, though in different
language. Each count alleges in proper form that Dunleavy at the time he was killed, was in the exercise of due
care.
At the close of the trial the counsel for the defendant
asked the court to instruct the jury that the evidence in the
a e was insufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff,
and that their verdict should therefore be for the defendant.
This instruction the court refused to give, and such refusal
is assigned for error.

* * * * * * * * * *
The next que tions to b considered are those which
relate to the pecial :finding of the jury. Upon this branch
of the ca it i urg d, fir t, that the court improperly refu ed to u bmit ertai qu tion of fact to th jury; second,
that rtain of th
u , ti n of fa t ubmitted w re not
pr perl.v an. w r d; and third, that tbe p ial :finding. of
fa t ar in on i t nt with th g neral v rdi t. The statute
nnd r i.: hi h
cial :finding. may b r quir d is but recent,
~n th rul
f practi th r by tablished have never befor h n r
nt d to thi ourt for its con ideration. We
n. t th r f re 1 k
inl t th
tatute it If for our
~11i<l in d t rminino- the propositions now raised.
The
. l tut is as follows:

Sec. l]

5 3

SPECIAL I NTERROGATORIES

Sec. 1] Special Intehkogatories 523

Section 1. "That in all trials by jury in civil proceed-

ings in this State in courts of record, the jury may render,

in their discretion, either a general or a special verdict;

and in any case in which they render a general verdict, they

may be required by the court, and must be so required on

request of any party to the action, to find specially upon

any material question or questions of fact which shall be

stated to them in writing, which questions of fact shall be

submitted by the party requesting the same to the adverse

l)arty before the commencement of the argument to the

jury.

Sec. 2. "Submitting or refusing to submit a question of

fact to the jury when requested by a party as provided by

the first section hereof may be excepted to and be reviewed

on appeal or writ of error as a ruling on a question of law.

Sec. 3. "When the special finding of fact is inconsistent

with the general verdict, the former shall control the latter

and the court may render judgment accordingly."
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This statute, so far as it relates to special verdicts, is

merely declaratory of the common law. It has been compe-

tent for juries at common law, since the statute of 13

Edward 1, to find a general verdict, or when they have any

doubt as to the law, to find a special verdict, and refer

the law arising thereon to the decision of the court. By

a special verdict, the jury, instead of finding for either

party, find and state all the facts at issue, and conclude con-

ditionally, that if upon the whole matter thus found, the

court should be of the opinion tliat the plaintiff has a good

cause of action, they then find for the plaintiff, and assess

his damages ; if otherwise, then for the defendant. 2 Tidd's

Practice, (Am. ed.) 897, and note.

The rules of law as to special verdicts and their requisites

have long been settled both in this country and in England.

Thus, it is held that they should find facts, and not the

mere evidence of facts, so as to leave nothing for the court

to determine except questions of law. Vhicrnt v. Morrhon,

Breese, 227 ; Brown v. Balson, 4 Rand. 504; Seward v. Jack-

son, 8 Cow. 406; Henderson v. Aliens, 1 Hen & Mun. 2.35;

Hill V. Covell, 1 N. Y. 522; Lanqleij v. Warren, 3 id. 327;

Kinsley v. Coyle, 58 Pa. St. 461; Thompson v. Farr, 1

Spears, 93 ; Leach v. Church, 10 Ohio St. 149 : LaFromhios v.

Jackson, 8 Cow. 589. To authorize a judgment upon a

ction 1. "That in all trials by jury in civil
ing in thi
tate in court of record, th jury ma r nd r
in their di cretion, ither a general or a pe ial verd~ t;
and in any ca e in which th~y render a o-en ral Y r i t th y
may be r quired by the court, and must be o required n
cially u n
r que t of any party to the action to find
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·ubmitted by the party reque ting the ame to the ad er
part; before the comm ncement of the argum nt to th
jury.
ec. 2. ''Submitting or refu ing to ubmit a que tion of
fact to the jur r when reque ted by a party a pro ided by
the fir t e tion hereof may be excepted to and be review
on a p al or writ of error a a ruling on a que tion of law.
Sec. 3. "When the pecial finding of fact i incon. i tent
with the general verdi t the former ball ontrol the latt r
and the court ma r render judgment accordino·ly.''
Thi statute o far a it relate to pecial 'erdi t:, i
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tatute of 1'
Edward 1 to find a general verdi.ct or wh n they have any
doubt a to the law to find a pecial
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a special verdict, the jur. , in tead of finding for either
party find and state all the fact at i ue, an 1 conclude conditionally that if upon the whole matt r thu f un th
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cau e of action they then find for the 1 laintiff, an a
hi dam a · ; if oth~rwi e then for the defendant.
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Pra tic , ( m. ed.) 97, and not .
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special verdict, all the facts essential to the right of the

party in whose favor the judgment is to be rendered, must

be found by the jury; finding sufficient evidence, prima

facie, to establish such facts, is not sufficient. Blake v.

Davis, 20 Ohio, 231; Hambleton v. Dempsey, id. 168. If

probative facts are found from which the court can declare

that the ultimate facts necessarily result, the finding is suf-

ficient. Alhambra Addition Water Co. v. Richardson, 72

Cal. 598 ; Coveny v. Hale, 49 id. 552. A special verdict can-

not be aided by intendment, and therefore any fact not

ascertained by it will be presumed not to exist. Lee v.

Campbell, 4 Porter, 198 ; Zumull v. Watson, 2 Munf. 283 ;

Laivrence v. Beaiibun, 2 Bailey, 625.

It is manifest of course that a special finding by a jury

upon material questions of fact submitted to them under the

provisions of the statute is not a special verdict, but an es-

sentially different proceeding. A special verdict cannot

be found where there is a general verdict, but the special
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findings of fact provided for by the statute can be required

only in case a general verdict is rendered. But while this

is so, much light in relation to special findings upon ques-

tions of fact, and their office and objects may be derived

from the rules applicable to special verdicts. Both forms

of verdict are provided for by the same statute, and they

must therefore be construed as being in pari materia.

In giving construction to the statute, the first, and per-

haps the most important question, relates to the scope and

meaning of the phrase, "material question or questions of

fact." May such questions relate to mere evidentiary facts,

or should they be restricted to those ultimate facts upon

which the rights of the parties directly depend? Evidently

the latter: Not only does this conclusion follow from an-

alogy to the rules relating to si)ecial verdicts, but it arises

from the very nature of the case. It would clearly be of

no avail to require the jury to find mere matters of evi-

dence, because, after being found, they would in no way

aid the court in determining what judgment to render.

Dou])tloss a probative fact from which the ultimate fact

necessarily results would be material, for there the court

could infer such ultimate fact as a matter of law. But

where the probative fact is merely prima facie evidence of

the fact to be proved, the proper deductions to be drawn
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·pecial verdict, all the facts essential to the right of the
party in whose favor the judgment is to be rendered, must
be found by the jur3 ; finding suffi.cient evidence, prima
f acie, to establish such facts, is not sufficient. Blake v.
Davis, 20 Ohio, 231; Hambleton v. Dempsey, id. 168. If
probative facts are found from which the court can declare
that the ultimate facts necessarily result, the finding is sufficient. Alhanibra Addition Water Co . v . Richardson, 72
Cal. 598; Coveny . Hale, 49 id. 552. A special verdict .cannot be aided by intendment, and therefore any fact not
ascertained by it will be presumed not to exi t. Lee v.
Campbell, 4 Porter, 198; Ziimull v . Watson, 2 J\1unf. 283;
L awrence v . Beaubun, 2 Bailey, 625.
It is manifest of course that a special finding by a jury
upon material que tions of fact submitted to them under the
provisions of the statute is not a special verdict, but an essentially different proceeding. A special verdict cannot
be found where there is a general verdict, but the special
findings of faict provided for by the statute can be required
only in case a general verdict is rendered. But while this
is so, much light in relation to special findings upon questions of fact, and their office and objects may be derived
fTom the rules applicable to special verdicts. Both forms
of verdict are provided for by the same statute, and they
must therefore be construed a being in pari materia.
In giving construction to the statute, the fir t, and perhaps the most important que tion, relates to the scope and
meaning of the phra e, "material question or question of
fact." May uch que tion relate to mere evidentiary facts,
or hould they be restricte.d to those ultimate f acts upon
whi h the rio-hts of the parties directly depend~ Evidently
the latter: Not only do thi on lu ion follow from analogy t th rul . relatin()' to p cial erdict , but it arise
from t e v r. nature of the as . It would 1 arly be of
no avail to r quire th jury to find m r matt rs of evid nr h au · , after h ing found, th y would in no way
a1 th court in d t rrnining what judont to rend r.
ul>tl '· · I ro ativ fa t from which th ultimate faict
n r .. ·,rilv r .·ults wo11ld h
at rial, for ther the ourt
ulrl inf r surh ultimat fa t a.
matt r f law. But
whc r th probative fa t i m r ly prima fa ie vid nee of
the f ct to be proved, the pro r dedu tions to b drawn
T
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from the probative fact presents a quefc>tion of fact and not

of law, requiring further action by the jury, and it cannot

therefore be made the basis of any action by the court. Re-

quiring the jury to find such probative fact is merely requir-

ing them to find the evidence and not the facts, and results

in nothing which can be of the slightest assistance to the

parties or the court in arriving at the proper determination

of the suit.

The vievf^ we take is strongly fortified by the provision

of the third section of the statute, that, when a special find-

ing of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, the

former shall control. This necessarily implies that the fact

to be submitted shall be one which, if found, may in its na-

ture be controlling. That can never be the case with a mere

evidentiary fact. A fact which merely tends to prove a

fact in issue without actually proving it, can not be said

to be, in any legal sense, inconsistent with a general ver-

dict, whatever that verdict may be. Such inconsistency
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can arise only where the fact found is an ultimate fact, or

one from which the existence or non-existence of such ulti-

mate fact necessarily follows, and that is never the case

with that which is only prima facie evidence of the fact

sought to be proved.

The common law requires that verdicts shall be the de-

claration of the unanimous judgment of the twelve jurors.

Upon all matters which they are required to find they must

be agreed. But it has never been held that they must all

reach their conclusions in the same way and by the same

method of reasoning. To require unanimity not only in

their conclusions but in the mode by which those conclusions

are arrived at would in most cases involve an impossibility.

To require unanimity therefore, not only in the result but

also in each of the successive steps leading to such result,

would be practically destructive of the entire system of

jury trials. To illustrate, suppose a plaintiff trying his suit

before twelve jurors, should seek to prove a fact alleged

in his declaration by giving evidence of twelve other facts,

each having an independent tendency to prove the fact al-

leged. The evidence of each probative fact, or the con-

clusions to be drawn from it, might appeal with peculiar

force to the belief or judgment of some one of the jurors,

but less so to his fellows. The cumulative effect of all the
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from the probative fact presents a que~tion of fa t and not
of law, requiring further action by the jur: and it annot
therefore be made the basis of any action b · th ourt.
quiring the jury to :find such probative fact i m r ly r quiring them to :find the evidence and not the fact and r ult.
in nothing which can be of the slightest a . i tan t th
parties or the court in arriving at the proper d termination
of the suit.
The view we take is strongly fortified by the provi ion
of the third section of the statute, that, when a sp cial :finding of fact is incon i tent with the general v rdict the
former suall control. This necessaril implies that the fact
to be submitted shall be one which if found, may in it nature be controlling. That can never be the case with a mere
e--ddentiary fact. A fact which mer:ely tends to prove a
fact in issue without actually proving it, can not be aid
to be, in an legal sense, incon istent with a general verdict whatever that verdict may be. Such in on i tency
an arise only where the fact found is an ultimate fa t, or
one from which the existence or non-existence of uch ultimate fact nece arily follows, and that is nev r the ca
with that whi h is only prima facie evidence of the fact
sought to be proved.
The common law require that verdicts shall be the declaration of the unanimous judgment of the tw Ive juror .
Upon all matters whi h they are required to find they mu t
e ao-reed. But it ha never been held that they must all
reach their conclu ions in the ame way and by the a
m thod of rea oning. To require unanimit. not only in
their conclusion but in the mode by which tho e conclu ion.
are arri ed at would in mo t ca e involve a impo i ility.
To require unanimity therefore not only in th r ult bu
al o in e h of the ucce i e tep 1 ading to u h r ult
would b
ra tically de tructive of the entire y t
f
jury trial . To illu trat uppo a plaintiff trying hi .. nit
b for twelv juror
hould e k to rove a f t all o- cl
in hi.
laration by gi in
id n e of twelv th r f ai t . ,
each havin()' an ind p n nt t n n . to pr ve th fa t al l ed. Th
Yid nee of a h probative fa t or th c
lu i ns to b drawn from it mi o-ht app al with
culiar
force to the b lief or judo-m nt f m n f the jur r. ,
but less so to his fellows. The cumulative ff ct of all th
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evidence might be such as to leave no doubt in the mind of

any member of the panel as to the truth of the fact alleged,

still, if the jury were required to find specially as to each

probative fact, no one of the twelve facts would be at all

likely to meet with the unanimous concurrence of the entire

jury. As to each they would be compelled to confess their

inability to agree, or what would be its equivalent, say they

did not know or could not tell, which, if we apply the rules

governing special verdicts, would be tantamount to a finding

that the fact was not proved or did not exist. If such find-

ing should be required, and should be given the effect of

controlling the general verdict, the result would be, that

under such system of trial, general verdicts could but sel-

dom stand.

However natural the curiosity parties may have to know

the precise course of reasoning by which jurors may arrive

at verdicts either for or against them, they have no right,

under gise of submitting questions of fact to be found
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specially by the jury, to require them to give their views

upon each item of evidence, and thus practically subject

them to a cross-examination as to the entire case. Such

practice would subserve no useful purpose, and would only

tend to embarrass and obstruct the administration of jus-

tice; and we may further say that such practice finds no

warrant in our statute.

We are referred to one case in another State, where, in

a suit for personal injuries against a railroad company,

the defendant was permitted under a statute somewhat

similar to ours, to put to the jury no less than one hundred

and thirty-six interrogatories as to the facts, covering, ap-

parently every possible phase of the evidence. The judg-

ment against the railroad company" was reversed for an

erroneous instruction to the jury as to the form to their

answer to questions where the evidence was not sufficient,

but no suggestions seems to have been made that any por-

tion of the questions put to the jury were improper. What-

ever may be the view of such practice taken by the courts

of other States, we are unwilling to give our countenance

to its adoy)tion here.

In the present case the defendant's counsel prepared and

submitted fifteen questions of fact upon which the court was

asked to require the jury to make special findings. Of these
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evidence might be su h a to leave no doubt in the mind of
any member of the panel as to the truth of the faict alleged,
till, if the jury were required to find specially as to each
probative fact, no one of the twelve facts would be at all
likely to meet with the unanimous concurrence of the entire
jury. As to each they would be compelled to confess their
jnability to agree, or what would be its equivalent, say they
did not know or could not tell which, if we apply the rules
overning special verdict , would be tantamount to a finding
that the fact wa not proved or did not exist. If such finding should be required and should be given the eff e.ct of
controlling the general verdict, the result would be, that
under such sy t m of trial, general verdicts could but seldom stand.
However natural the curiosity parties may have to know
the precise course of reasoning by which jurors may arrive
at verdicts either for or against them, they have no right,
under gise of submitting que tions of fact to be found
pecially by the jury, to require them to give their views
upon each item of evidence, and thus practically subje.ct
them to a cros -examination as to the entire case. Such
l ractice would sub eTve no useful purpose, and would only
tend to embarra s and obstruct the administration of justice; and we may further say that such practice finds no
waTrant in our statute.
We are referred to one case in another State, where, in
a uit for personal injuries against a railroad company,
the def ndant wa permitted under a statute somewhat
imilar to our , to put to the jury no l
than one hundred
and thirty-six interro atorie as to th faiets, coverin°·, appar tl very po ible ha e of the evidence. The judgm nt again t tb railroad company was rev r d for an
rroneous in tru tion to the jury a to the form to their
an w r to qu ti n wh re th evid nee was not suffi ient,
l ut no sugo· tio
m t h v be n made th t any portion f b iu ti n ut to th jur w r impro1 r. Whatr ma b th vi w of u b pra tj e tal n by th courts
<f
th r. 1 t t , w are un illi g t give our ountenance
t it.
ti n h r .
t' c uu 1 pr pared and
th pr nt a e th
tu on hi h the ourt wa
itt
ft
u .·ti n ,
t r 1ir the jury to ake pecial .findings. Of these
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the eleventh and twelfth were refused. The first was mod-

ified and suhmitted to the jury in its modified form. The

residue of the questions were submitted as asked. We do

not understand that the defendant is now complaining of

the action of the court in relation to its eleventh and twelfth

questions of fact. The first, as prepared by the defendant's

counsel, was as follows :

1. ''^^Hiat precaution did the deceased take to inform

himself of the approach of the train which caused the in-

jury?"

This was modified by the court so as to read as follows :

1. ''Was the deceased exercising reasonable care for his

own safety at the time he was killed?"

The ultimate fact which it was incumbent upon the plain-

tiff to prove, and which the defendant sought to disprove,

was that the deceased, at the time he was killed, was in

the exercise of due care. That was one of the issues made

by the pleadings, and it was one of the ultimate facts upon
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which the plaintiff's right to recover necessarily depended.

What the deceased did to inform himself of the approach of

the train was material only as tending to show reasonable

care on his part or the want of it. His acts in that behalf,

then, whatever they may have been, were facts which were

merely evidential in their nature, and while they doubtless

would have had a tendency to prove reasonable care or

the contrary, there were none of them, so far as the evi-

dence shows, which would have been conclusive of that

question. The question then, as submitted by the defend-

ant's counsel, sought to obtain a finding as to mere pro-

bative facts, and the court, therefore properly refused to

require the jury to answer it. The question substituted by

the court submitted to the jury a material and controlling

fact, and one which could be properly made the subject of a

special finding.

Complaint is made to the answers given by the jury to the

fourth and fifth questions. Those questions were as fol-

lows:

4. ''Did the deceased look to a&certain if the train in

question was approaching?

5. "Did the deceased listen to ascertain if said train was

approaching?"

To both of those questions the jury answered: "Don't
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the l Yenth and tw lfth w Te r efu . d. Tbe fir . t wa
odified and ubmitt 1 to th jun· in it. mo ifi d form. The
r idue of the qu . tion wer . ul mitt a a ke . W d
not under. tand that the d f ndant is now m1 lai in{Y of
the action of the court in r la ti on to it l v nth an tw Ifth
qn tion of fact. The fir t a prepared b r the defendant'.
couns 1, wa. as follow :
1. '' \Yhat precaution did the dee a ed take to inform
him elf of the approach of the train " ·bi h au ed the injury?"
This was modified by the court so as to read as follow :
1. '' W a the decea ed exerci ing rea. onabl are for bi.
own afety at the time he was killed 7''
The ultimate fact whi h it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove, and whi h the defendant ought to di prove
wa that the decea ed at the time he wa killed, was in
the exerci e of due are. That wa o_n e of the i ues mad
by the pl adinO' and it wa on of the ultimate fa t upon
which the plaintiff' right to recoYer nece aril d pended.
What the decea ed did to inform him If of the approach of
the train wa material onl a tending to how rea onabl
care on his part or the want of it. Hi act in that behalf
then, whatever they may have been were fact which were
merel evidential in their nature, and while they doubtle s
would have had a tenden.cy to pro-\ e rea onabl care or
th ontrary, there \\er none of them, o far a the vid nc
hows, which would have been conclu iYe of that
qu tion. The que tion then a ubmitt d b the d f ndant' oun el sought to obtain a fin Eng a to m re proative fa t , and the court. therefore properly r fu
to
rPquire the jury to an w r it. The qu tion u titut by
th court ubmitted to the jury a mat rial an
ontr lling
fa t and one whi h could
rop rly made th ubj t f a
. p rial finding.
Complaint is made to the an wers gi n by the jur t the
fourth and fifth que tion . Tho e que tion were a follow :
4. ''Did the de ea ed 1 ok to a certain if the train in
que tion wa approa hinO'?
5. ''Did the decea d li ten to a rtain if aid train wa
a pr a hing1"
To both of those questions the jury an w red: ''Don t
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know." It is perhaps questionable whether the defendant,

in order to avail itself of the objection that no proper an-

swer was made to these questions, should not have made it

at the time the verdict was returned and before the jury

were discharged, for then the jury might have been required

to complete their verdict by making proper answers. Moss

V. Priest, 19 Abb. Prac. 314. But however that may be, it

is manifest that the error, if it be one, cannot have been

prejudicial to the defendant unless it can be seen that

answers to said questions most favorable to the defendant,

which of course would have been answers in the negative,

would have constituted a finding inconsistent with the

general verdict.

If then we treat said questions as having been answered

in the negative, would such answers, either alone or in con-

nection with the answers to the other questions, have consti-

tuted a finding necessarily inconsistent with the general ver-

dict? To the second question, viz., "If the deceased had
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looked before the accident, could he have discovered the

approach of the train in time to have avoided the accident?"

the jury answered, "Yes," and to the third question, viz.,

"If the deceased had listened before the approach of said

train, could he have discovered the approach of the train

in time to have avoided the accident?" they answered, "If

he had concentrated his attention in that particular direc-

tion, yes." The first question, viz., "Was the deceased exer-

cising reasonable care for his safety at the time he was

killed?" was also answered, "Yes."

The question then presents itself, whether, if it be ad-

mitted that the deceased neither looked or listened for the

train, and also that if he had looked he could have seen it,

and if he had listened with his attention concentrated in

that direction, he could have heard it in time to avoid the

accident, such facts would constitute such conclusive proof

of contrilmtory negligence on the part of the deceased as

would have barred a recovery. Undoubtedly a failure to

look or listen, especially where it affirmatively appears that

looking or listening might have enabled the party exposed

to injury to see the train and thus avoid being injured, is

evidence tending to show negligence. But they are not

conclusive evidence, so that a charge of negligence can be

predicated upon them as a matter of law. There may be
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know." It is perhaps questionable whether the defendant,
in order to avail itself of the objection that no proper answer was made to these questions, should not have made it
at the time· the verdict was returned and before the juTy
were discharged, for then the jury might have been required
to complete their verdict by making proper answers. Moss
v. Priest, 19 Abb. Prac. 314. But however that may be, it
is manifest that the error, if it be one, cannot have been
prejudicial to the defendant unless it can be seen that
answers to said questions most favorable to the defendant,
which of 1course would have been answers in the negative,
would have constituted a finding inconsistent with the
general verdict.
If then we treat said questions as having been answered
in the negative, would such answers, either alone or in connection with the answers to the other questions, have constituted a :finding necessarily inconsistent with the general verdict~ To the second question, viz., ''If the deceased had
looked before the accident, could he have discovered the
approach of the train in time to have avoided the accident~"
the jury answered, "Yes," and to the third question, viz.,
''If the deceased had listened before the approach of said
train, could he have discovered the approach of the train
in time to have avoided the accidenU" they answered, "If
he had concentrated his attention in that particular direction, yes.'' The first question, viz., ''Was the deceased exercisinO' reasonable c'are for his safety at the time he was
killed~'' was also answered, ''Yes.''
The question then presents itself, whether, if it be admitted that the decea ed :o.either looked or listened for the
train, and al o that if he had looked he could have seen it,
and if he had listened with his attention oncentrated in
that direction, he could have h ard it in time to avoid the
a ident, uch fact would con titute such conclu ive proof
of co trilJutory ne ·ligence on th part of th d ceased as
would ha barr d a recovery. Undoubtedly a failure to
look or Ii t n, spe ially where it affirmativ ly a pears that
1 oking r Ii t ninO' might have nabl d th party expo ed
to injury to ,
the train and thus avoid b ing injur d, is
evi n
t nding to show n gliO' nee. But they are not
c n lu jve vid nc , so that a c arge of n o-li.gence can be
pr di ~ted upon th m as a matter of law. There may be
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various modifying circumstances excusing the party from

looking or listening, and that being the case, a mere failure

to look or listen cannot, as a legal conclusion, be pronounced

negligence per se.

In determining whether the special findings are inconsis-

tent with the general verdict so that the latter must be held

to be controlled by the former, this court cannot look at the

evidence. All reasonable presumptions will be entertained

in favor of the verdict, while nothing will be presumed in

aid of the special findings of fact. The inconsistency must

be irreconcilable, so as to be incapable of being removed

by any evidence admissible under the issues. Pennsylvania

Co. V. Smith, 98 Ind. 42; McComas v. Haas, 107 id. 512;

Redelsheimer v. Miller, id. 485. Under these principles it

must be held that there is no necessary or irreconcilable

inconsistency between the special findings and the general

verdict, especially in view of the fact that the jury, not-

withstanding their finding that the deceased did not look
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or listen, also found that he was in the exercise of reason-

able care.

We are of the opinion that the record contains no ma-

terial error, and the judgment of the Appellate Court will

therefore be affirmed.

Judgment afirmed}

1 Clementson, in his work on Special Verdicts and Findings, ingeniously

observes: — "The submipsion of interrogatories under the statute is a sort of

'exploratory opening' into the abdominal cavity of the general verdict (if

I may be pardoned a surgical metaphor) by which the court determines

whether the organs are sound and in place and the proper treatment to be

pursued." Page 45.

T. P.— 34
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various modifying circumstan e ex u ing the party from
looking or listening, and that bein()' the ca e, a m re failur
to look or Ii ten cannot, as a legal conclusion, be pronounced
negligence per se.
In determining whether the special finding are inconsi tent with the general verdict so that the latter must be hel
to be 'controlled by the former, thi court cannot look at th
evidence. All r easonable pre umptions will be entertained
in favor of the verdict, while nothing will be pre umed in
aid of the special findings of fact. The in con i tenc mu t
be irreconcilable so as to be incapable of being removed
by any evidence admi ible under the is ue . Pennsylv ania
Co. v . Smith, 98 Ind. 42; 1J1cComas v. Haas, 107 id. 512;
R edelsheimer v . 1J1iller, id. 485. Under the e principles it
mu t be held that there is no nece sary or irreconcilable
incon istency between the special findings and the general
verdict, especially in view of the fact that the jury, notwithstanding their finding that the decea ed did not look
or listen, al o found that he was in the exercise of reasonable care.

* * * • * * * * * *
We are of the opinion that the record contain no material error, and the judgment of the Appellate Court will
therefore be affirmed.
J udgment affirmed. 1
l
lementson in his work on Special Verdict and Findings ingeniou Jy
obi;er-ves :-''The submission of interrogatories under the ta tu e is a ort of
'exploratory opening' into the abdominal cavity of the general >eroj ct (if
I may h pardoned a surgical metaphor) by which the court determin
"betber the organs are sound and in place and the proper treatment to be
pursued.''
Page 45.
T. P.-34
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Section 2. Constitutionality.

WALKER V. NEW MEXICO AND SOUTHERN PA-

CIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.

SECTION

2.

CONSTITUTIONALITY.

Supreme Court of the United States. 1897,

165 United States, 593.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court.

The testimony was not preserved, and the case is submit-

WALKER V. NEW MEXICO AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMP ANY.

ted to us upon the pleadings, the verdict, the special findings

of fact and the judgment; and on the record as thus pre-

sented plaintiff in error rests her claim of reversal upon

Supreme Court of the United States.

1897.

three propositions : First, that the act of the territorial

legislature, authorizing special findings of fact and provid-

165 United States, 593.

ing for judgment on the special findings, if inconsistent

with the general verdict (Laws of New Mexico 1889, c. 45,

page 97), is in contravention of the Seventh Amendment to

the Constitution of the United States, which reads :

* ' In suits at common law, where the value in controversy

shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
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be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise

re-examined in any court of the United States, than accord-

ing to the rules of the common law."

First, with regard to the constitutional question, the

specific objection is thus stated in the brief :

''It is not contended, although the English authorities

would appear to warrant the contention, that at the common

law the judge might not require the jury to answer special

questions, or interrogate the jury as to the grounds upon

which their general verdict was found ; but it is most earn-

estly contended that the extent of the power of the judge,

if in his opinion the special findings or answers of the jury

to interrogatories were inconsistent with the general ver-

dict, was to set aside the general verdict and award a ven-

ire de novo, while under this statute authority is attempted

to be conferred upon the judge to render final judgment

upon tlie special findings."

We deem it unnecessary to consider the contention of

defendant in error that the territorial courts are not courts

MR. JusTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.
The testimony was not preserved, and the case is submitted to us upon the pleadings, the verdict, the special :findings
of fact and the judgment; and on the record as thus preented plaintiff in error re ts her claim of reversal upon
three propositions: Fir t, that the aict of the t erritorial
legislature, authorizing special :findings of fact and providing for judgment on the special :findings, if inconsistent
with the general verdict (Laws of New Mexico 1889, c. 45,
page 97), is in contravention of the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, which reads:
''In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of tTial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."

• • • * * * • * * *

First, with regard to the con titutional question, the
specific objection is thus stated in the brief:
"It is not contended, although the English authorities
would appear to warrant tbe contention, that at the common
law the judg might not require the jury to answer special
que tion , or interrogate the jury as to the grounds upon
which th ir g neral verdict wa folmd; but it is most earnrstly contend d that the xtent of the pow r of the judge.
if in his opinion the sp cial fin in O's or an w rs of the jury
t int rroO'atorie were i on i tent with the general verch t
t
t a. ide the g n ral v rdi t and award a venire de no o, hil un er tbi , tatute authority is a ttempted
t b ronf rr d upon th judO' to rend r :final judgment
11p n 01 '' l cial nndings."
¥ , l m jt unn rrRRary to consider t11c cont ntion of
def ndant in rro that the t rritorial ourts are not courts
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of the United States, and that the Seventh Amendment is

not operative in the Territories, for by the act of April 7,

1874,^ c. 80, 18 Stat. 27, Congress, legislating for all the

Territories, declared that no party ''shall he deprived of the

right of trial by jury in cases cognizable at common law;"

and while this may not in terms extend all the provisions

of the Seventh Amendment to the Territories, it does secure

all the rights of trial by jury as they existed at common

law.

The question is whether this act of the territorial legis-

lature in substance impairs the right of trial by jury. The

Seventh Amendment, indeed, does not attempt to regulate

matters of pleading or practice, or to determine in what way

issues shall be framed by which questions of fact are to be

submitted to a jury. Its aim is not to preserve mere mat-

ters of form and procedure but substance of right. This

requires that questions of fact in common law actions shall

be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume
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directly or indirectly to take from the jurj^ or to itself such

prerogative. So long as this substance of right is preserved

the procedure by which this result shall be reached is

wholly within the discretion of the legislature, and the

courts may not set aside any legislative provision in this

respect because the form of action — the mere manner in

which questions are submitted — is different from that which

obtained at the common law.

Now a general verdict embodies both the law and the

facts. The jury, taking the la^v as given by the court, apply

that law to the facts as they find them to be and express

their conclusions in the verdict. The power of the court

to grant a new trial if in its judgment the jury have misin-

terpreted the instructions as to the rules of law or misap-

plied them is unquestioned, as also when it appears that

there was no real evidence in support of any essential fact.

These things obtained at the common law; they do not tres-

pass upon the prerogative of the jury to determine all

questions of fact, and no one to-day doubts that such is tlie

legitimate duty and function of the court, notwithstanding

the terms of the constitutional guarantee of right of trial

by jury. Beyond this, it was not infrequent to ask from

the jury a special rather than general verdict, that is. in-

stead of a verdict for or against the plaintiff or defendant
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of th United States, and that the Seventh Amendment is
not oper tive in th Territories, for by the a t of April 7
1874, . 0, 18 tat. 27, Congre s, 1 i lating for all th
Territorie , d clared that no party" shall be leprived of the
right f trial by jury in case cognizable at common law;''
and '"hilo thi may not in term extend all the provi ion
of th eventh Amendment to the Territories, it doe s cure
all the rights of trial by jury as they existed at common
law.
The que tion is whether this act of the territorial legislature in ub tance impairs the right of trial by jury. The
Seventh Amendment, indeed, does not attempt to regulate
matt r of pleadinO' or practice, or to d termine in what way
i u
hall be framed by which que tion of fact are to be
.-ubmitte<l to a jury. Its aim i not to preserve mere matter of form and procedure but ub tance of right. This
require that que tions of fact in common law actions shall
be s ttled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume
directly or indirectly to take from the jury or to it elf such
preroo·ative. So long as this substance of right is preserved
the proc dure by which this re ult hall be reached i
wholly within the di cretion of the leO'i lature and th
ourt may not set a ide any legi lative provi ion in thi
respect be.cau. e the form of action-the mere manner in
whi h que tions are submitted-is different from that which
btained at tbe common law.
Now a general verdict embodies both the law and the
facts . The jur), taking the law as given b the court apply
that law to the fact a they find them to be and e:xpre
their conclu ion in the
rdict. Th pow r of the ourt
to grant a new trial if in it judgment the jur. have i i t rprete the in tru tion a to the rul of law or mi l plied th m i unque tion d a al o h n it ap ar th t
there wa no real eviden in u1 I ort of any
ntial fa t.
The things obtained at th common law· th . d not tr l a u on the pr r O'ati' e of the jury t d t rmine all
nn0 ti on. of fa t an no ne to-day· d u t that . u h i th
l o-itimat dut and fun ction of th court not ith tan incr
the term of the on titutional o-uarant of ri ht of trial
by jury. Beyon thi , it wa n t infr u nt t a k fr
the jury a
cial rather than gen ral ,~ r i t that i , instead of a erdi t for or again t the 1 intiff or defend nt
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embodying in a single declaration the whole conclusion of

the trial, one which found specially upon the various facts

in issue, leaving to the court the subsequent duty of determ-

ining upon such facts the relief which the law awarded to

the respective parties.

It was also a common practice when no special verdict was

demanded and when only a general verdict was returned to

interrogate the jury upon special matters of fact. Whether

or no a jury was compelled to answer such interrogations,

or whether, if it refused or failed to answer, the general

verdict would stand or not, may be questioned. Mayor &c

V. Clark, 3 Ad. & Ell. 506. But the right to propound such

interrogatories was undoubted and often recognized.

Walker v. Bailey, 65 Maine, 354; Spurr v. Shelburne, 131

Mass. 429. In the latter case the court said (page 430) :

"It is within the discretion of the presiding justice to put

inquiries to the jury as to the grounds upon which they

found their verdict, and the answers of the foreman, as-
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sented to by his fellows, may be made a part of the record,

and will have the effect of special findings of the facts stated

by him. And no exception lies to the exercise of this dis-

cretion. Dorr V. Fenno, 12 Pick. 521; Spoor v. Spooner,

12 Met. 281 ; Mair v. Basset, 117 Mass. 356 ; Lanier v. Earle,

5 Allen, 22." So that the putting of special interrogatories

to a jury and asking for specific responses thereto in addi-

tion to a general verdict is not a thing unknown to the com-

mon law, and has been recognized independently of any

statute. Beyond this we cannot shut our eyes to the fact

that in many States in the Union, in whose constitutions is

found in the most emphatic language as assertion of the

inviolability of trail by jury, are statutes similar to the one

enacted l)y the territorial legislature of New Mexico; that

those statutes have been uniformly recognized as valid, and

that a large amount of the litigation in the courts is carried

through in obedience to the provisions of such statutes. It

would certainly startle the profession to be told that such

stf^tntes contravene a constitutional requirement of the in-

vi'tlnbility of jury trials.

Indeed, the very argument of counsel for plaintiff in error

is an admission that up to a certain extent those statutes

are undoubtedly valid. That argument is practically that

when the specific findings are returned and found to be

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 13

embodying in a single declaration the whole conclusion of
the trial one which found specially upon the various facts
in i ue leaving to the court the sub equent duty of determining upon such facts the relief which the law awarded to
the re pe.dive parties.
It wa al o a common practice when no p ecial verdict was
demanded and when only a general verdict was returned to
interrogate the jury upon special matters of fact. Whether
or no a jury wa com elled to an wer such interrogations
or whether if it r efu ed or failed to an wer the general
'erdict \\oul
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7. . Clark, 3 Ad. & Ell. 506. But the right to propound such
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invi ]abilit. of trail y jury are tatut
imilar to the one
na t
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conflicting with the general verdict the court is authorized

to grant a new trial, but can do no more. But why should

the power of the court be thus limited? If the facts as spec-

ially found compel a judg-ment in one way, why should not

the court be permitted to apply the law to the facts as thus

found? It certainly does so when a special verdict is re-

turned. ^^^^en a general verdict is returned and the court

determines that the jury have either misinterpreted or mis-

applied the law the only remedy is the award of a new trial,

because the constitutional provision forbids it to find the

facts. But when the facts are found and it is obvious from

the inconsistency between the facts as found and the general

verdict that, in the latter, the jury have misinterpreted or

misapplied the law, what constitutional mandate requires

that all should be set aside and a new inquiry made of an-

other jury? Of what significance is a question as to a

specific fact? Of what avail are special interrogatories

and special findings thereon if all that is to result there-
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from is a new trial, which the court might grant if it were

of opinion that the general verdict contained a wrong in-

terpretation or application of the rules of law? Indeed, the

very thought and value of special interrogatories is to

avoid the necessity of setting aside a verdict and a new trial

— to end the controversy so far as the trial court is con-

cerned upon that single response from the jury.

We are clearly of opinion that this territorial statute does

not infringe any constitutional provision, and that it is

within the power of the legislature of a Territory to pro-

vide that on a trial of a common law action the court may,

in addition to the general verdict, require specific answers

to special interrogatories, and, when a conflict is found

between the two, render such judgment as the answers to

the special questions compel.

**********

These are all the questions in the case, and, finding no

error in the record, the judgment is

Affirmed.
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confli ting with the general verdict the court i authorized
to grant a new trial but an do no more.
ut why hould
the pow r of the court be thu limited . If the fact a pecially found omp 1 a jud 0 ment in one way, why ·houl not
the court be permitt d to apply the law to the fact a thus
found. It certainly do
o when a pecial v rdict i return d. vVhen a .o· neral -verdict i returned and tbe court
rlet rmine that the jur. have either mi interpreted or misapplied the law the only i·emedy i the award of a new trial,
l ecau e the con titutional I rovi ion forbid it to find the
fact . But when the fact are found and it i obviou from
the incon istency between the fact a found and the general
'?erdict that, in the latter the jury have mi interpreted or
mi applied the law, what ,non titutional mandate requires
that all hould be et a ide and a new inquiry made of another jury~ Of what i.o·nificance i a que tion a to a
pecific fact. Of what avail are spe ial interrogatories
and pecial finding. thereon if all that i to re ult therefrom is a new trial which the court mi()"ht grant if it were
of opinion that the eneral 'erdict contained a wron()' interpretation or application of the rule of law. Indeed the
v ry thought and value of special interrogatorie is to
avoid th nece sity of etting a ide a verdi.ct and an w trial
-to end the controYer y so far as the trial ourt i conrned upon that ingle response from the jur .
We are clearl of opinion that thi territorial tatute does
not infringe any con titutional proYi ion, and that it is
within the power of the 1 o-i lature of a Territory to proYide that on a trial of a ommon law action the court may,
in addition to the en ral verdict, r quire p cifi an wers
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l etw en the two, r nder uch judgment as the an wers to
the
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* * * * * * * * • •
Th se are all the que tion in the case, and findin()' no
rrror in the re ord, t e judgment is
Affirmed.
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Section 3. Argument and Instructions as to Proper

Answers.

SECTION
RYAN V. ROCKFORD INSURANCE COMPANY.

3.

ARGUMENT

AND

INSTRUCTIONS

AS

TO

PROPER

ANSWERS.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 1890,

77 Wisconsin, 611.

Cassoday, J. The learned counsel for the defendant

strenuously contends that the evidence is insufficient to sup-

RYAN V. ROCKFORD INSURANCE COMPANY.

port the general verdict or any of the special findings in

favor of the plaintiff. The view we have taken of the case

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

1890.

renders it unnecessary for us to determine that question.

77 Wisconsin, 611.

The statute requires the court to direct the jury to find a

special verdict when requested as prescribed. Sec. 2858,

R. S. Such verdict must ''be prepared by the court in the

form of questions in writing, relating only to material is-

sues of fact and admitting a direct answer, to which the

jury shall make answer in writing. The court may also

direct the jury, if they render a general verdict, to find in

writing upon any particular question of fact to he stated as
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aforesaid." Ibid. This last provision is applicable to

the case at bar. The purpose of thus submitting particu-

lar controverted questions of fact is to secure a direct an-

swer free from any bias or prejudice in favor of or against

either party. It is a wise provision in certain cases when

properly administered. It has often been demonstrated

in the trial of causes that the non-expert juryman is more

liable than the experienced lawyer or judge to be led away

from the material issues of fact involved by some collateral

circumstance of little or no significance, or by sympathy,

bias, or prejudice; and hence it is common practice for

courts, in the submission of such particular questions and

special verdicts, to charge the jury, in effect, that they have

nothing to do with, and must not consider the effect which

their answers may have upon, the controversy, or the par-

ties. The learned trial judge, when in health, has fre-

quently so charged. It is certainly a very proper thing to

do when the ])usiiiess or reputation of either party is such

as to naturally stimulate a bias in favor of the one party

or the oilier. It is true tliat jui-ies, under such a charge,

J.

The learned .counsel for the defendant
strenuously contend that the e\ idence is insufficient to support the general verdict or any of the special findings in
favor of the plaintiff. The view we have taken of the case
renders it unnecessary for us to determine that question.
The statute requires the court to direct the jury to find a
special verdict when requested as prescribed. Sec. 2858,
R. S. Such verdict must ''be prepared by the court in the
form of question in writing, relating only to material isues of faict and admitting a direct answer, to which the
jury shall make answer in writing.
The court may also
direct the jury, if they render a general verdict , to find in
writing upon any particular question of fact to be stated as
aforesaid."
Ibid.
This last provision is applicable to
the case at bar. The purpose of thus submitting particular controverted que tions of fact i to secure a direct answer free from any bias or prejudice in favor of or against
ither party. It is a wise provi ion in certain case when
properly admini tered. It has often been demon trated
1n the trial of an , that the non-expert juryman is more
liable than th xp ri n red ]awy r or jud<>' to b 1 d away
from the mat rial L . u . of fact invoh ed b. some ollateral
ircum tan
of litt1 or no . ignificanc , or by sympathy,
bia , or pr jndir ; and h nc it is common pra tic for
ourt. , in th submi. , ion of su h particular qu stion and
. p ial v rdi ts, t barp- the jury in eff ct, that they have
nothin to do with, and mu . t n t onsi r the effe t which
th ir an. w rs ma.: ha upon , th co trov rsy, or the parti . .
Th ] arn d tri l jn fo;r ' h n jn h alth, ha frequ ntly . o <'h< r g Nl. It i : r rt~in1.v v ry r p r tbin<>' to
clo wh n h lrn. in .. c:; or l' rrntati n of ith r party i . u h
Cl.'
n n tnr n ll ~' . timnlnt n 1 ifl . inf· v r of th
n party
or the ot11 'L It i.' tru that ju ·i s, un rr . u h
harge,
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sometimes return inconsistent answers ; but it is usually be-

cause such is the honest result of their unbiased judgment

upon different branches of the evidence.

In the case at bar the learned trial judge seems to have

been particularly anxious to prevent such inconsistent an-

swers ; and hence he explained to the jury what different an-

swers to each particular question so submitted would be con-

sistent, and what inconsistent, with a general verdict in

favor of one or the other party. This was peculiarly cal-

culated to secure special answers which would be consistent

with a general verdict rather than in accordance with the

weight of evidence upon each of such particular questions.

The effect of such instructions was very much the same as

though the court had charged the jury that after they had

determined upon a general verdict then they should answer

the particular questions submitted in the way they had thus

been informed would be consistent with such general ver-

dict. This was misleading, and well calculated to defeat

sion.
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the very object of the statute in authorizing such submis-

By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is re-

versed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY V. GORE.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1903.

202 Illinois, 188.

Mr. Justice Boggs delivered the opinion of the court.

**********
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ometimes return incon istent an wers; but it is usually beau e such i the honest re ult of their unbiased judgment
upon different branches of the eYidence.
In the case at bar the learned trial judge seems to have
been particularly anxious to prm ent such inconsistent answers; and hence he explained to the jury what different answers to each particular que tion o submitted would be consistent, and what inconsistent, with a general verdict in
favor of one or the other party. This was peculiarly calculated to secure special answers which would be consi tent
with a general verdict rather than in accordance with the
weight of evidence upon each of such particular questions.
The effect of such instructions was very much the same as
though the court had char ·ed the jury that after they had
determined upon a general verdict then they should answer
the particular questions ubmitted in the way they had thus
been informed would be consistent with such general verdict.
This was misleading, and well calculated to defeat
the very object of the statute in authorizing such submis-

We do not conceive that it was improper practice to per-

mit counsel for appellee to read the special interrogatories

'lOn.

to the jury, and in connection therewith discuss the evi-

dence, for the purpose of convincing the jury that under the

evidence the interrogatories should be answered in the af-

firmative or in the negative, as the case might be. The ob-

By the Court.-The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

jection is not that the avgiinieut of counsel appealed to the

prejudice of the jurors or to their sympathies, or that it

CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY V. GORE.
Sup reme Court of Illinois.

1903.

202 Illinois, 188.

MR. J usTICE BoGGS delivered the opinion of the court.
* * * * * * * * * *
\Ve do not conceive t at it wa improper practi to permit conn el for appellee to read the speicial interroo-atories
t the jur. and in o n tion therewit di 1
the e id n
for the purpo e of convin ing the jury that under the
eYid n e the interro ·atories should be an wered in the af·ati e as the ca e mi t be. The obfirmati-ve r in th
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transcended legitimate grounds of debate, but simply that

it was error to allow counsel to read the interrogatories to

the jury and discuss the evidence which bore upon the an-

swers which counsel conceived should be made by the jury

thereto. The statute which authorizes the submission of

special questions of fact to be answered by a jury requires

that such questions shall be stated to the jury in writing,

and ' ' shall be submitted by the party requesting the same,

to the adverse party before the commencement of the argu-

ment to the jury." The end designed to be attained by the

argument of counsel is to lead the jury to the proper de-

cision of or answer to the issues made by the pleadings. It

was entirely legitimate for counsel to review the evidenc

and suggest to the jury what, under the proof, their general

verdict should be, and none the less to suggest the answers

which, in the view of counsel, the evidence demanded should

be returned to the special interrogatories. In Timins v.

Chicago, etc., Railroad Co., 72 Iowa, 94, it was said: "It
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is competent for an attorney to read special interrogatories

to the jury, and to discuss the evidence applicable thereto,

and to suggest the answers which in his judgment ought to

be rendered."

The judgment of the Appellate Court must be and is

affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

CAPITAL CITY BANK V. WAKEFIELD.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 1891.

83 Iowa. 46.

ItIVEN, J.

IV. At the conclusion of the instructions the court sub-

mitted the three special interrogatories, with this instruc-

tion. "You will decide upon them in the same manner as

transcended legitimate grounds of debate, but simply that
it wa error to allow counsel to read the interrogatories to
the jury and discuss the evidence whid1 bore upon the anwers which counsel conceived bould be made by the jury
thereto.
The statute which authorizes the submi sion of
pecial que tions of fact to be answered by a jury requires
that uch questions shall be stated to the jury in writing,
and '' hall be submitted by the party reque ting the same,
to the adverse party before the commencement of the argument to the jury.'' The end designed to be attained by the
argument of counsel is to lead the jury to the proper decision of or answer to the issues made by the pleadings. It
wa entirely leO'itimate for counsel to review the evidenc<
and uggest to the jury what, under the proof, their general
verdi.ct should be, and none the les to uggest the an wers
which, in the view of coun el, the evidence demanded should
be returned to the special interrogatories.
In T iniin v.
Chicago, etc., Railroad Co., 72 Iowa, 94, it was said : "It
is competent for an attorney to read special interrogatorie.
to the jury, and to discuss the evidence applicable thereto,
and to uggest the an wers which in his judgment ought to
be rendered.''

* • • * • • • • • *

your general verdict, and answer the same. You will be

careful, however, that these answers are in harmony with

and suj)port your general verdict." The appellant con-

The judgment of the Appellate Court must be and is
affirmed.
Judgment affinned.

CAPITAL CITY BANK V. WAKEFIELD.
Supreme Court of Iowa.

1891.

83 Iowa. 46.
GIVEN,

J. •

•

•

•

•

>!(<

*

*

•

•

•

•

•

•

TV. At the on lusi n of th instru tion th court subrnitt01 tlw thr sp ria1 in rr gatori . with tbi in truci n. '' ou will d j(l upon th m in the ame manner as
•Tc ur g n ral v rdict ano answ r th
am . You will be
r•, r fnl, howev0r, tha th . e an. w r . arr i
harmony with
an<l . upport your
n ral verdict."
The appellant con('f
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tends that this instruction ' ' requires the jury to answer the

interrogatories, not with reference to the facts of the case

as shown by the evidence, but with reference to their gen-

eral verdict only." That the findings and verdict should

be in harmony is not questioned, nor that the court may in-

struct the jury to exercise care in that respect. Special

findings are of ultimate material facts only, and, when

found, the result — the general verdict — follows therefrom.

It is clear that a jury should first decide from the evidence

what the ultimate facts are; that is, the essential facts

which control as to what the verdict should be. With these

facts found, they should then decide to what result — what

general verdict — they lead. The jury were sworn to de-

cide the case according to the law as given by the court, and

the evidence. The general tenor of previous instructions

is that they should decide the case upon the evidence, and

then they were specifically told that they must decide upon

these special questions in the same manner as their general
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verdict. Thus far the jury could be in no doubt but that

they were to decide the special questions from the evidence.

The caution which follows could not lead to a different con-

clusion. True, it would have been more exactly correct if

it had cautioned them to be careful that their general ver-

dict was in harmony with the answers, as the answers con-

trol ; but we do not think, in view of what preceded, that the

jury could have understood that they were to decide upon

their answers to the special interrogatories from anything

but the evidence. People v. Murray, 52 Mich. 289; 17 N.

W. Rep. 843.

Our conclusion upon the whole record is that the judg-

ment of the district court should be affirmed.

tends that thi instruction "r quir s the jury to an wer the
interrogatorie , not with refer nee to the fa t of the ca e
as shown by the evidence, but with reference to their general verdict only.'' That the finding and verdict should
be in harmon i not que tioned, nor that the court may inSpecial
. truct the jury to exerci e care in that re pect.
finding are of ultimate material fact only, and, when
found, the re ult-the general verdict-follow , therefrom.
It is clear that a jury hould fir . t decide from the evidence
what tbe ultimate fact are; that is, the e ·ential facts
which control a to what the verdict hould be. With these
facts found, the) hould then d cide to what re ult-what
general verdict-they lead.
The jury were worn to decide the ca e according to the law a given by th court, and
the evidence. The general tenor of previou in tructions
is that they should decide the case upon the evidence, and
then the were pecifically told that hey mu t decide upon
the e pecial que tion in the ame manner a their general
verdict. Thu far the jury could be in no doubt but that
they were to decide the pecial que tions from the evidence.
The caution which follow could not lead to a different conlu ion. True it would have been more exactly correct if
it had cautioned them to be areful that their general verdict wa in harmony with the an wer , a the an wers control; but w do not think, in view of what preceded, that the
jury could have under tood that they were to decide upon
their answ rs to the pecial interrocratories from an. thing
but the evidence. P eo ple v . !lfiirray 52 :Mich. 2 9; 17 N.
W. Rep. 843.
Our conclu ion upon the whole record i that the judgment of the di trict court should be affirmed.
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COFFEYVILLE VITRIFIED BRICK COMPANY

V. ZIMMERMAN.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1900.

61 Kansas, 750.

COFFEYVILLE VITRIF I ED BRICK COMPANY
V. ZI~1MERMAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Smith, J. : This was an action for damages by the plain-

tiffs below, the father and mother of Arthur Zimmerman,

Supreme Court of Kansas.

1900.

who was killed by the falling of an embankment under which

he was at work while in the employ of plaintiff in error.

61 J(ansas, 750.

The action was brought under section 418, chapter 95, Gen-

eral Statutes of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1899, Sec. 4686), and there

was a verdict and judgment for plaintiffs. One of the in-

structions given by the court to the jury, over the objection

of plaintiff in error, was as follows :

''Your answers and findings should be consistent each

with the other, and should be consistent with the general

verdict, in order that any amount, if any you find in favor

of the plaintiff, must be consistent and in harmony with
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the answers that you make to these special questions.

Whatever verdict may be returned in this case, if not for

the defendant, it is largely upon the answers you make to

these questions, and they should be consistent each with the

other. ' '

It was clearly erroneous for the court to require the jury

to make their answers to the particular questions of fact

harmonize with the general verdict, or to suggest that the

findings should be consistent each with the other. Each of

he questions propounded should be answered truthfully, in

accordance with the preponderance of evidence upon the

question submitted. Under our statute, when the special

finding of facts is inconsistent with the general verdict, the

former controls the latter, and the court may give judgment

acoordingly. (Gen. Stat. 1897, ch. 95, §297; Gen.' Stat.

1899, § 4550.) The questions should be answered without

anv reference to their effect on the general verdict. (Dry

Goods Co. V. Kahn, 53 Kan. 274, 36 Pac. 327.)

For the error in the instruction given, the judgment of

the court below will be reversed and a new trial ordered.

The opinion of the cour t was delivered by
SMITH, J.: This was an action fo r damages by the plaintiffs below, the f ather and mother of Arthur Zimmerman,
who was killed by the falling of an embankment under which
he was at work while in the employ of plaintiff in error.
The action was brought under section 418, chapter 95, General S tatutes of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1899, Sec. 4686), and there
was a verdict and judgment for plaintiffs. One of the instructions given by the court to the jury, over the objection
of plaintiff in error, was as follows :
' 'Your answers and findings should be consistent each
with the other, and should be consistent with the general
ver dict, in order that any amount, if any you find in favor
of the plaintiff, mu t be consistent and in harmony with
the answer that you make to these special ques tions.
WhateYer verdict may be returned in this case, if not for
the defendant, it is largely upon the answers you make to
these questions, and they hould be consistent each with the
other. "
It was clearly erroneous for the court to require the jury
to make their answers to the particular questions of fact
harmonize with the general verdict, or to suggest that the
findino- hould be ieonsi ten·t ea h with the other. Each of
h qu . ti on propounded . h ould be answered truthfully, in
a ordan with the pr pond ranee of evidence upon the
CJ • ti n su mitted.
Under our statut , when the sp cial
findin · of fa t. is in on ist ent with the g neral ver dict , the
f r r ontrol. th latt r , and th court may giv judgment
ro rding1y.
(G n. tat. 1807 ch. 95, ~ 297; Gen. Stat.
1 99 § 455 . )
The qu . tions l ould be answer d without
n y r f r nr t their ff t on tb g neral verdict.
(Dry
oods o. v . K ahn 5
an. 274, 6 Pac. 27.)
* * • * * * * * * •
11"" r th rr r in th irn;;tru ti n given, the judgment of
tl
urt bel w will be rever ed and a new trial ordered.
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Section 4. Form of Interrogatories.

LOUISVILLE, NEW ALBANY & CHICAGO EAILWAY

SECTION

COMPANY V. WORLEY.

4.

FORM OF INTERROGATORIES.

Supreme Court of Indiana. 1886.

107 Indiana, 320.

Elliott^ J. * * *

**********

LOUISVILLE, NEW LBANY & CHI GO RAILWAY
COMP ANY V. WORLEY.

The appellant submitted to tlie court interrogatories, and

Supreme Court of Indiana.

asked that they should be submitted to the jury, but the

1886.

court, instead of submitting those asked by the appellant,

107 Indiana, 320.

prepared and submitted interrogatories of its own. The

prayer for the submission of the interrogatories to the jury

was not a proper one, for the court was not asked to in-

struct the jury to answer the interrogatories in the event

ELLIOTT,

that they returned a general verdict. Taylor v. Bruk,

91 Ind. 252.

We have, however, examined the interrogatories, and

find that those propounded by the court substantially cov-
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ered those asked by the appellant, so far as they were com-

petent and material. Our decisions are that it is proper

for the trial court to revise interrogatories submitted by the

parties, and to prepare and propound for itself proper in-

terrogatories to the jury. Killian v. Eigenmann, 57 Ind.

480.

The 'Court submitted this interrogatory. ''Could the de-

fendant have lawfully fenced its track at the point where

said mules entered upon the track?" It is contended that

this interrogatory is not a proper one, as it calls upon the

jury to decide a question of law, and not of fact, and thus

casts upon them a duty that the court should perform. We

can perceive no answer to this contention, and appellee's

counsel have not suggested any. Our statute makes it the

duty of the court to submit to the jury only questions of

fact, and the question here submitted is, it seems to us, one

of law. The purpose of addressing interrogatories to

juries is to elicit de<;isions upon matters of fact, and not to

ask them to state conclusions of law. Whether the track

of a railroad company is, or is not, lawfully fenced, is a mere

J. • * •
* * • • * * * * * •

The appellant submitted to the court interrogatorie , and
a ked that they should be ubmitted to the jury, but the
court, instead of submitting tho e a ked by the appellant
l repared and ubmitted interrogatories of it own.
The
prayer for the ubmi sion of the interrogatories to the jury
''a not a proper one for the court wa, not a ked to in. truct the jury to an wer the interrogatories in the event
that they returned a general verdict.
Taylor v. Bruk,
01 Ind. 252.
We have however examined the interroO'atories, and
find that tho e propounded by the court sub tantiall co red tho e a ked by the appellant, o far a they were competent and mat rial.
Our de i ions are that it is proper
for the trial court to revi e interrogatorie ubmitted by the
: I artie , and to I repare and propound for it elf proper interrogatori to the jury. Killian v. Eigenmann, 57 Ind.
480.

The .court ubmitted this interrogatory. ''Could the def ndant hav lawfully fenced it track at the point where
. aid mul . nter d 111 on the track. ' It i. c nt nded that
thi interroO'ator~T i not a roper one a it all u on the
junr to 1 cid a que tion f law and not of fa t and thus
<'a. t up n them a duty that the court hould p rf rm. We
can p r ive no an w r to thi contention and a p ll
un 1 have not ug e. t tl an..
ur tatut mak it the
duty of th ourt t
ul mit t th jnr. onl. qu ti ns of
fact and the que. tion h r . ubrnitt di it seem to
one
f law.
Th purp
of ad 1r . ing; interro atorie to
jnri i to li it d i. i n.._ up n matt r . f fa t and not to
n. k th m to . tat oncln. 1 n. of law. \\h t er the track
of a r, ilr ad rom1 an: i. or i not, lawfully f need is a mere
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conclusion to be deduced from the facts. We have re-

peatedly decided that parties are entitled in special verdicts

and in special findings to a statement of the specific facts,

and that statements of mere conclusions will not be suffi-

cient. Pittshurg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Spencer, 98 Ind. 186,

and authorities cited; Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Batch,

105 Ind. 93 ; Indianapolis, etc., R. W. Co. v. Bush, 101 Ind.

582 ; Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151.

That principle governs here. The jury should be re-

quired to state facts, and not conclusions of law, and the an-

swer to the question propounded in this instance could be, as

it was, nothing more than the statement of the jury's con-

clusion as to whether the railroad company could lawfully

fence its track at the place where the mules entered upon it.

Whether it could lawfully fence at that place depended upon

the character and surroundings, and when these are fixed

the question whether it could be lawfully fenced becomes

one of law for the decision of the court. There are many
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facts which make it improper for a railroad company to

fence, as, for instance, the fact that to fence would inter-

fere with the discharge of the company's duty to tlie public,

or would make the place dangerous to its servants, and it

is for the jury to state the facts, leaving the law to be ap-

plied by the court to the facts found by the jury.

It was held in the case of Jeffersonville etc., R. R. Co. v.

Underhill, 40 Ind. 229, that an allegation that the railroad

was ''not fenced according to law," was the statement of

a legal conclusion, and this general principle is declared in

many cases. Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bishop, 29 Ind.

202; Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 35 Ind. 380;

Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brown, 44 Ind. 409; Singer

Manufacturing Co. v. E finger, 79 Ind. 264.

We think it clear on principle and authority that the court

erred in ; iilimitting the interrogatory under immediate

mention to the jury. In view of the fact that the court re-

jected interrogatories submitted by the appellant, and un-

dertook to substitute those of its own, the error must be re-

garded as a material one. It would defeat the manifest

purpose of the statute to allow conclusions of law, rather

than statements of facts, to be made by the jury, for the

purpose of the statute is to get upon record the specific and

TRIAL PRACTICE
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conclusion to be deduced from the facts .
We have r epeatedly decided that parties are entitled in special verdicts
and in special findings to a statement of the specific facts,
and that statements of mere conclusions will not be sufficient.
Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Spencer, 98 Ind. 186,
and authorities cited; Louisville, etc., R . W. Co. v. B alch,
105 Ind. 93; I ndianapolis, etc., R . W . Co . v . Bush, 101 Ind.
582; Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co . v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151.
That pr inciple governs here.
The j ury should be required to st ate facts, and not conclusions of law, and the answer to the question propounded in this instance could be, as
it was, nothing more than the statement of the jury's conclusion as to whether the railroad company could lawfully
f ence its track at the place where the mules entered upon it.
Whether it could lawfully fence at that place depended upon
the character and surroundings, and when these are fixed
the question whether it could be lawfully fenced becomes
one of law for the decision of the court. There ar e many
facts which make it improper for a railroad company to
fence, as, for in tance, the fact that to fence would interfere with the discharge of the company's duty to the public,
or would make the place dangerous to its servants, and it
is for the jury to state the facts, leavjng the law to be applied by the court to the facts found by the jury.
It was held in the case of Jeffersonville etc., R. R. Co. v.
Underhill, 40 Ind. 229, that an allegation that the railroad
wa ''not fenced according to law,'' was the statement of
a 1 gal conclu ion, and this general principle is declared in
many •Ca e, . Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co . v. Bishop, 29 Ind.
202; lndianapoli , etc., R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 35 Ind. 380;
Pittsb1u-gh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brown, 44 Ind. 409 ; Singer
Mamtfacturing Co. v. Effinger, 79 Ind. 264.
W think it clear on principle and authority that the court
rr a in ~ '1hmitting the interrogatory under immediate
ntion t t h jury. In view of t e fact that the cour t rej et d jut JT ,o·atories submitted by the app llant, and un(l •rto k to . ubstitute those of its own, the error mu t be regar ]
as a material one. It would def at the manifest
pu rp ,
f the statut to allow con lu ion of law, rather
than .. tat m nts of fa t , to be made by th jury, for the
ur
f the statute is to get upon record the specific and
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material facts in the form of answers to interrogatories.

Judgment reversed.

PECIAL INTERROGATORIES

541

material facts in the form of answers to interrogatories.
Judgment reversed.

CHICAGO & ALTON KAILROAD COMPANY

V. HARRINGTON.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1901.

192 Illinois, 9.

The East St. Louis freight yard of the Toledo, St. Louis

and Kansas City railroad, (^commonly called the *' Clover

Leaf,") is what is called a stub-yard, and the only way of

getting into and from the yard with cars is from the east

end of it. A main or lead track runs from the east end of

CHICAGO & .ALTON RAILROAD COMP ANY
V. HARRINGTON.

the yard to the freight house at the west end. From this

main or lead track a number of switches branch off wester-

ly, on which are received freight cars coming from other

Supreme Court of Illinois.

1901.

roads, at all hours of the day and night. The switch

tracks are connected with the main or lead track by

192 Illinois, 9.

switches.

On January 27, 1897, early in the morning, and while it
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was yet dark and was snowing, a switch crew of the appel-

lant company transferred a number of cars of perishable

freight from appellant's road to a switch track of the Clov-

er Leaf road, and, in doing so, omitted to place the cars a

sufificient distance down the switch track to allow a lO'Como-

tive and cars to pass along the lead track without coming in

contact with the last car so placed on the switch track, and

also omitted to close the switch, but left it open.

Several hours before the servants of the appellant com-

pany had thus transferred its cars to a switch track of the

Clover Leaf road, a switching crew of the Clover Leaf road

had gone out of the yard up to Madison, or Miller's Station,

to take some cars, and returned to the freight yard of the

Clover Leaf road after appellant's switching crew had fin-

ished their work and left the yard. The switching crew of

the Clover Leaf road, which thus entered the freight yard

between four and six o'clock on the morning of January 27,

1897, consisted of five men. Of these five men one was the

The East St. Louis freight yard of the Toledo, St. Louis
and Kansas ity railroad, (1commonly called the ''Clover
Leaf,") is what i call d a stub-yard, and the only way of
o·etting into and from the yard with car is from the east
nd of it. A main or lead track run from the east end of
the yard to the freight hou e at the we t end. From this
main or lead track a number of witches bran h off westerly, on which are received freight .cars coming from other
roads, at all hours of the day and night.
The switch
· ra ks are connected with the main or lead track by
,'witche .
On January 27, 1897, early in the morning, and while it
wa yet dark and wa snowing, a swit h crew of the appellant company transferred a number of ar of perishable
frei ht from appellant' road to a witch track of the Clover L af road, and, in doing o omitted to place the cars a
ufficient di tance down the witch tra k to allow a }o,comotive and car to pa along the 1 ad tra k without oming in
contact with the la"' t car o pla ed on the wit h tra k and
al o omitt d to lo the witch but 1 ft it open.
Sev ral hour befor the ervant of the appellant compan had thu tran f err d it ar to a wit h track of the
lo r L af roa a witching r w of th
lov r Leaf road
had o-on out of the yard up to adi on r Miller' Station,
to take rn ars and r turn d t th fr io-ht yard of the
lo r L af roa after pp llant' witchino- crew had :fini h d th ir work nd 1 ft th yar . The swit hino- er w f
the lo r Leaf r d wl i h thu nt r d the fr iO'bt vard
betw en four an ix o' lo k on th mornino- f January 27,
1 97 on i t d of fly m n.
f th e five men one was the
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fireman and one was the engineer. Besides the fireman

and engineer there was a foreman and there were also two

helpers. Appellee was one of these helpers. When the

switching crew of the Clover Leaf road come down the lead

track, two freight cars were fastened to the locomotive

ahead of it, so that the two freight cars were pushed for-

ward by the locomotive. When the switching crew en-

tered the freight yard, the engineer and fireman were in

their proper places upon the locomotive. The foreman was

in the cab of the engine. One of the helpers was on top of

the forward car of the two cars which were pushed by the

engine. Appellee, the other helper, was standing upon the

foot-board in front of the engine and between the engine

and the second or last of the two cars. The engineer was

named Neff. The fireman was named Thomas or Thompson.

The foreman was named Donahue. The helper on the

forward car was named Fox. They were shoving the two

cars westward to the freight house, and it was the intention
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to cut the cars off and leave them.

Wlien the servants of the appellant transferred appel-

lant's cars, containing perishable freight, from appellant's

road to one of the switchtracks of the Clover Leaf road in

the freight yard of the latter, they left the switch open, and

the hindmost of appellant's cars projected over from the

side switch, upon which said cars stood, on to the main or

lead track. The result was that, when the engine and the

two cars ahead of it, which the switching crew of the Clover

Leaf road were pushing, reached the switch track on which

appellant's servants had left its cars, the cars, so pushed

by the Clover Leaf switching crew, ran into and collided

with appellant's cars. The result of this collision was that

the locomotive, on the front foot-board of which appellee

was riding, and the rear car of the two cars in front of the

locomotive, came together, breaking appellee's legs, tearing

off a finger, and otherwise severely injuring him.

The negligence, charged in the declaration against the

servants of appellant, was that they left the cars, contain-

ing perishable freight, on the switch track, and neglected to

close the switch.

**********

Mr. Justice Magruder delivered the opinion of the court.
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Besides the fireman
fireman and one was the engineer.
and engineer there was a for em an and there were also two
helpers. Appellee was one of these helpers. When the
switching crew of the Clover Leaf road come down the lead
track, two freight cars were fastened to the locomotive
ahead of it, so that the two fTeight cars were pushed forward by the locomotive.
When the switching crew entered the freight yard, the engineer and fireman were in
their proper places upon the locomotive. The foreman was
in the cab of the engine. One of the helpers was on top of
the forward car of the two cars which were pushed by the
engine. Appellee, the other helper, was standing upon the
foot-board in front of the engine and between the engine
and the second or last of the two cars. The engineer was
named Neff. The fireman was named Thomas or Thompson.
The foreman was named Donahue.
The helper on the
forward car was named Fox. They were shoving the two
cars westward to the freight house, and it was the intention
to cut the cars off and leave them.
When the servants of the appellant transferred appellant's cars, containing perishable freight, from appellant's
road to one of the switch track of the Clover Leaf road in
the freight yard of the latter, they left the switch open, and
the hindmo t of appellant's cars projected over from the
side switch, upon which said cars stood, on to the main or
lead track. The result was that, when the enO'ine and the
two cars ahead of it, which the switching crew of the Clover
Leaf road were pushing, reached the switch track on which
appellant's servants had left its cars, the cars, o pushed
hy the lover L eaf witching er w, ran into and ol1ided
with appellant' cars. The result of this colli ion was that
the locomotive, on the front foot-board of which appellee
was ridinO', and the rear car of the two car in front of the
Jo e motiv , c me torr th r, br aking app 11 e' legs, tearing
off finO' r and otherwi e v r ly injurinrr him.
h n gliO'
harO' d in th d 1 r tion a ainst the
.· rvant f a l llant, wa that they left the car , ontaini nh peri. bah] fr irrht, n the witch track, and neglected to
·l . the witch.

MR.

JusTrcE

M

R DER

liv r

th opinion of the court.

• • • • • • • • • •
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Fourth — An objection is also made by appellant to the

action taken by tlie trial court in reference to tbe special in-

terrogatories submitted to the jury, calling for special find-

ings upon their part.

In the first place, the court declined to give the interroga-

tories submitted by appellant, and prepared interrogatories

of its own motion, which were submitted. This was not

error; we have decided that a trial court may refuse re-

quests for special findings, and substitute others on its own

motion. {Chicago <f Alton Railroad Co. v. Pearson, 184

111. 386; Norton v. VoMe, 158 id. 402).

By the first interrogatory submitted by appellant, the

jury were asked whether it would not have been safer, if

appellee had placed himself on the rear foot-board of the

engine on the night in question, as the train was entering

the yard of the Clover Leaf. This interrogatory was prop-

erly refused, because an affirmative answer to it could not

have controlled a general verdict had it been in favor of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

appellee. (Chicago d Northive stern Bailway Co., C. Ditn-

leavy, 129 111. l.'^S). The second interrogatory, which re-

quired the jury to find whether *'the act of plaintitf, in

negligently placing himself on the foot-board of the engine

next to the car," contributed to cause the injurj^ was prop-

erly refused because it assumed that appellee was negli-

gent. The third interrogatory which required the jury

to find whether the accident to the plaintiff was caused by

the negligence of one Fox, who was on the first car of the

train, was properly refused, because it called for an eviden-

tiary fact only, and so, could not have controlled

a general verdict for appellee. Upon this sub-

ject the Appellate Court in deciding this case well

say: ''Although Fox and appellee were fellow-ser-

vants of a common master, and engaged in the same

line of duty, yet that master, was not appellant; hence the

fact, that they were fellow-servants, could not be availed of

by appellant to protect itself against the negligence of Fox,

if appellant's negligence contributed to the injury. If the

inquiry had been whether the negligeu'ce of Fox was the sole

cause of the injury, the condition of the matter would have

been different from what it now is. Although the negli-

gence of Fox might have caused the injury, yet the negli-

gence of the-servants of appellant might also have contrib-

Fourth-An objection is al o made by appellant to the
a tion taken by the trial court in reference to the special int rrogatories submitted to the jury calling for pecial findings upon their part.
In the first pla e, the court declined to gi' e the interro atorie submitted by appellant, and prepar d interrogatorie
of it · own motion which were submitted.
This was not
error; we have decided that a trial court may refuse requ t for special findjng and substitute others on its own
motion.
(Chicag o & Alton Railroad Co. v. P earson, 184
Ill. 3 6; Norton . l olzke, 15 id. 402).
B; the first interrogatory ubmitted by appellant, the
jury were asked whether it would not have been safer, if
appellee had placed him elf on the rear foot-board of the
engine on tbe nio-bt in que tion as the train wa entering
the yard of the loYer Leaf. This interrogatory was properly r fu ed becau e an affirmative an wer to it could not
ha e controlled a o·eneral verdict had it be n in favor of
a1 pellee.
(Chicago cf; N orthil estern Raili ay Co., C. Ditnlea y 129 Ill. 1 3). The second interrogatory which required the jury to find whether ''the act of plaintiff, in
ne Jig ntl~ pla ing him elf on the foot-board of the engine
next to the car," contributed to cause the injury, was proper!. refused because it assumed that app llee was negligent.
The third interrogatory which required the jur)"
to find whether the accident to the plaintiff "a caused by
the negligence of one Fox, who wa on the fir t car of th
train was properly refu ed, because it called for an evidentiar. fact only and so could not have controlled
Upon thi
uba general verdict for appellee.
je t the Appellate
ourt in deciding this ca e w 11
ay:
''Although Fox and appellee were f llow- ervant of a common ma ter, and engaged in th
am
line of duty, yet that master wa not appellant; hence the
fa t, that they w re fellow- er ants could not be availed of
bv a.pp llant to prote tit If again t th n o-lio-ence of Fox
if appellant' neo-lio- n e contributed to h injury. If th
inqui y had b n h th r th ne 1i n ... e of Fox wa . the sol
can of th injury the ondition of th matter would hav
b en differ nt fr m what it n w is.
lthouo-h the neglio-en of Fo:s. i ·ht haY cau. d th injur. . t the n glillant ight al o haYe ontribnce of the_ser ant of a
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uted to the injury, and an affirmative answer, tliat did not

fully negative the latter, would have established an eviden-

tiary fact only. The reasons given, wh}^ the court did not

err in refusing to give the third interrogatory, apply as

well to the fourth interrogatory. ' '

The interrogatories submitted by the court of its own mo-

tion, were as follows :

''1st. If you find a general verdict for the plaintiff in

this case, you will also answer and return with your verdict

the following questions :

' ' Did the act of the plaintiff, John Harrington, in placing

liimself on the foot-board of the engine next to the car con-

tribute to cause the injury he received?

"2nd. Was the plaintiff, John Harrington, using proper

care for his own safety by being upon the foot-board of the

engine between the car and the engine when he was in-

jured?"

The jury answered "No" to the first interrogatory, and
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"Yes" to the second. As is stated by the Appellate Court,

the two interrogatories, submitted by the court of its own

motion, contained all that was important in the fifth and

sixth interrogatories asked by the appellant, and, hence,

no error was committed in refusing to submit the latter to

the jury.

The main ground, however, upon which the appellant

charges that the interrogatories submitted by the court on

its own motion were erroneous, is that they began with this

statement: "If you find a general verdict for the plaintiff

in this case." The contention is that it was erroneous to

put the words, "for the plaintiff," 'after the words, "gen-

eral verdict." It would have been better if the court had

left out the words "for the plaintiff:" but their insertion

could not have done appellant any harm.

Tlie third section of the act in regard to special findings

and special verdicts, provides that, when a special finding

of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former

shall 'Control ; and we said in Chicago S Northwestern Rail-

loay Co. V. Dimleavy, supra (p. 144) : "This necessarily

implies that the fact to be submitted shall be one which, if

found, may in its nature be controlling. That can never be

the -case with a mere evidentiarv fnct. * * * Such incon-

sistency can arise only where the fact found is an ultimate

uted to the injury, and an affirmative answer, that did not
fully negative the latter, would have established an evidentiary fact only. The reasons given, why the court did not
err in refusing to give the third interrogatory, apply as
\\ell to the fourth interrogatory.''
The interrogatories submitted by the court of its own motion, were as follows:
"1st. If you find a general verdict for the plainti ff in
this case, you will also answer and return with your verdict
the following questions:
"Did the act of the plaintiff, John Harrington, in placing
him'"'elf on the foot-board of the engine next to the car contribute to cause the injury he received~
"2nd. Was the plaintiff, John Harrington, using proper
care for his own safety by being upon the foot-board of the
engine between the car and the engine when he was in:ured ~"
The jury answered "No" to the first interrogatory, and
"Yes" to the second. As is stated by the Appellate Court ,
the two interrogatories, submitted by the court of its own
motion, contained all that was important in the fifth and
, ixth interrogatories asked by the appellant, and, hence,
no error was committed in refusing to submit the latter to
the jury.
·
The main ground, however, upon which the appellant
ie·harges that the interrogatories submitted by the court on
its own motion were erroneou , i that they b rran with this
, tat ment: ''If you :find a general verdict for the plaintiff
in tl1is case." The contention is that it was rroneous to
put the word. , "for th plaintiff," after the word , "gen~ral v rdi t. ''
It would have b n better if the court had
l ft out th words ''for the plaintiff:'' but their insertion
f'011 ld not hav don app llant any harm.
Tl1 third s tion of th act in rerrard to special findings
and sp cial ver icts, provide that, wb n a pe ial :finding
of fact j in consist nt with th g neral verdi t, the former
shall o trol; and we aid in Chicaqo & N orthi estern Rail1r ay Co. 1. Dunleavy, snpra (p. 144):
"Thi.. n ssarily
jmp1ic. that th f act to b , ul mii.ted hall b one which, if
f01 ncl, maY in ]ts natur b rontroJlinrr. That can never be
th ras with a mer evirl0nt1arv f ct. *
Such inroni::dstoncy can arise only whfre th fact found is an ultimate
1

1

1
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fact, or one from which the existence or non-existence of such

ultimate fact necessarily follows, and that is never the case

with that which is only prima facie evidence of the fact

sought to be proved." In Chicago & Nortliivestern Rail-

ivay Co. V. Dunleavy, supra, we also said that an error com-

mitted in the giving of specific interrogatories, or in the

answers of the jury to the same, cannot be regarded as be-

ing prejudicial to the defendant, "unless it can be seen that

answers to said questions most favorable to the defendant,

which of course would have been answers in the negative,

would have constituted a finding inconsistent with the gen-

eral verdict." Interrogatories asked by the defendant are

framed for the purpose of controlling any general verdict

that may be returned for the plaintiff. In the case at bar,

the answers, which might be given to the interrogatories

framed by the court, might have had the effect of controll-

ing a general verdict for the plaintiff, but could have had no

effect in controlling a general verdict for the defendant.
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If the jury had answered, that the act of the plaintiff, John

Harrington, in placing himself on the foot-board of the en-

gine next to the car, did contribute to cause the injury he

received, and if they had answered that the plaintiff was not

usino" proper care for his own safety by being upon the foot-

board of the engine between the car and the enarine, then the

special finding would have been inconsistent with the gen-

eral verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and such general ver-

dict would have been controlled bv the special findine;. But,

in case of a oreneral verdict for the defendant, an affirmative

answer to the first interrogatorv framed bv the court, and

a negative ans-^^er to the second interrogatorv framed by

the court, would have been consistent with such s'eneral ver-

dict for the defpndant. and not inconsistent with it. If. in

case of a general verdict for the defendant, the first in-

terrojratorv had been answered in the nep-nh'vp and the

second in the a^rmative. it mav not have affected the o:en-

eral verdict in favor of the defendant, because the evidence

mav have shown that the defendant was not s"uiltv of neg-

lio-enop. and. if the defprirlnnf wa« not e:uiltv of neelisfence

the rtlaintiff was not entitled to re?ovpr even if he was not

p-niUx' of poritributorv neglisTPnop. The infprrogatorips,

on>.rv->i'ffod bv th p court were docionpd to secure a special

finding as to certain matters which might supersede the gen-

T. P. — .^'^ -
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fact or on from which the exi tence or non- xist nee of uch
ultimate fact n ce arily follows and that i. never the ca
with that whi h is only prima facie evidence of the fact
sought to be proved.'' In Chicago ct Northwestern Railway Co . v. Dunleavy, supra, we al o said that an error committed in the giving of specific interrogatories, or in th
an wers of th jury to the same, annot be regard d a b ing prejudicial to the defendant, "unl ._ it can be een that
an wers to aid question most favorable to the defendant,
whi h of c.our would have been an wer in the negative
would have con tituted a :finding incon i tent with the genral verdict." Interrogatorie asked by the defendant ar e
framed for the purpo e of controllino- any general verdi t
that may be returned for the plaintiff. In the ca e at bar
the answers, which mio-ht be given to the interrogatorie.
framed by the court, might hav had the effect of controllin o· a general verdi t for the pla'ntiff. but could have had no
effe t in controlling a general verdict for the defendant.
If the jury had an wered, that the a t of th plaintiff, John
Harrington, in I lacing himself on the foot-board of the engine next to tl e ar, did contribute to cau e the iniury he
received and if they bad answered tha the plaintiff wa not
nsinQ' proper care for hi own afet> by being upon the footboard of the engine between the car and the engine, then the
. perial findjng would have been in<'onsi. tent with the genPral verdjrt in favor of the plaintiff, and sur 1 general ver<li.ct woukl have been controlled bY tlw snPri.al :finding·. But,
in .ca e of a general verdict for th e defenoant. an affirmative
answer to t1 e :first interrogatorv framerl bv the court. and
a negative answer to tbe R rnnrl interrogatory fra Pd by
the rou t. wonlfl hHve b en con. i tent witb uch general ver<iirt for th rlefpnflant. :rnd not incon. jst nt with it. If. jn
<'ase of a gen ra1 verdict for the d fendant. th fin~ int rroo-atorv hail been anc::;w r d in th neo-~tj 'P :rnd the
se0ond jn the affirmative. it mav not lrnv aff rted tllP genral i;-rerdi t in fa\ or of th flpfenrl nt, b 0au. tl1 eviflenr
l11a have Rhown that th CT fonda t W3R not £rnilt\' of neg]i<YPTI<"'P. anrl jf th fleferirhmt w:ic:: not guilt" of neo·Jig nrr•
tlw Tllaintiff w~~ not ntitl0fl to rr.noyp-r even if he wa not
5'miltTT "'f N'ntrihnt rv n 2:Jig- n0P.
'rh e intr ,T gatorie . .
crnhrnjftp(l hv the C'011Tt WPTe ilfl ignp(l to Sf\C'lH R RP rial
finding a. to c rtain matt r which mio-ht uper ede the genT. P.-!li:: -
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eral verdict, if the verdict should be for the plaintiff, and

it was not improper to put the matter to the jury in that

way. ''The facts, upon which a jury should be asked to

find specially, should be material facts, which, if found,

would be controlling. " {Chicago S Northwestern Railway

Co. V. Dunleavy, supra; Terre Haute d Indianapolis Rail-

way Co. V. Voelker, 129 111. 540; Pike v. City of Chicago,

155 id. 656). The theories of appellant, as embodied in

the special interrogatories submitted by it, were presented

in the instructions given by the court.

It is also said that the interrogatories given hj the court

were defective in limiting the exercise of due care to the

time when the plaintiff was injured. This criticism is

without force, because we have held that the words ' ' at the

time," when used in an instruction in such cases, refer to

the whole transaction or series of circumstances, and not to

the precise moment when the injury occurs. Here, the

words ''in placing himself upon the foot-board of the en-
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gine," etc., refer to the circumstances which preceded that

act, as well as the act itself of standing on the foot-board of

the engine. {Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Fisher,

141 111. 614; Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co.

V. Ouska, 151 id. 238; McNulta v. Lockridge, 137 id. 270;

Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. John-

sen, 135 id. 653.)

After a careful examination of the record, we are unable

to discover any reason, which would justify us in reversing

the judgments of the lower courts in this case.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court is af-

firmed.

Judgment affirmed.
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eral verdict, if the verdict should be for the plaintiff, and
it was not improper to put the matter to the jury in that
way. "The facts, upon which a jur3 should be asked to
:find specially, should be material facts, which, if found,
would be controlling.'' (Chicago cf; Northwestern Railway
Co. v. Dunleavy, supra; Terre Haide & Indianapolis Railzcay Co. v. Voelker, 129 Ill. 540; Pike v. City of Chicago,
155 id. 656).
The theories of appellant, as embodied in
the special interrogatories submitted by it, were presented
in the instructions given by the court.
It is also said that the interrogatories given by the court
were defective in limiting the exercise of due care to the
time when the plaintiff was injured.
This criticism is
without force, because we have held that the words ''at the
time,'' when used in an instruction in such cases, refer to
the whole transaction or series of circumstances, and not to
the precise moment when the injury occurs.
Here, the
words "in placing himself upon the foot-board of the engine,'' etc., refer to the circumstances which preceded that
act, as well as the act itself of standing on the foot-board of
the engine.
(Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Fisher,
141 Ill. 614; Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co.
v . Ouska, 151 id. 238; McNulta v. Lockridge, 137 id. 270;
Lake Shore cf; Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Johnen, 135 id. 653.)
*

* * * * * * * * *

After a careful examination of the recorq, we are unable
to discover any reason, which would justify us in reversing
the judgments of the lower court in this case.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD

COMPANY V. AYERS.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1895.

56 Kansas, 176.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD
C01\1PANY V. AYERS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Maetin, C. J. : I. The original action was brought by the

Supreme Court of Kansas.

1895.

defendant in error against the plaintiff in error to recover

56 Kansas, 176.

damages for the alleged negligent burning of a grain ele-

vator, a hay press, some baled and a quantity of loose hay,

and other property. The trial resulted in a verdict and

judgment for the plaintiff. * * *

**********

II. The defendant pleaded and largelj^ relied upon the

contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a defense, such

negligence arising from permitting dry hay to accumulate

around the building in large quantities, extending therefrom

to the tracks of the company, so as readily to catch fire from

sparks emitted from the locomotive when properly man-
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aged. A great deal of the evidence related to the condition

of the building and the premises around it, the same being

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MARTIN, C. J.: I. The original action was brought by the
defendant in error against the plaintiff in error to recover
damages for the alleged negligent burning of a grain elevator, a hay pre s, some baled and a quantity of loo se hay
and other property.
The trial resulted in a verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff. * * *

* * * * * * * * * *

used for the baling of hay and the storing of the same, both

baled and loose. The defendant submitted 10 particular

questions of fact in relation to the condition of different

parts of the premises, three questions pertaining to the age

of different parts of the building, and one as to the same

never having been painted. The first 10 questions were

objectionable in form. No. 1 being as follows: "Is it not a

fact that the fire caught in the dry grass and rubbish that

had accumulated near the northeast corner of the build-

ing?" instead of directly asking the jury "Did the fire catch

in the dry grass," etc. Questions in a negative or a lead-

ing form should never be submitted, and these were both

leading and negative, and any direct answer to them by yes

or no was liable to be misunderstood. The court refused

to submit the 14 questions referred to, and was proceeding

to state the reasons therefor, when defendant's counsel ob-

jected to any argument in the presence of the jury, but this

was overruled, the defendant excepting, and the court, re-

ferring to the first 10 questions, said, among other things :

II. The defendant pleaded and largely relied upon the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a defense, such
negligence ari ing from permitting dry hay to accumulate
around the building in large quantitie , extending therefrom
to the tracks of the company, so as readily to .catch fire from
sparks emitted from the locomotive when properly managed. A great deal of the evidence related to the condition
of the building and the premises around it, the same being
used for the baling of hay and the storing of the same, both
baled and loose.
The defendant submitted 10 particular
questions of fact in relation to the condition of different
part of the premises, three questions pertaining to the age
of different parts of the building, and one as to the same
never having been painted.
The first 10 questions were
objectionable in form, No. 1 being as follows: "Is it not a
fact that the fire caught in the dry grass and rubbi h that
had accumulated near the northeast corner of the building 1" in tead of directly a king the jury "Did the fire .catch
in the dr gra , '' etc. Que ti on in a n gative or a leading form hould never be nbmitted and the e were both
leading and negative, and an r dir t an '~er to them by y
or no wa liable to be mi under t od. The court refu ed
to submit the 14 question ref rred to, and wa roceedin.O'
to tate the r a n th r for when d f ndant coun el object d to an. argum nt in th r nr f the jury but thi
v a o erruled th d f ndant xc ptin O' and the court referring to th_e fir t 10 qu tion
aid, among other things:
T
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''Suppose these questions should be answered as the de-

fense asks that they should be answered — that this com-

bustible material was scattered around there — it does not

show that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence. * * * it

gives no light to the court or any reviewing court." We

regard the remark as improper in the presence of the jury.

It was a statement as a proposition of law that the scatter-

ing of combustible material upon and over the plaintiff's

premises was not negligence. That was one of the prin-

ciple questions to be submitted to the jury, and they would

be very liable to interpret this remark of the judge as a de-

claration that all the evidence as to the existence of com-

bustible matter around and about the premises was imma-

terial. The first 10 questions seem quite pertinent to the

issue, although the answers to them in the manner most

favorable to the defendant may not have been sufficient

alone to overthrow a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. We

do not understand this, however, to be the test of the com-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

petency of particular questions of fact requested. If the

questions are plain and direct in form, are within the is-

sues, are not repetitions, and there is evidence upon which

they may be intelligently answered, they ought to be sub-

mitted, so that the detailed facts may appear of record ; thus

enabling the trial court, upon further proceedings, or a

reviewing court afterward, to form an intelligent judgment

upon the particular issues sought to be elucidated by the

questions and answers. It would have been proper to sub-

mit the other four questions, for they were remotely within

the issues, but they were not especially material, and the

refusal of the court to submit them would not be reversible

error. It is generally error to refuse to submit questions

of fact drawn in proper form, material to the case, and

based upon the evidence. Section 286 of the civil code has

been uniformly held to grant a right to the parties to have

proper questions of fact submitted to the jury. (Bent v.

PhUhrick, 16 Kan. 190; C. B. V. P. Bid. Co. v. Hofham,

22 id. 41 -^A.T.S S. F. Bid. Co. v. Plunkett, 25 id. 188, 198;

City of Wtmdotte v. Gibson, 25 id. 236, 243; W. d W. Bid.

Co. V. Fechheimer, 36 id. 45, 51 ; Kansas City v. Bradbury,

45 id. 381 , 388.) Of course, it is the duty of the court to re-

vise the questions, to strike out or amend those drawn by

the attorneys in improper form or equivocal in their mean-

'fRIAL PRACTICE
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''Suppose these questions should be answered as the defense asks that they should be answered-that this combustible material was scattered around there-it does not
show that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence. * * * It
gives no light to the court or any reviewing court.'' We
regard the remark as improper in the presence of the jury.
It was a statement as a proposition of law that the scattering of combustible material upon and over the plaintiff's
premi es was not negligence.
That was one of the principle questions to be submitted to the jury, and they would
be very liable to interpret this remark of the judge as a declaration that all the evidence as to the existence of combu. tible matter around and about the premises was immaterial.
The first 10 questions seem quite pertinent to the
i ue, although the answers to them in the manner most
favorable to the defendant may not have been sufficient
alone to overthrow a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. We
do not understand this, however, to be the test of the competency of particular questions of fact requested. If the
questions are plain and dire.ct in form, are within the isu , are not repetitions, and there is evidence upon which
th y may be intellio·ently answered, they ought to be submitted. o that the detailed fact may appear of re ord; thus
enal lin()' the trial court, upon furth er proceedings, or a
revi wing court afterward, to form an intelligent judgment
upon the particular i ues sought to be elucidated by the
qu . tions and an wer . It would have been proper to submit th other four que tion , for they were remotely within
th , i . ues, but they were not especially material, and the
r fu. al of the ourt to submit them would not be rever ible
rror. It is g nerally error tn refuse to submit question
f fa t drawn in pro er form, material to the a , and
. d upon th vi<l n . s ction 286 of the 1civil od has
b n uniformly h ld to ()'rant a r] ()'ht to th parti to h ve
prop r qu , tion of fa t submitt d to th jury. (B nt v.
P/iill; rick 1 J(an. 100 · C. B. U. P. Rld. Co. v. H othmn,
2... i<l. 41 ; A. T. & S. F. Rld. Co. v. Plitn'1 tt, 25 id. 1 , 19 ;
ity of TI yndotte v . Gib. on 25 i . 2. , ..A3; W. cf; TV. Rld.
Co. 1· . l r>r l1h eimer . G 1d. 45 51; l1 an a City v. Bradbury,
45 i l. ., 1, . 8.)
f ur. it i. th duty f the co rt to rei. th qu sti ns to , trik out r am nd tho drawn by
th att rn y in improp r form or equivo al in th ir mean1

~ec.
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ing, and those outside of or immaterial to the issues, as also

such as are not based upon any evidence in the case. {Mo.

Pac. Ely. Co. v. Eolley, 30 Kan. 465, 472, 473.)

5]

* * * * * * * * * *

The judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded

All the Justices ^concurring.

Section 5. Compelling Jury to Give Direct Answers.

CLEVELAND, COLUMBUS, CINCINNATI & INDIAN-

549

ing, and those outside of or immat rial to the is ue, , as al o
such as are not based upon any eviden e in the ca e.
(JYlo.
Pac. Rly. Co. v. Halley, 30 Kan. 465, 472, 473.)

**********

for a new trial.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES

The judgment must be rever ed, and the case remanded
for a new trial.
All the Justices 1concurring.

APOLIS EAILWAY COMPANY V. ASBURY.

Supreme Court of Indiana. 1889.

120 Indiana, 289.

Berkshire, J. — This was an action instituted by the ap-

})ellee to recover damages on account of personal injuries

which she claims to have sustained because of the fault of

SECTION 5. COMPELLING JURY TO GIVE DIRE T ANSWERS.

the appellant.

The appellant, at the proper time, moved the court to

require the jury to retire to their room to consider further
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of their answers to interrogatories numbered 4, 5, 6, 8, and

LEVELAND, COLUMBUS, INCINNATI & INDIANAPOLIS RAILWAY COMPANY V. ASBURY.

10, submitted to them at the request of the appellant, and

Supreme Court of Indiana.

to return definite, certain, and direct answers thereto,

1889.

which motion was overruled, and an exception saved.

120 I ndiana, 289.

These interrogatories, and the answers thereto, are as

follows :

*'4. Did not Daniel Asbury, the owner of said horse,

hoar the whistle of the approaching train while driving said

horse between the residence of Martha Helms and the cross-

ing where the accident occurred?

'* Answer. We do not know by the evidence that it was

tlie train whistle.

BERKSHIRE, J.-This was an action instituted by the app llee to recover damage on account of personal injuries
which she claims to have sustained because of the fault of
the appellant.

'*5. Could not the plaintiff and Daniel Asbury have seen

* * * * * * * * * *

tlie approaching train, or the head-light of its locomotive,

if they had looked from a point on said highway thirty-five

feet south of said crossing, in time to have averted the acci-

dent?

^'Ans. We don't know.

The appellant, at the proper time, moved the court to
r quire the jury to retire to their room to consider further
of thejr answers to interrogatories numbered 4, 5, 6, 8, and
10, ubmitted to them at the requ t of the appellant and
to return definite, certain, and direct answers thereto
wbich motion wa overruled, and an exception aved.
The e interrogatories, and the answers thereto, are a
L llow :
'' 4. Did not Daniel As bur. the owner of aid hor ,
h ar the whi tle of the approachin · train while dri' ing aid
hor e between the re idence of Martha Helm and the cro sing where the accident o urred?
'' n wer. W do not know by the evidence that it wa
th train whi tle.
"5.
ould n t tb 1 laintiff and Daniel
bury have een
0
th ap roa chinO' tTain or th h a -1i ·ht of it lo motive
if th v. had ]o k a from a oint on aid hiO'hwa. thirt . -five
f t outh of aid cro in , in time to have averted the accident~

''Ans.

We don't know.
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''6. From a point thirty-five feet south of the crossing

where the accident occurred on the highway or street along

which Asbury drove, how far from said crossing could the

approaching train be seen"?

"Ans. In daylight it might have been seen a mile.

"8. How often was said whistle sounded before the ac-

cident as said train approached the crossing?

^'Ans. We don't know what crossing was meant.

"10. Was not a bell attached to said engine, and was

not said bell rung continuously from said tile-shed crossing

to the place where the accident occurred?

"Ans. There was a bell attached, but we do not know

that it was rung continuously."

The answers to these interrogatories were evasive and

improper. There was evideece bearing upon every fact

covered by these interrogatories, and the jury should have

answered them definitely and in direct language. It would

have been no more improper had the jury returned a gen-
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eral verdict, "We, the jury, do not know whether we ought

to find for the plaintiff or defendant," than to have returned

the answers they did to the said interrogatories ; and the

court should have declined to receive the answers returned,

as it would have declined to receive a general verdict in the

form we have given, upon proper objection made.

If there was a disagreement among the members of the

jury as to the answers that should be made to the interroga-

tories, or if the evidence was such that they could not find

the facts, or any of them, to which the interrogatories re-

lated, then the jury should have so informed the court, and

in receiving the answers as made the court committed an

error. It should have sustained the motion of the appel-

lant, and required the jury to retire and return proper an-

swers to the interrogatories, or, in case of a disagreement,

to so inform the court. There seems to have been a disin-

clination on the part of the jury to answer the interroga-

tories; the answer to the eighth especially indicates that:

"How often was said wliistle sounded before the accident

as said train approached the crossing." There was but

one crossing in question, and that was the one where the ac-

cident happened, and tlie jury could but understand that

that was the crossing referred to in the interrogatory, and

TmAL
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" 6. From a point thirty-five feet south of the cro sing
where the accident oc urred on the highway or street along
which Asbury drove, how far from said crossing could the
approaching train be seen~
''Ans. In daylight it might have been een a mile.
'' 8. How often was said whistle ounded before the accident as said train approached the crossing~
''Ans. \Ve don't know what crossing was meant.
'' 10. \Vas not a bell attached to said engine, and wa.
not said bell rung continuously from said tile-shed crossing
to the I lace where the accident occurred~
''Ans. There was a bell attached, but we do not know
that it wa rung continuou ly. ''
The an wers to these interrogatories were evasive and
improper.
There was evideece bearing upon every fact
covered by these interrogatories, and the jury should have
answered them definitely and in direct language. It would
have been no more improper had the- jury returned a general verdiiet, "We, tbe jury, do not know whether we ought
to find for the i laintiff or defendant,'' than to have returned
the an. wer they did to the said interrogatorie ; and the
court should have de lined to rec ive the an wers returned,
as it would have declined to receive a general verdict in th e
form we bave given, upon proper objection made.
,
If there was a disagreement among the members of th
jury a to the an wer that hould be made to the interroga tori , or if the evid nee wa uch that th y could not find
the fa t , or any of th m, to whi h the int rrogatorie r lat d, th n the jury hould have so inform d the court, and
in r eivin the answer as made the court committed an
rror. It hould hav u tained the motion f the appe] ] nt, and r quir d the jur)Tto r tire and r tuTn proper an. w r to the int rrorratori , or, in ca e of a di arrr ement,
m t h
b n a di int . o inform th ourt. Th r
1in ti n n th
art f th jur. to an w r th int rrorra t ri . ; th an. w r t th ighth .
iaJl. i di at that:
' T w ft n a ajd whi.' tl
1nd d b f r th a id nt
,' . aid tr in pproa h i t11 ro .. ing."
Th r wa bnt
r . : in()' in u . ti n, , nd that wa tb n wb r th a ri nt h p n d n 1 fop :ury o 1]d l nt un r tand that
th t wa th cro ing r f )IT to in th interrogatory, and
1
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yet tliey answer, ''We do not know what crossing is

meant."

The evidence was not complicated, and there was very

little conflict, if any, as to many of the facts inquired for

in these interrogatories, and especially those relating to the

care and caution exercised by the appellee and her husband.

The appellant was entitled to full and fair answers to its in-

terrogatories.

We are aware of the rule that the court may refuse to re-

quire the jury to retire and make more definite answers to

interrogatories, and that it will not be available error if the

answers demanded would not, if given, change the result as

to the judgment to be rendered. McCormick, etc., Co. v.

Gray, 100 Ind. 285 ; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hedges, 105

Ind. 398. But had the interrogatories under consideration

been answered in the affirmative, they would have con-

trolled the general verdict.

Affirmative answers to these interrogatories would have
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disclosed, beyond question, contributory negligence on the

part of the appellee and her husband, and gone far in the

direction of establishing due care on the part of the appel-

lant.

**********

Because of the error of the court in overruling the mo-

tion to require the jnry to retire and make more definite

and certain the answers to the interrogatories, the judgment

must be reversed.

Judgment reversed, with costs.

Section 6. Effect of Answers on General Verdict.

RUNYAN V. KANAWHA WATER & LIGHT

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1911.

68 West Virginia, 609.

Action by C. D. Runyan, administrator of Walter Runyan,

against the Kanawha Water & Light Company. A verdict
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'et they answer, "We do not know what crossing i
meant.''
The evidence was not complicated, and there was very
little conflict, if any, as to many of the facts inquired for
in these interrogatories, and especially those relating to the
care and caution exercised by the appellee and her husband.
The appellant was entitled to full and fair answers to its interrogatories.

* * * * * * * * * *
We are aware of the rule that the court may refuse to require the jury to r etire and make more definite answers to
interrogatories, and that it will not be available error if the
answers demanded would not, if given, change the result as
to the judgment to be rendered.
McConnick, etc., Co. v .
Gray, 100 Ind. 285; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v . H edges, 105
Ind. 398. But had the interrogatories under consideration
been answered in the affirmative, they would have controlled the general verdict.
Affirmative answers to these interrogatories would have
disclosed, beyond question, contributory negligence on the
part of the appellee and her husband, and gone far in the
direction of establishing due care on the part of the appellant.

* * * * * * * * * *
Because of the error of the court in overruling the motion to require the jury to retire and make more definite
and certain the answers to the interrogatories, the judgment
must be reversed.
J udgment reversed, with costs.

SECTION 6. EFFECT OF ANSWERS ON GENERAL VERDICT.
RUNYANV.KANAWHA WATER&LIGHT
COMPANY.
Supreme Court of .Appeals of West Virginia.
68

1911.

West Virginia, 609.

Action by C. D. Run. an admini trator of Walter Runyan,
against the Kanawha Water & Light Company. A verdict
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for plaintiff having been set aside, he brings error.

Brannon, Judge:

The Kanawha Water & Light Company, a corporation

' irnishing electricity for public consumption in the city of

harleston, had its wires on a bridge over the Kanawha

Iver for conveyance of electricity. Walter Runyan was an

mploye of the bridge company engaged in painting the

>ridge, and while so employed came in contact with an elec-

ric wire, and was so badly burned by the electricity that he

'ied. His administrator sued the Kanawha Water & Light

ompany, and recovered a verdict for $5000, and the court

' aving set the verdict aside, the plaintiff comes to this

ourt.

**********

The main defense in the case is contributory negligence.

The general verdict finds against that defence ; but def end-

-mt insists that that verdict is overruled by a finding in an-

TRIAL PRACTICE

for plaintiff having been set aside, he brings error.
BRANNON, Judge :
The Kanawha Water & Light Company, a corporation
'·unishing electricity for public consumption in the city of
barleston, had its wires on a bridge over the Kanawha
~ \Ter for conveyance of ele.ctricity.
\lV alter Runyan was an
. iploye of the bridge company engaged in painting the
.ridge, and while so employed came in contact with an elecric wire, and was so badly burned by the electricity that he
'ied. His administrator sued the Kanawha Water & Light
'ompany, and recovered a verdict for $5000, and the court
av1ng set the verdict aside, the plaintiff comes t o this
, 'ourt.

■^wer to an interrogatory. This has given us some perplex-
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ity, and is the question of gravity in the case. The inter-

rogatory is this : ' ' If Walter Runyan had been careful, con-

sidering the knowledge he had of the wires, would he have

been injured?" The answer is, ''We think not." Is

this inconsistent with the general verdict so as to overrule

it? It must be so inconsistent that both cannot stand to-

gether. If possible they must be construed so as to har-

monize; or rather, as applied to this case, we must be able

to say that the finding finds a fact which inevitably over-

throws the general verdict. It must ex'clude every conclu-

sion that would authorize a verdict for plaintiff. Peninsular

Land Co. v. Ins. Co., 35 W. Va. 666. As a practical ques-

tion in this case, Does this finding find as a fact that Runyan

was guilty of contributory negligence defeating the action?

If it does not, it is not the overthrow of the general verdict.

It does not find facts to enable the court to say whether such

contributory negligence was a fact. This consideration at

once denies this finding any force to overthrow the general

verdict. This interroo-ntorv was put to get from the jury

an expression to sustain the charge of contributory negli-

gence. It does not ask the jury whether such and such

facts exist, facts whirh would in law constitute negligence,

as it must. The law is that an interrogatory must put only

questions of fact from which a legal proposition may be

[Chap 13

* * * * * * * * * *

.

The main defense in the ease is contributory negligen ce.
The general verdict finds against that defence; but defendnt insists that tbat verdict is overruled by a finding in an·wer to an interrogatory. This has given us some perplex[ty, and is the question of gravity in the case. The interr ogatory is this: ''If Walter Runyan had been careful, conidering the knowled ge he had of the wires, would he have
heen injured 1''
The answer is, ''\Ve think not.''
Is
this inconsistent with the general verdict so as to overrule
it~
It must be so inconsistent that both cannot stand together. If possible they must be construed so as to harmonize; or rather,. as applied to thi. ca e, we must be able
to ay that the finding finds a fa t which inevitably overthrows the general verdict. It must exielude every conclu. ion that would authorize a verdict for plaintiff. Peninsular
Land Co. v. Ins. Co., 35 W. Va. 666. As a practical que tion in this case, Do tbi. finrVing find a a fact that Runyan
vas guilty of contributory negligence defeating the action 1
Tf it doe not, it is not th overthrow of the general verdi t .
It do snot :flnd f a ct. to nab] th court to ay whether sunh
f'ontributory negligPnr was a fact. Thi con ideration at
onf'r rl nirs thi . finning anv force to overthrow th gen ral
Yrrdid. Thi . int rro.Q·::ttor was put t get fr m the jury
an
pr . sion to , nstairi th rhar,g of rontril utory ne<Y1ig nrr.
Tt clors not ::-i . k tho jur wh ther such and uch
faf't. 0.·i. t fa ts wl1i rh would in law constitute negligenc ,
a. it mn . t. Tho law i. that an int rrogatory mu t ut onl.
qnr. ti n . of fa<'t fr 1 'hirh
1 gal roposition ma.· be
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deduced. What facts arising on the evidence does this in-

terrogatory inquire about? The interrogatory must ask

as to facts such as, if answered as desired by the inter-

rogator, will make a verdict for his adversary inconsistent.

Any question the answer to which would be inconclusive,

and which would not be so inconsistent, should not be put.

20 Ency. PL & Prac. 328. "Questions which require the

jury merelj' to answer as to acts or omissions which may or

may not in their opinion be evidence of care or negligence,

or from answers to which, either way, the court cannot say,

as a matter of law, whether care or negligence is the result,

are not material." Clementson on Special Verdicts, 73.

This interrogatory, without specifying facts on which to

base the opinion, simply asks the jury whether in its opin-

ion Runyan exercised care. Virtually it asks the jury

whether in its opinion Runyan was guilty of contributory

negligence, a mixed ciuestion of law and fact, I may say of

law. Such an interrogatory is not good. The failure to
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ask as to facts on which carelessness, or in other words,

contributory negligence, is sought to be predicated is a fatal

defect in this interrogatory, and must render its answer

abortive. The answer does not find in words that Runyan

was guilty of contributory negligence, and could not, since

a question calling upon a jury to find on a question of law

must not be submitted. 20 Ency. PL & Prac. 326 ; Clement-

son on Special Verdicts, 117, 217. He is not proven negli-

gent. It does not appear.

But take the question and answer as they are. This find-

ing says that if Runyan had been careful he would not have

been injured. Does this come up to the standard of full

contributory negligence? No. It does not tell in what

he was careless, or to what degree. Runyan having a right

to be where he was in work, he could go near or over the

wires, unless he knew that there was positive actual danger

staring him in the face. If he by accident fell upon or caught

his foot in the wires, this would not bar recovery. He

might not have used the highest degree of care and yet not

be found guilty of contributory negligence defeating the ac-

tion. We cannot see what was the extent of his knowledge

of danger, whether or not he knew of defects in insula-

tion. He was called on to use only ordinary care required of

a prudent man under the circumstances; but this finding

SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
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deduced. What fact arising on the evidence does this interrogators inquire about~
The interrogatory must ask
as to facts such as, if answered as desired by the inter rogator, will make a verdict for his adversary in onsistent.
An question the ansv er to which would be inconclusi e,
and which would not be so inconsistent, should not be put.
20 Ency. Pl. & Prac. 328. ''Questions which require the
jury merely to answer a to acts or omis ions which may or
may not in their opinion be evidence of care or negligence,
or from answers to which either way, the court cannot say,
as a matter of law, whether care or negligence is the result,
are not material.''
Clementson on Special Verdicts, 73.
This interrogatory, without specifying fa ts on which to
base the opinion, simply asks the jury whether in its opinVirtually it asks the jury
ion Runyan exerci ed care.
whether in its opinion Runyan wa guilty of cop.tributory
negligence, a mixed question of law a~d fact, I may say of
law. Such an interrogatory is not good. The failure to
.ask as to facts on which carele sne s, or in other words,
contributory negligence, is sought to be predicated is a fatal
defect in this interrogatory, and must render its answer
abortive. The an wer does not find in words that Runyan
wa guilty of contributory negligence and could not, since
a question calling upon a jury to find on a question of law
mu t not be submitted. 20 Ency. Pl. & Prac. 326; Clement. on on Special Verdicts, 117, 217. He is not proven negligent. It does not appear.
But take the question and an wer as they are. This finding says that if Runyan had been careful he would not have
been injured. Does this come up to the standard of full
contributory negligence~
No. It does not tell in what
he wa careless, or to what degree. Runyan having a right
to be where he was in work he could 0 ·0 near or over the
"-rire , unless he knew that there wa po itive actual dano-er
staring him in the face. If he by accident fell upon or caught
his foot · in the wires thi would not bar recovery.
He
might not bave userl the hio-he t degree of care and yet not
be foun ·uilty of contributor. neglige ce d feating the action. We can ot s e what wa the ext nt of his knowl dge
of danO'er w ther or not he knew of defects in insulation. He wa called on to use only ordinary care required of
a prudent man under the circumstances; but this finding
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does not indicate what care or carelessness he used. We can-

not from the finding say, or guess, whether he exercised the

only care required by law, ordinary, or was chargeable with

gross negligence. In the one case he would not be guilt'

of contributory negligence defeating the action; in the othe

he would. We cannot say which from the question and an

swer. The main verdict finds no negligence, and we arv.

asked to say from the special finding that there was; and

thus make the special finding inconsistent with the main

verdict, when the special one does not give facts which, in

law, impute contributory negligence.

There is another defective feature of this finding to show

its inadequacy to overcome the general verdict. It is in

the inconclusive language, ''We think not." "Answers

expressing only the inclination of the minds of the jury, as

to say, 'We think not' are insufficient and too uncertain to

base a judgment on." Hopkins v. Stacey, 43 Ind. 554.

Eminent authority there cited says, "An opinion is not a
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legal verdict, and verdicts must be positive, certain and

free from all ambiguity." This position may be assailed

as technical ; but remember that special finding, to overcome

general verdicts must be certain and clearly and plainly in-

consistent with it. I grant that there are authorities hold-

ing otherwise. 20 Ency. PI. & Prac. 344. I cannot say

that I would for this defect alone reject the answer; still

it must be said that the answer is indefinite and leaves the

mind in doubt whether the jury intended to find a definite

fact. Why did it not say "No," if so intended? The

law says that answers to interrogatories should be "direct,

definite, certain and complete." 20 Ency. PI. & Prac. 342.

Again this question 10 called upon the jury to say whether

if Runyan had been careful he would have been hurt. "Only

such questions as can be fairly and intelligently answered

should be submitted. Interrogatories requiring the jury to

speculate as to what might have happened in a certain con-

tingency should not be submitted." Atchison dc. v. Lan-

nigan, 42 Pac. 343. Therefore, we must regard the an-

swer mere speculation, and not on specific facts, not a flat

finding. Findings must be free of obscurity. "They must

destroy the general verdict, if at all, only by their own in-

herent clearness and strength." Clementson on S])ecial

Verdicts 135. Thompson on Trials, § 2693 says: "The

J
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rloes not indicate what care or carelessness he used. We cannot from the finding say, or gue s, whether he exercised the
only care required by law, ordinary, or was chargeable with
gross negligence. In the one case he would not be guilt·
of contributory negligence defeating the action; in the othc
he would. We cannot say which from the question and an
swer. The main verdict finds no negligence, and we arl
asked to say from the special finding that there was; anc:
thus make the special finding incon istent with the main
verdict, when the special one does not give facts which, in
law, impute contributory negligence.
There is another defective feature of this finding to show
its inadequacy to overcome the general verdict.
It is in
the inconclusive language, "We think not."
"Answer
expressing only the inclination of the minds of the jury, a~
to say, 'We think not' are insufficient and too uncertain to
base a judgment on."
Hopkins v. Stacey, 43 Ind. 554.
Eminent authority there cited says, ''An opinion is not a
legal verdict, and verdicts must be positive, certain and
free from all ambiguity." This position may be assailed
as technical; but remember that special finding, to overcome
general verdicts must be certain and clearly and plainly inon istent with it. I grant that there are authorities holding otherwise.
20 Ency. PL & Prac. 344.
I cannot say
that I would for this defect alone reject the answer; still
it must be said that the answer is indefinite and leaves the
mind in doubt whether the jury intended to find a definite
Why did it not say ''No,'' if so intended~
The
fact.
law says that answers to interrogatories should be "direct,
de:fini te, certain and complete.'' 20 Ency. PL & Prac. 342.
Again thi question 10 calle 1 upon the jury to say whether
if Runyan had been car ful he would have been hurt. ''Only
u h ue tions as an be fairly and intelligently an wered
, h uld b ubmitted. Int rrogatories requiring th jury to
. p u1ate a to what mi O'ht have harp ned in a certain continn" n y . bou]d not he . nbrnitt d." At hi on &c. . La11,niga11, 42 Pa .. 4. .
Th r for , w mu t r .gard the an.·w r m re
ulation, and not n , I i:fic fact , not a flat
nndinO'. Finding mu. t
fr
f b urity. "Th y must
clP. tr y th g neral v r<li t if t all nly by their ow.n inh r nt rl arness and tren th.''
1 m nt n on p cial
\ rdirt. J. 5.
Th mp. on on Tri a1 . , § ~69 sav : "The
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court will not strain the language of the special findings to

override the general verdict. If possible they will be in-

terpreted to support the verdict rather than overturn it.

555
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court will not str in the language of the special findings to
ov:erride the general verdict. If possible they will be interpreted to upport the verdi ct rather than o erturn it.
No presumption will be made in their favor; nor will they
ontrol the general verdict, unless they are invincibly antagoni tic to it.''
Another objection to this :finding, depriving its answer
of force, is, that it a umes a very material fact, that is,
that Runyan knew the condition of the wires, their danger,
etc. Thi had a tendency to lead the mind of jurors to conclude that Runyan had uch knowledge, that even the judge
thought so, else he would not have allowed such an interrogatory.
An int rrogatory mu t not a ume material
facts. 20 Ency. PL & Pra-c. 322; Elliot v . Reynolds, 16 Pac.
698; Toledo R. Co. v . Goddard, 25 Ind. 185.
* * * * * * * * * *
Therefore, we rever e the order setting aside the verdict,
and render judgment upon that verdict for the plaintiff.
Reversed and rendered.
1

No presumption will be made in their favor ; nor will they

control the general verdict, unless they are invincibly an-

tagonistic to it."

Another objection to this finding, depriving its answer

of force, is, that it assumes a very material fact, that is,

that Runyan knew the condition of the wires, their danger,

etc. This had a tendency to lead the mind of jurors to con-

clude that Runyan had such knowledge, that even the judge

thought so, else he would not have allowed such an inter-

rogatory. An interrogatory must not assume material

facts. 20 Encv. PI. & Prac. 322 ; Elliot v. Reynolds, 16 Pac.

698; Toledo R. Co. v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185.

**********

Therefore, we reverse the order setting aside the verdict,

and render judgment upon that verdict for the plaintiff.
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Reversed and rendered.

EVANSVILLE & SOUTHERN TRACTION COMPANY

V. SPIEGEL.

Appellate Court of Indiana. 1911.

Indiana Appellate, ; 94 Northeastern, 718.

Lairy, J. This is an action brought by the appellee,

George P. Spiegel, against the appellant for damages oc-

casioned by the death of Carl Spiegel, the minor son of ap-

pellee, which death is alleged to have been caused by the

negligence of appellant in the operation of one of its cars

on Main street in the city of Evansville, Indiana. The di-

rection of Main street is a little east of north, and the ap-

pellant company has a double street car track near the cen-

ter of said street. Williams street enters Main street from

the east, at a point almost opposite to the place where Syca-

more street enters it from the west, so that the soutli line

of Williams street, at the point of its connection with Main

street, is almost opposite to the point where the north line

EVANSVILLE & SOUTHERN TRACTION COMP ANY
V. SPIEGEL.
Appellate Court of I ndiana.

1911.

- - Indiana Appellate, - - ; 94 Northeastern, 718.

J.

This i an action brought by the appellee,
George P. Spiegel again t the appellant for dama ·e occasioned by the death of arl Spi gel, the minor on of appellee, which death i alle ed to have been cau ed by the
negli()'enc of app llant in the operation of one of it car
on Main treet in the ity of Evan ville Indiana. The direction of 1\fain tr et is a little a t of north and the appellant ompany ha a <loubl treet car tra k n ar the .c nt r of aid tr t.
illiam tr t enter 1\Iain tre t from
the ea t at a oint alm . t oppo. it to the place wh r
~ amor tr t nt r it f · m th w t, . o that th outh line
of William . tr t at th } int of it connection with fain
. treet, i almo t o p it to the point where the north line
LAIRY,
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of Sycamore street connects with it on the west. The ac-

cident in wliich Carl Spiegel lost his life occurred about

noon on the 4th day of October, 1907. He came out of

Williams street riding a bicycle, and started diagonally

across Main street toward Sycamore street, and was struck

and killed by a street car going south on the west track.

(3) On behalf of appellant, it is urged that its motion

for judgment on the interrogatories notwithstanding the

general verdict should have been sustained, for the reason

that these answers show that the decedent was guilty of

negligence contributing to his death. The general verdict

in favor of the plaintiff is a finding of every material fact

necessary to a recovery. The special failings of the jury

will overthrow the general verdict only when both cannot

stand, and this antagonism must be apparent on the face of

the record beyond the possibility of being removed by any

evidence admissible under the issues made by the pleadings.

The evidence actually introducd cannot be considered in
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passing upon this question. Cox v. Ratcliffe, 105 Ind, 374,

5 N. E, 5; Indiana National, etc., Co. v. Long, 27 Ind, App.

219, 59 N. E. 410,

(4) Under the issues formed by the pleadings in this

case, evidence might have been introduced which would

bring the case within the operation of the doctrine known

as the ''last clear chance." This doctrine is clearly stated

by a writer in the Quarterly Law Review (vol. 2, p. 507), as

follows: ''The party who last has a clear opportunity of

avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his

opponent, is considered solely responsible for it." This

has been frequently recognized and applied by our courts.

(5) Even though it be conceded that the answers to

the interrogatories show that the plaintiff's decedent neg-

ligently approached and entered upon the track of the ap-

'j)enant in front of an approaching car, and thus negligently

\3xp0sed himself to the danger of a collision, this would not

necessarily preclude a recovery from injury resulting from

appellant's negligence. Answers to interrogatories show-

ing such facts would not overthrow a general verdict in

favor of the plaintiff, for the reason that evidence may have

been introduced proving or tending to prove that, after said

[Chap 13
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of Sycamore street connects with it on the west. The accident in which Carl Spiegel lost his life occurred about
noon on the 4th day of October, 1907. He came out of
Williams street riding a bicycle, and started diagonally
across Main street toward Sycamore street, and was struck
and killed by a street car goin°· south on the west track.
* * * * * * * * * •
(3) On behalf of appellant, it is urged that its motion
for judgment on· the interrogatories notwithstanding the
general verdict should have been sustained, for the reason
that these answers show that the decedent was guilty of
negligence contributing to his death. The general verdict
in favor of the plaintiff is a finding of every material fact
necessary to a recovery. The special failings of the jury
will overthrow the general verdict only when both cannot
stand, and this antagonism must be apparent on the face of
the record beyond the possibility of being removed by any
evidence admi sible under the issues made by the pleadings.
The evidence actually introducd cannot be considered in
passing upon this question. Cox v. Ratcliffe, 105 Ind. 374,
5 N. E. 5; Indiana National, etc., Co. v. Long, 27 Ind. App.
219, 59 N. E. 410.
( 4) Under the issues formed by the pleadings in this
case, evidence might have been introduced whi ch would
bring the case within the operation of the doctrine known
as the "last clear chance." This doctrine is clearly stated
by a writer in the Quarterly Law Review (vol. 2, p. 507), as
follow : ''The party who last has a clear opportunity of
avoiding the accident, notwith tanding the negligence of his
This
opponent, is considered solely responsible for it."
ha been frequently reie~ognized and applied by our court .
* * * * * * * * * *
( 5) Even though it be conceded that the answers to
th interrogatorie show that th plaintiff' d cedent neo-lio· ntly ap] roarhe 1 a d ntered up n th tra k of the a1 . p Hant in front of an approaching ar, an thus negligently
.. xp ed him lf to the cl· nger of a ollision, this would not
n c . arily r lude a r overy from injur re ulting fro
appellant'. n g1ig0n . An, wer to interrogatories howing :u h f t, wonld not oYorthrow a o-eneral verdict in
fav r of th laintiff, foT th r a. on tbat viden may have
be n intr clu ed proving or tendi g to prov that, aft r aid
1
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decedent was in the position of danger in which he had so

negligently placed himself, the defendant knew of his peril-

ous position, or might have known it by the exercise of or-

dinary care, in time to have prevented the injury, and that

it negligently failed to take advantage of the last clear

chance to prevent the injury. It is the duty of this court

to reconcile the interrogatories with the general verdict if

they can be so reconciled by any evidence which might have

been introduced within the issues; and, to this end, the

court, in ruling upon this motion, will treat the case as

though this evidence had been introduced and acted upon

by the jury. In view of what we have said, we are of the

opinion that the answers to the interrogatories are not in

irreconcilable conflict with the general verdict, and the mo-

tion of appellant for judgment in its favor on such inter-

rogatories notwithstanding the general verdict was prop-

erly overruled.

[Reversed on other grounds.]
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DEVINE V. FEDERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1911.

250 Illinois, 203.

Mr. Justice Cooke delivered the opinion of the court :

This was an action brought in the municipal court of the

city of Chicago by John F. Devine, as administrator of the

estate of Ralph W. Chance, deceased, against the Federal

Life Insurance Company, to recover the sum of $1000 al-

decedent was in the position of danger in which he had so
negligently placed himself, the defendant knew of hi. perilou po ition or might have known it by the exerci e of ordinary care in time to have prevented the injury, an that
it ne ligentl failed to take advanta ·e of th e la. t lear
·ban to prevent th injury. It is the duty of this ourt
to r on ile the interrogatories with the general verdict if
they can be so re.conciled by any evidence which mirrht hav
been introduced within the issues; and to thi. end, th
court, in ruling upon this motion, will treat the ca e as
though this evidence had been introduced and acted upon
by the jury. In view of what we have aid, we are of the
opinion that the an wers to the interro;atorie are not in ·
irrecon ilable conflict with the g neral verdict and the mo tion of app llant for judgment in it favor on uch interrogatories notwith tanding the general verdict was properly overruled.

* • • * * * * * * •

leged to be due on a policy of insurance claimed to have

been issued by the company to Chance in his lifetime. The

[Reversed on other gromids.]

policy was dated May 4, 1907, Chance was struck and

killed by a train of the Illinois Central Railroad Company

on the morning of May 30, 1907. The defense to the ac-

tion was that the i^olicy had never been in force, as it had

not been delivered to Chance and he had never paid any

part of the first premium. The claim of the administrator

was, that by an arrangement with Robert J. Jeffs, the gen-

DEVINE V. FEDERAL LIFE IN URANCE COMP ANY.
Supreme Court of Illinois.

1911.

250 Illinois, 203.

MR. J STICE CooKE deli ered the opinion of the .court:
Thi wa an action brought in the muni ipal court of the
city of hi ago b~~ John F. Devine as admini trator of th
. tat of Ralph W. hance d ea d again t th Federal
Lif In urance om1 any to re o er th um of $100 all
d to be due on a poli y of in urance laim d to haYe
be n i u d b th compan. to hance in hi lif time. The
poli -5· wa dat d -r..Iay 4 19 7.
han wa tru k and
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on th
or inO' of ~lay . 1 07.
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was, that by an arrangem nt with Robert J. Jeff , the gen-
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eral agent for the insurance company and the person who

secured the application of Chance, the policy was delivered

by the company to Jeffs for Chance, and it was held by Jeffs

to secure the pajTnent of three notes given by Chance to

Jeffs, one for the amount of the first premium, one for $50

and one for $10.14. After the death of Chance, and on

June 3, 1907, Jeffs, who had held the policy from the time

of its issuance until that date, returned it to the insurance

company, endorsed ''not taken." The jury found the is-

sues for the plaintiff and returned a verdict for the full

amount of the policy, $1000. Judgment was rendered on

this verdict and an appeal was taken to the Appellate Court

for the First District, where the judgment of the municipal

court was affirmed. The case is brought here by appeal

upon a certificate of importance.

It is first contended that this judgment should be reversed

for the reason that the general verdict is contrary to certain

special findings of fact made by the jury. The jury were

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

asked to answer twelve special interrogatories which were

submitted to them. Of the twelve, three were so framed

that no answer was required by reason of the answers given

to certain others of the interrogatories. By the first inter-

logatory the jury were asked, "Was the policy sued on in

this action delivered by the Federal Life Insurance Com-

pany to Ealph W. Chance during his lifetime?" To this

the jury answered ' ' no, ' ' and it is claimed that this finding

is so inconsistent with the general verdict that it must be

held to control the same and that the court should have en-

tered judgment for the appellant. In determining whether

a special finding is so inconsistent with the general verdict

that the latter must be held to be controlled by the former

we cannot look at the evidence. All reasonable presump-

tions will be entertained in favor of the general verdict

while nothing will be presumed in aid of the special finding

of fact. The inconsistency must be so irreconcilable as to

be incapable of being removed by any evidence admissible

under the issues. (Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co.

V. Dunleavy, 129 111. 132.) Applying this rule, we find that

there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between this special

findin'g of fact and the general verdict. By its terms the

application for a policy of insurance may be made a part of

tlio policy itself. The application may or may not provide

eral agent for the insurance company and the person who
ecured the application of Chance, the policy was delivered
by the company to Jeffs for Chance, and it was held by Jeffs
to secure the payment of three notes given by Chance to
Jeffs, one for the amount of the first premium, one for $50
and one for $10.14.
After the death of Chance, and on
June 3, 1907, Jeffs, who had held the policy from the time
of its issuance until that date, returned it to the insurance
company, endorsed ''not taken.''
The jury found the isues for the plaintiff and returned a verdict for the full
amount of the policy, $1000.
Judgment was rendered on
this verdict and an appeal was taken to the Appellate Court
for the Fir t Di trict, where the judgment of the municipal
court was affirmed.
The case is brought here by appeal
upon a certificate of importance.
It is first contended that this judgment should be reversed
for the reason that the general verdict is contrary to certain
pecial findings of fact made by the jury. The jury were
a ked to answer twelve special interrogatories which were
, ubmitted to them.
Of the twelve, three were so framed
that no answer was required by reason of the answers given
to certain others of the interrogatories. By the first interrogatory the jury were asked, ''Was the policy sued on in
this action delivered by the Federal Life Insurance Company to Ralph W. Chance during his lifetime~"
To this
the jury answered "no," and it is claimed that this finding
is so inconsi tent with the general verdict that it must be
held to control the same and that the court should have entered judgment for the appellant. In determining whether
a sp cial finding is so incoil istent with the general verdict
that the latter must be held to be controlled by the former
w cannot look at the evidenc . All reasonable presumption will be entertained in favor of the general v rdict
while nothing will
r um d in aid of the sp ial finding
f fa t. The incon i tency mu t b o irr .con ilabl a to
in ·a a 1 of being r moved by any evid nc admi sible
un r the i u . (Chicago and N orthwe tern Railway Co.
v . Dunl a ·y, 29 Ill. 132.) A J 1. in°· this rul , we find that
th r i.· no irr con ila 1 in n ist n y b tw en tbi special
fi Jing f fa t and th g nrral v rdict.
y it t rms the
HPl li re t1on f r a poliry fin . ll' n may b
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1l 0 r }j · it. lf. Tb appli ation may r ay not provide
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that the insurance shall take effect only upon the delivery of

the policy to the insured. Unless expressly made so by the

contract itself, an actual delivery of a policy of insurance

to the insured is not essential to the validity of the contract,

and the rule under such circumstances is, that a policy be-

comes binding upon the insurer when signed and forwarded

to the insurance broker to whom the application for insur-

ance was made, to be delivered to the insured. ^^^lere an

a])plication is made for insurance there is no liability until

t)ie application is accepted, but the acceptance and issuing

of the policy complete the contract. (Rose v. Mutual Life

Ins. Co. 240 111. 45.) The finding of the jury that the pol-

icy had never been delivered to Chance was not the deter-

mination of any ultimate fact, or of a fact which had a con-

trolling effect upon any ultimate fact. This finding is not

so inconsistent with the general verdict that it should con-

trol, and the court did not err in ignoring this finding and

entering judgment on the verdict.
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It is urged that special findings numbered 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10

and 12 are also inconsistent with the general verdict. We

do not so regard them. The third finding was that the de-

ceased had not paid the premium on his policy in cash ; the

fifth, that he did execute a note for the amount of the pre-

mium ; the sixth, that the note was executed on May 10, 1907,

and delivered to Jeffs ; the seventh, that the note was pay-

able in installments of $2.50 each, and that the first install-

ment became due on May 29, !I907; the eighth, that Chance

did not pay the installment falling due on May 29, 1907 ; the

tenth, that none of the installments mentioned in said note

were paid during the lifetime of Chance; and the twelfth,

that the policy sued on contained the provision, '^ failure to

pay any premium or note, or interest thereon, when due, will

forfeit, without notice, the policy and all payments thereon,

excepting as herein provided." It is not necessary that a

premium on a policy of life insurance should be paid in

cash. It can be paid by the giving of a note, or otherwise,

if so agreed by the parties. That Chance executed a note

and delivered it to Jeffs, the agent, for the amount of the

first year's premium, and that at the time of his death he

was in default in the payment of this note, would not neces-

sarily invalidate the insurance notwithstanding the pro-

vision found to have been contained in the policy, as Jeffs

SPECIAL !NTERR
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that the in urance shall take effect only upo the delivery of
the poli y tot e in ured. Unless ex1 re ly made so by the
ontract it elf, an actual delivery of a policy of insurance
to the insured is not essential to the validity of the contract,
and the rule under such circumstances is, that a policy beomes binding upon the insurer when signed and forwarded
to the insurance broker to whom the application for insurance wa made, to be delivered to the insured. Where an
application is made for insurance there is no liability until
the application is accepted, but the acceptance and issuing
of the policy complete the contract.
(Rose v. Mi(,tual Life
lns. Co. 240 Ill. 45.) The :finding of the jury that the policy had never been delivered to Chance was not the determination of any ultimate fact, or of a fact which had a controlling effect upon any ultimate fact. This :finding is not
. o incon i tent with the general verdict that it should control, and the court did not err in ign9ring this finding and
entering judgment on the verdict.
It is urged that special :findings numbered 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10
and 12 are also inconsistent with the general verdict. We
do not so regard them. The third finding was that the deeased had not paid the premium on his policy in cash; the
fifth, that he did execute a note for the amount of the premium; the sixth, that the note was executed on May 10, 1907,
and delivered to Jeffs; the seventh, that the note was payable in installments of $2.50 each, and that the first installment became due on May 29, 1907; the eighth, that Chance
did not pay the installment falling due on May 29, 1907; the
tenth, that none of the installments mentioned in said not
were paid during the lifetime of Chance; and the twelfth
that the policy sued on contained the provision ''failure to
pay any premium or note, or interest thereon, when due, will
f rfeit without notice tlie policy and all paym nt ther on.
x epting as herein provided.'' It is not n ce sary that a
pr mium on a policy of life insuranc should be paid in
a h. It can be paid by the oivin O' of a note or otherwi.__ e,
if o agreed by the parties. That Chance executed a not
and deli' ered it to Jeff the ag nt, for th amount of the
fir t year' premium, and that at th time of hi death he
wa in d fault in the payment of thi n te would not nee . rily ·in alidate th in uran
notwith tanding the pro' i. ion found to have been contained in the policy, as Jeffs
'.l

560
560 Tkial Peacticb [Chap. 13

may have taken the note under such circumstances as would

constitute an absolute pajonent of the premium. A further

reason why these special findings do not show a forfeiture

i)f the policy is, that by the twelfth finding the policy con-

tained a clause providing for a forfeiture under certain

circumstances, ' ' excepting as herein provided. ' ' What the

exceptions are is not shown by any of the special findings.

For anything that is disclosed by these findings, the circum-

stances may have been such that they come within some ex-

ception contained in the policy which would prevent a for-

feiture. As we view the special findings of the jury, and

testing them by the rule above referred to, we do not regard

any of them as inconsistent with the general verdict.

We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the

Appellate Court is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Me. Chief Justice Vickees took no part in the considera-

tion or decision of this case.
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Section 7. Effect of Answees Inconsistent With Each

Othee.

DRAKE V. JUSTICE GOLD MINING COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Colorado. 1904,

32 Colorado, 259.

Me. Justice Campbell delivered the opinion of the court.

The controversy here is between the owners of the Wash-

ington and Justice lode claims, situate in Gilpin county, as

to the ownership of ore bodies of a vein under the surface,

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 13

may have taken the note under such cir,cumstances as would
constitute an absolute payment of the premium. A further
reason why these special findings do not show a forfeiture
l)f the policy is, that by the twelfth finding the policy contained a clause providing for a forfeiture under certain
circumstances, ''excepting as herein provided.'' What the
exceptions are is not shown by any of the special findings.
For anything that is disclosed by these findings, the circumstances may have been such that they come within some exception contained in the policy which would prevent a forfeiture. As we view the special findings of the jury, and
testing them by the rule above referred to, we do not regard
any of them as inconsistent with the general verdict.
* * * * * * * * * *
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the
Appellate Court is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. CHIEF J us TICE V ICKERs took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

and within the exterior boundaries of the Washington lode

extended downward vertically. The claim of each party

is based upon ownership of the apex.

The cause was tried before a jury, and the court, upon

request, submitted, and the jury answered, three interroga-

tories, and also returned what the parties call a general ver-

dict, in favor of the defendant, on which judgment for it

SECTION 7.

EFFECT OF ANSWERS INCONSISTENT
OTHER.

w ITH EACH

DRAKE V. JUSTICE GOLD MINING COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Colorado.
32

Colorado,

1904.

259.

MR. J usTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.
T e controversy here is between the own r of the Washington and Ju ti e lode claims, ituate in Gilpin county, a
to tl owner hi of or bodies of a vein under the surface,
and within th xt rior oundari of the W a hington lode
down ard v rtically.
The claim of each party
du
r hi f t e apex.
tri before a jury, and the court, upon
d, a d the jury an wered, three interrogat ri s, an al r t r d what th parti call a general verdict, in favor of the def ndant, on which judgm nt for it
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was entered by the court. The i)laintiffs in error claim

that the answers to these three interrogatories were in their

favor, and are so inconsistent with the general verdict that,

under section 199 of our civil code so providing, the special

findings of fact, in such circumstances, must control the

general verdict.

Where a special finding of fact, inconsistent with the

general verdict, is so irreconcilable therewith as to be in-

capable of removal by any evidence admissible under the

general issues, the general verdict cannot stand, and judg-

ment entered upon it is improper. Every presumption and

intendment, however, is to be indulged in favor of a general

verdict, and in ascertaining whether such inconsistency

exists, recourse may not be had to the evidence actually ad-

duced at the trial, but may be to the issues as made by the

pleadings; and if, by any possible competent evidence that

might be produced thereunder, the apparent inconsistency

can be overcome, it may be disregarded, and the general
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verdict permitted to stand. But in the view we take of

whether there is such an inconsistency as the plaintiffs in

the case, it is not necessary, for two reasons, to decide

error assert.

1. We do not so hold, but for the purpose of the present

opinion we assume, with both parties, that the verdict re-

turned is a general verdict, and, with plaintiffs in error, that

it is in such irreconcilable conflict with the three special

findings of fact to which they allude, as to have made it the

duty of the trial court to disregard the general verdict, and

enter judgment upon the special findings, had action of the

court been seasonably and properly invoked. Such an in-

consistency may be waived by the party against whom it

operates, or he may, in the appropriate way, complain of it.

If, however, a party desires to have heard in an appellate

tribunal his objection to the entering of a judgment on a

general verdict which is inconsistent with special findings,

he must first call the attention of the lower court thereto

by a motion for judgment upon the special findings, not-

withstanding the general verdict. A motion for a new

trial does not save the point. Here plaintiffs in error neg-

lected to move for judgment on the findings, and therefore

thev mar not. on this review, for the first time be heard as

to the alleged inconsistency. — 2 Thompson on Trials, <^ 2696.

T. p.— 36

was entered by the court.
The plaintiffs in error claim
that the answers to these three interrogatories were in thei1
favor, and are so inconsistent with the general verdict that,
under section 199 of our civil code so providing, the r ecial
:findings of fact, in such circumstances, must control tLe
general verdict.
Where a special :finding of fact, inconsistent with the
general verdict, is so irreconcilable therewith a to be incapable of remo al by any evidence admi ible und r the
general is ues, the general verdict cannot stand, and judgment entered upon it i improper. Every presumption and
intendment, however, is to be indulged in favor of a gen ral
'erdict, and in ascertaining whether such inconsistency
exists, recourse may not be had to the evidence actually adduced at the trial, but may be to the i sues as made by th e
pleadings; and if, by any possible competent evidence tha~
might be produced thereunder, the apparent incon i tency
can be overcome, it may be disregarded, and the general
verdict permitted to stand.
But in the view we take of
whether there is such an inconsistency as the plaintiffs in
the case, it is not necessary, for two reasons, to decide
error assert.
1. We do not so hold, but for the purpo e of the present
opinion we a sume, with both parties, that the verdict returned i a general verdict, and, with plaintiffs in error, that
it i in uch irreconcilable conflict with the three perial
:finding of fact to which they allude, as to have made it th
dut of the trial court to disregard the general erdict an 1
enter judgment upon the special :findin°· had a tion of the
court been seasonably and properly invoked.
uch an inon i tency may be waived by the party agajn t whom it
I rates, or he may, in the appropriate way, mr lain fit.
If, howe' er, a party de ire to ha e h ard in an appellat
tri unal hi obje tion to the nt rin of a j idgm nt on a
g n r 1 v r i t whi h i in on i t nt with . p cial fin inohe mu t :fir t all the att ntion of the low r court th r to
by a motion for judo-m nt upon th , p cial fin in()' notwith. tandincr the
n ral 'T r i t.
moti n for a n w
trial doe. not "' av th point. H r plaintiff in error n glElrt d to mov for judgm nt on th fin incr , and th r for
tlwY maY not. on thi, r 'i w for th fir t tim be h ar<l a
to th al10~: inc n. i. t ncy.-2 Thomp on on Trial ~ 2696.
T. P.-36
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Many cases in Indiana, where such questions seem to have

arisen more frequently than in any other state, expressly

hold that such a motion is a necessary condition precedent to

the right to be heard in an appellate tribunal. — Bartlett v.

Pittsburgh, etc, Ely. Co., 94 Ind. 281; Anderson et al v.

Hubble, 93 Ind. 570; BricUey v. Weghorn et al, 71 Ind.

497 ; Adamson v. Rose, 30 Ind. 380. Additional authorities

are collected in 20 Enc. PI. & Pr. 375.

2. The foregoing is upon the assimiption that only three

interrogatories were answered by the jury, and all of them

were in favor of plaintiffs, and inconsistent with the gen-

eral verdict returned for defendant. The record, however,

discloses that three other interrogatories submitted by the

court were answered by the jury clearly and distinctly in

favor of the defendant, and they support, in every par-

ticular, the general verdict. These six answers, taken to-

gether, do not show that the jury so misunderstood the is-

sues or were in any way so confused as to make a new trial
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necessary. Such being the case, the doctrine seems to be

well settled that contradictory and inconsistent special find-

ings destroy each other, and the general verdict stands.—

Ind., etc., Gas Co. v. McMath, 26 Ind, App. 154; Midland

Steel Co. V. Baugherty, 26 Ind. App. 272; 2 Thompson on

Trials, -§ 2692. For additional authorities, see 20 Enc.

PI. & Pr. 354, 364 et seq.

The judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

Affirmed.

ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COM-

PANY V. BRICKER.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1899,

61 Kansas, 224.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Smith, J. : The findings of the jury being inconsistent

with one another, the verdict cannot stand. It is found that

the direct cause of the injury was the failure of the fore-

Many cases in Indiana, where such questions seem to have
arisen more frequently than in any other state, expressly
hold that such a motion is a necessary condition pre.cedent to
the right to be heard in an appellate tribunal.-Bartlett v.
Pittsbitrgh) etc.) Rly. Co.) 94 Ind. 281; Anderson et al v.
Hiibble) 93 Ind. 570; Brickley v. W eghorn et al., 71 Ind.
497; Adamson v. Rose) 30 Ind. 380. Additional authorities
are collected in 20 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 375.
2. The foregoing is upon the assumption that only three
interrogatories were answered by the jury, and all of them
were in favor of plaintiffs, and inconsistent with the general verdict returned for defendant. The record, however,
discloses that three other interrogatories submitted by the
court were answered by the jury clearly and distinctly in
favor of the defendant, and they support, in every par-·
ti ular, the general verdict. These six answers, taken together, do not show that the jury so misunderstood the issues or were in any way so confused as to make a new trial
necessary. Such being the case, the doctrine seems to be
well settled that contradictory and inconsistent special findings destroy each other, and the general verdict stands.Ind., etc.) Gas Co. v . McMath, 26 Ind. App. 154; Midland
Steel Co. v. Daugherty) 26 Ind. App. 272; 2 Thompson on
Trials, § 2692.
For additional authorities, see 20 Enc.
Pl. & Pr. 354, 364 et seq.
* * * * * * * * * *
The judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Affirmed.

ST. LOUIS & SAN FRAN IS 0 RAILWAY COMPANY V. BRICKER.
Supreme Court of Kansas.

1899.

61 J(ansas, 224.

Th pinion of th
irt wa d liv r d by
RM1Trr, .T.: Th fin ing, of tb jury b inO' inconsistent
with on an th r tl1 ver<lirt ('annot stand . It is found that

th

t cause of th injury wa th failure of the fore-

~ec.
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man in charge of the bridge repairers to give timely warn-

ing to the defendant in error, and neglect of the foreman to

inform the men who were unloading the timbers that there

was any one under the bridge at work. It is also found

that defendant in error knew that his coemployees were at

work above him, and that they were about to throw off a

stick of timber. This, coupled with the finding that

Bricker could have avoided the injury complained of had he

remained where he was at work and watched which side of

the bridge the stick of timber was about to fall, tends to the

conclusion that the defendant in error was guilty of contrib-

utory negligence, and that his own want of care, and not

that of the foreman, caused the injury. While want of

ordinary care on the part of the foreman is expressly found

in at least six of the answers to particular questions, yet a

strong showing of contributory negligence on the part of

plaintiff below appears in three other answers.

The inconsistency between these different findings is so
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palpable and clear as to render them irreconcilable. In

one answer the jury say that plaintiff below had no timely

warning of danger, and in another that his situation and

information were such that he needed none — in effect, say-

ing that a warning would not contribute to the knowledge

he already possessed of his dangerous position. The gen-

eral verdict, based on such findings, must be set aside.

{Shoemaker v. St. L. d S. F. Ely. Co., 30 Kan. 359, 2 Pac.

517; A. T. & S. F. Rid. Co. v. Weber, Adm'r, 33 id. 543,

6 Pac. S77;A.T.£ S. F. Rid. Co. v. Maker, 23 id. 163.)

The judgment of the court below will be reversed, and a

new trial ordered.
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man in charge of the bridge repairers to give timely warning to the defendant in error, and neglect of the foreman to
inform the men 'Nho were unloading the timbers that there
was any one under the bridge at work. It is al o found
that defendant in error kn w that his coemployees were at
work above him, and that they were about to throw off a
stick of timber.
Thi , coupled with the finding that
Bricker could have avoided the injury complained of had he
remained where he wa at work and watched which side of
the bridge the stick of timber was about to fall, tends to the
conclusion that the defendant in error was guilty of contributory negligence, and that his own want of care, and not
that of the foreman, cau ed the injury.
While want of
ordinary care on the part of the foreman is exp re sly found
in at least six of the an wers to particular questions, yet a
stronO' showing of contributory neglig nee on the part of
plaintiff below appear in three other answers.
The inconsi tency between the e different findings is so
palpable and clear as to render them irreconcilable.
In
one answer the jury say that plaintiff b low had no timely
warning of danger, and in another that his situation and
information were such that he needed none-in effect, saying that a warning would not contribute to the knowledge
he already po e ed of his dangerou po ition. The general verdict, ba ed on uch finding , mu t be et a ide.
(Shoemaker v. St. L. & S. F. Rly. Co., 30 I(an. 359, 2 Pac.
517; A. T. & S. F. Rld. Co. v. Weber, Adm'r, 33 id. 543,
6 Pac. 877; A. T. & S. F. Rld. Co. v. Maher, 23 id. 163.)
The judgment of the court below will be reversed, and a
new trial ordered.

CHAPTER XIV.

SPECIAL VERDICTS.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. PECK.

CHAPTER XIV.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1871.

8 Kansas, 660.

Beewer, J. : * * *

SPECIAL VERDICTS.

**********

In this case a special verdict was returned at the instance

of the plaintiff. Objection was made to the verdict on the

FIRST NATIONAL BANI{ V. PECK.

ground that it did not state all the facts established by the

Supreme Court of Kansas.

evidence. Special verdicts and findings upon particular

questions of fact are by the laws of 1870 matters of right.

Laws 1870, p. 173, sec. 7. It is no longer discretionary with

1871.

8 Kansas, 660.

the court to require them or not. Under these circum-

stances it becomes important to determine the scope of a

special verdict as fixed by our statute. Considerable dif-

ference of opinion has existed in reference to it, and a ju-

BREWER,

J.:. * *
* * * * • • • * • •

dicial construction in this court will doubtless be of service

in many cases. Wliat is a special verdict? Under our
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statute the jury can be called upon to respond in three ways

— by a general verdict, by a special verdict, and by re-

turning answers to particular questions of fact. True, this

latter mode of interrogating the jury can be resorted to

only in conjunction with the first, but it is nevertheless a

distinct mode. A general verdict embraces both the law

and the facts. It states the result of the whole contro-

versy. It determines the ultimate rights of the parties.

It combines the decisions of the court with the opinions of

the jury. True, the jury receive the law in the instruc-

tions of the court, but they apply the law to the facts, and,

having combined the two, declare the result. So that un-

der such a verdict they really perform two functions, that

of finding the facts, and then that of applying the law to

those facts. Any one at all familiar with the experiences

of a court-room is aware that the errors of the jury result

564

In this case a special verdict was returned at the instance
of the plaintiff. Objection was made to the verdict on the
ground that it did not state all the facts established by the
evidence.
Special verdicts and findings upon particular
questions of fact are by the laws of 1870 matters of right.
Laws 1870, p. 173, sec. 7. It is no longer discretionary with
the court to require them or not.
Under these circumstances it becomes important to determine the scope of a
special verdict as fixed by our statute. Considerable difference of opinion has existed in reference to it, and a judicial construction in this court will doubtless be of service
in many cases. What is a special verdict~
Under our
tatute the jury can be called upon to respond in three ways
-by a general verdict, by a spe.cial verdict, and by returning an wers to particular questions of fact. True, this
latter mode of interrogating the jur:y can be resorted to
only in conjun tion with the first, but it is nevertheless a
distinct mode. A general .verdict embraces both the law
and tbe facts . It tates the result of the whole controversy.
It determin the ultimate rights of the parties.
t combin . th d ci ions of the court with the opinions of
the jury.
Tru , th jury re eive the law in the in tructions of the 'court, but they a ply the law to the facts, and,
having mbinrd th two, d lar th r ult.
80 that unrl r . u h a v r i t they really p rform two fun tions, that
of finding th fa ts, and then that of a lyinO' the law to
those fart. . Any on at all familiar with the exp rien es
of a court-room is aware that the error of the jury result
564
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oftener from their misapplication of the law as stated, to

the facts, than from their misapprehension of the facts. A

special verdict, on the other hand, finds only the facts, and

leaves to the court tbp duty both of determining the law and

of applying it to the facts. It is thus defined in sec. 285 of

the code of civil procedure. Gen. Stat., 684 : ' ' A special ver-

dict is that by which the jury finds facts only. It must pre-

sent the facts as established by the evidence, and not the

evidence to prove them." It was decided in 1 Miles, 26,

that "if instead of finding facts the special verdict sets out

the evidence, a new trial will be granted." Whether that

be the necessary result or no, it is clear that a special ver-

dict should not be a recital of testimony, but a iinding of

certain facts as established by such testimony. But what

facts? How minutely may they, must they, be subdivided?

The facts stated in the pleadings ; as minutely, and no more

so in the special verdict, than in the petition, answer, and

reply. The special verdict must conform to the pleadings.
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The word "facts" is used in this section in the same sense,

and refers to the same things as when used in sec. 87 of the

code, which declares that a "petition must contain a state-

ment of the facts 'Constituting the cause of action, in ordi-

nary and concise language without repetition." There

are in every cause of action certain essential substantive

facts, certain elements, so to speak. Every pleader knows

this when he prepares a petition. The omission of any one

of these elements renders the petition defective. The fail-

ure to prove one defeats the cause of action. Now these

essential elemental facts are the ones the special verdict

must find, no more, no less. A history of the case in the

nature of a recital of the testimony, or a detail of the va-

rious steps in the transaction is not the function of a spe-

cial verdict. It responds to the various facts of the peti-

tion like a special denial, touching ea-ch separately. The

statute clearly points to this construction. It says, (T^aws

1870, p. 173, ch. 87, sec. 7, amending sec. 286 of the code,)

"the court shall direct the jury to find a special verdict in

writing upon all or any of the issues in the case." The is-

sues are to be passed upon in the special verdict. In Bacon's

Abridgement, vol. 10, p. 313. it is said, citing as authority

Unitpd St flies v. Briqht, Bright 's Trial, 199, "If in a special

verdict the jury find the issue, all they find beyond is sur-

SPECIAL VERDICTS
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oft ner from their mi appli ation of the law a tated, to
the fa ct , than from their mi ap1 rehen ion of the fad . A
pecial verdict, on the other hand, find only the fa t. , and
leaves to the onrt t w dnty botb of determining th law and
f applying it to the facts. It is thus defined in ec. 2 5 of
the code of cfril pro ·edure, Gen. , tat., 6 4: ''
pecial verdict iF that by which the jury find fa ts only. It mu t present the facts as e tabli hed by the evidence, and not the
evidence to prove them. '' It was decided in 1 :l\Iiles, 26,
that "if instead of finding facts the pecial verdict et out
the evidence, a new trial will be o-ranted.'' Wheth r that
be the neces ary result or no, it i clear that a special verdict should not be a recital of te timony but a anding of
ertain fa cts as e tabli hed byr uch te timony. But what
facts 1 How minutely may they mu t the be subdiYided ~
The fact. tated in th pleadings ; as minutely, and no more
. o in the . pecial erclict than in the petition an wer and
re ly. The special Yerdict mu t conform to the pleadings.
The word ''fact '' i u ed in this ection in the same n e,
and r efen) to tbe ame thing a. when u ed in ec. 87 of the
code which declare. that a ''petition must contain a tatement of the fact ,nonstituting the cau e of action in ordinary and conci e language without repetition.'' There
are in every can e of a tion certain es ential _uh. tan ti Ye
fact certain elements so to peak. Every pleader knows
thi when he prepares a petition. The omi .. ion of an:v one
of the e element renders the petition defe.::tive. The failure to prove one defeats the can e of action.
ow the e
ntial elemental fact are th on th . 1 <>ial Yerdict
mu t find no more, o le . A hi ton.,. of th case in the
nature o! a recital of th te. timony or a c etail of the ari ou tep in the tran,. a tion i not the function of a spe<>ial ver i t. It r . pond to the variou facts of the petition like a pecial denial touching ea.2h s parately. The
. tatute clearl~? point t thi. ro tructio . It . a\'~, (Law
1 7 . p. 17. , rh. 7 . . er. 7. amen(1ing ~ . 2 6 of th code )
'' tbe court ha11 dir ct the jury to find a
cial Yerdict in
writing u1 n all or any of th i , u in th a. .
The i ite are to b I a" ed upon in the , p cial verdi t. In Bacon'
brirlgpm nt vol. J 0, . ::n .. it i~ ai<l. riting a. autb.ori .
United 8tnte v. Bri.q ht Bright'. Trial, J !19, "If in a pecial
verdi t the jury find the i ue, all the find beyond is surJ,
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pliisage." The special verdict is simply the response of

the jury separately to the several issues presented by the

pleadings. ***** xhe judgment will be affirmed.

All the Justices concurring.

STANDARD SEWING MACHINE COMPANY V.

TRIAL PRACTICE
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plu age.' '
The sp .cial verdict is imply the response of
the jury separately to the several i sues presented by the
pleading . * * * * * The judgment will be affirmed.
All the J ustices concurring.

ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 1902.

201 Pennsylvania State, 645.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Mestrezat, March 3, 1902 :

This was an action of assumpsit on a fire insurance pol-

icy issued by the defendant. On the trial the court below

instructed the jury to return a special verdict and to answer

STANDARD SEWING MACHINE COMPANY V.
ROYAL INSURANCE COlVIPANY.

the following questions :

1. Did Bedient take possession of the property in the

interest of the machine company, and let Markle and Merry-

man hold it for the company after the assignment for the

benefit of creditors and prior to the fire in question?

,.,5"i.tpreme Coitrt of Pennsylvania.

1902.

201 Pennsylvania State, 645.

2. Did the machine company thus acting through Be
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dient subject the property to hazard not contemplated by

the policy and stipulated against by the provisions thereof?

3. What was the loss? This is to be estimated by the

cost of repairing or replacing the propertv with material of

like kind and quality so as not to exceed the limit thus indi-

cated.^

1 Form of special verdict. This method of preparing a special verdict, —

in the form of questions to be pnt to the jury upon all the material facts in

the cape, is a common and convenient one. It is sometimes prescribed by

statute.

In any event, the jury cannot be expected to draw up their own form of

special verdict, and it must be done by counsel. As said in Pittsburgh, Ft.

W, and C. Ey. Co. v. Ruby, (1871) 38 Tnd. 294, "Jurors are very competent

to understand the evidence, find facts, and draw conclusions from the facts

found ; but as a general rule, and especially in complicated cases, they are

not equal to the task of preparing a syiecial verdict. They do not know

what facts should be found to cover the issues, nor the manner of stating

them. ' '

Another familiar method is for counsel on each side to prepare a special

verdict in the form of a statement of the facts which they believe have been

estniilished by the evidence, and submit the same to the trial judge, vho there-

upon hands both forms, with or without amendment, as he deems proper, to

the jury under proper instructions, and the jury may then adopt either one,

in the form presented to them or with such changes as they wish to make,

fiR their verdict. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Ruby, supra; 22 Encyc.

PI. & Pr. 993.

Opinion by l\fR. JUSTICE "h1EsTREZAT, March 3, 1902:
Thi was an action of assumpsit on a fire insurance policy issued by the defendant. On the trial the court below
instructed the jury to return a special verdict and to answer
the following que tions:
1. Did Bedient take possession of the property in the
intere. t of the machine company, and let Markle and Merryman hold it for the company after the assignment for th e
benefit of creditors and prior to the fire in question ~
2. Did the machine company thus acting through Bedient ubject the property to hazard not contemplated by
the policy and stipulated against by the provi ions ther e of ~
3. What wa the los ~ This is to be estimated by the
cost of repairin()' or replacing the property with material of
like kind and quality so as not to exceed the limit thus indicat d. 1
1 Form of special i• rdict.
'l'hi method of preparinCY a special verdict,in the form of que. tions to 1 p11t to the jury upon all the material fact in
th
a e, is a ommon a n cl cony nient one.
It is . ometime prescribed b y
statute.
Tn any event, tb jnr:v rnnnot be xpe ted to ilraw up their own form of
p C'ia l ver lict, anrl it m11~t lie 1lon hy counsel .
As aid in Pitt b urgh, Ft.
W. ancl . Ry. o. v. Rnby ( 1 71) 3 Ind. 294, "Juror are v ry competent
to under. tnncl th
Yid n · , :find fact , and draw conclusions fro m t he fa t s
founc1; hut as a g n ra1 rul , and e p ial1y in complicat d cases, they a re
not eCJual to the task of pr paring a sp cia1 v rcli t .
They do not know
what fa ts hould be found to over th i ues, nor the mann r of tating
tb m.''
Anotb r famrnar method js for onnRel on each Rirl to prepare a pecial
ver1liC't in the form of a statem nt of th fart n·hirh th y b li ve have been
st~hli sliecl by the vi<l nr . and snhmit th . am to h trial jnd e, v•ho therenpon h~rncls both form . , "ith or witho11t am nrlm nt., as h cl ms prop r, t o
th jnry nncl r prop r ilrntrnrti 11 , ancl th<' jur)· may th n ad pt ith r one,
in th form pr<' ~· ntrd to 1h m r "ith snrh <'hangs ns tb y wi b to ma ke,
:1~ th ir ·rnlic·t.
f'itt!ilJtil'gh Ti'L W. & . Ry. o. v. Rnby, s1ipra; 22 E ncyc.
Pl. & Pr. 03.
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The first question was, by agreement of counsel, an-

swered in the affirmative ; the jury returned a negative reply

to the second question; and to the third question, the an-

swer was $1,747. Subsequently the court entered judg-

ment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,747.

This appeal is by the defendant and error is alleged in the

ruling of the court on the measure of damages, in the con-

struction put upon the policy of insurance by the court, and

in entering judgment on the special verdict, the defendant

claiming that the facts found were not sufficient to sustain

the judgment.

The last reason assigned for reversing the judgment of

the court below may be considered first.

It is the province of a special verdict to find and place on

record all the essential facts in the case. This includes the

disputed as well as the undisputed facts. What is not

found by the verdict is presumed not to exist, and no infer-

ences as to matters of fact are permitted to supply the
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facts themselves which the verdict should have found. In

entering judgment, the court is confined to the facts found

In- the special verdict, and unless they are sufficiently found

no judgment can be entered. The jury must find the facts

and the court declare the law on the facts so found. Such

are the requisites of a special verdict as held in all our

cases. In Wallingford v. Dunlap, 14 Pa. 33, it is said:

"It is of the very essence of a special verdict that the jury

should find the facts, on which the court is to pronounce

judgment according to law. And the court will not intend

anything, especially any fact not found by the jury. * * *

The undisputed facts ought to have been incorporated in

the special verdict. * * * The court is confined to the

facts found by the special verdict. And when a special

verdict is given, the court ought to confine its judgment to

that verdict. * * * But this special verdict is so defective

and erroneous, and the judgment so anomalous in being en-

tered partly on the verdict and partly on what was called

undisputed facts, that we must do what has often been

done before, reverse the judgment and send the case back

for a new trial." Me. Justice Mercur, delivering the

opinion of the court in Vansyckel r. Stewart, 77 Pa. 126,

says: "It (special verdict) must include both disputed and

undisputed facts. The court will not infer a fact not found

The fir t question wa , by agreement of counsel anwered in the affirmative; the jur returned a negative reply
to the second question; and to the third question, the answer was $1,747.
Sub equently the court entered judgment on the verdict in fa or of the plaintiff for $1,747.
This appeal is by the defendant and error is alleged in the
ruling of the court on the mea ure of damages, in the onstruction put upon the policy of in. urance by the court, and
in entering judgment on the spe ial verdict the defendant
claiming that the facts found were not sufficient to su tain
the judgment.
The last rea on as igned for rever ing the judgment of
the court below may be con idered fir t.
It is the province of a special erdict to find and place on
record all the essential facts in the case. This includes the
disputed as well as the undi puted facts.
What is not
found by the verdict is presumed nofto exist, and no inferences as to matters of fact are permitted to upply the
facts themselves which the verdict hould have found. I n
entering judgment, the court is confined to the facts found
by the special verdict and unle s they are sufficiently found
no judgment can be entered. The jury must find the fact
and the court declare the law on the facts so found. Such
are the r equisites of a special verdict as held in all our
cases. In Wallingford v . Dunlap 14 Pa. 33, it is said :
''It is of the very essence of a special verdict that the jury
should find the facts, on which the court is to pronounce
judgment according to law. And the court will not intend
anything, especially any fact not found by the jury. * * •
The undi puted facts ought to have been incorporat d in
the special vermct. * * * The court is confined to the
facts found by the special verdict.
And when a special
verdict is given, the court ought to confine its judgment t0
that verdict. * * * But this special verdict is o defecti e
and erroneous and the judgment so anomalou in being entered partly on the verdict and partly on what wa called
undisputed facts, that we mu t do what has often been
done before reverse the jud ent and end the case back
for a n ew trial.''
MR. J TICE MEROUR, deli\ erin t
o inion of the court in Vansyckel 'l. Ste'lcart, 77 Pa. 126
sav : ''It (
cia1 v r E t
u._ includ bot di ut and
un:di puted fa,_cts. Th court will not infer a fact not f und
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by the jury. It must declare the law on these facts alone.

As all the essential facts must be found in the verdict, it

follows that it cannot be aided by intendment or by ex-

trinsic facts appearing upon the record." In Tuigg v.

Treacy, 104 Pa. 498, Clark, J., speaking for the court, says :

"We cannot resort to the testimony, or to such extrinsic

matters as were undisputed at the trial, or avail ourselves

of such even as appear upon the record. It is of the very

essence of a special verdict, that the facts found are those

upon which the court is to pronounce judgment, according to

law. What is not thus found is presumed not to exist, the

verdict being conclusively the complete result of the jury's

deliberation upon the whole case presented."

In delivering the opinion of the court in the compara-

tively recent case of McCormicJc v. Royal Insurance Com-

pany, 163 Pa. 194, Chief Justice Sterrett says : ' ' Nothing

is better settled, on principle as well as authority, than that

all the facets upon which the court is to pronounce judgment
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should be incorporated in the special verdict. It is the ex-

clusive province of the jury, in the first place, to determine

all disputed questions of fact, from the evidence before

them; and then their special verdict is made up of those

findings of fact, together with such undisputed facts as may

be necessary to a just decision of the cause. * * * The

court, in considering a special verdict and entering judg-

ment thereon, is necessarily confined to the facts found and

embodied in the verdict; the latter cannot be aided by in-

tendment or extrinsic facts that may appear in the evi-

dence."

Applying these principles to the case in hand, it is appar-

ent that the verdict hero is fatally defective. As said by

Chief Justice Black in Thayer v. Society of United Breth-

ren, 20 Pa. 63, "the jury found a special verdict, but it

omits almost every importance fact." Here the verdict

found but three of the many facts necessary to support a

judgment. It is silent as to whether a policy of insurance,

the basis of this action, was issued to the plaintiff, and the

terms of the policy; as to what property was insured and

where situated; as to the loss of or damage to the insured

property and whether it occurred within the life of the pol-

icy; and as to the cause of the loss, whether by fire or other-

wise. Other omissions of fact might be suggested, but
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by the jury. It must declare the law on these facts alone.
As all the essential facts must be found in the verdict, it
follows that it cannot be aided by intendment or by extrinsic facts appearing upon the reicord."
In Tuigg v.
T1'eacy, 104 Pa. 498, CLARK, J., speaking for the court, says:
' We cannot resort to the testimony, or to such extrinsic
matters as were undisputed at the trial, or avail ourselves
of guch even as appear upon the record. It is of the very
essence of a special verdict, that the fact found are those
upon which the court is to pronounce judgment, 31ccording to
law. What is not thus found is presumed not to exist, the
Yerdict being conclusively the complete result of the jury's
deliberation upon the whole case presented.''
In delivering the opinion of the court in the comparatively recent case of McCormick v. Royal Insurance Comvany, 163 Pa. 194, CHIEF J usTrcE STERRETT says: ''Nothing
is better settled, on principle as well as authority, than that
all the faDts upon which the court is to pronounce judgment
should be incorporated in the special Yerdict. It is the exclusive province of the jury, in th e first place, to determine
all disputed que tions of fact, from the evidence before
them ; and then their special verdict is made up of those
findings of fact, together with such undisputed facts as may
be necessary to a just decision of the cause. * * * The
, ourt, in considering a special verdict and entering judgment thereon, is necessarily confined to the facts found and
embodied in the verdict; the latter cannot be aided by intendment or extrin ic facts that may appear in the evidence."
Applyin these principle to the case in hand, it is apparnt that the verdict here is fatally defectiv . As said b.
(1 IEF JusTICE BL Kin Thayer v. Society of United Brethren, 20 Pa. 63, ''the jury fo'und a pecial verdict, but it
omits almost everv imp ortanre fact.''
II ere the verdict
found but thr c of the many fa ts nee s ary to support a
j11clgment. It i. sil nt as to wh th r a policy of in urance,
th has]s of tb] . artion, wa. issu d to tl1 plaintiff, and the
t rm . of tlw polir. T; as to what property was insured and
wh re sitn trd; as to tlw lo. s of or dam ge to the insured
pr p rty and wl1cthPr it orrurr rl within th life of the policy; and as to th rause of t11 los. , wheth T by fir or otherwisE'.
Other omission.· of fa t might b UO'gested, but
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those named are sufficient to show that the verdict is wholly

inadequate to sustain the judgment entered by the court

below. A special verdict more barren of facts is not to be

found in the reported cases.

* * * the judgment is reversed and a venire facias de

novo is awarded.^

1 There is some authority to the contrary, as in Wisconsin, but see Hodges

V. Easton (1882) 106 U. S. 408, where it was held that the practice of ren-

dering judgment on a special verdict which found only the disputed facts but

not those undisputed, was a denial of the right of trial by jury.

those named are suffi ient to show that the v rdi t is wholl \
inadequate to sustain the judgment entered hv the cou;t
below. A p cial verdi·ct more barren of fact ·is not to be
found in the reported ca es.
* * * * * * * * * *
• * * the judgment is reversed and a venire f acias de
novo is awarded. 1

WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY V. RAY.

Supreme Court of Indiana. 1899.

152 Indiana, 392.

Jordan, J. — The appellant railroad company owned and

operated as one of its branches a railroad extending from

1 There is orne authority to th contrary a in Wi con in but see Hodges
v. Ea ton (1 2) 106 U. . 40 where it ~a held that the practice of ren·
rlering judgment on a pecial verdict which fonnd only the di puted facts but
not those undisputed, was a denial of the right of trial by jury.

the city of Detroit, Michigan, through Columbia City, In-

diana, to the city of Peru, in the latter State. Appellee is

the administratrix of William 0. Ray, deceased, who was at
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and prior to his death in the employ of appellant as a

brakeman on one of its local freight trains. He was ac-

cidentally killed while coupling cars at Columbia City, by

catching his foot in an unblocked guard-rail, and while in

WABASH RAILROAD co:MPANY V. RAY.

such condition was run over by the ear which he was at-

tempting to couple.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

1899,

To recover for this alleged negligent killing, the appellee

successfully prosecuted this action in the lower court, and,

upon a special verdict by the jury, obtained a judgment for

152 Indiana, 392.

$5,000. The alleged errors of which appellant complains,

in the main, are based upon the decision of the court in over-

ruling a demurrer to the amended complaint, and in deny-

ing its motion for a judgment upon the special verdict of the

jury, and in overruling its motion for a new trial.

We may, at least for the present, pass the consideration

of the sufficiency of the complaint, for the reason that sub-

stantially the same facts, and the same theory thereunder,

are disclosed by the special verdict, and if we can hold

JORDAN, J.-The appellant railroad company owned and
operated as one of its branches a railroad extending from
the city of Detroit, ~Echigan, through olumbia City, Indiana to the city of P eru in the latter tate. Appellee i
the administratrix of William 0. Ray, decea ed who was at
and prior to his death in the employ of appellant as a
brakeman on one of it local freight trains.
He was accidentally killed while coupling car at Columbia it. by
catching his foot in an unblocked guard-rail and while in
su h condition was run over by the car which he was attempting to couple.
To recover for this alleO'ed negligent killing the appellee
succe fully prosecuted this action in the lower court and
pon a special verdi t by the jury, obtained a judgment for
$5 000. The all g d error of whi h ap ellant complains
in the main ar ha ed upon the deci ion of the court in overrulinO' a demurr r to th a ended complaint and in denyin it motion for a ju<l
nt upon the ecial v rdi t of the
jury and in overrulin-, its m tion for an w trial.
We mav at lea t f r the r ent, pa th con ideration
of the ufflci ncy of the omplaint for tbe rea n that ubtantially the m fa t and th am th ory thereunder,
are disclosed by the s ecial verdict, and if we can hold
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that, under the facts therein found, appellee is entitled to a

judgment, such holding will certainly result in sustaining

the complaint. Counsel for appellant earnestly insist that

their motion for a judgment in favor of appellant, upon the

special verdict, ought to have been sustained. Preliminary

to the consideration of this insistence, we may properly

refer to some familiar and well settled rules applicable to a

special verdict, one of which is that it is the very essence of

such a verdict that it state all the material facts within the

issues of the case, and no omission of a fact therein can be

supplied by intendment. Its failure to find a fact in favor

of the party upon whom the burden of establishing it rests

is the equivalent of an express finding against him as to

such fact. When the party having the onus in a case asks

a judgment upon a special verdict, the material facts there-

in found, within the issues, must establish his right, under

the law, to a judgment, otherwise he must fail in his de-

mand; but where, as in this case, the moving party is not
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the one upon whom the burden of the issue rests, his right

to be awarded a judgment does not depend alone upon the

presence of material facts, but he may be entitled to the

judgment by reason of the absence of some essential fact

which it was incumbent upon his adversary to establish.

For the reasons stated, the facts set out in special verdict

do not entitle appellee to a judgment against appellant.

* * * The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded

to the lower court, with instructions to sustain appellant's

motion for judgment in its favor on the special verdict.

DARCEY V. FARMERS' LUMBER COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 1894.

67 Wisconsin, 245.

Action for personal injuries. Plaintiff was an employee

in defendant's sawmill, and had been such for about twenty

days before the 15th day of July, 1891, when the injuries

complained of occurred. He was twenty-three years of

[ ha1. 1-i
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that, under the fact therein found, appellee is entitled to a
judgment, such holding will certainly re ult in sustaining
the complaint. Counsel for appellant earnestly insist that
their motion for a judgment in favor of appellant, upon the
special verdict, ought to have been sustained. Preliminary
to the consideration of this insistence, we may properly
refer to some familiar and well settled rules applicable to a
special verdict, one of which is that it is the very essence of
such a verdict that it state all the material facts within the
issues of the case, and no omission of a fa ct therein can be
supplied by intendment. Its failure to find a f :wt in favor
of the party upon whom the burden of establishing it rests
is the equivalent of an express finding against him as to
such fact. When the party having the onus in a case asks
a judgment upon a special verdict, the material facts therein found, within the issues, must establi_sh his right, under
the law, to a judgment, otherwise he must fail in his demand; but where, as in this case, the moving party is not
the one upon whom the burden of the issue rests, his right
to be awarded a judgment does not depend alone upon the
presence of material facts, but he may be entitled to the
judgment by reason of the absence of some essential fact
which it was incumbent upon his adversary to establish.
* * * * * * * * * *
For the reasons tated, the facts set out jn special verdict
do not entitle appellee to a judgment against appellant.
* * * The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded
to the lower court, with in tructions to u tain appellant's
motion for judgment in its favor on the special verdict.

DARCEY V. FARMERS' LUMBER COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
87

1894.

Wisconsin, 245.

in

f r person 1 inj rj s. Plaintiff was an employee
f nd nt' saw il], an had
n uch for about twenty

o

t e 15th day of July, 1891, when the injuries
of
urred.
He was twenty-three years of

A ti

a

Chap. 14]
Chap. 14] Special Vekdicts 571

age. flis duty was to take edging and slabs from a cer-

tain line of rollers and put them on the ** slashing" table,

in which were a number of "slashing" saws; and when at

work he stood in an alley between the slashing table and the

said line of rollers. Near him was a large rotary saw,

called the * 'cut-off" saw, which revolved vertically, and was

hung at right angles with the line of rollers, and projected

into the alley in which plaintiff worked, but with room to

pass along the alley; and this saw was at all times running

at a high rate of speed. * * * The negligence charged was

in leaving the lower part of the saw uncovered.

The jury returned the following special verdict: * * *

Judgment for the plaintiff was entered on this verdict,

and defendant appealed.

WiNSLOW, J * * *

In answer to the fifth question, the jury find that the dan-

gers and risks from the exposed saw would be apparent to

any person using ordinary care and observation in like sit-
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uation with the i:)laintiff. This must include the risk from

which the plaintiff's injurj^ resulted, or else it is wholly ir-

relevant, and we so construe it. The question and answer,

therefore, meian that the plaintiff was chargeable with

knowledge of, and therefore assumed, the risk from which
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age. Hi duty was to take edginO' and . Jab from a r tain lin of rollers and put them on the " la bing" tabl ,
in which were a number of "slashinO'" saw ; and wh n at
work he stood in an alley between the slashing tabl and tlw
. aid line of rollers. Near him was a large rotar. saw,
called the "cut-off" saw, whi h revolved v rti ally, and wa.
hung at right angles with th line of roll r and proj ctecl
into the alley in which plaintiff work d, but with room to
pass along the alley; and this saw wa at all times running
at a high rate of speed. * * * Then gligence rharged wa
in l aving the lower part of the saw uncovered.
The jury returned the following special verdict: * * *
Judgment for the plaintiff was entered on this verdict,
and defendant appealed.
WINSLOW, J. * * *

* * * * * * * * * *

the accident resulted by remaining in the employment with-

out objection. This is a form of contributory negligence.

2 Thomp. Neg. 1014, sec. 19; Nadau v. White River L. Co.,

76 Wis. 120-131. In answer to the sixth question, the jury

find that there was no contributory negligence on the part

of the plaintiff.

Now, the only irround upon which it was claimed that

contributorv negligence could be imputed to plaintiff was

(as charged bv the court) flint he remained in the emplov-

ment after he knew, or ought to have known, the risk which

he incurred. This makes it very clear that the sixth ques-

tion and answer amount to a findins: that the plaintiff was

not chargeable with knowledge of the risk. But we have

seen that the fifth finding is a finding that he was charge-

able with such knowledge. The direct contradiction be-

tween these two findings makes a judgment for the plaintiff

on the verdict impossible, and a new trial must be had.

In answer to the fifth que tion, the jury find that the daner and risks from the exposed saw would be apparent to
any person using ordinary care and observation in like sitnati n with the plaintiff. Thi mu tin lude the ri k from
which the plaintiff's injury r sulted, or el e it i wholly irrelevant, and we so construe it. The question and answer,
therefore, mean that the plaintiff wa chargeable with
knowledge of, and therefore a sumed, the risk from whi.ch
the accid ent resulted by remaining in the employment without objection. This is a form of contributory negligence.
2 Thomp. Neg. 1014 sec. 19; N ad au 1 . White Ri er L. Co.,
76 Wis. 120-131. In answer to the ixth qn . tion, the jury
find that there was no contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff.
Now, the only ground upon which it wa. claimed that
rontributorv negligence could be imput d to plaintiff was
(as barged by the court) that h remain d in th mplovment after he kn w, or ou~ht to hav known the ri k whi h
h incurred. This mak . it verv l ar that the ixth que tion and answer amount to finding that th plaintiff wa
not rhargeabl with knowlr<lge of the ri. k. But w have
. e n that the fifth findino· i a fin Hng th, t he wa. bargeabl with such lrno ledg .
The dir ct
ntradi tion betw n these tw fincling. rnak s a judgment for th pl intiff
on the v rdict im o il 1 and a new trial must be had.
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By the court. — Judgment reversed, and action remanded

for a new trial.
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By the court.-J udgment reversed, and action remanded
for a new trial.

BAXTER V. CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAIL-

WAY COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 1899.

104 Wisconsin, 307.

Action by an employe of defendant to recover compensa-

tion for personal injuries received by him by the explosion

of a locomotive engine, claimed to have been caused by de-

fendant's keeping it in use with knowledge, or reasonable

means of knowledge, that it was defective to a degree which

BAXTER V. CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

rendered such an accident among the natural and reason-

able probabilities, and one which, in the exercise of ordinary

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

1899.

care, it should have apprehended.

Marshall^ J. The chief controversy on the trial was as

104

to whether the defective condition of the boiler, which

Wisconsin, 307.

caused the explosion, ought to have been discovered by the

defendant before that event, and guarded against. To cover

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

that field by the special verdict, defendant's attorneys re-

quested the court to submit for answers these four ques-

tions : '■ *■ Could the defects have been discovered without re-

moving the flues from such boiler?" ''Was it the ordi-

nary custom and practice among persons generally, using

locomotive boilers of a like kind, under similar circum-

stances, to remove the flues for the purpose, only, of in-

specting the shell of such boiler?" "Was the boiler of en-

gine No. 249, up to the time it exploded, used, operated,

treated, and inspected by the defendant in tlie manner us-

ually and ordinarily followed by persons generally, who use,

Action by an employe of defendant to recover compensation for personal injuries received by him by the explosion
of a locomotive engine, claimed to have been .cau ed by defendant's keeping it in use with knowledge, or reasonable
means of knowledge, that it was defective to a degree which
rendered such an accident among the natural and reasonable probabilities, and one which, in the exercise of ordinary
care, it should have apprehended.

* * * * * * * * * *

operate, treat, and inspect locomotive engine boilers of a

like kind under similar circumstances?" ''If you answer

'Yes' to question No. 10, did such use, operation, treatment,

and inspection cause or reveal any defects which caused the

injury to plaintiff?" Such questions were rejected and in

lieu thereof, following the question of whether the boiler

J.

The chief controversy on the trial was as
to whether the defective condition of the boiler, which
caused the explosion, ought to have been discovered by the
defendant before tbat event, and guarded against. To cover
that field by the special verdict, defendant's attorneys requ sted the court to submit for answers these four questions: " Could the defect have been discovered without removing the flues from such boiler?" "Was it the ordinary u tom and pra tice among persons generally, using
lo om tiYe boilers of a like kind, under similar circum. tanc , to remove th flues for the purpo e, only, of in, p cting th , h 11 of su h boil r ~" "W a.s the boil r of en,o -1n
o. 249, up to th time it explod d, u ed, operat d,
tr t
and in , p ct d by the defendant in th manner u ually and ordinaril. f llowed by per on g n rally, who u
ov rat tr t, and in p ct locomotiY engin b ilers of a
lil<r kin 1md r imil r ir umstan es'" "If y u an wer
'Y : ' to qn , tion No. 10 did such u. op ration, trPatment,
< ncl in. p )C'ti n an. ·
r rev al any d f •Ct whi h au. d th
injury t 11aintiff." ~ u h question wer r je t d and in
li 'll tber f, followi ; th qu tion of whether the boiler
MARSHALL,
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was defective in fact and the nature of the defects, this

question was submitted; "If you find in answer to question

No 5 that the boiler was defective at the time of said ex

plosion, then could the defendant company through its

agents and servants, by reasonable and proper care, tests,

or inspection, have discovered such defects before the ex-

plosion?" In connection with such question the jury were

instructed as follows: "Reasonable care as used in

this question means such care as ordinarily careful

persons exercise under like circumstances, and rea-

sonable tests and inspections mean such tests and

inspections as are made and employed by ordinarily

]irudent persons engaged in the same business and under

like circumstances." That ruling is assigned as error and

it appears to be one of the chief grounds of complaint. Ap-

l^ellant's counsel do not contend but that the real fact in is-

sue was, by the 'Court's question as explained, placed before

the jury for determination, but they contend that the right
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of defendant to a special finding as to every material fact

in issue, stripped of all conclusions of law, was violated be-

cause the question required the application of legal defini-

tions and explanations in order to enable the jury to prop-

erly answer it, the result being that the final conclusion em-

bodied in the answer was rather a conclusion of law than

one of fact ; and in support of that a lengthy argument upon

the character of a special verdict under the statute was

presented.

It seems hardly necessary at this day to discuss questions

so elementary as what constitutes a special verdict. It is

a finding upon all the material issues of fact raised by the

])leadings. A failure to distinguish between such facts and

the numerous evidentiary circumstances which may be the

subjects of controversy on the evidence and are relied upon

to establish the ultimate facts upon which the 'Case turns,

often leads to unjust criticism of a special verdict. A con-

clusion is not one of law because it is reached by a process

of reasoning from many primary circumstances. AYliile

such circumstances may be in dispute, the real question is,

Do they lead with reasonable certainty to, and establish,

the fact alleged by the pleading upon the one side and de-

nied by the pleading upon the other? If the subject of the

allegation in the complaint be one of law, or of mere evi-
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"Wa d fective in fact and the nature of the defects, this
qu -:tion wa ubmitt : ''If you find in an . wer to que tion
To 5 that the boiler was defecti e at the tim of aid ex·
plosion th n could the defendant om any through its
a ·ents and erYant by r a onable and proper care te t ,
or in pe tion have di covered uch defe t before the explosion . '' In connection with uch qu tion tbe jury were
in tructed a follow : "Rea onable care a u ed in
thi question mean such care a ordinarily careful
l r ons exerci e under like circum tance
an
rea. onable tests and inspections mean uch te t and
in pection a are made and emplo ed by ordinarily
I rudent per ons engaged in the ame bu in
and under
like ir um tan e . '' That ruling i a igned a error and
it a1 pear to be one of th chief ground of complaint. Ap1 llant's coun el do not contend but that the real fact in is. ue wa b. the •"ourt' que tion a xplained laced befor
the jury for determination but they cont nd that the right
of defendant to a pecial findin a to eYery material fact
in i ue, stripped of all con lu ion of law. was violated berau. e the que. tion requir d the a1 plication of 1 o·al definition and explanation in order to enable the jury to properlr an wer it the re ult being that the final on In ion embodied in the an wer wa rather a conclu. ion of law than
ne of fa t · and in upport of that a leno-thr ar<Yument upon
the character of a pecial verdict under the tatute wa
re ented .
It
m. hardly ne e ary at thi day to di cu question
o elem ntary as what con titute a
ial 'erdict. It i
a findin upon all the material i ue of fact rai ed by th
pl adin
A failur to di ting·ui h tw en u h fa t and
th num rou vid ntiar:v circum tanc whi ·h may be th
. nbje t of ntrov r y on th vid nee and r r Ii d u1 n
to e tabli.h th ultimat fa t upon whi h th a e turn
oft n lead t unju t riti i m of a p ial v r Ji t. A nlu. ion i. not on of law e cau ~ it i r a h d y a pro . .
of rea onirw fr m many I rirnar~· ir um tan
il
. uch ir•"Um tanre may b in di . ut , the r al ue tion i ,
Do th . 1 ad with r
onal J
rtainty to a
e tah]i. h,
the fact all O' d hy th
I a ing 1p n th on . id an
rnied by the I a ino· upon th other? If th uhj ct of the
allegation in the c m lai t b ne f law or of mere evi1
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dence, it has no proper place in the pleading, and hence no

necessary place in the special verdict. By the complaint,

certain facts are alleged to exist constituting the plaintiff's

cause of action and warranting the remedy sought. Those

facts, if put in issue by the answer, and controverted on the

evidence, in case of a special verdict, must appear to exist

thereby, or the conclusion of law must be against the plain-

tiff. The object of a special verdict is solely to obtain a

decision of issues of fact raised by the pleadings, not to

decide disputes between witnesses as to minor facts, even if

such minor facts are essential to and establish, by inference

or otherwise, the main fact. Goesel v. Davis, 100 Wis. 678 ;

Eberhardt v. Sanger, 51 Wis. 72 ; Jeivell v. C, St. P. S M. R.

Co., 54 Wis. 610; Klochinski v. Shores L. Co., 93 Wis. 417;

Ward V. C, M. & St. P. R. Co., 102 Wis. 215. A strict com-

pliance with, this rule requires that the verdict be made up

of sufficient questions to at least cover, singly, every fact in

issue under the pleadings. If that could always be kept in
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view, the legitimate purpose of such a verdict in promoting

the administration of justice would be uniformly accom-

plished, and the opinion entertained by some that its use i'^

harmful would cease to exist.

Testing the ruling of the trial court by what has been

said, it is free from any reasonable criticism. Neither of

the questions which were refused called for a response to

any issue raised by the pleadings. Each called for a find-

ing as to some essential as a matter of law to, or bearing on

the existence of, the main fact, each being, however, of a

strictly evidentiary character. The real fact in issue was

as to whether the condition of the boiler which caused the

explosion ought to have been known to the defendant. The

question submitted plainly covered that subject. The de-

gree of care with which the defendant was chargeable was

strictly a legal question. WTiether that degree of care was

exercised in the instance under consideration was strictly

a question of fact. The instruction properly laid down the

law for the guidance of the jury, and the question called for

an answer as to whether the defendant came up to the legal

standard in the particular instance. The jury were thus

called upon to find the fact, not the evidence of the fact,

leaving it to tlio court to ap|)ly tlioreto the proper legal

principles. No doubt the finding of evidentiary facts is
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dence, it has no proper place in the pleading, and hence no
n cessary place in the special verdict. By the complaint,
certain facts are alleged to exi t constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action and warranting the remedy sought. Those
facts, if put in issue by the an wer, and controverted on the
evidence, in case of a special verdict, must appear to exist
thereby, or the conclu ion of law must be against the plaintiff.
The object of a special verdict is solely to obtain a
decision of issues of fact raised by the pleadings, not to
decide disputes between witnesses as to minor faicts, even if
uch minor facts are essential to and establish, by inference
or otherwise, the main fact . Goe . . el v. Davis, 100 Wis. 678;
Eberhardt v. Sang er, 51 Wi . 72; Jewell v . C., St. P. & M . R.
Co ., 54 Wis. 610; Klochinski v. Shores L. Co., 93 Wis. 417;
Ward v. C., M. & St. P.R. Co ., 10:2 Wis. 215. A strict compliance with thi rule require that the verdict be made up
of ufficient question to at lea t cover, ingly every fact in
i su e under the pleading . If that could always be kept in
view, the legitimate purpose of such a verdict in promotino·
the administration of justice would be uniformly accom plished, and the opinion entertained by ome that its u e j ·
harmful would cease to exist.
Testing the ruling of the trial court by what has been
said, it is free from any reasonable critici m. Neither of
the question which were refused called for a respon e to
any issue rai ed by the pleading, . Each called for a finding as to some essential as a matter of law to, or bearing on
th exi tence of, the main fact, each beino·, however, of a
tri tly evidentiary character. The r al fact in i ue was
a to whether the condition of the boil r which cau ed the
x lo ion oug t to have been known to the d fendant. The
qu , tion ubmitt d plainly covered that ubject. Th degr of are with whi h the d f ndant was charo- able was
, tri, tly al gal u tion. Whether that deo-ree of care was
x rri cl in th in tan und r on ideration wa trictly
a qu . ti
f fa t. Th in truction prop rly laid d wn the
] w f r the gui l nr f th jury an th qu tion call d for
an an. w r a. t wh tlwr th d f nd t m p to th legal
. tan far in tho parti ular in. tanr . Th jury w re thus
<'al1 l up n t find th fa t. not tl1
vid n of th faict
l c ving it t tl1 r nrt to apply th r t th
rop r legal
r]n iple . No d ubt the finding of
id ntiary facts is
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fiometimes helpful in tying the jury down to the precise

question in controversy, by keeping before them the bar-

riers they must overcome in order to reach the conclusion

contended for by plaintiff ; but so long as the ultimate ques-

tion is properly one of fact, or of mixed law and fact prop-

erly pleadable as matter of fact, and essential to the cause

of action upon w4iich a recovery is sought, it is strictly the

proper subject of a question, and those facts from which it

is or may be inferable may properly be omitted.

The idea advanced by counsel for the defendant that the

statutory right to a special verdict is only satisfied by ques-

tions that do not need to be -considered in the light of legal

principles given to the jury by the court, is contrary to the

universal practice and the settled law upon the subject.

Often, whether certain conduct complained of is negligence,

where the evidentiary facts are all established, is a question

of fact, in respect to which different minds may reasonably

come to different conclusions. In that situation it is neces-
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sary to carefully instruct the jury regarding the standard

of care necessary to the performance of the duty alleged to

^lave been violated, leaving it to them to determine whether

'he alleged wrongdoer came up to the legal standard in

the particular instance complained of. The question of

contributory negligence, of proximate cause, and what is

reasonable, are only, ordinarily, determinable by viewing

evidentiary facts in the light of legal principles. The ulti-

mate fact being only properly determinable by viewing evi-

dentiary facts in the light of legal standards, instructions

bv the court in regard to such standards are necessary.

When such ultimate facts are established, the legal liability

follows as a conclusion of law. At that point the jury

should not be instructed. They are to find the facts,

guided bv the law regarding such facts, but regardless of

the legal effect of their conclusions. The issues of fact

raised by the pleadings are to be passed upon by the jury.

The legal conclusion to be drawn from such findings is to be

referred to the court with an additional conclusion by the

jury, express or implied, that if the court should be of the

opinion, upon the whole case, as found, that plaintiff has a

good cause of action, they find for the plaintiff*, otherwise

for the defendant. Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How. 427.

~ m time helpful in t ing the jury O\rn to the preci e
que tion in ontro\ ersy, by keeping bef re them the barri r th . must overcome in order to r a h the onclu ion
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I roper ubj ect of a que tion and tho e fa t from which it
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The idea advanced by coun el for the defendant that the
. tatutory rio·ht to a pe ial erdict i only ati fi ed by que tion that do not need to be ·con idered in the light of legal
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evidentiary facts in the light of legal prin ipl
The ultimate fa ct being only properly determinable b~T vi wing evidentiary facts in the light of 1 gal tandard. , in tTuction
bv the court in regard to u h . tandard are nece ary.
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* * * Further, it is proper, and on request it is error to

refuse, to give instructions requested as to each question

submitted, that may be reasonably necessary to enable the

jury to answer it intelligently and according to the law gov-

erning the subject. But no instructions as to the effect of

an answer upon the ultimate rights of the parties is proper.

Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 611; Ward v. C, M. &

St. P. R. Co., 102 Wis. 215.1

1 General iyistmctions on the law of the case are never proper where the

jury are required to return a special verdict Stayner V. Joyce (1889) 120

Ind. 99, 22 N. E. 89.
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* •
Further it is proper, and on request it is error to
refuse, to give instructions requested as to each question
ubmitted, that may be reasonably neces ary to enable the
jury to answer it intelligently and according to the law govrning the subject. But no instructions as to the effect of
an answer upon the ultimate rights of the parties is proper.
Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 611; Ward v . C., M. ct
t. P. R. Co., 102 Wis. 215. 1
* * * * * * * * * •
lj!<
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1 General in.striwtions on the law of the case are never proper where the
jury are required to return a special verdict.
Stayner !· Joyce ( 1889) 120
Ind. 99, 22 N. E. 89.

CHAPTER XV.
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
CHAPTER XV.

JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.

PLUNKETT V. DETROIT ELECTRIC RAILWAY

COMPANY.

PLUNKETT V. DETROIT ELECTRIC RAILWAY
COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Michigan. 1905,

Supreme Court of Michigan.

140 Michigan, 299.

Montgomery, J. Plaintiff, a city fireman, was pipeman

1905.

on a hose truck, which was proceeding west on High street

140

at 7 :45 p. m., February 2, 1900, when it was struck at Hast-

Michigan, .299.

ings street by a north-bound Hastings street car belonging

to defendant. Plaintiff was thrown and injured. Plain-

tiff brought this action to recover for the injuries sus-

tained, and on the trial, under a charge submitting the ques-

tion of defendant's negligence, and that of the contributory

negligence of the plaintiff, to the jury, a verdict was ren-

dered in favor of the plaintiff for $2,500. Defendant there-

upon entered a motion for judgment in its favor non ob-

stante veredicto, for the reasons :

^' First. For that under the evidence given in said cause
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a verdict should have been directed by the court in favor of

the defendant at the conclusion of the trial thereof.

'^Second. For that this court charged said jury, in sub-

stance and effect, that the said plaintiff by and through the

persons with whom he was riding, was guilty of contrib-

utory negligence."

This motion was granted, and judgment non obstante ver-

edicto was entered for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.

The defendant and the court below mistook the practice

at the common law, judgment non obstante veredicto could

be entered only when the plea confessed the cause of action

and set up matters in avoidance which were insufficient, al-

though found true, to constitute a defense or bar to the ac-

tion. The rule was later relaxed, and made to apply in

favor of the defendant, so that it is now generally held that

the defendant is entitled to a judgment non obstante vere-

577

T. P.— 37

MoNTGOMERY, J. Plaintiff, a city fireman, wa pipeman
on a hose truck, which was proceeding we t on High street
at 7 :45 p. m. February 2, 1900 when it wa struck at Hastings street by a north-bound Ha ting street car belonging
to defendant. Plaintiff was thrown and injured. Plaintiff brought this action to recover for the injurie sustained, and on the trial under a charge submitting the question of defendant's negligence, and that of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff to the jury, a verdi ct was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $2,500. Defendant thereupon entered a motion for judgment in its favor non obtante veredicto for the rea ons:
"First. For that under the evidence gi en in said cause
a verdict should have been directed by the court in favor of
the defendant at the conclusion of the trial thereof.
"Second. For that this court charged aid :ury, in ubstance and effect, that the said plaintiff by and through the
persons with whom he was riding, was guilty of ·contributor negligence.''
This motion was granted and judgment non obstante veredicto was entered for defendant. Plaintiff bring error.
The defendant and the court below mi took the practice
at the common law, judgment non obstante eredicto could
be ent red onl. when the plea confe ed the cause of action
and set up matters in avoidance which were in uffi ient, although found true, to constitute a defen e or bar to the a· The rule was later r lax d and made to ap ly in
tion.
favor of the defendant so that it i now enerally held that
the defendant is entitled to a judgment non obstante vere1

577
T. P.-37
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dicto when the plaintiff's pleadings are not sufficient to sup-

port a judgment in his favor. 11 Enc. PL & Prac. 912 et

seq. So, too, if there be both a general and special verdict,

and the latter be inconsistent with the former, judgment

may, in some cases, be based upon the special verdict, disre-

garding the general verdict. But we know of no case in

which it is proper practice to enter a judgment non obstante

veredicto, unless it appears on the record that the verdict of

the jury cannot be supported as matter of law. In all

other cases the proper practice is to move for a new trial,

or review the case on writ of error and exceptions. There

must be either a general or special verdict to support a

judgment, or the pleadings must authorize its entry. This

question is ruled by Central Sav. Bank v. O'Connor, 132

Mich 578. See also, Schmid v. Village of Frankfort, 134

Mich. 619, and County of Montmorency v. Putnam, 135

Mich. 111. Counsel for appellant has presented the case

upon the assumption that the circuit court had power to
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consider the question which he assumed to passed upon, and

has pointed out that the court mistook the rule as to im-

puted negligence, and that his holding is at variance with

the ruling of this court in McKernan v. Railway Co., 138

Mich. 519.

Defendant's counsel 'Contend that there are other reasons

why the verdict should have been for the defendant. We

must decline to enter upon a consideration of these ques-

tions.

The judgment is reversed, and the case will be remanded,

that the plaintiff may move for judgment on the verdict.

Plaintiff will recover costs.

Moore, C. J., and Grant, Blair, and Ostrandeb, JJ., con-

curred.

FLOYD V. COLOEADO FUEL & IRON COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of Colorado. 1897,

10 Colorado Appeals, 54.

BissELL, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Goorge Floyd was employed in the converting mill of the

Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, and was a foreman in
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dicta when the plaintiff's pleadings are not sufficient to support a judgment in his favor. 11 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 912 et
eq. So, too, if there be both a g neral and special verdict,
and the latter be inconsistent with the former, judgment
may, in ome cases, be based upon the special verdict, disregarding the general verdict. But we know of no case in
which it is proper pradice to enter a judgment non obstante
1 ereclicto, unless it appears on the record that the verdict of
the jury cannot be supported as matter of law.
In all
other cases the proper practice is to move for a new trial,
or review the case on writ of error and exceptions. There
mu t be either a general or special verdict to support a
judgment, or the pleadings must authorize its entry. This
que. tion is ruled by Central Sav. Bank v . O'Connor, 132
See also, Sch11iid v . Village of Frankfort, 134
Mi h 578.
Mi1ch. 619, and CoiJ;nty of JYlon tmorency v. Putnam, 135
Counsel for appellant has presented the case
Mich. 111.
upon the assumption that the circuit court had power to
ron ider the question which he assumed to passed upon, and
has pointed out that the court mistook the rule as to imputed negligence, and that his holding is at variance with
the ruling of this court in M cK ernan v. Railway Co., 138
Mich. 519.
Defendant's counsel 1contend that there are other reason.
why the verdict should have been for the defendant. We
mu t decline to enter upon a consideration of these que tions.
The judgment is reversed, and the case will be remanded
that the plaintiff may move for judo·ment on the verdict.
Plaintiff will recover costs.
MooRE, C. J., and GRANT, BLAIR, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred.

FLOYD V.

OLORADO FUEL & IRON COMP ANY.

Court of Appeals of Colorado .

1897.

10 Colorado Appeals, 54.

Br. SELL, .J., a liver d tb 0 inion of the court.
G0 rg 1 }oy wa mploy d ju th onverting mill of the
C 1 rado Fu 1 & Iron ompany, and was a foreman in
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charge of one of its cupolas. He had under him three men.

Their duties were to attend to the cupolas, withdraw^ the

molten iron and distribute and care for the slag or refuse

which rose to the surface of the iron after it was melted.

This slag or refuse was drawn off through what is termed a

cinder notch or tap hole in the cupola and through a runner.

These runners are half circular troughs of iron, about eight

feet long and weigh in the neighborhood of seven or eight

hundred pounds. They are fastened on to the cupola by a

collar. The runners last for a considerable time unless the

molten iron rises too high and flows into them. This will eat

them out and necessitate their rej)lacement. This was the

condition of one of the runners in charge of Floyd in June,

1893. It was observed by Crow, the superintendent of the

con\"erting mill. Douglass was a machinist in charge of

repairs and was sent by Crow to put in a new runner.

When he came up with some helpers, he called on Floyd and

his men to assist him in the work. While doing it Floyd
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was injured. The runner slipped, fell on his foot, mashed

it, and he was disabled for a long time to do his usual work

or any other wiiich compelled him to be on his feet. There

is very considerable dispute between Floyd and Crow re-

specting the terms of the order and the obligations and du-

ties of the parties, but according to the view which we take

of the present record and of the judgment which was en-

tered, we are not concerned with these details or with the

discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses. Floyd

brought this suit against the company to recover damages.

The -case went to trial and resulted in a verdict in his favor

for $1,250. The defendant company moved for a nonsuit

at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, and a direction to

the jury to find a verdict for the defendant when the testi-

mony was closed. Both motions were denied. After-

wards the company filed a motion for a new trial and a mo-

tion for judgment noii nhsfanfe veredicto. This term is

used because it was so denominated by the mover, and in

terms was an application for judgment dismissing the ac-

tion notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, although the

grounds of it remove it entirely from that class of motions.

It was wholly based on considerations foreign to such ap-

plications, and its eight several grounds as specifically

stated, were rested on parts and portions of the testimony,
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charge of one of its cupolas. He had under him three men.
Their duties were to attend to the cupola , withdraw tb e
molten iron and distribute and care for th slag or refu ·e
which rose to the surface of the iron after it was elted.
This slag or refuse was drawn off through what is termed a
cinder notch or tap hole in the cupola and through a runner.
These runners are half circular troughs of iron, about eight
feet long and weigh in the neighborhood of seven or eigl t
hundred pounds. They are fastened on to the cupola by a
collar. The runners last for a considerable time unless the
molten iron rises too high and flows into them. This will eat
them out and nece. sitate their replacement. This was the
condition of one of the runner s in charge of Floyd in June.
1893. It was observed by Crow, the superintendent of the
con verti.ng mill. Douglass was a machini t in charge of
repairs and was sent by Crow to put in a new runner.
When be came up with some helpers, h-e called on Floyd and
bis men to assi t him in the work. While doing it Floyd
was injured. The ru nner slipped, fell on his foot, mashed
it, and he was di abled for a long time to do his usual work
or any other which compelled him to be on his feet. There
· is very con. iderable dispute between Floyd and Crow respecting the t erms of the order and the obligations and duties of the parti e , hut according to the vi.ev' which we take
of the present record and of the judgment which wa entered, we are not concerned with these details or with the
discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses.
Floyd
brought this uit against the company to recover damage .
The case went to trial and resulted in a verdict in his favor
for $1,250. The defendant company moved for a nonsuit
at the conclusion of the plainfrff ca e and a dire tion to
the jury to find a verdict for the defendant wh n th te timony was clo sed. Both motion were denied.
ft rwards the company filed a moti n for a n w trial ~nd a
tion f r judo·ment non ob tante veredicto . Thi t rm i"
u. ed beca 1se it was so d nominated 1 . th mov r and in
term wa an application for judg·ment i mi in°· the action notwith tanding the verdict of the jur although th
ground. f it r mo e it entir ly from that la of m ti n, .
It wa wholl
a d on on i ration f · i 0 ·n to u h ap-pli.ca.tion , and its eight se ral ground a
p ifically
stated were rested on parts and portion of the te timony
'
.
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and on it as a whole the defendant attempted to maintain

the right to a judgment in its favor notwithstanding the ver-

dict because from the evidence sundry and divers facts ap-

peared which would bar a recovery. It was granted and

the court entered judgment for the defendant. This judg-

ment and order of the court is the only error assigned and

therefore the only one which will be considered.

In support of the assignment, the plaintiff insists that a

judgment non obstante veredicto may not be entered on the

motion of the defendant. Many cases are cited to this

proposition and thej^ uniformly support it. It is urged to

the contrary that the rules, proceedings, and practice which

prevailed at the common law are inapplicable under the

code, which can alone be looked to, to ascertain whether the

defendant may make such a motion and obtain relief which

was formerly granted in like cases, wherein application was

made by one entitled to present it. We do not regard the

question as an open one. We discover in a case which was
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not called to our attention that this question has been set at

rest by an authoritative decision of the supreme court ren-

dered since the code went into effect, and the practice is set-

tled by that case. Quimhy v. Boyd et al., 8 Colo. 194.

Therein the court holds that this motion may not be

made by the defendant, nor can he obtain relief of an ana-

logous character otherwise than by one in arrest of judg-

ment. Since this is true, it must be conceded that the re-

sult sought could not be secured by this procedure. The

liberality which pervades the code practice, and the pur-

pose and intent of the legislature to require the courts to

disregard errors of an unsubstantial character and to af-

firm judgments which do not affect the substantial rights

of the parties, compel us to consider another question

which may be regarded as collateral to the first. This is

whether the motion can be considered as one in arrest of

judgment. But this reaches only those defects which are

apparent on the face of the record and which are not cured

by a verdict or saveid by a failure to demur, and which

do not require the consideration of matters not apparent

in ilie record proper, nor dependent on testimony for their

solution. We have been able to find no exceptions to this

rule. 1 Black on Judgments, Sec. 98; Commonivenlth v.

Watts, 4 Leigh, G72; Banner v. Sayne, 78 Ga. 467; Brown
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and on it as a whole the defendant attempted to maintain
the right to a judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict because from the evidence sundry and divers facts appeared which would bar a recovery. It was granted and
the court entered judgment for the defendant. This judgment and order of the court is the only error assigned and
therefore the only one which will be considered.
In support of the assignment, the plaintiff insists that a
judgment non obstante veredicto may not be entered on the
motion of the defendant.
:Many cases are cited to this
propo ition and they uniformly support it. It is urged to
the contrary that the rules, proceeding , and practice which
prevailed at the common law are inapplicable under the
code, which can alone be looked to, to ascertain whether the
defendant may make such a motion and obtain relief which
was formerly granted in like cases, wherein application was
made by one entitled to present it. We do not regard the
que ti on as an open one. We discover in a case which was
not .call d to our attention that this question has been set at
rest by an authoritative decision of the supreme court rendered since the code went into effect, and the practice is settled by that case. Quimby v . Boyd et al., 8 Colo. 194.
Therein the court holds that this motion may not be
made by the defendant, nor can he obtain relief of an analoo·ous character otherwise than by one in arrest of judgment. Since this is true, it must be conceded that the reult ought could not be secured by this procedure.
The
liberality which pervades the .code practice, and the puro and intent of the 1 gi lature to require the courts to
di T gard errors of an uns.u bstantial character and to affirm judo-ments which do not affect the sub tantial rio·hts
of th parties, compel u to consider another u tion
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V. Lee, 21 Ga. 159; Balliett v. Humphreys, 78 Ind. 389;

Sedgivick v. Daivkins, 18 Fla. 335; Hardesty v. Price, 3

Colo. 556.

The evidence is no part of the record for the purposes

of such a motion. For this reason no argument to sup-

port it can be predicated on the theory that the evidence is

insuffi'cient to warrant the recovery. Bond et al. v. Dus-

tin, 112 U. S. 604.

The motion does not attack the sufficiency of the com-

plaint as a statement of a cause of action nor is there any

other defect in the record pointed out or adverted to in

the argument by which the judgment of the court below

can be sustained, or which could in any event be deemed

sufficient to support a motion in arrest of judgment. Since

the motion is neither one non obstante veredicto nor in

arrest, and can be supported on neither hypothesis, there

is no way known to the practice by which the defects or de-

ficiencies in the case made by the proof can be reached,
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except by a motion for a new trial. The code distinctly

provides that wherever the evidence is insufficient to sup-

port the verdict, the court shall have full power to set it

aside and grant a new trial. It is an easy and a swift

remedy, available to the parties and within the power of

the court. That which was made and the judgment which

was entered does not accord with the practice which must

prevail in such cases. Under our system this was an ac-

tion for the recovery of damages, and as such, was triable

only by jury. If the court refuses to nonsuit the plaintiff

or to direct a verdict for the defendant, the case must go

to the jury and the issues be determined by them. If

their conclusions are unsatisfactory, or the court deems

them unsupported by the e^^dence, it has full power to set

the verdict aside, but only one course can be pursued. The

issues must be resubmitted to another jury. It is the

right of the plaintiff as well as of the defendant to have

questions of fact settled in the mode provided by law. We

know of no way save by the consent of parties whereby a

suit to recover damages can bo otherwise tried.

The court erred in entering the judgment, and it will

therefore be reversed.

Reversed.
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v. Lee, 21 Ga. 159; Balliett v. Humphreys, 78 Ind. 3
edgwick v. Dawkins, 18 Fla. 3 5; Hardesty v . Price,
olo. 556.
The evidence is no part of the record for the purpose
of uch a motion.
For this rea on no ar um nt to support it an be predicated on the theory that the evid nee i.
in uffi, ient to warrant the recovery. Bond et al. v. Dustin. 112 U. . 604.
The motion does not attack the sufficiency of the complaint a a statement of a cause of action nor is there any
other defect in the record pointed out or ad,Terted to in
the argument by which the judgment of the court below
can be u tain d, or which could in any eYent be deemed
sufficient to upport a motion in arrest of judgment. Sine
the motion i neither one non obstante veredicto nor in
arre t and can be upported on neither hypothesis there
is no way known to the practice by which the defects or defi iencie in the case made by the proof can be reached
except by a motion for a new trial.
The code di tinctly
proYide that where\ er the evidence is in ufficient to upport the verdi,nt the court shall have full power to set it
a ide and oTant a new tTial.
It is an ea y and a swift
r medy a\ ailabl to the parties and within the power of
the court. That which was made and the judgment which
\\a entered doe not accord with the practice which mu t
pre\ ail in uch ca es. Under our sy t m thi was an action for the recov r. of damages and a such was triable
only by jury. If the court refuse to non uit the plaintiff
or to dire t a verdi,ct for the d fendant the ca e mu t g
to the jury and the issue be determined by them.
If
their conclu ion. are un ati facton- or the court deem
th m un upport d by the e-vid nee it ha full po"er to e
the verdi t a. ide, but only one cour e can be pur u d. Th
L . ue mu t b re ubmitted to anoth r jury.
It i th
rio·ht of the 1 Jaintiff a w 11 a of th d f ndant to hav
que tion. of fa t . ettl d in th mo provi
by law.
kn w of n way . ave by the on nt of parties whereby a
suit to recoY r damage an l) th rwi. tried.

• "" • • * * • • • •

The ourt err d in entering the judgment and it will
therefore be reversed.
Reversed.

582
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CRUIKSHANK V. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE

INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. 1899,

75 Minnesota, 266.

CRUIKSHANK V. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE
INSURANCE COMP ANY.

Mitchell, J.

This was an action to recover upon a ''hail insurance

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

1899.

policy," one provision of which was that,

75 Minnesota, 266.

''In case of loss by hail to the crops insured, the assured

shall mail a written notice to the company at its office in

the city of St. Paul, Minn., within forty-eight hours after

the time of such loss, stating the day and hour of the

storm, also the probable damage to each part of the crops

insured."

So far as material for the purposes of this appeal, the

defense was that the insured had not given notice of loss

in accordance with this provision of the policy.

The policy contained a warranty that the insured was

the owner of all the land upon which the crops covered by
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the policy were growing, but a breach of this warranty, if

any, was a matter of defense, and no such defense was

pleaded.

When the evidence closed the defendant moved the

court to direct a verdict in its favor, but the court denied

the motion and submitted the case to the jury, which found

a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Thereupon the defend-

ant made a motion, not in the alternative for judgment not-

withstanding the verdict, or, in case that should be denied,

for a new trial, but merely for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict. The court denied the motion, and from the

judgment entered upon the verdict the defendant appealed.

Originally at common law, judgment notwithstanding

the verdict could only be granted in favor of the plaintiff,

the remedy in favor of the defendant being to have the

judgment arrested; but either by statute or by judicial re-

laxation of this rule, judgment notwithstanding the ver-

dict became quite generally allowable in favor of either

party. But in either case the motion was based on the

record alone, and the granting or denying it depended

MITCHELL,

J.

This was an action to re.cover upon a ''hail insurance
policy," one provision of which was that,
''In case of loss by hail to the crops insured, th(~ assured
shall mail a written notice to the company at its office in
the city of St. Paul, Minn., within forty-eight hours after
the time of such loss, stating the day and hour of the
storm, also the probable damage to each part of the crops
insured.''
So far as material for the purposes of this appeal, the
defense was that the insured had not given notice of loss
in accordance with this provision of the policy.
The policy contained a warranty that the insured was
the owner of all the land upon which the crops covered by
the policy were growing, but a br ach of this warranty, if
any, was a matter of defense, and no such defense was
pleaded.
When the evidence closed the defendant moved the
court to direct a verdict in its favor, but the court denied
the motion and submitted the case to the jury, which found
a v rdict in favor of tbe plaintiff. Thereupon the defendant mad a motion, not in the alternative for judgment notwith tanding the verdict, 01~, in ca e that should be denied,
for a new trial, but m rely for judgment notwithstanding
th verdi t.
The court deni d the motion, and from the
J {Yment ter d upon the verdict the d f ndant a p al d.
rigin 1ly at ommon law, judgm nt notwith tandin<Y
th verdi t oul nly b grant d in favor of th plaintiff,
th r m d. in f vor of the cl f ndant
in<Y to have the
~u <YID nt ar · . t
· but ith r by tatut or by judi ial r le xation of this rule, ju gm nt notwithstanding th v rcli t b c·
uit g n rally 1lowabl in favor of ith r
rty.
it j
ith r r . th motion was bas d on th
r
rd alone, a d the granting or denying it dep nded
1

hap. 15]
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upon tile pleadings. The rendition of judgment notwith-

stading the verdict was discretionary with the court. It

would only be granted when it was clear that the cause of

action, or the defense, put upon the record did not, in point

of substance, constitute a legal cause of action or defense.

It was never granted on account of any techincal defect

in the pleadings, but in such case the court would order a

repleader.

By enacting laws 1895, c. 320,^ the legislature was not

creating a new remedy, but merely extended, as has been

done in many other states, the common law remedy to

cases where, upon the evidence, either party was clearly

entitled to judgment. In thus extending the remedy it

must be presumed that the legislature intended it to be gov-

erned by the same rules which applied when it was

granted upon the record alone ; that is, that it should not be

granted unless it clearly appeared from the whole evi-

dence that the cause of action, or defense, sought to be es-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

tablished could not, in point of substance, constitute a legal

cause of action or a legal defense.

The court has acted on this construction of the statute

and refused to order judgment even where there was a

total absence of evidence on some material point, but where

it appeared probable that the party had a good cause of

action or defense, and that the defect in the evidence could

be supplied on another trial. This is just such a case.

From the record it appears probable that the plaintiff

has a good cause of action and that the defects, if any, in

the evidence, are largely technical and could be supplied

on another trial. The alleged defects in the evidence

suggested are of the following character: that the letter

from plaintiff's father to Kenaston was not formally in-

troduced in evidence, that there was no evidence that the

1 The statute is as follows: "In all cases where at the close of the testimony

in the case tried a motion is made by either party to the suit requesting the

trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party making such motion, which

motion \yas denied, the trial court on motion made that judgment be en-

tered notwithstanding the verdict, or on motion for a new trial, shall order

judgment to be entered in favor of the party who was entitled to have

a verdict directed in his or its favor; and the supreme court of the state on

appeal from an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial in the

action in which such motion was made may order and direct judgment to be

entered in favor of the party who was entitled to have such verdict directed

in his or its favor whenever it shall appear from the testimony that the

party was entitled to have such motion granted."

JUDGMENT NoTwITHSTANDING VERDICT
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n on the pleadings. The rendition of judgment notwithtading the verdict was discretionary with the ourt. It
would only be granted when it was clear that th cause of
action, or the defense, put upon the record did not, in point
of substance, constitute a legal cause of action or defense.
It was never granted on account of any tecbin al defect
in the pleadings, but in such case the court would order a
repleader.
By enacting laws 1895, c. 320, 1 the legi lature was not
creating a new remedy, but merely extended, as has been
done in many other state the common law remedy to
cases where, upon the evidence, either party wa clearly
In thus extending the remed it
entitled to judgment.
must be presumed that the legislature intended it to be governed by the ame rules which applied when it was
granted upon the record alone; that is, that it should not be
granted unless it clearly appeared from the whole evidence that the cau e of action, or defen e, sought to be established ould not, in point of substance, constitute a legal
rause of action or a legal defen e.
The court has acted on this construction of the statute
and refu ed to order judgment even where there was a
total ab ence of evidence on ome material point but where
it appeared probable that the party had a good cause of
a tion or def n e and that the defect in the evidence could
be u1 plied on another trial. This is ju t uch a ca e.
From the record it appear probable that the plaintiff
has a good cause of action and that the defect if any in
tbe e idence, are largel. te hnical and could be supplied
on another trial.
The alleged defects in the evidence
ugge ted are of the following character: that the letter
from plaintiff's father to I{enaston was not formally introduced in evidence, that there was no evid nee that the
1 The tatute i as follows: "In an case where at the clo e of the te timony
in the ca e tried a motion is made by eitb r party to the suit reque tina the
trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party makin such motion which
motion wa denied the trial court on motion made that judgment be entered notwith tan<ling the verdict, or on motion for a new trial, hall order
jud ment to e entered in favor of the party who was entitl d to have
a verdict dire t d in his or its favor; and the nprem court of the tate on
appeal from an order granting or den~·ing a motion for a new trial in the
action in which uch motion wa mad ma.v orc1er and direct judgment to be
entered in favor of the party who was ntitl d to ha e uch verdict directed
in hi or its favor whene er it hall app ar from the testimony that the
party was entitled to have such motion granted.''
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letter from Kenaston to the defendant was never mailed,

and that there was no evidence that the person who came

to adjust the loss was McClure, or that M.cClure was at

that time defendant's adjuster. The statute permits a

party to make his motion in the alternative. Defendant

has elected not to do so, but to stand exclusively on its

right to judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict

against it. Not being entitled to this relief, it is not en-

titled, at least as a matter of right, to a new trial on the

ground of the insufficiency of the evidence. Indeed, coun-

sel for the defendant conceded this upon the argument.
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Judgment affirmed.

[Chap. 15
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letter from Kenaston to the defendant was never mailed,
and that there was no evidence that the person who came
to adjust the loss was McClure, or that M cClure was at
that time defendant's adjuster.
The statute permits a
party to make his motion in the alternative.
Defendant
has elected not to do so, but to stand exclusively on its
right to judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict
against it.
Not being entitled to this relief, it is not entitled, at least as a matter of right, to a new trial on the
ground of the insufficiency of the evidence. Indeed, counel for the defendant conceded this upon the argument.
Judgment affirmed.
1

CHAPTER XVI.

ARREST OF JUDGMENT.

Section 1. For What Defects?

CHAPTER XVI.

PELICAN ASSURANCE COMPANY V. AMERICAN

FEED AND GROCERY COMPANY.

ARREST OF JUDGMENT.

Supreme Court of Tennessee. 1909,

122 Tennessee, 652.

Mr. Chief Justice Beard delivered the opinion of the

SECTION 1. FoR WHAT DEFECTS?

^^ourt.

In the case at bar errors are assigned upon the action of

the trial judge in admitting over objection incompetent

testimony, in overruling a motion for peremptory instruc-

tion, in giving .certain instructions to the jury, and failing

. ELICAN ASSURANCE COMPANY V. AMERICAN
FEED AND GROCERY COMPANY.

to grant requests that were submitted. It will be ob-

Supreme Court of T ennessee.

served that these errors if committed, occurred in the trial

1909.

of the cause, and would have constituted grounds of a mo-

122 Tenn essee, 652.

tion for a new trial, made in the court below, to the end

that a retrial might be obtained, or, failing in this, then to

preserve the same in the record, so that the ruling of the
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trial judge in declining the motion might be preserved to

the plaintiff in error. Railroad v. Johnson, 114 Tenn.

633, 88 S. W. 169. Resting upon matters extrinsic to the

:MR. CHIEF J usTICE BEARD delivered the opinion of the
fiourt.

* *

~

* * * * * * *

technical record, they could only be preserved for review

in this court by a properly filed bill of exceptions. If,

as is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error, they can

here be made the subject of investigation, by reason of the

motion in arrest having been overruled, then we can see

no distinction between that and a motion for new trial;

for the very errors that are now made the subject of com-

plaint are those which would have been properly raised

on this latter motion. It is apparent that, to secure a re-

versal on account of these errors, it would be necessary to

lools beyond the ''face of the record" into the evidence in-

troduced. This cannot be done. It is well settled by the

585

In the case at bar errors are assigned upon the action of
the trial judge in admitting over objection incompetent
testimony, in overruling a motion for peremptory instruction, in giving 1certain instructions to the jury, and failing
to grant r equests that were submitted.
It will be observ d that these error if committed, occurred in the trial
of tbe cau e, and would have constituted grounds of a motion for a new trial made in the court below, to the end
that a retrial might be obtained, or, failinO' in this, then to
pre erve the same in the record, so that tl e ruling of the
trial judge in declining the motion miJrht be preserved to
the lain tiff in error.
Railroad v. J olznson, 114 Tenn.
633 8 S. W . 169. Resting upon matters extrin ic to the
te hnical record they could only be pre erved for review
in this court by a properly filed bill of exceptions. If,
as is •Contended by oun el for plaintiff i error, they can
her b made the subject of inve tigation by rea on of the
motion in arrest haYin ' been overruled, then we can e
no di tinction etw en that and a motion for new trial;
for the ver. error that are now made the subject of complaint are tho e which would have be n properl rai ed
on thi latter motion. It is app rent that, to secure a rev r. al n account of the e err r it would e nece ary to
I k l yond tl1e "fa e of the record ' into th evidence introdu ed. This cannot be done. It is well settled by the
585
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authorities that a motion in arrest of judgment lies alone

for some error which vitiates the proceeding, or is of so

serious a character that judgment should not be rendered.

It "can onl.y be maintained for a defect upon the face of

the record, and the evidence is no part of the record for

this purpose." Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604, 5 Sup. Ct.

296, 28 L. Ed. 835; Van Stone v. Stilhvell E. T. C. Co.,

142 U. S. 128, 12 Sup. Ct. 181, 35 L. Bd. 961; 23 Cyc. 825.

Applying this rule of correct procedure to the present

case, it follows that the judgment must be affirmed.

GRAY V. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 1895.

92 Virginia, 772.

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. lG

authoritie that a motion in arre t of judgment lies alone
for some error which vitiate the proceeding, or is of so
eriou a character that judgment should not be rendered.
It " an only be maintained for a defect upon the face of
the record, and the evidence is no part of the record for
this purpose.'' Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604, 5 Sup. Ct.
296, 28 L. Ed. 835; Van Stone v. Stillwell E. T. C. Co.,
142 U. S. 128, 12 Sup. Ct. 181, 35 L. Ed. 961; 23 Cyc. 825.
Applying this rule of correct procedure to the present
case, it follows that the judgment must be affirmed.

RiELY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

After the jury had rendered their verdict the prisoner

moved the 'Court in arrest of judgment, on the ground that

one of the jurors was incompetent ; which motion the court

overruled. It appears from the bill of exceptions that
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the juror, when examined on his voir dire, suggested him-

GRAY V. COMJ\10NWEALTH.

self that he might not be competent to serve, as he was

deputy sheriff when the killing took place, which was

more than two years prior to the trial, and had the war-

rant for the arrest of the prisoner, but, on being fully ex-

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia .

1895.

amined by the court, answered that he made no arrest

92

and had not formed or expressed any opinion as to the

Virginia, 772.

guilt or innocence of the prisoner, and could give him a

fair and impartial trial. PTe was thereupon accepted by

the court as a juror, without ol)jection from either side.

The prisoner claimed that ho had discovered, after the

iurv was sworn, that the said juror had not only the war-

rant for his arrest, but also, with a number of other per-

sons, had pursued him for some days, and had several

times visited the neighborhood in searcli of him. It is

not the province of a motion in arrest of judgment to cor-

rect an error like the one alleged. That lies only to cor-

RrnLY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
* * * * * * * * * *
After the jury had rendered their verdict the pri oner
moved the court in arrest of judgment, on the ground that
one of the jurors was incompetent; which motion the court
overruled.
It appear from the bill of exceptions that
the juror, when examined on his voir dire, suggested himself that he might not be competent to serve, as he was
deputy sheriff wh n th killing took place, which wa
more than two year prior to the trial, and bad the warrant for the arrest of th e prj oner, but, on being fully examin d by the court, an wered that he made no arrest
and had not form d or ~r pr s ed any opinion a to the
guilt or inno nc of th l ri on r, and could o·ive bim a
fair nd impartial trial.
IT wa . th er upon a c pt d b~,;
th
ourt a a juror, without obj tion from eith r i
'Th pri. n r lai d that h had di overed, after th
inrv w , . worn t t th . aid juror bad not only the warr ant f r hi arre t, but al o, with a numb r of oth r per.'on. h 1 ur. u d him for om day , and had s v ral
f i 0R vi. it d tl
n i,.)1b rhood in ar h f him.
It i'
r1 t th provinr f motion in arr . t of juflgm nt to orr · ·t an rror lik the on all g d.
That Ii only to or1

Sec. 1]
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rect an error that is apparent on the face of the record.

Commonwealth v. Stephen, 4 Leigh, 679; Watt's Case, Id.

672; Bishop on Cr. Pro. (3d ed.), sections 1282 and 1285;

and 4 Minor's Institutes (3d ed.) Pt. I, 939. The ground

of the objection nowhere appears in the record. This

bill of exceptions was not, therefore, properly taken. But

even if the proper proceedings had been resorted to, the

statement set forth in the bill of exceptions, which is not

supported by the affidavit of the prisoner or any one else,

did not disqualify the juror or furnish ground for a new

trial, and certainly not when the objection was not brought

to the attention of the court until after the verdict. Bris-

tow's Case, supra.

The judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed.

A-ffirmed.

HUBBARD V. RUTLAND RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Vermont. 1907.

80 Vermont, 462.
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RowELL, C. J. Case for negligently injuring the plaintiff

by a collision of trains, on one of which he was a passen-

ger. Plea, the general issue, and trial by jury. Ver-

dict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant con-

587

ARREST OF JUDGMENT

rect an error that is apparent on the face of the record.
Conini.onwealth v. Stephen, 4 Leigh, 679; liVatt's Case, Id.
672; Bishop on Cr. Pro. (3d ed.), section 12 2 and 12 5;
and 4 Minor's Institutes (3d ed.) Pt. I, 939. The ground
of the objection nowhere appears in the record.
Thi
bill of exceptions was not, therefore, properly taken. But
even if the proper proceedings had been re orte to, th
.. tatement set forth in the bill of exceptions, which is not
upported by the affida' it of the pri oner or any one el e
did not disqualify the juror or furni h ground for a new
trial, and certainly not when the objection was not brought
to the attention of the court until after the verdict. Bristow' s Case, supra.

* * * * • * * * * *
The judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed .
.Affirmed.

ceded the right of recovery, but denied the claim for dam-

ages, both in character and extent, in manner and form

alleged.

The defendant moved in arrest, for that *'the verdict is

largely based on facts not in issue under the declaration

and concessions of the defendant made on trial and ac-

cepted by the plaintiff, and varies materially from the is-

sue made on trial, and finds facts foreign to such issue,

HUBBARD V. RUTLAND RAILROAD COMP ANY.

and is for for entire damages, without discrimination be-

tween facts made material and immaterial by the issue,

Supreme Court of Vermont.

1907.

and is insufficient."

It is conceded that when the motion goes to defects in

BO Vermont, 462.

RowELL, C. J. Case for negligently injuring the plaintiff
by a colli ion of trains, on one of which he was a pa enPlea, the general issue, and trial by jury.
Verger.
dict and judgment for the plaintiff.
The defendant conceded the right of reco' ery, but denied th claim for damages, both in character and extent in manner and form
alleged.

* * * * * * * * • •
The defendant moved in arre t for that ''the v rdi t i
largely based on fact not in i sue under the d ·claration
and on e ions of the def ndant made n trial an a pt d b the plaintiff, a
Yari mat rially fr m th i ue made on trial, an find . fa t f r i 0 ·n to u h i. u
and is for for entire damaO'e
ithout di riminati n b tween fa t mad mat rial and immaterial by th
ue,
and i jn uffi i nt."
It is on eded that wh n the motion goe to d f t in

588
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the pleadings, an inspection of the record alone is to gov-

ern, and that the evidence cannot be looked into. But

it is contended that when the motion goes to defects in the

verdict, as this motion does, the rule is different; that the

verdict is a part of the record, but any defect in it is not

apparent on its face ; that it is not a pleading, and if a mo-

tion in arrest will lie for defects in it, it follows that it

must be looked into to discover those defects, and that this

necessitates an examination of the evidence upon which

it rests.

That a judgment may be arrested for defects in the ver-

dict is clear. But a motion for that purpose stands like a

motion in arrest for defects in the pleadings, and like that,

must be tested by what appears on the face of the record,

of which the verdict is a part. Mr. Gould says, in speak-

ing of Lord Mansfield's disapprobation of the rule, that

when there are good and bad counts, and a general ver-

dict for the plaintiff for entire damages, without discrim-
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inating between the counts, no rule appears to be more

clearly warranted by the original principles of the law

than that the judgment, which is only an interference of

law from the facts ascertained upon the record, must al-

ways be formed from the face of the record itself, and

from that alone; and as the jury must be presumed to

know nothing of the sufficiency or the insufficiency of

counts, the conclusion seems perfectly just, in legal theory,

that the damages are as likely to have been assessed in

whole or in part on the bad count as on the good count.

r!--id's PI. c. X, sec. 58, n. (7).

Mr. Tidd says that the only ground for arresting judg-

ment at this day is, some matter intrinsic, appearing on

the face of the record, that would render the judgment

erroneous and reversible; for though it seems to have been

otherwise formerlv, yet it is now settled that judgment

cannot be arrested for extrinsic or foreign matter not ap-

nenring on the face of the record, but that courts are to

iudge upon the record itself, that their successors may

know the frrounds of their judgment. 2 Tidd's Pr.

'/'OIR) * # •

The defendant contends, as we have seen, that if the tes-

timony cannot be looked into when the verdict does not

show the defect on its face, there can be no remedy in such

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 16

the pleadings, an inspection of the record alone is to govern, and that the evidence cannot be looked into.
But
it is contended that when the motion goes to defects in the
verdict, as this motion does, the rule is different; that the
verdict is a part of the record, but any defect in it is not
apparent on its face; that it is not a pleading, and if a motion in arrest will lie for defects in it, it follow that it
mu:t be looked into to discover those defects, and that this
necessitates an examination of the evidence upon which
it rests.
That a judgment may be arrested for defects in the verdi,nt i clear. But a motion for that purpose stands like a
motion in arrest for defects in the pleadings, and like that,
mu t be tested by wbat appears on the face of the record,
of ·which the verdict is a part. Mr. Gould says, in speaking of Lord Mansfield's disapprobation of the rule, that
when there are good and bad counts, and a general verdict for the plaintiff for entire damages, without discriminating between the counts, no rule appears to be more
clearly warranted by the original principles of the law
than that the judgment, which is only an interference of
law from the facts ascertained upon the record, must alway be formed from the face of the record itself, and
from that alone; and as the jury must be presumed to
know nothing of the sufficiency or the in uffi.ciency of
rount , the conclusion seem perfectly just, in legal theory,
that the damages are as likely to have been assessed in
whole or in part on the bad count as on the good count.
! ! ~ ,, lrl ' . Pl. c. :X, se . 58, n. (7).
Mr. Tidd says that th only o·round for arresting judgment at this day is, some matter intrinsic, appearino- on
th face of the record, that would render the judgment
erroneous and rever. ih1 e; for though it
mR to have been
oth rwi. formerlv, y t jt is now s ttlcd that judgment
<'annot h arr0st d for extrinsic or foreign matt r not ap11 aring on · th0 fR
of the rPror 1, hut that rourts are to
'ndg upon the recor 1 it. elf, that th fr lliC'CeRRors may
Jmow tl10 0Tn1mds of their judgment.
2 Tidd 's Pr.
· rn 1R). * * •
Th e •fen ant ont nd. a we hav s n, that if the t tim ny C'annot be l ok 1 int
hen th v rdi t do s not
show the d f ct on its fa e, there can be no r medy in such
1
•

Sec. 1]
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a case by motion in arrest. And that is true if, as here,

if anywhere, the defect appears only in the testimony, for

that is not a part of the record, and the court must judge

upon the record, and upon that alone. But the verdict

being a part of the record, if the record as a whole shows

the defect, it is enough. And it will show it, and must

show it, if it is a defect that the law recognizes as ground

for a motion in arrest. Thus, if the verdict varies sub-

stantially from the issue, as if, instead of finding the mat-

ter in issue, the jury finds something foreign to the issue,

the judgment must be arrested, for the court cannot tell

for which party judgment should be rendered. Here the

verdict does not show the defect on its face, but taken

with the rest of the record, which shows what the issue

was, the record as a whole shows the defect on its face.

The same is true when the verdict finds only part of the

matter in issue, omitting to find either way another ma-

terial part. These instances are sufficient to show how
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defects in a verdict not apparent on its face are made to

appear for the purposes of a motion in arrest.

Judgment affirmed.

BULL V. MATHEWS.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 1897.

20 Rhode Island, 100.

TiLLiNGHAST, J. This is a motion in arrest of judg-

ment on the ground of a misjoinder of causes of action.

The action is trespass on the case for trover and conver-

sion, and the declaration contains a count in trover and

conversion, and also the ordinary counts in assumpsit. At

the trial of the case in the District Court a decision was

rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $19.10 and costs; but

a case by motion in arrest. And that is true if, as here,
if anywhere, the defect appear only in the te tim ny for
that is not a part of the record, and the court mu t jurloupon the record, and upon that alone.
But the v rdict
being a part of the record, if the record a a whole how
the def ct, it is enough.
And it will show it, and mu t
show it, if it is a defect that the law recogniz a groun
for a motion in arrest.
Thus, if the verdict varies subtantially from the issue, as if, instead of finding the matter in issue the jury finds something for eign to the i sue
the judgment must be arrested, for the court cannot tell
for which party judgment should be rendered. Here the
verdict does not show the defect on its face but taken
with the rest of the record, which show what the i ue
was, the record as a whole shows the defect on its face.
The same is true when the verdict finds only part of the
matter in is ue, omitting to find either way another material part.
These instances are sufficient to show how
defects in a verdict not apparent on its face are made to
appear for the purpo es of a motion in arrest.
Judgment affirmed.

there is nothing in the record to show whether the judg-

ment was based on the count in trover and conversion,

or on those in assumpsit. No plea was filed in the case,

but as the defendant entered an appearance the general

issue is deemed to be filed. Gen. Laws E. I., cap. 237, sec.

BULL V. MATHEWS.
Supreme Court of Rhode I sland.

1897.

20 Rhode I sland, 100.

TILLINGHAST, J.
This is a motion in arre t of judg-ment on th ground of a mi joinder of cau e f action.
The a tion i trespa on the a e for tr ver and conv r ion, and th e declaration ontains a count in trov r an l
f'onver ion and al th ordinary ount in a ~, nm1 , it.
the trial of the ca e in th Di trict ourt a d i ion wa
r n r din favor of the plaintiff for $19.10 an
.t · n
there i nothin()' in the r cord to how wh ther th judgment wa ba ed n th count in trover a d
nv r i
or on tho e in a um it. N plea wa fil d i th
but a the def ndant nt r d an a
aran the
n ra1
issue is deemed _to be filed. Gen. La s R. I., cap. 237, ec.
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3. But whether, in this case the general issue as to the

connt in trover, which would be not gnilty, or as to the

counts in assumpsit, which would be non assumpsit, is in,

we have no means of determining. Within five days after

the rendition of said decision the defendant filed his mo-

tion in arrest of judgment in the District Court, where-

upon the case was certified to this court.

It is a familiar rule of common-law pleading that counts

sounding in tort cannot properly be joined with counts

sounding in contract, and also that such misjoinder is

fatal, not only on demurrer, but also on motion in arrest

of judgment. Ency. PI. & Pr. vol. 2, p. 803, and cases

cited; Haskell v. Boiven, 44 Vt. 579. The effect of such

misjoinder is clearly expressed in Chit. PI. 9 Am. ed. 206,

as follows: ''The consequences of a misjoinder are more

important than the circumstances of a particular count

being defective; for in a case of misjoinder, however per-

fect the counts may respectively be in themselves, the
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declaration will be bad on demurrer or in arrest of judg-

ment, or upon error. See also Gould's PL cap. 4, sec. 87,

and cases cited.

The ordinary test for determining whether different

causes of action may be joined is to inquire whether the

same plea may be pleaded and the same judgment given

on all the counts of the declaration; and unless this ques-

tion can be answered in the affirmative the counts cannot

be joined. See Drury v. Merrill, ante, 2. See also Court

of Probate v. Sprague, 3 R. I. 205.

A Implying this test to the case at bar, it will at once be

seen that there is a fatal misjoinder. If the pleader in

this case had simply omitted to strike out the money counts

which are printed in the writ, perhaps we might disre-

gard them; but as he has filled them out in the ordinary

way where the case is assumpsit, we feel bound to presume

that he intended to rely thereon, as well as on the count

in trover.

It is true that, since the case was certified to this court,

the plaintiff's counsel has filed an affidavit setting forth

that by reason of mistake and oversight he neglected to

strike out the money counts, and also that at the trial in

the District Court, the o\'idonce introduced was confined

to the count in trover, which was the only count relied on.

TRIAL PRACTI E
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3. But whether, in this case the general issue as to the
· nnt in tro-ver , which would be not guilty, or as to the
counts in assumpsit, which would be non assumpsit, is in,
we have no means of determining. Within five days after
the rendition of said decision the defendant filed his motion in arrest of judgment in the District Court, whereupon the case was certified to this 'court.
It is a familiar rule of common-law pleading that counts
sounding in tort cannot properly be joined with counts
sounding in contract, and also that such misjoinder is
fatal, not only on demurrer, but also on motion in arrest
of judgment.
Ency. PL & Pr. vol. 2, p. 803, and cases
cited; Haskell v. Bowen, 44 Vt. 579.
The effect of such
misjoinder is clearly expressed in Chit. Pl. 9 Am. ed. 206,
as follows: ''The con equences of a misjoinder are more
important than the circumstances of a particular count
being defeictive; for in a case of misjoinder, however perfect the counts may respectively be in themselves, the
declaration will be bad on demurrer or in arrest of judgment, or upon error. See also Gould's Pl. cap. 4, sec. 87,
and cases cited.
The ordinary test for determining whether different
ca u es of action may be joined is to inquire whether the
same plea may be pleaded and the same judgment given
on all the counts of the declaration; and unless this question can be answered in the affirmative the counts cannot
be joined. See Drury v. Merrill, ante, 2. See also Court
of Probate v. Sprague, 3 R. I. 205.
A lying this t t to the case at bar, it will at once be
seen that there is a fatal mi joinder.
If the pleader in
thi ca had imply omitted to tr ike out the money counts
whi h ar printed in the writ, p rha
we might di regard them; but a he has filJed th m out in the ordinary
way wh re the ca e i as ump it, we fe 1 bound to pr ume
that h intended to rely ther on as well as on the count
in trov r.
It is tru that, sin the ' a e was rtified to thi court,
th
Jni tiff '.
un. 1 has fil d an affid vit etting forth
th at y r a. n f mi tak and over io-ht h negl cted to
. trik ., o t the on y
unt , and al o that at th trial in
tlw i. tTi t
nr t, 111
vid . n r introdnr
wa, onfined
r, whi h wa th only count relied on.
t th ·CO nt in tr
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But as a motion in arrest of judgment raises only those

objections which are apparent upon the re<}ord; State v.

Paul, 5 R. I. 189 ; Black on Judgments, vol. 1, Sees. 96-8 ;

and as the affidavit forms no part of the record, we are

not at liberty to consider it.

Judgment arrested.

PITTSBURGH, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS

ARREST

OF

J DGMENT

591

But as a motion in arre t of jud ·ment rai e only tho e
bjection whi h are apparent upon the rocord; State v.
Paul, 5 R. I. 189; Black on Judgments, vol. 1, e . 96-8;
and as the affidavit form no part of the record, we are
not at liberty to consider it.
J udgment arrested.

RAILWAY COMPANY V. CITY OF CHICAGO.

Appellate Court of Illinois. 1908,

144 Illinois Appellate, 293.

Mr. Peesiding Justice Thompson delivered the opinion

of the court.

This is an action in case begun the 16th day of May,

1895, in the Circuit Court of Cook county, Illinois, by the

Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Com-

pany against the city of Chicago to recover three-fourths

of the damages sustained by it on account of the destruc-

P I TTSBURGH, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS
RAILWAY COMPANY V. CITY OF CHICAGO.

tion of property of which "the plaintiff was possessed as
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of its own property," during riots there in July, 1894.

Appellate Court of Illinois.

1908.

**********

144 Illinois Appellate, 293.

The action is based ujoon a statute of this state provid-

ing as follows:

"That whenever any building or other real or personal

property except property in transit, shall be destroyed or

injured in consequence of any mob or riot composed of

twelve or more persons, the city, or if not in a city then

the county in which such property was destroyed, shall be

liable to an action by or in behalf of the party whose prop-

erty was thus destroyed or injured for three-fourths of the

damages sustained by reason thereof.

"No person or corporation shall be entitled to recover in

any such action if it shall appear on the trial thereof that

such destruction or injury of property was occasioned or

in any way aided, sanctioned or pennitted by the careless-

ness, neglect or wrongful act of such person or corpora-

MR. PRESIDING J us TICE THOMPSON deli ered the opinion
of the court.
This is an action in ca e begun the 16th day of May,
1 95, in the Circuit Court of Cook county, Illinois, by the
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Loui Railway Company against the city of Chicago to recover three-fourths
of the damages sustained by it on account of the destruction of property of which "the plaintiff was po es ed as
of it own property," during riots there in July, 1894.

* * * * * * * * * *
The action is based upon a statute of this state providin a follows:
'That w hene er any building or other real or personal
property except property in transit, shall be de troyed or
injured in con equence of any mob or riot com osed of
t elve or more per on the city, or if not in a city then
th ounty in which u h propert · was de tro ed hall be
liable to an action by or in behalf of the arty who e rop~rty was thus destroyed or injur d for three-£ ourths of the
damages sustained by rea on ther of.

*

*. *.

* ••• , .

"No per on or corpora ti n hall be entitled to recover in
anv uch a ti n if it hall a pear on the trial thereof that
u · h d truction or injury of pro erty wa occa ioned or
in any way aid d, anction d or ermitted by the careles n s, negl ct or wrongful act of uch per on or corpora-
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tion ; nor shall any person or corporation be entitled to re-

cover any damages for any destruction or injury of prop-

erty as aforesaid, unless such party shall have used all

reasonable diligence to prevent such damage.

**No action shall be maintained under the provisions of

this act, by any person or corporation whose property

shall have been destroyed or injured as aforesaid, unless

notice of claim for damages be presented to such city or

county within thirty days after such loss or damage oc-

curs and such action shall be brought within twelve months

after such destruction or injury occurs, * * *"

It is urged the motion in arrest of judgment should have

been sustained because the declaration is insufficient in

that it does not state a cause of action by failing to state

facts but only stating conclusions in several particulars.

Tt is argued (1) ''that ownership is not alleged as a con-

clusion nor by way of uncertain or incomplete statement,

by way of argument, by evasion, nor is there any allega-
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tion from which it can necessarily be inferred. All that

is alleged is possession;" (2) "that the declaration should

locate the mob as within the city of Chicago;" (3) the stat-

ute ''requires that such party shall have used all reason-

able diligence to prevent such damage," while the declar-

ation only avers that the injury was not occasioned through

any neglect on the part of the plaintiff to use reasonble dil-

igence to prevent such injury; (4) that "the declaration

does not aver that a notice of plaintiff's claim for damages

was presented to the city within thirty days after the de-

struction or damage to its property occurred."

The numerous alleged defects in the declaration which

have been presented for our consideration are purely for-

mal. The defects complained of could not have been

reached by a general demurrer. They could only have

been grounds for a special demurrer assigning the causes.

A judgment after verdict can only be arrested for substan-

tial faults. All defects which would not have been fatal

on a general demurrer are cured by pleading to the issue,

and are aided by verdict. When the pleading states the

essential requisites of a cause of action, the court will pre-

sume that the particular fact or circumstance which ap-

pears to be defectively or imperfectly stated or omitted

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 16

tion; nor shall any person or corporation be entitled to recover any damages for any destruction or injury of property as aforesaid, unless such party shall have used all
reasonable diligence to prevent such damage.

* * • • • • * • • •

''No action shall be maintained under the provisions of
this act, by any person or corporation whose property
shall have been destroyed or injured as aforesaid, unless
notice of claim for damages be presented to such city or
county within thirty days after such loss or damage occurs and such action shall be brought within twelve months
after such destruction or injury occurs, * * * ''
It is urged the motion in arrest of judgment should have
been sustained because the declaration is insufficient in
that it does not state a cause of action by failing to state
facts but only stating conclusions in several particulars.
It is argued (1) "that ownership is not alleged as a connlusion nor by way of uncertain or incomplete statement,
by way of argument, by evasion, nor is there any allegation from which it can necessarily be inferred.
All that
is alleged is possession;" (2) "that the declaration should
locate the mob as within the city of Chicago;" ( 3) the statute ''requires that such party shall have used all reasonable diligence to prevent such damage," while the declaration only avers that the injury was not occasioned through
any neg] ect on the part of the plaintiff to use reasonble diligence to prevent such injury; ( 4) that "the declaration
does not aver that a notice of plaintiff's claim for damages
was presented to the city within thirty days after the detruction or damao-e to its property occurred.''
The numerous alleged defects in the declaration which
have been pre ented for our consideration are purely forThe defects complained of could not have been
al.
rea h d y a general demurrer.
They could only have
be n o-roun , f r a pecial demurrer a ignin ('/' the causP-s.
judg
t aft r
rdict can only be arrested for substantial fault . .
11 d f cts which would not have been fatal
n a gen eral d murr r ar cured by pleading to the i u ,
and ar ai
hy verdi t.
Wh n th pleading states the
ntial r ui ites of a cau e of action, the court will presum that th
arti ular fact or circumstan e which appears to be defectively or imperfectly stated or omitted
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was proved at the trial. A defective or inaccurate state-

ment of a cause of action is cured by a general verdict but

where no cause of action is stated a verdict will not cure

the defect. Gould on PI., chap. X.

Counsel for appellant state in their original argument

(p. 21): ''The declaration states the name of the plain-

tiff. It states that 'said plaintiff was possessed as of its

own property,' of the railway equipment, etc., described

and claimed to have been injured or destroyed, and for

which judgment is asked. It also avers 'that the property

of the plaintiff was destroyed or injured.' These aver-

ments only amount to an assertion that the plaintiff ivas

the owner of the property mentioned and that the legal

title was in the plaintiff. Such an averment is only a

mere statement of a conclusion of law and amounts to noth-

ing as an averment." At common law the possessor of

personal property is prima facie the owner of the property.

The averments that "iDlaintiff was possessed as of its own
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property," and "the property of the plaintiff was de-

stroyed or injured," amount to an allegation of owner-

ship by the plaintiff, when the declaration is first ques-

tioned after verdict. Beigen v. Biggs, 34 111. 170. On a

motion in arrest of judgment "every intendment will be

indulged in favor of the declaration, and if it contain.^

terms sufficiently general to comprehend by fair and rea-

sonable intendment any matter necessary to be proved, and

without proof of which the jury could not have given the

verdict, the want of an express averment in the declara-

tion has been cured by the verdict." Danley v. Hihhard.

222 111. 88; Fountain Head Drain Dist v. Wright, 228 111.

208. We hold that the conclusion to be drawn from the

averments of the declaration is that the plaintiff is the

owner of the property destroyed or injured.

The declaration avers that "within the territorial limits

of tlie city of Chicago, aforesaid, in consequence of a cer-

tain mob or mobs, riot or riots, each of which was then

and there composed of twelve or more persons within the

territorial limits of said city of Chicago, a large quantitv."

etc. This language locates the mob within the city of Chi-

cago in the language of the statute and fully answers the

second reason urged in arrest of judgment.

We do not think it necessary to comment on the third

T. P.— 38

wa pro ed at the trial. A def ecti e or inaccurate statement of a cause of action is cured by a general verdict but
where no cause of action is stated a verdict will not cure
the defect.
Gould on Pl., chap. X.
ounsel for appellant state in their original argument
(p. 21) : ''The declaration states the name of the plaintiff. It state that 'said plaintiff was possessed as of it
own property,' of the railway equipment, etc., de cribed
and claimed to have been injured or de troyed, and for
which judgment is asked. It also avers 'that the property
of the plaintiff was destroyed or injured.'
These averments only amount to an assertion that the plaintiff was
the owner of the property mentioned and that the legal
title wa in the plaintiff.
Such an averment is only a
mere statement of a conclusion of law and amounts to nothing as an averment. ''
At common law the posse sor of
personal property is prima f acie the owner of the property.
The a\ erments that ''plaintiff was possessed as of its own
property,'' and ''the property of the plaintiff was detro Ted or injured,'' amount to an allegation of owner. hip by the plaintiff, when the declaration is first questioned after verdict. Beigen v. Riggs, 34 Ill. 170. On a
motion in arre t of judgment ''every intendment will b
indulged in fa or of the declaration, and if it contain:
t rm. sufficientl general to comprehend by fair and r aonable intendment any matter necessary to be proved and
without proof of which the jury could not have o-iven the
v rdict, the want of an express averment in the declarati n has b en cured by the verdict.'' Danley . H iuba rd.
2 .... 2 Ill.
; Fountain Head Drain Dist v. Wright, 2_ Ill.
20 . We hold that the conclusion to be drawn from th
a\ erments of the declaration is that the plaintiff i th
wner of the property destroyed or injured.
The declaration avers that "within the territ rial limit
of the ity of hicago, afore aid in on equenc of a c rtain mob or mob , riot or riots each of whi h wa . h n
and th r compo ed of twelve or mor per on within th
t rrit ria1 li it of aid city of hirag·o, a lar quantih-. ''
et . Thi lano-ua locate th mob within the cit. of hiag in the 1 ngu o-e of th
tatute and fully an w r. th
Pron r a on ur .-: d in arr t of ju o- nt.
W do not think it n c . ar to comment on the third
T. P.-3
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and fourth reasons urged in arrest of the judgment further

than to state that under the rule announced in Danley v.

Hihhard, supra, the allegations contained in the declara-

tion concerning these matters are sufficiently general to

comprehend by fair and reasonable intendment the mat-

ters necessary to be proved in the respects complained of,

and the court did not err in overruling the motion.

Ajjirmed}

1 The same rule applies to matters in abatement. They cannot be availed

of on motion in arrest. Hiiger v. Cunningham (1906) 126 Ga. 684, 56 S. E.

and fourth reasons urged in arrest of the judgment further
than to state that under the rule announced in Danley v.
Hibbard, supra, the allegations contained in the declaration concerning these matters are sufficiently general to
comprehend by fair and reasonable intendment the matters necessary to be proved in the respects complained of,
and the court did not err in overruling the motion.

• * * * * * * * * •

(i4; Hawkins v. Hughes (1882) 87 N. C. 115.

Section 2. Time foe Making Motion.

Affirmed. 1

CHICAGO AND ALTON EAILROAD COMPANY

V. CLAUSEN.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1898.

173 Illinois, 100.

Me. Justice Caetweight delivered the opinion of the

1 The same rule applies to matters in abatement.
They cannot be availed
of on motion in ~rrest.
Huger v. Cunningham (1906) 126 Ga. 684, 56 S. E.
64; Hawk.ins v. Hughes (1882) 87 N. C. 115.

court :
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Appellee brought this suit against appellant to recover

damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the

starting of a train on which he was a passenger, while he

was attempting to get off at appellant's station at Gard-

ner, Illinois. There was a judgment for appellee, which

has been affirmed by the Appellate Court.

It is argued at much length that the trial court improp-

SECTION

erly overruled a demurrer to the first original count and

2.

TIME FOR MAKING MOTION.

five amended counts of the declaration upon which the case

CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMP ANY
V. CLAUSEN.

finally went to trial. No error has been assigned upon

such ruling on the demurrer, either in the Appellate Court

or this court, and none could be so assigned for the rea-

son that after the demurrer was overruled the defendant

Supreme Court of Illinois.

pleaded the general issue and thereby raised an issue of

1898.

fact, which was tried. It has always been the rule in this

173 Illinois, 100.

State that if a party wishes to have the action of a court

MR. JusTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the
court :
Appellee brought this suit against appellant to recover
damages for injuries alleo-ed to have been sustained by th
tarting of a train on which he wa a pa enger, while he
wa attempting to g t off at appellant's station at Gardn r, Illinois.
There was a judgm nt for appellee, which
has been affirm d by th App llat Court.
It is argu d at much 1 ngth that th trial court impropr]y verruled a d murrer to the fir t oriO'inal count and
fi am nded count of tbe d claration u on which the ca. r
finally w nt to trial.
No error ha. he n
ign d upon
. u h rulinO' on th d murr r eith r in the App Hate Court.
r this urt, and on ou] b . a .. i ~n d for the r an that ft r tb
murr r wa. ov rrnl d the d f ndant
pl cl d tl1 g n ral i , u an 1 th r by rai d an i su
f
fc t
l1ic·h wa. tri d. It ha. always b n th rul in thi.
~ at that if a
rty ish , to rrnv th a tion f a court
i-

1

Sec. 2]
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in overruling his demurrer reviewed in this court he must

abide by tlie demurrer. By pleading over he waives the

demurrer and the right to assign error upon the rul-

ing. * * *

Defendant made a motion in arrest of judgment, which

was overruled, and that is assigned for error; but having

once had the judgment of the court on its demurrer it could

not again invoke it for the same reasons by motion in ar-

rest. After a judgment overruling a demurrer to a de-

claration there can be no motion in arrest of judgment on

account of any exception to the declaration that might

have been taken on the argument of the demurrer. Rouse

V. Coimty of Peoria, 2 Gilm. 99; Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood,

11 111. 68; American Express Co. v. Pinchney, supra; In-

dependent Order of Mutual Aid v. Paine, 122 111. 625.^

While the defendant, by pleading over, waived its de-

murrer and the right to assign error upon the ruling of

the court on the demurrer, it did not waive innate and sub-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

stantial defects in the declaration which would render the

declaration insufficient to sustain a judgment, and the ques-

tion whether it is so far defective may be considered under

the assignments of error. The question which may be

thus presented is not as broad as those questions which

may be raised by demurrer, for the reason that defects

in pleading may sometimes be aided by the pleadings of

the opposite party, or be cured by the Statute of Amend-

ments and Jeofails, or by intendment after verdict. The

objections made to the various counts of the declaration

are, that the statements therein are too general and in

definite in. failing to show how the starting of the train

operated to throw plaintiff from it and in what manner it

was started, and that the various counts allege certain du-

ties on the part of the defendant, and charge the neglect

and violation of other duties, and the doing of other acts

foreign to the duties so alleged, as the jause of the sup-

1 This is the orthoilox rule, and seems to be based on no better reason tlian

that suggested in the followinrr qijotntion from Tidd : "After judgment

on demurrer, there can be no motion in arrest of judgment, for any exception

that might have been taken on arguing the demurrer; the reason is, that the

matter of law having been already settled, by the solemn determination of the

court, they will not afterwards suffer anyone to come as amicus curiae, and tell

them that the judgment which they gave on mature deliberation is wrong;

but it is otherwise after iudgTTient bv default, for that is not given in so sol-

emn a manner." 2 Tidd'e Practice, *918.
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in overruling his demurrer reviewed in this court he must
abide by the demurrer. By pleading over he waives the
emurrer and the right to assign error upon the ruling. * * *
D fendant made a motion in arrest of judgment, whicl
was overruled, and that is as igned for error; but havin
nee had the judgment of the court on its demurrer it could
not again invoke it for the same reasons by motion in arr t. After a judgment overruling a demurrer to a declaration there can be no motion in arrest of judgment on
a count of any exception to the declaration that might
have been taken on the argument of the demurrer. Rouse
. County of Peoria, 2 Gilm. 99; Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood,
77 Ill. 6 ; .American E x press Co . v . Pinckney, supra; Independent Order of Mutual .Aid v. Paine, 122 Ill. 625.1
While the defendant, by pleading over, waived its demurrer and the right to assign error upon the ruling of
the court on the demurrer, it did not waive innate and subtantial defects in the declaration which would render the
declaration in ufficient to sustain a judgment, and the question whether it is o far defective may be considered under
the assignments of error.
The question which may be
thus presented is not as broad as those questions which
may be raised by demurrer, for the reason that defects
in pleading may sometimes be aided by the pleadings of
the opposite part , or be cured by the Statute of Amendments and J eofails, or by intendment after verdict.
The
objections made to the various counts of the declaration
are, that the statem nts therein are too general and in ·
definite in failing to how how the starting of the train
operated to throw plaintiff from it and in what manner it
was started, and that the various counts allege certain duties on the part of the d fend ant, and charge the negl ct
and violation of other duties, and the doing of other ads
fcreign to the duties so alleged, as the ...iu ~ 3 of the sup1 This is the ortboclox rule an~
ems to b ba d on no better rea on than
that suggested in the followinrr <inot~tion fr0ni T ir10: '' fter judgment
on demurrer, there can be no motion in arrest of judgment, for any exception
that might have b en taken on arguing th d murrer · the rea on i that the
matter of law having been alread. settl d, by the solemn determination of the
court, they will not afterward uffer an one to come a amicus curiae, and tell
them that the judgment wbi h they ga e on mature deliberation is wrong;
hut it i other irn aftn jurlgment hv rlf'fault, for that is not given in so sol·
emn a manner.''
2 Tidd 's Practice, *918.
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posed injuries. So far as the declaration is defective in

the respects complained of, the defendant's plea of the

general issue, of course, could not aid or supply any omis-

sion or informality therein. It is also true that the Stat-

ute of Amendments and Jeofails does not extend to cure

defects which are clearly matters of substance. It pro-

vides that judgment shall not be reversed for want of any

allegation or averment on account of which omission a

special demurrer could have been maintained, but it does

not protect a judgment by default against objections for

matter of substance. Many such objections, however,

have always been cured, at the common law, by a verdict.

At the common law, independently of any statute, the rule

was and is, ''that where there is any defect, imperfection

or omission in any pleading, whether in substance or form,

which would have been a fatal objection upon demurrer,

yet if the issue joined be such as necessarily required, on

the trial, proof of the facts so defectively or imperfectly
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stated or omitted, and without which it is not to be pre-

sumed that either the judge would direct the jury to give

or the jury would have given the verdict, such defect, im-

perfection or omission is cured by the verdict." (1 Chit-

ty's PI. 673.) This rule was quoted and approved in Kee-

gan v. Kinnare, 123 111. 280, and Chicago and Eastern Illi-

nois Railroad Co. v. Eines, 132 id. 161. The intendment

in such case arises from the joint effect of the verdict and

the issue upon which it was given, and if the declaration

contains terms sufficiently general to comprehend, by fair

and reasonable intendment, any matter necessary to be

proved, and without proof of which the jury could not have

given the verdict, the want of an express statement of it in

the declaration is cured by the verdict. Under this rule

a verdict will aid a defective statement of a cause of ac-

tion, but will never assist a statement of a defective cause

of action. (1 Chitty's PI. 681.) Where the declaration

and the issue joined upon it do not fairly impose the duty

on the plaintiff to prove the omitted fact, the omission will

not be cured, {Joliet Steel Co. v. Shields, 134 111. 209), and

if, with all the intendments in its favor, the declaration is

so defective that it will not sustain a judgment, such de-

fects mav be taken advantage of on error. {Wilson v. My-

ricTc, 26 111. 34; Scho field v. Settley, 31 id. 515; Chicago and
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posed injuries.
So far as the declaration is defective in
the respects complained of, tbe defendant's plea of the
general issue, of course, could not aid or supply any omision or informality therein. It is also true that the Statute of Amendments and J eofails does not extend to cure
defects which are clearly matters of substance.
It provides that judgment shall not be reversed for want of any
allegation or averment on account of which omission a
pecial demurr~r could have been maintained, but it does
not protect a judgment by default against objections for
matter of ubstance.
Many such objections, however,
have alway been cured, at the common law, by a verdict.
At the common law, independently of any statute, the rule
was and i , ''that where there is any defect, imperfection
or omission in any pleading, whether in substance or form,
which would have been a fatal objection upon demurrer,
yet if the i ue joined be such as necessarily required, on
the trial, proof of the facts so defectively or imperfectly
tated or omitted, and without which it is not to be pre8umed that either the judge would direct the jury to give
or the jury would have glven the verdict, such defect, imperfection or omission is cured by the verdict."
(1 Chitty ' Pl. 673.)
This rule was quoted and approv d in Keegan v . Kinnare, 123 Ill. 280, and Chicago and Ea tern IlliThe intendrnent
nois Railroad Co. v. Hines, 132 id. 161.
in su h ca e arises from the joint effect of the verdict an<i
the is ue upon which it wa o-iv n , and if the <lr:!cla.ration
con tains term ufficiently o-eneral to comprehend, lJy fair
and reasonabl intendment, any matter nee .· ·ary to be
proved, and without proof of which tbe jury could not have
giv n th vPrdi.ct, the want of an xpress tat ment of it jn
th d laration i. cured by the verdi t.
Under thjs rule
a verdi t ill aid a <l f tive statement of a cau e of action but will n v r a i t
tatement of a def tive cctu.~e
of arti . (1 hitty'. I. 681.)
Wber th declaration
an th i. u join d upon it do not fairly impo th dut.
on th plaintiff to prov th mitt a fact the omi ' ion will
not b ur d, (Joli t Steel Co. v. hields, 134 Ill. 209), and
if with a11 th int ndm nt in its favor, th
claration is
a f c·i iv th t it wilJ not u. tain a judo·ment, u h d f ·t: mav h tak n a va tao- f n rror. (Wilson v. Myrick, 2 ill. 4; chofi ld v . ettley, 1 id. 515; Chicago and
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Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. Hines, supra; Culver v.

Third Nat. Bank, 64 111. 528.) * * *

When these rules are applied to the declaration in this

case, we are satisfied that, although not very well drawn,

it is clearly sufficient to sustain the judgment. * * *

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

NEWMAN V. PERRILL.

Supreme Court of Indiana. 1880.

73 Indiana, 153.

Elliott, J. The questions presented by this appeal

597
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Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. Hines, supra; Culver v.
Third !\at. Bank, 64 Ill. 5~8.) * * *
When th se rules are appli d to the declaration in this
case, we are satisfied that, although not very well drawn,
it is clearly suffi ient to u tain the judgment. * * *
* * * * * * ** * *
The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.
Judgment affirrned.

arise upon the ruling of the court sustaining the appellee's

motion in arrest of judgment.

**********

Appellant argues that, as the court had overruled de-

murrers to the complaint, it could not afterwards right-

fully sustain a motion in arrest. We do not think that

the court, by ruling wrongly upon the demurrers, precluded

NEWMAN V. PERRILL.
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itself from afterwards ruling rightly upon the motion in ar-

rest. If, when the motion was presented, the court deemed

Supreme Court of Indiana.

1880.

the complaint so clearly bad as not to be sufficient to sus-

tain a judgment, it was right to arrest the proceedings at

73 Indiana, 153.

that stage, notwitlistanding the fact that at an earlier stage

the court had entertained a different opinion.

A complaint fatally defective is vulnerable to attack,

even upon appeal, and there can certainly be no error in

declaring a fatally defective complaint bad on motion in

arrest, although demurrers may have been previously over-

ruled. It is the duty of the court not to permit a judg-

ment to be entered upon a complaint which is so clearly in-

sufficient as to afford the judgment no foundation. There

can be no valid judgment without a sufficient complaint,

and, where a party's complaint is incurably bad, he cannot

justly complain of any ruling which prevented him from

obtaining a judgment based upon it.

ELLIOTT, J.
The que tions presented by this appeal
arise upon the ruling of the court sustaining the appellee 's
motion in arrest of judgment.

* '" *

¥.•

* * * * * *

Appellant argue that, as the court had overruled demurrers to the com1 laint, it could not afterwards rightfull sustain a motion in arrest.
We do not think that
the court, by ruling wrongly upon the demurrers, precluded
itself from afterwar 1 ruling rightly upon the motion in arrest. If, when the motion was presented, the court deemed
the complaint o clearl3 bad as not to be sufficient to su tain a judgment, it was ri 'ht to arrest the proceedino's at
that tage, notwith . tanding the fact that at an earlier stag
the court had entertained a different opinio .
A complaint fatally def ectiYe is vulnerable to attack
ven upon appeal, and there can certainly be no error in
declaring a fatall defective complaint bad on motion in
arre. t lthouo·h demurrers ma. ha e been previou ly overrul
It is the duty of the court not to per it a ju 1rrment to be ent r ed upon a complaint which i
clearl. inuffi ient as to afford the judgment no foundation . Ther
can be no Yalid ju m nt with ut a u ficient complaint,
an<l, wh re a party' complaint i in urahly bad h cannot
ju tl. co lain of any ruling which prevented him from
obtaining a judgment ba d upon it .

• • • • • • • • • •
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Judgment affirmed.1

Judgment affirmed.^

1 To the same effect see Turnpike Co. v. Yates (1901) 108 Tenn. 428, 67

S. W. 69; Field v. Slaughter (1808) 1 Bibb. (Ky.) 160; Griffin v. The Jus

tices (1855) 17 Ga. 96. In Iowa this practice is expressly authorized by

statute. Frum v. Keeney (1899) 109 la. 393, 80 N. W. 5U7.

t To the same
S. W. 69; Field
tices (1855) 17
tatute.
Frum

effect see Turnpike Co. v. Yates ( 1901) 108 T enn. 428, 6i
v. Slaughter (1 08) 1 Bibb. (Ky.) 160; Griffin v. The JusGa. 96 .
In Iowa thi practice is expressly authorized by
v. Keeney (1899) 109 Ia. 393, 80 N . W. 507.

KELLER V. STEVENS.

Court of Appeals of Maryland. 1886,

66 Maryland, 132.

Yellott, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellee instituted proceedings in the Circuit Court

KELLER V. STEVENS.

for Baltimore County, to enforce a mechanics' lien. * * *

* * * On the 17th day of April, 1886, judgment was

extended in favor of plaintiff for $389.92, with interest

from date, and costs, and on the same day judgment fiat

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

1886.

executio was entered on motion of plaintiff's attorney. On

66 Maryland, 132.

the 20th of April, 1886, after final judgment had thus been

entered, the appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment.

The motion was overruled and from this determination of
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the court below an ajjpeal has been taken.

There can be no doubt that, if a motion in arrest had

been made subsequently to the judgment by default and

antecedently to the entry of final judgment, the motion

would have been strictly in conformity with regular pro-

cedure. * * *

But this motion in arrest was filed after the rendition of

a final judgment. It therefore comes too late. What ju-

dicial action is invoked by the interposition of a motion in

arrest? The party presenting the motion asks the court

not to enter final judgment because of some supposed de-

fect in the proceedings which he undertakes to make ap-

parent. But the judgment having been already entered,

if he wishes to have it removed from the record, he must

endeavor to accomplish that result by a motion to strike

out.

But the record shows that this appeal is from the de-

cision of the court below overruling a motion in arrest of

judgment filed after a final judgment had been entered in

J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellee instituted proceedings in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County, to enforce a mechanics ' lien. * * *
* * * * * * ** * *
* * * On the 17th day of April, 1886, judgment was
extended in favor of plaintiff for $389.92, with interest
from date, and costs, and on the same day judgment fiat
executio was entered on motion of plaintiff's attorney. On
the 20th of April, 1886, after final judgment h ad thus been
entered, the appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment.
The motion was overruled and from this determination of
the court below an appeal has been taken.
There can be no doubt that, if a motion in arrest had
been made sub equently to the judgment by default and
antecedently to the entry of final judgment, the motion
would have been strictly in conformity with r egular procedure. * * *
But this motion in arrest was filed after the r endition of
a final judom nt. It therefore comes too late. Wha t judicial a tion i invok d by th interpo ition of a motion in
arr . t ~
Th party presenting the motion ask the court
not to enter final judO'ment because of some upposed def t in th pro ding. which h und rtake to make apar nt.
But the judgment having b n already entered,
if h wish s to have it r moved from the r ord, he must
n avor to accompli h that r , ult l y a motion to strike
out.
ut th r or show. tl1at thj, app al i. from the def'i . ion of tl rout h l w v ,rn1lin<r a l oti n in arrest of
j ucJgm Jnt fi1 Jtl afl r
final jud 0 m nt h d h n nt red in
YELLOTT,

t
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the cause. There was no error committed by the Circuit

Court in the disposition which it made of the motion, and

its ruling should be affirmed.

Ruling affirmed.

Section 3. Effect of Motion.

599
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the ause. There wa no error committed by the Circuit
Court in the dispo ition which it made of the motion, and
its ruling should be affirmed.
Ruling affirmed.

STATE EX EEL. HENRY W. BOND V. FISHER.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1910,

230 Missouri, 325.

[On January 16, 1904, Sallie Bond filed a suit against

the relator, Henry W. Bond, in the circuit court of St.

Louis, upon a foreign judgment rendered against hioi in

SECTION

3.

EFFECT OF MOTION.

the state of Tennessee. Henry W. Bond filed defend 3s *o

this action, and on June 21, 1907, the cause came on for

STATE EX REL. HENRY W. BOND V. FISHER.

trial. The court made a finding against the defendant,

Henry W. Bond, whereupon, at the same term, he filed his

motion in arrest of judgment, which motion was continued,

Sitpreme Court of lklissouri.

1910.

and thereafter, on June 22, 1908, said motion was sustained,

for the stated reason that the judgment was not respon-

230 Missouri, 325.
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sive to the issues. Neither party took any steps to appeal

from or review this order of the trial court. Nothing fur-

ther was done for a year, when the said cause was set for

trial for the 5th day of October, 1909. Relator at once

filed a motion to strike the cause from the docket, on the

ground that the order in arrest of judgment had put an end

to the cause, which motion was overruled. Relator then

filed a petition in the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibi-

tion restraining the Hon. D. D. Fisher, judge of the circuit

court of St. Louis, from proceeding further with said

cause. A preliminary rule was issued requiring respond-

ent to show cause why a permanent writ of prohibition

should not issue.] ^

Woodson, J. This is an original proceeding instituted

in this court, seeking to prohibit the respondent, as judge

of the circuit court of tlie city of St. Louis, from taking

and further exercising jurisdiction over the parties to and

^ The matter inclosed in brackets is a condensation by the editor of the

statement of facts published with the opinion.

[On January 16, 1904, Sallie Bond filed a suit against
the relator, Henry W. Bond, in the circuit court of ~t.
Louis, upon a foreign judgment rendered against him in
the state of Tennessee. Henry W. Bond filed defen'3 3s +o
this action, and on June 21, 1907, the cause came on for
trial.
The court made a finding against the defendant,
Henry W. Bond, whereupon, at the same term, he filed his
motion in arrest of judgment, which motion was continued,
and thereafter, on June 22, 1908, said motion was sustained,
for the stated reason that the judgment was not responsive to the i ues. Neither party took any steps to appeal
from or review this order of the trial court. Nothing further was done for a year, when the said cause was set for
trial for the 5th day of October, 1909. Relator at once
:filed a motion to strike the cause from the docket, on the
ground that the order in arre t of judgment had put an end
to the cau e, which motion was overruled.
Relator then
fil d a petition in the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition re training the Hon. D. D. Fisher, ju ge of th circuit
court of t. Louis, from proceeding further with said
cau e. A preliminary rule was i ued r quiring re pondent to show au e why a permanent writ of prohibition
should not issue.] 1
WoonsoN, J.
This is an ori inal proc eding instituted
in this court, seekino- to prohi it the r
on ent a ju ge
of the circuit court of tbe city of St. Louis, from taking
and furth r exerci ino- juri dicti n ov r the parties to and
' The matt r inclo ed in bracket i a ondenRation by the editor of the
statement ~f fact:s published ""ith the opinion.

600
600 Trial Peacticb [Chap 16

the subject-matter involved in the case of Sallie Bond

against this relator, pending therein.

I. There are but two legal propositions presented by

this record for determination: First, what is the legal ef-

fect of an unappealed from order of the circuit court of this

State sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment ; and, sec-

ond, * * *

"We will dispose of these propositions in the order stated.

At common law an unconditional order sustaining a mo-

tion in arrest of judgment was a final disposition of the

cause, that is, it prevented the rendition of a subsequent

final judgment therein. But, if the order was made condi-

tional upon an amendment, or such other action as would

remove the cause of arrest, and the condition complied

with, then a venire facias de novo should be awarded, in

which case the order in arrest would not constitute a bar

to the entry of a final judgment therein.

In Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, vol. 23, p. 836, the
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doctrine is stated thus: "The granting of a motion in ar-

rest of judgment prevents the entry of a final judgment in

the cause, unless it is made conditional upon an amend-

ment, or such other action as will remove the cause of ar-

rest. And if it does not award a venire facias de novo, it

operates as a discontinuance and dismisses defendant with-

out day."

In Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, vol. 2, p. 820,

the rule is stated in this language: ''In civil cases the sus-

taining of a motion in arrest of judgment has the effect

of putting an end to the case."

The rule is tersely and clearly stated by the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Butcher v. Metis, 1

Miles 233, in the following language:

"An arrest of judgment is in effect nothing more than

superseding a verdict for some cause apparent upon the

record, which shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to the

benefit of the verdict. It is often followed by a judgment

for the defendant, that he go without day, but it is not of

itself a judgment for the defendant. The court may, after

an arrest of judgment, award a repleader or a venire de

novo without a repleader. Wliich of these courses is the

proper one, depends upon the nature of the defect for which

TRIAL PRACTICE
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the subject-matter involved in the case of Sallie
against this relator, pending therein.

B~md

* * * * * * * * * *
I. There are but two legal propositions presented by
this record for determination: First, what is the legal eff ct of an unappealed from order of the circuit court of this
tate sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment; and, secnd * * *
' will dispose of these propositions in the order stated.
We
At common law an unconditional order sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment was a final dispo ition of the
cause, that is, it prevented the rendition of a subsequent
final judo·ment therein. But, if the order was made conditional upon an amendment, or such other action as would
remove the cause of arrest, and the condition complied
with, then a venire f acias de novo should be awarded, in
which case the order in arrest would not constitute a bar
to the entry of a final judgment therein.
In Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, vol. 23, p. 836, the
doctrine is stated thus: ''The granting of a motion in arrest of judgment prevents the entry of a final judgment in
the can e, unl
it is made conditional upon an amendment, or such other action as will remove the cau e of arrest. And if it does not award a venire facias de novo, it
operates as a di continuance and dismisses defendant without day.''
In Encyclopedia of Pl adino- and Practice, vol. 2, p. 820,
the rule is stated in thi language: "In civil cases the sus- .
taining of a motion in arre t or judgment bas the effect
of putting an en 1 to th case. ''
he rule is tersely and clearly stated by the Supreme
ourt of P nn. ~dvania in the case of Butcher v. Metts, 1
Mil R 2. 3, in the fol1owing lanO'uage:
"An arre t of judo·ment is in ffect nothino- more than
. u1 r. ing a v rdict for some aus ap ar nt upon the
rPc·or] which b w that the plaintiff is not ntit ed to th
h TI0,fit f th v r i t. It i oft n foll wed by a jud 0 ·m nt
for th 1 f ndant, that h go without day but it is not of
it ·plf a judgm nt f r th defendant.
Th ourt may, aft r
,m arn» ·t f jud O' cmt, a war] a r pl a 1 r or a v nir de
?l.O o
ithout a r 1 lead r. Whi h of the e cour
i the
prop r o
cl p nd. u on the nature of the defect for which
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the judgment is arrested. If it appears by the record that

the plaintiff has no cause of action, the court will give judg-

ment, after the arrest of judgment on the verdict, that the

plaintiff take nothing by his writ, and that the defendant

go without day. If issue be joined upon an immaterial

point, there being a sufficient cause of action alleged in the

declaration, the proper course is to award a repleader.

If the pleadings be sufficient and the issue well joined, but

the verdict is imperfectly found, it is usual to award a

venire de novo; and this it is said may be done upon the

motion of the defendant, without a motion in arrest of

judgment.

''The venire de novo is an ancient proceeding of the

common law. It was in use long before the practice of

granting new trials. It follows, of course, upon the grant-

ing of a new trial ; but as a distinct proceeding it is com-

monly adopted after a bill of exceptions or after a special

verdict imperfectly found, but always for some cause ap-
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parent on the record, and if granted when it should not be,

it is error, and the award of it may be reversed.

"A new trial, on the other hand, is commonly granted

after a general verdict for some cause not apparent on tne

record, and it is not assignable for error. (Hanihleton v.

Veere, 2 Saund. 169 (n. 1) ; Good title v. Jones, 7 T. R. 43,

48 ; Witham v. Lewis, 1 Wils. 48, 56 ; Com. Dig., tit. Pleader,

R. 18; 1 Sellon's Practice, ch. 11, sec. 3 (C. D.) ; Miller v.

JRalston, 1 Serg. k Rawle 309; Ehersoll v. Krug, S'Binn. 53;

Lessee of Pickering v. Rutty, 1 Serg. & Rawle 515.)

"In this case the fault was in the verdict. Of course it

appears upon the record. A venire facias de novo is there-

fore proper.

"In regard to the objection that the defendant is no

longer in court on this action, it should be observed that

the judgment was arrested at this term, and no judgment

has been entered for the defendant. He is therefore still

in court and bound to take notice of the further proceed-

ings in the cause. But if the term had been allowed to

elapse after the arrest of judgment, and the cause had not

been continued by a cnria adv. vult, according to strict no-

tions of practice, the action would have been discontinued,

and the defendant without day in court. Venire de novo

awarded.'*

the judgment is arre ted. If it appears by the record that
the plaintiff has no cause of action, the court will give judgment, after the arre t of judgment on the verdict, that the
plaintiff take nothing by his writ, and that the defendant
go without day.
If issue be joined upon an immaterial
point, there being a sufficient cause of action alleged in the
declaration, the proper course is to award a repleader.
If the pleadings be sufficient and the is ue well joined, but
the erdict is imperfectly found, it is usual to award a
enire de nova; and this it is said may be done upon the
motion of the defendant, without a motion in arrest of
judgment.
''The venire de nova is an ancient proceeding of the
common law.
It was in u se long before the practice of
granting new trial . It follow , of cour e, upon the granting of a new trial; but a a distinct proceeding· it is commonly adopted after a bill of exceptions or after a special
\ erdict imperfectly found, but always for some cause apparent on the record, and if granted when it should not be,
it is error, and the award of it may be rever ed.
''A new trial, on the other hand, is commonly granted
after a general verdict for some cau e not apparent on tne
record, and it is not assignable for error. (H anibleton v .
Veere, 2 Saund. 169 (n. 1); Goodtitle v. J ones, 7 T . R. 43,
48; Witham v. Lewis, 1 \Vils. 48, 56; Com. Dig., tit. Pleader,
R. 18 ; 1 Sellon 's Practice, ch. 11, sec. 3 ( C. D.) ; Miller v .
Ralston, 1 Serg. & Rawle 309; Eb ersoll v . K r'Ug, 5 "Binn. 53;
L essee of Pickering v . Rutty 1 Serg. & Rawle 515.)
"In thi ca e the fault was in the ver i t. Of cour e it
appear. upon the record. A venire facias de nova is therefore proper.
"In regard to th objection that the defendant is no
lono·er in court on this action, it should be ob erved that
the judgment was arr ted at this term and no judgment
ha been nter d for tJ1 def ndant. He i ther fore still
in court and bound to tak notice of the further proce di.ng in the can e.
ut if th term had e n allowed to
lapse after th arre . t of jn g e t a d th cau e had not
he n continued b. a cu rin ad 11. 1.:ult accordjno- to tri t n tions of practi e th artion would ha' b n di continued,
and th d fendant with ut day in court. Venire de nova
awarded."

60~
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And the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Raber

V. Jones, 40 Ind. 1. c. 441, in discussing this question used

this language: ''The complaint does not aver that the

judgment against the corporation was recovered upon the

policy. It is a clear principle of pleading, that in declar-

ing upon a statute, the averments must be sufficient to bring

the case within the statute. The complaint was, therefore,

radically defective, in not stating facts sufficient to con-

stitute a cause of action, and the court properly arrested

the judgment.

''When the judgment was arrested, however, there

should have been an end of the case. No judgment for th"

defendant should have followed. The arrest of judgment

ends the case. Each party pays his own costs, and the

plaintiff is at liberty to proceed de novo in a fresh action.

3B1. Com. 393, note u."

The case of Kaufman v. Kaufman, 2 Wharton (Pa.)

139, 1 c. 147, announces the same doctrine.
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The authorities seem to be uniform upon this proposi-

tion. The only modification that has been made of that

common law rule is contained in section 804, Revised Stat-

utes 1899. That section reads as follows: "When a judg-

ment shall be arrested, the court shall allow the proceed-

ings in which the error was, to be amended in all cases

when the same amendment might have been made before

trial, and the cause shall again proceed according to the

practice of the court."

Under the provisions of this statute, the order of the

court sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment does not

necessarily result in a new trial, any more than it did at

common law. Such an order has that effect only in those

cases where the motion is sustained for an error which

could have been cured by an amendment made before the

trial occurred. This was so held by this court in the case

of Stid V. Railroad, 211 Mo. 1. c. 415, where Lamm, J., in

speaking for the court, used this language: "Speaking with

prer-ision, a motion in arrest is not a motion for a rehear-

ing. If granted, it does not necessarily result in a new

trial. If an amendment be allowed, the cause by statutory

command proceeds 'according to the practice of the court.'

(R. S. 1899, sec. 804.)"

This construction of that statute is in harmony with the
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And the Supreme Court of Indiana in the ca e of Raber
. Jon es, 40 Ind. 1. c. 441, in discussing this question used
this language: "The complaint does not aver that the
judgment against the corporation was recovered upon the
policy. It is a clear principle of pleading, that in declaring upon a statute, the averments must be sufficient to bring
the case within the statute. The complaint was, therefore,
radically defective, in not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of aiction, and the court properly ;;trrested
the judgment.
''When the judgment was arrested, however, there
should have been an end of the case. No judgment for th ,,
lefendant should have followed.
The arrest of judgment
ends the case.
Each party pays his own costs, and the
plaintiff is at liberty to proceed de nova in a fresh action.
3 Bl. Com. 393, note u. ''
The case of Kauffnian v. Kauffman, 2 Wharton (Pa.)
139, 1 c. 147, announces the same doctrine.
The authorities seem to be uniform upon this proposition.
The only modification that has been made of that
common law rule is contained in section 804, Revised Statutes 1899. That section reads as follows: "When a judg-ment shall be arrested, the court shall allow the proceedings in which the error was, to be amended in all cases
when the same amendment might have been made before
trial, and the cause shall again proceed according to the
practice of the court.''
Under the provision of this statute, tbe order of the
court su taining a motion in arrest of judgment does not
nee s arily result in a new trial, any more than it did at
common law. Such an order has that effect only in those
ase where the motion is su tained for an error which
ul have b n ured by an amendment made b fore the
trial o urr d. Thi. wa. so held by thi ourt in the case
of 1 tid v . Railroad, 211 Mo. 1. 1c. 415, where LAMM, J., in
. p kin for tb court, u d thi lan uage: '' SpeakinO' with
prc-'f'i.·ion a motion in arr st is not a motion for a rehearing. If ~r nt , it d . n t n s arily r sult in a new
trial. If an m ndm nt bCl allow 1, the ause by statutory
"'r"~"'rl, 'a c rdinO' to the practice of the court.'
. ~ . 1 9!)
. 804.) "
This onstru tion of that statute is in harmony with the
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spirit of our legislation upon the subject of nonsuits and

arrests of judgments, as expressed in section 4285, Revised

Statutes 1899, which, insofar as is material, reads as fol-

ARRE ' T OF

~pirit

the time respectively prescribed in this chapter, and the

plaintiff therein suffer a nonsuit, or, after a verdict for him,

the judgment be arrested, or, after a judgment for him,

the same be reversed on appeal or error, such plaintiff

may commence a new action from time to time, within one

year after such nonsuit suffered or such judgment arrested

or reversed."

The only remaining matter to be determined in this con-

nection is, was the motion in arrest sustained for an error

which might have been ^cured by a timely amendment be-

fore the trial was had in the circuit coart of the city

of St. Louis? The order sustaining the motion in arrest

specifically sets out the reason for the court's actions in

that regard, namely, for the reason that the judgment ivas
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not responsive to the issues. Clearly, this was not an error

which could have been cured by an amendment before the

trial was had in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis,

within the meaning of said section 804, for the obvious

leason that the judgment could not in the very nature of

things have been rendered until after the trial was had

{therein. And since the order of the court sustaining the

motion in arrest was unconditional, unappealed from, and

the term at which it was entered having long ago elapsed,

it became absolute and final, and, therefore, constitutes a

complete bar to all further proceedings in said cause.

**********

We are of opinion that the preliminary rule heretofore

issued should be made permanent.

It is so ordered. All concur.

DGl.\IENT
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of our legi lation upon th ubj t of n n. uits and
arrests of judgments, as expr
in ·ection 42 5, Revi ed
Statutes 1899, whi ch, in ofar a i material, read as follows: "If any action shall have been comm n d within
the time respectively prescribed in thi hapter and th
plaintiff therein suffer a non uit, or, after a verdict for him,
the judgment be arrested, or, after a judgment for him,
the same be reversed on appeal or eTror uch plaintiff
may commence a new action from time to time, within one
year after such nonsuit suffered or such judgment arrested
or reversed.''
The only remaining matter to be determined in this connection is, was the motion in arrest sustained for an error
which might have .been •cured by a timely amendment before the trial was had in the circuit coart of the city
of St. Loui ~ The order sustaining the motion in arrest
pecifically sets out the reason for -the court's actions in
that regard namely, for the rea on that the ju.dgnient was
not responsi e to the issues. Clearly, this was not an error
which could ha' e been cured by an amendment before the
trial was had in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis,
·within the meaning of said se.ction 804 for the obvious
reason that the judgment could not in the 'ery nature of
things have been rendered until after the trial was had
rtherein. And since the order of the court sustaining the
'motion in arre t was unconditional unappealed from, and
the term at whi h it was entered having long ago elapsed,
it became ab olute and final, and therefore, constitutes a
complete bar to all further proceedings in said cau e.
* * * * * * * * * *
We are of opinion that the preliminary rule heretofore
i. ued should b made permanent.
It is so ordered. All concur.
1

lows: ''If any action shall have been commenced within

J
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CINCINNATI, INDIANAPOLIS, ST. LOUIS AND CHI-

CAGO EAILWAY COMPANY V. CASE.

Supreme Court of Indiana. 1889,

122 Indiana, 310,

CINCINNATI, INDIANAPOLIS, ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO RAILWAY COMPANY V. CASE.

Coffey, J. This was an action by the appellee against

the appellant to recover damages for negligent delay in

Supreme Court of Indiana.

1889.

shipping appellee's cattle from the town of Fowler to the

city of Indianapolis.

Upon issues formed the cause was tried by a jury, who

returned a verdict for the appellee.

Appellant moved in arrest of judgment, which was over-

ruled, and an exception taken.

Appellant then filed its motion and reasons for a new

trial, which was overruled and exception reserved. Judg-

ment on verdict.

The first and second errors assigned here call in ques-

tion the sufficiency of the complaint, and the third questions

the propriety of the ruling of the circuit court in overrul-
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ing the motion for a new trial.

No objection to the ruling of the circuit court in over-

ruling the motion in arrest of judgment is urged in this

court. It is not even assigned here as error.

It is now claimed by the appellee that as the motion in

arrest of judgment preceded the motion for a new trial, the

right to move for a new trial was cut off, and that it can-

not, for that reason, bo considered. Such seems to be the

established practice in this state. * * *

It is claimed by the appellant that no good reason can be

given for the rule established by these numerous cases,

and that therefore, they should be overruled. But it must

not be forgotten that they establish a rule of practice

wliich has prevailed in this State for many years, well

understood by the profession. A rule so firmly established

and so well understood as this should not be disturbed, ex-

cept for some strong reason. The rule can work no hard-

ship, as a party may, after a motion for a new trial, move

in arrest of judgment and thus secure the benefit of both

122

Indiana, 310.

COFFEY, J . This was an action by the appellee against
the appellant to recover damages for negligent delay in
shipping appellee's cattle from the town of F owler t o the
city of I ndianapolis.
* * * * ~ • * • • *
Upon issues formed the cause was tried by a jury, who
returned a verdict for the appellee.
Appellant moved in arrest of judgment, which was overruled, and an exception taken.
Appellant then filed its motion and rea~ons for a new
trial, whi,ch was overruled and exception reserved. J udgrn n t on verdict.
The first and second errors assigned here call in question tbe ufficiency of tbe complaint, and the third questions
the propriety of the ruling of the circuit court in overruling the motion for a new trial.
* * * * * * * * * *
No objection to the ruling of the circuit court in overruli.nO' the motion in arrest of judgment is urged in this
rourt. It is not even a signed here as error.
It is now claimed by the appellee that as the motion in
arrest of judgment preceded the motion for a new trial, the
right to move for a new trial was cut off, and that it cannot, f r that r ason, be considered. Such s ems to be the
r. tahli . 11 <l prartic in this stat . * * •
It i. laimed by the app Hant that no good reason can be
giv n f l' the rule e tablished by these numerous cases,
nncl tliat th refor , they should b overrul d. But it must
not he f or,<Yott n that they e tabli h a rule of practice
"11ic·h 11 a. JT Yail din this State form ny y ar,, well
1rndur"t
cl by th prof ssion. A rule so firmly tabli hed
ancl . o w "]] uncl r. to d a this Rh uld n t b disturb d, ex<'PJ>t for som stron g r ason. Th rul
n work no hard·
.. hip cs n p rty may, , ft r a motio for an w trial, move
in arr . t of judgment and thus s cure the benefit of both

~
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motions. We know of no good reason why this long list of

cases should be overruled. We find no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed.^

c. 3]

ARREST

OF

605

JUDGMENT

motion
We know of no good reason why this long list of
ca. es l ould be overruled. We find no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed. 1

1 ' ' This rule, however, extends only to cases where the party has knowledge

of the fact, at the time of moving in arrest of judgment; therefore, a new

trial was granted after such a motion, on affidavits of two of the jury, that

they drew lots for their verdict. (Pr. Reg. 409. Bui. Ni. Pri. .325, 6. Bed

quaere, whether such affidavits would now be received.) " 2 Tidd's Practice,

•913.

JEWELL V. BLANDFORD.

1 ''This rule, however, extends only to cases where the party has knowledge
of the fact, at the time of moving in arrest of judgment; therefore, a new
trial was granted after such a motion, on affidavits of two of the jury, that
they drew lots for their verdict.
(Pr. Reg. 409.
Bul. Ni. Pri. 325, 6.
Sed
quaere, whether such affidavits would now be received.) "
2 Tidd 's Practice,
*913.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1838.

7 Dana, 472.

Opinion of the Court, by Chief Justice Robertson".

**********

First, did the previous motion in arrest of judgment pre-

clude Jewell from a right to ask a new trial? and, secondly,

was he entitled to a new trial?

First. Cases may, we know, be found in the British

JEWELL V. BLANDFORD.
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books, in which judges in England decided that a motion

for a new trial comes too late after an unsuccessful motion

Court of .Appeals of Kentucky.

1838.

to arrest the judgment ; and the only reason given for such

a practice seems to have been that assigned by Bayley,

justice; and that is because, as he said, by moving to

7 Dana, 472.

arrest the judgment, the party acknowledged that there

was no valid objection to the verdict. But that assump-

tion is, in our judgment, unreasonable, and the estoppel de-

duced from it seems to be equally so.

If it be true that a motion in arrest is an implied waiver

of a right to a new trial, should not a motion for a new

trial equally operate as an implied admission that there is

no cause for arresting the judgment? And considered as

an original question, is there, should there be, any such

implied admission or waiver in either case? We think not.

Indeed, in England this is a mere matter of practice only.

and arose in England, from the peculiar organization and

powers of its courts. There is no principle in it.

Our practice is different, and is, therefore, in our opinion,

Opinion of the Court, by CHIEF J us TICE RoBERTSON.
* * * * * * * * * *
First, did the previous motion in arrest of judgment pre-·
elude Jewell from a right to ask a new trial~ and, secondly,
wa he entitled to a new trial 1
First.
Cases may, we know, be found in the Briti 11
books, in which judges in England decided that a motion
for a new trial comes too late after an unsuccessful motion
to arrest the judgment; and the only rea on given for such
a practice seems to have been that assigned by Bayley,
ju ti. e; and that is because, as he said, by moving to
arrest the judgment, the party acknowledO'ed that there
was no valid objection to the verdict. But that assumption i , in our judgment, unreasonable and the estoppel de<luc d from it eems to be equally so.
If it be true that a motion in arrest is an implied waiver
of a ri.crht to a new trial, should not a motion for a new
trial equally operate a an imr lied admi ion that ther i
no au e f r arre tinO' the judgm nt And on idered a
an original que tion is th r , hould there e any uch
impli d adrni ion or waiver in either a e? We think not.
Inde d, in EnO'land thi i a ere matter of practice only.
and aro e in nO'la d from th p culiar organization an 1
power of it ourt . There i no principle in it.
Our practic is diff r nt, and i , ther fore in our opinion
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more consonant with justice and all the ends of the law.

We do not hesitate, therefore, to decide that the motion

for a new trial did not come too late in this case, and the

more especially as, by not objecting to it when made, the

plaintiff in the action waived the technical objection which

the British practice, if it had been adopted here, might

have authorized him then only to make.

TRIAL PRACTICE

more consonant with justice and all the ends of the law.
We do not hesitate, therefore, to decide that the motion
for a new trial did not come too late in this case, and the
more especially as, by not objecting to it when made, the
plaintiff in the action waived the technical objection which
the British practice, if it had been adopted here, might
have authorized him then only to make.

• • • * • • • • • •
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CHAPTER XVII.

NEW TRIALS.

Section 1. General Purpose.

GUNN V. UNION RAILROAD COMPANY.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Rhode

Island. 1901.

CHAPTER XVII.

23 Rhode Island, 289,

Rogers, J. — This suit is trespass on the case for negli-

NEW TRIALS.

gence brought in the Common Pleas Division, wherein,

upon a jury trial, the plaintiff obtained a verdict against

the defendant for $10,000; and thereupon the defendant

SECTION

1.

GENERAL PURPOSE.

brought it to this Division on a petition for a new trial on

the ground, among others, that the verdict was against the

law and \\\q evidence and the weight thereof. On Decem-

GUNN V. UNION RAILROAD COMPANY.

ber 28, 1'jOO, this Division filed its opinion granting the

petition on the ground that the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence. See 22 R. I. 321. On the same day,

wit, December 28, 1900, the plaintiff moved that this

.Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Rhode

I sland. 1901.

Division dismiss the defendant's petition for a new trial
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and direct the Common Pleas Division to enter judgment

on the verdict of the jury in said action, —

23 Rhode Island, 289.

''First. Because the record in said case shows that to

grant a new trial on the grounds therein set forth would

be in violation of the constitution of Rhode Island, and

also of the constitution of the United States, to wit, of the

fourteenth amendment to said constitution of the United

States, wherein it is provided that no state shall 'deprive

any person of life, liberty or property, without due process

of law,'

"Second. Because the court in its opinion has 'granted

the defendant's petition for a new trial' on grounds which

the record shows deprive the plaintiff of his right to a trial

by jury, and of his property, 'without due process of law.' "

607

RoaERs, J.-This suit is trespass on the case for negligence brought in the Common Pleas Division, wherein,
upon a jury trial, the plaintiff obtained a verdict against
the defendant for $10,000; and thereupon the defendant
brought it to this Division on a petition for a new trial on
the ground, among others, that the verdict was against the
law and the evidence and the weight thereof. On December 28, l:JOO, this Division filed its opinion granting the
petition on the ground that the verdict wa against the
weight of the evidence. See 22 R. I. 321. On the ame day,
o wit, December 28, 1900, the plaintiff moved that this
Di i ion di mi s the defendant' petition for a new trial
and direct the Common Pleas Division to enter judgment
on the verdict of the jury in said action,"Fir t. Because the record in aid case shows that to
grant a new trial on the grounds therein set forth would
be in violation of the con titution of Rhode I land and
also of the con titution of the Unit d tat
to wit, of t
fourteenth amendment to said con titution of the United.
States, wh rein it is provided that no tate shall 'deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due proce s
of law.'
"Se ond. Because the court in its opinion ha 'gTanted
he defend nt' p tition f r a new trial' on groun which
the record how de rive the laintiff of his ri ht to a trial
I y jury, and of his property, 'without due proce of law.' ''
607
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At the time our State constitution went into operation

section 5 of "An act to establish a Supreme Judicial Court"

was in full force, which gave that court the power to grant

new trials in cases decided therein or in any Court of Com-

mon Pleas for various reasons specified; and said section

contained this clause, viz.: "and the said court shall also

have power to grant new trials in cases where there has

been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials have

been usually granted at common law." Digest of 1822,

p. 109.

It is clear that our ancestors prior to our present State

constitution found trial by jury so fallible that it was

necessary to provide for more than one trial. In England

as well as in the older States of America, two hundred years

ago, trial by jury was in a state of evolution. The old law

of attaints against a jury as a means of reversing a verdict

against the evidence was apparently obsolete both in Eng-

land and in this country before the American Revolution.
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Note to Erving v. Cradock, Quincey, 560, by Horace (Mr.

Justice) Gray.

Sir William Blackstone, writing in or about 1765 (3

Com. Chitty's ed., 388-392), says: "Formerly the prin-

cipal remedy, for reversal of a verdict unduly given, was

by writ of attaint. * * * But such a remedy as this laid

the injured party under an insuperable hardship by making

a conviction of the jurors for perjury the condition of his

redress. The judges saw this; and therefore very early,

even upon writs of assise, they devised a great variety of

distinctions, by which an attaint might be avoided, and the

verdict set to rights in a more temperate and dispassionate

method. * * * When afterwards attaints, by several

statutes, were more universally extended, tlie judges fre-

quently, even for the misbehaviour of jurymen, instead of

prosecuting the writ of attaint, awarded a second trial:

and subsequent resolutions, for more than a century past,

have so amplified the benefit of this remedy, that the attaint

is now as obsolete as the trial by battle which it succeeded;

and we shall probably see the revival of the one as soon as

the revival of the other. * * * Tf every verdict was final in

the first instance, it would tend to destroy this valuable

method of trial, and would drive away all causes of conse-

quence to be decided according to the forms of imperial

..A.t the time our State constitution went into operation
section 5 of" An act to establish a Supreme Judicial Court"
was in full force, which gave that court the power to grant
new trials in cases decided therein or in any Court of Common Pleas for various reasons specified; and said section
contained this clause, viz.: ''and the said court shall also
have power to grant new trials in cases where there has
been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials have
been usually granted at common law.'' Digest of 1822,
p. 109.
It is clear that our ance tors prior to our present State
constitution found trial by jury so fallible that it was
necessary to provide for more than one trial. In England
a well as in the older States of America, two hundred years
a o·o trial by jury was in a state of evolution. The old law
of attaint against a jury as a mean of reversing a verdict
against the evidence was apparentl:y obsolete both in England and in this country before the American Revolution.
Note to Erving v. Cradock, Quincey, 560, by Horace (Mr.
Ju tice) Gray.
Sir William Blackstone, writing in or about 1765 ( 3
om. Chi tty's ed., 388-392), says: "Formerly the princjpal remedy, for reversal of a verdict unduly given, wa.
by writ of attaint. * * * But such a remedy as thi laid
the injured party under an insuperable hard hip by makinO'
a conviction of the jurors for perjury the condition of hi
r dr s. The jud ·e aw thi ; and therefore very early,
ev n upon writ of a i ·e, they devi, d a great variety of
di tin ti on , by wbi h an attaint miO'ht be avoided, and the
" rdi t ct to right in a more temp rate ancl di pas ionat
m tho . * * * When aft rward attaint , by several
. tatut . , w r mor univer all. xt nd d, th judO'es fr qu ntly, v n f r the mi b haviour of jurym n, instead f
nr . ntin the writ of attaint, aw rd d a
cond trial:
;n d . uh. ri 1 t r . 1uti n for m r tlian a ntury a . t,
ha v . a plifi d th b n fit f thi r m dy, th t the attaint
j , now a. h 1 t
th trial by battl whi hit ucceed d;
, n 1 w . h 11 pr hahl. .
th r iv(, 1 of th
e a soon a
th rC>vival f th oth r . * '~ :Mt If v r . v rdi t was final in
UH' Jlr.·i in:t n , it w ul t n t
troy thi valuable
rn < h <1 of tri 1, an w u]d 1r1
aw y all au
of ron qu n
t
e decid d a
rding to the form of imp rial
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law, upon depositions in writing, which might be reviewed

in a course of appeal. * * * The jury are to give their

opinion instanter; that is, before they separate, eat, or

drink. And under these circumstances the most intelligent

and best intentioned men may bring in a verdict, which

they themselves upon cool deliberation would wish to re

verse.

"Next to doing right, the great object in the administra-

tion of public justice, should be to give public satisfaction

If the verdict be liable to many objections and doubts in

the opinion of his counsel, or even in the opinion of by-

standers, no party would go away satisfied unless he had a

prospect of reviewing it. Such doubts would with him be

decisive : he would arraign the determination as manifestly

unjust, and abhor a tribunal which he imagined had done

him an injury without a possibility of redress.

''Granting a new trial, under proper regulations, cures

all these inconveniences, and at the same time preserves
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entire and renders perfect that most excellent method of

decision, which is the glory of the English law. A new trial

is a rehearing of the cause before another jury, but with as

little prejudice to either party, as if it had never been

heard before. *************

"Nor is it granted where the scales of evidence hang

nearly equal; that which leans against the former verdict

ought always very strongly to preponderate."

Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, decided in the King's bencli

in 1757, was a motion for a new trial upon which the judges

gave their opinion, granting the new trial, seriatim. Lord

Mansfield, inter alia, said, page 393, — "Trials by jury, in

civil causes, could not subsist now without a power, some-

where, to grant new trials. If an erroneous judgment be

given in point of law, there are many ways to review and

set it right. Where a court judges of fact upon depositions

in writing, their sentence or decree may, many ways, be re-

viewed and set right. But a general verdict can only be set

right by a new trial; which is no more than having the

causes more deliberately considered by another jury, where

there is a reasonable doubt, or perhaps a certainty, that

justice has not been done.

"The writ of attaint is now a mere sound in every case:

in many it does not pretend to be a remedy. There are

T. p.— 39
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law, upon depo itions in writing, which might be reviewed
in a course of appeal. * * * The jury are to give their
opinion instanter; that is, before they separate, eat, or
drink. And under these circumstances the mo t intel1igent
and best intentioned men may bring in a verdict, which
they themselves upon cool deliberation would wish to re
verse.
"Next to doing right, the great object in the administra tion of public justice, should be to give public sati faction
If the verdict be liable to many objections and doubt in
the opinion of his counsel, or even in the opinion of bystanders, no party would go away satisfied unless he had a
prospect of reviewing it. Such doubts would with him be
decisive: he would arraign the determination as manifestly
unjust, and abhor a tribunal which he imagined had don
him an injury without a possibility of redress.
''Granting a new trial, under proper regulations, cure ~
all the e inconveniences, and at the same time preserve"
entire and renders perfect that most excellent method of
decision, which is the glory of the English law. A new trial
is a rehearing of the cause before another jury, but with a
little prejudice to either party, as if it had never been
beard before. * * * * * * * * * * * * *
''Nor is it granted where the scales of evidence hang
nearly equal; that which leans again t the former verdict
ought always ver strongly to preponderate.''
Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, decided in the King' bencb
in 1757, was a motion for a new trial upon which the judge:·
o·ave their opinion, granting the new trial, seriatini. Lord
Man field, inter alia, said, page 393,-" Trials by jury, in
ivil cause could not subsist now without a power omewhere, to grant new trials. If an erroneou jud 0 ment b
given in point of law, there are many way to re iew an
set it right. Where a court judges of fact upon lepo ition
in writinrr their sentence or decree ma many .way , b r viewed and et ri ht. But a general verdict can onl. be s t
ri ht by a new trial; which is no more than ha :nO' the
au. s more delib rat l~ co idered y another jury wh r
th re i a rea onabl doubt, or perhap a certainty, that
ju tice ha ot e n done.
''The writ of attaint i now a m re sound in every case:
in man it does not pretend to be a remedy. There are
T. P.-39
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numerous causes of false verdicts, without corruption or

bad intention of the jurors. They may have heard too

much of the matter before the trial, and imbibed preju-

dices without knowing it. The cause may be intricate ; the

examination may be so long as to distract and confound

their attention. ************

"If unjust verdicts obtained under these and a thousand

like circumstances, were to be conclusive forever, the deter-

mination of civil property, in this method of trial, would

be very precarious and unsatisfactory. It is absolutely

necessary to justice, that there should upon many occasions,

be opportunities of reconsidering the cause by a new

J-^jn] *************

"It is not true 'that no new trials were granted before

1655,' as has been said from Style, 466."

After referring to Slade's case, which was in 1648, re-

ported in Style, 138, and to Wood v. Gunston, in 1655,

Style, 466, Lord Mansfield proceeds : "The reason why this
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matter cannot be traced further back is, 'that the old re-

port-books do not give any accounts of determinations

made by the court upon motions. '

"Indeed, for a good while after this time, the granting of

new trials was holden to a degree of strictness, so intoler-

able, that it drove parties into a court of equity, to have, in

effect, a new trial at law, of a mere legal question, because

the verdict, in justice, under all the circumstances, ought

not to conclude; and many bills have been retained upon

this ground, and the question tried over again at law,

under the direction of a court of equity. And therefore of

late years the courts of law have gone more liberally into

the granting of new trials, according to the circumstances

of the respective cases. And the rule laid down by Lord

Parker, in the case of the Queen against the corporation of

Helston, H. 12 Ann B. R. (Lucas, 202) seems to be the best

general rule that can be laid down upon this subject; viz.

'Doing justice to the party,' or in other words 'attaining

the justice of the case.'

"The reasons for granting a new trial must be collected

from the whole evidence, and from the nature of the case

considered under all its circumstances."

Mr. Justice Denison concurring, added "that it would be

difficult perhaps to fix an absolutely general rule about
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numerous causes of false verdicts, without corruption or
bad intention of the jurors. They may have heard too
much of the matter befo're the trial, and imbibed prejudices without knowing it. The cause may be intricate; the
examination may be o long as to distract and confound
their attention. * * * * * · * * * * * * *
''If unjust verdicts obtained under these and a thousand
like circumstances, were to be conclusive forever, the determination of civil property, in this method of trial, would
be very precarious and unsatisfactory. It is absolutely
necessary to justice, that there should upon many occasions,
be opportunities of reconsidering the cause by a new
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
trial.
''It is not true 'that no new trials were granted befor~
1655,' as has been said from Style, 466. ''
After referring to Slade's case, which was in 1648, reported in Style, 138, and to Wood v. Gunston, in 1655,
Style, 466, Lord :hfansfield proceeds: ''The reason why this
matter cannot be traced further back is, 'that the old report-books do not give any accounts of determinations
made by the court upon motions.'
''Indeed, for a good while after this time, the granting of
new trials wa holden to a degree of strictness, so intolerable, that it drove parties into a court of equity, to have, in
ffect, a new trial at law, of a mere legal question, because
the verdict, in justice, under all the circumstances, ought
not to conclude; and many bills have been retained upon
this ground, and the question tried over again ~t law,
under the direction of a court of equity. And therefore of
late years the court of law have gone more liberally into
the ranting of new trial , according to the circum tance
of the respe tive ca . And the rule laid down by Lord
Parker, in the case of the Qiieen against the corporation of
H lston, . 12 Ann . R. (Lu as, 202) seem to be the best
g n ral rul that can be laid down upon thi ubject; viz.
' in ju tic to the party,' or in other words 'attaining
th ju. tice of th a e.'
'' h r a on for grantincr a new trial mu t be collected
from the wh l vid
e, and from the nature of the case
r n. i r
r all it ir um tan es."
Mr. Ju ti
ni. n co curring added "that it would be
<liffi ult verbaps to fix an ab olutely gen ral rule about
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granting new trials, without making so many exceptions to

it as might rather tend to darken the matter than to explain

it; but the granting a new trial, or refusing it, must depend

upon the legal discretion of the court, guided by the nature

and circumstances of the particular case, and directed with

a view to the attainment of justice."

Mr. Justice Foster agreed to the propriety of what had

been said, as to such cases in which the juries give verdicts

against evidence, and even as to cases where there may be

a contrariety of evidence, but the evidence upon the whole,

in point of probability, greatly preponderates against the

verdict; (which, depending on a variety of circumstances,

is matter of legal discretion, and cannot be brought under

any general rule;) but in all cases where the evidence is

nearly in equilihrio, he declared that he should always think

himself bound to have regard to the finding of the jury, for

"ad questionem facti respondent jiiratores."

Other eases in which new trials were granted in England
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prior to the American Revolution, are Berks v. Mason,

Sayer, 264, decided in 1756; Goodtitle v. Clayton, in 1768,

4 Burr. 2224; and N orris v. Freeman, in 1769, 3 Wil. 38. In

Marsh v. Boiver, 2 Black. W. 851, heard in 1773, the action

was for words spoken, and the words were fully proved on

the trial, but the jury found for the defendant. The court

refused a new trial solely on the ground of triviality, de-

claring "that they would not grant a new trial for the sake

of sixpence damages, in mercy to the plaintiff as well as

the defendant,"

The authorities above cited satisfy us that, at the time

of the separation of the American colonies from the mother

country, the common law of England authorized the grant-

ing of a new jury trial, in a proper case, on the ground that

the former verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

In this State the decisions of this court, as well those deny-

ing, as those granting a new trial, recognize that the grant-

ing of a new trial upon a strong preponderance of testi-

mony has been the long-established rule. See Johnson v.

Blanchard, 5 R. I. 24; Patton v. Hughesdale, 11 R. I. 188;

Watson V. Tripp, 11 R. I. 98, 103; Chafee v. Sprague, 15 R.

I. 135; Sweet v. Wood, 18 R. I. 386; Lake v. Weaver, 20 R.

1.46.

For a large number of cases in other States upon the

1]

NEW TRIALS

611

granting new trials, without making so many exceptions to
it as might rather tend to darken the matt r than to explain
it; but the granting a new trial, or refu in it mu t depend
upon the legal discretion of the court, guided b the nature
and circumstances of the particular case, and directed with
a view t o the attainm nt of justice."
Mr. Justice Foster agreed to the propriety of what had
been said, as to such ca es in which the juries give verdicts
against evidence, and even a to cases where there may be
a contrariety of evidence, but the evidence upon the whole,
in point of probability, greatly preponderates again t the
verdict; (which, depending on a variety of circumstance',
i matter of legal discretion, and cannot be brought under
any general rule;) but in all cases where the evidence is
nearl in equilibria, he declared that he hould alway" think
himself bound to have regard to the finding of the jury, for
'ad questionem facti respor1dent jitralores."
Other ca es in which new trial were granted in England
I rior to the American Revolution, are Berks v. Mason,
~ ayer 264, decided in 1756; Goodtitle v. Clayton, in 1768,
-! Burr. 2224 · and Norris v. Freeman, in 1769, 3 Wil. 38. In
Marsh v. Boi er, 2 Black. W. 851, heard in 1773, the action
was for word po ken and the words were fully proved on
the trial, but the jury found for the defendant. The court
refused a new trial solel on the ground of triviality, declaring "that they would not grant a new trial for the sake
of ixpence damage , in mercy to the plaintiff as well as
tbe defendant.''
The authorities above cited ati fy us that, at the time
of the separation of the merican colonies from the mother
country, the common law of England authorized the ()'ranting of a new jury trial in a proper ca e, on the ground that
the former verdict wa ao-ain t the weight of the evidence.
In thi tate the c1 10 of thi court a "\\ell tho e denying a tho
rantin a new trial recogniz that the o-rant ·
in of a new trial upon a trono- r pond ranee of te timony ha be n the lono-- tabli hed rul .
ee John on v.
Bla·1;chard 5 R. I. 24 · Patton . Hitghe dale 11 R. I. 1
Wat on v . Tripp 11 R. I. 9 1 3 · Chafee v . prague 15 R.
I. 13fl; i eet v . TV ood 1 R. I. 6 · Lake v . Wea er, 20 R.
I. 46.
For a large number of cases in other States upon the
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proposition that when a verdict is clearly against the

weight of the evidence, it is the duty of the court to set it

aside and order a new trial, see 16 A. & E. Enc. of Law

(1st ed.), 554, note 7.

The plaintiff in the case at bar contends that it was an

essential provision of the common law that motions for new

trials should be addressed to the trial court. One judge,

however, as we understand it, went upon circuit, and the

judges in banc sat upon motions for a new trial, and though

the opinion of the judge that sat on the jury trial was lis-

tened to with much respect, yet it was not final ; otherwise

there would have been no reason for the others sitting and

going through the idle form of expressing their opinion as

they were wont to do. Reference to the old cases hereinbe-

fore cited seems to show that. In Marsh v. Boiver, supra,

the report of the case says: "Lord Mansfield, who tried

the cause on the Home Circuit, reported," &c. , but "The

court unanimously declared," etc.
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In 16 A. & E. Enc. of Law (1st ed.), 618, is the following

statement, viz.: "In the absence of statute regulations, the

general rule is that an application for a new trial must be

addressed to the court in which the cause was tried, and

under circumstances rendering it necessary, it may be made

to the judge who presided at the trial, during vacation. This

rule is particularly applicable, and of nearly universal ap-

plication in case of motions for new trial for errors of fact.

Where a judge dies or goes out of office, however, his suc-

cessor may entertain the motion, and where a cause has

been transferred from one district to another by a change

of lines or otherwise, such a motion may be heard by the

proper tribunal in the new district, while power to entertain

such motions has been conferred by statute in many and

perhaps all of the states upon courts other than those in

which the trial took place, in cases and under circumstances

and conditions differing greatly in the different states."

In 3 Waterman on New Trials, 1214, is this statement,

viz. : "Notwithstanding, however, the evident want of qual-

ification of the Appellate Court to form a correct opinion as

to the conformity of the evidence with the verdict, in this

country it is generally permitted to exercise a discretion in

the premises."
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proposition that when a verdict is clearly against the
weight of the evidence, it is the duty of the court to set it
aside and order a new trial, see 16 A. & E. Enc. of Law
(1 t ed.), 554, note 7.
The plaintiff in the case at bar contends that it was an
essential provi ion of the common law that motions for new
trial hould be addres ed to the trial court. One judge,
how 'er, as we understand it, went upon circuit, and the
judges in bane sat upon motions for a new trial, and though
the opinion of the judae that at on the jury trial was listened to with much respect, yet it was not final; otherwise
there would have been no reason for the others sitting and
goino· through the idle form of expressing their opinion as
the were wont to do. Reference to the old cases hereinbefore cit d seems to show that. In Marsh v. Bower, supra,
the report of the case says: "Lord Mansfield, who tried
the cause on the Home Circuit, reported," &c., but "The
ourt unanimously declared,'' etc.

* * * * * * * * * *
In 16 A. & E. Enc. of Law (1st ed.), 618, is the following
,·tatement, viz.: "In the absence of statute regulations, the
general rule is that an application for a new trial must be
addres ed to the court in which the cause was tried, and
under circumstances rendering it necessary, it may be made
to the judge who presided at the trial, during vacation. This
rul i particularly applicable, and of nearly universal ap1 Hration in ca e of motions for new trial for errors of fact.
Wh r a judge dies or aoes out of office, however, his sucor may entertain the motion, and where a cause has
h n tran ferred from one district to another by a change
of Jin s or otherwi e, such a motion may be heard by tbe
l rop r tribunal in tbe n w distri t, while power to entertain
. uch moti n has be n conf rred by tatute in many and
l) rhaps all of the stat s upon court other than those in
hirh ih trial took la , in ca s and under circumstanc '
( nd ronrlition, diff ring gr atly in th diff rent tat . "
Jn . Wat rman on N w Trial , 1214, i thi st t m nt,
viz.: "Notwith . tanrling, how v r,the vi ntwantofqualiflr·n i n of th App llat
onrt t f rm a orr t opinion a..,
t th ronformity f th
vid n with th v rdi t, in this
r
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Our statute provides that a new trial by jury may be

granted "for reasons for wliieli a new trial is usually grant-

ed at common law. ' ' We have already expressed the opin-

ion that the verdict's being against the weight of the evi-

dence was a common-law reason at the time of the adoption

of our State constitution ; but while reasons are prescribed,

methods of procedure are not, and it seems to us utterly un-

reasonable to try to stretch the application of the word

reasons, to methods of procedure, so that in the lapse of

years, reaching it may be to centuries, no change, or devel

opmont, or imiDrovement, no adaptation to altered condi

tions or circumstances, can be made or permitted without

making unconstitutional the very same reasons that are still

being adhered to.

Granting a new trial is exercising n discretion, and, with

us, as in many other States, is a power not confided to a

single justice. The exercise of that discretion, when de-

pending upon the weight of the evidence, necessitates some
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knowledge of the evidence, and in this State that knowledge

is furnished by a stenographic report of the evidence — ques-

tions, answers, and rulings — typewritten out at length,

made by a sworn officer of the court and verified by the al

lowance of the justice presiding at the jury trial, or, if that

be not possible, then verified by affidavit. In this way all

the judges have equal opportunities of judging of the evi-

dence, and are not dependent upon the prejudices or pecu-

liarities of any one man; and, as they will not grant a new

trial because of the verdict being against the weight of the

evidence, unless it is against a clear and decided preponder-

ance thereof, if they have any question in the matter they

will invariably sustain the verdict. Though the justice

presiding at a jury trial has some opportunity, perhaps, of

weighing the evidence, that other justices have not, yet he

is also subjected to greater probability of having prejudices

awakened, so that in some states the disadvantages are

deemed to outweight the advantages of his sitting on a

petition for a new trial, and, in this State, it is provided

by statute, that "no justice shall sit in the trial of any

cause * * * in which he has presided in any inferior court,

or in any case in which the ruling or act of such justice

sitting alone or with a jury is the subject of review, except

by consent of all the parties." Gen. Laws E. I. cap. 221, s 4.
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Our statute provide that a new trial by jury may be
granted ' for reasons for which an w trial is u ually granted at common law.'' We have already expres d the opinion that the verdict's being against the weight of the evidenc was a common-law reason at the time of the adoption
of our State constitution; but while reasons are pre cribed,
methods of procedure are not, and it seems to us utterly unreasonable to try to stretch the application of the word
reasons, to methods of procedure, so that in the lap e of
years, reaching it may be to centuries, no change, or devel .
opment, or improvement, no adaptation to altered condi.
tions or circum tances, can be made or permitted without
making unconstitutional the very same reasons that are still
being adhered to.
Granting a new trial is exercising a discretion, and, with
us, as in many other States, is a power not confided to a
single justice. The exercise of that discretion, when depending upon the weight of the evidence, necessitate "' som
knowledge of the evidence, and in this State that knowledge
i furni hed by a tenographic report of the evidence-que,::.
tion. , an wer , and rulings-typewritten out at length .
made by a worn officer of the court and verified by the al lowance of the justice presiding at the jury trial, or, ;f that
be not po sible, then verified by affidavit. In this way all
the judge have equal opportunities of judging of the evid nee, and are not dependent upon the prejudices or peculiaritie of any one man; and, as they will not grant a new
trial because of the verdict being again t the wei ht of the
vi nee, unless it is against a clear and decided preponderanc ther of, if th y have an question in the matter they
will invariablv u. tain the verdict. Thouo·h the ju ti
pr idino· at a· jury trial ha some opportunity, p rhap of
weigbino- the vidence that other ju ti s have ot yet h
i8 al o ubject d to greater probabilit. of havino- r judice
aw k n a 0 that in ome tate th di d' antarr . are
de m
t outweio·ht th advantag
of hi ittin o a
etition for a ne trial, an , in thi. ~ tat it i pro ide
by t tut tJrnt "n justi e : ha 11 it in th trial f an.
au * * * in hi h he ha r . id in any inferior court,
r in any
e in which tJ1 rulino- or act of u h ju tic
ittino- alon r with a jury i tl e ubj ct of review except
hy corn~ nt of all the partie._ . G n. Law R. I. cap. 221 s 4.
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In Missouri v. Letvis, 101 U. S. 22, 31, Mr. Justice Brad-

ley, delivering the opinion, said : ' ' The Fourteenth Amend-

ment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United

States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies.

Great diversities in these respects may exist in two states

separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this

line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other

side no such right. Each state prescribes its own modes of

judicial proceeding."

In Broiun v. Levee Commissioners, 50 Miss. 468, the Su-

preme Court of Mississippi speaking of the meaning of the

phrase "due process of law," uses these words which are

quoted approvingly by Mr. Justice Matthews in Hiirtado v

California, 110 U. S. 516, 536, viz.: ''The principle does

not demand that the laws existing at any point of time shall

be irrepealable, or that any forms of remedies shall neces

sarily continue. It refers to certain fundamental rights

which that system of jurisprudence, of which ours is a
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derivative, has always recognized. If any of these are dis-

regarded in the proceedings by which a person is con-

demned to the loss of life, liberty, or property then the

deprivation has not been by 'due process of law.' "

Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations

(6th ed.), 434, says: "The principles, then, upon which the

process is based are to determine whether it is 'due pro-

cess' or not, and not any considerations of mere form. Ad-

ministrative and remedial process may be changed from

time to time, but only with due regard to the landmarks

established for the protection of the citizen."

In our opinion it is not necessary in order not to contra-

vene the constitution either of this State or of the United

States that the justice presiding at the jury trial should

first pass upon the question whether the verdict is against

the weight of the evidence, or that he should sit with the

court required to pass upon that question, in granting a new

trial for that reason.

We are of the opinion that this court has the constitu-

tional right to grant a tt^w trial in a civil case when in its

opinion the verdict is against the weight of the evidence,

and that granting such new trial in the case at bar, would

[Cl.tap. 17

* * * * • • • * •

In Missouri v . L euis, 101 U. S. 22, 31, Mr. Justice Bradley, delivering the opinion, said: ''The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United
States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies.
Great diversities in these respects may exist in two state::;
separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this
line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other
side no such right. Each state prescribes its own modes of
judicial proceeding."
ln Brown v . L evee Comrnissioners, 50 Miss. 468, the Su ·
preme Court of Mississippi speaking of the meaning of the
phrase ''due process of law,'' uses these words which are
quoted approvingly by Mr. Justice Matthews in Hurtado v
California, 110 U. S. 516, 536, viz.: ''The principle does
not demand that the laws existing at any point of time shall
be irrepealable, or that any forms of -remedies shall necessarily continue. It refers to certain fundamental rights
which that system of jurisprudence, of which ours is a
derivative, has always recognized. If any of these are disreO'arded in the proceedings by which a person is condemned to the loss of life, liberty, or property then the
deprivation has not been by 'due process of law.' "
Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations
(6th ed.) , 434, says : "The principles, then, upon which the
process is based are to determine whether it is 'due proces • or not, and not any considerations of mere form. Admini trat1ve and remedial proces may be chanO'ed from
time to time, but only with due regard to the landmarks
establi h d for the protection of the citizen.''
• • • • .• • * * * *
In our opfr1ion it i not necessary in ord r not to contrav n the constitution either of this State or of the United
State, that th ju, ti e pre idinO' at th jnr:v trial should
flr . t pa. , u on th qu , tion whether th verdi t i. against
th w igl1t of th vi n e, or that he should sit with th e
r urt r quir d to pa s u on that question, in Tantino- an w
trial f r that reason.
ar
f th
pini n that thi ourt has th con titutional right to O'rant a n l') w trial in a civil ca when in it.·
pini n tb v r j t i
O'ain t the w ight of th evid nee,
an that grantinO' u h n w trial in tbe ca e at bar, would
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not be a violation of the constitution either of this State or

of the United States. The plaintiff's motion, therefore, that

this Division dismiss the defendant's petition for a' new

trial and direct the Common Pleas Division to enter judg-

ment on the verdict of the jury in this action, is denied.

NEW
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not be a iolation of the constitution either of this State or
of the Unit d tates. The plaintiff's motion, therefore, that
thi Di vi ion dismiss the defendant's petition for a new
trial and direct the Common Pl as Division to enter judgment on the verdict of the jury in this action, is denied.

CALDWELL V. WELLS.

Supreme Court of Idaho. 1909.

16 Idaho, 459.

Stewaet, J. — This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's

and materialman's lien under the laws of this state. Upon

the issues presented by the pleadings the court submitted

certain interrogatories to a jury. The jury made answer

to such interrogatories, and the answers were in favor of

CALDWELL V. WELLS.

the defendant. The trial judge adopted the findings of the

jury as the findings of the court and entered judgment in

Supreme Court of Idaho.

1909.

favor of the respondent, A notice of intention to move

for a new trial was served as follows :

"Take notice, that plaintiff, J. W. Caldwell, intends to

16 Idaho, 459.
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move the above-named court to vacate and set aside the

judgment rendered in the above-entitled cause, and to grant

a new trial of said cause, upon the following grounds, to

wit:

"3. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the judg-

ment.

"4. That the judgment is against the evidence.

*'5. That the judgment is against law.

* * * The motion for a new trial was overruled and the

plaintiff appeals from the judgment and from the order

overruling the motion for a new trial.

**********

* * * An application for a new trial is directed to the

verdict of the jury or the decision of the court. The ver-

dict and the decision are supposed to be based n]">ori the

facts. The judgment is based upon the verdict, or the de-

cision or findings of the court. If the verdict or findings of

STEW ART, J.-Thi is an action to foreclo e a mechanic's
and materialman 's lien under the law of thi state. Upon
the issues presented by the pleadings the court ubmitted
certain interrogatorie to a jury. The jury made answer
to such interrogatori s, and the answer were in favor of
the defendant. The trial judge adopted the findings of the
iury as the finding of the court and entered judgment in
fa or of the re pondent. A notice of intention to move
for a new trial wa served as follows:
''Take notice, that plaintiff J. W. Caldwell, intends to
move the above-named court to vacate and set aside the
judO'ment rendered in the above-entitled cause, and to grant
new trial of said cau e, upon the following grounds, to
wit:

* * * * * * * * * *
'' 3. In ufficiency of the evidence to justify the judgment.
'' 4. That the judgment i again t the eVIdence.
"5. That the iudgm nt is aO'ain t law.
* * * Tb motion for a new trial was overruled and th
laintiff ap al from the ju gment and from the order
overrulin · th motion for a new trial.

* * • An application for a new trial is directed to the
· rdict of th jury or th d i ion f the court. The verlict and th
Cl , lOn
r ~ Ul po
to h ha d ll}) rt th
facts. The judgm nt i ba d upon th verdict, or the de·
ci ion or findings of the court. If the verdict or findings of
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the court do not support the judgment, the remedy is not

by moving for a new trial. If, however, the verdict or de-

cision of the court are not supported by the evidence, then

the remedy is to move for a new trial and this requires a

re-examination of the issue of fact. When a new trial is

granted, the finding or verdict is set aside, in which case the

judgment must also fall. In the case of Boston Tunnel Co.

V. McKenzie, 67 Cal. 485, 8 Pac. 22, the court says of Sawyer

V. Sargents}

"It was held that a motion for new trial cannot be based

on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify

the judgment, nor can it, says the court, be based on the

ground that the judgment is against law. The motion should

be directed at the decision, and not the judgment. '*

Whether the judgment is authorized by the findings can-

not be raised on the motion for a new trial, for it is not

involved in a re-examination of the issues of fact; so in this

case it was not error in the trial court to overrule the mo-
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tion for a new trial, for the reason that counsel for appel-
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the court do not support the judgment, the remedy is not
by moving for a new trial. If, however, the verdict or decision of the court are not supported by the evidence, then
the remedy is to move for a new trial and this requires a
re-examination of the issue of fact. When a new trial is
granted, the :finding or verdict is set aside, in which case the
judgment must also fall. In the case of Boston Tunn el Co.
v. McKenzie, 67 Cal. 485, 8 Pac. 22, the court says of SawyM
v . Sargents. 1
"It was held that a motion for new trial cannot be based
on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the judgment, nor can it, says the court, be based on the
ground that the judgment is against law. The motion should
he directed at the decision, and not the judgment.''

* * * * * * * * * *

lant failed to specify the statutory grounds upon which

such motion could be entertained. To have entitled the

appellant to have the facts reviewed or have this court de-

termine whether or not the trial court's decision was sup-

ported by the evidence, or against the evidence and the law.

counsel should have specified in the notice of intention to

move for a new trial such matters as grounds for granting

a new trial. In other words, the motion should have been

directed to the decision of the court, rather than the judg-

ment. Whether the judgment is correct cannot be deter

mined upon a motion for a new trial; whether the decision

of the court as contra-distinguished from the judgn1on^

was correct, could have been determined upon motion for a

now trial, had such matter been specified as a reason for

.q:ranting such new trial. Of course in this case the failure

<"o properly specifv the insufficiencv of the evidence, or that

the decision was aorainst law, would not have precluded the

court from considering the other proper specifications con-

tained in the notice, had tliere been anvthino: in the record

to support such grounds ; but it is admitted by counsel for

1 65 Cal. 259, 3 Pac. 872.

[Chap. 17

Whether the judgment is author :zed by the :findings cannot be raised on the motion for a new trial, for it is not
involved in a re-examination of t:1e issues of fact; so in thL;
case it was not error in the trial court to overrule the motion for a new trial, for the reason that counsel for appellant failed to specify the statutory grounds upon which
.·uch motion could be entertained. To have entitled the
appellant to have the fact s reviewed or have this court determine whether or not the trial court's decision was supported by the evidence, or again t the evidence and the law.
conn el should have specified in the notice of intention to
move for a new trial such matters as o-rounds for granting
a new trial. In other words, the motion should have been
directed to the deci . ion of the court, rather than the judgment. Wbether the judgment is correct cannot be deter
mined upon a motion for ·a new trial; whether the decL ion
of the court as contra-di tingui.Rhed from the jud_gmPn~ .
as correct, coulrl have been determinrd upon motion for ::i
n0w trial had snrb matter heen specifi0rl as a reason for
()'nm ting sur] nrw tri::il. Of cour. e in this r::tRe the Eailure
to 11 operlv sperifY tlw immfhrienrv of the evidenre, or that
thP clPrision wM~ ~H; , in st law, would not have nreclnd cl tlw
r·onrt from ron sidering tl P oth0r prop r Rpeci Acations contain d in th0 notic , lrnrl thrr hrrn anvtl1ing in tl1e r cord
to . u port , u h ground. ; but it is admitted by counsel for
l

65

al. 259, 3

a . 872.
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appellant that the sole and only ground upon which a new

trial could have been granted was the insufficiency of the

evidence, and that the decision of the court was against the

evidence and law, and as these grounds were not specified,

the court committed no error in overruling the motion. * *

For these reasons the judgment is affirmed. Costs award-

ed to respondent.

Sullivan, C. J., and Ailshie, J., concur.

ARMSTEONG V. WHITEHEAD.

617

NEW TRIALS

appellant that the sole and only ground upon which a new
trial could have been granted was the insufficiency of the
evidence, and that the decision of the court was against the
evidence and law, and a these grounds were not specified,
the court committed no error in overruling the motion. * •
For the e reasons the judgment is affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.
SULLIVAN, C. J., and AffisHrn, J., concur.

Supreme Court of Mississippi. 1902,

81 Mississippi, 35.

Whitfield, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellant sued appellee for $144. In the course of the

trial appellee, defendant below, reserved various exceptions

to the action of the court in admitting and excluding evi-

dence. So it was, however, that ultimately the judgment

was rendered in favor of appellant, plaintiff below, for only

ARMSTRONG V. WHITEHEAD.

$59. Defendant below made no motion for a new trial, being
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satisfied with the result. Plaintiff below, dissatisfied with

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

1902.

the amount of the recovery, made a motion for a new trial,

which was overruled, and then brought the record to this

court by appeal. Defendant below, finding plaintiff below

81 Mississippi, 35.

had appealed, petitioned the circuit clerk for a cross-appeal

and has here cross assigned errors predicated upon the ac-

tion of the court below in admitting and excluding evidence

in the course of the trial, the court having overruled his

objections, and he liaving excepted at the time. Appellant,

plaintiff below, moves to dismiss the cross-appeal because

the defendant below made no motion for a new trial.

In Chasfine's case, 54 Miss. 503, following the statute

prior to the code of 1892, §739, it was held that this court

would not pass upon the action of the court below in over-

ruling a motion for a new trial, where that particular action

of the court had not been excepted to below, but the court,

nevertheless, looked to the bill of exceptions, and the record,

and for instructions improperly refused, and evidence im-

WHITFIELD, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant sued appellee for $144. In the course of the
trial appellee, defendant below, r eserved variou exceptions
to the action of the court in admitting and excluding evidence. So it was, however, that ultimately the judgment
was rendered in favor of appellant, plaintiff below, for only
$59. Defendant below made no motion for a new trial being
ati :fied with the result. Plaintiff below, di ati :fied with
the amount of the recovery, made a motion for a new trial,
which was overruled, and then brought the record to this
court by appeal. Defendant below finding plaintiff below
had appealed, petitioned the circuit clerk for a cro s-appeal
and has here cro -assigned errors predicated upon tbe action of the court below in a mitting and excluding evidence
in the c ur e f the trial, the court ha inO' overruled hi.
objection and he having excepted at the time. Appellant
plaintiff below moves to dismi the cro s-app al becaus
th defendant el ow made no motion for a new trial.
In Cha tine ' s ca e 54 Mi . 503 following; th
tatut
prior to t e code of 1 92 . 7 9 it wa held that this court
would not pa upon th action of the court low in overruling a motion for an w trial where that arti ular action
of th ourt had not
n • e1 t d to bel w, ut the court.
neverth 1
looked to the ill of excepti n and the recor .
and for in truction improperly refused, and evidence im-
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properly admitted, reversed the case. But, let it be marked,

there was a motion for a new trial in that case, and the

court below acted on that motion overruling it. In Spreng-

ler's case, 74 Miss. 129 (s. c, 20 So. 879, s. c, 21 So. 4), the

court pointed out the fact that § 739 of the code of 1892

changed the rule that this court would not pass on the ac-

tion of the court below in overruling a motion for a new

trial where such action in overruling the motion had not

been excepted to. But, let it be marked again, there was in

Sprengler's case a motion for a new trial, and a judgment

of the court below overruling the motion. The important

thing to note in Chastin's case and Sprengler's case is that

in both the party appealing had specifically called the at-

tention of the court below to the errors complained of, not

simply by excepting in the course of the trial, but by re-

peating the exceptions in motions for new trials on which

the court acted. It would be very unfair to the court be-

low, for this court to pass upon errors assigned here for
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the first time, which had never been called to his attention

in a motion for a new trial below. The object of the motion

for a new trial, and the reason requiring it to be made and

acted on in order that this court may review the action of

the court below, is clearly set out in 14 vol. Ency. of PI.

and Pr., p. 846,

'^a. Generally. — The office of a motion for a new trial is

two-fold: first, to present the errors complained of to the

trial court for review and correction, or to secure a new

trial; second, to preserve the same errors in the record, so

that the ruling of the trial court in granting or refusing a

new trial may be reviewed by the appellate court. It is a

general rule that all errors correctible by motion for a new

trial and not so assigned are deemed to have been waived

by the applicant for the new trial. Unless the motion for a

"new trial has been presented and considered by the lowei*

court and its ruling preserved, the errors assigned in surh

motion will not be reviewed by the appellate court.

''h. To Obtain Bevicw hy Trial Court. — To secure a re-

view in the trial court of errors committed at the trial, the

complaining party must except to the errors and irregulari-

ties at the time when the ruling of the court thereon are

made, and must call attention of the trial court to such

rulings by assigning them as errors, and as grounds for a

ii
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properly admitted, reversed the case. But, let it be ma.rked,
there was a motion for a new trial in that case, and the
ourt below acted on that motion overruling it. In Sprengler' s case, 74 l\fiss. 129 (s. c., 20 So. 879, s. c., 21 So. 4), the
court pointed out the fact that § 739 of the code of 1892
changed the rule that this court would not pass on the action of the court below in overruling a motion for a new
trial where such action in overruling the motion had not
been excepted to. But, let it be marked again, there was in
Sprengler's -case a motion for a new trial, and a judgment
of the court below overruling the motion. The important
thing to note in Chastin' s case and Sprengler' s case i.s that
in both the party appealing had specifically called the attention of the court below to the errors complained of, not
simply by excepting in the course of the trial, but by repeating the exceptions in motions for new trials on which
the court acted. It would be very unfair to the court be- ·
low, for this court to pass upon errors a ssigned here for
the first time, which had never been called to his attention
in a motion for a new trial below. The object of the motion
for a new trial, and the reason requiring it to be made and
acted on in order that this court may review the action of
the court below, is clearly set out in 14 vol. Ency. of Pl.
and Pr., p. 846.
"a. Generally.-The office of a motion for a new trial ii:;
two-fold: first, to present the errors complained of to the
trial court for r eview and correction, or to secure a new
trial; second, to preserve the same errors in the record, s
that the ruling of the trial court in granting or refusing a
new trial may be r eviewed by the appellate court. It is a
·eneral rule that all errors correctible by motion for a new
trial and not so a , igned are deemed to have been waive(l
b the appli ant for the n w trial. Unle s the motion for ' L
new trial has h en pr ent d and considered by the lower
co rt and it rulin O' pr rved, th error as iO'ned jn sur h
m tion will not b r viewed b:v th ap llat court.
"b. To Obtain Revi w by Trinl Court.-T o secure a re,.i
in the trial court f error ommitt d at the trial , tlw
rorn laini.ng party .mu. t xcept to the errors and irregulariti
at th tim wh n the ruling of the court thereon are
m
, an must all attention f the trial ourt to uch
ruling by assigning them as errors, and as grounds for a
0
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new trial ; otherwise such errors will be deemed waived.

" c. To Obtain Review by Appellate Court. — (1) Neces-

sity of Motion and Ruling Thereon. — It is a well-known rule

of appellate courts that errors of the trial court occurring

during the trial will not be reviewed unless such errors

have been called to the attention of the trial court, and an

opportunity given to correct them. It is necessary, there-

fore, to present such error to the trial court by a motion for

a new trial and to secure a ruling on the motion."

And in Thomp. on Trials, sec. 2712 :

"Motion Necessary to Preserve Errors in the Record for

Revieiv. — The motion is necessary to enable the court to

correct such errors, occurring at the trial, as do not appear

on the face of the record proper, as where it is insisted that

there is no evidence to support the verdict, or that the ver-

dict is against the law and the evidence, or that the evidence

does not authorize the judgment, or that there is an error in

the verdict of the jury, or where it is alleged that court
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erred in matter of law, either in admitting or rejecting evi-

dence, or in giving or refusing instructions, or where it is

alleged that there has been misconduct on the part of the

jury, or that the damages assessed are inadequate, or ex-

cessive, or in a criminal case, for an alleged error because

of the non-arraignment of the defendant. The grounds

upon which the motion is to be made are expressly enumer-

ated in a majority of the practice acts of the various States,

and include generally such errors in the mode of trial as do

not otherwise appear on the record, but which are proper

matters of exception. And when no motion for a new trial

is made in the trial court to correct such errors, most of the

decisions hold that they are deemed to have been waived,

and that the appellate court will refuse to review them."

Judge Thompson properly calls attention to the distinc-

tion which exists in such cases between those exceptions

which would appear upon the face of the record and which

the judge would be supposed consequently to have always

in mind, and the very different character of exceptions

which are made in the current course of a trial and set forth

in the ordinary bill of exceptions, and which do not appear

elsewhere. Here we have a case in which it would have been

very easy for the defendant to have put the record in such

<hape by making a motion for a new trial, and having the

NEW TRIALS
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new trial; otherwise such errors will be deemed waived.
' c. To Obtain Review by Appellate Court.-(1) N ecessity of Motion ancl Ruling Thereon.-It is a well-known rule
of appellate courts that errors of the trial court occurrin ·
during the trial will not be reviewed unle
uch error
have been called to the attention of the trial court, and an
opportunity given to correct them. It is nece sary, therefore, to present such error to the trial court by a motion for
a new trial and to ecure a ruling on the motion.''
And in Thomp. on Trial , ec. 2712:
"Motion Necessary to Preserve Errors in the Record for
Review.-The motion is neces ary to enable the court to
orrect such errors, occurring at the trial as do not appear
on the face of the record proper, as where it i. in isted that
there is no evidence to upport the verdict, or that the verdict is again t the law and the evidence, or that the evidence
does not authorize the judgment, or that there i an error in
the verdict of the jury, or where it is alleged that court
erred in matter of law, either in admitting or rejectinO' evidence, or in giving or refu ing in tructions, or where it is
alleged that there has been misconduct on the part of the
jury, or that the damages a sessed are inadequate, or exce ive, or in a criminal case, for an alleged error because
of the non-arraignment of the defendant. The grounds
upon which the motion is to be made are expres ly enumerated in a majority -)f the practice act of the various State,,
and include generally such errors in the mode of trial as do
not otherwise appear on the record, but which are _proper
matter of exception. And when no motion for a new trial
is made in the trial court to correct uch error , mo t of the
deci ions hold that they are deemed to ha e been waived,
and that the appellate court will refu e to review them."
Judge Thomp on properly call attention to the di tinction which exi t in such ca e between tho e excer tions
which would appear upon th face of the record and which
the judO'e would b upr o d con equ ntly to have always
in min and the
ry iff r nt character of exce tion
which are ma in th urrent our e of a trial and t forth
in th ordinarv ill f xc pti n and whi h do not a
ar
lewhr. H.r w hav a a inwhihitwould av b n
,. ry a for th
f n ant to have put the r c r in uch
-- hap
making a motion for a new trial and havin(}" the
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court overrule it, as would have enabled him when the appel-

lant brought the whole record here, to cross-assign error.

The defendant did not choose to do that. He did not Ccill the

attention of the court below, as it was just he should have

done, to the errors on which he finally relied, by setting

them out in a motion for a new trial, and, of course, there

being no such motion, the court below acted on no such mo-

tion. Unlike Chastine's and Sprengler's cases, the case

contains no motion for a new trial at all on the part of the

defendant below, and for reasons given in the authorities

cited the motion will be sustained.

Cross-appeal dismissed.

STATE V. PHAEES.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1884.

24 West Virginia, 657.

Johnson, President: * * *

It is also assigned as error, that illegal evidence was ad-

[Chap. 17

~ourt

overrule it, as would have enabled him when the appellant brought the whole record here, to cross-assign error.
The defendant did not choose to do that. He did not Cilll the
attention of the court below, as it was just he should have
done, to the errors on which he finally relied, by setting
hem out in a motion for a new trial, and, of course, there
being no such motion, the court below acted on no such motion. Unlike Cha tine 's and Sprengler's cases, the case
contains no motion for a new trial at all on the part of the
defendant below, and for reasons given in the authorities
cited the motion will be sustained.
Cross-appeal dismissed.

mitted. The plaintiff in error cannot avail himself of this
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exception. He made no motion in the court below to set

aside the verdict of the jury; and the court below as well

as this Court may well suppose he was satisfied with the

verdict. Had he moved to set aside the verdict, on the

ground that the allegation and proof did not agree, it is

very probable the court would have granted his motion. In

STATE V. PHARES.

a case tried by a jury no matter how many errors are saved,

and exceptions taken to the ruling of the court during tlie

trial, unless a motion is made to set aside the verdict, and

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

1884.

that motion is overruled, all such errors saved will by the

appellate court be deemed to have been waived. The rulings

24

of the court during the trial are often necessarily hastily

West Virginia, 657.

made, and if a motion is made for a new trial on the ground

of erroneous rulings made at the trial, the court may at his

leisure critically review his rulings, and, if convinced that

they were erroneous, will correct them in the only manner

he can by setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial,

and thus save to the parties the expense of a writ of error.

President: * * *
It is also assigned as error, that illegal evidence was admitted. The plaintiff in error cannot avail himself of this
exception. He made no motion in the court below to set
aside the verdict of the jury; and the court below as well
as this Court may well suppose he was satisfied with the
verdict. Had he moved to set aside the verdict, on the
ground that the all gation and proof did not agree, it is
very probal le the court would have granted hi motion. In
a ca e tried by a jury no matter how many errors are saved,
and x tions taken to the ruling of the court during th
trial, unl s a motion i made to et a ide the verdict, and
that motion i overrul d, all u h errors aved will by the
app llat court h d m d to hav been waiv d. Th ruling"
f th ourt during tb trial ar oft n ne sarily hastily
mad and if a motj n i ~ mad for a new trial on the ground
f rron ou rulino- mad at tb trial, the court may at his
l i ur ritj ally r vi w his rn]jng , and, if co vinced that
th y w r rr n ou. will rr t tl m i the nly manner
he an by , ctting , i th v rdi t a d o-ranting a n w trial,
and thus save to the arti . th xp n of a writ of error.
JOHNSON,
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It would be unfair to the trial-judge not to give him an o^j-

portunity to correct his rulings, if the exceptor is not satis-

fied with the verdict and intends to take his writ of error.

The exceptions taken during the course of the trial are con

ditional. The exceptor will take advantage of them, pro-

vided he is not satisfied with the verdict. If dissatisfied, he

will move to set it aside ; and if his motion is overruled, he

will except; but if satisfied, he makes no such motion,

acquiesces in the verdict and waives his exceptions. He

may be satisfied with the verdict at the time, for the reason

that he would have no hope of changing it to his advantage

by a new trial. It would certainly be unfair, in the absence

of a motion to set aside the verdict, and after considerable

time had elapsed, and the chief witnesses of his adversary

dead, to permit him to have erroneous rulings during the

trial reversed, after he had by his own action at the rendi-

tion of the verdict given his adversary to understand^ that

he acquiesced in the verdict. A new trial for errors com-
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mitted during the trial can only be had after motion made

in the court below and overruled, as this Court will not ex

mem motu grant a new trial in case no such motion was

made in the court below. [Hiimplireys v. West, 3 Rand.

516; Miller r. Shreivshury, 10 W. Va. 115; Riddle v. Core,

21 W. Va. 530.) Of course it is different if the error is in

the pleadings, as in such case there was a mistrial.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed with costs

and damages according to law.

Affirmed.

DUBCICH V. GRAND LODGE ANCIENT ORDER OF

UNITED WORKMEN.

Supreme Court of Washington. 1903.

33 Washington, 651.

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King

county, Morris, J., entered March 13, 1903, upon the verdict

of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff in an action upon

a life policy in a mutual benefit society. Affirmed.

It would be unfair to the trial-judge not to give him an opportunity to correct his rulings, if the exceptor i not ati. fied with the verdict and intends to take hi writ of rror.
The exceptions taken during the course of the trial ar con·
ditional. The exceptor will take advantage of them provided he is not sati fied with the verdict. If di ati "fi d, he
will move to et it aside; and if his motion is overrule , h
will except; but if satisfied, he make no uch motion,
acquiesces in the verdict and waives hi exceptions. He
may be sati fied with the verdict at the time, for the reason
that he would have no hope of changing it to hi advantage
by a new trial. It would certainly be unfair in the ab ence
of a motion to set aside the verdict and after con iderabl
time had elap ed, and the chief witnes e of hi adver ary
dead to permit him to have erroneous ruling during the
trial reversed, after he had by hi own action at the rendition of the verdict given hi adversary to understand 7 that
he acquie ced in the verdict. A new trial for errors committed durin the trial can onlv be had after motion made
in the court below and o erruled, as this Court will not e.r
mero motit grant a new trial in case no such motion wa .
made in the court below. (Hwmph1"eys v . West, 3 Rann .
516 · Miller . Shre-i bury, 10 W. Va. 115; Riddle v . Car ,
21 W. Va. 530.) Of course it is different if the error is in
the pleadino-s, as in such ca e there was a mi trial.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed with cost
and damages according to law.
'1

.Affirmed.

DUBCICH V. GRAND LODGE ANCIENT ORDER OF
UNITED W RKMEN.

Supreme Court of W a hington.

1903.

33 W a hington, 651.

Appeal from a jud ment of the uperior court for King
county MoRRIS J. enter d March 1 1903 upon the erdict
of a jury rendered in fa or of th I laintiff in an action upon
a life policy in 51 mutual benefit society. Affirmed.
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Hadley, J. * * *

Respondent moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground

that, as no motion for new trial was made, the judgment

cannot, for that reason, be reviewed here. The errors spe-

cifically assigned, however, all involve rulings made by the

trial court during the progress of the trial. The office of

the motion for new trial, in its necessary relation to the

appeal, is to give the trial court opportunity to pass upon

questions not before submitted for its ruling such as mis-

conduct of the jury, newly discovered evidence, excessive

damages, error in the assessment of the amount of recovery,

and similar questions. The motion seems to serve no neces-

sary purpose, as far as concerns the review on appeal of

questions once submitted to, and decided by, the trial court.

It is true, if such questions are raised a second time, under

the motion for new trial, the trial court may consider them,

and may review its own rulings made at the trial to the ex-

tent of correcting them by granting a new trial. But such

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

review by the trial court is not necessary in order that ques-

tions once actually decided by it in the cause may be con-

sidered on appeal. This court in effect so held in Johnson

V. Maxwell, 2 Wash. 482, 27 Pac. 1071, and Kennedy v. Der-

rickson, 5 Wash. 289, 31 Pac. 766. In the last named case

the court said :

''The only effect which the failure to make such motion

can have upon the proceedings in this court is to limit the

questions which may be properly presented here."

It is contended that those decisions were based upon § 450

of the Code of 1881, which provides that ''the supreme court

may review and reverse on appeal or writ of error any

judgment or order of the district court, although no motion

for a new trial was made in such court;" and it is urged

that no such provision now exists in our statutes. Our at-

tention has, however, not been called to any existing statute

which affirmatively provides that the motion is necessary

as a preliminary to the review on appeal of questions passed

upon during the progress of the trial. We think, in the

absence of such a statute, that the provisions of § 6520, Bal.

Code, are broad enough to authorize the review of such

questions here without a motion for new trial. We refer

particularly to the following in said section:

"Upon an appeal from a judgment, the supreme court

lIADLEY,
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Respondent moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that, as no motion for new trial was made, the judgment
cannot, for that reason, be reviewed here. The errors specifically assigned, however, all involve rulings made by the
trial court during the progress of the trial. The office of
the motion for new trial, in its necessary relation to the
appeal, is to give the trial court opportunity to pass upon
questions not before submitted for its ruling such as misconduct of the jury, newly discovered evidence, excessive
damages, error in the assessment of the amount of recovery,
and similar questions. The motion seems to serve no necessary purpose, as far as concerns the review on appeal of
questions once submitted to, and decided by, the trial court.
It is true, if such questions are raised a second time, under
the motion for new trial, the trial court may consider them,
and may review its own rulings made at the trial to the extent of correcting them by granting a new trial. But such
review by the trial court is not necessary in order that questions once actually decided by it in the cause may be considered on appeal. This court in effect so held in Johnson
v. Maxwell, 2 Wash. 482, 27 Pac. 1071, and Kennedy v. Derrickson, 5 Wash. 289, 31 Pac. 766. In the last named case
the court said :
''The only effect which the failure to make such motion
can have upon the proceedings in this court is to limit the
que tions which may be properly presented here.''
It is contended that those decisions were ba ed upon § 450
of the Code of 1881, which provides that "the supreme court
may review and reverse on appeal or writ of error any
judgment or order of the district court, although no motion
for a new trial was made in uch court;" and it is urged
that no such provision now exists in our st~tutes. Our attention ha , how ver, not b en call d to any exi tin statut
whi h affirmatively provides that tbe motion i necessary
a a pr Jiminary to the review on appeal of que tions pass d
upon durin the proo-res of th trial. We think, in th
ab 111.. of u h a tatute, that th provisions of § 6520, Bal.
road nough to authorize the r vi w of such
d , ar
uestion. b re without a moti n for n w trial. We refer
}J rti ular]y to th following in said
tion:
"
n an appeal from a judgment, the supreme court

~
Sec. 2] New Trials 623

may review any intermediate order or determination of the

court below which involves the merits and materially af-

fects the judgment appearing upon the record sent up from

the superior court."

The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

Section 2. Disqualification of Jurors.

ec. 2]

623
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may review any intermediate order or determination of the
ourt low which involves the merit and materially affect the judgment appearing upon the record sent up from
the uperior court.''
The motion to dismi s the appeal is denied.

HAERINGTON V. MANCHESTER & LAWRENCE

RAILROAD.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. 1882,

62 New Hampshire, 77.

Case, for personal injuries. After the trial, and a ver-

dict for the defendants, the plaintiff moved to set the ver-

SECTION

2.

DISQUALIFICATION OF JURORS.

dict aside "because the foreman of the jury was an uncle of

the defendants' treasurer, a stockholder in the corporation,

and a witness on the trial. The juror was regularly drawn

from a town in the county, and had been in attendance as a

HARRINGTON V.

MANCHESTER
RAILROAD.

& LAWRENCE

juror eight days before the trial. The juror understood

that the defendants' treasurer was a stockholder. Motion
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denied.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

1882.

Allen, J. It is repugnant to the natural sense of justice

that one pecuniarily interested in the event of a trial, or

62 New Hampshire, 77.

related to either party to the cause, should decide, or take

part in deciding, its merits. The preservation of confidence

in jury trials, and of purity in the administration of jus-

tice, requires that jurors should be free from objections

which are everywhere recognized as disqualifying, and that

they should be *'as impartial as the lot of humanity will

dmit." Bill of Rights, Art. 35. The smallest pecuniary

nterest in the result of a cause disqualifies a juror from sit-

ting, and is a sufficient ground for a challenge for cause

{Page v. Contoocooh Valley Railroad, 21 N. H. 438; Smith

V. B. C. (& M. Railroad, 36 N. H. 458) ; and near relationship

by blood or marriage to a party in interest has always been

regarded as having the same effect. Bean v. Quimhy, 5 N.

H. 98; Gear v. Smith, 9 N. H. 63; Sanborn v. Fellows, 22 N.

H. 473 ; Moses v. Julian, 45 N. II. 52, 56. The stockholder

CASE, for personal injuries. After the trial, and a verdict for the defendants, the plaintiff moved to set the verdict aside ·becau e the for man of the jury was an uncle of
the defendants' trea urer, a stockholder in the corporation,
and a witne s on the trial. The juror was regularly drawn
from a town in the county, and had been in attendance as a
juror eight days before the trial. The juror understood
that the defendant ' trea urer was a stockholder. Motion
denied.
LLE , J. It is repugnant to the natural sense of justice
that one pecuniarily interested in the event of a trial, or
related to either party to the cause should de ide, or take
part in deciding, it merits. The preservation of confidence
in jury trials, and of purity in the admini tration of justice, requires that jurors hould b fr e from obj ctions
which are everywhere r oo·nized a disqualifyino-, and that
t bey hould be ''a. impartial a th lot of humanity will
drnit. '' Bill of Rights, Art. 35. The malle t p cuniary
;nt r tin the result of a au e di qualifi a juror from itting, and is a suffi ient o-ronnd for a challenge for cau e
(Page v. Contoocook Vall ey Railroad, 21 N. H. 438; Smith
v. B. C. & "!J1. Railroad, 36 N. H. 45 ) ; and near r lation hip
by blood or marriao- to a party in inter t ha alway been
reo- rd d a havin the ame eff ct. B an v. Quimby, 5 N.
I.
· G ar v. Smith, 9 N. H. 63 · anborn . Fellows, 22 N.
H. 473; "!J1oses v. Julian, 45 N. H. 52, 56. The stockholder
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of a corporation having for its object a dividend of profits,

though not a party in a strict or technical sense when the

corporation sues or is sued, is necessarily interested in the

result of the proceeding, and is so far a party in interest

as to come within the disqualifying rule ; and neither he, nor

his near kindred, would ordinarily be permitted to sit as a

juror. Page v. Contoocook Valley Railroad, supra; Smith

V. B. C. & M. Railroad, supra; Moses v. Julian, supra;

Quinehaug Bank v. Leavens, 20 Conn. 87 ; Place v. Butter-

nuts Mfg. Co., 28 Barb. 503 ; Ranger v. Great Western Rail-

way Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 1854. The nephew of the foreman of

the jury was not only a stockholder in the defendant cor-

poration, but was also an important officer testifying in the

case, and to some extent representing the defendants. He

was so far identified in interest with the corporation, and

known to the juror to be so, that the relationship was a dis-

qualifying objection, and a sufficient cause for challenge.

It has not been the usual practice to disturb a verdict for
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a disqualification of one of the jurors rendering it, when the

objection has not been taken until after verdict, and was

known, or by reasonable diligence might have been known,

to the party making it, before the trial or before verdict ;

and the burden of showing want of knowledge, and due dili-

gence in discovering the objection, has, as a rule, been

placed on the party moving for a new trial. In Rollins v.

Ames, 2 N. H. 349, it was decided that the fact that a juror

had, as a magistrate, taken the depositions of the witnesses

of one party was good ground for a challenge, but objection

was not made until after the verdict; and the verdict was

not disturbed, because only one of the two attorneys for the

excepting party made and submitted his affidavit that he

was not aware of the objection before the verdict. It did

not appear that the other attorney, or the party himself,

was aware of the fact of ]oa;n] in^npacitv in season to have

taken advantage of it before verdict. In State v. HascalJ.

6 N. H. 352, 360, the objection was that the juryman was

drawn more than the required time of twenty days before

court, and it was decided that it was too late to take the ob-

jection after verdict, on the ground that the party and his

counsel had had opportunity to examine the venires and dis-

cover the irregularity before trial, and, failing to do this,

the objection was waived. To the same effect are Wilcox

TRIAL PRACTICE
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of a corporation having for its object a dividend of profits,
though not a party in a strict or technical sense when the
corporation sues or is sued, is necessarily interested in the
result of the proceeding, and is so far a party in interest
as to come within the disqualifying rule; and neither he, nor
his near kindred, would ordinarily be permitted to sit as a
juror. Page v. Contoocook Valley Railroad, supra; Smith
v. B. C. & M. Railroad, supra; Moses v. Julian, supra;
Quinebaug Bank v. Leavens, 20 Conn. 87; Place v. Butternuts Mfg. Co., 28 Barb. 503; Ranger v. Great Western Railway Co., 5 H. L. Oas. 1854. The nephew of the foreman of
the jury was not only a stockholder in the defendant corporation, but was also an important officer testifying in the
case, and to some extent representing the defendants. He
wa:s so far identified in interest with the corporation, and
known to the juror to be so, that the relationship was a disqualifying objection, and a sufficient cause for challenge.
It has not been the usual practice to disturb a verdict for
a disqualification of one of the jurors rendering it, when the
objection has not been taken until after verdict, and was
known, or by reasonable diligence might have been known,
to the party making it, before the trial or before verdict;
and the burden of showing want of knowledge, and due diligence in discovering the objection, has, as a rule, been
placed on the party moving for a new trial. In Rollins v.
Ames, 2 N. H. 349, it was decided that the fact that ~juror
had, as a magi trate, taken the depositions of the witnesse,
of one party was good ground for a challenge, but objection
was not made until after the verdict; and the verdict was
not disturbed, because only one of the two attorneys for the
exc ting party made and submitted his affidavit that h
wa not aware of the objection before th verdict. It did
not app ar that the other attorn y, or the party himself,
wa aware of the f t of 1egal inf'Rpa ity in a on to hav
akPn adv::mtag of it before verdict. In State v. Hascall.
6 N. II. 52, . 60, tbe obje tion w . that th juryman was
dra . n mor than th r quir d tim e of twenty days before
O Ht and it wa d i
d that it wa too lat to take the obj tion ft r v rdi t, n th ground that th party and hi'
coun. 1 ha ha opportunity to xamjn th v nires and di"'cov r th irr
larity f r tri R1, and, fail in er to do this,
th bjection was waived. To the same effect are Wilcox
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V. School District, 26 N. H. 303, where only one selectman

was present at the drawing of jurors, and the irregularity

did not appear in the return upon the venire, but only in the

records of the town; Bodge v. Foss, 39 N. H. 406, 407, where

the objection was, that the officers who attended to the draw-

ing of jurors had not been chosen under a new organiza-

tion of the town after its division by the legislature: and

Pittsfield V. Barnstead, 40 N. H. 477, 497. In all these cases

the objection was taken after verdict, and neither the par-

ties nor their attorneys had knowledge of the objection at

the time of trial. Having opportunity, and failing to sea-

sonably examine the returns upon the venires and the

records of the town, the objection could not prevail. In

State V. Daniels, 44 N. H. 383, 385, the objection was, that

the juror was prejudiced by previous conversation about

the case, and it did not appear that the prejudice was not

known to the respondent or his counsel before verdict, and

a new trial was refused. In Wassum v. Feeney, 121 Mass.
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93, the objection that a juror was an infant was not taken

until after verdict ; and though the fact of infancy was not

known to the party or his counsel during the trial, it was

decided that there had been sufficient opportunity to learn

the fact, and make the objection at the time the jury was

impanelled to try the case, and that objection after verdict

came too late. In the opinion, it is said that the same rule

applies to a juror disqualified by reason of interest or re-

lationship; and Jeffries v. Randall, 14 Mass. 205, and Wood .

V ard V. Dean, 113 Mass. 297, are cited as authorities. Even

in a capital case, application of the rule has been made to

a juror not of the county or vicinage as required by the con-

stitution. See anonymous case referred to in Amherst v.

Hadley, 1 Pick. 38, 41, 42. In Qninehaug Bank v. Leavens,

20 Conn. 87, objection after verdict was made, that n juror

was the father of a stockholder of the bank, and that the

fact was not known to the defendant or his counsel before

verdict. This was decided to be a sufficient ground for

challenge, but the objection came too late, the defendant not

having been diligent in inquirv to learn the fact before ver-

dict.

The general rule derived from the cases is. that if the

party has used reasonable diligence to ascertain the compe-

tency of a juror, and has failed to discover disqualifpng

T. p.— 40

v. School District, 26 N. H. 303, where only one selectman
was present at the drawing of jurors, and the irregularity
did not appear in the return upon the venire, but only in th0
records of the town; Bodge v. Foss, 39 N. H. 406, 407, where
the objection was, that the officers who attended to the drawing of jurors had not been chosen under a new organization of the town after its division by the legislature; and
Pittsfield v . Barnstead, 40 N. H. 477, 497. In all these ca es
the objection was taken after verdict, and neither the parties nor their attorneys had knowledge of the objection at
the time of trial. Having opportunity, and failing to seaonably examine the returns upon the venires and the
records of the town, the objection could not prevail. In
State v. Daniels, 44 N. H. 383, 385, the objection wa'3, that
the juror was prejudiced by previous conversation about
the case, and it did not appear that the prejudice was not
known to the respondent or his counsel before verdict, and
cl new trial was refu ed.
In Wassum v. Feeney, 121 Mas .
a3, the objection that a juror was an infant was not taken
until after verdict; and though the fact of infancy was not
known to the party or his counsel during the trial, it was
decided that there had been sufficient opportunity to learn
the fact, and make the objection at the time the jury was
impanelled to try the case, and that objection after verdict
rame too late. In the opinion, it iR , aid that the ame rule
'lpplies to a juror disqualified by reason of intere t or r Plationship; and J effries v. Randall, 14 Ma s. 205, and Woorl nard v . Dean, 113 Ma . 297, are cited as authoritieR. Ev n
in a capital case, application of the rule ha. h en mad to
a juror not of the county or vicinao- a requir d h> th on" titution. See anonymous case ref rred to in Am hPr t 'l'.
Ha,dley, 1 Pick. . 8 41, 42. In QuinPbaitg Bank 'l. Lr)a en. ,
20 Conn. 87, obj ction aft r verdict was mad , that a juror
was the fath r of a stockbold r of th hank, and that the
frt t wa not known to th d f ndant Or 11i . C'OUil } eforP
,. rdict. This was d cid d to be a 11 ri rn t gTound f r
C'hall nge, ut thr ohje tion came too Jat , thP d f ndant no t
havino- b en ilio- nt in inquiry to learn th fa t before verdict.
The ·en ral rnl d riY d from the a . i., that if th
party ha n. <l r a ona hl dil i o- nc to a rta in th eompet ncy of a jnrQr and ha fail d to di cover i qualif rinoT. P.-40
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facts afterwards proved, and which might operate to his

prejudice in the trial, the verdict will be set aside; other-

wise not. Proffat's note to Rollins v. Ames, 9 Am. Dec. 79,

S2. It does not appear, from any facts in the case, that

the plaintiff used diligence in discovering the relationship

of the juror to a stockholder of the defendants, and the mo-

tion to set the verdict aside was properly denied.

Judgment on the verdict.^

Claek, J., did not sit : the others concurred.

1 GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL.

Sections 2-8 of this chapter deal with various grounds upon which new trials

may be granted. For the jjurpose of affording a convenient basis of reference

for the study of these cases, the following summary is given of the common

facts afterwards proved, and which might operate to his
prejudice in the trial, the verdict will be set aside; otherwise not. Proffat 's note to Rollins v. A mes, 9 Am. Dec. 79,
K:2. It does not appear, from any facts in the case, that
the p1ai.ntiff used diligence in discovering the relationship
of the ju1-0r to a stockholder of the defendants, and the motion to set the verdict aside was properly denied.
Judgment on the verdict. 1
CLARK, J., did not sit: the others concurred.

law grounds and of the statutory enactments of the various states dealing

with the grounds for granting new trials.

Common Law. Tidd enumerates the common law grounds for new trial as

follows: 1. Want of due notice of trial; 2. Material variance between

the issue or paper-book delivered and the record of nisi prius; 3. Want of
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a proper jury; 4. Misbehaviour of the prevailing party, towards the jury or

witnesses; 5. Unavoidable absence of attorneys or witnesses, or the dis-

1

covery of new and material evidence since the trial; 6. Perjury of wit-

GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL.

nesses on whose testimony the verdict was obtained; 7. Misdirection of the

judge, or the admission or exclusion of evidence contrary to law; 8. Error

or mistake of the jury in finding a verdict without or contrary to evidence;

9. Misbehaviour of the jury in casting lots for their verdict; 10. Excessive

damages. 2 Tidd's Practice, *903,

AlabamM,:

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

Arizona: Rev. St. 1901, sec. 1472.

"New trials may be granted and judgments may be set aside or ar-

rested on motion for good cause on such terms and conditions as the court

shall direct. ' '

Arkansas: Kirby's Digest, 1904, sec. 6215.

"1. Irregularity in the proceeding of the court, jury or prevailing party, or

any order of the court, or abuse of discretion, by which the party was pre-

vented from having a fair trial.

2. Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party.

3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded

Sections 2-8 of this chapter deal with various grounds upon which new trials
may be granted. For the purpose of affording a convenient basis of reference
for the study of these cases, the following summary is given of the common
law grounds and of the statutory enactments of the various states dealing
with the grounds for granting new trials.
Common Law.
Tidd enumerates the common law grounds for new trial as
follows:
1. Want of due notice of trial; 2. Material variance between
the i ue or paper-book delivered and the record of nisi prius;
3. Want of
a proper jury; 4. Misbehaviour of the prevailing party, towards the jury or
witne ses; 5. Unavoidable absence of attorneys or witnesses, or the discovery of new and material evidence since the trial; 6. Perjury of witnesses on whose testimony the verdict was obtained; 7. Misdirection of the
judge, or the admission or exclusion of evidence contrary to law; 8. Error
or mistake of the jury in finding a verdict without or contrary to evidence;
9. Misbehaviour of the jury in casting lots for their verdict; 10. Excessive
damages.
2 Tidd 's Practice, *903.

against.

4. Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence

LJ../,abama:

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

of passion or prejudice.

5. Error in the assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large

or too small, where the action is ui)on a contract, or for the injury or deten-

tion of j)roperty.

6. Thfit the verdict or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or

Rev. St. 1901, sec. 1472.
''New trials may be granted and judgments may be set aside or arrested on motion for good cause on such terms and conditions as the court
shall direct. ' '

Arizona :

ia contrary to law.

7. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party applying, which he

could not with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.

Kirby's Digest, 1904, sec. 6215.
'' 1. Irregularity in the proceeding of the court, jury or prevailing party, or
any or<ler of the court, or abu e of discretion, by which the party was prevented from h aving a fair trial.
2. Mi conduct of the jury or prevailing party.
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
again . t.
4. Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the iniiuence
of p ass ion or prejudice.
5. Error in the assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large
or too sma1l, where the action is upon a contract, or for the injury or detention ot prop rty.
6. 'l'h nt the verdict or d i ion is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or
is rontnir · to law.
7.
.,. ,~ l y rli ov reO. evi n e, material for the party applying, which he
coulcl not with reasonable dilig n e h ave discovered and produced at the trial.

Arkansas:

Sec. 2]
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8. Error of law occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the party mak-

ing the application. ' '

California: Code Civ. Pro., sec. 657.

' ' 1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party,

or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was

prevented from having a fair trial.

2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors

have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding

on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determina-

ion v^f chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one

of the jurors.

3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded

against.

4 Newly discovered evidence material for the party making the applica-

tion, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and pro-

duced at the trial.

5. Excessive dan.ages, appearing to have been given under the influence

of passion or ])rejudice.
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6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision; or

that it is against law.

7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making

NEW TRIALS
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8. Error of law occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the party mak·
ing the application. ' '
California:
ode Civ. Pro., sec. 657.
'' 1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of di cretion by which either party was
.
prevented from having a ~air trial.
2. Misconduct of the Jury; and "'"henever any one or more of the JUrors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding
on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determina·
ion ,,f chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one
o:f the jurori::.
3. .Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
again et.
4 Newly discovered evidence material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and pro·
duced at the trial.
5. Excessive darr,ages, appearing to have been given under the in:fluencE
of passion or pre;judice.
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision; or
that it is against law.
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making
the application.''

the application. "

Colorado: Code Civ. Pro., Sec. 256.

Same as the California statute, with term "referee" added under 1st

ground, and the words "or inadequate" inserted before damages under 5th

ground.

Colorado:
Code Civ. Pro., Sec. 256.
Same as the California tatute, with term ! 'referee'' added under 1st
ground, and the words '' or inadequate' ' inserted before damages under 5th
ground.

Connecticut: Practice Act, sec. 815.

* ' The superior court, court of common pleas, district court of Waterbury,

and any city court, may grant new trials of causes that may come before them

respectively, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence, want of actual

notice of the suit to any defendant, or of a reasonable opportunity to appear

and defend, when a just defense in whole or in part existed; or for other

reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases."

Delaware:

Connecticut:
Practice Act, sec. 815.
''The superior court, court of common pleas, district court of Waterbury,
and any city court, may grant new trials of causes that may come before them
respectively, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence, want of actual
notice of the suit to any defendant, or of a reasonable opportunity to appear
and defend, when a just defense in whole or in part existed; or for other
reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such ca es.''

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

District of Columbia: Comp. St., 1894, Ch. 55, sec. 6.

Delaware:
No statutory enumeration of grounds.

' ' The justice who tries the cause may, in his discretion, entertain a motion,

to be made on his minutes, to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial upon

exceptions, or for insufficient evidence, or for excessive damages; but such mo-

tion shall be made at the same term at which the trial was had. ' '

Florida :

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

District of Columbia:
Comp. St., 1894, Ch. 55, sec. 6.
''The justice who tries the cause may, in his di cretion, entertain a motion,
to be made on his minute , to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial upon
exceptions, or for insufficient evidence, or for excessive damages; but such mo·
tion shall be made at the same term at which the trial was had.''

Georgia: 1 Code, 1911, sec. 6088.

"In all applications for a new trial on other grounds, not provided for in

this Code, the presiding judge must exercise a sound legal discretion in

Florida:
No statutory enumeration of grounds.

granting or refusing the same according to the provisions of the common law

and practice of the courts."

Idaho: Code Civ. Pro., sec. 4439.

Same as the California statute.

Illinois: Kurd's St., Ch. 110, sec. 57.

"In all cases where a new trial shall be granted on account of improper

Georgia:
1 Code, 1911, ec. 60 8.
''In all applications for a new trial on other grounds, not provided for in
thi!l Gode, the lire iding judge mu t exerci e a ound legal discretion in
granting or reful"ing thn same according to the provi ions of the common law
and pra tice of the courts. ''

instructions having been given by the judge, or improper evidence admitted

or because the verdict of the jury is contrary to the weight of the evidence or

for any other cause not the fault of the party applying for such new trial

Idaho:
Code
ame as the

iv. Pro., ec. 4439.
alifornia tatute.

said new trial shall be granted without costs, and as of right." '

Illinois:
Hurd 's St., Ch. 110, sec. 57.
. 'In ~11 cases. where a i:ew trial ha~l be gran~ed on account of improper
rn truction havmg been given y the Judge, or improper evidence admitted
or becau the verdict of the jury is contrary to the weight of the evidence 0 ;
any oth_ r cau e not th fault of the party applying for such new t;ial,
said ne trial shall be granted without costs, and as of right.''

to:
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Indiana: Burn's Ann. St., sec. 585.

TRIAL PRACTICE
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Indiana:
Burn 's Ann. St., sec. 585.
Same as the Arkansas statute, except 4, which reads simply, "Excessive
Jamages. ''

Same as the Arkansas statute, except 4, which reads simply, "Excessive

damages. ' '

Indian Territory: St. 1899, sec. 3556.

Same as the Arkansas statute.

Iowa: Code, 1897, sec. 3755.

Same as the Arkansas statute, except that the term "referee" occurs after

"jury" and after the second use of the word "court," in 1, and the term

"report" occurs after the word "verdict" in 6; and another ground is added

as follows:

' ' 9. That the pleadings of the prevailing party do not state facts suffi-

cient to constitute a cause of action or defense, as the case may be, specify-

Indian Territory:
St. 1899, sec. 3556.
Same as the Arkansas statute.
Iowa:
ode, 1897, sec. 3755.
Same as the Arkansas statute, except that the term '' referee'' occurs after
'' jury'' and after the second use of the word ''court,'' in 1, and the term
' report' ' occurs after the word ' 'verdict' ' in 6; and another ground is added
as follows:
'' 9. That the pleadings of the prevailing party do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or defense, as the case may be, specifying wherein they are defective.''

ing wherein they are defective. ' '

Kansas: G. S. 1909, sec. 5899.

* ' 1. Because of abuse of discretion of the court, misconduct of the jury

or party, or accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have

guarded against, or for any other cause whereby the party was not afforded

a reasonable opportunity to present his evidence and be heard on the merits
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of the ease.

2. Erroneous rulings or instructions of the court.

3. That the verdict, report or decision was given under the influence of

passion or prejudice.

4. That the verdict, report or decision is in whole or in part contrary to

the evidence.

5. For newly discovered evidence material for the party applying, which he

could not with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial."

Kansas:

G. S. 1909, sec. 5899.
' '1. Because of abuse of discretion of the court, misconduct of the jury
or party, or accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against, or for any other cause whereby the party was not afforded
a reasonable opportunity to present his evidence and be heard on the merits
of the case.
2. Erroneous rulings or instructions of the court.
3. That the verdict, report or decision was given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.
4. That the verdict, report or decision is in whole or in part contrary to
tha evidence.
5. For newly discovered evidence material for the party applying, which he
could not with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.''

Kentucky: Code, 1900, sec. 340.

Same as the Arkansas statute, except that the words "or of his attorney"

are added to 2.

Louisiana: Garland's Rev. Code, 1901, sec. 560.

Kentucky:

Code, 1900, sec. 340.
Same as the Arkansas statute, except that the words ''or of his attorney''
are added to 2.

"A new trial shall be granted; 1. If the judgment appear clearly con-

trary to law and evidence; 2. If the party has discovered, since the trial,

evidence important to the cause, which he could not, with due diligence, have

obtained before; 3. If the cause has been tried by a jury, and it be shown

that the jury has been bribed, or has behaved improperly, or that impartial

justice has not been done in the cause."

Maine: E. S. 1903, Ch. 84, sec. 54.

"Any justice of the supreme judicial or of a superior court may, at the

same term at which it is rendered, set aside a verdict and grant a new trial

in a case tried before him, when in his opinion the evidence demands it."

Maryland :

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

.Louisiana:

Garland's Rev. Code, rno1, sec. 560.
''A new trial shall be granted; 1. If the judgment appear clearly contrary to law and evidence; 2. If the party has discovered, since the trial,
evidence important to the cau e, which he could not, with due diligence, have
obtained before; 3. If the cause has been tried by a jury, and it be shown
that the jury has been bribed, or has behaved improperly, or that impartial
justice has not been done in the cause.''

Maine:

R. S. 1903, Ch. 84, sec. 54.
''Any ju tice of the supreme judicial or of a superior court may, at the
same term at \Thich it is r endered, set aside a verdict and grant a new trial
in a case tried b fore him, when in his opinion the evidence demands it."

Massachusetts: Kev. Laws, 1902, Ch. 173.

"Sec. 112. The courts may, at any time before judgment, set aside the ver-

dict in a civil action and order a new trial for any cause for which a new

Maryland:
No statutory enumeration of grounds.

trial may by law be granted.

Sec. 113. A new trial may be granted, upon motion, for a mistake of

law or for newly discovered evidence in a case heard by the court."

Michigan :

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

Minnesota: Rev. Laws, 1905, sec. 4198.

"1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, referee, jury or prevail-

!<. v. La~· , 1902, Ch. 173.
'' ec. 112. Tb courts may, at any tim before judgment, set aside the ver·
diet in a ivil a tion and order a new trial for any cause for which a new
trial may by law b granted.
A new trial may be granted, upon motion, for a mistake of
ec. 113.
law or for newly discovered evidence in a case heard by the court.''

Massachusett :

ing party, or any order or abuse of discretion, whereby the moving party wa«

deprived of a fair trial:

2. Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party;

Michigan:
No statutory enumeration of grounds.

Minnesota:

Rev. La ws ] 905, sec. 4198.
'' 1. Irr gul:irity in th pro edings of tbe court, referee, jury or prevailing party, or any or<1er or abuse of discr tion, whereby the moving party wu
<l priv
o! a fair trial:
2. Misconduct of th jury or prevailing party;

a
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3. Accident or surprise which could not have been prevented by ordinary

7>rndence;

4. Material evidence, newly discovered, which with reasonable diligence

could not have been found and produced at the trial.

5. Excessive or insufficient damages, appearing to have been given under

the influence of passion or prejudice.

6. Errors of law occurring at the trial, and either excepted to at the time,

or clearly assigned in the notice of motion.

NEW TRIALS
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3. Accident or surprise which could not have been prevented by ordinary
T'rndenre ·
4. 1faterial evidence newly discoYered, which with rea onable diligence
coulc1 not have been found and produced at the trial.
5. Exce sive or insufficient damages, appearing to have been given under
th influence of pa . ion or prejm)ice.
6. Error of law occurring at the trial, and either excepted to at the time,
or clearly a signed in the notice of motion.
7. That the verdict, decision or report is not justified by the evidence,
or is contrary to law."

7. That the verdict, decision or report is not justified by the evidence,

or is contrary to law."

Mississippi :

Mississippi:
No statutory enumeration of grounds.

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

Missouri: Ann. St., 1906, sec. 800.

' ' In every case where there has been a mistake or surprise of a party, his

agent or attorney, or a misdirection of the jury by the court, or a mistake

by the jury, or a finding contrary to the direction of the court, or a fraud

or deceit practiced by one party on the other, or the court is satisfied that

perjury or mistake has been committed by a witness, and is also satisfied that
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an improper verdict or finding was occasioned by any such matters, and that

the party has a just cause of action or of defense, it shall, on motion of the

proper party, grant a new trial, and, if necessary, permit the pleadings to be

amended on such terms as may be just."

Missouri:
Ann. St., 1906, sec. 00.
In every case where there ha ._ been a mistake or surprise of a party, hi
agent or attorney, or a mi direction of the jury by the court, or a mi take
by the jury, or a finding contrary to the direction of the court, or a fraud
or deceit practiced by one party on the other, or the court is ati fied that
perjury or mi take has been committed by a witne s, and i al o ati fied that
an improper verdict or finding wa. occasioned by any such matter , and that
the party has a just cau e of action or of defen. e it hall, on motion of the
proper party, grant a new trial, and, if necessary, permit the pleadings to be
amended on such terms as may be ju t.''

Montana: Eev. St., 1907, sec. 6794.

Same as the California statute.

Nebra^lca: Code Civ. Pro., sec. 314.

Montana:
Rev. St., 1907 sec. 6794.
Same as the California tatute.

Same as the Arkansas statute except that term "referee" occurs after

"jury" and after the second use of the word "court" in 1, and the term

"report" occurs after the word "verdict" in 6.

Nevada: C. L. 1900, sec. 3290.

Same as the California statute except 2, which reads merely "Misconduct

of the jury."

New Hampshire: Pub. St., 1901, Chap. 230.

"A new trial may be granted in any case, when through accident, mistake or

Xebraska :
Code Civ.
Same as the Arkan
''jury'' and after the
''report' ' occurs after

Pro., ec. 314.
as statute except that term "referee" occurs after
second u e of the word ''court'' in 1, and the term
the word ' 1 verd~t'' in 6.

Nevada:
C. L. 1900, sec. 3290.
Same as the California tatute except 2, which reads merely ' 1 Misconduct
of the jury. "

misfortune justice has not been done and a further hearing would be equit-

able. ' '

New Mexico :

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

New York: Code Civ. Pro., sec. 999.

New Ham pshire: Pub. St. 1901, Chap. 230.
1
'
A new trial may be granted in any case, when through accident, mistake or
misfortune justice has not been done and a further hearing would be equitable.''

"The judge presiding at a trial by a jury may, in his discretion, entertain

a motion, made upon his minutes, at the same term, to set aside the verdict,

or a direction dismissing the complaint, and grant a new trial upon excep-

New Mexico:
No statutory enumeration of grounds.

tions; or because the verdict is for excessive or insufficient damages, or other-

wise contrary to evidence, or contrary to law."

Norlh Carolina: Eevisal of 1905, sec. 554.

"The judge who tries the cause may, in his discretion, entertain a motion,

to be made upon his minutes, to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial

upon exceptions, or for insufficient evidence, or for excessive damages."

North Bal-ota: Eev. Codes, 1905, sec. 7063.

Same as the California statute.

Ohio: Gen. Code, 1910, sec. 11576.

Same as the Arkansas statute, except that the words 'referee, master" oc-

cur after the word "jury" and the word "referee" occurs after the second

New York:
Code Civ. Pro., ec. 999.
1
' The judge pre iding at a trial by a jury may, in hi
di cretion entertain
a motion, made upon his minute at the rnme term, to set aside the verdict
or a dirertion dLmi!=:sing the complaint, and grant a new trial upon exception. · or because the verdict is for exce sive or in ufficient damages, or otherwi e contrary to evidence, or contrary to law.''
Revisal of 1905 ec. 554.
The judge who tries the cause may, in bis discretion entertain a motion,
to e maile upon hi. minute , to et a ide a verdict and grant a new trial
upon exception , or for insufficient evidence, or for excessive damages.''

North Carolina:
'

1

use of the word "court" in 1, and the word "report" occurs after the word

"verdict" in 6.

i:;. orth D akota:

ame a the

Rev. Code 1905, ec. 7063.
alifornia statute.

Ohio:
Gen. Code, 1910, sec. 11576.
ame a the Arkansas statute except that the words 'referee, master'' occur after the word ''jury' and the word 1 'referee' occurs after the seeond
u e of the woril 11 court'' in 1 and the word ''report'' occurs after the word
1
' verdict ' ' in 6.
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Comp. La"s, 1909, sec. 5825.
Same as the Arkansas tatute except that the word ''referee'' occurs after
''jury'' and after t he second use of the word ''court'' in 1, and the woro
' report ' occurs after ''verdict'' in 6.
Oklahoma:

630 Teial Practice [Chap. 17

OHahnma: Comp. Laws, 1909, sec. 5825.

Same as the Arkansas statute except that the word "referee" occurs after

"jury" and after the second use of the word "court" in 1, and the word

' ' report ' ' occurs after ' ' verdict " in 6.

Oregon: Lord's Oregon Laws, sec. 174.

"1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, .i"ry or adverse party, or

any order of the court, or abuse of discretion, by Mhich such party was pre-

vented from having a fair trial;

2. Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party;

3. Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded

against ;

4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the applica-

tion, which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and pro-

duced at the trial;

5. Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence

of passion or prejudice ;

6. Insuflficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or

that it is against law;
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7. Error in law occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the party mak-

L ord 's Oregon Laws, sec. 174.
Irregularity in the p roceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or
any order of the court, or abuse of discTetion, by which such party was prevented from having a fair trial;
2. Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party;
3. Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
again t;
4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at tho trial;
5. Excessive damages, appearing to h ave been given under the influence
ot passion or prejudice;
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against la.w;
7. Error in Jaw occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the party making the application.''
Oregon:

'' 1.

ing the application."

Pennsylvania :

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

See: 2 Ash. 3L

P ennsylvania:
N o statutory enumeration of grounds.
See:
2 Ash. 31.

South Carolina : Code of Laws, 1902,

"Sec. 2734. Circuit courts shall have power to grant new trials in cases

where there has been a trial by jury for reasons for which new trials have

usually been granted in the Courts of law of this State."

Sec. 286, Same as the North Carolina Statute.

South Dalcota: Code Civ. Pro., sec. 300.

South Carolina:
Code of Laws, 1902.
''Sec. 2734.
Circuit courts shall have power to grant new trials in cases
where there has been a trial by jury for reasons for which new trials have
usually been granted in the Courts of law of this State.' '
Same as the North Carolina Statute.
Sec. 286.

Same as the California statute,

Tennessee :

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

Texas: Sayles Civ. St., sec. 1370.

New trials may be granted, and judgments may be set aside or arrested on

motion for good cause, on such terms and conditions as the court shall direct.

Utah: C. L. 1907, sec. 3292,

Same as the California statute.

Vermont :

South Dakota:
Code Civ. Pro., sec. 300.
Same as the California statute.
T ennessee :
No statutory enumeration of grounds.
T exas : Sayles Civ. St., sec. 1370.
New trials may be granted, and judgments may be set aside or arrested on
motion for good cause, on uch terms and conditions as the court shall direct.

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

Virginia: Code, 1904, sec. 3392.

"In any civil case or j)roceeding, the court before which a trial by jury

Utah:
C. L. 1907, sec. 3292.
Same as the California statute.

is had, may grant a new trial, unless it be otherwise specially provided, A

new trial may be granted as well where the damages awarded are too small as

where they are excessive. ' '

Vermont:

No statutory enumeration of grounds.

Washington: E. & B. 's Ann. Codes, sec. 399,

1 - 4, same as 1 - 4 in California.

"5. Excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been given under

the influence of passion or prejudice.

6. Error in the assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large

or too small, when the action is upon a contract, or for the injury or de-

tention of property."

7 - 8, Same as - 7 in C.-ilifornia.

West Virgivia: '^ndo, lOOfi, sec. 3985.

Same aa Virginia.

Virginia:
Code, ] 904, sec. 3392.
''In any civi l aRe or pro eeding, the court before which a trial by jury
is had, may grant a n w trial, unless it be otherwise specially provided.
A
new trial may be grant d a w 11 where the damages awarded are too small a
wh ro th y are exc sive. ' '
Washington:
R. & B. 's Ann. oil s, sec. 399.
1 - 4, same a 1 - 4 in alifornia.
'' 5. Exe s i e or inadequate damages appearing to have b en given under
the infl11 nc of pn , sion or pr juCli e.
6. Error in th as ssment of th amount f r
very, whether too large
or too small, wb n the a tion is upon a outract, or for the injury or det n ion ot prop rty. ''
7 - 8.
am as 6 - 7 jn California.
11 rR f l'ir(tinin:
011
• 'arne as Virgiuia.
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irijiconsin: St. 1898, sec. 2878.

' ' The judge before whom the issue is tried may, in his discretion, enter-

tain a motion to be made on his minutes to set aside a verdict and grant a

new trial upon exceptions or because the verdict is contrary to law or con-

trary to evidence, or for excessive or inadequate damages."

Wyoming: Comp. St., 1910, sec. 4601.

St. 1898, sec. 2878.
' The judge before whom the issue is tried may, in his discretion, entertain a motion to be made on his minutes to set aside a verdict and grant a
new trial upon exceptions or because the verdict is contrary to law or contrary to evidence, or for exce sive or inadequate damages.''
Jl"i.scons·in:

Comp. St., 1910, sec. 4601.
ame as the Arkan a& tatute except that the words ''referee, master'' occur after the word ''jury'' and the word ''referee'' occurs after the second use of the word ' ' court'' in 1 1 and the word '' report' 1 occurs after the
\\'Ord ' 'verdict' ' in 6.
Wyoming:

Same as the Arkansas statute except that the words ' ' referee, master ' ' oc-

cur after the word "jury" and the word "referee" occurs after the sec-

ond use of the word "court" in 1, and the word "report" occurs after the

word * * verdict " in 6.

JOHNS V. HODGES.

Court of Appeals of Maryland. 18S3.

60 Maryland, 215.

Ritchie, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

**********

After the verdict was rendered, the defendant, discover-

JOHNS V. HODGES.

ing that two of the jnrors were under twenty-five years of

age, on the ground of this want of proper age and his pre-
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vious ignorance of it, filed a motion for a new trial, and also

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

1883.

n petition that the Court refuse to certify the verdict of the

60 Maryland, 215.

jurv to the Orphans' Court, because void and illegal.

The Court refused to grant a new trial and also to grant

the petition, which it treated as in the nature of a motion

for a new trial upon the ground that the objection was not

taken in time.

In the course of its opinion upon the point presented the

Court forcibly remarks: ''It was competent for the de-

fendant to have made the proper inquiries, and after hav-

ing satisfied himself on the subject, to have made the ob-

jection before the juror was sworn, but this he neglected to

do. He waited until he had lost his case. If a party to a

suit may omit to make such inquiries until after a verdict

lias been rendered against him, and may then set it aside

on discovery and proof of the existence of a good cause of

challenge against any one of the jury, it would introduce

an additional element of uncertainty in the administration

of justice, and lead in many cases to great and unnecessary

delay and expense.'*

Under our present jury system, while the law aims to ex-

RrTCHIE,

J., delivered the opinion of the court.

• * • * ~ • • • • ~
After the verdict was rendered the defendant, di covering that two of the jurors were under twenty-five years of
age, on the ground of thi want of proper age and his previous ignorance of it, filed a motion for a new trial, and al o
a petition that the Court refuse to certify the verdict of th~
jur to the Orphan ' Court, becau e void and illegal.
The Court refu ed to grant a new trial and also to grant
the petition, which it treated as in the nature of a motion
for a new trial upon the ground that the objection was not
taken in time.
In the cour£e of its opinion upon the point pre ented the
Dourt forcibl. remark : "It wa, competent for the d fendant to have made the proper inquirie and aft r havinO' . ati fied himself on the subject, to have made the objectio before the juror wa worn ut thi he negl ct d t
<lo. He waited until he bad lo t hi ca . If a party to a
. uit may omit to mak uch inquirie until aft r a verdi t
ha been rendered again t him and may then et it a id
on di co ery and proof of the xi tence of a go d cau e of
hall no-e again t any on of the jury it would introdu
an additional lement of unc rtainty in the a mini tration
of justice, and lead in many ca es to gr at and unnecessary
<l lay and expen e."

• • • • • • • • • •

Und r our ptes nt jury y t m wbil

h law aim to ex-
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elude persons under twenty-five years of age from serving

on juries, from tlie nature of the methods prescribed by the

statute for drawing a jury, no certain means are provided

for the absolute exclusion of such persons. The presump-

tion arises, therefore, not that the officers charged with the

duty of preparing the lists have wholly succeeded in secur-

ing those free from all statutory disability, but that they

have succeeded so far as diligence and good faith within the

scope of their opportunities have enabled them to do so.

That the officers charged with the selection of the jury will

endeavor to discharge that duty according to law is an obli-

gation not peculiar to those who provide the jury under

our present system; but has been incident to the summon-

ing of jurors from time immemorial. But the presumption

that jurors only have been provided who have the proper

legal qualifications has not been of that character as to ren-

der needless the right of challenge. The right of challenge

itself is a safeguard provided by law in contemplation of
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the contingency that the officers whose duty it is to select

only qualified persons have failed in the performance of that

duty. It is a means specially provided by which a party to

a suit ma}^ readily and effectually protect himself against

any oversight or neglect committed in the original selection.

That men may be, and are, summoned, who are not contem-

plated by the law as the subjects of jury duty, is common

experience. And as the consequences of such an error can

be readily obviated by inquiry and challenge when they

come to be sworn, it is laches not to avail of so simple and

efficacious a means of protection, where prejudice is ap-

prehended or may be rendered im]:»ossible, as examination

and challenge before the jury is empanelled. Not to exer-

cise this right, when so simple a matter as the age of the

juror is to be ascertained, or where he resides, but to pro-

ceed to trial unimformed, and then endeavor after verdict

to avail of a defect in these respects, would be not only to

entail a loss of time, labor and money that a little diligence

at the outset would have prevented, but to offer an induce-

ment to suitors to await the verdict before questioning the

f|iialification of the jnror, that, if favorable, the objection

may be suppressed, and if ndverse, that it may then be called

into requisition. No snch lottery is to be encouraged.

Among the numerous cases which decide that what ia

~lude
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persons under twenty-five years of age from serving
on juries, from the nature of the methods prescribed by the
statute for drawing a jury, no certain means are provided
for the absolute exclusion of such person . The presumption arises, therefore, not that the officers charged with the
duty of preparing the lists have wholly succeeded in securing those free from all statutory di ability, but that they
have succeeded so far as diligence and good faith within the
scope of their opportunities have enabled them to do so.
That the officers charged with the selection of the jury will
endeavor to discharge that duty according to law is an obligation not peculiar to those who provide the jury under
our present system; but has been incident to the summoning of jurors from time immemorial. But the presumption
that jurors only have been provided who have the proper
legal qualifications has not been of that character as to render needless the riO'ht of challenge. The right of ch:illenge
itself is a safeguard provided by law in contemplation of
the contingency that the officers who se dut>T it is to select
only qualified persons have failed in the performance of that
duty. It is a means special1y provided by which a party to
a suit may readily and effectually protect himself against
any oversight or neglect committed in the original selection.
That men may be, i:tnrl ~ue, summoned, who are not contemplated by the law as the subject of jury duty, is common
xperience. And as the consequences of sucb an error can
be readily obviated by inquiry and challenge when they
come to be sworn, jt is la cht's not to avail of o imple and
ffi acious a means of protection wher prejudice is appr hendPd or may b ren lere<l impo ible, as examination
and chall nge b fore th jt-:. r y is empanell d. Not to exerise thi rig11t, w]1en o imple a matt r as the age of the
juror i to b a . rertEtin a, or wher he r side ::' , hut to pro(' d to trial unimforme<l, nnfl th .n nd avor after verdi t
r · l ect would b not only to
o avail of a def t in th
<~ntai] a lo . of time, Jahor an<l mon >- t1rnt a littl diligenc
nt th outs t wonl 1 hav prrv nt , hut to off r an inducement to suitors to await tlw ver irt h for <]n stioning the
qu, lift ti n f ih juror, tl1at, if fay rabl , th objection
m . Th , uppr s d, and if 8rlv r . that it may th n b callecl
int r qui. ition. No Rn h lottery i. to h ncourao-ed.
Am ng th num r u ases which de ide that what is
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cause for challenge cannot be relied on to set aside the ver-

dict, if the right of challenge has not been exercised, are

Minna Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch. 290; Hollingsworth v.

Duane, 4 Dall. 353 ; Amherst v. Hadley, 1 Pick. 38 ; People

V. Jewett, 6 Wendell, 386; United States v. Baker, 3 Bene

diet, 68; Gormley v. Laramore, 40 Ga. 253; Wassum v. Fee

ney, 121 Mass. 93 ; Rex v. Sutton, 8 Barn. & Cress, 417.

The fact that the party was not aware of the disqualifi

cation when the jury was empanelled is not material; be-

cause he might have known it. In the cases in 4 Dall., 3

Benedict, 121 Mass., and 40 Ga., just cited, the disqualifica-

tion was not known when the juror was sworn. The case

in 121 Mass., was very similar in its facts to those relied

on by the appellant. The objection was to the infancy of

the juror, which was unknown to the defendant until the

time of making his motion to set aside the verdict. Gray,

C. J., in delivering the opinion of the Court, fully reviews

the decisions bearing on the subject. Lord Tenterden, in
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Rex V. Sutton, goes so far as to say: ''I am not aware that

a new trial has ever been granted on the ground that a juror

was liable to be challenged, if the party had an opportunity

of making his challenge."

**********

Rulings affirmed, and cause remanded.

FITZPATRICK V. HARRIS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1855.

16 B. Monroe, 561.

* * * A new trial was asked upon the ground that Elliott

had been improperly admitted to testify, and that one of the

jurors who sat on the last trial had also sat on the first

trial. * * *

Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the

court.

Though the affidavit of the defendant states that he did

not know until after he was accepted, that Salyers, who was

cau e for challenge cannot be relied on to et aside the verdict, if the right of challenge has not been exerci ed, are
~Minna Queen v . Hepburn, 7 Cranch. 290; Hollingsworth v.
Duane, 4 Dall. 353; Amherst v. Hadl y, 1 Pick. 3 ; People
v. Jewett, 6 Wendell, 386; United States v . Baker, 3 Ben
diet, 68; Gormley v. Laranwre, 40 Ga. 253; Was univ. Fe
1rny, 121 Mass. 93; Rex v. Sutton, 8 Barn. & re 417.
The fact that the party was not aware of the disqualification when the jury wa empanelled i not material; becau e he might have known it. In the cases in 4 Dall., 3
Benedict, 121 ~1:ass., and 40 Ga., just cited, the disqualification was not known when the juror wa sworn. The ca e
in 121 Ma s., was ver similar in its facts to those relied
on by the appellant. The objection was to the infancy of
the juror, which was unknown to the defendant until the
time of making his motion to set aside the verdict. Gray,
C. J ., in deli ering the opinion of t1:ie Court, fully review
the deci ion bearing on the subject. Lord Tenterden, in
Rex v. Sutton, goes so far as to say: ''I am not aware that
a new trial has ever been granted on the ground that a juror
wa liable to be challenged, if the party had an opportunit
of making hi challenge."

* * * * * * • * * *
Rulings affirmed, and cause remanded.

one of the jury on the last trial, had been one of the jury on

FITZP A.TRICK V. HARRIS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

1855.

16 B. Monroe, 561.

• • • A new trial wa a ked upon the ground that Elliott
had been improperly admitted to te tify and t at on of the
juror, who sat on the la t trial had al o at on the first
trial. * * *
CHIEF JUSTICE 11AR HALL delivered the oprn1on of the
court.
Thoug-h the affi avit of th d fendant tate that he di
not kn w until aft r h wa. accept d, that alyer , wh wa
one of the ju1-:y on the la t trial, had been one of the jury on
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the former trial, (when a verdict was found for the plain-

tiff,) it is not a sufficient ground for a new trial. The ob-

jection might have been made at any time before the juror

was sworn, and, as we think, at any time before the entire

jury was sworn, and the fact should have been made known

as soon as discovered, at any time before the jury retired,

when it might have been in the power of the parties to cure

or waive the objection. Besides, the record of the former

trial furnished to the parties and their counsel the means of

knowing the names of the jurors who had then tried the

case, and even if they were not personally known, the iden-

tity of name would suggest the probable indentity of the per-

son ; and even without the trouble of examining the record,

the fact that there had been a previous trial, authorized, and

should have suggested, the question to be asked of the juror

himself, whether he had been one of the former jury. With

such opportunities of ascertaining the fact, the failure to

disclose it until it is made the ground of asking a new trial,
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raises a presumption of bad faith, or of wilfuU neglect,

which can only be overcome by showing such extraordinary

circumstances, if there can be any such, as will account for

ignorance where the party ought to have knowledge, and

excuse neglect where he is bound to be diligent. In this

case the affidavit of Salyers proves that he and the defend-

ant were familiar acquaintances and friends. — And thus the

circumstances strengthen instead of repelling the unfavor-

able presumptions in the case. And we may add, that even

if the defendant himself were ignorant, it is not shown that

his counsel, who conducted the defense, did not know the

fact now brought forward, nor, if they were ignorant of it,

is any reason shown for their neglecting the means of knowl-

edge so easily within their power. The affidavit, therefore,

makes out no ground for a new trial.

Affirmed.
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the former trial, (when a verdict was found for the plain.
tiff,) it is not a sufficient ground for a new trial. The objection might have been made at any time before the juror
was sworn, and, as we think, at any time before the entire
jury was sworn, and the fact should have been made known
as soon as discovered, at any time before the jury retired,
when it might have been in the power of the parties to cure
or waive the objection. Besides, the record of the former
trial furnished to the parties and their counsel the means of
knowing the names of the jurors who had then tried the
case, and even if they were not personally known, the .identity of name would suggest the probable indentity of the person; and even without the trouble of examining the record;
the fact that there had been a previous trial, authorized, and
should have suggested, the question to be asked of the juror
himself, whether he had been one of the former jury. With
such opportunities of ascertaining the fact, the failure to
disclose it until it is made the ground of asking a new trial,
raises a presumption of bad faith, or of wilfull neglect,
which can only be overcome by showing such extraordinary
circumstances, if there can be any such, as will account for
ignorance where the party ought to have knowledge, and
excuse neglect where he is bound to be diligent. In this
case the affidavit of Salyers proves that he and the defendant were familiar acquaintances and friends.-And thus the
circumstances strengthen instead of repelling the unfa vorable presumptions in the case. And we may add, that even
if the defendant himself were ignorant, it is not shown that
his counsel, who conducted the defense, did not know the
fact now brought forward, nor, if they were ignorant of it,
i any reason shown for their neglecting the means of knowledge so easily within their power. The affidavit, therefore:
makes out no ground for a new trial.

• • * * • • • * * •

Affirmed.
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KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS V. STEELE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee. 1901.

KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS V. STEELE.

107 Tennessee, 1.

Wilkes, J. This is a suit against the Endowment Bank

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

1901.

of the Order of Knights of Pythias to recover $3,000, the

amount of a benefit certificate in the fourth class upon the

life of J. K. Steele, j)ayable to his wife as beneficiary.

107 Tennessee, 1.

**********

It is assigned as error that the Court below erroneously

refused to grant a new trial on the grounds of incompetency

and misconduct of the jury. It appears that three of the

jurors who sat upon the case, to wit, Munroe, Felts and

Flanaghan, had served upon the jury in Shelby County with-

in two years before they were called upon the jury in this

case, and were therefore incompetent. It appears that the

jury was placed in the box and tendered to the parties in a

body. Counsel for the Order, when the jury was thus tend-

ered, asked the question of them collectively if any one of
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them had served as a juror on a regular panel in any Court

in Shelby County within the last two years, and each shook

his head.

It appears also that when this jury was made up on the

Monday preceding the trial, for service generally in the

Court, two of them, Munroe and Flanaghan, were examined

separately and individually by the presiding Judge, and

each answered that he had not served on any regular jury in

the county of Shelby within the two years next preceding.

The other juror, Felts, appears not to have been present and

was not examined on that occasion, but it is reasonably cer-

tain from the record that he was examined when he was af-

terward chosen, though he sitates he was not.

We are of the opinion that these jurors were not the good

and lawful men to whom the parties were entitled as jurors

under Article I., Section 6, of the Constitution. Neeley v.

The State, 4 Bax. 180. They were not competent to serve

as jurors, and were subject to challenge. Shannon's Code,

§ 5090.

While it is not a good objection generally, after verdict,

that a juror who sat on the case was incompetent propter

WILKES, J. This is a uit against the Endowment Bank
of the Order of Knights of Pythias to recover $3,000, the
amount of a benefit certificate in the fourth class upon the
life of J. K. Steele, payable to his wife as beneficiary.

* * * * * * * * * *
It is assigned as error that the Court below erroneously
refused to grant a new trial on the grounds of incompetency
and misconduct of the jury. It appears that three of the
jurors who sat upon the case, to wit, Munroe, Felt. and
Flanaghan, had served upon the jury in Shelby County within two years before they were called upon the jury in thi
ca e, and were therefore incompetent. It appear that the
jury was placed in the box and tendered to the parties in a
body. Coun el for the Order, when the jury wa thn tendered, asked the question of them collective!. if any one of
them had served as a juror on a regular panel in any Court
in Shelby ounty within the last two years, and each hook
his head.
It appears also that when this jnry wa made up on the
Monday preceding the trial, for service generally in the
ourt, two of them, Munroe and Flanaghan were examined
. eparatel. and individually by the pre iding Judge and
ach answered that he had not erved on an regular jury in
the county of Shelby within the two year next pre eding.
The other juror Felt , appears not to ha been pre ent and
was not examined on that occa ion, but it i rea onably ertain from the record that he wa xamin d when he wa afterward cho en, though h state he wa not.
We are of the opinion that the e juror were not th good
and lawful men to whom the parti wer ntitl d a jur r ·
under Article I.
ti n
of the on titution. "!>. e ley .
The tate, 4 Bax. 1 0.
h . w r n t om et nt to
ha non
a. juror , and wer ul j ct to hall n · .
50 0.
Whil it i not a o·oocl bj ction n rally aft r
rdi t,
that a juror ho at on the c e wa incompetent propter
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defectum, and it does not matter whether the fact was known

to the parties or not, yet this rule proceeds npon the idea

that the juror miglit have been examined before being selec-

ted or the parties might have ascertained the fact and ex-

cluded such juror by challenge. But in this case the coun-

sel for the company exercised reasonable precaution to as-

certain if the jury or any one of them was incompetent by

inquiring of the jurors themselves, and had the assurance of

competency, from the presumption that the trial Judge ex-

amined them upon that point when they were placed on the

regular jury, and the actual fact of a second examination by

himself. Tlic jurors explained that they were mistaken

about the time when they served, and did not intend to

state a falsehood or mislead. However this may have been,

the fact of incompetency existed, and counsel for the com-

pany was misled and deceived, after taking proper precau-

tions to ascertain the fact, and by the jurors themselves

while either actually or virtually under oath, and it was not
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simply a case of want of knowledge of incompetency nor a

waiver of incompetency, with or without knowledge of its

existence, in which case the exception being propter defec-

tum, must be considered as waived ; but it is a case where

the exception was reasonably made, or would have been

made but for the incorrect or false statements of the jurors,

which misled the defendant's counsel and influenced his ac-

tion. It is true counsel might have examined the jury books

of the Court, and such other Courts in Shelby County as

had jurors, but this would have been an extraordinary pre-

caution, which would have consumed time and delayed the

Court, and he could not be required so to do.

The judgment of the Court below is reversed, and the

cause remanded, and appellee will pay costs of appeal.

TRIAL PRACTICE
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defectum, and it does not matter whether the fact was known
to the parties or not, yet this rule proceeds upon tho idea
that the juror might have been examined before being selected or the parties might have ascertained the fact and excluded such juror by challenge. But in this case the coun·el for the company exercised reasonable precaution to ascertain if the jury or any one of them was incompetent by
inquiring of the jurors themselves, and had the assurance of
competency, from the presumption that the trial Judge examined them upon that point when they were placed on the
regular jury, and the actual fact of a second examination by
himself. The jurors explained that they were mistaken
about the time when they served, and did not intend to
state a falsehood or mislead. However this may have been,
the fact of incomp tency existed, and counsel for the company was misled and deceived, after taking proper precautions to ascertain the fact, and by the jurors themselves
while either actually or virtually under oath, and it was not
imply a case of want of knowledge of incompetency nor a
waiver of incompetency, with or without knowledge of its
existence, in which case the exception being propter def ectum, must be considered as waived; but it is a case where
the exception was reasonably made, or would have been
made but for the incorrect or false statements of the jurors,
which misled the defendant's counsel and influenced his action. It is true counsel might have examined the jury books
of the Court, and such other Courts in Shelby County as
ha l juror , but thi would have been an extraordinary preaution, which would have consumed time and delayed the
ourt, and he could not be required so to do.
* * * * * * * * • *
The judgm nt of the Court below is reversed, and th
ause remanded, and appellee will pay costs of appeal.
0
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UNITED STATES V. CHRISTENSEN.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah. 1890,

UNITED STATES V. CHRI TENSEN.

7 Utah, 26.

Anderson, J.

The defendant was indicted for unlawful cohabitation,

Supr eme Court of the Territory of Utah.

1890.

and was tried and convicted. He moved for a new trial up-

7 Utah, 26.

on the ground, among others, of misconduct of the jury

tending to prevent a fair and due consideration of the case,

based upon affidavits showing that one John Harris, who

was one of the petit jury which convicted him, was on the

grand jury which found the indictment, and tliat the fact

was not known of him or his counsel until after the verdict,

and that the juror stated falsely on his voir fizre that he had

not formed or expressed an unqualified opinion as to the

guilt or innocence of the accused of the offense charged.

The motion was sustained, and a new trial granted, and the

United States excepted to the ruling of the court, and now

prosecutes this appeal from the order of the court granting
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a new trial. When the juror Harris was called, he was

sworn on his voir dire, and interrogated by defendant's

counsel as follows : ' ' Do you know the defendant ? Do you

know any of the witnesses named on the back of the indict-

ment? Have you talked with any person regarding this

case? Have you ever formed or expressed an opinion as

to the guilt or innocence of the defendant?" To each of

these questions he answered in the negative, and was ac-

cepted as a juror in the case.

The only question to be determined is whether the court

erred in sustaining the motion for a new trial. In the case

of People V. Reece, 3 Utah, 72, 2 Pac. Rep. 61, it was held

that where a juror falsely stated, upon examination under

oath as to his qualifications as a juror, that he was a citizen

of the United States, and neither of the defendants knew or

had reason to believe until after verdict that he was not a

citizen, the defendants could not be deemed to have waived

their right to a jury of twelve men possessing the qualifica-

tion of citizenship, and, being guilty of no negligence or

want of watchfulness, were entitled to have the verdict set

aside, and a new trial granted. In People v. Lewis, 4 Utah,

ANDERSON,

J.

The defendant was indicted for unlawful cohabitation,
and was tried and convicted. He moved for a new trial upon the ground, among others, of mi onduct of the jur r
t nding to prevent a fair and due consideration of the case
based upon affidavits showing that one John Harri', who
was one of the petit jury which convicted him, was on the
nTand jur which found the indictment, and that the fact
wa not known of him or his counsel until after the verdi t
and that the juror stated fal ely on his air dire·that be ha 1
not formed or expressed an unqualified opinion as to th
guilt or innocence of the accu ed of the offen e charged.
The motion was sustained, and a new trial granted, and th~
United State excepted to the ruling of the court, and now
pro ecute this appeal from the order of the court grantin ·
a new trial. When the juror Harri wa called he wa
worn on hi voir dire, and interrogated by defendant's
counsel as follows: ''Do you know the defendant. Do you
know any of the witnesses named on tb back of the indictment~ Have you talked with any p r on regarding thi
ca e 1 Have you ever form d or expre ed an opinion a
to the O'uilt or inno en e of the defendant ~ " To each of
the e que tions be an wered in the negative, and was ace ted a a juror in the a e.
The only que tion to b d termined i whether the court
erred in u taining th motion for a new trial. In the ca
of People . R eece, Utah 7_ 2 Pa . Re . 1, it wa b 1
that wb r a juror fal 1. tat d upon examinati n und r
oath a. to hi qualifi ation a a juror that h wa a itizen
of the nit d tate and n itb r f the d f ndants knew or
had rea on to b lie e until aft r v r ict that h wa not a
citizen th def ndant c uld not
d med to have waiv
their right to a jury of tweh m n po
inO' th qua lifi ation of citizen. hip and beinO' o·uilty f no n o·li n
or
want of watcbfuln
were ntitl d to have th verdict et
aside, and a new trial grante . In People v. Lewis, 4 Utah,
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42, 5 Pac. Eep. 543, the defendant was convicted of grand

larceny. One of the trial jury which convicted him was a

member of the grand jury which found the indictment

against him. Neither the defendant nor his counsel knew

this until after the verdict. The defendant moved for a

new trial, which was overruled, and the ruling was affirmed

in this court upon the ground of the defendant's negligence

in not making sufficient inquiries as to the qualifications of

the jurors. The jurors were sworn on their voir dire, and

interrogated as to their statutory qualifications, to which no

answer was given. Counsel for defendant then examined

the jurors as follows :

''Are you acquainted with the defendant, Walter Lewis,

here? Have any of you heard so much about his case as to

form or express an opinion, an unqualified opinion, concern-

ing his guilt or innocence? If any of you have, make it

known. I will not put questions directly to each of you."

The jurors were then asked if any of them were related to
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the prosecuting witness, and if they had formed or express-

ed an opinion from anything they had heard him say, and hi'

added: ''You don't seem to answer, and I will not put thv

question to any of you particularly." No statement of th'

facts constituting the alleged offense was made to the jurors,

and hence, the court say, the jurors could not well have

known whether they had an opinion as to the guilt or inno-

cence of the defendant or not, and that, taking into con-

sideration the timidity and apparent unwillingness of many

jurors to answer questions unless they are individually in-

terrogated, it is not surprising that there was no response

to the questions of defendant's counsel. The court was of

the opinion that interrogating the jurors in such a general

way was such negligence that the defendant could not, after

an unfavorable verdict, successfully move for a new trial,

when, with the proper diligence, good ground for a chal-

lenge of the juror would have been discovered. The court

said, however, that "an express unqualified answer that the

juror is a citizen, or that he has not formed or expressed an

opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, is suffi-

cient to relieve the defense from further investigation un-

less there is something to put the party upon furthf^r in-

quiry." In the present case the defendant's counsel asked

the juror whether he had formed or expressed an opinion

J~,
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- Pac. Rep. 543, the defendant was convicted of grand

larceny. One of the trial jury which convicted him was a
member of the grand jury which found the indictment
against him. Neither the defendant nor his counsel knew
this until after the verdict. The defendant moved for a
new trial, which was overruled, and the ruling was affirmed
in this court upon the ground of the defendant's negligence
in not making sufficient inquiries as to the qualifications of
the jurors. The jurors were sworn on their voir dire, and
interrogated as to their statutory qualifications, to which no
answer was given. Counsel for defendant then examined
the jurors as follows :
''Are you acquainted with the defendant, Walter Lewis,
here~ Have any of you heard so much about his case as to
form or express an opinion, an unqualified opinion, concerning his guilt or innocence~ If any of you have, make it
known. I will not put questions directly to each of you."
The jurors were then asked if any of them were related to
the prosecuting witness, and if they had formed or expressd an opinion from anything they had heard him say, and h .,
added: "You don't seem to answer, and I will not put th ti
que tion to any of you particularly." No statement of tb r.
facts constituting the alleged offense wa made to the jurors,
and hence, the court say, the jurors could not well have
known whether they bad an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant or not, and that, taking into con. ideration the timidity and apparent unwillingness of many
jurors to answer questions unles.s they are individually int rrogat d, it is not surprising that there was no re ponse
to the que tions of defendant's counsel. The court was of
th opinion that interrogatino- the jurors in uch a o·eneral
way was u h negligence that the defendant could not, after
an unfavorable verdict, succe sfully move for a new trial,
h n, with the proper dilig nee, o-o d ground for a chal1 ng f th juror would have be n discovered. The court
" id }1ow v r, that" an xpr ss unqualified answer that the
jur r i a itizen, or that h bas not form d or expr ssed an
or 1n i n . t th guilt or inn n of the a cu. ed, i suffiri t to r 11
th
f ns from furth r inv . tigati. n un1 . . th r iR Rom thing t put thr party upon further inquiry." nth r nt a the d f ndant's counsel asked
tl1 jur r wh b r e had formed or xpr
an opm1on

~
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:is to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and he answer-

ed that he had not, and under the ruling in People v. Lewis,

supra, the defendant was not bound to pursue the investiga-

tion further. It is not shown that the juror Harris had

formed or expressed an unqualified opinion as to the guilt

or innocence of the defendant further than the fact that he

was one of the grand jury that found the indictment against

him, and as to this fact he was not interrogated. The case

of Rice V. State, 16 Ind. 298, was precisely like the one at

bar in its facts. One of the trial jurors had been one of the

grand jury which found the indictment. The juror was not

asked as to whether he had been on the grand jury that

found the indictment, but was asked whether he had formed

or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the

accused, and answered that he had not. The fact that he

had been on the grand jury was not discovered until after

verdict, and, on a motion for a new trial, the affidavit of the

juror was filed in support of the verdict to the effect that at
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the time of being examined he had no opinion as to the de-

fendant's guilt, and had forgotten the circumstance of his

having been on the grand jury. The court held that the

defendant was entitled to a new trial, and was guilty of no

negligence in not sooner discovering the fact of the juror's

incompetency, but that, if the fact had been known to the ac-

cused at the time the jury was accepted and sworn, he could

not afterwards have been heard to make the objection.

An objection to a juror such as is raised in this case is not

like merely technical disqualifications, such as allienage,

non-residence, and the like, which do not tend to impeach

the fairness and impartiality of the jury. It is possibly

true that the juror in this case had no opinion at the time

of his examination as to the guilt or innocence of the ac-

cused. He may have forgotten that he was on the grand

jury that found the indictment. He may have voted against

finding the indictment, or may have been absent when it was

found, as twelve of the fifteen jurors constitute a quonmi,

and may transact business ; but the presumptions of the law

are all to the contrary, and, in the absence of any showing to

that effect, ho must be presumed to have participated in the

finding of the indictment, and to have formed an opinion as

to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. It might be pos-

sible, also, even if the juror had formed an unqualified be-

(~s

to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and he answer. . J that he had not, and under the ruling in People v. Lewis,
. ·up ra, th defendant wa not bound to pur u the inv stig tion further. It is not shown that the juror Harris had
f rmed or expre ed an unqualified opinion a to th guilt
or innocence of the defendant further than the fact that h
wa one of the grand jury that found the indictment again t
him, and as to this fact he was not interrogated. The case
of Rice v. State, 16 Ind. 298, was precisely like the one at
bar in its facts. One of the trial jurors had been one of the
grand jury which found the indictment. The juror was not
asked as to whether he had been on the grand jury that
found the indictment, but was asked whether he had formed
or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the
accu ed, and an wered that he had not. The f~ct that he
had been on the grand jury was not discovered until after
verdict, and, on a motion for a new trial, the affidavit of the
juror wa filed in support of the verdict to the effect that at
the time of being examined he had no opinion as to the d f ndant 's guilt, and had forgotten the circum tance of his
having been on the grand jury. The court held that th
rlef ndant wa entitled to a new trial, and was guilty of no
n gligence in not ooner discovering the fact of the juror'.
incompetency, but that, if the fact had been known to the accu ed at the time the jury was accepted and worn he could
not afterwards have been heard ,to make the objection.
An objection to a juror such as is raised in thi case is not
like merely technical disqualifications, uch as allienage,
non-re idence, and the like, which do not tend to impeach
the fairne s and impartiality of the jury. It i po ., ibly
true that the juror in this ca e had no opinion at the time
of his xamination a to the guilt or innocence f the acu d. He ma. have forgotten that he wa on th ()'rand
jury that found th indictment. He may have vote a ainst
findin()' th indictm nt, or may ha e be n ab ent wh nit was
found a tw lve of the fifteen jurors con titut a quorum,
and ma r transa t bu in
; but the re umption of th law
are all to th ontrary, and, in the ab en of an howin()' to
that ff t b mu t be pre um d to hav partici1 at a in th
findinb' of th in i tm nt an to ave f rmed an
inion a.
to the O'uilt or inno nc of th d fendant. It i()'bt b _
ible, also, even if the juror bad forme an unqualified be'.l
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lief of the defendant's guilt from the evidence submitted to

the grand jury, to change the opinion by evidence at the

trial, if he were a man of candor and intelligence. But the

defendant has a right to be tried by an impartial jury. A

juror who, acting on his own oath as a grand juror, and up-

on the sworn testimony of witnesses, has already formed an

opinion as to the defendant's guilt, and has solemnly ac-

cused him of a crime, should not be deemed an impartial or

proper juror to try him. Having served on the grand jury

which found the indictment and having formed or expressed

an unqualified opinion or belief that the prisoner is guilty

or not guilty of the offense charged, are each a ground of

challenge to a juror for implied bias. 2 Comp. Laws 1888,

§ 5022, subds. 4, 8. And where the accused properly ex-

amines the jurors concerning their qualifications, and they

do not answer truthfully, he is thereby not only deprived of

his right of challenge for cause, but may also be prevented

from exercising his right of peremptory challenge. If, in
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such a case, a defendant, in trying to ascertain whether

the jurors are competent or not, without negligence on his

part, is denied a new trial, the greatest injustice might be

done. In this case the names of the grand jurors did not

appear on the indictment, the law only requiring that the

name of the foreman should appear ; and there was nothing

to notify defendant that the juror had been on the grand

jury that found the indictment, nor to put him on inquiry.

It is true if he had searched the records of the court he

would have ascertained that fact, and it would have been

commendable prudence and diligence to have done so; but

we do not think his failure to do so is such negligence as

should deprive him of the right to be tried by an impartial

jury, especially in view of the false answer given by the

juror. The motion for a new trial was properly granted.

In support of the views above expressed, see Com. v. Hus-

sey, 13 Mass. 221; Dilworth v. Com., 65 Amer. Dec. 264;

Bennett v. State, 24 Wis. 57 ; Hayne, New Trials, § 45, and

cases cited. See, also section 64. Our attention has been

called to a number of cases where, upon the same state of

facts as are presented here, a different conclusion has been

reached, but we think the weight of authority as well as of

lief of the defendant's guilt from the evidence submitted to
the grand jury, to change the opinion by evidence at the
trial, if he were a man of candor and intelligence. But the
defendant has a right to be tried by an impartial jury. A
juror who, acting on his own oath as a grand juror, and up·
on the sworn testimony of witnesses, has already formed an
opinion as to the defendant's guilt, and has solemnly accused him of a crime, should not be deemed an impartial or
proper juror to try him. Having served on the grand jury
which found the indictment and having formed or expressed
an unqualified opinion or belief that the prisoner is guilty
or not guilty of the offense charged, are each a ground of
challenge to a juror for implied bias. 2 Comp. Laws 1888,
§ 5022, subds. 4, 8. And where the accused properly examines the jurors 12oncerning their qualifications, and they
do not answer truthfully, he is thereby not only deprived of
his right of challenge for cause, but may also be prevented
from exercising his right of peremptory challenge. If, in
such a case, a defendant, in trying to ascertain whether
the jurors are competent or not, without negligence on his
part, is denied a new trial, the greatest injustice might be
done. In this case the names of the grand jurors did not
appear on the indictment, the law only requiring that the
name of the foreman should appear; and there was nothing
to notify defendant that the juror had been on the grand
jury that found the indictment, nor to put him on inquiry.
It i true if he had searched the records of the court he
would have ascertained that fact, and it would have been
comm ndable prudence and diligence to have done so; but
w do not think hi failure ·to do o is such n gligence as
hould d priv him of the rio-ht to be tri d by an impartial
Jury, p cially in view of the fal e answer ·iven by the
Juror. The motion for a new trial was prop rly granted.
In . up ort of the vi ws abov ex r ed, ee Coni. v. Hu . ey, 1. )\f a . 221; Dilworth v . Com. , 65 Amer. Dec. 264;
B enn tt v . Stat , 24 Wis. 57; Hayne, N w Trial , § 45, and
a. r . cit d. S e , 1. o . ection 64. Our attention has been
all <1 t a numb r of a
w]1 r , upon th ame state of
f art.· . a r pr nt d h r
diff r nt conclu ion has been
r
h , but we think the w ight of authority as well as of
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reason is iu accordance with this opinion. The ruling of the

district court is affirmed.

Zane, C. J., and Henderson, J., concurred.
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re on i in accordance with this opinion. The ruling of the
district court is affirmed.
ZANE, C. J., and HENDERSON, J., concurred.

FLORENCE, EL DORADO & WALNUT VALLEY RAIL

ROAD COMPANY V. WARD.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1883,

29 Kansas, 354.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Valentine, J. : This action grows out of a condemnation

proceeding instituted in Butler county by the Florence El

Dorado & Walnut Valley railroad company, to acquire a

right-of-way for its railroad over the lands of J. R. Ward

FLORENCE, EL DORADO & WALNUT VALLEY RAILROAD COMP ANY V. WARD.

and others. Ward, being dissatisfied with the award of the

Supreme Court of Kansas.

commissioners, appealed to the district court of said county

1883.

by which appeal he became the plaintiff, the railroad com-

29

pany became the defendant. The case was then tried be-

Kans as, 354.

fore the court and a jury. The jury consisted of Robert F.

Moore, R. H. Steele, Harry Jones, James Hughes, and
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others. In impaneling the jury the following proceedings,

among others, were had:

R. H. Steele, examined by plaintiff's attorney: Q. Have

the facts, or what purported to be the facts, been related in

your presence or hearing. A. Yes, sir ; to a large extent.

I have heard a great deal of the case.

Q. Have you heard what purported to be the facts of the

damages the plaintiff has sustained? A. I have heard the

iircumstances of the land and the conditions through which

the road ran through there, explained to me.

**********

R. H. Steele, examined by defendant's attorney: * * *

Q. Have you from Mr. Ward or others heard of a com-

promise having been made by the defendant railroad com-

pany to Mr. Ward in regard to this suit?

(Plaintiff objects as immaterial and irrelevant, which the

court overrules, the plaintiff at the time excepting.)

A. Yes, sir j I have.

T. P.— il

The opinion of the court was delivered by
VALENTINE, J.: This action grows out of a condemnation
proceeding instituted in Butl~r county by the Florene~, El
Dorado & Walnut Valley railroad company, to acquire a
right-of-way for it railroad over the lands of J. R. Ward
and others. Ward, being dis atisfied with the award of the
commissioners, appealed to the district court of said county,
by which appeal he became the plaintiff, the railroad company became the defendant. The ca e was then tried before the court and a jury. The jury con isted of Robert F.
Moore, R. H. Steele, Harry Jones, James Hughes, and
others. In impaneling the jury the following proceedings,
among others, were had :
R.H. STEELE, examined by plaintiff's attorney: Q. Have
the fact , or what purported to be the fact , been related in
your pre ence or hearing. A. Yes, sir; to a large extent.
I have heard a great deal of the case.
Q. Ha e Y,2.U heard what purported to be the facts of the
damag the plaintiff has u tained? A. I ha e heard the
:ircum tance of the land and the conditions through which
the road ran through there explained to me.

* * * • * * * * * •
R. H. STEELE, examined by def ndant' attorney: • * *
Q. Rav you from Mr. Ward or other. heard of a compromi ha' ing een made b the def ndant railroad compan. to 1Ir. ard in re ard to thi uit?
(Plaintiff obje t as imm t rial an irr 1 vant which the
court v rrul
th lain tiff at the time excepting.)
A. Y s, sir; I have.
T . .-41
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Q. In what you heard, was any amount stated? A. It

was.

Q. Did you, at the time you heard it form any opinion as

to whether that amount was more or less than Ward ought

to receive?

(Plaintiff objects as immaterial, which objection the

court overrules.)

A. I believe I did.

(Defendant's counsel challenge R. H, Steele for cause )

The court overruled defendant's challenge for cause, to

which ruling the defendant at the time excepted.

The jury found a general verdict in favor of the plain-

tiff and against the defendant, and assessed the amount of

the damages at the sum of $1,050. The defendant then

moved the court for a new trial upon various grounds, and

among others, on the ground of misconduct on the part of

the jury. The alleged misconduct was principally that of

R. H. Steele. On the hearing of the motion for a new trial,
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the several jurors were examined orally with reference to

certain matters occurring during their deliberations with

reference to their verdict. A portion of their evidence is

as follows:

[It was shown that Steoile, in order to get the verdict

above $1,000, stated to the other jurors that the defendant

had offered to pay the plaintiff $1,000, and also that unless

the verdict was above $1,000, the plaintiff would have to

pay the costs.] ^

Upon the foregoing evidence, these questions arise: 1.

Was the juror Steele a competent and impartial juror? 2.

Was he guilty of misconduct while the jury were delibera-

ting upon their verdict?

The plaintiff claims that the juror was competent and im-

partial, and that he was not guilty of any misconduct; while

the defendant claims the reverse. * * *

The plaintiff also claims that the defendant did not ex-

haust its peremptory challenges ; that, at the time the jury

were impaneled and sworn and the trial commenced, the de-

fendant still had one peremptory challenge, which it might

1 The matter inclosed in brackets is a condensation of facts made by the

editor.

Q.
was.
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In what you heard, was any amount stated?

A.

It

Q. Did you, at the time you heard it form any opinion as
to whether that amount was more or less than Ward ought
to receive~
(Plaintiff objects as immaterial, which objection the
ourt overrules.)
A. I believe I did.

* * * * * * * * * •
(Defendant's counsel challenge R. H. Steele for cause)
* * * * * * * * * *
The court overruled defendant's challenge for cause, to
which ruling the defendant at the time excepted.
The jury found a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and assessed the amount of
the damages at the sum of $1,050. The defendant then
moved the court for a new trial upon various grounds, and
among others, on +he ground of misconduct on the part of
the jury. The alleged misconduct was principally that of
R.H. Steele. On the hearing of the motion for a new trial,
the several jurors were examined orally with reference to
ertain matters occurring during their del~berations with
i·efe;rence to their verdict. A portion of their evidence is
as follows:
[It wa shown that Ste~e, in order to get the verdict
above $1,000, stated to the other jurors that the defendant
had offered to pay the plaintiff $1,000, and also that unles"
the verdict was above $1,000, the plaintiff would have to
pay the costs.] 1
Upon the foregoing evidence, these que tions arise: 1.
Was the juror Ste le a competent and impartial juror~ 2.
Wa. he guilty of misconduct while the jury were deliberating upon their v rdict ~
The laintiff 1 im that th juror was competent and imparti 1, and tb t h was not O'uilty of any mi conduct; whil _}
th d f
ant laims the reverse. * * *
h I 1 intiff al o claim that the defendant did not exhau .. t it per m tory challenge ; that, at the time the jury
1d a
sw rn a d th trial co m need, the detill h d one peremptory challeng , which it might
1 The matter inclosed in brackets is a condensation of facts made by the
editor.
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have exercised in discharging Steele from the jury if it had

so chosen; but that it did not so choose, and therefore

Steele remained a member of the jury. We have examined

this claim of the plaintiff, and the claim seems to be correct.

The record does not show that the defendant exercised

more than two of its peremptory challenges, while, under

the statutes, each party is entitled to three. (Civil Code,

§ 271.) This fact, that the defendant did not exercise all

its peremptory challenges, we think must have an impor-

tant bearing in the case. It is our opinion that the juror

Steele was not a fair and impartial juror, though his pre-

conceived opinions in the case were not so manifestly pre-

judicial as to render him an unmistakably incompetent

juror. It is also our opinion that he was guilty of unques-

tionable misconduct in acting as he did in the jury room,

and while the jury were deliberating upon their verdict, but

his misconduct was not so flagrantly wrong, or so manifest-

ly prejudicial in its influences, as to make it clear that the
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verdict might have been affected thereby. And while we

think that the court below should have discharged the juror

Steele on account of his admitted opinions in the case, yet

it is difficult for us to say that the court below committed

material error in refusing to do so ; and while we think that

the court below might very properly have granted a new

trial on the grounds of his prejudice and misconduct, and

the previous failure on the part of the court to discharge

him, yet it is difficult for us to say, under all the circum

stances of the case, that the court below committed any ma-

terial error in refusing to so grant such new trial. Parties

are usually held to the strictest vigilance in impaneling

juries, and generally if an improper person is allowed to

remain on the jury through the fault or negligence or want

of proper diligence on the part of any party, such party

cannot complain. In the present case, the defendant knew

that the juror Steele believed that the defendant had offered

to confess judgment for a certain amount, and it knew that

the juror believed that he knew what that amount was;

and yet the defendant failed to challenofo the juror peremp-

torily, although at the completion of the panel it still retain-

ed one of its peremptory challenges, unused and unexer-

cised. "We think, under such circumstances, it would be

proper to hold that the defendant was willing to take the

NEW TRIALS
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have exerci ed in di charging Steele from the jury if it had
so chosen; but that it did not so choo e, and therefore
Steele remained a member of the jury. We have examine
thi claim of the plaintiff and the claim e m to be ~orrect.
The record doe not how that the d f ndant exercised
more than two of it peremptor challenge , while, unde:r
th tatute each party i entitled to three. (Civil Code
§ 271.) Thi fact, that the d f ndant did not exerci e all
its peremptory challenge , we think mu t have an important bearing in the ca e. It i our opinion that the juror
teele was not a fair and im artial juror though his preconceived opinion in the case were not o manife tly prejudicial a to render him an unmi takably incompetent
juror. It is al o our opinion that he wa <Yuilt. of unque. tionable mi conduct in acting as he did in the jury room,
and while the jury were deliberating upon their verdict but
his mi conduct wa not so flagrantly wrong, or o manife tly prejudicial in it influence a to make it clear that the
verdict mio-ht ha e been affe ted thereby. And while we
think that the court below hould have di charged the juror
teele on account of hi admitted opinion in the ca e yet
it is difficult for u to sa. that the court b low committed
material error in refu ing to do o · and while we think that
the court below mio-ht v ry prop rly have granted a new
trial on the ground of hi. prejudice and mi conduct and
the previous failure on the part of the court to di charge
him, . et it i difficult for us to ay under all the circum
, tance of the ca e, that the court below committed any material error in r fu'"'in!S to o grant uch new trial. Partie
are u ually h Id to the stricte t vigilance in impanelin
jurie and O'en rally if an improper per on i allowed to
remain on th jury throug-h th fault or ne<Ylio·ence or want
of rop r dili nee on th part of any part.
u h party
cannot com1 lain. In th pre nt a e, th
f ndant knew
that th juror~ t 1e b Ii v d that th d f n 1 nt ha ffer d
to conf
:iudgm nt f r a r ain amount, an it knew that
th juror
IieY d that h kn w what that amount wa ·
an yet th
f n ant fail 1 to ball ng th iur r per mptorily alth u h at the omp1 tion f the pan 1 it . till r tainr m tory hall ng . . 1nu
an un ~Pr
ed on of it.
ci d.
think tm r . nch circnm tanr s, it wou1d e
proper to hold that the d fen ant was willinO' to tak th
0
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juror as he was, and to take the chances of his acting fairly

and impartially in the case; and that if he did not do so

with reference to the facts of which the defendant knew the

juror had knowledge, the defendant should not complain.

A party should not be allowed to decline to exercise his per-

emptory challenges in discharging supposed incompetent

jurors, and thereby to keep the question open as to their

incompetency until after it is ascertained that the verdict

is against him, and then allowed him to again raise the

question as to competency. He should be compelled to use

all reasonable means to discharge all objectionable jurors

before the commencement of the trial ; and the failure to do

so must be considered as a waiver of all known objections.

And afterward if the juror should act as it might reason-

ably be supposed he would act under the circumstances, the

party failing to remove him, when he could so easily have

done so if he had so chosen, should not be allowed to com-

plain. In the present case, the incompetency of the juroi'

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

was slight and not very clear, and his misconduct was also

slight, and not necessarily prejudicial to the defendant's

rights, and probably neither his incompetency nor his mis-

conduct had any effect upon the verdict of the jury; but

even if it had, it was partially the fault of the defendant

in not removing him by one of its peremptory challenges.

According to the testimony of the several jurors, nearly all

of them were in favor of assessing the damages at from

$1,100 to $1,200, instead of $1,050, as they finally did ; and

it seems almost certain that if the juror Steele had not said

a word, the verdict would not have been any less than it

was. Such seems to be the testimony of all the jurors, and

their testimony was oral, and in the presence of the trial

court. Hence we cannot say, under all the circumstances,

that the court below committed material error in refusing to

grant the defendant a new trial on the ground of the incom-

petency and misconduct of the juror Steele.

**********

The judgment of the court below will be affirmed.

All the justices concurring.
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juror as he was, and to take the chances of his acting fairly
and impartially in the case; and that if he did not do so
with reference to the facts of which the defendant knew the
juror had knowledge, the defendant should not complain.
A party should not be allowed to decline to exercise his peremptory challenges in discharging supposed incompetent
jurors, and thereby to keep the question open as to their
incompetency until after it is ascertained that the verdict
is against him, and then allowed him to again raise the
question as to competency. He should be compelled to use
all reasonable means to discharge all objectionable juror ~
before the commencement of the trial; and the failure to do
o must be considered as a waiver of all known objections.
And afterward if the juror should act as it might reasonably be supposed he would act under the circumstances, the
party failing to remove him, when he could so easily have
done so if he had so chosen, should not be allowed to complain. In the present case, the incompetency of the juror·
was slight and not very clear, and his misconduct was also
slight, and not necessarily prejudicial to the defendant's
rights, and probably neither his incompetency nor his misconduct had any effect upon the verdict of the jury; but
ev n if it had, it was partially the fault of the defendant
in not removing him by one of its peremptory challenge ·.
According to the testimony of the several jurors, nearly all
of them were in favor of assessing the damages at from
$1,100 to $1,200, instead of $1,050, as they :finally did; and
it em almost certain that if the juror Steele had not said
a word, the verdict would not have been .a ny less than it
wa .
uch seems to be the- testimony of all the jurors, and
th ir te timony wa oral, and in the pre ence of the trial
court. Hence we cannot say, under all the circumstances,
that th ourt below committed material error in refu ing to
rant th def ndant a new trial on the ground of the incom ·
p t ncy and misconduct of the juror Steele.
* * * * * * * * * *
h j gm nt of the court below will be affirmEAf.
All the justices concurring.
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Section 3. Misconduct of Jury or Paety.^

UNDERWOOD V. OLD COLONY STREET RAILWAY

COMPANY.

3.

SECTION

MISCONDUCT OF J

RY OR

p ARTY . 1

Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 1910.

31 Rhode Island, 253,

Johnson, J. * * *

After verdict, the defendant in due time filed a motion for

UNDERWOOD V. OLD COLONY STREET RAILWAY
COMPANY.

a new trial upon the following grounds :

"Sixth. That said defendant did not have a fair trial of

Supreme Coiwt of Rhode Island.

1910.

said cause before a competent and impartial jury, inasmuch

as one member of said jury, namely, Louis Sisson, was re-

31 Rhode Island, 253,

peatedly intoxicated while said trial was in progress and

testimony was being taken therein before said jury, and

was asleep during a part of the time when said trial was in

JOHNSON, J. •

* *

progress and testimony was being taken therein, and was

biased and prejudiced against the defendant, as shown by

remarks made by him to other persons while said cause

was being tried and during adjournments taken bv said
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court, and misconducted himself in other ways, all of which

will be shown by affidavits to be filed in court in support

of this motion, said affidavits when filed to become a part

of this motion by reference.

*** * # * * * * * *j)

After hearing counsel and considering the affidavits, the

trial justice denied the motion so far as it was based on the

verdict being against the evidence and the weight thereof,

and against the law. He also denied it so far as based up-

on the condition and misconduct of the juror Sisson and his

bias and prejudice. * * *

**********

(1) We have, therefore, in this case, a mass of testi-

mony to the effect that, for at least two days, a juror, dur-

ing the progress of the trial was so much under the in-

fluence of liquor that he was asleep a large part of the

time. He so far lost his power of self-control as to be un-

1 As to misconrluct of an attorney ns ground for a new trial, see cases under

"Argument and Conduct of Counsel," s^ipra, Chapter XII.

After verdict, the defendant in due time filed a motion for
a new trial upon the following grounds:

* * * * * * • * * *
"Sixth. That said defendant did not have a fair trial of
aid cause before a competent and impartial jury, ina much
as one member of "'aid jury, namely, Louis Sisson, was repeatedly intoxicated while said trial was in progress and
testimony was being taken therein before said jury and
was asleep during a part of the time when said trial was in
I rogres and te timony wa being taken therein, and wa
biased and prejudiced against the defendant, as shown by
remark made by him to other persons while said cau e
was being tried and during adjournments taken by said
court, and mi conducted himself in other ways, all of which
will be hown by affidavit to be filed in court in upport
of this motion, aid affidavits when filed to become a part
of this motion by reference.
* * * • • • * * * *''
After hearing counsel and con idering the affidavit. the
trial ju tice denied the motion so far a it wa ba ed on the
Y rdict being again t the evidence and th
w i ht th reof
and ao-ain t the law. H al o d ni d it o far a based upon th co dition and mi conduct of the juror i on and hi·
bia and prejudice. * * *
* * * • • • • • • •
(1) W have therefor in tbi ca , a mas of te timony to the ff ct that, for at 1 a t tw day a juror durin the rogr
f th trial wa so much under the influence of liquor that he wa a 1 ep a lar e part of the
time. H o far lo t hi power of elf-control a to be un1 As to mi conduct of an attorney ns ground for a new trial see cases under
''.Argument and qonduct of Coun eJ
S'ltpra, hapter XII.
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able to walk steadily in and out of the jury-box, and by

his foolish and childish actions, while testimony was being

put in, revealed his own inattention and disturbed the jurors

near him. He was boisterous and profane in his language,

and talked freely about the case with strangers during the

court recesses. According to a great number of witnesses,

he was, during the court proceedings, so much intoxicated

that it was impossible for him to understand and weigh in-

telligently the evidence that was introduced in the case.

The authorities are unamimous in recognizing the grave

danger of the use of intoxicating liquor by jurors, and con-

demn in the strongest terms the indulgence in drinking by

jurors while sitting in the trial of a case. Some jurisdic-

tions, especially Iowa and Texas, have held that the mere

fact of drinking spirituous liquors by jurymen during the

trial of a case, without regard to the quantity used or itfe

effect, is sufficient ground for the granting of a new trial.

Ryan v. Harroiv, 27 Iowa, 494; Jones v. The State, 13
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Texas, 168.

The great weight of authority, however, is in favor of the

proposition that, if a juror, during the progress of the trial,

drinks intoxicating liquor to such an extent that he is in-

toxicated or under the influence of liquor so that his facul

ties are affected, while sitting in the case, the verdict should

be set aside. Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 ; Hedican v. Pa.

Fire Ins. Co., 21 Wash. 488; Broivn v. The State, 137 Ind.

240 ; State v. Ned, 105 La. 696 ; State v. Jenkins, 116 No. Car.

972; Davis v. Cook, 9 Nev. 134; 17 Amer. & Eng. Encyc.

Law, p. 1234.

Perry v. Bailey, supra, was a case in which two affidavits

were filed, stating that one of the jurors, during the pro-

gress of the trial, had been under the influence of liquor.

The court held that, although the affidavits were not full

and positive yet it was clear that the juror had drunk so

much as to unfit him for the proper discharge of his duty,

and consequently the verdict should be set aside. In the

opinion. Judge Brewer, said, at page 546:

"We tliink however, the great weight of authority estab-

lishes these propositions: That if a juror during the pro-

gress of the trial drinks intoxicating liquor on the invita-

tion and at the expense of the party who afterwards has the

verdict, or if at his own expense he drinks so much as to
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able to walk steadily in and out of the jury-box, and by
bis foolish and childish action , while testimony was being
put in, revealed bis own inattention and disturbed the juror:::;
near him. He was boisterous and profane in bis language,
and talked freely about the case with strangers during the
court r cesse . According to a great number of witnesses,
he wa , during the court proceedings, so much intoxicated
that it was impossible for him to understand and weigh intellig ntly the evidence that was introduced in the case.
The authorities are unamimous in recognizing the grave
danger of the use of intoxicating liquor by jurors, and condemn in the strongest terms the indulgence in drinking by
juror while sitting in the trial of a case. Some jurisdictions, e pecially Iowa and Texas, have held that the mere
fact of drinking spirituous liquors by jurymen during the
trial of a ca e, without regard to the quantity used or it~
effect, is sufficient ground for the granting of a new trial.
Ryan v . Harrow, 27 Iowa, 494; Jo n es v. The State, 13
Texa , 168.
The great weight of authority, however, is in favor of the
proposition that, if a juror, during the progress of the trial ,
drink intoxicating liquor to such an extent that be is in toxi at d or under the influence of liquor so that bis facul tie ar affected, while sitting in the ca e, the verdict should
be ta id . P erry v . Bail y, 12 Kan. 539; Redican v. Pa.
Fire In . Co., 21 Wa h. 488; Brown v. The State, 137 Ind.
240; tate v. Ned, 105 La. 696; State v. Jenkin , 116 No. Car.
972; Da is v . C oo."l[,, 9 Nev. 134; 17 Amer. & Eng. Encyc.
Law p. 1234.
Perry v . Bailey, upra, wa a cas in which two affidavits
wer :fil d, tating that one of th jurors, during the progr s of tb trial, had b n under the influence of Ii quor.
Tb ourt h ld th t, althouo·h th affidavit were not full
and po. itiv y t it wa l r that th juror had drunk so
mu h a. to unfit him f r th pro r di har 0 • of hi duty,
an r n. <Jn ntly th v r i t l ul b
t a ide. In the
inion, ,Ju 10'
r
r, . id, at aO' 546:
'' W thjnk ho
r, th gr at w i ht of authority tabli . h . th ,.
ro . iti n : That if j r r durino- th progr s. f th tri 1 r1rink. int i atinO' liquor on the invita,
ti
n t th xp ns f th arty wh aft rward ha th
v r i t, r if at hi wn x
h drinks so much as to
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be under the influence of liquor while sitting in the case, the

verdict ought not to stand ; and on the other hand, the mere

drinking of spirituous and intoxicating liquors by a juror

during the progress of a trial is not, in and of itself, suffi-

cient to set aside a verdict (authorities). Aware as all are

of the subtle and potent influence of liquor on the brain, no

judge should for a moment permit a trial to proceed where

it appeared that any juror was under the influence of intox-

icating drink, or permit a verdict to stand which was not

the cool, deliberate judgment of sober men."

Hedican v. Pa. Fire Ins. Co., supra, was a case where,

during the trial at an evening session of the court and dur-

ing the defendant's argument, a juror was intoxicated.

This fact was brought to the attention of the court after

the session was concluded and the court permitted counsel

at the following morning session to make their arguments

without limitation as to time. All the testimony had been

put in before the juror became intoxicated, and this fact

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

was urged against the motion for a new trial. The court

held that a new trial must be granted because of the miscon-

duct of the juror. The court said, at page 490 :

"Parties are entitled to have a cause submitted only to

sober jurors, and the court will not undertake an inquiry in-

to the state or condition of mind of a juryman who has been

intoxicated during the progress of a trial, but will assume

that he was incompetent to determine the cause. Drunk-

enness during the progress of a trial is not only the gravest

breach of a juryman's duty, but it is also a most serious

contempt of the court and the administration of the law.**

In Brouni v. The State, supra, the court granted a new

trial on the ground of intoxication of one of the jurors dur-

ing the trial and at page 241 said :

"It seems to be well settled in this state as well as in

other jurisdictions that drinking intoxicating liquor during

the recess of the court is not such misconduct of the juror

as vitiates the verdict, unless the drinking is to such an ex-

tent as to produce intoxication; but where a juror drinks

to such an extent as to become intoxicated, such conduct ren-

ders the verdict invalid and the court, upon proof of such

misconduct, should set it aside and grant a new trial."

In Davis v. Cook, supra, the court said, at page 147 :

"In vindication of the character of courts and the purity
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le under the influence of liquor while sitting in the case, the
\Terdict ought not to stand; and on the other hand, the mere
drinking of spirituous and intoxicating liquors by a juror
during the progress of a trial is not, in and of itself, sufficient to set aside a verdict ( authoritie ) . Aware as all are
of the subtle and potent influence of liquor on the brain, no
judge should for a moment permit a trial to proceed where
it appeared that any juror was under the influence of intoxicating drink, or permit a verdict to stand which was not
the cool, deliberate judgment of sober men."
Hedican v. Pa. Fire Ins. Co., supra, was a case where,
during the trial at an evening session of the court and during the defendant's argument, a juror was intoxicated.
This fact wa brought to the attention of the court after
the session wa concluded and the court permitted counsel
at the following morning session to make their arguments
without limitation as to time. All the testimony had been
put in before the juror became intoxicated, and this fact
was urged against the mo~ion for a new trial. The court
held that a new trial mu t be granted because of the misconduct of the juror. The court said, at page 490:
"Parties are entitled to have a cause submitted only to
ober jurors, and the court will not undertake an inquiry into the state or condition of mind of a juryman who has been
intoxicated during the progress of a trial, but will assume
that he was incompetent to determine the cau e. Drunkenness during the progre of a trial is not onl the gravest
breach of a juryman' duty, but it i also a mo t serious
contempt of the court and the administration of the law.''
In Brown v. The State, itpra, the court <>'ranted a n w
trial on the ground of intoxication of one of the jurors during the trial and at page 241 said:
"It eems to be well settled in this tate a well a in
other juri diction that drinking intoxicating liquor during
the r e s of th court i not such mi conduct of the juror
a vitiates the v rdict unl s th drinkincr is to such an extent as to produ e intoxication· ut wh re a juror drinks
to su~h an e t nt a to becom intoxicated uch conduct render the verdict invalid and t
court upon proof of such
mi conduct, hould et it a id and rant a new trial.''
In Davis v. Cook upra, the ourt aid at page 147:
"In vindication of the character of courts and the purity
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of jury trials a verdict participated in by a jury-man with

passions inflamed and reason impaired by ardent spirits

should not be allowed to stand. Trial by jury regarded by

our ancestors as the principal bulwark of their liberties and

the glory of the English law, would degenerate into a mock-

ery of justice if verdicts were capriciously determined by

intoxicated jurors. The judgment must be reversed."

In American & Eng. Ency. of Law, supra, the law is

stated to be as follows :

^'If during the progress of the trial or during their de-

liberations on the verdict jurors partake of intoxicating

liquors to such an extent as to affect their ability clearly,

impartially and calmly to consider the evidence the verdict

will be set aside ; and the rule applies, it seems, where such

an inordinate amount is drunk as to make a juror sick^ or

to render it probable that he was incapacitated."

The cause is remanded to the Superior Court for a new

trial.
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CEAIG & COMPANY V. PIERSON LUMBER COM-

PANY.

Supreme Court of Alabama. 1910.

169 Alabama, 548.

DOWDELL, C. J. * * *

The main question in this case arises out of the action

of the trial court in denying the motion for a new trial.

The principal ground of the motion was the alleged im-

[Chap. 17
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of jury trials a verdict participated in by a jury-man with
passions inflamed and reason impaired by ardent spirits
should not be allowed to stand. Trial by jury regarded by
our ancestors as the principal bulwark of their liberties and
the glory of the English law, would degenerate into a mockery of justice if verdicts were capriciously determined by
intoxicated jurors. The judgment must be reversed.''
In American & Eng. Ency. of Law, supra, the law is
stated to be as follows:
''If during the progress of the trial or during their deliberations on the verdict jurors partake of intoxicating
liquors to such an extent as to affect their ability clearly,
impartially and calmly to consider the evidence the verdict
will be set aside; and the rule applies, it seems, where such
an inordinate amount is drunk as to make a juror sick, or
to render it probable that he was incapacitated."
* * * * * * * * * *
The cause is remanded to the Superior Court for a new
trial.

proper conduct of J. 0. Acree, one of the parties to the

suit. It was not denied on the hearing of the motion that

after the evidence in the case was conchided, and the court

had recessed for dinner, before hearing the argument,

Acree invited one of the jurors trying the case to dine with

him at a certain hotel, which invitation was accepted, and

that vXoree paid for the juror's dinner. ''Misconduct or ir-

regularity on the part of the jurors, if not induced by the

CRAIG & COMPANY V. PIERSON LUMBER COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Alabama.

1910.

169 Alabama, 548.
DowDELL,

C. J. * * *
* * * * * * * • • •

Th main question in this case arises out of the action
of the trial court in denying the motion for a new trial.
Th principal ground of the motion was the alleged improp r onduct of .J. 0. Acree, one of the partie to the
·uit. It was not denied on the hearino- of th motion that
ft r the vi nee in the case was con luded and the court
had r
f r dinner, b fore h arinO' th argum nt.
o th juror trying th ca, t dine with
hi
r r jn h t I whi h invitation wa, ac pt d, and
ha l\ rr pai r r th juror'. dinn r. "Mi ondnct or i rr gul rity n th part of the jur rs, if not induced by th&
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prevailing party, will not ordinarily be ground for setting

aside the verdict, unless it was calculated to prejudice the

unsuccessful party. When, however, the misconduct is due

directly to an improper act by the prevailing party, the

verdict will be set aside without reference to the question of

resulting injury." — 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.)

p. 1204. "It is the general rule that a new trial will be

granted if jurors .ire entertained during the trial by the

party in whose favor a verdict is rendered. So it has been

held ground for a new trial that the prevailing party fur-

nished jurors with cigars or intoxicating liquors." — Id. p.

1235.

Aside from protecting the rights of parties, in the fair

and impartial administration of justice, respect for the

courts calls for their condemnation of any improper con-

duct, however slight, on the part of a juror, of a party, or of

any other person, calculated to influence the jury in return-

ing a verdict. So delicate are the balances in weighing jus-
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tice that what might seem trivial under some circumstances

would turn the scales to its perversion. Not only the evil,

in such cases, but the appearances of evil, if possible, should

be avoided.

The learned judge who tried the case below, in overruling

the motion for a new trial, evidently proceeded on the theory

that the defendants waived their right of objection in fail-

ing to bring the matter to the attention of the court at their

first opportunity after knowledge acquired by them or their

attorney of the alleged misconduct of the said Acree. Here

the knowledge was acquired during the recess period of the

court for dinner or lunch, and on the reconvening of the

court, without objection made, the argument of the case

proceeded, and the charge of the court to the jury was giv-

en, and the jury permitted to retire to make a verdict, and

not until a motion for a new trial was the alleged miscon-

duct made known to the court.

The general rule is that, in the impaneling of a jury, mat-

ter going to the disqualification of a juror, if within the

knowledge of a party or his attorney, should be taken on

objection at the time the juror is put upon him for accept-

ance or rejection; and a failure to so object is accounted a

waiver on his part of the objection. But this rule does not

and should not apply in case of misconduct on the part of
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prevailing party, will not ordinarily be ground for setting
aside the verdict, unless it was calculated to prejudice the
unsuccessful party. When, however, the mi conduct is due
directly to an improper act by the prevailing party, the
verdict will be set aside without reference to the question of
re ulting injury. ''-17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.)
p. 1204. ''It is the general rule that a new trial will be
granted if jurors :ire entertained during the trial by the
party in who e favor a verdict i r endered. So it has been
held ground for a new trial that the prevailing party furni bed jurors with cigars or intoxicating liquors. "-Id. p.
1235.
A ide from protecting the rights of parties, in the fair
and impartial admini tration of ju tice, respect for the
courts calls for their condemnation of any improper conduct, however slight, on the part of a juror, of a party, or of
any other per on, cal ulated to influence the jury in returning a verdict. So delicate are the balances in weighing ju .. _
tice that what might seem trivial under some circumstances
would turn the scales to its perversion. Not only the evil,
in uch case , but the appearances of evil, if possible, should
be avoided.
The learned judge who tried the case below, in overruling
the motion for a new trial, evidently proceeded on the theory
that the defendant waived their right of objection in failing to bring the matter to the attention of the court at their
fir t opportunity after knowledge acquired by them or their
attorney of the alleged misconduct of the said Acree. H ere
the knowledge wa acquired during the rece period of the
court for dinner or lunch and on the recon ening of the
court, without objection made, the argument of the case
proc eded and the charge of the court to the jury was given and the jury permitted to retire to make a verdict, and
not until a motion for a new trial wa the alleged miscondu t made known to the court.
Th O' neral rule i that in the impaneling of a jury, matter oinO' to the di qualification of a juror if within th
knowl do-e of a party or his attorne , hould be taken on
obj tion at the tim th juror i ut upon him for acceptan e or rej tion · ~md a failure to o obje t i accounted a
waiv r on hi part of the objection. But thi rule does not
and should not apply in case of misconduct on the :Rart of
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a juror, arising after his acceptance as such and a trial

entered upon. In the present case the alleged misconduct

was that of a part}^, and the remedy of the injured party

was by a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial.

It is true he might have brought the matter to the attention

of the court before proceeding further with the trial, but his

failure to do so ought not to deprive him of his remedy on

a motion for a new trial. It does not lie in the mouth of

the party guilty of the misconduct to object on the ground

of speculating on the verdict of the jury, since his own mis-

conduct produced the conditions. To require a party to

make his objection pending the trial might still further pre-

judice him, especially if it should happen that he was mis-

taken in making the charge, though ever so honest.

We are of opinion that the motion for a new trial should

have been granted, and that the court erred in refusing it.

For the errer of overruling the motion for a new trial,

the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
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Reversed a/nd remanded.

Anderson, Sayre, and Evans, JJ., concur.

BAKER V. BROWN.

Supreme Court of North Carolina. 1909,

151 North Carolina, 12.

#**

Walker, J. —

The defendant moved to set aside the verdict because the*

plaintiff had talked to one of the jurors. This was not

])roper conduct on the part of the plaintiff, when unexplain-

ed, i)ut the evidence shows that it was inadvertent and that
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a juror, arising after his acceptance as such and a trial
ntered upon. In the present case the alleged misconduct
wa that of a party, and the remedy of the injured party
was by a motion to set a ide the verdict and for a new trial.
It is true he might have brought the matter to the attention
of the court before proceeding further with the trial, but his
failure to do so ought not to deprive him of his remedy on
a motion for a new trial. It does not lie in the mouth of
the party guilty of the misconduct to object on the ground
of speculating on the verdict of the jury, since his own misTo require a party to
conduct produced the conditions.
.make his objection pending the trial might still further pre-·
judice him,. especially if it should happen that he was mistaken in making the charge, though ever so honest.
vVe are of opinion that the motion for a new trial should
have been granted, and that the court erred in refusing it.
* * * * * * * * * *
For the errer of overruling the motion for a new trial,
the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed a;nd remanded.
ANDERSON, SAYRE, and EvANS, JJ., concur.

what he said did not even remotely relate to the case tried

by the jury of which he was a member, and was utterly

harmless. It had no influence whatever upon the jury or

the juror with whom the plaintiff talked, and the Court so

finds the facts to be. As was said by Judge Pearson, in

Slate V. Tilghman, 33 N. C, at p. 552, ''Perhaps it would

BAI{ER V. BROWN.
'Supreme Coiwt of North Carolina.

1909.

151 North Carolina, 12.
WALKER,

J.- "" * *
* * * * * * * * • •

The d f ndant mov d to t a ide the verdict because thr
plaintiff had talk d to one of th jurors. Thi was n0t
J ro r on u t on th part of th plaintiff, wh n unexplaiL.1 lrnt tl
vi nc how, th at it was inadv rt nt and that
what h
i
id not v r mot ly r late to the case trie.l
hy th j ry of whi h h wa a m mber, and was utterly
11, r l , . It had n influ n
hatever upon th jury or
tl1 jur r with whom th
1 intiff talk d and th
ourt so
find . h fa t . t
.
wa aid by Judo- P ar n, in
/:.)f ul " v. Tilghman, 33 N. C., at p. 552, "P rhaps it would
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have been well had his Honor, in his discretion, set aside

the verdict and given a new trial as a rebuke to the jury

and an assertion of the principle that trials must not only

be fair, hut above suspicion. This, however, was a matter

of discretion, which we have no right to reverse. Our in-

quiry is, was the misconduct and irregularity such as to

vitiate the verdict, to make it in law null and void and no

verdict?" That case is an authority for the position that,

under the facts of this case, the motion for a new trial was

addressed to the sound discretion of the court. "When the

circumstances are such as merely to put suspicion on the

verdict by showing, not that there ivas, but that there might

have been undue influence brought to bear upon the jury,

because there was opportunity and a chance for it, it is a

matter within the discretion of the presiding judge; but if

the fact be that undue influence was brought to bear upon

the jury, as if they were fed at the charge of the prosecutor

or prisoner, then it would be otherwise." State v. Brit
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tain, 89 N. C. 483. See, also, State v. Harper, 101 N. C.

r61; State v. Morris, 84 N. C. 757; State v. Tilghman, su-

pra; State V. Gould, 90 N. C. 658; State v. Barber, 89 N. C.

523. In Moore v. Edmiston, 70 N. C. at p. 481, Justice By-

num, for the Court, thus formulates the rule: ''The line of

distinction is that to vitiate and avoid a verdict it must ap-

pear upon the record that undue influence was brought to

bear on the jury. All other circumstances of suspicion ad-

dress themselves exclusively to the discretion of the presid-

ing judge in granting or refusing a new trial. He is clothed

with this power because of his learning and integrity and of

the superior knowledge which his presence at and participa-

tion in the trial gives him over any other forum. However

great and responsible this power, the law intends that the

judge will exercise it to further the ends of justice; and

though doubtless it is occasionally abused, it would be diffi-

cult to fix upon a safer tribunal for the exercise of this dis-

cretionary power, which must be lodged somewhere." It

does not appear in this case that the jury were influenced in

the slightest degree, in deciding upon their verdict, by what

the plaintiff said to one of the jurors. On the contrary, it

appears that they were not and could not have been so in-

fluenced.
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have been well had his Honor, in his discretion, set aside
the verdict and giYen a new trial a a rebuke to the jury
and an assertion of the principle that trials mu t not only
be fair, but above suspicion. Thi , howe er, was a matter
of discretion, which we have no right to rever e. Our inquiry is, was the misconduct and irregularity such as to
Yitiate the verdict, to make it in law null and void and no
1;erdict?" That ca e is an authority for the position that,
under the fact of thi ca e, the motion for a new trial wa
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. ''When the
circumstances are uch as merely to put suspicion on the
verdict by showing, not that there was, but that there might
have been undue influence brought to bear upon the jury,
because there was opportunity and a chance for it, it is a
matter within the di cretion of the presiding judge ; but if
the fact be that undue influence was brought to bear upon
the jury, as if they were fed at the charge of the prosecutor
or prisoner, then it woul be otherwise.'' State v . Brit
fain, 89 N. C. 483. See, also, State v. Harp er, 101 N. C.
761; State v. Morris, 84 N. C. 757; State v. T ilghman, supra; State v . Goitld, 90 N. C. 65.S; State v. Barber, 89 N. C.
523. In JJt[ oore v . E d11iiston, 70 N. C. at p. 481, Justice Bynum, for the Court, thus formulates the rule: ''The line of
distinction is that to vitiate and avoid a verdict it must appear upon the record that undue influence was broucrht to
bear on the jury. All other circumstances of suspicion addre them elves exclu ively to the di cretion of the presiding judO'e in granting or refu ing a new trial. He i clothed
with thi power becau e of his learning and integrity and of
the superior knowledge which his presence at and participation in the trial gives him over any other forum. However
O'reat and r e pon ible thi power, the law intends that the
judge will exerci it to further the ends of ju tice ; and
though doubtle s it is occasionally abu ed, it would be diffi ·
cult to fix upon a safer tri unal for the xerci e of thi di retionar. pow r which mu t be lodged somewhere." It
does not appear in thi ca that the jury were influenced in
the lio-hte t d ree in d ci inO' u on their verdict b. what
the plaintiff aid to o of th juror . On the contrary it
appear that they w re not and could not have been so influenced.

• • • • • • • • • •
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Upon a review of the whole case, we find no error in the

rulings and judgment of the court.

No error.
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Upon a review of the whole case, we find no error in
rulings and judgment of the court.
No error.

th~

FLESHER V. HALE.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 1883.

22 West Virginia, 44.

This is a writ of error to an order, made by the circuit

court of Lewis county, March 16, 1882, setting aside the ver-

dict of the jury and granting a new trial in an action of

FLESHER V. HALE.

assumpsit brought by the plaintiff in error in the county

court of said county, February 29, 1879, against the defend-

ant in error for one thousand six hundred and forty-seven

dollars and eighty-four cents, and transferred by operation

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

1883.

of law to said circuit court before trial. The defendant

22 West Virginia, 44.

pleaded non assumpsit and filed specifications of set-off, and

the verdict was for two hundred and seventy-one dollars

and twenty-seven cents in favor of the plaintiff. After the

rendition of the verdict the defendant moved the court to
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set the same aside, which motion the court sustained and the

plaintiff excepted and tendered his bill of exceptions, which

shows that the defendant in support of his motion read

three several affidavits in which the affiants state, that Al-

len Snow, one of the jurors who tried the case, was intoxi-

cated and drunk to such a degree that most of the time dur-

ing the argument he was asleep and incapable of rendering

a decision or determining the case in the manner and way

of a sober juror.

Snyder, Judhe:

The court having set aside the verdict and granted a new

trial upon the facts before stated, the single question pre-

sented to this Court is, did the court in so doing err? Our

statute provides that:

'*No irregularity in any writ of venire facias, or in the

drawing, summoning, or impaneling of jurors, shall be suffi-

cient to set aside a verdict, unless the party making the ob-

This is a writ of error to an order, made by the circuit
court of Lewis county, March 16, 1882, setting aside the verdict of the jury and granting a new trial in an action of
a surnpsit brought by the plaintiff in error in the county
court of said county, February 29, 1879, against the defendant in error for one thousand six hundred and forty-seven
dollars and eighty-four cents, and transferred by operation
of law to said circuit court before trial.
The defendant
pleaded non assumpsit and filed specifications of set-off, and
the verdict was for two hundred and seventy-one dollars
and twenty-seven cents in favor of the plaintiff. After the
rendition of the verdict the defendant moved the court to
set the same aside, which motion the court sustained and the
plaintiff excepted and tendered his bill of exceptions, which
shows that the defendant in support of his motion read
three several affidavits in which the affiants state, that Allen Snow, one of the juror who tried the ca e, was intoxicated and drunk to such a qeO'ree that most of the time during th argument he was a 1 p and incapable of renderinO'
a d Lion or det rmining the case in the manner and way
. of a sober juror.
* * * * * * # * * •
SNYDER, JUDGE:

Th ourt having t asi l th v rdict and ranted a new
trial upon th fa t. h f r stat
the inO'l question pre,· nt d t tJ1i. ourt i , did the court in so doing err1 Our
statut provid that:
"
irr O'ularity in any writ of venire facia s, or in the
rawing, ummoning, or im an linO' of juror , hall be sufficient to set aside a verdict, unl s the party making the ob-
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jection was injured by the irregularity, or unless the ob-

jection was made before the swearing of the jury." Acts

1882, sec. 19, chap. 83, p. 190.

Applying the spirit of said statute and, perhaps, extend-

ing the rule and policy of it, the courts Virginia and of this

State have repeatedly held, and it is now the settled law

of this State, in both criminal and civil trials, that the ver-

dict of the jury will not be set aside for objections to

jurors, on grounds which existed before they were sworn,

unless it is made to appear that by reason of the existence

of such grounds the party objecting has suffered wrong or

injustice. Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 228, and cases

there cited. In this class of cases the objections to the

jurors were of such character that, if made before the jury

was sworn, they would have been sustained and the jurors

objected to held to be disqualified; but notwithstanding this

and the fact that the parties, were ignorant of any grounds

of disqualification until after the verdict, the court refused
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to set aside the verdict, because it did not appear that said

grounds had operated so as to inflict injustice.

The rule is, however, different in cases where the disquali-

fication arises from the misconduct of the jurors after they

have been sworn. While it requires clear and satisfactory

proof to establish misconduct in a member of the jury after

he has been sworn, because the presumption of right acting

which obtains with reference to the conduct of every per-

son acting in an official position unless the contrary is

shown, applies in full force with reference to the conduct

of sworn jurors, yet when misconduct is established of such

a nature that prejudice might have resulted from it, a pre-

sumption of prejudice arises from it, which unless rebutted

by the successful party will vitiate the verdict and require

a new trial. Woods v. State, 43 Miss. 364-72 ; State v. Car-

tiirigU, 20 W. Va. 32; State v. Robinson, Id. 713.

''Where facts are established which show that improper

influences were brought to bear upon the jury, or that they

were guilty of improper conduct, such as might have result-

ed prejudicially to the losing party, a presumption arises

against the purity of their verdict ; and unless there is testi-

mony which shows that their verdict was not affected by

such influences or conduct, it will be set aside; and the bur-

den of producing such testimony is upon the party claiming

jec.tion was injured by the irregularity, or unles the objection was made before the swearing of the jury.'' Acts
1882, sec. 19, chap. 83, p. 190.
Applying the pirit of said statute and, perhap , ext nding the rule and policy of it, the courts Virginia and of thi.
State have repeatedly held, and it is now the settled law
of this State, in both criminal and civil trials, that the verdict of the jury will not be set aside for objection t
jurors, on grounds which existed before they were sworn,
unless it is made to appear that by reason of the exi tence
of such grounds the party objecting has suffered wrong or
injustice. Sweeney v . Baker, 13 W. Va. 228, and case
there cited. In this class of ca es the objections to the
jurors were of such character that, if made before the jury
was sworn, they would have been sustained and the juror~
objected to held to be disqualified; but notwith tanding thi
and the fact that the parties, were ignorant of any grounds
of di qualification until after the verdict, the court refused
to et aside the verdict, because it did not appear that said
grounds had operated so as to inflict injustice.
The rule is, however, different in cases where the disqualification arise from the misconduct of the jurors after they
have been worn. While it require clear and sati factory
proof to e tabli h misconduct in a member of the jury after
he has been worn, because the pre umption of right actinff
which obtains with reference to the conduct of every peron acting in an official po ition unless the contrary i.
shown, applie in full force with reference to the conduct
of worn juror , yet when mi conduct is e tabli hed of such
a nature that pr judice might have resulted from it, a preumption of prejudice ari es from it, which unle s rebutted
by the sue essful party will vitiate the verdict and requir
a new trial. Wood v. State, 43 Mi s. 364-72; State v. Cart'l.u·ight 20 W. Va. 2; State v . Robinson Id. nl ..
"Where facts are establi hed whi h how that improper
influ nc s wer brought to bear upon the jury or that th >.
were uilty of im1 ro r condu t uch a miO'ht ha re ulted r judi ially to the 1 inO' party a r umption ari e
again t the purity 0f their verdi t · and unle there i te timon-\ whi h bow that th ir Y rdi t wa not aff t d hY
uch influence or conduct it will be t aside; and the bu~ 
den of producing such testimony is upon the party claiming
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the right to keep the vardict. The rule is one of public

policy. In order to preserve public confidence in the ad-

ministration of justice, it is not only necessary that judicial

trials should be conducted with reasonable regularity, but

that verdicts should be free from the taint of suspicion of

improper conduct or influences." — Thomp. & Mer. on

Juries, §439; Phillip's Case, 19 Gratt. 485; Com. v. Bohy,

12 Pick. 496; Thompson v. State, 26 Ark. 323.

While these are the general rules established by the

courts in regard to verdicts where the disqualification or

misconduct of the jurors was unknown to the parties until

after verdict, there is another rule which limits these rules

and applies to all classes of cases, whether the disqualifica-

tion of the jurors existed before being sworn or arose out

of misconduct during the trial. All the authorities agree

that, where a new trial is asked on account of irregularity

or misconduct of the jury, it must appear that the party

so asking called the attention of the court to it at the time
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it was first discovered or as soon thereafter as the course

of the proceedings would permit, and if he fail or neglect

to do so, he will be held to have consented to have vvaived

all objections to such irregularity or misconduct, and, un-

less it be a matter which could not have been waived, or

which could not have been remedied or obviated, if attention

had been called to it at the time it was first discovered,

he will be estopped from urging it as a ground for a new

trial. — Diliuorth's Case, 12 Gratt. 689; Coleman v. Moody,

4 H. & M. 1 ; Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23 ; Fox v. Hazel-

ton, 10 Pick. 275; Oleson v. Mender, 40 Iowa, 662; Tjee v.

McLeod, 15 Nev. 158; State v. Tidier, 34 Conn. 280; Dolloff

V. Stimpson, 33 Me. 546; Martin v. Tidwell, 36 Gn. 332;

Parks V. State, 4 Ohio St. 234 ; State v. Daniels, 44 N. H. 383.

The knowledge of the attorney in such case is the knowl-

edge of his client. — Russell v. Quinn, 114 Mass. 103; Fessen-

den V. Sayer, 53 Me. 531 ; Parker v. State, 55 Miss. 414 ;

Cox V. People, 80 N. Y. 500.

This rule proceeds upon the ground that a party ought

not to be permitted, after discovering an act of misconduct

which would entitle him to claim a new trial, to remain si-

lent and take his chances of a favorable verdict, and after-

wards, if the verdict is against him, liring it forward as a

ground for a new trial. A party cannot be permitted to
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the right to keep the verdict. The rule is one of public
policy. In order to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice, it is not only necessary that judicial
trials should be conducted with reasonable regularity, but
that verdicts should be free from the taint of suspicion of
improper conduct or influences.' '-Thomp. & Mer. on
Juries, ~ 439; Phillip's Case, 19 Gratt. 485; Com. v. Roby,
12 Pick. 496; Thomp on v. Sta.te, 26 Ark. 323.
While these are the general rules established by the
courts in regard to verdicts where the disqualification or
misconduct of the jurors was unknown to the parties until
a.fter verdict, there is another rule which limits these rules
and applies to all classes of cases, whether the disqualification of the jurors existed before being sworn or arose out
of misconduct during the trial. All the authorities agree
that, where a new trial is asked on account of irregularit:y
or misconduct of the jury, it must appear that the party
o asking called the attention of the court to it at the time
it wa first discovered or as soon thereafter as the course
of the proceedings would permit, and if he fail or neglect
to do so, he will be held to have consented to have waived
all objections to such irregularity or misconduct, and, unless it be a matter which could not have been waived, or
which could not have been remedied or obviated, if attention
had been called to it at the time it was first discovered,
he will be estopped from urging it as a ground for a new
trial.-Dilworth's Case, 12 Gratt. 689; Coleman v. Moody.
4 I . & M. 1; Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23; Fox v. Hazelton, 10 Pick. 275; Oleson v. M Pad er, 40 Iowa, 662; Dee 'l.
McLeod, 15 Nev. 158; State v. Tull er, 34 Conn. 280; Dolloff
v . Stimpson, 3. M . 546; Martin v . Tidwell, 36 Ga. 332;
Parks v . State, 4 Ohio St. 234; State v. Daniels, 44 N. H. 383.
The knowl dge of the attorney in such case is the knowld of hi li nt.-Russell v . Quinn, 114 Mass. 103; Fessenden v. Sayer, 53 M . 531 · Parker v. State, 55 Mis .... 414;
Co v . P ople, 80 N. Y. 500.
hi ru1 pr e d upon th O'round that a party ought
n t t b l rmitt d, after di overing an act of misconduct
whi h woul 1 ntit] him to laim a new trial, to remain si1 nt and tak hi, 11 n . f a favor bl v rdi t, and afterw rds, if th v rdirt is again. t him, brinO' it forward as a
gr un for a n w trial. A arty cannot be p rmitted to
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lie by, after having knowledge of a defect of this charac-

ter, and speculate upon the result, and complain only when

the verdict becomes unsatisfactory to him. — Selleck v.

Sugar H. T. Co., 13 Conn. 453; Orrok v. Com. his. Co., 21

Pick. 456; Rex v. Sutton, 8 Barn. & Cres. 417.

It follows, therefore, that when a party moves for a new

trial on the ground of misconduct on the part of the jury,

which took place during the trial, he must aver in his mo-

tion and show affirmatively that both he and his counsel

were ignorant, until after the jury had retired, of the fact

of such misconduct. Thomp. & Mer. on Juries, § 428 and

cases cited ; Id. § 456.

In the case at bar, the counsel certainly, and, we may

presume from his being present at the trial, the defendant

also had notice of the misconduct of the juror, Snow, at the

time it occurred. In fact, ''it was mutually agreed that tht?

case might be tried and determined by the remaining eleven

jurors." This agreement was made in the presence of the
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judge of the court by the counsel both of the plaintiff and

defendant. After this agreement was made, no motion or

effort was made to remove the said Snow from the jury

box. He was not even requested to retire, and, probably,

he had no knowledge of the agreement, and so he contin-

ued on the jury. Afterwards when, during the subsequent

])rogress of the trial, the court called attention to the fact

tliat said Snow was still on the jury, the counsel for the

plaintiff and defendant ''agreed that it was immaterial what

l)ecame of said Snow," and he was, no doubt, in conse-

quence of said agreement allowed to remain on the jury un-

til after the verdict. Certainly by this conduct the defend-

-nt consented to have the said Snow remain on tlie jury

after he knew of his misconduct, and, under the rule of law

before stated, he thereby waived all right to object to the

verdict on that ground and estopped himself from relying

on said misconduct as a ground for a new trial, unless his

situation and rights were such at the time he made the dis-

covery, that the objection could not have been obviated, or

that ills right, was such that no waiver or consent could

conclude him.

If he had made the objection and insisted on it, the court

could, under our statute, have had another juror sworn in

his place. Code, ch. 159, <^ 7. Or by consent the cause
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lie by, after having knowledge of a d feet f this character, and peculate upon the r sult, and omplain only when
the v r ict l;>ecomes unsatisfactory to him.-Selleck v.
Sugar H. T. Co., 13 Conn. 453; Orrok v . Com. Ins. Co., 21
Pick. 456; R ex v. Sutton, 8 Barn. & Cres. 417.
It follows, therefore, that when a party moves for a new
trial on the ground of misconduct on the part of the jury,
which took place during the trial, he must aver in his motion and show affirmatively that both he and his counsel
were ignorant, until after the jury had retired, of the fact
of such misconduct. Thomp. & Mer. on Juries, § 428 and
cases cited; Id. § 456.
In the case at bar, the counsel certainly, and, we may
presume from his being present at the trial, the defendant
also had notice of the mi conduct of the juror, Snow, at the
time it occurred. In fact, "it was mutually agreed that th cl
ca e might be tried and determined by _the remaining eleven
jurors.'' This agreement was made in the presence of the
judge of the court by the counsel both of the plaintiff and
defendant. After this agreement was made, no motion or
effort was made to remoYe the said Snow from the jury
box. He was not even requested to retire, and, probably~
he bad no knowledge of the agreement, and so he contin
ued on the jury. ...Vterwards when, during the subsequent
progress of the trial, the court called attention to the fact
that said Snow was still on the jury, the counsel for the
plaintiff and defendant'' agreed that it was immaterial what.
be ame of said Snow," and he was, no doubt, in conse quence of said agreement allowed to remain on the jury until after the verdict. Certainly by this conduct the def end:.nt consented to have the said Snow remain on the jury
aft r he knew of hi. miRc n luct, and under the rule of law
h fore stated, he thereby waived all right to object to the
,·erdict on that ground and e to1 ped him ·elf from relyinu·
on said misconduct as a ground for a new trial, uhles hi'
. ituation and right were such at the time he made the di rov r. , that the obj ction ould not have been obviated, or
that hi right, was such that no waiver or consent could
ron lude him.
If he had made the objection and in isted on it, the court
r uld under our statut , ha ha a other juror worn in
hi place. Code, ch. 159, § 7. Or by consent the cause
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might have been tried by the court, or by the remaining

jurors or seven of them. Code, ch. 116, § 29; Dilworth's

Case, 12 Gratt. 708; Tooel's Case, 11 Leigh. 714; State v.

Van Matre, 49 Mo. 268.

The objection, therefore, if it had been made could have

been obviated at the time, and that the rights of the defend-

ant were such that he could waive them is equally clear.

This is a civil action and in such cases any consent of the

parties is binding. They relate to and affect only individ-

ual rights which are entirely within their personal con-

trol, and which they may part with at their pleasure. The

design of such actions is the enforcement of merely pri-

vate obligations and duties. Any departure from legal

rules in the conduct of such actions with the consent of the

litigants is, therefore, a voluntary relinquishment of what

belongs to them exclusively. — Thomp. & Mer. on Juries, §

8; Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; Durham v. Hudson, 4

Ind. 501; Comonwealth v. Dailey, 12 Cush. 80; Sarah v.
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State, 28 Ga. 576.

Upon the foregoing authorities as well as upon justice

and reason it is plain, that the defendant could have waived

as in fact he did waive the irregularity arising from the

misconduct of the said juror. Snow, and his conduct and ac-

quiescence after he was apprised of the misconduct of said

juror, in permitting him to remain on the jury, must be re-

garded as a consent that he should so remain notwithstand-

ing such misconduct; and, consequently, it would be unjust

to permit the defendant, after having taken his chance of

a favorable verdict, to take an advantage of an irregulari-

ty, which he had waived and consented to, for the purpose

of avoiding an unfavorable verdict.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the said order of the

circuit court setting aside the verdict of the jury and grant-

ing a new trial is erroneous and must be reversed with costs

to the plaintiff in error; and this Court proceeding to enter

such judgment as the said court ought to have entered, it

is considered that the defendant 's motion to set aside

the verdict be overruled and that the plaintiff recover from

the defendant the sum of two hundred and seventy-one

dollars and twenty-seven cents, the amount of the verdict

of the jur}^, with interest thereon from the 16th day of

March, 1882, till paid and his costs in the prosecution of his
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might have been tried by the court, or by the remaining
jurors or seven of them. Code, ch. 116, § 29; Dilworth's
Case, 12 Gratt. 708; Tooel's Case, 11 Leig4. 714; State v.
Van Matre, 49 Mo. 268.
The objection, therefore, if it had been made could have
been obviated at the time, and that the rights of the defendant were such that he could waive them is equally clear.
This is a civil action and in such cases any consent of the
parties is binding. They relate to and affect only individual rights which are entirely within their personal control, and which they may part with at their pleasure. The
design of such actions is the enforcement of merely private obligations and duties. Any departure from legal
rules in the conduct of such actions with the consent of the
litigants is, therefore, a voluntary relinquishment of what
belongs to them exclusively.-Thomp. & Mer. on Juries, ~
8; Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; Durham v. Hudson, 4
Ind. 501; Comonwealth v. Dailey, 12 Cush. 80; Sarah v.
State, 28 Ga. 576.
Upon the foregoing authorities as well as upon justice
and reason it is plain, that the defendant could have waived
as in fact he did waive the irregularity arising from the
misconduct of the said juror, Snow, and his conduct and acquiescence after he was apprised of the misconduct of said
juror, in permitting him to remain on the jury, must be regarded as a consent that he should so remain notwithstanding such mi conduct; and, consequently, it would be unjust
to permit the defendant, after having taken bis chance of
a favorable verdict, to take an advantage of an irregularity, which he had waived and consented to, for the purpose
of avoidi
an unfavorable verdict.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the said order of the
·ircuit ourt etting aside the verdict of the jury and granting a new trial j erron ou and mu t be reversed with costs
to th plaintiff i rror; and this Court proc din to enter
su h ju gm nt as the aid court ou()"ht to have entered, it
i
n id r d tl at th d £endant' motion to set aside
tb
rdi t
v rruled and that the plaintiff recover from
tb d f nd nt the sum of two hundred and seventy-one
d 11 r . and tw nty- v n cents, the am.o unt of the verdict
f tb jury, with int re t thereon from the 16th day of
Mar , 1882, till paid and his costs in the prosecution of hi-3
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action in said circuit court expended, which is ordered to

be certified to said court.

The other Judges concurred.

Judgment reversed.

CORLEY V. NEW YORK & HARLEM RAILROAD
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action in said circuit court expended, which is ordered to
be certified to said court.
The other Judges concurred.
Judgment reversed.

COMPANY.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York.

1896.

12 Appellate Division, 409.

Baeeett, J. (concurring) * * *

The affidavits conclusively establish that, when the plain-

tiff was called to the witness stand during the examination

of Dr. Kellogg, he made use of crutches and was lifted and

helped along by his father, and that he returned to his seat

CORLEY V. NEW YORK & HARLEM RAILROAD
COMPANY.

in the same manner; but that, nevertheless, for two weeks

and over before the trial the boy had entirely discarded

.Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New Yark.

his crutches in the house where he lived, and had done so

1896.

with his mother's consent. The affidavits stating that he
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had abandoned the use of crutches indoors before the trial

12 .Appellate Division, 409.

are numerous and uncontradicted. His mother, herself, de-

poses that she ''did request and instruct her son Martin

to use crutches at all times within the house and when he

went without the house, for the first three or four tueeks

after his return from the hospital; and that during the

subsequent intervening weeks prior to the trial your de-

ponent requested and instructed her son Martin to use

crutches when he ivalked without the house, upon the street,

and elsewhere." It will be observed that Mrs. Corley here

pointedly omitted to state that after the first three or four

weeks following his return from the hospital she gave her

son any instructions to use crutches in the house. It is

overwhelmingly established that, during the latter period,

he never used them in the house and frequently omitted

their use out of doors. Indeed, he played and ran about

in the streets quite the same as other boys. Tlie use of

crutches in the court room was, therefore, wholly unneces-

T. p.— 42

J. (concurring) • • *
The affidavits conclusively establish that, when the plain-·
tiff was called to the witness stand during the examination
of Dr. Kellogg, he made use of crutches and was lifted and
helped along by his father, and that he returned to his seat
in the same manner; but that, nevertheless, for two weeks
and over before the trial the boy had entirely discarde
his crutches in the house where he lived, and had done 30
with his mother's consent. The affidavits tating that he
bad abandoned the use of crutches indoor before the trial
are numerous and uncontradicted. His mother, herself, d poses that she ''did request and instruct her son 1\{artin
to u e crutches at all times within the house and when he
went without the house, for the fir t three or four weeks
after his return from the hospital; and that during the
ub quent intervening week prior to the trial your d pon nt requested and instructed her on Martin to u e
crut bes when he walked withoi~t the hou , 'upon the treet,
and elsewhere." It will be observed that 1\:f r . orley her
oint dly omitted to state that aft r th :fir t three or four
w k following his return from the ho pital he o-ave her
on a y i structions to use crutch s in the hoit e. It i:-;
o rwhelmin -I T e tabli h d that durino- th latter period
h n v r u
th m in the hon e and fr qu ntly omitt
h ir u out of door . Inde d, h
lay d and ran about
in th tr et. quite the ame a oth r boy . Th use of
-rut h in th ourt room was th refore wholly unnece"'BARRETT,

T. P.-4 ....
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sary. The boy had nothing to fear from the people in the

court room nor from the narrowness of the aisle to be tra-

versed on his way to and from the witness stand. But^ if

he had anything to fear from these surroundings, the dan-

ger could only have been enhanced by the use of cratches.

The reason which is given for their use seems quite shallow.

It is, in truth, but a transparent pretense. There could

have been but one purpose, and that was to hoodwink the

jury — to deceive them as to the boy's sufferings and to ap-

peal to their sensibilities. It was bad enough to present

to the jury the false picture of a suffering boy upon crut-

ches. But that was not all. He was lifted up, helped upon

his crutches, supported while thereon and assisted, as he

proceeded, apparently with great difficulty, to and from the

witness stand. This was a gross, and I regret to say, a de-

liberate deception. For, it appears, by uncontradicted

testimony, that immediately after the trial the boy was se-

cluded and rigidly kept within doors. His parents were
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evidently determined that the spectacle presented in the

court room should not be publicly followed by too marked

and dangerous a contrast. And yet, while he was thus

withdrawn from general observation, he was permitted,

without crutch or assistance, to play upon the roof of the

house and actually to climb upon the rear fire escape.

It is a mistake to suppose that a new trial can only be

granted when a case therefor can be classified under some

well-defined head such as surprise or newly-discovered evi-

dence. The court is not thus limited. The true rule is well

stated in Graham and Waterman on New Trials, 1009, as

follows: *'It need scarcely be said that any unconscionable

advantage obtained during a trial by one party over the

other, through fraud or artifice, to the injury of the latter,

will be good ground for a new trial. So obvious a principle

of common right and justice requires no comment and needs

no illustration." I (|uite agree that verdicts should not

sary. The boy had nothing to fear from the people in the
court room nor from the narrowness of the aisle to be traversed on his way to and from the witness stand. But, if
he had anything to fear from these surroundings, the danger could only have been enhanced by the use of crutches.
The reason which is given for their use seems quite shallow.
It is, in truth, but a transparent pretense. There could
have been but one purpose, and that was to hoodwink the
jury-to deceive them as to the boy's sufferings and to appeal to their sensibilities. It was bad enough to present
to the jury the false picture of a suffering boy upon crutches. But that was not all. He was lifted up, helped upon
his crutches, supported while thereon and assisted, as he
proceeded, apparently with great difficulty, to and from the
witness stand. This was a gross, and I regret to say, a deliberate deception. For, it appears, by uncontradicted
testimony, that immediately after the trial the boy was secluded and rigidly kept within doors. His parents were
evidently determined that the spectacle presented in the
court room should not be publicly followed by too marked
and dangerous a contrast. And yet, while he was thus
withdrawn from general observation, he was permitted,
without crutch or assistance, to play upon the roof of the
house and actually to climb upon the rear fire escape.

lightly be disturbed, and that the court, in granting new

trials, should act with great caution. But the rule above

stated — a rule which was fully recognized in Ward v. Town

of Southfield (102 N. Y. 287) — is founded upon justice and

necessity. It should be firmly applied when the facts clear-

ly warrant its application. I can conceive of nothing bet-

* * * * * * * * * *
It is a mistake to suppose that a new trial can only be
granted when a case therefor can be classified under some
well-defined head such as surprise or newly-discovered evidence. The court is not thus limited. The true rule ie well
stated in Graham and Waterman on New Trial , 1009, as
f llow : ''It need scarcely b aid that any unconscionable
advantage obtained during a trial by one party over the
oth r, throu h fraud or artifice, to the injury of the latter,
will b good ()'round for a new trial. So obvious a principle
f o mon right and ju tic r quir no comm nt and need.·
no iJlu tration.'' I quit aO'r
that v rdi ts should not
lii:-JJtly b di turb , and that the court, in ()'ranting new
tri 1 , houl a t wit} O'f t aution. But the rule abov
rul whi h wa fully r c O'niz d in Ward v. Town
.t t of 8 mtlh/ifld ( 0.., N. Y. 2 7) - i. f unded upon ju tice and
n
... ity. t
oul
firmly ppli d wh n the fa t 1 arJy warr nt it ap Ji a ti
n on iv of n thing bet-
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ter calculated to encourage fraudulent litigation than the

minimizing of such misconduct as is here disclosed.

The order should, therefore, be reversed, and a new trial

granted, with costs of this appeal to the appellant. The

costs of the former trial should abide the event.

Section 4. Accident, Mistake and Surprise.
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tP-r calculated to encourage fraudulent litigation than the
minimizing of uch mi conduct as is here disclosed.
The order hould, therefore, be reversed, and a new trial
crranted, with costs of this ap eal to the appellant. Th
co t of the former trial should abide the event.

MEHNERT V. THIEME.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1875,

15 Kansas, 368,

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Brewer, J.: The plaintiffs in error were sued upon a

promissory note. Mehnert filed an answer in person, al-

leging part payment to the amount of $166.10, and that af-

ter the maturity of the note he and his co-defendant had

SECTION

4.

AccrnENT, MrsTAKE AND SURPRISE.

given a mortgage due in twelve months as security, and that

this time had not passed. They made no appearance at the

NIEHNERT V. THIEME.

trial, and judgment was rendered for the face of the note

and interest. On the same day they, by an attorney, filed
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a motion to vacate the judgment, and grant them a new trial,

Supreme Court of Kansas.

1875.

on the ground that they were prevented from making their

defense by "accident, which ordinary prudence could not

15 Kansas, 368.

have guarded against, and unavoidable misfortune." This

motion was overruled, and this is the error complained of.

Mehnert 's affidavit was the only testimony offered upon said

motion. He testified that he filed the arswer, and that it

was true; that he lived twelve miles from Fort Scott, where

the court was in session; that he had a large amount of

stock, and no male help on his place, and was consequently

obliged to be home every night ; that in order to be present

in court in time on that morning he rose between three and

four o'clock, attended to his home duties, and started with

his team for Fort Scott between five and six o'clock, drove

with all possible dispatch, and made no stoppages on tlie

road; that he reached the court-house about ten o'clock

and found that the case had been called and disposed of a

The opinion of the court was deliv~red by
BREWER, J.:
The plaintiffs in error were sued upon a
l romi ~ory note. Mehnert filed an answer in person, alleging part payment to the amount of $166.10, and that after the maturity of the not.e be and his (lo-defendant had
given a mortgage due in twelve month as security, and that
this time had not passed. They made no appearance at the
trial, and judgment was rendered for the face of the note
and intere t. On the same day they, by an attorne filed
a motion to vacate the judgment, and grant them a new trial,
on the ground that they were prevented from making their
defense by ''accident, which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded again t, and unavoidable mi fortune." Thi
motion was overruled, and this is the error complained of.
Mehnert' affidavit was the only testimony offered upon aid
motion. He testified that he filP l the PX. wer, and that it
was true; tbat he lived tw 1 mil s fr m Fort cott, where
the court was in e ion; that h had a large amount of
tock, and no male help on hi plac , and wa con equently
obliged to be home very ni ·ht · that i ord r t
pre nt
in court in time on that mornin°· he ro e between three and
four o'clock, att nd d to hi home duti
nd tarted with
hi team for Fort Scott betwe n fi and ix o'clock. drove
with all po ible di pat b and made no toppages on th
road· that h reached the court-house about ten o'clock
and found that the case had been called and disposed of a
I
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few minutes prior thereto ; that the delay in driving in was

caused by the bad almost impassable condition of the roads.

Was this accident which ordinary prudence could not have

guarded against, or unavoidable misfortune? It does not

appear that the roads were for that season of the year, De-

cember, exceptionally bad, or that by an unexpected change

in the weather they had become suddenly bad, or that Meh-

nert did not by frequent travel have full knowledge of their

actual condition. At that time, it is no uncommon thing

for country roads to be very rough, and in very bad condi-

tion. Common prudence would dictate that one who was

acting as an attorney, and attending to business in court

then in session, should not run the risk of getting into court

in the morning over such roads from a remote part of the

county. The real difficulty was, that Mehnert was attempt-

ing to perform the double part of suitor and attorney.

While this is perfectly proper, yet whoever attempts it sub-

jects himself to the obligations and liabilities of both. It
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is the duty of an attorney having business in court to be

present during its sessions. There is his business ; there is

his work. Oftentimes that which will excuse the absence of

a suitor, will come far short of excusing the absence of his

attorney. Now, Mehnert, was acting as an attorney, in-

trusted with business in the court then in session. Instead

of employing some one to take care of his stock on his farm,

and being himself in readiness to attend to his case, he is

with full knowledge of his great distance from the court-

house, and the almost impassable condition of the roads, at-

tempting to take care of both stock and lawsuit. He suc-

ceeded in the former, but failed in the latter, and failed

simply from omitting the ordinary precautions which men

take under similar circumstances. Hill v. Williams, 6 Kas.

17.

The judgment will be affirmed.

All the justices concurring.
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few minutes prior thereto; that the delay in driving in was
caused by the bad almost impassable condition of the roads.
Was this accident which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against, or unavoidable misfortune 1 It does not
appear tbat the roads were for that season of the year, December, exceptionally bad, or that by an unexpected change
in the weather they had become suddenly bad, or that Mehnert did not by frequent travel have full knowledge of their
actual condition. At that time, it is no uncommon thing
for country roads to be very rough, and in very bad condition. Common prudence would dictate that one who was
acting as an attorney, and attending to business in court
then in session, should not run the risk of getting into court
in the morning over such roads from a remote part of the
county. The real difficulty was, that Mehnert was attempting to perform the double part of suitor and attorney.
While this is perfectly proper, yet whoever attempts it sub.iects himself to the obligations and liabilities of both. It
i the duty of an attorney having business in court to be
present during its sessions. There is his bu iness; there is
his work. Oftentimes that which will excuse the absence of
a uitor will come far short of excusinO' the ab ence of his
attorney. Now, Mehnert, was acting as an attorney 1 in.trusted with business in the court then in session. Instead
of employing· some one to take care of his stock on his farm,
and b ing himself in readiness to Bttend to his case, he is
with full knowledO'e of hi great di tance from the courthouse, and the a1mo t impassable condition of the roads, att mpting to take are of both tock and law uit. He suer d d in th form r, but failed in th latter, and fail <l
. irn ly from omitting the ordinary precautions which men
take und r sim ilar ir um tances. Hill v. Williams, 6 Kas.
17.
Th ju gm n t will be affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
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GKIFFIN V. O'NEIL.

GRIFFIN V. O'NEIL.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1891,

47 Kansas, 116.

Opinion by Strang, C. : * * *

Was the defendant entitled to a new trial because of un-

Supreme Court of J(ansas.

1891.

avoidable accident, as claimed in his affidavit filed with

47 Kansas, 116.

his motion for a new trial? We think not. The alleged

accident consists in a failure of the defendant to receive a

telegraphic message in time for him to attend the trial of

the case. The accident was llierely the miscarriage of an

arrangement by the plaintiff with his own attorneys and

the telegraph operator at the station nearest his home, for

the transmission and delivery to him of a message giving

him information concerning the trial of his case. His

failure to receive the message in time was not the result of

accident at all, but of the negligence of his own agent. If

there had arisen a storm of such a character as to have pre-

vented the transmission of the message over the wires in
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time to notify the defendant so he could be present at the

trial, or of such a character as to have prevented the de-

fendant traveling to the place of trial, it might be said he

was prevented by accident, but a mere failure of his own

agents to do as he alleges they promised to, in connection

with the transmission or delivery of a message, is not an

accident. The affidavit shows that the message was receiv-

ed by the acent at 8 o'clock in the morning, and that he did

not get it delivered in the country to the defendant until it

was too late for him to attend the trial. It was not the

business of the agent, as the agent of the telegraph com-

pany, to deliver the message away from his office, in the

country. He was only required to do so in this instance

by his agreement with the defendant, and whatever he did

or neglected to do under such agreement, he did or neglect-

ed as the agent of the defendant. We do not think a failure

of the defendant's agent to deliver a message to him, as

per request or agreement, in time for him to attend the

trial furnishes the defendant with any cause, known tc the

Opinion by

STRANG,

C.: * * *

* * * * * * * * * *
Wa the defendant entitled to a new trial because of unavoidable accident, as claimed in hi affidavit filed with
his motion for a new trial. We think not. The alleged
accident consists in a failure of the defendant to receive a
telegraphic messag in tim for him to attend the trial of
the case. The accident wa :merely the mi carriage of an
arrangement by the plaintiff with hi own attorn ys and
the telegraph operat r at the tation neare t hi. home, for
the tran mission and delivery to him of a me age giving
him information con erning the trial of his ca e. His
failure to receive the mes age in time was not the result of
accident at all, but of the negligence of his own aO'ent. If
there had ari en a torm of uch a character a to ha e pr vented the tran. mi . . ion of the me sage over the wire in
time to notif. the def ndant so he could be pre ent at the
trial, or of such a character as to have prev nted the defendant tra\ eling to the place of trial, it mio·ht he aid he
wa prevented by accident, but a mere failure of his own
a o·ent. to do a he alleges they promised to, in connection
ith the tran mi . ion or d livery of a me ao- , i not an
acci ent. The affida' it . how that the messaO'e wa receivd hy the agent at 8 o' lo k in the mornino-, and that he di
not o-et it delivered in th country to the def ndant until it
wa too lat for him to attend the trial. It wa. not the
of the agent as th a ·ent of the t 1 O'raI h omhu in
an. , to deliv r the m ao- away from hi offi , in th
untr. . H wa. only r quir d to do o in thi in tancP
1 . hi aoT ment with th def ndant, and what v r he did
r n gl t d to d under . uch a reem nt he di or neO'lectd a th a O' nt of the d f n ant. We do not think a failur
of th d f ndant' aO' nt to d liver a m age to him a
p r r que t or agr ement in time for him to attend the
trial furnishes the defendant with any cause, known tc the

TRIAL PRACTICE
662 Teial Peactice [Chap. 17

law, for a new trial. He made an arrangement with his

own agents for notice. He in no wise relied on any ar-

rangement with the plaintitf, nor with the court. He relied

upon his own agents, and without any accident or excuse,

so far as we know, they failed him, and we cannot relieve

him from the consequences.

We find no mateiral error in the record of this case, and

thei:efore recommend that the judgment of the trial court

be affirmed.

By the court : It is so ordered.

All the Justices concurring.

STAUNTON COAL COMPANY V. MENK.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1902.

197 Illinois, 369.

Mr. Chief Justice Mageudee delivered the opinion of

[Chap. 17

law, for a new trial. He made an arrangement with his
own agents for notice. He in no wise relied on any arrangement with the plaintiff, nor with the court. He relied
upon his own agents, and without any accident or excuse,
o far as we know, they failed him, and we cannot relieve
him from the consequences.
We find no mateiral error in the record of this case, and
the:r:.efore recommend that the judgment of the trial court
be affirmed.
By the co·u rt : It is so ordered.
All the Justices concurring.

the court :

The alleged ground, upon which it was sought by the

appellant in the court below to set aside the verdict and

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

grant a new trial, was that the circuit court tried the case

out of its order on the docket at the request of appellee's

attorneys, and without notice to the appellant, and without

any good cause for so trying the case out of its order.

STAUNTON COAL COMPANY V. MENK.

Second — But, even if the case was set for trial out of its

order upon the docket, section 16 givQ. the court the right

to take such action for good and sufficient cause. That

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1902.

section only provides, that causes shall be tried in the order

they are placed on the docket, "unless the court for good

197 Illinois, 369.

and sufficient cause shall otherwise direct." It nowhere

appears in the affidavits, that the court did not have good

and sufficient cause for setting the case for trial on Wed-

nesday, October 10, 1900.

**********

Third — Tlie affidavits, filed by the appellant in the court

below, do not show that duo diligence was exercised by it in

this matter, and do not show sufficient excuse for not being

MR. CHIEF J us TICE MAGRUDER delivered the opinion of
the court:
The alleged ground, upon which it was sought by the ·
appellant in the court below to set aside the verdict and
grant a new trial, was that the circuit court tried the case
out of its order on the docket at the request of a ppellee 's
attorney , and without notice to the appellant, and without
any good cause for so trying the case out of its order.
* * * * * * * * * *
Second-But, ev n if the case was set for trial out of it
order upon th d ket,
tion 16 o-iv~ the court the right
to take uch a tion for o- od and uffici nt cau . That
tion on]y provi
, that au e hall be tried in the order
th y r pla d on the do k t, "unle s the court for good
nd . ffi i nt c u e hall otherwi e dir t . '' It nowhere
pp ar. in th affi avit. , that th ourt did not have o-ood
and . uffi i nt au. for ttin o- th ca e for trial on Wedctob r 10, 1900.
n . <l
* * * • * * * • * *
Third- Th afficlr vit., fil ~ hy th a
11 nt in th court
hcl w, lo n t show th , t <ln c1ilig-rnr wa. ~ r i. d by it in
tl i : mutt ·r a 1 1 not sh w , um i nt x n for n t being
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present in court at the time when the case was set for trial.

Arfidavits, filed in support of applications to set aside judg-

ments by default, or entered in ex parte proceedings, are to

be construed most strongly against the party making the

application. {Grossman v. Wolillehen, 90 111. 537).

According to the statements in the affidavit of appellant's

attorney, he knew that the number of the case at bar was

76 on the law docket for the September term, and that there

were seventy-five law cases and sixty-four criminal cases on

that docket ahead of the case at bar, and entitled to prior

trial. This being so, it was the duty of the appellant to

take notice, or at least it is presumed to have taken notice

of every step taken in the cause. {Schneider v. Seihert,

50 111. 284). In his affidavit the attorney states that, in the

due course of business, the cases ahead of No. 76 could not

have been tried in their order before the latter part of

October, or the middle of November, 1900. He also states

that he wrote to the clerk of the court on the 10th day of
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October to inquire when said cause would be for trial, and

received notice on the 12th day of October from the clerk,

that the case had already been tried on October 10. The

attorney had no reason to suppose, so far as is shown by

the affidavits, that the present case would not be reached

in its regular order upon the docket before the latter part

of October or the middle of November, 1900. There is

nothing to show, that the case would not have been reached

as early as the day, upon which it was set for trial. It is

the duty of a party to be present when his case is reached.

His negligence in ascertaining when the case will be reached

does not excuse his absence. If appellant relied upon the

opinion of its attorney as to the time when the case would

be reached for trial, it did so at its peril. The negligence

of the attorney in such matters is the negligence of the

client. {Mendell v. Kimhall, 85 111. 582; Walsh v. Walsh,

114 id. 655; Laivler v. Gordon, 91 id. 602; Schidtz v. Meisel-

bar,U4[d.26).

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

NEW TRIALS
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pre ent in court at the time when the case was set for trial.
Atfidavit , filed in upport of applications to set aside judgments by default, or entered in ex parte proceedings, are to
be construed most strongly again t the party making the
application. ( Crossma;n v . TVohlleben, 90 Ill. 537).
According to the statements in the affidavit of appellant''"'
attorney, he knew that the number of the case at bar was
76 on the law docket for the September term, and that there
were seventy-five law cases and sixty-four criminal ca es on
that docket ahead of the case at bar, and entitled to prior
trial. This being so, it was the duty of the appellant to
take notice, or at least it is presumed to have taken notice
of e ery step taken in the cause. (Schneider v . Seibert,
50 Ill. 284). In his affidavit the attorney states that, in the
due course of busine s, the ca es ahead of No. 76 could not
have been tried in their order before the latter part of
0 tober, or the middle of November, 1900. He also states
that he wrote to the clerk of the court on the 10th day of
0 tober to inquire when said cause would be for trial, and
received notice on the 12th day of October from the clerk,
that the case had already boon tried on October 10. The
attorne. had no r eason to suppose, so far as is shown by
the affida it , that the present ca e would not be reached
in its regular order upon the docket before the latter part
of October or the middle of Nov mber, 1900. There is
nothing to how, that the case would not have been reached
a arl as the day, upon which it was set for trial. It is
the duty of a party to be present when his case is reached.
His negligence in ascertaining when the ca e will be reached
doe not excu e hi ab ence. If appellant relied upon the
opinion of its attorney a to the time when the ca e would
be reached for trial, it did so a+ it peril. The ne ligen
of the attorney in uch matters is the n ligen e of the
cli nt. (JJ1 en dell v . K iniball, 85 Ill. 5 . . ; Wal h . Wal h
114 id. 655; Lai ler v. Gordon, 91 id. 602; Schultz v . Meiselbar, 144 id. 26).
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY V.

CHAMBLEE.

WESTERN

Supreme Court of Alabama. 1898.

122 Alabama, 428,

UNION TELEGRAPH
CHAMBLEE.

COMP ANY

V.

Haralsott, J. * * *

The defendant afterwards moved the court for a new

trial, which was overruled. The cause is here on bill of ex-

Supreme Court of Alabama. 1898.

ceptions reserved on the trial of that motion. It is based

122 Alabama, 428.

on the ground that the attorneys for the defendant were

absent by alleged unavoidable delay in consequence of be-

ing engaged in the trial of two causes in Birmingham, one

in the Federal and the other in the city court in that city.* *

The law firm employed by defendant to defend its suit,

consisted of three members, all residing in Birmingham.

The case was orginally set for trial on October 26, 1897,

but by an agreement of counsel on both sides, and with the

consent of the court, it was reset for November 3, follow-

ing. The attorneys for defendant did not appear at De-
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catur on the last day named. One of them telegraphed on

the 2nd, to the clerk of the court in Decatur: ''We are en-

gaged in United States Court. Pretty sure can be in De-

catur Friday or Saturday;" requesting the clerk to show

the message to Mr. Brown, attorney for plaintiff, and have

case passed to Friday or Saturday. The clerk replied

same day, that Brown was not there and judge refused to

make order in his absence. Brown lived in Hartselle, Ala.

On the 3d., the same attorney telegraphed to Brown in De-

catur : ''If case reached please pass until tomorrow. Our

firm engaged in city and United States courts. If I cannot

come will send some lawyer in my place. If the case will

not be reached tomorrow, wire me today." To this Brown

replied: "Telegram received after case was disposed of

this forenoon. Judgment against defendant for about

$120." Defendant's attorney then telegraphed to Brown

or Judge Speake, expressing surpi-ise at the taking of the

judgment after seeing his telegram, and stating that he

HARALSON,

J .•••

* * * * * * * * * •
The defendant afterwards moved the court for a new
trial, which was overruled. The cause is here on bill of exception reserved on the trial of that motion. It is based
on the O'round that the attorneys for the defendant were
absent by alleged unavoidable delay in consequence of being eng·aged in the trial of two causes in Birmingham, one
in the Federal and the other in the city court in that city.* *

* * * * * * * * * *
The law :firm employed by defendant to def end its uit,
consi ted of three members, all residing in BirminO'ham.
The case was orginally set for trial on October 26, 1897,
but by an agreement of counsel on both sides, and with the
consent of the court, it was reset for November 3, f ·Jllowing. The attorneys for defendant did not appear at Decatur on the last day named. One of them telegraphed on
the 2nd, to the clerk of the court in Decatur: "We are engaged in United States Court. Pretty sure can be in Deatur Friday or Saturday;" requesting the clerk to show
the m age to Mr. Brown, attorney for plaintiff, and have
ca, passed to Friday or Saturday. The clerk replied
, am day, that Brown was not there and judge refused to
mak order in his ab. en e. Brown liv din Hartselle, Ala.
On th 3d., the sam attorney teleO'raph d to Brown in Deratur: "If case reached please pa. s until tomorrow. Our
fir rnga<>'ed in ity and nit d Stat courts. If I cannot
· m will , nd ome lawyer in my la e. If tb ca e will
not h r a h d tomorr w, wir me toda T." To this Brown
rrpli
'' T 1 nram re ive aft r a . e wa di posed of
111 . f r n n. .TucJgm nt a<>'ain. t d f ndant for about
$1-0." D f nclant' attorn . th n t 1 gnq h d to Brown
r .J udg 1- peak , xpr Rs ing . urpri.
t th takinO' of the
judgm nt aft r s ing hi. t 1 gram, and stating that he
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would be up that night with his witnesses, ready to try the

case, and requesting Brown to keep his witnesses there or

get them back, if they had gone. To this Brown replied:

** Witnesses are gone. Heard nothing of your telegram un-

til my client and witnesses were here ready and demanding

trial. Big damage suit against Morgan county on trial,

which will last several days."

It is not shown that defendant's counsel attempted to

have either of their cases in the city or Federal court laid

over, in order that one of them might go to the Decatur

court to try this cause, which had been previously set by

their consent on the 3d of November. Reasons are stated

why one of the counsel engaged in the city court case was

needed to try that cause, and another to try the cause in the

Federal court, but no facts are shown why it was neces-

sary that the third one should remain in Birmingham on

account of either of said causes, further than the expression

of a conclusion that it was necessary for him to do so. It is
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not shown why defendant's counsel, when apprehensive of a

conflict in the trials of their causes in Birmingham and at

Decatur, did not communicate with plaintiff and his attor-

ney. Brown, both of whom lived at Hartselle, before the

latter left home to come to Decatur to try said cause, and

attempt to make arrangements for the postponement of this

cause. It appears they presumed it would be done as a

matter of courtesy, and they delayed timely effort to effect

such an arrangement. The attorney of defendant, who did

the correspondence by wire, in one of his messages to plain-

tiff's attorney, stated that if he could not come at a certain

time, if the case was laid over till then, he would send

another attorney to represent him. He does not show, that

he might not have done this and had the case tried when

set. It also appears, there were other capable lawyers liv-

ing in Decatur, who had no connection with this case, who,

for aught appearing, could have represented defendant. It

was the duty of defendant or his attorneys to have made

some arrangement for the trial of the cause, by the appear-

ance of one of them, or by a suitable representative for the

purpose, and not to have depended on a courtesy to be

shown them by opposing counsel, especially when it woul 1

have been at considerable expense to his client to do so.

We will not attempt to deal with the question of courtesy
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would be up that night with his witnes es, ready to try th
case, and reque ting Brown to keep hi witn e there or
()'et them back, if they had gone. To thi Brown replied:
"Witnesses are gone. Heard nothing of your telegram until my client and witnesses were here ready and demanding
trial. Big damage uit against Morgan county on trial,
which will last several days."
It i not shown that defendant' counsel attempted to
have either of their ca es in the city or Federal court laid
over, in order that one of them might go to the Decatur
ourt to try this cause, which had been previously set by
their con ent on the 3d of November. Reason are stated
why one of the coun el engaged in the city court ca e wa.
needed to try that cau e, and another to try the cause in th
Federal court, but no facts are shown why it was neces. ary that the third one hould remain in Birmingham on
account of either of aid causes, further than the expression
of a conclu ion that it was neces ary for him to do so. It i
not bown why defendant's counsel, when apprehen ive of a
conflict in the trials of their cau es in Birmingham and at
Decatur, did not communicate with plaintiff and his attorney, Brown, both of whom lived at Hart elle before th o
latter left home to come to Decatur to try aid cause, and
attempt to make arran()'ement for the postponement of thi . .
cau e. It appears they pre urned it would be done as a
matter of courtes , and they delayed timely effort to effect
·uch an arrangement. The attorney of defendant who did
the correspondence by wire in one of hi me sage to plaintiff' attorney, tated that if he could not ome at a certain
time if the case wa. laid over till then, he would send
anoth r attorney to repre ent him. He doe not bow that
he might not hav done thi. and bad the cas tri d when
et. It al o app ar. , tber were other capable lawyers livincr in D catur who had no onnection with thi ca e, who
for f1UO'ht app arin/:""l·, could have repre nted d f n ant. It
was th duty of d f n lant or his attorney to hav made
. ome arrang m nt for th trial of the cau
by th appearan
f on of them or l y a uitabl repre ntati e for th~
purpo e and n t to ha' de nd
on a courtesy to b
"'hown th m by opJ o. i :--; oun 1, . pe ially wh n it woul 1
have be n at on. id rn hl xp n . to hi lieut to 0 . .
We will not att mpt to eal with the question of courte y
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between opposing counsel. The judge who tried this cause,

sitting as a fair arbiter in the premises, with all the facts

before him, decided that it was not his duty to grant a new

trial, and we are unable to hold that he erred in so doing.

This conclusion is fully justified by previous decisions of

this court.— ^rocA; v. S. S N. A. RR. Co., 65 Ala. 79',Broda

V. Greemvald, 66 Ala. 538; McLeod v. Shelby Mfg. d Imp.

Co., 108 Ala. 81.

Affirmed.

HOSKINS V. HIGHT.

Supreme Court of Alabama. 1891,

95 Alabama, 284.
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between opposing counsel. The judge who tried this cause,
sitting as a fair arbiter in the premises, with all the facts
before him, decided that it was not his duty to grant a new
trial, and we are unable to bold that he erred in so doing.
This conclusion is fully justified by previous decisions of
this court.-Brock v. S. & N. A . RR. Co., 65 Ala. 79; Broda
v. Greenwald, 66 Ala. 538; McLeod v. Shelby Mfg. & Imp.
Co., 108 Ala. 81.
Affirmed.

Stone, C. X* * *

The power to set aside verdicts and grant new trials is

inherent in our courts of common-law jurisdiction; and in

the exercise of this power the court is called upon to use its

equitable discretion to prevent a palpable and material

wrong. As said by Clopton, J., in Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala.
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630, ''The power is essential to prevent irreparable injus-

HOSKINS V. HIGHT.

tice, in cases where a verdict wholly wrong is the result of

inadvertence, forgetfulness, or intentional or capricious

Supreme Court of Alabama. 1891.

disregard of the testimony, or of bias or prejudice, on the

part of juries, which sometimes occurs."

When, in the exercise of this inherent power, the trial

95

court grants a new trial, the presumption is that it has

rightfully used its discretion ; but, if the contrary appears,

and it is plainly shown that the trial court has a4:)used its

power, this discretion, being judicial in its character, should

be revised on appeal. — Edsall v. Ayres, 15 Ind. 286; Lloyd

V. McClure, 2 Greene (Iowa), 139; Frieley v. David, 7 Iowa,

3.

The grounds upon which a new trial may be granted are

as varied as the circumstances of each individual case. In

the exercise of a sound discretion, the court must consider

the particular surroundings, and have special regard to the

STONE,

c. J. * * ,.

Alabama, 284.

* * * * * * * • * •
The power to set a ide verdicts and grant new trials is
inherent in our courts of common-law jurisdiction; and in
the exercise of this power the court is called upon to use its
equitable di cretion to prevent a palpable and material
wrong. As said by Clopton, J., in Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala.
630, ''The power is es ential to prevent irreparable injustice, in case where a verdict wholly wrong is the result of
inadvertence, forgetfulnes , or intentional or capricious
di regard of the te timony, or of biais or prejudice, on the
part of juries which ometimes occurs.''
When, in the exerci e of this inherent power, the trial
court grants a new trial, the presumption is that it has
rightfully u ed it. di cretion; but, if the contrary appears,
and it is pl inly shown that the trial court has abused its
pow r, this di cretion, b ing judicial in it haracter, should
b r vi.
n appeal.-Edsa,ll v . Ayre , 15 Ind. 286; Lloyd
v. M Clure, 2 Greene (Iowa), 139; Frieley v. David, 7 Iowa,
2.
Th gr und upon whi h a new trial may be O'ranted are
a. v ri d as th circumstan . of ea h individual ca e. In
h x r i of a soun di creti n, the court must consider
th parti ular surroun ino-s, and have special reo-ard to th()
J
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(Mjuitable demands of each s-aparate case. But text-writers

and different courts recognize many different grounds for

the granting of new trials. Surprise and mistake are

placed in this category; and there are many instances

where new trials have been granted, because one party to

a suit has been taken by surprise, or has been prejudiced, on

account of a mistake or inadvertence for which he was not

responsible, and which was not occasioned in any way by

his negligence. No doubt it was intended that the ground

upon which the new trial in this case was asked and granted

should receive its force and efficacy from this division of

the causes that justify such equitable interposition by the

court. We shall so consider it ; for the ground as stated in

the motion is, that the defendant "was prevented from

making his defense thereto by accident or mistake, and

without fault on his part. ' '

In order to obtain a new trial on the ground of mistake

and surprise, there are certain requirements which must be
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fulfilled as conditions precedent to the exercise by the

trial court of this discretion. It must be shown that the

surprise or mistake occurred in reference to some matter

material to the issue involved; that injury resulted there-

from and that the party asking for a new trial has not been

guilty of negligence or fault in the premises. — Beadle v.

Graham, m Ala. 102; Brooks v. Douglass, 32 Cal. 208;

Jackson v. Worford, 7 Wend. 62 ; Huber v. Lane, 45 Miss.

608; Walker v. Kretsinger, 48 111. 502; Fretivell v. Lajfoon,

77 Mo. 26 ; 16 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. Law, p. 532.

The first duty of a party surprised at the trial, or upon

the discovery of a mistake that will prejudice his interest,

is to take proper legal steps to continue or delay the cause;

for "he can not neglect this in the hope of securing a ver-

dict in spite of the surprise (or mistake), and then obtain a

new trial." In the case of Shipp v. Siiggett, 9 B. Monroe

(Ky.) 5, the court observed; "The correct practice in such

case is for the party at once, upon the discovery of the cause,

during the progress of the trial, which operates as a sur-

prise on him, to move a continuance or postponement of

the trial, and not attempt to avail himself of the chance

of obtaining a verdict on the evidence he has been able to

introduce, and if ho should fail, tlien to apply for a new

trial on the ground of surprise. To tolerate such a prac-
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equitable demands of each BBl arat ca:e. But text-writer
and different courts recognize many liffer nt grounds for
the granting of new trials.
urpri e and mi take ar
placed in this category; and there are many instan
where new trials have been granted b ca u one party to
a suit has been taken by surpri e, or ha been prejudiced, on
a count of a mi take or inadvertence for which be was not
r sponsible, and which was not occasioned in any way by
his negligence. No doubt it wa intended that the ground
upon which the new trial in this case was asked and granted
hould receive its force and efficacy from this division of
the causes that justify such equitable interposition by the
court. We shall so consider it; for the ground as stated in
the motion is, that the defendant ''was prevented from
making hi defense thereto by accident or mistake, and
without fault on his part.''
In order to obtain a new trial on the ground of mistake
and surprise, there are certain requirements which must be
fulfilled as conditions precedent to the exercise by the
trial court of this discretion. It mu t be shown that the
surprise or mi take occurred in reference to some matter
material to the issue involved; that injury resulted therefro m and that the party asking for a new trial has not been
O'uilty of negligence or fault in the premises.-Beadle v.
Graham, 66 Ala. 102; Brooks v. Dou.glass, 32 Cal. 208;
Jackson v . Worford, 7 Wend. 62; Hitber v. Lane, 45 Miss.
608; Walker . K ret inger, 48 Ill. 502; Fretwell v . Laffoon,
77 Mo. 26; 16 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. Law, p. 532.
The fir t duty of a party surprised at the trial, or upon
the di covery of a mistake that will prejudice his interest,
i to take proper legal steps to continue or delay the cause ;
for ''he can not neglect this in the ho1 e of ecuring a verdict in pite of the surprise (or mi take) and then obtain a
n w trial." In the ca e of hipp v. itggett, 9 B. Monroe
(Ky.) 5, the court ob r ed · "The corr ct practice in uch
ra e i for the party at once upon the di co very of the can e,
during the progr s of th trial, whi h operate a a sur1 rise on him to mo-\ e a continuanc
r po tponem nt of
t h trial, and not att mpt to avail him lf of the chance
(If obtaininO' a
r i t on h 'i n h has been able to
intro nee and jf h . h nld fail then t apply for a new
trial on the gr und of urpri e. To tolerate such a prac-
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tice would have the effect of giving to the party surprised

an unreasonable and unfair advantage, and tend to an un-

necessary and improper consumption of the time of the

court." We approve this language, and announce the rule,

that before a party can be granted a new trial on the

ground of surprise and mistake, which was known or dis-

covered before or during the trial, he must first move for a

continuance, or take such legal steps to postpone the trial

of the cause as the circumstances of the particular case may

require. Washer v. White, 16 Ind. 136; Young v. Com., 4

Gratt. 550; Gee v. Moss, 69 Iowa, 709; Wells v. Sanger, 21

Mo. 354; Rogers v. Bine, 1 Cal. 429; Bell v. Gardner, 71

111. 319 ; Boyle v. Sterga, 38 Cal. 459 ; Beivey v. Frank, 62

Cal. 343; 16 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 533. This mo-

tion for a continuance, or effort to postpone the trial, is

affirmative matter, and should therefore, appear of record.

In its absence, this court can not presume such motion or

effort was made; and the cause must be considered in the
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light of such facts and matters of record as appear in the

transcript. This conclusion is decisive of the only ques-

tion presented by this appeal, for no motion for a continu-

ance, nor any effort to postpone the trial, was made when

the absence of the important witnesses was discovered. The

trial court should not have granted the motion for a new

trial, under the circumstances shown in the record.

We could rest our opinion here ; but, considering that this

phase of the question has never before been presented to

us for review, we deem is best to decide the correctness

of the lower court's ruling in granting a new trial upon the

ground stated in the opinion, and the evidence produced to

substantiate such ground.

The accident or mistake that prevented the defendant

from making his defense, was the absence of certain wit-

nesses, whose names he had given to his counsel to have

summoned. These witnesses were never subpoenaed, and

this is, no doubt, at least one of the reasons they were ab-

sent. These witnesses were not subpoenaed by reason of

the mistake or negligence of the defendant or his counsel,

have the clerk of the court subpoena the witnesses. The

clerk had no recollection of any such direction, and never

whose recollection was that counsel directed his clerk to

TRIAL PRACTICE

.

[Chap. 17

tice would have the effect of giving to the party surprised
an unreasonable and unfair advantage, and tend to an unneces ary and improper consumption of the time of tb
court.'' We approve this language, and announce the rule,
that before a party can be granted a new trial on the
ground of surpri e and mistake, which was known or discovered before or during the trial, he must first move for a
continuance, or take such legal steps to postpone the trial
of the cause as the circumstances of the particular case may
require. Washer v. White, 16 Ind. 136; Young v. Com., 4
Gratt. 550; Gee v. Moss, 69 Iowa, 709; Wells v·. Sanger, 21
Mo. 354; Rogers v. Hine, 1 Cal. 429; Bell v. Gardner, 71
Ill. 319; Doyle v. Sterga, 38 Cal. 459; Dewey v . Frank, 62
Cal. 343; 16 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 533. This motion for a continuance, or effort to postpone the trial, is
affirmative matter, and should therefore, appear of record.
In its absence, this court can not presume such motion or
effort was made; and the cause mu t be considered in the
light of such facts and matters of record as appear in the
transcript. Tbis conclusion is deci ive of the only question presented by this appeal, for no motion for a continuance, nor any effort to po tpone the trial, was made when
the absence of the important witnesses was di 'covered. The
trial court should not have granted the motion for a new
trial, under the circum tances hown in the record.
We could rest our opinion here; but, considering that this
pha e of the question has never before been presented to
u. for review, we deem is best to decide the correctne s
of th lower court' rulinO' in granting a new trial upon the
ground stated in the opinion, and the evidence produced to
sub tantiate such o·round.
Th a id nt or mi take that prevented the defendant
from m king his defen e, was the abs nee of certain witn . . who nam s he had given to his coun 1 to have
summ n d. These witnesses were never subpamred, and
tbi . i. , no
ubt, at 1 ast one of the rea on. they were ab. ut. Th . e witness s were not subp n d by reason of
th 1i. t k or negljo· n e of th d fendant or his counsel,
haY th 1 rk of the ourt sub
a th witnesses. The
]('rk ha no r col] tion of any u h dir tion, and never
who. r
11 ction was that couns 1 dir t d his cl~rk to
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instructed the clerk of the court to subpoena the said wit-

nesses.

While it is true that a new trial may be granted to a

party who was deprived of the benefit of the evidence of a

witness who was excusably absent, and whose testimony

would have probably affected the result, yet, in order to

claim the benefit of a new trial on this ground, it must, as

a general rule, be shown that the witnesses had been reg-

ularly summoned and that their absence was not caused

through the negligence of the party asking for a new trial

As said in 16 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 541, ''It is a

general rule, that a new trial should not be granted on ac-

count of the absence of witnesses, when a continuance has

not been asked for, or the absence of the witnesses is caused

by any form of neglect by the party applying for a new

triaV—Huhland v. Sedgwick, 17 Cal. 123; Tilden v. Gardi-

ner, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 663; Love v. Breedlove, 75 Tex. 649;

Gee V. Moss, 68 Iowa, 318; Young v. Com., 4 Gratt. (Va.)

429.
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550; Wells V. Sanger, 21 Mo. 354; Rogers v. Hine, 1 Cal.

The result is the same, whether the absence of the wit-

nesses was caused by the mistake or negligence of the party

or of his attorney. "The mistake or negligence of the at-

torney appearing for the party to a suit is the mistake or

negligence of the party; and no new trial will be allowed

where such mistake arises from negligence or lack of skill."

—Handy v. Davis, 38 N. H. 411 ; Heath v. Marshall, 46 N.

H. 40. The failure to make defense to a suit, by reason of

a mistake of the defendant or his counsel, caused by negli-

gence, can not justify the granting of a new trial, it matters

not how effective or just the defense may be. — 16 Amer. &

Eng. Encyc. of Law, 549, n. 4.

Under the principle above announced, the judgment of tho

City Court granting a new trial is reversed, and a judgment

is here rendered overruling the defendant's motion for a

new trial.

Reversed and rendered.
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in tructed the clerk of the court to subpcena the said witnesses.
While it is true that a new trial may be granted to a
party who was depri ed of the benefit of the evidence of a
witness who was excusably absent, and whose testimony
would have probably affected the result, yet, in order to
claim the benefit of a new trial on this ground, it must, as
a general rule, be shown that the witnes es had been regularly summoned and that their absence was not caused
through the negligence of the party a king for a new trial
As said in 16 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 541, "It is a
general rule, that a new trial should not be granted on account of the absence of witnesse , when a continuance '!la."'
not been asked for, or the absence of the witne se is caused
by any form of neglect by the party applying for a new
trial.''-Huhland v. Sedgwick, 17 Cal.123; Tilden v. Gardiner, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 663; Love v. Breedlove, 75 Tex. 649 ·
Gee v. Moss, 68 Iowa, 318; Young v. Com., 4 Gratt. (Va.)
5 0; Wells v. Sanger, 21 Mo. 354; Rogers v . Hine, 1 Cal.
429.
The result is the same, whether the ab ence of the witne es was caused by the mi take or negligence of the part
or of his attorney. ''The mistake or negligence of the attorney appearing for the party to a suit i the mi take or
negligence of the party; and no new trial will be allowed
where uch mistake arises from neglicrence or lack of skill.'
-Handy v. Davis, 38 N. H. 411 · H eath v . Marshall, 46 N.
H. 40. The failure to make defense to a suit, by reason of
a mistake of the defendant er bis coun el caused by negligence, can not justify the crrantincr of a new trial it matter.
not how effective or ju t th d f n e may be.-16 Amer. &
Eng. Encyc. of Law, 549, n. 4.
Under the principle aboYe announced the ju gm nt of the
City Court granting a new trial i reversed, and a judgmen t
i here rendered overruling the defendant's motion for a
new trial.

Reversed and rendered.
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GOTZIAN V. McCOLLUM.

GOTZIAN V. McCOLLUM.

Supreme Court of South Dakota. 1896.

8 South Dakota, 186.

Fuller, J. Based upon a claim of ownership, this ac-

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

1896.

tion was against a sheriff, to recover the value of a stock

8 South Dakota, 186.

of boots and shoes seized and sold under an execution is-

sued upon a judgment in favor of the Norwegian Plow

Company, against Asa Covell and another; and the appeal

is from an order setting aside a verdict and granting the

defendant a new trial. At the trial and after plaintiff and

appellant had made a prima facie case and rested, and in

support of that part of the answer in which it is alleged

that Asa Covell, the judgment debtor, was in fact the

owner of the property in controversy, said Covell was called

on the part of the defendant and respondent, and testified

that he was not the owner thereof, but that said property

belonged to C. Gotzian & Co. when the same was seized and

sold on execution. At this stage in the i3roceedings an ap-
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plication for a continuance was made by resj^ondent's coun-

sel, based upon the ground of surprise in the testimony of

the witness Covell. * * * From counsel's affidavit for a con-

tinuance, upon which this verdict was set aside and a new

trial was ordered, it appears that said Asa Covell, whom

defendant had called as a witness, at all times claimed the

property, and had recently made certain affidavits in which

he had stated specifically, upon oath, that he was at the

time of the seizure thereof the owner of all the property

described in the complaint herein, and that relying upon

said witness, and believing that he would testify upon the

trial that he was the owner of the property at the time the

same was seized and sold by the sheriff in satisfaction of

said judgment against liim, and regarding such direct and

solemn declarations as sufficient assurance that he would

again so testify, counsel had deemed it unnecessary to call

and produce at the trial certain other accessible witnesses

named in his affiflavit, a^ir! bv whom he would if a continu-

ance were granted, be able to prove certain specified facts,

tending to show that said (V)V(>11, tlic judgment debtor, and

not C. Gotzian & Co., owned the entire stock of boots and

FULLER,

J. Based upon a claim of ownership, this ac-

tion was against a sheriff~ to recover the value of a stock
of boots and shoes seized and sold under an execution isued upon a judgment in favor of the Norwegian Plow
Company, against Asa Covell and another; and the appeal
is from an order setting aside a verdict and granting the
defendant a new trial. At the trial and after plaintiff and
appellant had made a prima facie case and rested, and in
upport of that part of the answer in which it is alleged
that Asa Covell, the judgment debtor, was in fact the
owner of the property in controversy, said Covell was called
on the part of the defendant and respondent, and testified
that he was not the ·Owner thereof, but that said property
belonged to C. Gotzian & Co. when the same was seized and
sold on execution. At this stage in the proceedings an application for a continuance was made by respondent's counsel, based upon the ground of surprise in the testimony of
the witness Covell. * * * From counsel's affidavit for a continuance, upon which this verdict was set aside and a new
trial was ordered, it appears that said Asa Covell, whom
defendant had called as a witness, at all times claimed the
property, and had recently made certain affidavits in which
he had tated p ci:fically, upon oath, that he was at the
time of the seizure thereof the owner of all the property
d ribed in the complaint herein, and that relying upon
. aid witnes , and believing that he would testify upon the
trial that he was the own r of the property at the time the
.-am wa seized and sold by the sheriff in satisfaction of
. ai ju gment o-ainst him, and r gardin su h direct and
ole n d claration a sufficient assurance that he would
ary to call
ilgai o t tify, coun 1 had deemed it unne
nn d produ
at the trial ertain other a c ible witn sses
n med in bi am l ,. rit, nri l l v liom h would jf a ontinun wer granted, be able to prove certain s ci:fi d facts,
t n<lin . t ,,bow th t 'aid
vell, th judgm nt a tor, and
not •. .r tzian & o., owned the entire st k of boot and
l
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shoes at the time the same was seized and sold at execution

sale by the defendant sheriff.

Upon the hearing of the motion for a new trial, respond-

ent relied wholly upon his affidavit for a continuance ; and,

in opposition thereto, appellant submitted affidavits to dis-

prove the recitals thereof concerning facts to which certain

witnesses would testify, if present, and tending to rebut

statements contained in said affidavit relating to the ques-

tion of good faith, ordinary prudence, surprise, and the

exercise of diligence to prevent the same. If, in the exer-

cise of a sound judicial discretion, the court, upon the show-

ing made ought to have granted a continuance, it was en-

tirely proper, upon the same showing, to correct the error

by awarding a new trial. Both rulings being within the

exercise of a judicial discretion, neither would be reviewed

on appeal, in the absence of an abuse thereof. From a

knowledge of the nature of his previous statements under

oath, respondent's counsel were justified in presuming that
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the witness Covell would testify at the trial that he was the

owner of the property, and they were reasonably justified in

omitting to subpoena other witnesses in possession of facts

relating to the question of ownership. Obviously, the wit-

ness would not have been called upon by counsel for re-

spondent to testify in support of the one vital issue tend-

ered by the complaint of appellant, and traversed by the

answer; and, when he did so, it is equally clear that re-

spondent, at least, was surprised. That there are many

witnesses who unconsciously or designedly make statements

in private consultation, before the trial, more probative,

direct, and certain than ever reach the ear of the court and

jury from the lips of the witness when under the solemnity

of an oath, is a fact well known to every law^s^er; but where,

as in this instance, a witness has positively and deliberately

sworn upon two or three recent occasions that he was at

all times the owner of the identical property in dispute, and,

when called as a witness for the sole purpose of establishing

such fact, not only testifies that he did not own said prop-

erty, or any part thereof, but that the same belonged to a

claimant against whom he was called as a witness, a dif-

ferent, and, we trust, a far more unusual, case is presented.

To allow a case to be continued, so near the close of a long

jury trial, would necessitate the trouble and expense of
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shoes at the time the same wa seized and old at execution
. · le b;: the ef ndant sheriff.
U on the hearing of the motion for a new trial, respondent relied wholl ur on bis affidavit for a continuance; and,
in oppo ition thereto, appellant u mitted affidavits to di prove the recitals thereof concerning facts to which certain
witnes es would testify if pre ent, and tending to rebut
...,tatem nt ontained in said affidavit relating to the que ti on of good faith ordinary prudence surpri e and the
xercise of diligence to pre ent the same. If, in the exeri e of a sound judicial disCJetion, the court upon the showi g made ought to have granted a continuance, it was entirely proper, upon the ame bowing, to correct the error
by awarding a new trial. Both rulings being within the
x r i e of a judicial di cretion neither would be reviewed
n appeal in the ab enc of an abuse thereof. From a
knowledge of the nature of hi prev· ous statements under
oath re pond nt' counsel were ju. tified in I re uminO' that
the witne
oYell would testify at the trial that he wa the
owner of the property, and they were reasonal ly ju tified in
omit tin · to ubr ama other witne es in pos e ion of fact
relating to b que tion of owner hip.
bviou ly the witne would not have been called upon by coun el for reondent to t tify in upport of the one vital i ue tender d by the o plaint of appellant, and traver ed b~ th
an wer; and, when he did o it i equally clear that repondent, at least wa urpri ed. That th re are many
witne e who uncon ciou ly or de ignedly mak . tatement
in private on ultation befor the trial, more probative,
direct, and rtain than ever r a h the ear f the court and
jury from th lip f the witne when under th olemnity
of an oath i a fact well known to ever. lawyer· but wher ,
in thi in tan
a witne. ha po itiv 1. an d li rately
. worn upon two or three recent occa ion that he wa a
all time th wner of th i enti al rop rty in di pute an ,
when called a a witne . f r th ole pur o of e ta li hint">
:uch fact, not nl. t tifi that he did not own ai pro rty, or any art th r of ut that the . a
b 1 ricred to a
<·laimant a ·ain t h m h wa all d a a witn . ,
ifferent and w tru t a far
r unu ua1 ca e i pr nt
To allow a a to be conti ued so near the clo of a 1 n:jury trial would nee . it t the troul 1 and xpense of
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a retrial, in any event; and, in the face of this fact, the

court evidently denied the application without serious re-

flection, and with the intention at the time to correct the

error, if any was made, by granting a new trial, when ap-

plied for, in case it should be found that substantial injury

had resulted therefrom. Upon the entire record, we think

the trial court was justified in concluding that reasonable

care and diligence had been used to procure testimony on

the part of the defense, and that, notwithstanding the sur-

prise, ordinary prudence had been exercised by the attor-

neys for respondent in preparing for trial, and that the in-

jury resulting from their disappointment in the testimony

of the witness Covell might be remedied by another trial

of the cause. An application for a continuance or for a

new trial on the ground of surprise being addressed to the

sound discretion of the trial court, the exercise thereof will

be reviewed only in cases where there is manifestly an

abuse of such discretion ; and a stronger case must be made
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to justify a reversal on appeal when a continuance or a

new trial has been granted that when such application has

been refused. Alt v. Raihvay Co. (S. D.), 57 N. W. 1126.

The order from which this appeal was taken is therefore

affirmed.

HILL V. McKAT.

Supreme Court of Montana. 1908.

36 Montana, 440.

Mr. Chief Justice Brantly delivered the opinion of the

court.

This action was brought to obtain a decree adjudicating

the respective rights of the parties plaintiff and defend-

ant against each other and among themselves, to the use

of the waters flowing in Indian creek, a tributary of Ruby

river, in Madison county. * * *
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a retrial, in any event; and, in the face of this fact, the
court evidently denied the application without serious reflection, and with the intention at the time to correct the
error, i.f any was made, by granting a new trial, when applied for, in case it should be found that substantial injur}
had resulted therefrom. Upon the entire record, we think
the trial court was justified in concluding that reasonable
care and diligence had been used to procure testimony on
the part of the defense, and that, notwithstanding the surprise, ordinary prudence had been exercised by the attorneys for respondent in preparing for trial, and that the injury resulting from their disappointment in the testimony
of the witness Covell might be remedied by another trial
of the cause. An application for a continuance or for a
new trial on the ground of surprise being addressed to the
ound discretion of the trial court, the exercise thereof will
be reviewed only in cases where there is manifestly an
abuse of such discretion; and a stronger case must be made
to justify a reversal on appeal when a continuance or a
new trial has been granted that when such application has
been refused. Alt v. Railway Co. (S. D.), 57 N. W. 1126.
The order from which this appeal was taken is therefore
affirmed.

The defendant McKay (appellant) is the owner of cer-

tain lands situated on Mill creek, another tributary of

]{uby river. He also owns a flouring-mill, situated on the

HILL V. McKAY.

Supreme Court of Montana.
36

Montana,

1908.

440.

MR. CHIEF JusTICE BRANTLY delivered the opinion of the
cont.
Thi a tion was brou()'ht to obtain a deer e adjudicating
th r . ctive ri()'hts of the partie plaintiff and defendant against each oth r and amonO' them e1v , to the use
of th wat r flowi g in I dian er k, a tributary of Ruby
ri r, in Ma i on c unty. * * *
Th
f ndant McKay (app llant) is the own r of certain ]and. ituat
on Mill r k, another tributary of
I uby ri r. He also o
a flouring-mill, situat d o the
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sHme stream, which is propelled by waterpower. It seems

that the water diverted by him through his mill ditch, and

for the irrigation of his lands in Mill Creek, does not,

after its release, return to Indian creek, but flows into the

channel of Mill creek. The issue at the trial, so far as

appellant is concerned, was whether the right asserted by

him through his mill ditch was superior to the rights of

the other claimants during the season of the year when

irrigation was necessary for farm purposes, or whether

it was available only during the other portions of the

year.

The appellant claims as the successor in interest of one

Hall, now dead, who, with others, built the mill and con-

structed the ditch in 1866. The court found that ''it was

the intention of those who built the mill ditch and appro-

priated the waters of Indian creek thereby to use the wa-

ters for mill and power purposes when the waters in In-

dian creek were not needed for irrigation purposes." It
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was accordingly adjudged that the defendant's use must

be confined to the autumn, winter and early spring months,

when the "waters of Indian creek are not required for the

proper irrigation of lands." This defendant has appealed

from an order denying his motion for a new trial. The

ground of his motion was surprise, in that two witnesses,

introduced by him to establish his right, made statements

at the trial directly contrary to what they had induced

him to believe they would make when he had interviewed

them to ascertain what their testimony would be touching

his right. His affida\4t in support of the motion states,

in substance, that he was charged by his counsel with the

duty of finding and producing witnesses in support of his

water-right through his mill ditch; that in performance

of this duty he questioned witnesses John Hatfield and

William Ferm as to the use of the water in the mill during

the time Hall was one of the owners of it; that he ques-

tioned them fully, but neither of them disclosed to him any

fact or information tending to impair the superiority of

his right during Hall's ownership, or tending to show that

Hall ever recognized any right in Indian creek superior to

the mill ditch right; that, on the contrary, Hatfield, when

questioned by affiant as to the conduct of Hall when the

farmer?, ^hithout his consent diverted the water from the

T. p.— 48
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ame stream, which is pro elled by waterpower. It eem
that the water diverted by him throuO'h hi mill dit h, and
for the irrigation of his lands in 1-ifill Creek, does not,
after its r 1 a e, return to Indian ere k but flow into the
channel of Mill creek.
The i ue at the trial, so far as
appellant is concerned, wa whether tb right a rted by
him through his mill ditch wa uperior to the riO'hts of
the other claimants during the sea on of the year when
irrigation was neces ary for farm purpo es, or wheth r
it was available only during the oth r portions of the
year.
The appellant claims as the succe or in intere t of one
Hall, now dead, who, with other , built the mill and contructed the ditch in 1866. The court found that ''it wa
the intention of those who built the mill ditch and appropriated the waters of Indian creek thereby to use the waters for mill and power pur o e when the waters in Indian creek were not needed for irrigation purpo e"'." It
was accordingly adjudO'ed that the def ndant 's u e mu t
be confined to the autumn, wint r and arl pring month
when the "waters of Indian r k are not required for the
proper irrigation of land . " Thi defendant ha appealed
from an order denyinO' hi motion for a new trial. Th
oTound of his motion wa urpri e in that two witne e
introduced by him to establi h hi right made tatement
at the trial directly contrary to what th y had induced
him to believe they would make when he had interviewe
them to asc rtain what their te timon. would be touchinO'
hi right. His affidavit in upport of the motion tate ,
in substance that he wa charg d by hi corm 1 with the
duty of finding and producin O' witne e in u port of hi
water-right through hi mill ditch· that in performan e
of thi duty he que tioned witn es John Hatfield and
William Ferm as to the u e of the water in he mill urin
the time Hall was one of th owner of it· that h que tioned them fully but neither f th m di lo ed to him any
fa t or information t ndin t impair th u eri ritv of
hi right durin Hall' own r . hi , or t
inO' to how 'that
Hall v r r co nized any riO'bt in Indian er k uperior t
the mill ditch right· that on th on tr ry, atfi ld: wh n
qu tioned y affiant a to th co duct of Hall when th
farm er ~ wbithout his consent diverted the water from the
T. P.-43
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mill ditch, told him that Hall ''went and took it," meaning

and intending that affiant should understand thereby that

jTatfield would testify that under such circumstances Hall

reclaimed the water, thus asserting the superior right of

the mill ditch; that, relying upon the information so given

him by Hatfield and Ferm, and believing that they had

fully stated the facts to which they would testify, affiant

called them to testify in his behalf, and took no steps to

secure testimony from other witnesses to establish the

facts ; that Hatfield testified upon the trial directly contra-

ry to what he had informed affiant prior to the trial, by

saying that Hall had an understanding with the farmers

below the head of his ditch that when they wanted the

water they could take it and shut the mill down; that the

farmers took the water whether it was needed for the mill

or not ; that this arrangement was the result of a bargain,

made about the year 1866 with one Bateman and sundry

other persons; that William Ferm testified that Hall had
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obtained permission from certain unnamed persons to

build the mill ditch, with the understanding that when they

needed the water it was to be returned to them ; that Ferm,

being called by plaintiffs as their own witness in rebuttal,

testified positively that Hall had told the witness that he

used the water from Indian creek with the consent of the

people living along the stream below; that both these wit-

nesses constantly associated with the plaintiffs and their

witnesses; and, upon information and belief, he charges

that their testimony at the trial was the result of collusion

with plaintiffs. It is further alleged that if a new trial

should be granted, the appellant can produce six witnesses,

naming them, whose testimony will show that Ilall, his

])redecessor, always possessed and asserted the right to

the use of the mill ditch, to the exclusion of all other rights

below the mouth of that ditch. The affidavits of these wit-

nesses were also used in support of the motion, and, gen-

erally, support the Hall right, as claimed by the appellant.

The plaintiffs filed no counter-affidavits, and hence the

statements of the appellant, so far as they are statements

of fact, are not controverted.

Do the facts stated make out a case upon which the court

should in its discretion, have granted a new trial? * * *

Coming, now, to the merits of the motion, it is the gen-
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mill ditch, told him that Hall ''went and took it,'' meaning
and intending that affiant should understand thereby that
Hatfield would testify that under such circumstances Hall
reclaimed the water, thus asserting the superior right of
the mill ditch; that, relying upon the information so given
him by Hatfield and Ferm, and believing that they had
fully stated the facts to which they would testify, affiant
alled them to testify in his behalf, and took no steps to
secure testimony from other witnesses to establish the
facts; that Hatfield testified upon the trial directly contrary to what he had informed affiant prior to the trial, by
saying that Hall had an understanding with the farmers
below the head of his ditch that when they wanted the •
water they could take it and shut the mill down; that the
farmers took the water whether it was needed for the mill
or not; that this arrangement was the re ult of a bargain,
made about the year 1866 with one Bateman and sundry
other persons ; that William Ferm testified that Hall had
obtained permission from certain unnamed persons to
build the mill ditch, with the understanding that when the?
needed the water it was to be returned to them; that Ferm,
l eing called by plaintiffs as their own witness in rebuttal,
testified positively that Hall had told the witness that he
used the water from Indian creek with the consent of the
people living along the stream below; that both these witnesses constantly associated with the plaintiffs and their
witnesses; and, upon information and belief, he charges
that their testimony at the trial was the result of collusion
with plaintiffs. It is further alleged that if a new trial
.·hould be o-ranted, the appellant can produce six witnesses,
naming them, who e testimony will how that Hall, hi
pred cessor, always po sessed and a . erted the rio-ht to
th use of the mill ditch, to the exclu ion of all other rights
h ]ow th mouth of that ditch. The affidavits of the e witn es wer al o u d in support of the motion, and, ()' n( rally, support the Ilall right, as claimed by the app '.:)llant.
rr'h plaintiff filed no count r-affidavit., and hence the
stat ment. of the app 11ant, so far as th y are statements
of fa t ar not ontroverted.
o the facts stat d make out a case upon which the court
.. 11011] 1 in j t. di. r ti on have ()'rant a a n w tri au * "* *
ommg, n w, to the merits of the m tion, it is the gen-
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eral rule that a new trial will be granted on the ground of

surprise only when it is clearly shown that the movant was

actually surprised, that the facts from which the surprise-

resulted had a material bearing on the case, that the verdict

or decision resulted mainly from these facts, that the al-

leged condition is not the result of movants own inattention

or negligence, that he has acted promptly and claimed re-

lief at the earliest opportunity, that he has used every

means reasonably available at the time of the surprise to

remedy the disaster, and that the result of a new trial will

jDrobably be different, {O'Donnell v. Bennett, 12 Mont. 242,

29 Pac. 1044; Schellhous v. Ball, 29 Cal. 605; Doijle v.

Sturla, 38 Cal. 456; Chicago & Great Eastern Ry. Co. v.

Voshurgli, 45 111. 311; Hull v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 64

Minn. 402, 67 N. W. 218; 1 Spelling on New Trial and Ap-

pellate Practice, sec. 201 ; 14 Encyclopedia of Pleading and

Practice, 723.) If, at the time the condition arises, the

party can make use of other evidence at hand or can avoid
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the threatened disaster by securing a continuance, or by

submitting to a nonsuit, he must do so ; and not only so, but,

after these means have failed, he must by his showing make

it clear that his allegation is not a mere pretense to cover

his own lack of diligence. As was said in Schellhous v.

Ball, supra; ''It is the duty of the courts to look upon appli-

cations for new trials upon the ground of surprise with sus-

picion, for the reason that from the nature of the case

surprise may be often feigned and pretended, and the op-

posite party may be unable to show that such is the case.

Hence, the party alleging surprise should be required to

show it conclusively, and by the most satisfactory evidence

within his reach." In Chicago S Great Eastern Ry. Co. v.

Voshurgh, supra, the court said: ''In applications for new

trials on such ground it is not only necessary that the party

should have been surprised, but that it was in a matter

material to the issue, and that it produced injury to the

party ; that it was not the consequence of neglect or inatten-

tion on the part of the party surprised; also, that he used

all reasonable efforts to overcome the evidence which

worked the surprise, or that it was not within his power to

have done so by the employment of reasonable diligence."

Applying this rule to the appellant's affidavit, we find

that it is insufficient in several particulars. It does not ap-
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eral rule that a new trial will be granted on the ground ()f
urprise only when it is clearly shown that the movant wa~
actually surprised, that the facts from whi h the surpri. ~
resulted had a material bearing on the ca e, that the verdi t
or decision resulted mainly from these facts, that the alleged condition is not the re ult of movants own inatt ntion
or negligence, that he ha acted promptly and claimed relief at the earliest opportunity, that he has u ed ver
means reasonably available at the time of the surpri e to
remedy the disaster, and that the result of a new trial wilJ
probably be different. ( 0 'Donnell v . Bennett, L..1 Mont. 242,
29 Pac. 1044; Schellhous v. Ball, 29 Cal. 605; Doyle v.
Sturla, 38 Cal. 456; Chicago & Great Eastern Ry. Co. v.
Vosburgh, 45 Ill. 311; Hull v. 111inneap olis St. Ry. Co., 64
Minn. 402, 67 N. W. 218; 1 Spelling on New Trial and Appellate Practice, sec. 201; 14 Encyclopedia of Pleading and
Practice, 723.) If, at the time the condition ariseb, the
party can make use of other evidence at hand or can avoid
the threatened disaster by securing a continuance, or by
submitting to a nonsuit, he must do so; and not only so, but,
after these means have failed, he mu st by bi showing make
it clear that his alle<Yation is not a mere pretense to cover
his own lack of diligence. A wa aid in S chellhous v .
Ball, supra; "It is the duty of the courts to look upon applications for new trials upon the ground of surpri e with uspicion, for the reason that from the nature of the case
surprise may be often feigned and pretended, and the opposite party may be unable to show that such i the case.
Hence, the party alleging surpri e should be r quired to
show it conclu ively, and by the most satisfactory evidence
within hi reach.'' In Chicag o cf; Great Eastern Ry. Co. .
Vo bitrgh, supra, the court said: "In application for new
trial on su h ground it i not onl. nece. sary that the part
should have been urprised, but that it wa in a matter
material to the is ue and that it pro uc d injur~ to th
party; that it was not th consequ n e of n lect or inattention on th part of the party ur ri d · al o that h u d
all rea onabl
ffort to over ome th
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which
work d th urpri
r that it w n t within hi.
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that it is in ufficient in se ·eral particulars. It does not ap0
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pear therefrom, except by way of conclusion of the affiant,

what inquiry appellant made of the witnesses whoso con-

duct is complained of; nor does it appear, except in thy

same way, what they told him they would testify to. Ex-

cept the statement of Hatfield that Hall said he "went

and took it," referring to the water, we have but the con-

clusion of the appellant as to what the purport of the

statements to him by the witnesses were. They may have

had the purport and evidentiary value assigned to them by

the appellant, but that this is true we cannot say, because

the details of them are not before us. The evidence heard

by the trial court is not before us. Therefore, we cannot

say, except from the statements in the affidavit, that the

court based its findings as to the mill ditch mainly upon

their testimony. So far as we know, there may have been

other evidence in the case, and sufficient to justify the find-

ing, even if the witnesses had testified as appellant sup-

posed they would. For, while we may infer from the affi-
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davit that they were the only witnesses called by appellant,

there is no positive statement that such was the case, or

that they were the only witnesses who testified as to the

mill ditch. From the affidavit, as a whole, coupled with the

fact that many other witnesses were found after the trial

was over who could furnish the desired evidence, we think

the inference permissible that the appellant was negligent

in the search for evidence to sustain his contention prior

to the trial, and that the judge who decided the motion

thought so.

There is a total want of any showing of prompt action

and diligence on the part of the appellant in his effort to

avoid the result of his alleged surprise at the testimony,

when it came out. He made no application for a continu-

ance. He did not call the attention of counsel to the mat-

ter ; nor was it called to the attention of the court. It does

not appear that he did not have other evidence at hand or

within reach which would have been available. In fact, so

far as we can judge, he sat silent during the trial, and,

though the cause was tried by the court sitting without a

jury, and it was held under advisement from June 4th, the

date of the trial, until August 30th, the appellant made no

application to have the cause reopened, but still remained

silent, thinking no doubt, that the result would be satis-
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pear therefrom, except by way of conclusion of the affiant,
what inquiry appellant made of the witnesses whos·J conduct is complained of; nor does it appear, except in the
same way, what they told him they would testify to. Except the statement of Hatfield that Hall said he "went
and took it,'' referring to the water, we have but the conclu ion of the appellant as to what the purport of the
statements to him by the witnesses were. They may have
had the purport and evidentiary value assigned to them by
the appellant, but that this is true we cannot say, because
the details of them are not before us. The evidence heard
by the trial court is not before us. Therefore, we cannot
ay, except from the statements in the affidavit, that the
court based its :findings as to the mill ditch mainly upon
their te timony. So far as we know, there may have been
other evidence in the case, and sufficient to justify the :finding, even if the witnesses had testified as appellant suppo ed they would. For, while we may infer from the affidavit that they were the only witnesses called by appellant,
there is no positive statement that such was the case, or
that they were the only witnesses who testified as to the
mill ditch. From the affidavit, as a whole, coupled with the
fact that many other witnesses were found after the trial
wa over who could furnish the desired evidence, we think
th inference permi . ible that the appellant was negligent
in the search for evidence to sustain his contention prior
to the trial, and that the judge who decided the motion
thouo-bt so.
Th ere is a total want of any showing of prompt action
an dilio-ence on the part of the appellant in his effort to
avoid the re ult of his alleged surprise at the testimony,
wh n it came out. He made no application for a continuan . He did not call the attention of counsel to the matt r; nor was it call d to th att ntion of the court. It does
not appear that he did not hav other evid nee at hand or
within r a h whi h would have been available. In fact, so
f r a. w
an ju
, he sat ilent during the trial, and,
th 1gl1 tJ1 au. wa tri d by the court ittino- without a
jury, an l it wa h ld und r advisement from June 4th, the
t of th tri 1, until Auo-u t th, the a pellant made no
J 1 li ation t have tb cau . r op n d, but still remained
il t, thinking no doubt, that the result would be satis-
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factory. Evidently the surprise upon which he relies is the

surprise at the result, rather than at anything that oc-

curred during the trial.

A consideration, which is conclusive, however, is that it

is not at all apparent that there is any probability that

the result reached by the trial judge would be different if a

new trial were granted. As stated above, the evidence

is not before us, and though it may be conceded that the

new witnesses whose affiidavits are embodied in the record

would testify as they allege, in the absence of the evi-

dence, we cannot say that a different result would pro-

bably be reached.

We are of the opinion that no abuse of discretion is

shown, and that the order denying a new trial should

be affirmed. It is so ordered.

A firmed.

Mr. Justice Holloway and Me. Justice Smith concur.

NELLUMS V. NASHVILLE.
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Supreme Court of Tennessee. 1901.

106 Tenessee, 222.

Wilkes, J. This is an action against the Mayor and City

Council of Nashville for damages, for personal injuries,

sustained by Mrs. Nellums on account of a defective plank

walk upon what is called in the record Belleville street.
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factory. Evidently the urpri e u on which he relie is the
surprise at the result, rather than at anything that occurred during the trial.
A con ideration, which is conclusive, however, i that it
i not at all apparent that there is any probability that
the re sult reached by the trial judge would be different if a
new trial were granted. As stated abov , the evidence
is not before u , and though it may be conceded that the
new witnes es who e affiidavits are embodied in the record
would testify as they allege, in the absence of the evidence, we cannot say that a different re ult would probably be reached.
We are of the opinion that no abuse of discretion is
shown, and that the order denying a new trial should
be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Affirmed.
MR. JusTICE HoLLOWAY and MR. JusTICE SMITH concur.

There was a trial before a jury in the Court below and ver-

dict and judgment for the city, and the plaintiff has ap-

pealed and assigned errors.

The first error assigned is that the Court below should

have granted a new trial upon the ground of surprise and

newly discovered evidence. In support of this assignment

plaintiff states that the city did not disclose its real de-

fense until its last witness, Pat Cleary, was examined.

NELLUMS V. NASHVILLE.

This witness, in substance, stated that the city of Nash-

ville had never done any work on the west side of Relle-

ville Street, nor had it in any other manner accepted the

Supreme Court of Tennessee. 1901.
106 T enessee, 222.

WILKES, J. This is an action against the l\![ayor and City
ouncil of Nashville for damage , for per on.al injuries,
sustained by Mrs. Nellurns on account of a defective plank
walk upon what is called in the record Belleville treet.
There was a trial before a jur. in the Court below and verdict Rnd jud ment for the city, and the plaintiff has appealed and assigned errors.
'rh fir t error a ign d is that the ourt b ]ow hould
have granted a new trial upon the ground of urpri e and
n wly di covered vi en e. In up ort of this a io-nment
plaintiff tat that the ity did not di clo e it r al def en e until it la t witne s Pat Cl ary wa examin d.
Thi witne , in ub tance tat d that the cit. of Nashville had ne er do e an. work on the we t side of R 11.eville Street, nor had it in an other m nner accepted the
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V

same as a street since it was included within tlie corporate

limits of the city in 1890.

The insistence is, that this was great surprise to the

plaintiff, inasmuch as the fact of nonuser and nonaccept-

ance was not specially pleaded, and the street had been

used by the public, and was in a thickly settled part of

the city, and had been recognized as a street by the public

in numerous ways, and at many times, after it was taken

into the city and prior to the accident.

The affidavit upon which the application for a new trial

is based states this feature of surprise, and adds that

plaintiff will make proof of user and many other facts

showing acceptance on the part of the city, and it is sup-

ported, as to the latter feature, by the sworn statements of

quite a number of witnesses.

The city filed only one plea, that of not guilty, and upon

this the plaintiff took issue.
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Under the plea, and upon this issue, we think it clear

that the city might show by evidence that it had never

accepted that portion of the street where the accident oc-

curred. * * * This being true, the plaintiff was bound to

take notice of every defense that could be legally advanced

under the plea of the general issue. Conceding the pro-

position to be correct that the evidence was within the

issues presented by the pleadings, surprise cannot be pre-

dicated upon the fact that evidence was not anticipated

along any line embraced within the pleadings. The doctrine

is thus laid down in Vol. 16, page 544 (old Ed.) Am. &

Eng. Ency. Law.

"The fact that an adversary's evidence is different from

what it was supposed it would be, is not sufficient. If

there has been any want of diligence in ascertaining what

the testimony of a witness would be, a new trial will be

refused." In 15 Ency. Pleading & Practice, 733, it is

said: "A party is bound to come prepared to meet the

case made by his adversary, and he cannot plead surprise

at material and relevant testimony." In support of this

proposition are cited Cole v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 10 N. Y.

447; Knapp v. Fisher, 49 Ver. 94; Davis v. Buggler, 2

Chand. (Wis.), 152; Bragg v. Moberhj 17 Mo. App. 221;
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ame as a street since it wa included within the corporat,e
limits of the city in 1890.
The insistence is, that this was great surprise to the
plaintiff, inasmuch as the fact of nonuser and nonacceptance was not specially pleaded, and the street had been
used by the public, and was in a thickly settled part of
the city, and had been recognized as a street by the public
in numerous ways, and at many times, after it was taken
into the city and prior to the accident.
The affidavit upon which the application for a new trial
i based states this f eature of surprise, and adds that
plaintiff will make proof of user and many other facts
howing acceptance on the part of the city, and it is supported, as to the latter feature, by the sworn statements of
quite a number of witnesses.
The city filed only one plea, that of not guilty, and upon
this the plaintiff took issue.
Under the plea, and upon this issue, we think it clear
that the city might show by evidence that it had never
accepted that portion of the street where the accident occurred. * * * This being true, the plaintiff was bound to
take notice of every defense that could be legally advanced
under the plea of the general issue. Conceding the pro1 osition to be correct that the evidence was within the
i sues presented b}r the pleadin g , surprise cannot be predicated upon th e fact that evidence wa not anticipated
alon an:v line embraced within the pleadings. The doctrine
i thn laid down in Vol. 16, page 544 (old Ed.) Am. &
Eng. Ency. Law.
"Th f t that an adversary's evidence is different from
what it was upposed it would be, is not ufficient. If
there ha been any want of di1i()'ence in a certainin()' what
tbe te timony of a witne would be, a new trial will b
r fus d.'' In 15 Ency. Pleading & Practi e, 7 3 it is
party i bound to com
repared to m t the
. aid: ''
a ma by his adv r ary, and he cannot plead urpri
t material and r 1 vant te timony." In support of tbi.
ro o. ition ar it d ol v . Fall Brook Coal Co., 10 N. Y.
447 · K n app
Fi her, 49 V r. 94; Da i v. Ritggl r, 2
ban . ("\Vis.), 152; Bragg v. Moberly 17 Mo. App. 221;
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McNeally v. Stroud, 22 Tex. 229; Anderson v. Duffield, 8

Tex. 237, and a number of other cases.

We do not find any reversible error in the action and

judgment of the Court below, and it is affirmed with costs.

Section 5. Verdict Contrary to Evidence.
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"/.lcNeally v . Stroud, 22 Tex. 229; Anderson v. Duffield, 8
Tex. 237, and a number of other ca e .
• * * * * • • * * •
We do not find any reversible error in the action and
judgment of the Court below, and it is affirmed with costs.

SERLES V. SERLES.

Supreme Court of Oregon. 1899.

35 Oregon, 289.

This is an action by W. L. Series against Clara Series,

S. C. Zuber, and John Hough, to recover damages for tres-

pass in detaching and removing a dwelling house from the

realty of the plaintiff. The verdict of the jury was for

plaintiff in the sum of $400, and against the defendants

SECTION 5. VERDICT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE.

Series and Zuber, ind judgment having been entered

thereon, they appeal * * * After the rendition of the

verdict, the defendants interposed a motion to set it aside,

SERLES V. SERLES.

and for a new trial, based upon several grounds: First,

tliat of newly discovered evidence ; Second, excessive dam-

Suprenie Court of Oregon.

1899.
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ages; and, Third, that tlie evidence was insufficient to war-

rant the verdict, — that the verdict is against the evidence,

is not justified thereby, and is contrary to law. This mo-

35 Oregon, 289.

tion was overruled, the court saying: ''Tlie question of

whether the verdict is a proper one upon the evidence is

not now involved, only to the extent as to whether there

was any evidence to support it, and there is no doubt that

there was, and the court cannot review their decision up-

on the preponderance of the evidence."

Reversed.

Mr. Chief Justice Wolverton, after stating the facts,

delivered the opinion of the court.

2. It is strenuously urged, however, that the court be-

low decided the motion for a new trial upon an erroneous

principle of law, in this : That it was governed, as is shown

This is an action by W. L. Serles against Clara Serles,
S. C. Zuber, and John Hough, to recover damages for trespass in detaching and remo' ing a dwelling house from the
realty of the plaintiff. The verdict of the jury was for
plaintiff in the um of $400 and again t the defendants
erles and Zuber, Lnd judgment having been entered
thereon, they appeal * * * After the rendition of the
'\'erdict, the defendant interpo ed a motion to set it a ide,
and for a new trial ba ed upon several ground : First,
that of newl di covered e' id nee; Second, exce i e damages; and, Third, that th e-vidence wa in ufficient to warrant the verdict,-that the verdict i aO'ainst the evidence
i not justified ther by and i contrar. to law. This motion was overruled the court aying: ''Th que tion of
whether the verdict i a proper one upon the evidence i
not now involved, only to the extent a to whether ther
wa any evidenc to upport it and there i no ou t that
tbere was, and the court annot r iew their d i ion upn the preponderance of the e id nee.''
Re er ed.
MR. CHIEF J STICE WoL"\ERTON, after stating the fact
rfolivered the opinion of th court.
• • • * * * • • • •
2. It i tr nuou Iv urO' d how v r, that the ourt below d id d th motion for a new trial upon an erron ou.·
princi l of law, in thi : That it was go-vern d as is hown
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by its written opinion, by the idea that, if there was any

evidence in the record to support the verdict, it was with-

out power to disturb the same or set it aside; whereas, it

is insisted that it is the duty of the court, in the considera-

tion of the motion for a new trial, based upon the insuffi-

ciency of the evidence, to weigh all the evidence submitted

to the, jury, and if, upon the whole case, the verdict appears

to be against the weight of evidence and is manifestly un-

just, to allow the motion. The trial judge seems to have

assimilated the ground for granting a new trial to that

which is proper in support of a motion for a non-suit, and

hence, his conclusion that, if there was any evidence to

support the verdict, it was his duty to uphold it. It is a

rule of law, well established in this jurisdiction, that a mo-

tion for a nonsuit is in the nature of a demurrer to the

evidence, and it not only admits all that the evidence

proves, but all inferences that might be legitimately

drawn therefrom tending to prove a fact under the issues ;
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and, if there is any evidence offered from which such an

inference could be drawn, it is the duty of the court to

permit it to go to the jury, as the motion is a test of the

competency of the evidence to prove the fact to which it

is directed. And the question is, upon such motion, whetli

er there is any evidence tending to prove the material al-

legation upon which the cause of action is based, and this is

one of law. But whether a given amount of evidence is

sufficient to sustain an allegation is a question of fact for

the jury; so that, if there is any evidence tending to prove

a given fact, it is the duty of the court, upon the motion fov

nonsuit to permit it to go to the jury, and to take their

verdict touching it: Vanhehber v. Plunheit, 26 Or. 562

(27 L. R. A. 811, 38 Pac. 707), and cases therein cited.

Under the statute (Hill's Ann. Laws, § 235, subd. 6),

the court is authorized to set aside a verdict and grant a

new trial for ''insufficiency of the evidence to justify the

verdict or other decision, or that it is against law." This

statute does not appear to have received any direct con-

struction by this court; but there are authorities elsewhere

pertinent to the inquiry, and they leave no doubt but that,

in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support

the verdict, the trial court is authorized to weigh and con-

sider all the evidence which has been submitted to the

TRIAL PRACTICE
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by its wr:tten opinion, by the idea that, if there was any
evidence in the record to support the verdict, it was without power to disturb the same or set it aside; whereas, it
is insisted that it i the duty of the court, in the consideration of the motion for a new trial, based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, to weigh all the evidence submitted
to the. jury, and if, upon the whole case, the verdict appears
to be against the weight of evidence and is manifestly unjust, to allow the motion. The trial judge seems to have
assimilated the ground for granting a new trial to that
which is proper in support of a motion for a non-suit, and
hence, hi conclusion that, if there was any evidence to
support the verdict, it was his duty to uphold it. It is a
rule of law, well established in this jurisdiction, that a motion for a non uit is in the nature of a demurrer to the
evidence, and it not only admits all that the evidence
prove , but all inference that might be legitimately
drawn therefrom tending to prove a fact under the issues;
and, if there is any evidence offered from which such an
inference could be drawn, it is the duty of the court to
permit it to go to tbe jury, as the motion is a test of the
competency of the evidence to prove the fact to which it
is directed. And the question is, upon such motion, wheth
er there is any evidenr,e tending to prove the material allegation upon which the cans of action is based, and this i.
one of law. But whether a given amount of evidence i
, uffi jent to u tain an all o-ation is a question of fact for
th jur. · . o that, if ther i any e idence tending to prove
a giv n fa t, it i. the duty of the court, upon the motion fo-i.:
non uit to permit it to o-o to the jury, and to take their
verdi t tou hing it: Vanb ebber v. Plimkett, 26 Or. 5!i2
(27 L. R. A. 811, 38 Pac. 707), and ca es therein cited.
n r the statute (Hill's Ann. Laws, ~ 235, ubd. 6),
th ourt i authorized to set a ide a verdi t and grant a
n w trjal for "insufficiency of the viden
to ju tif. the
v r i t or other decision, or that it i a ·ain t law." Thi .
. t tut d , not appear to have r c ived any dir t contru ti n y this court; but there ar authoriti
Is where
p rtin nt t th i quiry, and they leav no doul t but that,
in pa . . ing up n th um i n y of the evi nc to support
th verdirt, the trial ourt i authorized to weig·h and on. id r all th
vi 1 nr which has b en submitt d to the
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jury, and if it is ascertained that the verdict is against the

clear weight thereof, or is one that is manifestly unjust,

or that reasonable men would not adopt or return, to set

it aside and grant a new trial. A similar statute has re-

ceived express construction by the Supreme Court of the

United States in the case of Metropolitan R. R. Co. v.

Moore, 121 U. S. 558 (7 Sup. Ct. 1334). It was there held

that the language used in the statute, which gave a right

to set aside the verdict for insufficient evidence, was not to

be limited to its insufficiency in point of law, but that it

extended also to its insufficiency in point of fact. Such

evidence is said to be insufficient in law only where there

is a total absence of proof, either as to the quantity or

kind, or from which no inference could be drawn in sup-

port of the fact sought to be established. But insufficiency

in point of fact may exist where there is no insufficiency

in point of law; that is, there may be some evidence to

sustain every element of the case, competent both in quan-
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tity and quality under the law, and yet it may be met by

countervailing proof so potent and convincing as to leave

no reasonable doubt of the opposite conclusion. So it is

that, upon a review of the whole evidence, the testimony

in support of the cause of action or defense may be so

slight, although competent in law, or the preponderance

against it may be so convincing, that a verdict may seem

to be plainly unreasonable and unjust; and in many cases

it might be the duty of the court to withdraw the case from

the jury, or to direct a verdict in a particular way, yet in

others, where it would be proper to submit the case to the

jury, it might become its duty to set aside the verdict and

grant a new trial. The statute of the District of Colum-

bia, which was under consideration, was evidently taken

from the New York practice act; and the court in Metro-

politan R. R. Co. V. Moore, 121 U. S. 558 (7 Sup. Ct. 1334),

seems to have followed the New York decisions, upon the

principle that, where one jurisdiction adopts the statute

of another state or jurisdiction, it also adopts the construc-

tion given such statute by the courts of the latter jurisdic-

tion. See Algeo v. Duncan, 39 N. Y. 313. In Slater v.

Drescher, 72 Hun. 425 (25 N. Y. Supp. 153), it is said that

an objection to the verdict, because it was against the

weight of evidence, means the same thing as if it had
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jury, and if it is ascertained that the ver ict i against th C'
lear weight thereof, or i one that i manifestly unjust
or that reasonable men would not adopt or return, to s t
it aside and grant a new trial. A similar statute has r eceived express con truction by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Metrop olitan R. R. Co. v.
JI oore, 121 U. S. 558 (7 Sup. t. 1334). It wa there held
that the language u ed in the tatute, which gave a right
to et a ide the verdict for in ufficient evidence, was not to
be limited to its insufficienc in point of law, but that it
extended al o to it in ufficiency in point of fact. Such
evidence is said to be in ufficient in law only where there
is a total ab ence of proof, either a to the quantity or
kind or from which no inference could be drawn in support of the fact sought to be establi hed. But in ufficienc
in point of fact ma exist where there i no in ufficiency
in point of law; that. i there ma. - be ome evidence to
u tain ff'\ ery element of the ca e, competent both in quantity and quality under the law and et it may be met by
countervailing proof o potent and convincing as to leave
no reasonable doubt of the oppo ite conclusion. So it i
that upon a review of the whole e idence, the te timony
in upport of the cau e of action or defense may be o
. light, although competent in law, or the preponderance
again t it may be o convincing that a verdict may seem
to be plainly unrea onable and unjust; and in many cases
jt might be the dut. of the court to withdraw the ca e from
the jury, or to direct a verdict in a particular way yet in
other where it would be proper to submit the ca e to the
jur. it might become it dut to set a ide the verdict and
rant a new trial. Tb statute of the Di trict of Columbia which was under con ideration wa evidently taken
from the New York practice act· and the court in J.1 etropolitan R.R. Co. v. J.1oore 121 U. . 558 (7 up. Ct. 1334)
. e m to have followed the New York d cisions upon the
principl that where one juri di tion a opt the tatute
of an tber state or juri diction it al o ad t the con ruction i en ucb tatut b. the c urt. of th ld.tter juri diction.
e Al_qeo . Duncan 39 N. Y. 313. In lat er v.
Dre cher 72 Hun. 425 (25 N. Y. upp. 153) it i aid that
an obj tion to the v rdict b cau e it wa a ain t the
weight of evidence, means the same thing as if it had
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been based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to sup-

port it. The Ohio statute is substantially the same as our

own, and it is there held that the court, by force thereof

may grant a new trial where the verdict is "against or

contrary to the weight of the evidence:" Weaver v. Colum-

bus, S. d H. V. Ry. Co., 55 Ohio St. 491 (45 N. E. 717).

The California statute is in the exact language of ours,

and the courts of that state, from the time of their earliest

cognizance of the statute, have construed it as conferring

the power to weigh the evidence and determine its suffi-

ciency; and that if, upon the whole, the judge is satisfied

that the verdict is against the indubitable preponderance

or clear weight of evidence, or is unjust, or such as reason-

able men would not return under the circumstances of the

case, he is authorized, in his discretion, to set it aside,

which discretion is not subject to review by the supreme

court, except for an abuse thereof: Hall v. The Emily

Banning, 33 Cal. 522. So, it was said in People v. Lum
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Yit, 83 Cal. 130 (23 Pac. 228), that it was the duty of the

judge to grant a new trial if he is not satisfied that the

evidence as a whole was sufficient to sustain the verdict.

And in People v. Knutte, 111 Cal. 453 (44 Pac. 166), the

'jourt, speaking through Van Fleet, J., says: "The case

was argued here by both parties upon the assumption that

the new trial was granted upon the ground that the evi-

dence was deemed insufficient to sustain the verdict; and,

while no specific ground is stated in the order of the

court, it may be safely taken, from the court's action in

advising the jury to acquit, that this assumption of coun-

sel is correct. * * * While it is the exclusive province of

the jury to find the facts, it is nevertheless one of the most

important requirements of the trial judge to see to it

that this function of the jury is intelligently and justly

oxercised. In this respect, while he cannot competently

interfere with or control the jury in passing upon the evi-

dence, he nevertheless exercises a very salutary super-

visory power over their verdict. In the exercise of that

power, he should always satisfy himself that the evidence

as a whole is sufficient to sustain the verdict found, and,

■f in his sound judgment it is not, he should unhesitatingly

say so, and set the verdict aside." See, also, Lorenzana

c.'Camarillo, 41 Cal. 467; Kile v. Tuhhs, 32 Cal. 332, 339;
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b n based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to supThe Ohio statute is substantially the same as our
own, and it is th ere held that the cour,t, by force thereof
may grant a new trial where the verdict is "against or
contrar) to the weight of the evidence :'' liVeaver v. Colurnbits, S . & H. V . Ry. Co., 55 Ohio St. 491 ( 45 N. E. 717).
The California statute is in the exact language of ours,
and the courts of that state, from the time of their earliest
cognizance of the statute, have construed it as conferring
the power to weigh the evidence and determine its suffiiency; and that if, upon the whole, the judge is satisfied
that the verdict is against the indubitable preponderance
or clear weight of evidence, or is unjust, or such as reasonable men would not return under the circumstances of the
ca e, he is authorized, in his discretion, to set it aside,
which di cretion is not subject to review by the supreme
court, ex ·ept for an abuse thereof: Hall v. The Emily
Banning, 33 Cal. 522. So, it was said in People v. Lum
Yit, 83 Cal. 130 (23 Pac. 228), that it was the duty of the
judge to grant a new trial if he is not satisfied that the
evidence as a whole was sufficient to su stain the verdict.
And in P eople v. Knutte, 111 Cal. 453 ( 44 Pac. 166), the
' ~ o urt, peaking through \ AN FLEET, J., says: ''The case
was argued here by both parties upon the assumption that
the new t rial was granted upon the ground that the evidence was deemed insufficient to sustain the verdict; and,
tated in the order of the
while no specific ground i
court, it may be safely taken, from the court's action in
advising the jury to a quit that this assumption of coun. 1 i correct. * * * Whil jt is the exclu ive province of
the jury to find th fact , it i nevertheles one of the most
j portant requir m nt
of the trial judge to see to it
that thi function of th jury i intelligently and justly
x r i d. In thi r . I t, while h cannot compet ntly
int rf r with or ontrol th jury in a ing upon the vi1 n , b n v rth 1 .
x r i . a v ry alutary upervi r p
r
r th ir v r i t. In the ex rcise of that
p w r, h h uld alway ati fy him lf that the evid n e
a. a whol i . um i nt to u tain the verdi t found, and,
:f in hi
und juda-m nt it i not, h hould unhesitatin()'ly
. y , o, an
t th verdi t a i ''
e, al o, Lorenzana
<'. C'aniarill , 4
al. 467; Kile v . Tubbs, 32 Cal. 332, 339;
1 ort it.
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Oullahan v. Starbuck, 21 Cal. 413; Walton v. Maguire, 17

Cal. 92.

It must be understood, of course, that a mere dissatis-

faction of the judge with the verdict is not sufficient ground

for disturbing it, but the court must exercise its judgment

in each particular case, and if, from all the testimony given

the jury, it is satisfied that the verdict is against the clear

weight or preponderance of evidence, or that the jury has

acted unreasonably in returning the verdict, or has been

misled or misdirected, or has acted through improper mo-

tives, it is the duty of the court to set it aside and grant

a new trial: Wright v. Southern Express Co., 80 Fed.

85, 93; Mt. Adams, etc., Ry. Co. v. Loivery, 20 C. C. A. 596,

74 Fed. 463, 477. There may be sufficient evidence to go

to the jury to make a prima facie case, yet there may be

opposing evidence so strong, palpable, and overwhelming

as to dissipate any reasonable idea that the prima facie

case should prevail; or the case as first made may be so
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strong, and the countervailing testimony so weak and un-

satisfactory, as to preclude an honest and rational judg-

ment against the case first made. In either case, if the

jury should disregard the better showing, it would plainly

be the duty of the court to interpose, upon motion for a

new trial, and set the verdict aside; and this is the ra-

tionale of the statute, in providing that the verdict may be

set aside for insufficiency of evidence.

Mr. Justice Beewee has laid down what seems to us to

l)e the proper rule for the guidance of the trial judge, in

Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kmikel, 17 Kan. 172. He says:

"The one (the trial judge) has the same opportunity as the

jury for forming a just estimate of the credence to be

placed in the various witnesses, and, if it appears to him

that the jury have found against the weight of evidence,

it is his imperative duty to set the verdict aside. We do

not mean that he is to substitute his own judgment in all

cases for the judgment of the jury, for it is their province

to settle questions of fact ; and when the evidence is nearly

balanced, or is such that different minds would naturally

and fairly come to different conclusions thereon, he has

no right to disturb the findings of the jury, although his

own judgment might incline him the other way. In other

words, the finding of the jury is to be upheld by him as
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Oullahan v. Starbuck, 21 Cal. 413; Walton v. Maguire, 17
Cal. 92.
It must be understood, of course, that a mere dissatisfaction of the judge with the verdict is not ufficient ground
for disturbing it, but the court mu t exercise its judgment
in each particular ca e, and if, from all the te timony given
the jury, it is ati fied that the verdict is against the clear
weight or preponderance of evidence, or that the jury has
acted unreasonably in returning the verdict, or has been
misled or misdirected, or has acted through improper motives, it is the duty of the court to set it a ide and grant
a new trial:
Wright v . Southern Express Co ., 80 Fed.
85, 93; Mt. Adams, etc., Ry. Co. v. Lowery, 20 C. C. A. 596,
74 Fed. 463, 477. Th re may be sufficient evidence to go
to the jury to make a prima f acie ca e, yet there mav be
opposing evidence so trong, palpable, and overwhelming
as to di sipate any rea onable idea that the prima facie
case should prevail; or the case as first made ma be so
trong, and the countervailing te timony so weak and unatisfactory, as to preclude an bone t and rational judgment again t the ca e fir t made. In either case, if the
.iury should disregard the better showing, it would plainly
be the duty of the court to interpose upon motion for a
new trial and set the verdict a ide; and thi is the rationale of the statute, in providing that the verdict may be
et a ide for in uffi ciency of evidence.
Mr. Ju tice BREWER has laid down what seems to us to
be the proper rule for the guidance of the trial judge, in
Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v . Kitnkel 17 Kan. 172. He say :
"The one (the trial judge) bas the ame op ortunit a the
jury for forming a ju t e timat of the redence to be
and if it app ar to him
placed in the variou witn
that the jury have found ao-ain t th weight of e id n e,
it is hi imperative dut to t th Y rdi t a ide. We do
not m an that he is to u titut hi own ju o-m nt in all
a e for th ju o-ment f th juD f r it i th ir rovin e
to ettl qu tion f fact· an wh n be vid nc i n arly
alanced or i u h that iff r n t in
would n turally
and fairl. om t
iff r nt c nrlu. ion th r n, h b
no rio-bt to di hub th :findin
f the jury altbou h hi
own judo-m nt mio-ht incline him th ther way. In oth r
word th fi
f th Jnr. i to e uph ld y him a
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against any mere doubts of its correctness. But when

his judgment tells him that it is wrong; that, whether from

mistake, or prejudice, or other cause, the jury have erred,

and found against the fair preponderance of the evidence,

— then no duty is more imperative than that of setting

aside the verdict, and remanding the question to another

jury."

We think the court in the case at bar proceeded upon an

erroneous principle of law in limiting its inquiry to ascer-

taining whether there was any evidence from which the

jury might infer the facts which were attempted to be

proven. It should have gone further, and weighed the

evidence in accordance with the principles hereinbefore

enunciated: Larsen v. Oregon Ry. S Nav. Co., 19 Or. 240

247 (23 Pac. 974) ; State v. Billings, 81 Iowa, 99 (46 N. W.

862) ; City of Tacoma v. Tacoma Light S Water Co., 16

Wash. 288 (47 Pac. 738); Hawkins v. Reichert, 28 Cal.

534; Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 565; Bennett v. Hobro, 72
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Cal. 178 (13 Pac. 473); Reid v. Young, 7 App. Div. 400

(39 N. Y. Supp. 899); First Nat. Bank v. Wood, 124 Mo.

72 (27 S. W. 554). The defendants were entitled to have

their motion for a new trial passed upon in pursuance of

correct principles of law, and, the trial court having failed

in this, the cause will be remanded, with directions to de-

termine the motion under the rules herein announced. The

cumulative character of the newly-discovered evidence ren-

ders defendants' position upon the first ground untenable;

and, as it pertains to the second, viz., that the damages as-

sessed are excessive, that was a matter within the discre-

tion of the trial court. By anything we have said in this

opinion it is not intended to indicate in any manner our

impressions touching the weight of the evidence submitted

to the jury, and the court below, having seen the witnesses

and observed their manner, must act entirely upon its own

judgment in passing upon the motion.

Reversed.
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against any mere doubts of its correctness. But when
his judgment tells him that it is wrong; that, whether from
mistake, or prejudice, or other cause, the jury have erred,
and found against the fair preponderance of the evidence,
-then no duty is more imperative than that of setting
aside the verdict, and remanding the question to another
jury."
We think the court in the case at bar proceeded upon an
erroneous principle of law in limiting its inquiry to ascertaining whether there was any evidence from which the
jury might infer the facts which were attempted to be
proven. It should have gone further, and weighed the
evidence in accordance with the principles hereinbefore
enunciated: Larsen v. Oregon Ry. d!; N av. Co., 19 Or. 240
247 (23 Pac. 974); State v. Billings, 81 Iowa, 99 ( 46 N. W.
862) ; City of Tacorna v. Tacoma Light d!; Water Co., 16
Wash. 288 (47 Pac. 738); Hawkins v. Reichert, 28 Cal.
534; Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 565; Bennett v. Hobro, 72
Cal. 178 (13 Pac. 473); Reid v. Young, 7 App. Div. 400
( 39 N. Y. Supp. 899) ; First Nat. Bank v. Wood, 124 Mo.
72 (27 S. W. 554). The defendants were entitled to have
their motion for a new trial passed upon in pursuance of
correct principles of law, and, the trial court having failed
in this, the cause will be remanded, with directions to determine the motion under the rules herein announced. The
cumulative character of the newly-discovered evidence renders defendants' position upon the first ground untenable;
and, as it pertains to the second, viz., that the damages assessed are excessive, that was a matter within the discretion of the trial court. By anything we have said in this
opinion it is not intended to indicate in any manner our
impre ion touching the weight of the evidence submitted
to th jury, and the court below, having seen the witnesse
and obs rv d their manner, mu t act entirely upon its own
judgment in pa sing upon the motion.
Reversed.
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HARRISON V. SUTTER STREET RAILWAY

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of California. 1897.

116 California, 156.

Van Fleet, J. — Plaintiff had verdict and judgment

HARRISON V. SUTTER STREET RAILWAY
COMPANY.

against defendants for eight thousand dollars, as dam-

Supreme Court of California.

ages suffered by the heirs of his intestate through the

1897.

death of the latter, resulting from injuries received in a

116 California, 156.

collision between a car of the railroad company, on which

lie was a passenger, and a wagon of the brewing company,

occasioned by the negligence of the defendants.

The court below granted defendants a new trial, on the

ground that the verdict was excessive; and the plaintiff

appeals from such order, urging that it was wholly unwar-

ranted under the e\adence, and was an abuse of discretion

on the part of the trial court.

Certain preliminary objections are interposed by defend-

ants, and reasons suggested why the order appealed from
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cannot be reviewed, but these objections, while possibly pos-

sessed of some merit, being purely technical, and the court

being of opinion that the order must be affirmed on the

merits, it will prove more satisfactory to both parties, and

more in accord with the disposition of the court, to so dis-

pose of the appeal.

That the granting of a new trial is a thing resting so

largely in the discretion of the trial court that its action

in that regard will not be disturbed except upon the disclo-

sure of a manifest and unmistakable abuse has become

axiomatic, and requires no citation of authority in its sup-

port. It is true that such discretion is not a right to the

'exertion of the mere personal or arbitrary will of the

judge, but is a power governed by fixed rules of law, and

to be reasonably exercised within those rules, to the ac

complishment of justice. But so long as a case made

presents an instance showing a reasonable or even fairly

debatable justification, under the law, for the action taken,

such action will not be here set aside, even if, as a ques-

tion of first impression, we might feel inclined to lake a

FLEET, J.-Plaintiff had verdict and judgment
ainst defendants for eight thousand dollars, as damages suffered by the heirs of his intestate through the
death of the latter resulting from injuries received in a
rollision between a car of the railroad company on which
he was a passenger, and a wagon of the brewing company,
o casioned by the negligence of the defendants.
The court below granted defendants a new trial, on the
ground that the verdict wa exces ive; and the plaintiff
appeals from u h order, urO'jn g that it was wholly unwarranted under th evidence, and wa an abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court.
Certain preliminary objections ara interpo ed by defendants, and reason sugge ted why the order appealed from
cannot be reviewed, but these objection , whil e possibly possessed of some merit, being purely technical, and the court
being of opinion that the order must he affirmed on the
merits, it will prove more sati factory to both parties, ano
more in accord with the dispo ition of the court, to so dispose of the appeal.
That the grantinO' of a new trial is a thing resting so
largely in the di cretion of the trial court that its action
in that regard will not be di turbed except upon the disclo ure of a manif t and unmi takable abuse ba becom
axiomatic, and require no citation of authorit_T in it upport. It is true that uch di cretion i not a right to the
1exertion of the m re p r onal or arbitrary will of the
judge, but i a power O'ffverned b~v fL~ed rul of law an<l
to be r a onably _,.erci, ed within tho
rule to th ac-·
compli hm nt ~f jn ti e.
ut so long a a ca
mad
presents an in , tan
, howin a rea. on ble or v n fairly
debatabl ju tifi ation under th law, for th action tak n
such action will not b h re et a ide, ven if a a question of first i~pression, we might feel inclined to take a
VAN
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different vie\v from that of the court below as to the pro-

priety of its action. More especially is this true where,

as here, the question rests largely in fact, and involves the

proper deduction to be drawn from the evidence. The

opportunities of the trial court, in such instances, for

reaching just conclusions are, as a general thing, so su-

perior to our own, that we will not presume to set our

judgment against that of the former, where there appears

any reasonable room for difference.

Appellant does not seriously question the correctness of

these principles, but he contends that the record does not

disclose a proper case for their application. He contends

that there was no room for the exercise of discretion ; that

the evidence as to the amount of damages suffered was

wholly without conflict; that there was nothing to indicate

passion or prejudice, except the amount of the verdict it-

self, and that there was no showing, by affidavit or other-
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wise, of any improper conduct on the part of the jury. As

to the last suggestion, it is impertinent to the inquiry.

Granting a new trial for the misconduct of the jury, such

as may be shown by affidavit, is something wholly different

and apart from the right which the statute gives to grant

such relief on the ground of excessive damages. The for-

mer contemplates some overt act of impropriety, such as

receiving evidence out of court, reaching a verdict by

chance, and, the like; while an excessive verdict implies no

misconduct of the jury necessarily, but simply that the re-

sult has been induced through excited feelings or preju-

dice, of which the jury may not, perhaps, have been even

aware, but which has, nevertheless, precluded an impartial

consideration of the evidence. Whether the verdict is ex-

cessive is to be determined solely from a consideration of

the evidence in the case, and whether it will fairly sustain

the conclusion of the jury — a question which cannot be

aided by the showing of extrinsic facts, by affidavit, or

otherwise.

As to the suggestion that the evidence touching ''the

amount of damages" was without conflict, we are not whol-

ly certain that we appreciate exactly what counsel means.

There was no evidence given as to the amount of the dam-

ages suffered. The damages sued for were in their nature

unliquidated, and no witness pretended to fix the precise
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different view from that of the court below as to the proI riety of its action. More especially is this true where,
as here, the question rests largely in fact, and involves the
J roper deduction to be drawn from the evidence. The
opportunities of the trial court, in such instances, for
reaching just conclusions are, as a general thing, so superior to our own, that we will not presume to set our
judgment against that of the former, where there appears
any reasonable room for difference.
Appellant does not seriously question the correctness of
these principles, but he contends that the record does not
disclose a proper case for their application. He contends
that there was no room for the exercise of discretion; that
the evid nee as to the amount of damages suffered was
wholly without conflict; that there was nothing to indicate
passion or prejudice, except the amount of the verdict itelf, and that there wa no showing, by affidavit or otherwise, of any improper conduct on the part of the jury. As
to the last suggestion, it is impertinent to the inquiry.
Granting a new trial for the misconduct of the jury, such
as may be shown by affidavit, is something wholly different
and apart from the right which the statute gives to grant
uch relief on the ground of excessive damages. The former contemplates some overt act of impropriety, such as
receiving evidence out of court, reaching a verdict by
chance, and the lik ; while an exc~s sive verdict implies no
mi conduct of the jury necessarily, but imply that the re. ult ha been induced through excited feelings or prejudi e, of which the jury may not, perhaps, have been even
awar , but which ha , nevertheles , precluded an impartial
on ideration of the evidence. Whether the verdict is exc , ive is to
determined sol ly from a on ideration of
the vid n e in the a , and whether it will fairly sustain
the on lu ion of the jury-a question which cannot be
aid d y the showinO' of extrin ic fact , by affidavit, or
tl1 rwi e.
A t th sugg tion that the evid nee touching ''the
amount of damaO' '' wa without onfli t, we are not whol1v . rtain that w a
r ci te ex tly what counsel means.
ri her w no vid n gi v n a t the amount of the dam::tg
uff r d. Th l m
u for w re in their nature
~rn1i<]ui
ted, and n witne pr tended to fix the precise
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amount plaintiff should recover. We presume counsel

means that the evidence as to the circumstances which tin

jury had a right to regard in determining the award of

damages, such as age, condition of life, etc., of deceased,

was without conflict. But if this were true, which we do

not think can be fairly said, the question as to the proper

deduction and conclusion to be drawn from such evidence

would still remain for the jury, and whether their con-

sideration of the evidence for this purpose was influenced

by passion or prejudice would not necessarily be affected

by the fact that the evidence was without conflict. A jury,

if excited by prejudice, might as readily award unjust dam-

ages where the evidence was uncontradicted as where it

was in sharp conflict.

The evidence tended to show that deceased was about

sixty-nine years of age, but his physical appearance would

seem to have indicated more advanced years. Dr. Dorr,

one of his physicians, testified that he looked older; that
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he appeared between seventy-five and eighty years of

age; while Dr. O'Brien, a physician who examined him on

behalf of one of the defendants, after the accident and

before his death, testified that he considered him a debili-

tated man; that in his judgment the result of the injury

would not have been serious but for his age and debility.

According to the testimony of his widow his health was

very good, but he had suffered all his life from sick head-

ache, for which she had been required to nurse him.

His income was about one hundred and ten dollars per

month, that is, it did not appear that he was in steady or

permanent employment, but the evidence tended to show

that he was an expert accountant, who straightened out

books and tangled accounts when called upon, and that his

earnings averaged that sum monthly.

According to the Carlisle mortality tables, he had an ex-

pectancy or probable lease of life of a fraction over nine

years and a half. He had dependent on him a wife and an

adult unmarried daughter.

Upon these facts the jury were instructed, as to the

question of damages, in effect, that they should estimate

and determine the amount that the deceased would in all

reasonable probability have earned in the years yet re-

maining to him ; and, deducting from this the amount which
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amount plaintiff hould r cover. We pr ume coun el
mean that the evi en e as to the circum tances which tl1
jury had a right to r gard in det rmininO' the award of
damage , such as age, condition of lif , etc., of decea ed,
was without conflict. But if this were tru , whi h we do
not think can be fairly said, the question as to the proper
deduction and conclusion to be drawn from such evidence
would still remain for the jury, and whether their conideration of the evidence for this urpo e was influenced
by passion or prejudice would not nece arily be affeoted
by the fact that the evidence was without conflict. A jury,
if excited by prejudice, might as readily award unju t damages where the evidence was uncontradicted as where it
was in sharp conflict.
The evid nee tended to how that deceased was about
sixty-nine year of age, but his physical appearance would
seem to have indicated more advanced years. Dr. Dorr,
one of his physicians, te tified that he looked older; that
he appeared between seventy-five and eighty years of
aO'e; while Dr. 0 'Brien, a phy ician who examined him on
behalf of one of the defendants, after the accident and
before his death, testified that he considered him a debilitated man; that in his judgment the result of the injury
would not have been eriou but for hi age and debility.
According to the te timony of hi widow his health was
very good, but he had 's uffered all hi life from sick heada lw for which she had been required to nurse him.
His income was \about one hundred and ten dollars per
month, that is, it did not appear that he was in steady or
permanent employment but the evidence tended to how
that he was an expert accountant who traight ned out
book and tangled account when alled u on, and that hi
earninO' averaged that um monthly.
According to the Carli le mortalit. ta les he had an expectancy or probable lea e f life of a fraction ov r nin
~ear and a half. H bad d pend nt on him a wife and an
adult unmarried daughter.
U on the e fa ts the jury w re instruct d a to the
que tion of damage , in eff t t at they should estimate
and determine th amount that the decea ed would in all
r a. onable robability have earn d in the years yet remaining to him; and, d ducting from tbi the amount whi h
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lie would reasonably require for his own personal use and

maintenance, give a verdict which would pecuniarily com-

pensate the heirs. It is conceded that this instruction gave

the correct rule for the guidance of the jury.

In view of this evidence, and the rule of compensation

by which the jury were to be governed, we think it quite

manifest that we should not be justified in holding that

there was an abuse of discretion in setting aside the ver-

dict. The jury would seem to have proceded upon the

theory that the deceased's expectancy of life would be

fully realized, and that he would continue to the end with

the same earning capacity as that possessed by him at the

time of his death, for their verdict implies that he would

have earned, over and above the amount required for his

personal needs, the large net sum of eight thousand dol-

lars, and this would necessarily contemplate constant em-

ployment without interruption from sickness or other cause

and with a rate of earnings in no way diminished, since it
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will readily be perceived that according to his income his

utmost gross earnings in the given time would not have

exceeded twelve thousand dollars.

Such a result does not accord with ordinary human ex-

'perience. The deceased's expectancy of life was not a cer-

tainty, but a mere probability. It is true he might have

lived even longer than the limit of such expectancy, but

the chances were much against it. He might also have

retained his vigor and ability to labor to the last, but ordi-

nary experience teaches that the weight of advancing years,

after the age attained by deceased, bears strongly against

such result. Under these circumstances we do not think

it should be said that the conclusion of the trial judge was

without support in the evidence.

But appellant urges that it is only where the verdict

is so grossly disproportionate to any reasonable limit of

compensation warranted by the facts, as to shock the sense

of justice, and raise at once a strong presumption that it is

based on prejudice or passion rather than sober judgment,

that the judge is at liberty to interpose his judgment as

against that of the jury; and that such an instance is not

shown. The rule invoked is correct, as addressed to the

function of the trial court, or when asking this court to set

aside the verdict where it has been refused by the court
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he would reasonably require for his own personal use and
maintenance, give a verdict which would peuuniarily compensate the heirs. It is conceded that this instruction gave
the correct rule for the guidance of the jury.
·
In view of this evidence, and the rule of compensation
by which the jury were to be governed, we think it quite
manifest that we should not be justified in holding that
there was an abuse of di cretion in setting a ide the verdict. The jury would seem to have proceded upon the
theory that the deceased 's expectancy of life would be
fully realized and that be would continue to the end with
the same earning capacity as that possessed by him at the
time of his death, for their verdict implies that he would
have earned, over and above the amount required for his
personal needs, the large net sum of eight thousand dollar , and this would necessarily contemplate constant employment without interruption from ickness or other cause
and with a rate of earnings in no way diminished, since it
will readily be perceived that according to his income his
utmost gross earnings in the given time would not have
exceeded twelve thousand dollars.
Such a re ult does not accord with ordinary human ex·perience. The deceased 's expectancy of life was not a certainty, but a mere probability. It is true he might have
lived even longer than the limit of such expectancy, but
the chance were much against it. He might also have
retained bis vigor and ability to labor to the last, but ordinary experience teaches that the weight of advancing year ,
aft r the age attained by deceased, bears strongly again t
uch r sult. Under these circumstances we do not think
it hould be said that the conclusion of the trial judge was
without support in the evidence.
But app llant urg . that it is only where the verdict
1.
o O'ro. , 1y di proportionate to any rea onable limit of
omp n ation warranted by the fa ts, a to shock the s nse
of ju. ti , and rai at once a tronO' pr sum tion that it is
ba c1 on r judi e or pa ion rath r than sober jud ·m nt,
that thr ju ere L at lib rty to int rpo e hi judgment as
again t that of th jury; nd that u h an in tance is not
bown. Th rule invok d is correct, as addr s ed to the
funrti n of tb triaJ ourt, or when a king thi. ourt to et
aside the verdict where it bas been refu ed by th court
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below. But when we are asked to review the act of that

court, where in the exercise of its discretionary power it

has seen fit to set aside the verdict on this ground, a very

different rule prevails. Every intendment is to be in-

dulged here in support of the action of the court below,

and, as elsewhere suggested, it will not be disturbed if the

question of its propriety be open to debate.

Order granting new trial affirmed.

Hareison, J., and Garoutte, J., concurred.

GRAHAM V. CONSOLIDATED TRACTION COM-

PANY.

Supreme Court of New Jersey. 1900.

65 New Jersey Laiv, 539.

On rule to show cause.

below. But when we are asked to review the act of that
court, where in the exercise of its discretionary power it
has seen fit to set a ide the verdict on this ground, a ver ,
different rule prevail . Every intendment i to be indulged here in support of the action of the court below,
and, as elsewhere suggested, it will not be di turbed if the
question of its propriety be open to debate.
* * * * * * * ~ * •
Order granting new trial affirmed.
HARRISON, J., and GAROUTTE, J., concurred.

Before Justices Depue, Van Syckel and Gummeee.

Per Curiam.

This suit was brought by the plaintiff as administrator

of Melville T. Graham, deceased, under the act which pro-
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vides for recovery of damages in cases where the death of

a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default.

Gen. Stat. p. 1138. The suit is for the benefit of the father

of the deceased, as his next of kin, to recover damages for

GRAHAM

V.

the *' pecuniary injury resulting to him from the death of

CONSOLIDATED
P ANY.

TRACTION

COM:-

the deceased." The deceased was a boy four years and

four months old at the time the accident happened which

Supreme Court of New J ersey. 1900.

resulted in his death. The jury found a verdict for the

plaintiff and assessed the damages at $2,000.

65 New J ersey Law, 539.

This case was first tried in September, 1896, and resulted

in a verdict for $5,000 for the plaintiff. Upon a rale to

show cause why this verdict should not be set aside this

court, June Term, 1897, held that the damages were ''ab-

surdly excessive," and ordered that a new trial be granted

On rule to show cause.
B efore Justices DEP E, VAN SYCKEL and GuMMERE.

unless the plaintiff would accept the sum of $1,000, which

lie declined to do. In October, 1897, the case was again

tried, and a second verdict for $5,000 was rendered. This

T. p. — 44

P ER
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of Melville T. Graham, deceased, under the act which proide for r ecover y of damages in ca es where the lea th of
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Gen. Stat . p. 1138. The uit is for the benefit of the father
of the decea ed, as his next of kin, to recover dama()' for
the ''pecuniary injury re ulting to him from the l ath of
the de ea ed.' ' The deceased wa a boy four :'e r and
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verdict was set aside on tlie ground that the damages were

excessive. Graham v. Consolidated Traction Co., 33

Vroom 90. The case was retried January 30th, 1899, and

resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $5,000.

The verdict was set aside on two grounds — first, that the

plaintiff had not established by a preponderance of proof

that defendant was liable; second, that the damages were

excessive. Graham v. Consolidated Traction Co., 35 Id.

10.

The evidence at this trial is substantially the same as it

was at the last preceding trial. Two additional witnesses

were examined on the part of the plaintiff, Olivett Butler

and Joseph A. Smith. As to the amount of damages that

should be recovered the case is not in anywise altered.

With respect to the case upon the merits as presented at

the last preceding trial, the opinion of Chief Justice Magie

demonstrates that it was insufficient to sustain any verdict

in, favor of the plaintiff. A careful examination and con-
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sideration of the testimony at the last trial, including that

given by Olivette Butler and Joseph A. Smith, the new

witnesses called by the plaintiff, leave the case substantial-

ly in the same condition, upon the weight of the evidence,

that it was in when the last preceding verdict was set

aside. The observations of the Chief Justice on the evi-

dence at that time apply with full force to the present

case.

The rule should be made absolute on both grounds.^

t This is probably an extreme case, in one aspect of it. Usually the court

will acquiesce in the decision of the jury if a second verdict is rendered in

substantial conformity to that which was set aside as contrary to the evidence.

Bryant v. Commonwealth Tns. Co. (1833) 13 Pick. (Mass.) 543; Monarch G.

«S S. Min. Co. V. McLaughlin (1877) 1 Ida. 650; Van Doren v. Wright (1896)

65 Minn. 80, 67 N. W. 668.

verdict was set aside on the ground that the damages were
excessive. Graham v. Consolidated Traction Co., 33
Vroom 90. The case was retried January 30th, 1899, and
resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $5,000.
The verdict was set aside on two grounds-first, that the
plaintiff had not established by a preponderance of proof
that defendant was liable ; second, that the damages were
excessive. Graham v. Consolidated Traction Co., 35 Id.
10.
The evidence at this trial is substantially the same as it
was at the last preceding trial. Two additional witnesses
were examined on the part of the plaintiff, Olivett Butler
and Joseph A. Smith. As to the amount of damages that
hould be recovered the case is not in anywise altered.
With respect to the case upon the merits as presented at
the last preceding trial, the opinion of Chief Justice Magie
demonstrates that it was insufficient to sustain any verdict
in, favor of the plaintiff. A careful examination and conideration of the testimony at the last trial, including that
given by Olivette Butler and Jo seph A. Smith, the new
witnesses called by the plaintiff, leave the case substantially in the same condition, upon the weight of the evidence,
that it was in when the last preceding verdict was set
aside. The observations of the Chief Justice on the evidence at that time apply with full force to the present
case.
The rule should be made absolute on both grounds. 1
1 This is probably an extreme case, in one asp· t of it.
Usually the court
will acquie ce in the deci ion of the jury if a second verdict is rendered in
sub tantial conformity to that which was set aside as contrary to the evidence.
Bryant v. Commonwealth In , . Co. (1 33) J3 Pick. (Ma.s.) 543; Monarch G.
& S. Min. Co. v. McLaughlin (1877) 1 Ida. 650; Van Doren v. Wright (1896)
65 Minn. 80, 67 N. W. 668.
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TATHWELL V. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 1903,

122 Iowa, 50.

TATHWELL V. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS.

Action to recover damages resulting from personal in-

juries received by plaintiff while driving in a street of de-

Suprerne Court of Iowa.

1903.

fendant city by reason of his horse stepping into a hole in

the highway in or beside a culvert, the result being that

plaintiff was thrown to the ground. Judgment for plain-

122 Iowa, 50.

tiff on a former trial was reversed, and a new trial ordered.

114 Iowa, 180. On this trial verdict was returned for the

plaintiff for $100 damages, which, on plaintiff's motion,

was set aside as inadequate. From this ruling defendant

appeals. — A firmed.

McClain, J. — There was a conflict in the evidence as to

whether the street was defective at the place where plain-

tiff was injured, but the verdict of the jury for the plain-

tiff establishes the existence of a defect and the negligence

of the city with reference thereto, and we have for con-
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sideration only this question: Did the trial judge err in

setting aside the verdict on the ground that the damages

awarded to plaintiff for the injury were inadequate? The

right of jury trial, as uniformly recognized under the com-

mon-law sj^stem, involves the determination by the jury,

rather than by the judge, of questions of fact, including the

amount of damage to be given where compensation is for

an unliquidated demand. Nevertheless, the trial courts

have exercised from early times in the history of the com-

mon law the power to supervise the action of the jury, even

as to the measure of damages, and to award a new trial

where the verdict is not supported by the evidence and is

manifestly unjust and perverse. And while it is uniformly

held that the trial judge will interfere with the verdict of

the jury as to matters of fact with reluctance, and only

where, on the very face of the evidence allowing every

presumption in favor of the correctness of the jury's ac-

tion, it is apparent to a reasonable mind that the verdict is

clearly contrary to the evidence, yet the power of the judge

to interfere in extreme cases in unquestionable. It has

Action to recover damages resulting from personal injuries received by plaintiff while driving in a street of defendant city by reason of bis horse stepping into a hole in
the highway in or be ide a culvert, the result being that
plaintiff was thrown to the ground. Judgment for plaintiff on a former trial was reversed, and a new trial ordered.
114 Iowa, 180. On this trial verdict was returned for the
plaintiff for $100 damages, which, on plaintiff's motion,
was et aside a inadequate. From this ruling defendant
a ppeals.-A ffinned.
McCLAIN, J.-There was a conflict in the evidence as to
whether the street was defective at the place where plaintiff was injured, but the verdict of the jury for the plaintiff establi hes the existence of a defect and the negligence
of the city with reference thereto, and we have for consideration only this question: Did the trial judge err in
setting aside the verdict on the ground that the damage.
awarded to plaintiff for the injury were inadequate~ ·The
right of jury trial, as uniformly recognized under the common-law system, involves the determination by the jury,
rather than by the judo·e, of question of fact, including th
amount of damage to be given where compensation is for
an unliquidated demand. N everthele s, the trial courts
have exerci ed from early time in the hi tory of the common law the power to super i e the action of the jury, even
as to the measure of damaO'es, and to award a new trial
where the erdict is not upport d by the e idence and i
manife tly unju t and perverse. And while it is uniformly
held that the trial judge will int rfere with the verdict of
the jury as to matters of fact with relu tance, and only
allowing e r.
where, on the ery fac of the eviden
presumption in favor of the correctne s of the jury's action, it i apparent to a rea onable mind t at the verdict i
clearly ontrary to th e id n e yet the power of the jud
to interf r in :xtreme ca s in unque tionable. It bas
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sometimes been said that the judge should not interfere

where the verdict is supported by a scintilla of evidence;

but the scintilla doctrine has been discarded in this state,

and is not now generally recognized elsewhere. Meyer v.

Houck, 85 Iowa, 319. The general scope and extent of the

judge's supervisory power with reference to the jury's

verdict as to questions of facts is well illustrated by the

very first reported case in which the power a])pears to

have been exercised — that of Wood v. Gunston, decided in

1655 by the Court of King's Bench (or, as it was called dur-

ing the commonwealth, Upper Bench), found in Style's Re-

ports, on page 466. The action was upon the case for

speaking scandalous words against the plaintiff, charging

him, among other things, with being a traitor. The jury

gave plaintiff one thousand five hundred pounds damages,

whereupon the defendant moved for a new trial on the

ground that the damages were excessive, and that the jury

had favored the plaintiff. In opposition to this it was said
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in argument that, after a verdict the partiality of the jury

ought not to be questioned, nor was there any precedent

for it — '*in our books of the law," and that it would be of

dangerous consequence if it should be permitted, and the

greatness of the damages cannot be a cause for a new trial.

But counsel for the other party said that the verdict was a

"packed business," else there could not have been so great

damages, and that the court had power, "in extraordinary

cases such as this is to grant a new trial." The chief jus^

tice thereupon said: "It is in the discretion of the court

in some cases to grant a new trial, but this must be a

judicial, and not an arbitrary, discretion, and it is frequent

in our books for the court to take notice of miscarriages

of juries, and to grant new trials upon them. And it is

for the people's benefit that it should be so, for a jury may

sometimes, by indirect dealings, be moved to side with one

party, and not to be indifferent betwixt them, but it cannot

be so intended with the court; wherefore let there be a

new trial the next term, and the defendant sliall pay full

costs, and judgment to be upon this verdict to stand for

security to pay what shall be recovered upon the next ver-

dict." This case is especially interesting in connection

with the present discussion, because it is one in which the
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sometimes been said that the judge should not interfere
where the verdict is supported by a scintilla of evidence;
but the scintilla doctrine has been discarded in this state,
and is not now generally recognized elsewhere. Meyer v.
Houck, 85 Iowa, 319. The general scope and extent of the
judge's supervisory power with reference to the jury's
verdict as to questions of facts is well illustrated by the
very first reported case in which the power aJJp ear to
have been exercised-that of Wood v. Gunston, decided in
1655 by the Court of King's Bench (or, as it was called during the commonwealth, Upper Bench), found in Style's Reports, on page 466. The action was upon the case for
speaking scandalous words against the plaintiff, charging
him, among other things, with being a traitor. The jury
gave plaintiff one thousand five hundred pounds damages,
whereupon the defendant moved for a new trial on the
ground that the damages were excessive, and that the jury
had favored the plaintiff. In opposition to this it was said
in argument that, after a verdict the partiality of the jury
ought not to be questioned, nor was there any precedent
for it-" in our books of the law," and that it would be of
dangerous consequence if it should be permitted, and the
greatne s of the damages cannot be a cause for a new trial.
But coun el for the other party said that the verdict was a
"packed bu iness," else there could not have been so great
damage , and that the court had power, ''in extraordinary
case such a this is to grant a new trial.'' The chief jus..
tice ther upon aid: ''It is in the di cretion of the court
in some ca e to grant a new trial, but this must be a
judi ial, and not an arbitrary, discretion, and it is frequent.
in our book f r the court to take notice of mi carriages
of juri , , an to O'rant new trial upon th m. And it is
for th p or 1 ' b n fit that it hould be so, for a jury may
som tim , b indir t dealing , be moved to side with one
party, and not to b in iff rent b twixt th m, but it c nnot
be s int n d with th court; wherefore 1 t th r be a
new trial t e n t t rm, and the d fendant shall pay full
·o ·t . , a
ju gm nt to e upon this v r i t to stand for
,' urjt. o ay what hall b recov r d upon the n t rhi. a. i. , e iall i t r ting in conne tiorr
li ~t. ''
ith th pr ent di u sion, b aus it is one in which the
1

Sec. 5]
Sec. 5] New Trials 693

assessment of damages was peculiarly within the province

of the jury, and because the nature of the supervisory

power of the trial judge is explained as being, in effect, to

set aside a verdict for excessive damages in such cases

which seem to have been the result of passion and preju-

dice, and not the deliberate exercise of judgment. That

the practice of granting new trials under such circumstances

has continued in all the courts administering the common

law from the time of the case just cited to the present time

is a matter of common knowledge with the profession, and

citation of authorities would be superfluous. That the

power is exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice by

reason of the rendition of a verdict by the jury which is

wholly unreasonable, in view of the testimony, which is

given in the presence of the court, is universally conceded.

But the question with which we are now more particular-

ly concerned is whether this power of the trial judge may

be exercised where the injustice consists in rendering a
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verdict for too small an amount. If the case is one in

which the measure of damages is a question of law, the

court has, of course, the same power to set aside a verdict

for too small an amount as one which is excessive ; and this

is, in general, true without question where the damages are

capable of exact computation — that is, where the facts

established by the verdict of the jury show as matter of

law how much the recovery should be. In such cases the

court may grant a new trial, unless the defendant will con-

sent to a verdict for a larger amount fixed by the court,

than that found by the jury; just as in case of excessive

damages under similar circumstances the court may re-

duce the amount for which the verdict shall be allowed, to

stand, on penalty of setting it aside if the successful party

does not agree to the reduction. Carr v. Miner, 42 111. 179;

James v. Morey, 44 111. 352. It seems to have been thought

by some courts that the general supervisory power over

verdicts, where the amount of damage is not capable of

computation, and rests in the sound discretion of the jury,

should not be exercised where the verdict is for too small

an amount; at least not with the same freedom as in cases

where it is excessive. Earlier v. Dixie, 2 Strange, 1051;

Pritchard v. Hewitt, 91 Mo. 547 (4 S. W. Eep. 437, 60 Am.
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a e ment of damages was peculiarly within the province
f the jury, and because the nature of the super isory
p wer of the trial judge is exp] ained a being, in effect, to
~e t a ide a ' rdict for exce iYe damages in uch cases
which eem to have been the re ult of pa sion and prejudice, and not the deliberate exerci e of judgment. That
the practice of granting new trial under such circum tances
has continued in all the court admini tering the common
law from the time of the ca e ju t cited to the present time
is a matter of common knowledge with the prof e ion and
citation of authoriti
would be uperf:luous. That the
power i exerci ed to I revent mi carriage of ju tice by
I eason of the rendition of a verdict by the jury which is
wholly unrea onable in view of the te timony which is
·iven in the presence of the court is univer ally onceded.
But the que tion with which we are now more particularly concerned i s whether thi power of the trial judge may
l e exeTci ed where the mjustice consi t in rendering a
, . erdict for too mall an amount. If the ca e i one in
which the measure of damage i a que tion of law, the
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rapable of exact computation-that i , where the facts
tabli hed by the verdict of the jury how a matter of
law how much the recovery hould be. In u h ca es the
ourt mav grant a new trial unl
the defendant will con. ent to a verdict for a larger amount fixed by the court,
than that found by the jur ; ju. t as in case of exces ive
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Eep. 265) ; Martin v. Atkinson, 7 Ga. 228 (50 Am. Dec. 403).

No such limitation on the supervisory power of the trial

judge has been definitely established, and by the great

weight of authority, both in England and America, the

power to set aside the verdict, when manifestly inconsis-

tent with the evidence, and the result of a misconception by

the jury of their powers and duties, is as fully recognized

where the verdict is inadequate as where it is excessive;

and ample illustration of the exercise of this power is

found in actions to recover damages for personal injuries

or injury to the reputation, although in such cases the

amount of damage is jDeculiarly within the jury's discre-

tion. Phillips V. London S S. W. R. Co., 5 Q. B. D. 781;

Robinson v. Town of Waupaca, 77 Wis. 544; Whitney v.

Mihvaukee, 65 Wis. 409 ; Caldivell v. Vichshurg, 8. & P. R.

Co., 41 La. Ann. 624 (6 So. Rep. 217); Benton v. Collins,

125 N. C. 83 (34 S. E. Rep. 242, 47 L. R. A. 33) ; McNeil v.

Lyons, 20 R. I. 672 (40 Atl. Rep. 831) ; Lee v. Publishers,
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George Knapp S Co., 137 Mo. 385 (38 S. W. Rep. 1107);

McDonald v. Walter, 40 N. Y. 551; Carter v. Wells, Fargo

(& Co., (C. C.) 64 Fed. Rep. 1007.

Counsel for appellant urge, however, that the whole mat-

ter of granting new trials is controlled by the provisions

relating to that subject found in the Code, and that these

provisions supersede the common-law rules on the subject.

It has not been our understanding that the provisions of

the Code relating to practice are intended to entirely super-

sede the rules of the common law. They are, like other |

statutory law, merely additions to or modifications of com-

mon-law rules. We have licld for instance, that, without

any statutory provision on the subject, the court may di-

rect a verdict in a pro])er case; that new trials may be

granted in equity after the expiration of one year from the

time of rendering judgment, although the statutory provi-

sions as to new trials after judgment limit the right to one

year; that the Supreme Court may grant a restraining

order, in the exercise of its general appellate jurisdiction,

although there is no statutory provision whatever with

reference thereto. These illustrations indicate that the

provisions of the Code as to practice supersede common-

law rules only so far as they are inconsistent therewith.
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Rep. 265); "ll1artin v . Atkinson, 7 Ga. 228 (50 Am. Dec. 403).
No such limitation on the supervisory power of the trial
judge ha been definitely e tablished, and by the great
weight of authority, both in England and America, the
power to et a ide the verdict, when manifestly inconsistent with the evidence, and the re ult of a misconception by
the jury of their powers and duties, is as fully recognized
where the verdict is inadequate as where it is excessive;
and ample illustration of the exerci e of this power is
found in actions to recover damage for personal injuries
or injury to the reputation, although in such cases the
amount of damage is peculiarly within the jury's discretion. Phillips v. London & S. W. R. Co., 5 Q. B. D. 781;
Robinson v. Town of TiVaiipaca, 77 Wis. 544; Whitney v.
Milwauk e, 65 Wi . 409; Caldwell v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.
o., 41 La. Ann. 624 (G So. Rep. 217); Benton v. Collins,
l'.25 N. C. 83 (34 S. E. R p. 2.42, 47 L. R. A. 33); McNeil v.
Lyon , 20 R. I. 672 ( 40 Atl. Rep. 831); Lee v. Publishers,
George Knapp & Co., 137 Mo. 385 (38 S. W. Rep. 1107);
McDonald v. TiValter, 40 N. Y. 551; Carter v . Wells, Fargo
& Co., (C. C.) 64 Fed. Rep. 1007.
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The legislature has never attempted a complete codification

of the rules and principles of the common-law, either as to

substantive or remedial rights. The language of Code,

section 3446, seems to be directly applicable. It is as fol-

lows: "The rule of the common-law, that statutes in

derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no ap-

plication to this Code. Its provisions and all proceedings

under it shall be liberally construed with a view to pro-

mote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice."

We are inclined, therefore, to the view that the sections

relating to new trial do not necessarily cover the whole

ground, nor prevent us from recognizing powers of the trial

court in this respect which have generally been exercised

under the common-law system. See McDonald v. Walter,

40 N. Y. 551.

However this may be, we think the authority is expressly

given in Code, section 3755, to set aside a verdict which is

manifestly inadequate under the evidence. It is true that
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paragraph four of that section, with reference to the in-

fluence of passion or prejudice, mentions excessive dam-

ages, and that paragraph five, with relation to error in the

assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large

or too small, refers only to actions upon contract, or for

the injury or detention of property. But paragraph six

authorizes a new trial if the verdict is not sustained by.

sufficient evidence, and we see no reason for limiting this

]iaragraph to cases where, under the evidence, it appears

that the verdict should have been the other way. A verdict

in favor of plaintiff for $100 is as much against the plain-

tiff as to any right to recover damages not covered by the

verdict as though it had been outright for the defendant.

Suppose the plaintiff sues on a promissory note, and, de-

fendant having interposed a general denial, plaintiff intro-

duces the note in evidence (the signature not being denied

under oath), and there is no evidence whatever that the note

is not valid, or has been discharged, and nevertheless the

jury returns a verdict for defendant, could it be claimed

that a new trial should not be granted? And yet this case

does not come under any of the paragraphs of the action

on new trial, unless it comes under the paragraph last

above referred to. We think this paragraph should have a

NEW TRIALS

The 1 O'i lature bas ne'er attempted a complete codification
of the rule and principle of the common-law either as to
sub tantive or remedial rights. The language of Code>
section 3446, seems to be directly applicable. It is as follows: ''The rule of the common-law, that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be tri tl construed, bas no application to this Code. Its pro' i ion and all proceedings
under it shall be liberall; con trued with a view to promote its object and a ist the parties in obtaining ju tice."
We are inclined, therefore, to the view that the section
relating to new trial do not n eces arily cover the whole
ground, nor prevent us from recognizing powers of the trial
ourt in tbi respect which have generally been exercised
under the common-law y tern. See McDonald v. Walter,
40 N. Y. 551.
Howe er tbi may be, we think the authority i expre ly
given in Code, section ·3755, to set a ide a verdict which is
manife tly inadequate under the evidence. It is true that
paragraph four of that ection, with reference to the influence of passion or prejudice, mentions exces ive damages, and that paragraph five with relation to error in the
a e sment of the amount of reco ery, whether too large
or too mall, r fer onl to action upon contract or for
the injury or detention of property. But paragraph six
authorizes a new trial if the verdict i not sustained b
. ufficient evidence, and we see no reason for limiting tbi
paragraph to cases where under the evidence it appear
that the verdi t hould have been the other way. A verdict
in favor of plaintiff for $100 i a much again t the plaintiff as to any right to r o er dama 0 ·e not covered b. the
v rdict a though it bad been outright for the defendant.
uppo e th plaintiff ue on a promis ory note an defendant havina- interpo ed a general denial p]aintiff introduce the note in evid n (the i nature not b in denied
nnder oath) and there i no evi n e whate er that he note
i. not valid or ha b e di charO'ed and ne\'erth 1
th
jury return a verdi t for efen ant oul it b claim d
that a new trial hould ot b O'rant
n . et t i a e
does not ome under an~ of the paracrra h of th action
n n w tri 1 unl s it
un r th l aracrrap la t
abo' r f rr t .
e think t i ara ra1 h houl have a
1

1
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liberal interpretation, and that it covers such a case as the

one now before us. Similar provisions in other Codes have

been construed as authorizing the setting aside of verdicts

on plaintiff's motion because the damages allowed are in-

adequate. Du Brutz V. Jestup, 54 Cal. 118; Bennett v.

Hohro, 72 Cal. 178 (13 Pac. Eep. 473) ; Emmons v. Sheldon,

26 Wis. 648; Henderson v. St. Paul S D. R. Co., 52 Minn.

479 (55 N. W. Rep. 53) ; McDonald v. Walter, 40 N. Y. 551.

The trial judge therefore had the power to set aside

the verdict below on account of the inadequacy of the dam-

ages, and the question is whether the case is a proper one

for the exercise of such power. We interfere reluctantly

with the action of the lower court in ruling on motions for

a new trial, and especially where a new trial has been

granted. Peebles v. Peebles, 77 Iowa, 11; Morgan v. Wag-

ner, 79 Iowa, 174; Hophins v. Knapp S Spaulding Co., 92

Iowa, 212; Mally v. Mally, 114 Iowa, 309; Chouquette v.

Southern Electric R. Co., 152 Mo. 257. Although it is
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urged in this case that the jury allowed to the plaintiff the

actual damages sustained by him so far as they were shown

by any evidence corroborating his own testimony, neverthe-

less, it clearly appears that, if his unimpeached testimony

is to be credited, he was damaged to a much larger extent

than is covered by the verdict rendered by the jury. We

do not hold that the trial judge may substitute his judg-

ment of the credibility of the witness in place of the judg-

ment which the jury has exercised, but we do say that the

trial judge may, if he finds that the jury have failed to

allow the amount of damages shown by uncontradicted testi-

mony, set aside the verdict as in conflict with the evidence

and award a new trial.

The ruling of the lower court was therefore correct, and

it is Affirmed.
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liberal interpretation, and that it covers such a case as the
one now before us. Similar provisions in other Codes have
been construed as authorizing the setting aside of verdicts
on plaintiff's motion because the damages allowed are inadequate. Du Brutz v. J estup, 54 C 1. 118; Bennett v.
H ob1·0, 72 Cal. 178 (13 Pac. Rep. 473); Emmons v. Sheldon,
26 Wis. 648; Henderson v. St . Paul <!; D. R. Co., 52 Minn.
479 (55 N. W . Rep. 53); McDonald v. l!Valte1', 40 N. Y. 551.
* * * * * * * * * *
The trial judge therefore had the power to set aside
the verdict below on account of the inadequacy of the damages, and the question is whether the case is a proper one
for the exercise of such power. We interfere reluctantly
with the action of the lower court in ruling on motions for
a new trial, and especially where a new trial bas been
granted. P eebles v . Peebles, 77 Iowa, 11; Morgan v. Wagner, 79 Iowa, 174; Hopkins v. Knapp cf; Spaiilding Co., 92
Iowa, 212; Mally v. },]ally, 114 Iowa, 309; Chouqitette v.
Soitthern Electric R. Co., 152 Mo. 257. Although it is
urged in this case that the jury allowed to the plaintiff the
actual damages sustained by him so ~ar as they were shown
by an>Tevidence corroborating his own t stimony, nevertheles , it clearly appears that, if his unimpeached testimony
is to be credited, be was damaged to a much larger exte.n t
than i covered by the verdict rendered by the jury. We
do not hold that the trial judge may substitute his judgm nt of the credibility of the witness in place of the judgm nt which the jury ha exercised, but we do ay that the
trial judO'e may, if he :finds that the jury have failed to
aJlow th a ount of damaO'e, shown by uncontradicted testimony, s t aside the verdict as in conflict with the evidence
and award a new trial.
Th ruling of the lower court was therefore correct, and
it is Affirmed.
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Section 6. Vekdict Contrary to Law.

LYNCH V. SNEAD ARCHITECTURAL IRON WORKS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1909,

SECTION

6.

VERDICT CONTRARY TO

LAW.

132 KentiicTcy, 241.

Opinion of the court by Judge Lassing — Reversing.

**********

LYNCH V. SNEAD ARCHITECTURAL IR N WORKS.

Appellant complains that the jury in arriving at their

verdict wholly disregarded instruction No. 1, and returned

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

1909.

their verdict in favor of plaintiff in spite of it. It is urged

by counsel for appellant that, without entering into a con-

sideration as to whether or not this instruction properly

132 K entitcky 241.

presented the law as warranted by the facts proven, never-

theless it was the law of this case, and in disregarding it

and returning a verdict in favor of plaintiff as they did the

jury found contrary to the law, and that, for this reason,

the judgment predicated upon their verdict should be re-

versed and a new trial awarded. On the other hand, it is

claimed by plaintiff's counsel that this instruction did not
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fairly present the law of the case, as warranted by the facts,

but that as the jury, even though not properly instructed,

reached a reasonably fair and just conclusion, their ver-

dict and finding should not be disturbed. The greater part

of the briefs of opposing counsel is devoted to a considera-

tion of this question. The defendant did not except or ob-

ject to this instruction, nor is his counsel now objecting

to same, but his complaint is that the jury disregarded this

instruction. * * *

Section 340, subsec. 6, Civ. Code Prac. makes one of the

grounds upon which a new trial may be granted ''that the

verdict or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or

is contrary to law." An examination of the authorities

discloses the fact that courts of last resort of the various

states are not by any means harmonious in the construc-

tion which they have placed upon similar code provisions,

and there is, at least, an apparent lack of uniformity upon

this point in the decisions in our own state. The superior

court in the cases of Gausman v. Paff, 10 Ky. Law Rep.

Opinion of the court by

JUDGE

LASSING-Reversing.

* * * * * * * * * *
Appellant complain that the jur in arriving at their
verdict wholly di regarded in truction No. 1, and returned
their verdict in fa or of plaintiff in spite of it. It is urged
by coun el for appellant that, without entering into a consideration a to whether or not thi in truction properly
pre ented the law a warranted by the facts proven neverthele s it wa the law of this case and in di regarding it
and returning a verdict in favor of plaintiff as they did the
jury found contrary to the law, and that, for thi reason
the judgment predicated upon their verdict hould be rever ed and a new trial awarded. On the other hand, it is
laimed by plaintiff' coun el that tbi in truction did not
fairly pre ent the law of the ca e a warranted b. the fact ,
but that a the jury even though not properly in tructed
reached a rea onabl. fair and ju t conclu ion, their verdict and finding hould not be di. turbed. The greater part
of the brief of oppo ing coun. el i devoted to a consideration of thi que tion. The defen ant did not except or object to thi in truction nor i bi coun el now ob· ecting
to same but bi. complaint i that the jury di regarded this
instruction. * * *
ection 340 sub c. 6, iv. ode Prac. make on of the
round upon whi h a n w trial may be grant d "that the
v rdi t or d i. ion i not . u tained b. uffici nt evidence or
i contrar. to law.''
n xamination of the authorities
di clo e tb fact that ourt.. of la t re ort of tbe ariou
states ar not bv anv m an harmoniou in the con truction whi h the. l1av . i la d u on imilar cod provi ion
an t r i at l a t, an apparent la k of unif rmity upon
thi point in th
i 10
in our own tate. The up rior
court in the ca e of Gait man v. Paff, 10 Ky. Law Rep.
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240; Palmer v. Jolinson, 13 Ky. Law Eep. 590; Burns v.

McGihhen, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 441, and Bertman v. Ehert's

Adm'r., 9 Ky. Law Rep. 198, held that, where a verdict is

sought to be avoided on the ground that it is contrary to

law, the complaint relates to the law as given by the court

in its instructions to the jury, and not as it should have

been given, or, in other words these decisions hold that

where a new trial is sought on the ground that the verdict

is contrary to law, the ''law" here referred to means the

"law" as declared or given by the court, and not as it

should have been given; that, even though the court was

in error and failed to give the law correctly, nevertheless

the jury was bound by the "law" as given, and, if their

verdict was contrary to the "law", this fact would author-

ize a reversal of the case, and the granting of a new trial.

And in the case of Curran v. Stein, etc., 110 Ky. 99, 60 S.

W. 839, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1575, this court said: "It is in-

sisted for appellant that the court erred in giving the jury
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a peremptory instruction, or in interfering with the free-

dom of their deliberation by requiring them to return a

verdict which they were unwilling to render. There was

r\o error of the court in requiring the jury to obey his in-

structions. The peremptory instruction of the court to the

jury, like any other order the court may make in a case,

must be obeyed. * * * To hold that the jury may disobey

the peremptory direction of the court would be to vest the

jury with power to review the decisions of the court on the

law of the case." As opposed to this idea, this court in

the case of Armstrong v. Keith, 3 J. J. March. 153, 20 Am.

Dec. 131, upheld a verdict which was admittedly contrary

to "law" where the instruction or law, as given by the

court, was erroneous, and said that the finding of the jury,

under such circumstances, was sufficient to justify a final

judgment. * * *

That this court had, even prior to 1830, when the opinion

in the case of Armstrong v. Keith, was delivered, commit-

ted itself to the doctrine that the jury may not disregard

the "law" as given by the court, and decide on the facts to

the contrary, notwithstanding the instruction, while not

directly decided, is incidentally established. In the case

of Sfiiith V, Morrison, 3 A. K. Marsh, 81, in passing upon
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240; Pal11ier v. Johnson, 13 l{y. Law Rep. 590; Burns v.
111cGibben, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 441, and Bertman v. Ebert's
Adm'r., 9 l{y. Law Rep. 198, held that, where a verdict is
sought to be avoided on the ground that it is contrary to
law, the complaint relates to the law as given by the court
in its instructions to the jury, and not as it should have
been given, or, in other words these decisions hold that
where a new trial is sought on the ground that the verdict
is contrary to law, the "law" here referred to means the
"law" as declared or given by the court, and not as it
should have been given; that, even though the court was
in error and failed to give the law correctly, nevertheless
the jury was bound by the "law" as given, and, if their
verdict was contrary to the "law", this fact would authorize a reversal of the case, and the granting of a new trial.
And in the case of Curran v. Stein, etc., 110 Ky. 99, 60 S.
W. 839, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1575, this court said: "It is insisted for appellant that the court erred in giving the jury
a peremptory instruction, or in interfering with the freedom of their deliberation by requiring them to return a
verdict which they were unwilling to render. There was
·10 error of the court in requiring the jury to obey his in1
structions. The peremptory instruction of the court to the
jury, like any other order the court may make in a case,
must be obeyed. * * * To hold that the jury may disobey
the peremptory direction of the court would be to vest the
jury with power to review the decisions of the court on the
law of the case.'' As opposed to thi idea, this court in
the case of Armstrong v . K eith, 3 J. J. March. 153, 20 Am.
Dec. 131, upheld a verdict which was admittedly contrary
to "law" wh re the in truction or law, as given by the
ourt, wa erroneous, and said that the finding of the jury,
under u h ircum tanc s, was sufficient to justify a final
jud ment. * * *
That thi ourt had, v n prior to 1830, when the opinion
in th ca. e f Armstrong v. Keith, was d livered, committhat the jury may not disregard
Jd it 1f t th do tri
O'iv n hv th c urt, and decide on the facts to
n twith tandino- the in truction, while not
ir
i
, i in id ntally e tabli hed. In the case
1
f mith v. Morris on, A. K. Marsh, 81, in passing upon
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the ruling of the trial court in stopping Smith's counsel

from arguing a proposition of law seemingly contrary to

that given by the court, this court said : ''In thus restrain-

ing counsel we are of opinion the court acted perfectly

correct. After having obtained from the court an opinion

on the legal import of the settlement, a decent regard for

that opinion would seem to forbid the same matter from

being again canvassed before the jury," * * * The deci-

sions of other courts of last resort upon this point are not

harmonious, but the decided weight of the authorities is to

the effect that, where a statute authorizes a reversal upon

the ground that the verdict is contrary to the "law," the

"law" referred to means the "law" of tliat case as given

by the court, whether right or wrong. The Supreme Courts

of California, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Penn-

sylvania, South Carolina, Alabama, South Dakota, and

England have held that, where a verdict is returned con-

trary to "law" as given by the instructions of the court,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

it is such a verdict as will authorize the trial court to set

aside because contrary to law. The "law" referred to in

the opinions undef consideration is invariably held to mearn

the "law" as given by the court, and not as it should or

might have been given. On the other hand, the Supremei

Courts of Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas have taken ai

contrary view, and, where the verdict is in harmony with

what the court conceives to be the "law" should have been,

rather than in harmony with the law as given by the trial

judge, the finding of the jury has not been disturbed.

In the case of Murray v. Heinze, 17 Mont. 353, 42 Pac.

1057, 43 Pac. 714, the court had under consideration the

correctness of the ruling and judgment of the trial court

because it was contrary to the "law" as given by the court.

Upon appeal it was urged that this was error because the

instruction or "law" as given by the trial court was itself

erroneous. In disposing of this question the court said:

"But counsel for the appellant contend that, the instruction

being erroneous, the court erred in setting aside the ver-

dict, because of the fact that the jury wliolly disregarded

it. The question presented is: Had the jury the right

to disregard the instructions of the court if erroneous?

This is a most important question in the administration of

NEW TRIALS

690

the ruling of th trial court in top ing mith' counse]
from arrrujng a I ropo ition of law seemin 'ly c ntrary to
that given by the court, thi court aid: ''In thu restraining counsel we are of opinion the court acted perf ctly
correct. After having obtained from the court an opinion
on the legal import of the ettlement, a decent r gard for
that opinion would eem to forbid the ame matter from
being again canva ed before the jury.'' * * * Th deciions of other courts of last resort upon thi point are not
harmonious, but the decided weight of the authoritie is to
the effect that, where a statute authorizes a re ersal upon
the rrround that the verdict is contrary to the "law," the
"law" referred to mean the "law" of that ca e as gi'i·en
by the court, whether right or wrong. The Supreme Courts
of alifornia, Iowa, Montana, N ebra ka, N w York, Pennsylvania, South arolina, Alabama, South Dakota, and
En()'land have held that, where a ve_rdict is returned contrary to "law" as given by the instructions of the court,
it i such a v rdict a will authorize th trial court to t
a ide becau e contrary to law. The "law" referred to in
the opinions unde'r con ideration i invariably held to mean
the "law" a given by the court, and not as it hould 01·
might have b en given. On the other hand the upremei
Court of Georgia, Mi sissippi, and Texas have taken ai
contrary vi w and, where the verdict i in harmony with
what the ourt conceives to be the "law" hould have been,
rather than in harmony with the law as given by the trial
judo·e the fin inrr of the jury has not be n di turbed.
In the ca e of Mitrray v. Heinze, 17 Mont. 353, 42 Pac.
] 057 43 Pa . 714 the ourt had under con ideration the
corre tne of the rulin()' and ju gm nt f the trial court
ecau e it was contrar ~ to the "law" a given by the court.
Upon appeal it was urrr d that thi wa rror be au e the
in tru tion or "law" a ·i en by the trial court wa it elf
rr neou . In di p inrr f this qu tion th
ourt aid:
"But coun 1 for th a p llant ont n that the in. truction
in()' erron ou th
urt rr d in etti ()' a id the verdi t be au of th fa t that th jur r wholly di regarded
it. Th
u ti on pr . nt
i, :
Ha th jury the right
t
i r O'ar th in tru tion
f th
ourt if erroneous~
Thi i a m t i ort t qu tion in the administration of
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the law. It must be conceded that there is a conflict of

authority on this question. Counsel for the appellant cite

a number of authorities in support of their claim that the

jury may disregard the instructions of the court, if er-

roneous, if the verdict is otherwise in accord with the law,

and that it would be error in the court under such circum-

stances to set aside the verdict. It seems from the authori-

ties cited by appellant that Kentucky, Georgia, Texas, and

some other states have so held. A number of the cases

cited by counsel for appellant are not exactly in point ; that

is, they are cases in which the jury did not seeminglv dis-

regard the erroneous instructions upon vitally material is-

sues in the case, and where the verdict was in conformity

with the charge of the court, taken as a whole. But it

must be confessed that some of the authorities cited hold

that the jury have a right to disregard erroneous instruc-

tions of the court, and that the verdict should not be set

aside in such cases if in accord with the correct law. * * *

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

But let it be conceded that there is a conflict of authorities

upon the question under discussion, or let us suppose that it:

is a new question, without any adjudications or authority

in either event; what course should this court pursue? It

has always been held in this jurisdiction that it was the sole

province of the jury to determine questions of fact. It

has been uniformly held that it was error for the court to

invade this special province of the jury by even comment-

ing on the evidence. State v. Sullivan^ 9 Mont. 174, 22

Pac. 1088, and authorities cited. Our system of practice

is certainly based upon the theory that it is the province

of the jury to determine facts, and that of the court to de-

termine and declare the law in all cases, except in prosecu-

tions for libel. 'The jury, under the direction of the court,

shall determine the law and the facts.' State Const, art.

.3, section 30. From this constitutional clause it seems

plain that the jury have no right to determine the law in

any other case. ' Expressio unius est exclusio alterius/

This is the first time it has been seriously contended in this

court that the jury have the right to determine the law in

an ordinary suit at law and to absolutely disregard the in-

structions of the court on the ground that, in the oiVmion

of the jury, the instructions of the court are erroneous. If
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the law. It must be conceded that there is a conflict of
authority on this question. Counsel for the appellant cite
a number of authorities in support of their claim that the
jury may disregard the instructions of the court, if erroneous, if the verdict is otherwise in accord with the law,
and that it would be error in the court under such circumstances to set aside the verdict. It seems from the authorities cited by appellant that Kentucky, Georgia, Texas, and
some other states have so held. A number of the cases
cited by counsel for appellant are not exactly in point; that
is, they are cases in which the jury did not seemina-lv disregard the erroneous instructions upon vitally material issues in the case, and where the verdict was in conformity
with the charge of the court, taken as a whole. But it
must be confessed that some of the authorities cited hold
that the jury have a right to di regard erroneous instructions of the court, and that the verdict should not be set
aside in such cases if in accord with the correct law. * * *
But let it be conceded that there is a conflict of authorities
upon the question under discussion, or let us suppose that it
is a new question, without any adjudications or authority
in either event; what course should this court pursue~ It
ha always been held in this jurisdiction that it was the sole
province of the jury to determine questions of fact. It
ha been uniformly held tbat it was error for th court to
invade this pecial province of the jury by even commentin on the evidence. State v. Sitllivan, 9 Mont. 174, 22
Pac. 108 , and authoriti
cited. Our system of practi e
i ertainl based upon the theory that it is the provin
of th jury to d termine facts, and that of the court to d t rmin ancl d lar the law in all case , exc pt in prosecution. for lih 1. 'The jury, under the dire tj n of t e court,
hall c1 t rmin th law and the fact . '
tate onst. art.
ti on J 0. From thi
onstitutional clau. i.t
ems
plain that th jury bav no rjght to d t rmin th law in
anv other cas . 'Expr s io itnius est excliisio alteriu . '
J~i j , th :flr. t time it h ' b en riou ly c nt nd din thi.
rt th t tl1 jury hav th ri ht t d t rmin th law jn
n r jnary uit at la an to ab lut ly di r gar the in. tn1 ·1 i n
f th r urt n th gronn that, in th 01 inior:
of th jury, th in tru tions of the court are erroneous. If
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the contention of tlie appellant is to be upheld, what may

we not anticipate as the result in the administration of the

law in this state? If the jury may rightfully invade the

l^rovince of the court, why may not the court retaliate by

invading the province of the jury in determining questions

of fact? As counsel for the respondent suggest, if the con-

tention of appellant is correct, then logically there is an

appeal in all cases upon questions of law from the trial

court to the jury. And as counsel for respondent further

suggest in their argument, if the jury may determine the

law, an attorney arguing the case may say to the jury:

'The court will charge you that the law is so and so, but I

say to you the court is wrong. You, the jury, are the

hidges of the law, and may determine it for yourselves.'

Would any court permit such an argument to a jury? Cer-

tainly not. But, if the jury are the judges of the law, why

should a court prohibit such an argument to them? If a

juror should state upon his voir dire that he would not be
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ii'overned by the law as declared by the court, if he thought

ihe instructions erroneous, nobody would doubt that he

would not be permitted to sit in the case. Yet, if he has

the right as a juror to determine the law, we do not see

why he should be challenged for asserting that right. If

^he contention of appellant is correct, the time of this court

in hearing future appeals will be devoted to determining

whether the court or the jury were right in their views of

the law in the trial of the cause in the lower court. Author-

ity, or no authority, we cannot give our sanction to a prac-

tice that would lead to such results. Such a course would

ultimately result in overturning our system of keeping

separate and distinct the powers and duties of the courts

and juries, confining each to its own proper province, in the

degradation of the courts, and confusion and chaos in the

administration of the law."

And in the case of Einerson v. County of Santa Clara,

40 Cai. 543, the court, in passing upon a similar question,

said: ''It matters not if the instruction disobeyed be itself

erroneous in point of law, it is nevertheless binding upon

the jury who can no more be permitted to look beyond the

instructions of the court to ascertain the law than they
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the contenti n of the appellant is to be upheld, what may
w n t anti i1 at a th re ult in the a lmini tration of the
law in thi t t . If the jury may rj O'htfully invade the
I roYince f th court why may not the court retaliate by
invadino· the province of the jury in determinino· que tionE<
of fact.
coun el for the re pondent ugge t, if the contention of app llant i correct then lo()'icall there is an
a1 I eal in all ca es upon que tion of law from the trial
court to the jur . And a conn el for re pondent further
. u 0 ·g st in their argument, if the jury may determine the
Jaw an attorney arguin the ca e ma. ay to the jury:
'The court will char e . ou that the law i o and o, but I
. ay to you th court i wronO'. You, the jury are the
iud
of the law and ma determine it for your elves.'
Would any court permit uch an argument to a jury? Certainly not. But, if the jury are the judge of the law, why
.·hould a ourt prohibit uch an argument to them? If a
juror hould tate upon bis voir dire that he would not be
goyerned by the law a declar d b. the court, if he thought
1he in tru tion. erroneou , nobody would doubt that be
w uld not be permitted to sit in the ca e. Yet, if he bas
1he right a a juror to determine the law, we do not see
why he hould be hallenged for a erting that right. If
fh contention of appellant i correct, the time of this court
in hearing future appeal will be devoted to determining
whetb r tbe ourt or the jury were rio·ht in their views of
th law in the trial of the can e in the lower court. Authority or no authority we cannot giv our auction to a practj e that would lead to uch re ult .
uch a cour e would
nltimately r ult in overturning our y tern of ke ping
. parate and di tin t the pow r and dutie of the court
and juri confining ach to it own proper province in the
rle.o-radation of the court., an confu ion and chaos in the
a mini tr a ti on f th law.''
And in th a e of Emer. on . Co'llnty of Santa Clara
-tO ai. 5.J: th ourt in pa . in()' upon a imilar qu tion
. aid : ' It matt r not if th in. tru tion di bey d be it, lf
rroneou in p int of law it i n vertbele bin.din upon
th jur-y wh an no mor b
r itt to look l yon 1 thr
in truction of the court to a c rtain the law than th y
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would be allowed to go outside of the evidence to find the

facts of the case."

And in the case of Barton v. Sliull, 62 Neb. 570, 87 N. W.

322, the Supreme Court in passing upon a similar question,

said: ''Without at the present time discussing the correct-

ness of the instructions, the rule is that it is the duty of the

jury in all cases to follow the instructions given them by

the court whether correct or not ; and, if they fail to do so,

the verdict will be deemed to be contrary to law, and should

be set aside and a new trial ordered. The reasons for the

rule are obvious. Any other would lead to endless con-

fusion sanctioning utter disregard of the court's opinion

of the law applicable to the pleadings and the evidence, and

render its instructions entirely impotent, except when will-

ed otherwise by the jury. A refusal or failure to follow

the instructions of the court is sufficient ground for setting

asid-e the verdict and granting a new trial."

And in Way v. Chicago d Rock Island Bailway Co., 73
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Towa, 463, 35 N. W. 525, the court said: ''We will not in-

quire whether the instruction is correct or not. It was

given as the law of the case, and should have been respected

by the jury. A verdict which has been found against the

instructions of a court should be set aside, even though the

disregarded instructions should be erroneous." To the

^ame effect are Bunt en v. Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Bosw. (N. Y.)

254; Flemming v. Marine Ins. Co., 4 Whart. (Pa.) 59, 33

Am. Dec. 33; Dent v. Bryce, 16 S. C. 1; Fleming v. L. & N.

R. R. Co., 148 Ala. 527, 41 South. 683; Wood v. Cox, 84

Rnglish Common Law, 280. In this case the Chief Justice,

Sir John Jervis, said: "Without discussing the merits

of the case or the propriety of the directions of the pre-

siding judge, I think the verdict cannot be sustained. The

undersheriff directs the jury to find for the plaintiff, telling

them there is no evidence to support the plea, and they

persist in finding for the defendant. There must be a new

trial." The authorities which we have cited are represen-

tative cases in their respective jurisdictions bearing upon

this question. As opposed to the views therein expressed,

the Supreme Courts of Texas, Georgia, and Mississippi,

as above indicated, have taken a contrary view, but the

reason for the rule announced in these several cases cited
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would be allowed to go outside of the evidence to find the
facts of the case.''
And in the case of Barton v. Shull, 62 Neb. 570, 87 N. W.
3:.2, the Supreme Court in passing upon a similar question,
aid: "Without at the present time discussing the correctness of the instructions, the rule is that it is the duty of the
jury in all cases to follow the instructions given them by
the court whether correct or not; and, if they fail to do so,
the verdict will be deemed to be contrary to law, and should
be set aside and a new trial ordered. The reasons for the
rule are obvious. Any other would lead to endless confusion anctioning utter disregard of the court's opinion
f the law applicable to the pleadings and the evidence, and
render its instructions entirely impotent, except when willd otherwise by the jury. A refusal or failure to follow
the instructions of the court is sufficient ground for setting
a. id~ the verdict and granting a new trial.''
And in Way v. Chicago & Rock Island Railway Co., 73
Iowa, 463, 35 N. W. 525·, the court said: "We will not in'luire whether the instruction is correct or not. It was
given a the law of the ca e, and should have been respected
hy the jury. A verdict which has been found against the
in tructions of a court should be set aside even though the
di regarded instructions should be erroneous.'' To the
'flme effect are Bunten v. Mutual In~. Co ., 4 Bosw. (N. Y.)
:254; Flemming v . Marine Ins. Co., 4 Whart. (Pa.) 59, 33
Am. Dec. 33; Dent v. Bryce, 16 S. C. 1; Fleming v. L. & N.
R. R. Co., 148 Ala. 527, 41 South. 683; Wood v. Cox, 84
nJngli. h
mmon Law, 280. In thi case the Chief Ju tice,
,_ ir John J rvi , aid: ''·W ithout discu ino· the m rits
f th ca or th propriety of the dir tion of the pre' l ing judg , I think the verdict cannot b ustained. The
nn r h ·i direct th jury to find for th plaintiff, telling
th m th r i n
vi n e to up ort the 1 a, and they
p r .·i tin fi ing for th d f ndant. There mu t be a new
trial." Th authoriti which we have ited ar r presentati e a . in th ir r p ctiv juri di tion b arino- upon
tbi. qu tio
As op o d t th views th r in expre sed,
th
rt of T xa G or ia, an Mi is ippi,
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i
i
t , hav tak n a
ntrary view, but the
r a . on for the rule announced in th se sev ral cases cited
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by counsel for appellee in support of his contention is far

from satisfactory, and the conclusion reached is opposed

to both the theory and spirit upon which our system of

jurisprudence is based, and is overwhelmed by the weight

of authority in other jurisdictions.

After a full consideration, we adhere to the rule infer-

entially declared in Sjuith v. Morrison, * * * and subse-

quently followed by the superior court in the several opin-

ions to which we have referred, and by this court in the

later case of Curran v. Stein, that it is the duty of the trial

jury to "conform to the instructions of the court upon

matters of law." In other words, that it is the exclusive

province of the court to determine questions of law, and

that of the jury only to apply the facts proven to the

law as given by the court; and, when it is stated that the

verdict is contrary to "law," reference is had to the law

as given by the court, and not as it might or should have

been given.
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Section- 7. Newly Discovered Evidence.

(a) Cumulative Evidence.

WINFIELD BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION

V. McMULLEN.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1898.

59 Kansas, 493.

Johnston, J. J. F. McMullen was elected secretary of

the Winfield Building and Loan Association, and for the

faithful performance of his duties he executed a bond in the

by counsel for appellee in upport of his ontention is far
from sati factor), and the conclusion reached is oppo ed
to both the theory and spirit upon which our system of
jurisprudence is based, and is overwhelmed by the weight
of authority in other jurisdictions.
After a full con ideration, we adhere to the rule inf erentially declared in Srnith v. Morrison, * * * and subsequently followed by the superior court in the se eral opinions to which we have referred, and by this court in the
later case of Curran v. Stein, that it is the duty of the trial
jury to "conform to the instructions of the court upon
matters of law." In other words, that it is the exclusive
province of the court to determine questions of law, and
that of the jury only to apply the facts proven to the
law as given by the court; and, when it is stated that the
verdict is contrary to "law," reference is had to the law
as given by the court, and not as it might or should have
been given.

sum of two thousand dollars, which was signed by J. C. Mc-

Mullen as surety. It was claimed that the secretary mis-

appropriated $2,201.75 of the money of the Association,

and an action was commenced on the bond. Among other

defenses alleged, J. C. McMullen, the surety, denied the

execution of the bond, and, upon testimony offered, the

SECTION 7.
(a)

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

Curnulative Evid ence.

WINFIELD BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
V. McMULLEN.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1898.
59

Kansas, 493.

J oHNSTON J. J. F. McMullen was elected secretary of
the Winfield Building and Loan Association, and for the
faithful performance of his duties he executed a bond in the
um of two thou and dollars, which wa igned by J. C. M Mull n as urety. It was claimed that the secretary misappropriated $2,201.75 of the mon y of the A ociation,
and an ti n wa comm need on the bond. Amono· other
defen
all o-ed, J.
M Mull n, th surety denied the
execution of_ the bond, and, upon testimony offered, the
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jury in answer to a special question found that he did not

execute it, and a general verdict was returned and judg-

ment rendered in his favor. Afterward, the Association

filed its petition, under the statute, asking the court to set

aside the verdict and judgment on the ground of newly-

discovered evidence. The bond had been lost and was

therefore not produced at the trial. It was afterward

found, and it constituted the newly-discovered evidence up-

on which a new trial was asked. On the application, testi-

mony was offered as to the loss of the bond and the dili-

gence exercised to secure it before the trial was had. After

a full hearing, the District Court granted a new trial and

set aside the verdict and judgment theretofore rendered.

This order was reversed by the Court of Appeals (46 Pac.

410), and its ruling is here for review.

The Court of Appeals held that the testimony was new-

ly-discovered evidence, that it was material, and that due

diligence had been used to obtain it, but that it was cumu-
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lative in character; and on this ground the reversal was

based. That the bond was newly discovered evidence is

"lear. It was lost and is found. It was very material.

Prom the fact that its execution was denied. When pro-

duced, and submitted to the inspection of the jury, they

could determine for themselves, from it and from the testi-

mony offered in connection with it, as to the genuineness

of the defendant's signature thereon. Whether the surety

signed the bond was the principal fact to be investigated;

and when the jury found that he did not sign it, they were

not required, under the instructions of the court, to pursue

their investigations further, nor to determine anything as

to the other defenses which were set up. It was therefore

a controlling issue in the case; and with respect to it, the

new testimony was of the utmost importance. The District

Court and the Court of Appeals therefore correctly ruled

that the evidence was newly discovered, that it was ma-

terial, and further that due diligence had been used to ob-

tain and produce it at the trial. Was it cumulative, and

did the trial court err in granting a new trial?

The general rule is that newly-discovered evidence

which is merely cumulative is not sufficient ground for a

new trial ; but we are clearly of the opinion that the pro-

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 17

jury in answer to a pecial question found that he did not
execute it, and a general verdict was returned and judgment rendered in his favor. Afterward, the Association
filed its petition, under the statute, asking the court to set
aside the verdict and judgment on the ground of newlydiscovered evidence. The bond had been lost and was
therefore not produced at the trial. It was afterward
found, and it constituted the newly-discovered evidence upon which a new trial was asked. On the application, testimony was offered as to the loss of the bond and the diligence exercised to secure it before th~ trial was had. After
a full hearing, the District Court granted a new trial and
set aside the verdict and judgment theretofore rendered.
This order was reversed by the Court of Appeals ( 46 Pac.
410), and its ruling is here for review.
The Court of Appeals held that the testimony was newly-discovered evidence, that it was material, and that due
diligence had been used to obtain it, but that it was cumulative in character; and on this ground the reversal was
based. That the bond was newly discovered evidence is
"lear. It was lost and is found. It was very material,
fro m the fact that its execution was denied. When pro'Juced, and submitted to the inspection of the jury, they
could determine for themselves, from it and from the testimony offered in connection with it, as to the genuineness
of the defendant's ignature thereon. Whether the surety
.·igned the bond was the principal fact to be investigated;
and when the jury found that he did not ign it, they were
not required, under the in tructions of the court, to pursue
th ir inve tiO'ations further, nor to det rmine anything as
to t11 other d fense which were et up. It was the ref ore
a ntrolling is ue in the ca. ; and with re p ct to it, the
new t . tim ny was of the utmo. t importance. The District
out and th Court of Appeal th er for corr ctly ruled
that th vid nee w . n wly di cover d, that it was mat rial and furtb r that due dDigenc had be n u ed to obt in and pr du
it at th trial. Was it cumulative, and
did th trial ourt rr in granti g a n w trial~
r1 Jw
n ral rul i. that n w1y- i over d vidence
wl11C'11 is m lf ly umulative i not . urn i nt ground for a
n '"W tri J ; but we ar l ly f the opinion that the pro-
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po ed t ·timon3 cannot be regarded a cumulati\ e merely. ' umulative e idence is evidence of the same kind t
the ame oint. '' 1 Greenleaf on Evid nee, § 2. The
fact that the te timony may tend to prove the same issue
ur on which proof was offered on the trial, i not enough
to make it cumulative ; and whether or n t it i cumulative
is to be determined from it kind and character, rather
than from its effect. On the trial t timony was offered
that a bond wa executed, and that on of the signature
thereon wa that of the uret. . Thi wa m r ly th
01 inion of expert , which, in character, i di tinctly different from th in trument it elf upon which the action
was brought. In t ead of taking the judgment or relying
on the or inion of others, the jury can inspect the bond,
and, from the in pection and by compari on of the ignatures thereon with other signature admitted or proved
to be genuine, determine for them elye the point in contra er y. It is a very material item of evidence, on the
turninO"-point in the ca e, wholly di imilar in character
from that produced on the trial; and therefore cannot be
cla ed as cumulative. The tate v . Ty on, 56 Kan. 6 6
44 Pa . 609; Cairns v. K eith, 50 }.finn. 32; Knowles 't:.
"1'i orthrop, 4 Atl. 269 · Protection Life Ins. Co. v . Dill, 91
Ill. 174; Wilday v . McConnell, 63 Ill. 27 ; Guyot v . Bittt,
4 Wend. 5 1; Platt v. Mitnroe, 34 Barb. 291; Wayt v. B.
C. R. & N. R. Co., 45 Ia. _18.
1

posed testimony cannot be regarded as cumulative mere-

ly. "Cumulative evidence is evidence of the same kind to

the same point." 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 2. The

fact that the testimony may tend to prove the same issue

upon which proof was offered on the trial, is not enough

to make it cumulative ; and whether or not it is cumulative

is to be determined from its kind and character, rather

than from its effect. On the trial, testimony was offered

that a bond was executed, and that one of th,e signatures

thereon was that of the surety. This was merely the

opinion of experts, which, in character, is distinctly dif-

ferent from the instrument itself upon which the action

was brought. Instead of taking the judgment or relying

on the opinion of others, the jury can inspect the bond,

and, from the inspection and by comparison of the signa-

tures thereon with other signatures admitted or proved

to be genuine, determine for themselves the point in con-

1

troversy. It is a very material item of evidence, on the
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turning-point in the case, wholly dissimilar in character

from that produced on the trial; and therefore cannot be

classed as cumulative. The State v. Tyson, 56 Kan. 686,

44 Pac. 609; Cairns v. Keith, 50 Minn. 32; Knowles v.

Northrop, 4 Atl. 269; Protection Life Ins. Co. v. Dill, 91

111. 174; Wilday v. McConnell, 63 111. 278; Guyot v. Butts,

4 Wend. 581 ; Piatt v. Munroe, 34 Barb. 291 ; Wayt v. B.

C. R. & N. R. Co., 45 la. 218.

**********

The judgment of the Court of Appeals will be reversed

and the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

WALLER V. GRAVES.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. 1850.

20 Connecticut, 305.

This was a petition for a new trial of a cause, which had

previously come before this court. Graves v. Waller, 19

Conn. R. 90. For the nature of the action and the decla-

T. P.^5

* * * * * * * * * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals will be reversed
and the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

WALLER V. GRAVES.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

1850.

20 Connecticut, 305.

Thi wa a p titio f r a n w trial f a cau e which had
m bef re thi ourt. Gra 'e v. Wall er 1
For the natur of th a tion and the declaT. P.-45
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ration, it is sufficient, for the present purpose, to refer to

the report of that case.

On the trial of the cause to the jury, it became a ma-

terial question, and one on which the determination of

the cause depended, whether the words "rapacious credi-

tor," were in the original manuscript, when it was handed

to the editor of the New Milford Republican, the news-

paper in which it was alleged to have been published, or

were inserted in the manuscript or published in the news-

paper, by some person, unknown to the petitioner, and

without his knowledge; the plaintiff in that suit claiming

the former branch of the alternative, and the defendant

the latter.

The plaintif[ introduced evidence tending to prove his

claim. The defendant on the other hand, introduced Syl-

vanus Merwin, as a witness, who testified, that he drew

up in part the certificate on which the action was founded ;

that he asked Waller if he would sign it? That Waller
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asked him what it was? that he then read it over to him;

that he made no objection to signing it, and said it was

true; that the words "rapacious creditor," were not in

it ; that he did not tell Waller, that he intended to publish

it; and that he, Merwin, sent it to the publisher of the

news-paper, but did not authorize the continuance of it

the second week; that he saw the piece soon after it was

published, and discovered that it was different from the

manuscript when sent to the publisher.

On the hearing of the present petition also, Merwin was

a witness, and testified, that he did not authorize any one

to make any other alterations in the manuscript than such

as were necessary to make its language grammatical.

The deposition of Averill as to the alteration of the

original manuscript, was annexed, and made part of the

finding of the court in the case. In that deposition, the

deponent testified, that being publisher of a weekly news-

paper in New-Milford, entitled The New-Milford Republi-

can, he published in that paper, in April or May 1846, a

writing signed by Homer Waller of New-Milford, reflect-

ing somewhat severely on the character and person of

Jedediah Graves, father-in-law of Sylvanus Merwin; that
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ration, it is sufficient, for the present purpose, to refer to
the report of that case.
On the trial of the cause to the jury, it became a material question, and one on which the determination of
the cause depended, whether the words ''rapacious credrtor," were in the original manu cript, when it was handed
to the editor of the New Milford Republican, the newspaper in which it was alleged to have been published, or
were inserted in the manuscript or published in the newspaper, by some person, unknown to the petitioner, and
without his knowledge; the plaintiff in that suit claiming
the former branch of the alternative, and the defendant
thr latte.t.
rrhe plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove bis
claim. The defendant on the other hand, introduced Sylvanus Merwin, as a witness, who testified, that he drew
np in part the certificate on which the action was founded;
that he asked Waller if he would sign it~ That Waller
asked him what it was~ that he then read it over to him;
that he made no objection to signing it, and said it was
true; that the words "rapacious creditor," were not in
it; that be did not tell Waller, that be intended to publish
it; and that he, Merwin, sent it to the publisher of the
new -paper, but did not authorize the continuance of it
the second week; that he saw the piece soon after it was
published, and discovered that it was different from the
manuscript when sent to the publisher.
On the hearing of the present petition also, Merwin was
a witne s, and te tified, that be did not authorize any one
to make any other alteration in ~he manuscript than such
a were nece ary to make its language grammati al.

* * * * * * * * * *
The d position of Av rill as to the alteration of the
original manu ript, was ann xed, and made part of the
findin of th court in th
. In that de o ition, the
p
nt t tifi d, that b in publish r of a weekly newsa r in N w-Milford, ntitl d The New-Milford Republia , h
u li h d in th t ap r, in April or May 1846, a
writin
jgn d by o r Waller of New-Milford, reflectwhat severely on the character and person of
h Grav , fath r -in-law of ylvanus Merwin; that
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this writing came to the deponent's office in the hand-

writing of said Merwin; that the deponent was instructed,

by a private note from Merwin, to make such alterations

in the body of the writing, as he saw fit, to make it read

grammatically, which he did accordingly; that the words

''rapacious creditor," and some others, were inserted by

the deponent, without the consent or knowledge of Wal-

ler, or even his approbation; and that the substance of

the whole writing was materially changed from what it

was when it was received by him for publication, without

authority from Waller for so doing.

The case was reserved for the advice of this court.

Church, Ch. J. The most aggravated portion of the

libel complained of, is that by which the plaintiff. Graves,

was exposed to public reproach and contempt, as having,

in the character and spirit of a rapacious creditor shame-

fully abused Sylvanus Merwin, his son-in-law, and his

wife and children.
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This charge was libellous, and, in a good degree, gave

sting and character to the whole publication, and was the

chief ground of the plaintiff's claim to the recovery of

damages at the trial, and upon which the issue of the

cause was supposed much to depend, as we infer from the

allegations in this petition, and found by the court to be

true.

The ground of this application for a new trial, is that

from evidence newly discovered, the petitioner Waller, can

prove, that the language ''rapacious creditor/' was never

used by him, in composing the article, nor approved by

him, but without his knowledge, was inserted by the editor

of the newspaper in which it was published, and for which

unauthorized act he ought not to be made responsible.

If such is the real truth, and if the jury had so believed

upon the trial, we think the result would and should have

been a different one.

There is, and there should be, reluctance in courts to

disturb the verdicts of juries, unless in cases where it is

most manifest, that either the law has been perverted or

mistaken, or that the losing party has not had a full and

impartial hearing. It is easy for a party to claim the dis-

covery of new evidence, and it is hard that his opponent
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this writing came to the deponent 's office in the handwriting of said Merwin; that the deponent was instructed,
by a private note from Merwin, to make uch alteration.
in the body of the writing, as he saw fit, to make it real
grammatically, which he did accordingly; that the word
''rapacious creditor,'' and some other , were inserted by
the deponent, without the consent or knowledge of Waller, or even his approbation; and that the substance of
the whole writing was materially changed from what it
was when it was received by him for publication, without
authority from Waller for so doing.
The case was reserved for the advice of this court.
CHURCH, CH. J.
The mo t aggravated portion of the
libel complained of, is that by which the plaintiff, Graves,
was exposed to public reproach and contempt, as having,
in the character and pirit of a rapacious creditor shamefully abu ed Sylvanus Merwin, his son-in-law, and his
wife and children.
This charge wa libellous, and, in a good degree, gave
sting and character to the whole publication, and was the
chief ground of the plaintiff' claim to the recovery of
damages at the trial, and upon whi h the is ue of the
cause was sup po ed much to depend, a we inf er from the
allegations in this petition, and found by the court to be
true.
The ground of this application for a new trial, is that
from e idence newly di covered the petitioner Waller, can
prove, that the language ''rapacious creditor,'' was never
used by him, in composing the article, nor approved by
him but without hi knowled
wa in erted by the editor
of the newspaper in which it wa published and for which
unauthorized act he ought not to be made re pon ible.
If such i the real truth and if the jury had o b lieved
upon the trial, we think the re ult would and should have
been a different one.
There i , and there hould be, relu tan e in courts to
di turb the verdicts of jurie , unl s in ca e where it is
most manife t that eith r th law ha b n per rted or
mi tak n or that th lo ina- I art. ha. not had a full an
impartial h ari a-. It i a for a party t laim th di covery of new evid nee and it i har that hi oppon nt
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should be compelled to submit to the expense of a second

trial, when such claim is either unfounded, or the result

of negligence in the first preparation. We feel all this

in the present case, and with much hesitation have formed

the opinion now declared.

**********

So if the evidence now claimed to be newly discovered,

is merely cumulative evidence, we cannot grant a new

trial, unless the effect of it will be to render clear and posi-

tive, that which was before equivocal and uncertain.

By cumulative evidence is meant additional evidence of

the same general character, to the same fact or point

which was the subject of proof before. Watson v. Dela-

field, 2 Gaines, 224; Reed v. McGreiv, 1 Harmond, 386;

Smith V. Brush, 8 Johns. R. 84; Pike v. Evans, 15 Johns.

R. 210; The People v. The Superior Court, 5 Wend. 114;

S. C. 10 Wend. 285; Guyot v. Butts, 4 Wend. 579; Gard-

ner V. Mitchell, 6 Pick. 114; Chatfield v. Lathrop, id. 417;
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Parker v. Hardij, 24 Pick. 246.

The fact in dispute, on the trial of this cause, was,

whether the words, "rapacious creditor," were a part of

the libellous writing, when it was signed by Waller. That

they were not, was the most material ground of defence;

and this ground was supported, by the testimony of Mer-

win alone, who wrote the article originally, and who swore

that these words were not then in it.

From some of the cases on this subject, it may perhaps

be inferred, that courts have supposed all additional evi-

dence to be cumulative merely, which conduced to estab-

lish the same ground of claim or defence before relied up-

on, and that none would be available, for a new trial, un-

less it disclosed or established some new ground. But this

does not seem to us to be the true rule, as recognized in

the best considered cases.

There are often various distinct and independent facts

going to establish the same ground, on the same issue.

Evidence is cumulative which merely multiplies witnesses

to any one or more of these facts before investigated, or

only adds other circumstances of the same general charac-

ter. But that evidence which brings to light some new

and independent truth of a different character, although

TRIAL PRACTICE
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should be compelled to submit to the expense of a second
trial, when such claim is either unfounded, or the result
of negligen e in the first preparation. We feel all this
in the pre ent case, and with mu h hesitation have formed
the opinion now declared.
* * * * * * * * * *
So if the evidence now claimed to be newly discovered,
is mer ly cumulative evidence, we cannot grant a new
trial, unless the effect of it will be to render clear and positive, that which was before equivocal and uncertain.
By cumulative evidence is meant additional evidence of
the ame general character, to the same fact or point
which was the subject of proof before. Watson v. Delafield, 2 Caines, 224; Reed v . JJ! cGrew, 1 Harmond, 386;
Sniith v . Brush, 8 John . R. 84; Pike v. Evans, 15 Johns.
R. 210 · The People v . The Su,perior Court, 5 Wend. 11±;
S. C. 10 Wend. 285; Guyot v. Butt , 4 Wend. 579; Gardner v. 11!itchell, 6 Pick. 114; Chatfield v. Lathrop, id. 417;
Park er v . Hardy, 24 Pick. 246.
The fact in dispute, on the trial of this cause, was,
wh ther the word , "rapacious creditor," were a part of
the libellous writing, when it was igned by Waller. That
they were not, was the mo t material ground of defence;
and tbi ground was upported, by the t stimony of Merwin alone, who wrote the article orio·inally, and who swore
that th e words were not then in it.
Fr m ome of the ca e on this ubject, it may perhaps
b inf rred, that court have uppo ed all additional evitabd nc to be cumulative merely, which conduced to
li h th am ()'round of claim or defence before relied upon, a rl that none would be available, for a new trial, un1 . it i. lo ed or e tabli
d m new ground. But thi
do not eem to u to b th true rule, as re o nized in
th b t on id r d a
ft n variou di tin t and ind p nd nt fa t
h r ar
a
()'round, on th
am
tal li h th
umulativ whi h m r ly multipli witne es
n r ore of th
fa t
efor inve ti()'at d, or
ad] oth r ir um t n
f the am g n ral harac_, t th t vi n
whi h hring to li()'ht som n w
in pen nt truth of a diff rent character, although

ec. 7]
Sec. 7] New Trials 709

it tends to prove the same proposition or ground of claim

before insisted on, is not cumulative within the true mean-

ing of the rule on this subject; as in the present case,

Merwin testified only, that the libel, as printed and pub-

lished, was not like the paper written by him and signed

by Waller, in the particular referred to. But now appears

a new fact, entirely independent of the testimony of Mer-

win — one which did not exist, at the time Merwin speaks

of; which is, that another person, without the knowledge or

consent of either Waller or Merwin, inserted the objec-

tionable words into the article, which appeared in the news-

paper.

Suppose a question on trial to be, whether the note of a

deceased person has been paid, and witnesses have been

introduced testifying to various facts conducing to prove

such payment, and after a verdict for the plaintiff, the

executor should discover a receipt or discharge in full, or

had discovered that he could prove the deliberate confes-
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sion of the plaintiff of the payment of the note. There

could be no question, in such a case, but a new trial should

be granted, although the new facts go to prove the former

ground of defence.

We shall therefore advise a new trial.

In this opinion, Waite, Stores, and Hinmaist, Js., con-

curred.

Ellsworth, J. concurred in the principles advanced in

such opinion, but did not think them applicable to the

present case; and for that reason would not grant a new

trial.

New trial to he granted.
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it tends to prove the same propo ition or ground of claim
before in i ted on, is not cumulati e within the tru meaning of the rule on this subject; a in the pre nt ca e
Merwin te ti:fi d only, that the libel, a printed and publi h d, was not like the paper written by him and signed
by Waller, in the particular referred to. But now appears
a new fact, entirely independent of the testimony of Merwin-one which did not exi t, at the time l\{erwin peak
of; which is, that another per on, without the knowledge or
consent of either Waller or Merwin, inserted the objectionable words into the article, which appeared in the news1 aper.
Suppose a question on trial to be, whether the note of a
deceased person ha been paid, and witnes es have been
introduced te tifying to various facts conducing to prove
'uch payment, and after a verdi t for the plaintiff the
executor should discover a receipt or discharge in full, or
had discovered that he could prove the deliberate confe sion of the plaintiff of the payment of the note. There
could be no question in such a ca e, but a new trial should
be granted although the new facts go to prove the former
ground of def nee.

* * * * * * * * * •
We shall therefore advise a new trial.
In this opinion, WAITE, STORRS, and HINMAN, J s., conurred.
ELLSWORTH, J. concurred in the principle advanced in
uth opinion, but did not think them applicable to the
pres nt case; and for that rea on would not grant a new
trial.
New trial to be granted.
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GERMAN V. MAQUOKETA SAVINGS BANK.

Supreme Court of loiva. 1874,

GERMAN V. MAQUOKETA SAVINGS BANK.

38 Iowa, 368.

Plaintiff claims $1,000, alleged to be due on account of

business transacted with defendant in the years 1872 and

Supreme Court of Iowa.

1874.

1873. The defendant denies that any balance is due plain-

tiff. Trial to the court.

38 Iowa, 368.

Plaintiff testified in substance that on or about Nov.

25th, 1872, he gave defendant two drafts, each for $1,000,

on Vaughn Bros., Chicago.

That one of these drafts was forwarded to Chicago and

paid. That the other, under his direction, was retained;

that he gave checks against this draft to the amount of

$980.93, which was charged to his account; and that after-

ward he settled the account by turning out notes which

the bank discounted, and this draft was delivered up to

him and destroyed.

The defendant's cashier and vice-president both testi-
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' ed that the draft sent to Chicago was drawn on the 23d

of November, and that the bank paid over the counter

therefor $1,000 less exchange.

The plaintiff, in rebutt#l, testified that it was possible

the draft paid by Vaughn Bros, was drawn on the 23d, but

that he did not, on that day or any other day, receive from

any officer of the bank $1,000 in cash over the counter of

the defendant on that draft, or upon any draft in contro-

versy in this suit; and that no officer of the bank ever

claimed to him before the day of trial that they had paid

cash over the counter of the bank on any draft in contro-

versy.

Upon the testimony introduced, the court rendered judg-

ment for the defendant.

Plaintiff thereupon moved for a new trial on the ground

of surprise and of newly discovered evidence.

The court overruled the motion on the ground that the

newly discovered evidence was cumulative. Plaintiff ap-

peals.

The further material facts are stated in the opinion.

Plaintiff claims $1,000, alleged to be due on account of
bu ine tran acted with defendant in the years 1872 and
1873. The defendant denies that any balance is due plaintiff. Trial to the court.
Plaintiff te tified in substance that on or about Nov.
~5th, 1872, he gave defendant two drafts, each for $1,000,
on Vaughn Bros., Chicago.
That one of these drafts was forwarded to Chicago and
paid. That the other, under his direction, was retained;
that he gave checks against this draft to the amount of
$980.93, which was charged to his account; and that afterward he settled the account by turning out notes which
the bank discounted, and this draft was delivered up to
him and destroyed.
The defendant's cashier and vice-president both testi, · d that the draft sent to ChicaO'o was drawn on the 23d
of November, and that the bank paid over the counter
th r efor $1,000 le exchange.
The plaintiff, in rebutt1.l, testified that it was possible
t]i draft paid by Vaughn Bros. was drawn on the 23d, but
that he did not, on that .d ay or any other lay, receive from
any of6cer of the bank $1,000 in cash over the counter of
th d f n ant on that draft, or upon any draft in controv r y in this uit; and that no officer of the bank ever
l im d to him bef re the day of trial that they had paid
a h over the counter of the bank on any draft in contro,. r y.
Upon th testimony introduced, the court r ndered judgm nt f r th
f ndant.
laintiff th r upo mov d for a n w trial on the ground
f . urpri and f n wly di cov r d vid n .
Th
rt v rrul d th
otion n th O'round that the
n wly
vid n was umulativ . Plaintiff apls.
Th further mat rial fa ts are stated in the opinion.
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Day, J. — I. That a new trial will not be granted because

of the discovery of evidence, which is merely cumulative,

is a general doctrine of the courts, and has been frequently

recognized in this state. See 1 Graham and Waterman on

New Trials, 486-495, and cases cited; Alger v. Merritt, 16

Iowa, 121; Sturgeon v. Ferron, 14 Iowa, 160; Manix v.

Malony, 7 Iowa, 81.

It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to furnish a

general definition of cumulative evidence, which in a given

case will materially aid in determining whether particular

testimony offered falls within or without that class.

In 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, <^ 2, it is said: "Cumulative

evidence is e\ddence of the same kind, to the same point.

Thus, if a fact is attempted to be proved by the verbal ad-

mission of the party, evidence of another admission of the

same fact is cumulative." And in Alger v. Merritt, 16

Iowa, 121, (127), it is said: "If the new evidence be

specifically distinct and bear upon the issue, though it
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may be intimately connected with some parts of the testi-

mony at the trial, it is not cumulative." Citing 1 G. &

W. on New Trials. Ma:*y of the cases seem to hold that

evidence is cumulative if it goes to establish the issue

which was principally controverted upon the former trial.

These cases, we think, lay down too broad a rule. The

evidence may tend to establish the same issue, and yet be

so unlike and distinct from any testimony before produced,

as to furnish no protext for declaring it cumulative. The

case of Gardner v. Mitchell, 6 Pick. 114, furnishes an apt

illustration.

In that case the plaintiff recovered a verdict for $5,337

on a breach of warranty as to the quality of 51,000 gallons

of oil sold him by defendant. The defendant moved for

a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence by

which he could prove declarations of the plaintiff that the

oil was as good as expected. It was held that this was a

new fact not before in the case, and a new trial was grant-

ed. The same principle was recognized in Guyot v. Butts,

4 Wendell, 579.

In this case plaintiff states in his motion for new trial,

"that he can fully prove by the testimony of William Phil-

lips of Clinton county, Iowa, that on the 23d day of No-
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DAY, J.-I. That a new trial will not be granted because
f the discovery of evidence, which is merely cumulative,
i · a general doctrine of the courts, and has been frequently
recognized in this state. See 1 Graham and Waterman on
New Trials, 486-495, and ca e cited; Alger v . /.ti erritt, 16
Iowa, 121; Stitrgeon v. Ferron, 14 Iowa, 160; Manix v.
Malony, 7 Iowa, 81.
It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to furnish a
general definition of cumulative evidence, which in a given
case will materially aid in determining whether particular
testimon offered falls within or without that class.
In 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, ~ 2, it is said: ''Cumulative
evidence is evidence of the same kind, to the same point.
Thus, if a fact i attempted to be proved by the verbal admission of the party, evidence of another admission of the
same fact is cumulative." And in Alger v. Merritt, 16
Iowa, 121, ( 127), it is said : "If _the new evidence be
specifically distinct and bear upon the issue, though it
may be intimately connected with some parts of the testimony at the trial it i not cumulative.'' Citing 1 G. &
W. on New Trials. Ma~y of the cases seem to hold that
evidence i cumulative if it goes to establi h the issue
which wa principally controverted upon the former trial.
These case , we think, lay down too ·broad a rule. The
evidence ma tend to e ta bli h the same i sue, and yet be
so unlike and distinct from any te timon before produced,
as to furnish no pretext for declaring it cumulative. The
case of Gardner v. "A1itch ell, 6 Pick. 114 furni hes an apt
illustration.
In that ca e the plaintiff recovered a verdict for $5,337
on a brea h of warranty as to the quality of 51,000 gallons
of oil sold him by defendant. The defendant moved for
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence by
which he could pro e d laration of the plaintiff that the
oil was as good a exp cted. It wa hel that this wa a
new fact not before in the ca e and a new trial was grantd. Th am principle. was r ognized in Guyot v. Butts,
4 Wendell, 579.
In this case plaintiff tates in bi motion for new trial,
''that he can fully prove b. the te timony of William Phillips of linton county, Iowa, that on the 23d day of No-
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vember, A. D. 1872, this plaintiff drew a draft on Vaughn

Bros, of Chicago, for $1,000, at the bank of defendant;

that said witness was with plaintiff at the time, and that

he, plaintiff did not receive cash for the same, but did

check against said draft to the amount of $500, and plain-

tiff says he can show he drew no other draft that day.

Plaintiff also states he can prove substantially the same

by Abram Gish.

Now, whilst this testimony tends to the establishment of

the same fact as that testified to on the former trial by

plaintiff, to-wit: that $1,000 was not paid when the draft

was drawn, it tends to establish it in part, as an inference

from a new fact, not introduced upon the former trial,

viz: that a check was drawn against the draft to the

amount of $500.

It seems to us, therefore, that the case falls within the

principle of Gardner v. Mitchell, 6 Pick. 114, and Guyot v.

Butts, 4 Wendell, 579, and that the evidence newly dis-
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covered was something more than merely cumulative. See

1 G. & W. on New Trials, 490-493, and cases cited; 3 Id.

1048, and cases cited.

We think the motion for a new trial should have been

sustained.

Reversed.

BROWN V. WHEELER.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1901.

62 Kansas, 676.

Pollock, J. * * •

**********

Is the evidence cumulative? Does the fact that the ad-

mission made by Van A^oorhis Brown in this letter is in

writing, while his admissions shown upon the trial were

oral, take it out of the rule against cumulative evidence?

We think not. Cumulative evidence is evidence of the

[Chap. 17
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vember, A. D. 1872, this plaintiff drew a draft on Vaughn
Bros. of Chicago, for $1,000, at the bank of defendant;
that said witness was with plaintiff at the time, and that
he, plaintiff did not receive cash for the same, but did
check against said draft to the amount of $500, and plaintiff says he can show he drew no other draft that day.
Plaintiff also states he can prove subst antially the same
by Abram Gish.
Now, whilst this testimony tend to the establishment of
L~ e same fact as that testified to on the former trial by
~)laintiff, to-wit: that $1,000 was not paid when the draft
was drawn, it tends to establi h it in part, as an inference
from a new fact, not introduced upon the former trial,
viz: that a check was drawn against the draft to the
amount of $500.
It seems to us, therefore, that the case falls within the
principle of Gardner v . lllitchell, 6 Pick. 114, and Guyot v.
Butts, 4 Wendell, 579, and that the evidence newly discovered was something more than merely cumulative. See
1 G. & W. on New Trial , 490-493, and cases cited; 3 Id.
10-±8, and cases cited.
* * * * * * * * * *
We think the motion for a new trial should have been
l-'U tained.
Reversed.

BROWN V. WHEELER.
Supreme Court of Kansas.

1901.

62 Kansas, 676.
POLLOCK,

J .• ••

* • • • • • * * * •

L th vid n cumulative t Do s the fact that the adm1s. 10n
d by \ an Voorbi. Brown in tbi 1 tter i in
writirw, whil }·i. admis. jon . b wn upon the trial were
r el ta kr it ut f th rnl aO' inst umulati
vid n ~
W th ink not.
umul ti e
i
eviden e of the
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same kind to the same point. Here the evidence offered

is an admission. Oral admissions of Brown of identical

import were shown by witnesses for the defense upon the

trial. All are admissions ; hence, they are of the same kind

of evidence. All go to the same point — to show that Van

Voorhis Brown was not the owner of the property. The

fact that the admission here made is in writing may have

made it stronger, but does not change its nature as evi-

dence; it is cumulative. {Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v.

Ross, 142 111. 9, 31 N. E. 412; Klein v. Gibson, 2 S. W.

(Ky.) 116; Cox V. Harvey, 53 Ind. 174; The Town of Man-

son V. Ware, 63 Iowa, 345, 19 N. W. 275; Wayne v. New-

man's Adm'r, Etc., 75 Va. 811; Wall v. Trainer, 16 Nev.

131; Glidden v. Dunlap, 28 Me. 379.) * * *

LAYMAN V. MINNEAPOLIS STREET RAILWAY

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. 1896.

66 Minnesota, 452.
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Staet, C. J. The plaintiff's intestate died as a result of
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same kind to the ame point. Here the evidence offered
is an admission. Oral admi ions of Brown of identical
import were hown by witne es for the defense upon the
trial. All are admi sion ; hence, they are of the same kind
of evidence. All go to the same point-to show that Van
Voorhis Brown was not the owner of the property. The
fact that the admi ion here made is in writing may have
made it stronger, but does not change its nature as evidence; it is cumulative. (Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v.
R oss, 142 Ill. 9, 31 N. E . 412; Klein v. Gibson, 2 S. W.
(Ky.) 116; Cox v. Harvey, 53 Ind. 174; The Town of Manson v . Ware, 63 Iowa, 345, 19 N. W. 275; Wayne v. Newman' s Adm'r, Etc., 75 Va. 811; Wall v. Trainor, 16 Nev.
131; Glidden v. Dunlap, 28 Me. 379.) * * *

a collision between a wood cart, which he was driving, and

one of the defendant's street cars. Both were going in the

same direction. The main issues litigated on the trial of

the action, which was for the recovery of damages on ac-

count of his death, were the negligence of the defendant and

the contributory negligence of the deceased. There was a

verdict for the defendant. The trial court granted the

plaintiff's motion for a new trial solely on the ground of

newly-discovered evidence, and defendant appealed from

LAYMAN V. MINNEAPOLIS STREET
COMPANY.

RAILWAY

the order.

The verdict was general only, hence the record does not

disclose the ground upon which the jury based the verdict.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

1896.

The trial court stated, in its memorandum, that evidently

the jury found that the deceased was guilty of contributory

66

Minnesota,

452.

negligence, and that such finding was the basis of the ver-

dict. It cannot be so assumed, although the evidence ren-

ders it more probable that such was the case than that the

START, C. J.
The plaintiff's intestate died as a result of
a collision between a wood cart, which be was driving, and
one of the defendant's treet cars. Both were going in the
same direction. The main is ues litigated on the trial of
the action, which was for the recovery of damages on account of hi death, were the negligence of the defendant and
the contributory negligence of the deceased. There was a
verdict for the defendant. The trial court granted the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial solely on the ground of
newly-di covered e idence, and defendant appealed from
the order.
The verdict was general only, hence the record does not
disclo e the ground upon which the jur. based the verdict.
The trial court tated in its memorandum, that evidently
the jury found that the decea d wa guilt. of contributory
negligence and that such finding wa the ba is of the verdi0t. It cannot be so a sumed although the evidence renders it more probable that such was the case than that the
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jury found that the defendant was not guilty of negligence

in the premises. These suggestions are made with reference

to the character of the newly-discovered evidence, which

tends to show that the deceased, as he started to turn his

team upon the car tracks for the purpose of avoiding a pile

of lumber which had been placed near the curb of the street

along which he was driving his cart, looked back in the di-

rection he had been coming, and that there was no car then

in sight. It is undisputed that his view, in the direction

from which the car came, was unobstructed for at least

three blocks. The defendant claims, that this evidence is

simply cumulative, that it is false, and would not change the

verdict on another trial.

The granting or denying of a motion for a new trial on

the ground of newly-discovered evidence is a matter rest-

ing largely in the discretion of the trial court and its order

will not be reversed on appeal unless it is made to appear

that the order violated some legal right of appellant, or
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was an abuse of discretion ; the presumption being that the

discretion was properly exercised. Lampsen v. Brander,

28 Minn. 526, 11 N. W. 94. The question, then, is not

whether the trial court might have properly denied the mo-

tion, but whether the granting of it was an abuse of its

discretion for any of the reasons assigned by the defendant.

The newly-discovered evidence was not cumulative, within

the meaning of the general rule that a new trial will not be

granted where the evidence is simplj^ cumulative. Cumula-

tive evidence, as the term is here used, is held to be evi-

dence which speaks to facts in relation to which there wa«

evidence on the trial; or, in other words, it is additional

evidence of the same kind, and to the same point, as that

given on the first trial. But it is not cumulative if it relate

to distinct and independent facts of a different character

tending to establish the same ground of claim or defense.

ITil. New Trials, 501; Nhiinger v. Knox, 8 Minn. 110 (140) ;

H OS ford V. Ttowe, 41 Minn. 245, 42 N. W. 1018.

On the trial there was no evidence as to whether the do

ceased looked to see if a car was ai)proaching before driv-

ing upon the tracks. The new evidence directly tends to

])rove that he did so look. This is a fact bearing upon the

question of liis contributory negligence. The evidence,

therefore, is material, and is not cumulatice. The credi-
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jury found that the defendant was not guilty of negligence
in the premi es. The e suggestions are made with reference
to the character of the newly-discovered evidence, which
tends to show that the deceased, as he started to turn his
team upon the car tracks for the purpose of avoiding a pile
of lumber which had been placed near the curb of the street
along which he was driving his cart, looked back in the direction he had been coming, and that there was no car then
in sight. It is undisputed that his view, in the direction
from which the car came, was unobstructed for at least
three blocks. The defendant claims, that this evidence is
simply cumulative, that it is false, and would not change the
verdict on another trial.
The granting or denying of a motion for a new trial on
the ground of newly-discovered evidence is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial court and its order
will not be reversed on appeal unless it is made to appear
that the order violated some legal right of appellant, or
was an abuse of discretion; the presumption being that the
discretion was properly exercised. Lampsen v. Brander,
28 Minn. 526, 11 N. W. 94. The question, then, is not
whether the trial court might have properly denied the motion, but whether the granting of it was an abuse of its
discretion for any of the reasons assigned by the defendant.
The newly-discovered evidence was not cumulative, within
the meaning of the general rule that a new trial will not be
granted where the evidence is simply cumulative. Cumulative evidence, as the term is here used, is held to be evidence which speak. to fact in relation to which there wa ~
evidence on the trial; or, in other words, it is additional
evidence of the same kind, and to the ame point, as that
given on the fir t trial. ut it i. not cumulative if it relate
to distinct and indep nd nt facts of a different character
tendino- t.o tabli. h th same o-round of claim or defen e.
-Ii]. N w Trial , 501; Nining er v. Knox, 8 Minn. 110 (140);
l-1 o. ford v. Rowe, 41 Minn. 245 42 N. W. 1018.
n th trial ther wa no vjdenr a to whether the d(' ·
r a
look d to s e if a ar wa. al proa hino- before drivjng u on t11 tracks. Th n w vid n
dir ctly tends to
prov that h ·did so lo k. Thi i a fact b aring upon the
rin 80on f his ontributory n glig n . Th
vid nee,
th f r , is material, and is not umulati e. The redi-
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bility of the evidence, and whether it would probably change

the result on another trial, are questions peculiarly, but not

exclusively, for the trial judge, who saw the witnesses,

heard their testimony, followed the course of the trial, noted

the claims of the respective parties, and whose opportunity

to judge of the credibility of the newly-discovered evidence,

and the probable effect it would produce on another trial,

was superior to our own. Our conclusion, from a consid-

eration of the entire evidence given on the trial, is that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the mo-

tion for a new trial.

Order affirmed.

(b) Impeaching Evidence.

BLAKE V. RHODE ISLAND COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 1911.

32 Rhode Island, 213.
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bility of the evidence, and whether it would probably change
the result on another trial, are questions peculiarly, but not
exclusively, for the trial judg wbo saw the witnesses,
heard their te timony, followed the cour e of the trial, noted
the claims of the respective parties, and whose opportunity
to judge of the credibility of the newly-di covered evidence,
and the probable effect it would produce on another trial,
was uperior to our own. Our conclu ion, from a consideration of the entire evidence given on the trial, is that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for a new trial.
Order affirmed.

Johnson, J. This is an action of the case, brought by

Lewis A. E. Blake against the Rhode Island Company, to
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recover damages for personal injuries allegad to have been

sustained through the negligence of the defendant company

in the operation of one of its street cars.

On the 29th day of June, 1906, the plaintiff was driving

an ice cart, and had just turned with said cart from Patt

(b)

street into East avenue, in the city of Pawtucket, when a

car of the defendant company, travelling from Providence

Impeaching Evidence.

toward Pawtucket, overtook and collided with said ice cart ;

BLAKE V. RHODE ISLAND COMP ANY.

and as a result of said collision the ice cart was overturned

and the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and injured.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

The case was tried before a justice of the Superior Court

and a jury, on the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st days of October,

1911.

1909, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff" for $9,082.50.

32 Rhode Island, 213.

Thereafter the defendant duly filed a motion for a new trial

upon the grounds :

**4, That said defendant has discovered new and ma-

JOHNSON, J. This is an action of the case, brought by
Lewis A. E. Blake against the Rhode Island Company, to
recover damage for personal injuries allegod to have been
ustained through the negligence of the defendant company
in the operation of one of it street cars.
On the 29th day of June, 1906, the plaintiff was driving
an ice cart, and had ju t turned with aid cart from Patt
tre t into East avenue, in the city of Pawtucket, when a
car of the defendant company, travelling from Providence
toward Pawtucket, overtook and collided with said ice cart;
and a a re ult of said lli ion the ice cart was overturned
and the plaintiff wa thr wn to the ground and injured.
The ca wa tri d f re a ju tice oi the up rior Court
and a jury, on the 18th, 1. th ...,0th, an ""'1 t da. of 0 tob r
1 0 and re , ult a in a rdi t for the plaintiff for$ 0 ~.50.
Th r aft r th
fend nt duly filed a motion for a new trial
upon th
""

'' 4.

That

. . . .. ....

aid def n ant ha

di overed new an

ma-
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terial evidence in said case which it had not discovered at

the time of the trial thereof, and which it could not with

reasonable diligence have discovered at any time previous

to the trial of said case, as by affidavits to be filed in court

will be fully set forth, said affidavits being made a part of

this motion."

This motion was heard July 2, 1910, by the justice who

presided at the trial, and July 8, 1910, a rescript was filed

denying said motion on all grounds except that of exces-

sive damages. * * *

**********

The case is now before this court on * * * two bills of

exceptions.

The exceptions pressed by the defendant are the fol-

lowing, as numbered in its bill of exceptions :

"25. To the decision of said court denying the defend-

ant's motion for a new trial on the ground of newly dis-

covered evidence."
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**********

The twenty-fifth exception is to the decision of the court

denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the

ground of newly discovered evidence. In support of the

motion on this ground several affidavits were filed covering

three conversations alleged to have been had with the mo-

torman Cook on March 21, March 29, and April 1, 1910.

The affiants state that in said conversations said Cook ad-

mitted that he testified falsely at the trial of the case and

declared that he had lied and perjured himself on the wit-

ness stand. The case seems to come clearly within the

law as laid down by this court in Dexter v. Handy, 13 E.

I. 474. In that case the court, Durfee, C. J. (pp. 475-6),

said: ''The ground of the petition is that these witnesses,

after the trial was over, severally admitted that their testi-

mony was untrue. The affidavits of persons who profess to

have heard these admissions are filed in support of the pe-

tition, but no affidavits are produced from the witnesses

themselves either admitting that their testimony was false

or stating anything differently from their testimony, while,

on the contrary, one of the witnesses, and he the most im-

portant, has given an affidavit denying that he ever made

the admissions. If another trial were granted, the new

TRIAL PRACTICE
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terial evidence in said case which it had not discovered at
the time of the trial thereof, and which it could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered at any time previous
to the trial of said case, as by affidavits to be filed in court
will be fully set forth, said affidavits being made a part of
this motion.''
This motion was heard July 2, 1910, by the justice who
presided at the trial, and July 8, 1910, a rescript was filed
denying said motion on all grounds except that of excessive damages. * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
The case is now before this court on * * * two bills of
exceptions.
The exceptions pressed by the defendant are the following, as numbered in its bill of exceptions :
*· * * * * * * * * ~
'' 25. To the decision of said court denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.''
* * * * * * * * * *
The twenty-fifth exception is to the decision of the court
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. In support of the
motion on this ground several affidavits were filed covering
three conver ations aJleged to have been had with the motorman Cook on March 21, ~{arch 29, and April 1, 1910.
The affiants state that in said conversations said Cook admitted that he testin ed fal ely at the trial of the case and
declared that he had lied and perjured himself on the witness stand. Tbe case seem. to come clearly within the
law as laid down by thi ·court in D exter v. Handy, 13 R.
I. 47 4. In that case the court, Durfee, C. J. (pp. 475-6),
said: ''The ground of the p etjtion i that the e witnes es,
after the trial was over, severally admitted that their testimony wa, untrn . The affidavits of p r on who profess to
hav heard th . adrni.ssion. are ftl ,d in supp rt of the petition, but no affi davit are produc d from the witnesses
the . lv s ith r admitting .that their testimony was false
or . tating anything tiff rently from their testimony, while,
n th ontrary, one of the witn s , and he the mo t imp rtant, bas giv n an affidavit
nyino- that he ever made
the admis. ions. If anoth r trial wer o-ranted, the new
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evidence would not be admissible in proof of the issue made

by the defendant, but only to contradict or discredit the

witnesses if they were again put on the stand by the plain

tiff. A new trial is seldom granted for the introduction

of newly discovered testimony, which goes merely to im-

peach the witnesses of the prevailing party. We confess

that the jDetition does not commend itself to our minds. If

the affidavits introduced by the petitioner are true, the wit-

nesses have confessed themselves perjurers ; and yet the pe-

titioner, while he asks us to grant him a new trial on that

account has not, so far as appears, taken any steps to have

them prosecuted. It has been decided that a new trial on

account of perjury will not be granted until after the per-

jured witness either has been convicted or is dead, mere

evidence of the perjury, or even an indictment for it, being

deemed insufficient. Dyche v. Patton, 3 Jones Eq. 332;

Benfield v. Petrie, 3 Doug. 24; Seeley v. Mayhew, 4 Bing.

561 ; Wheatly v. Edwards, Lofft. 87. Perhaps the rule laid
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down in these cases may be too strict and exacting for all

circumstances, but it is obviously founded in wise policy.

Certainly the talk of a witness after trial ought not general-

ly to weigh against the sworn testimony; for there wouhl

be no security for verdicts if without peril to the witnesses,

they were liable to be upset by such talk. The best evi-

dence of perjury is the con\'iction of the perjurer. It is

against the petition that the petitioner can find no prece-

dent for it. There is, however, precedent against it. In

CommomveaUh v. Randall, Thacher Cr. Cas. 500, it was

held that expressions used by a witness after a trial, con-

tradicting or denying what he said in court, are not ground

for setting aside the verdict and for granting a new trial,

but are evidence to convict him of perjury. 'In almost

every instance,' said the court, 'it would be easy for a los-

ing party to obtain affidavits of that description.' We

must, therefore, refuse a new trial on this ground." The

doctrine of this case has been followed in Boherfs v. Rob-

erts, 19 R. T. 349; Jones v. N. Y., N. H. cf- H. R. R. Co., 20

R. I. 214; Timony v. Casey, 20 R. I. 257; and State v. Lynch,

28 R. I. 463. In the last mentioned case, the court, Doug-

las, C. J. (p. 465), said: "On examination of the affida-

vits submitted we find that they do not divulge any evi-

dence upon the merits of the case, but are confined to at-
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evidence would not be admissible in proof of the is ue mad by the defendant, but only to contradict or discredit th
witnesses if they were again put on the stand by the r Jain
tiff. A new trial is seldom granted for the introductio1
of newly discovered testimony, which goe merely to impeach the witnesses of the prevailing party. We confe .that the petition does not commend itself to our minds. If
the affidavits introduced by the petitioner are true, the witnesses have confessed themselves perjurers; and yet the petitioner, while he asks us to grant him a new trial on that
account has not, so far as appears, taken any steps to have
them prosecuted. It has been decided that a new trial on
account of perjury will not be granted until aft r the perjured witness either has been convicted or is dead, mer
evidence of the perjury, or even an indictment for it, being
deemed insufficient. Dyche v. Patton, 3 Jone . Eq. 332;
Benfield v. P etrie, 3 Doug. 24; Seeley_v. Mayh ew, 4 Bing.
561; Wheatly . Edwards, Lofft. 87. Per hap the rule laid
down in these cases may be too strict and exacting for all
circumstances, but it is obviously founded in wise policy.
Certainly the talk of a witness after trial ought not general ly to weigh against the sworn testimony; for there wouH
be no security for verdicts if without peril to the witnesses
they were liable to be upset by uch talk. The best evidence of perjury is the conviction of the perjurer. It is
aa-ain t the petition that the petitioner can find no preced nt for it. There is, however precedent against it. In
Cornrnonwealth 1. Randall, Thacher Cr. Oas. 500, it was
held that expre sions used by a witness after a trial, contradicting or denying what he said in court, are not ground
for setting aside the verdict and for granting a n ew trial,
but are evidence to convict him of perjury. 'In almo t
ev ry in tance,' aid the court 'it would be ea y for a lo in? part. to obtain affidavits of that description.' We
mu t, therefore, r fus a new trial on this ground.'' The
do trine of tbi a. bas been follow d in Rob rt. . R obert , 19 R. I. 49 · J ones v. N. Y., N . H. & H. R. R. Co ., _o
R. I. 214 · Timony v. Casey 20 R. I. 257 · and State . L .vnch
28 R. I. 46 . In the la t m ntion d ca. the court DouO'la , . J. (p. 465) aid: "On examination of the affidavits submitted we find that they do n t di ulge any evidence upon the merits of the case, but are confined to at-
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tempts to discredit the principal witness of the crime. They

consist mostly of statements which this witness is said to

have made contradictory of her story upon the stand.

Such evidence, if well fortified, is not generally admitted to

impeach a verdict, as we have frequently decided" (citing

the cases supra).

CHICAGO AND EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD

COMPANY V. STEWART.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1903,

[Chap. 17
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tempts to discredit the principal witness of the crime. They
consist mostly of statements which this witness is said to
have made contradictory of her story upon the stand.
Such evidence, if well fortified, is not generally admitted to
impeach a verdict, as we have frequently decided'' (citing
the cases supra).
• * * * * * • $ • •

203 Illinois, 223.

Mr. Justice Wilkin delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action of trespass on the case, brought by

Robert Stewart against appellant, to recover damages on

account of a personal injury sustained by him on the 30th

day of December, 1899, occasioned by a collision between

appellant's locomotive engine and the street car upon

which appellee was a passenger, in the city of Chicago.

The jury returned a verdict for $1,358.40. Appellant

CHICAGO AND EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD
COMP ANY V. STEWART.
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made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and

judgment was rendered upon the verdict. The railroad

Supreme Court of Illinois.

1903.

company now prosecutes a further appeal from a judgment

of affirmance in the Appellate Court for the First District.

The only ground for reversal urged in this court is that

203 Illinois, 223.

the court below erred in overruling the defendant's motion

for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

The claim for damages was for injuries to the plaintiff's

spine, shoulder and arm. During the progress of the trial

plaintiff testified that he had never received an injury be-

fore this accident. On cross-examination he was asked if

he had not been injured some years ago in an accident on

the Santa Fe railroad, to which he replied that he did not

get hurt in that accident. He was then asked to hold up

his left hand, which showed three fingers missing, and when

asked as to the time of losing those fingers he replied that

he did not remember when it was. After the verdict was

MR. J us.TICE WILKIN delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an action of trespass on the case, brought by
Robert Stewart against appellant, to recover damages on
account of a personal injury sustained by him on the 30th
day of December, 1899, occasioned by a collision between
1
appellant's locomotive engine and the street car upon
which appellee was a passenger, in the city of Chicago.
The jury returned a verdict for $1,358.40. Appellant
made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and
judgment was rendered upon the verdict. The railroad
company now prosecutes a further appeal from a judgment
of affirmance in the Appellate Court for the First District.
The only ground for reversal urged in this court is that
the court below erred in overruling the defendant's motion
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The claim for damages was for injuries to the plaintiff 'R
spine, shoulder and arm. During the progress of the trial
plaintiff testified that he bad never received an injury before this a id nt. On cros -examination he was a ked if
he had not be n injur d som years ago in an accident on
th ~ anta F railroad, to which he replied that he did not
g t hurt in that accid nt. H was then asked to hold up
his 1 ft hand, which show d three :finO'ers missing, and when
a. k d a s to th time of l inO' those fing rs he replied that
h did n t r m m r wh n it was. After the verdict was
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returned the claim agent of the appellant company made an

investigation on the Santa Fe accident, and ascertained

from the county hospital that on April 25, 1899, one ''E.

Stuart" had been taken to that hospital because of an in-

jury to his hand. The agent then made an affidavit to

the facts ascertained by him in his investigation, and coun-

sel for appellant presented it to the court in support of

the motion for a new trial. Counsel insisted that new evi-

dence had been discovered which would tend to impeach

the plaintiff and show that he had sworn falsely when he

stated that he did not know when he received the injury to

his hand. No claim is made in this cause for any injury

to the hand, therefore the loss of the fingers was wholly

immaterial to the issue in the case. It was, perhaps, prop-

er, in the discretion of the court, to permit the cross-ex-

amination of the witness upon that subject for the purpose

of discrediting him, but for no other purpose. The new-

ly discovered evidence, therefore, even if it would have
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been competent upon the trial, tended only to impeach or

discredit the plaintiff, and that upon a matter not material

to the issue. It has been often decided by this court that

a new trial will never be granted on the ground of newly

discovered evidence merely for the purpose of impeaching a

witness who testified upon the trial. (Friedberg v. Peo-

ple, 102 111. 160; Grady v. People, 125 id. 122; Monroe v.

Snotv, 131 id. 126; Bemis v. Horner, 165 id. 347; Ohicago

and Northern Raikvag Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm, 194 id.

9.) The motion for a new trial was therefore properly

overruled.

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
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returned the claim agent of the appellant company made an
investigation on the Santa Fe accident, and ascertained
from the county ho pital that on April 25, 1899, one '' R.
Stuart" had been taken to that ho pital because of an injury to his hand. The a · nt then made an affidavit to
the facts ascertained by him in his investigation, and counel for appellant presented it to the court in support of
the motion for a new trial. Counsel in isted that new evidence had been discovered which would tend to impeach
the plaintiff and show that he had sworn falsely when he
stated that he did not know when he received the injury to
hi hand. No claim is made in this cause for any injury
to the hand, therefore the loss of the fingers was wholly
immaterial to the is ue in the case. It was, perhaps, proper, in the discretion of the court, to permit the cross-examination of the witne upon that subject for the purpose
of discrediting him, but for no other purpose. The newly discovered evidence, therefore, even if it would have
been competent upon the trial, tended only to impeach or
discredit the plaintiff, and that upon a matter not material
to the issue. It has been often decided by this court that
a new trial will never be granted on the ground of newly
di covered evidence merely for the purpose of impeaching a
witness who testified upon the trial. (Friedberg v. People, 102 Ill. 160; Grady v. People, 125 id. 122; Monroe v.
C::now 131 id. 126; Bemis v. Horner, 165 id. 347; Ohicago
a.nd Northern Railway Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm, 194 id.
9.) The motion for a new trial was therefore properly
overruled.
The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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MOOEE V. CHICAGO, ST. LOUIS AND NEW OR-

LEANS RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Mississippi. 1881.

MOORE V. CHICAGO, ST. LOUIS AND NEW ORLEANS RAILROAD COMP ANY.

59 Mississippi, 243.

CooPEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

1881 .

The appellant sued the Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans

Railroad Company to recover damages for an injury sus-

tained by him in being forcibly ejected from one of its

59 Jl.f. ississippi, 243.

trains while the same was in motion. At the April Term of

the Circui*t Court of Marshall County there was a trial of

the cause which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the

plaintiff. The defendant moved for a new trial, which

was granted, and thereupon the plaintiff excepted to the

action of the court in granting the new trial, and a bill of ex-

ceptions was signed, embodying the evidence introduced.

At the October Term of the court another trial was had, re-

sulting in a judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff

made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled; and
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che plaintiff again excepted, took another bill of exceptions,

and now prosecutes this appeal, assigning for error the

action of the court below in granting the new trial asked

by the defendant, and in refusing that asked by himself. * *

The newly discovered evidence of that of a witness who,

some days after the occurrences in which the plaintiff was

injured, had a conversation with the conductor of the de-

fendant, who the plaintiff testified had inflicted the injuries

on him, in which conversation the conductor admitted to

the witness that he had kicked the plaintiff from the train.

It is apparent that these admissions would not have been

admissible in evidence for any other purpose than that of

)mi)eaching the credibility of the conductor, who had testi-

fied on the trial as a witness for the defendant, and had

stated that lie had had no part in inflicting the injury on the

plaintiff; for these declarations were not a part of the res

gestae, and only on that ground could they bind the de-

fendant. Dickman v. Williams, 50 Miss. 500; 1 Greenl.

Evid. § 113; Sisson v. Cleveland Railroad Co., 14 Mich.

489; Smith v. Betty, 11 Gratt. 752; ThaUhimer v. Brincher-

hoff, 4 Wend. 394; Virginia Railroad Co, v, Sayers, 26

CooPER, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant sued the Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans
Railroad Company to recover damages for an injury sustained by him in being forcibly ejected from one of its
trains while the same was in motion. At the April Term of
the Circui-t Court of Marshall County there was a trial of
the cause which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff. The defendant moved for a new trial, which
was granted, and thereupon the plaintiff excepted to the
action of the court in granting the new trial, and a bill of exceptions was signed, embodying the evidence introduced.
At the October Term of the court another trial was had, resulting in a judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff
made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled; and
the plaintiff again excepted, took another bill of exceptions,
and now prosecutes this appeal, assigning for error the
action of the court below in granting the new trial asked
by the defendant, and in refusing that asked by himself. * *
The newly discovered evidence of that of a witness who,
some days after the occurrences in which the plaintiff was
injured, had a conversation with the conductor of the defendant, who the plaintiff testified had inflicted the injuries
on him, in which conversation the conductor admitted to
the witne that he had kicked the plaintiff from the train.
It i apparent that these admi. sions would not have been
dmi sibl in evidence for any other purpose than that of
i mpea hino- the credibility of the conductor, who had testifi d on tb trial as a witness for the defendant, and had
tat d that Ji lia 1 had no part in infli ting the injury on the
plaintiff; f r tb se declarations were not a part of the res
ge ta e, and only on that O'roun coul 1 th y bind the def nd nt. Dickman v. Williams, 50 :Miss. 500; 1 Green!.
Evid. § J 1. ; Sisson v. Cleveland Railroad Co., 14 Mich.
48 ; Smith . B tty, 11 Gratt. 75~; Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 4 Wend. 394; Virginia Railroad Co. v. Sayers, 26
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Gratt. 328. But a new trial will not be granted on the

ground of newly discovered testimony, the only effect of

which would be to impeach the credibility of a witness.

3 Graham & Waterman on New Trials, 1074.

We are therefore of opinion that there is no error in the

record, and the judgment is

Afirmed.

(c) Necessary Diligence.

NICHOLSON V. METCALF.

NEW

TRIALS

721

Gratt. 328. But a new trial will not be granted on the
ground of newly discovered testimony, the only effect of
which would be to impeach the credibility of a witne .
3 Graham & Waterman on New Trials, 1074.
We are therefore of opinion that there is no error in the
record, and the judgment is
.Affirmed.

Supreme Court of Montana. 1904.

31 Montana, 276.

Mr. Commissioner Claybekg prepared the following opin-

ion for the court :

This is an appeal by Metcalf from an order granting a

new trial. The only ground of the motion for a new trial

was_i ^wly discovered evidence. The only affidavit filed

( c)

showing that evidence was newly discovered is that of plain-

Necessary Diligence.

tiffs. This affidavit, in so far as the discovery of the evi-

NICHOLSON V. METCALF.
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dence and the showing of diligence in that regard is con-

cerned, is as follows: ''That subsequent to the trial of

said cause, to-wit, on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1902,

Supreme Court of Montana.

I have discovered evidence which will establish the fact that

1904.

myself and my co-plaintiff is said action," etc. Then fol-

31 Montana, 276.

lows a statement of the evidence which has been discovered.

The affidavit then continues: "I did not know of the ex-

istence of said evidence at the time of the trial, and could

not, by the use of reasonable diligence, have discovered

or produced the same upon the former trial. The name

of the witness by which I can establish the facts herein set

forth is E. A. Briggs, now residing at Centerville, in Sil-

ver Bow county, Montana ; that I did not for eighteen year?

prior to the 12th day of December, A. D. 1902, know the

whereabouts of said BriggB." The affidavit of Briggs also

appears in the record, supporting the affidavit of plain-

tiffs as to the facts to which he would testify, and stating

T. p. — *6

MR. COMMISSIONER CLAYBERG prepared the following opinion for the court:
This is an appeal by Metcalf from an order granting a
new trial. The only ground of the motion for a new trial
wa. _• wly discovered evidence. The only affidavit filed
showing that evidence was newly discovered is that of plaintiff . This affidavit, in so far a the discovery of the evidence and the showing of diligence in that regard is concerned, is a follows: ''That subsequent to the trial of
said cause, to-wit, on the 12th da of December A. D. 1902,
I have di covered evidence which will establi h the fact that
myself and my co-plaintiff is said action '' etc. Then follows a statement of the evidence which has been discovered.
The affidavit then continues: ''I did not know of the exi tence of aid evidence at the tim of the trial and ould
not, by the u e of rea onable diligence, have di . covered
or produced the same upon tbe former trial. The name
of the witne by whi h I an e tabli h th fa t herein et
forth i E. A. Bri
now r idi g at
nter ille, in Silver Bow ounty Montana; that I id not for i.o·hteen year . .
prior to th l_th da. of Decemh r A. D. 1 0...,, know the
wh rea out of ai
riO'O'S." The affidavit of Bri()' als0
appears in the r cord, upporting the affidavit of plaintiff as to the fa ts t '"hi h he w uld t stify, and stating
T. P.-46
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that he was present and heard the conversation upon

which plaintiffs' cause of action was based.

The statute concerning new trials provides as follows:

' ' The former verdict or other decision may be vacated and

a new trial granted on the application of the partv ag-

grieved for any of the following causes materially affect-

ing the substantial rights of such party * * * (4) Newly

discovered evidence material for the party making the ap-

plication which he could not with reasonable diligence

liave discovered and produced at the trial." (Section

1171, Code of Civil Procedure.)

We are of the opinion that the affidavit does not contain

a sufficient showing of diligence, as contemplated by the

statute, to warrant the order appealed from. {Rand v.

Kipp, 27 Mont. 138, 69 Pac. 714; Gregg v. Kommers, 22

Mont. 511, 57 Pac. 92 ; Caruthers v. Pemherton, 1 Mont.

Ill; Butler v. V assault, 40 Cal. 74; Hendy v. Desmond, 62

Cal. 260; Bagnall v. Roach, 76 Cal. 106, 18 Pac. 137; Bar-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ton V. Laws, 4 Colo. App. 212, 35 Pac. 284; State v. Power,

24 Wash. 34, 63 Pac. 1112, 63 L. R. A. 902 ; Bradley v. Nor-

ris, 67 Minn. 48, 69 N. W. 624; 1 Spelling on New Trial

and Appeal, Sees. 209-218.)

Under these authorities it was incumbent upon plaintiffs

to show that they had been guilty of no laches, and that

failure to produce the evidence on the trial could not be

imputable to lack of diligence on their part. They must

make strict proof of diligence, and a general a.verment of

its existence is insufficient. Whether reasonable diligence

has been used is a question to be determined by the court

upon the affidavits presented, and therefore these affida-

vits should state with particularitv what acts were per-

formed. They should show what diligence was used, how

the new evidence was discovered, why it was not discovered

before the trial, and such other facts as make it clear that

the failure to produce the evidence was not their own

fault, or because of want of diligence on their part. So

far as the evidence presented in this case is concerned, the

first search for evidence may have been made after the

cause had been tried. If Briggs was present at the con-

versation, plaintiffs must have known it. Perhaps this

fact escaped their memory at the time of the trial, but

that he was present and heard the conversation upon
which plaintiffs' cause of action was based.
The statute concerning new trials provides as follows:
''The former verdict or other decision may be vacated aud
a new trial granted on the application of the party aggrieved for any of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of such party • * * ( 4) Newly
discovered evidence material for the party making the application which he could not with reasonable diligence
(Section
have discovered and produced at the trial."
1171, Code of Civil Procedure.)
We are of the opinion that the affidavit does not contain
a sufficient showing of diligence, as contemplated by the
"' tatute, to warrant the order appealed from. (Rand v .
Kipp, 27 Mont. 138, 69 Pac. 714; Gregg v. Kommers, 22
Mont. 511, 57 Pac. 92; Caruthers v. Pemberton, 1 Mont.
111; Butler v. Vas sault, 40 Cal. 74; Hendy v. Desmond, 62
Cal. 260; Bagnall v . Roach, 76 Cal. 106, 18 Pac. 137; Barton v. Laws, 4 Colo. App. 212, 35 Pac. 284; State v. Power,
24 Wash. 34, 63 Pac. 1112, 63 L. R. A. 902; Bradley v. Norris, 67 Minn. 48 69 N. W. 624; 1 Spelling on New Trinl
and Appeal, Sec . 209-218.)
Under these authorities it was incumbent upon plaintiff~
to how that they had been guilty of no laches, and that
failure to produce the evidence on the trial could not be
i'mputable to lack of diligence on their part. They must
make strict proof of diligenc , and a O'eneral averment of
its exi tence is insufficient. Whether reasonable diligen 0
ha be n used i a question to b det rmined by the court
upon the affidavits pr ented, RIHi therefore the e affidavit . . hould tate with particularitv what acts were p rformfld. They should how what dilig nee was used, ho-w
th n w evjd nc wa di cov rel, why it was not di cover d
hefor th trial, and , u h th r fa t a. mak it clear that
th f ai]ur t produr the
id nc wa not their own
fault or h rause of want of dilig n
on th ir part. Ro
far a. th v1 n pr R nt d in thi. as is on erned, thr
fir . t . arrh for vi l n
m y hav h n made after thP
raus hail h n tri . If Brig;-()' wa. re. ent at th l onr . c t i n , pl~intiff. must hav known it. P rhanR thi.
f ct . aped th ir m mory at th tim of the trial, but
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mere forgetfulness is no excuse. {Hendy v. Desmond, 62

Cal. 2G0.)

The mere allegation that for eighteen years plaintiffs

did not know the whereabouts of Briggs is insufficient. If

plaintiffs knew that Briggs could testify in their behalf,

they should have shown that they had exhausted the meth-

ods provided by law for obtaining the attendance of wit-

nesses. If they did not know that Briggs could so testify,

it is immaterial that they did not know his whereabouts.

While it is true that the granting or refusing of a motion

for a new trial is largely in the discretion of the trial court,

and its action will not be interfered with on appeal unless

there is abuse of such discretion, the affidavits being defec-

tive in the showing of diligence, we are satisfied that the

court below had no authority to grant the order, and there-

fore abused its discretion.

We therefore advise that the order appealed from be

reversed, and the cause remanded.
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Per Curiam. — For the reasons stated in the foregoing

opinion, the order is reversed and the cause remanded.

COFFER V. ERICKSON.

Supreme Court of Washington. 1911.

61 Washington, 559.

Dunbar, J. — The appellant, Erickson, was under a con-

tract with the city of 'Seattle for the regrade of Fourth

avenue from Yesler Way north to Pike street. Fourth

avenue runs northerly and southerly, and is crossed by

Columbia street, running easterly and westerly. At the

NEW TRIALS
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mere forg etfulness is no excuse. (Hendy v. Desmond, 62
al. :...60.)
The mere all gation that for eighteen years plaintiffs
Jid not know th whereabouts of Briggs is insufficient. If
plaintiffs knew that Briggs could testify in their behalf,
they hould ha e shown that they had exhausted the methods provided by law for obtaining the attendance of witne e . If they did not know that Briggs could so testify,
it i immaterial that they did not know his whereabouts.
vVhile it is true that the granting or refusing of a motion
for a new trial i largely in the di cretion of the trial court,
and its action will not be interfered with on appeal unless
there is abuse of such discretion, the affidavits being defective in the showing of diligence, we are satisfied that the
court below had no authority to grant the order, and therefore abu ed it di cretion.
We therefore advi e that the ord~r appealed from be
r ver ed, and the cau e remanded.
P ER C RIAl'rr.-For the reasons stated in the foregoing
opinion, the order is reversed and the cause remanded.

intersection of Columbia street and Fourth avenue. Fourth

avenue had been cut down about thirteen feet, and in order

to permit the going and coming of foot passengers upon

Columbia street across Fourth avenue, the city had author-

ized the appellant to construct a wooden bridge, extending

along the north side of Columbia street from the east side

COFFER V. ERICKSON.

of I'ourth avenue to the west side, spanning the entire

Fourth avenue. The bridge was sixty eight feet long, the

Supreme Court of Washington. 1911.
61 Washington, 559.

J.-The a pellant, Erickson, was under a contract with the city of "Seattle for the regrade of Fourth
avenue from Ye ler Way north to Pike street. Fourth
avenue run northerly and south rly, and is crossed by
Columbia tre t, runnin ea terly and we t rly. At the
intersection of Columbia treet a d Fourth avenue Fourth
a enue had been cut down about thirteen feet and in order
to permit the goinO' an coming of foot pa ·engers upon
Columbia street acros Fourth avenue the city had auth orized t11P ap-p 1la t t con truct a wooden brid
extending
along the north ide of olumbia street from the east ide
of Fourth av nu to th we t ide, spanning the entire
Fourth avenue. The bridge was sixty.. eight feet long, the
DuN°BAR,
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main part of it six feet wide, with extending floors three

feet on each side, making the entire width of the bridge, so

far as protection from anything below was concerned,

about twelve feet. The appellant at the time of this acci-

dent, which was in September, 1908, had laid down two

tracks upon which he operated trains of dump cars drawn

by small locomotive engines, to carry the dirt from the

northern portion of the work southerly, and these trains

passed to and fro under this foot bridge. The respond-

ent was a timber cruiser and had lived in that neighbor-

hood for about a year. On the first of September, 1908,

while walking down Columbia street he stepped upon this

bridge, and while going across it, one of the appellant's

engines carrying some empty dirt cars passed under the

bridge and, according to respondent's complaint, puffed

up or threw up on top of the bridge a cloud of cinders, one

of which was thrown into respondent's eye, with the effect

that, after a long treatment, the eye was lost ; and this ac-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

tion is brought for damages for said loss.

**********

It is also assigned that the court erred in not granting

the appellant a new trial on the ground of newly discov-

ered evidence. The application for new trial was based on

the affidavit of John J. Jamison, a clerk in the office of tli'

attorneys for the appellant, who swears that, as such clerk,

he had sole charge of the investigation of the facts con-

stituting a defense, and of the securing of witnesses and the
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main part of it six feet wide, with extending floors three
feet on each side, making the entire width of the bridge, so
far as protection from anything below was concerned,
about twelve feet. The appellant at the time of this accident, which was in September, 1908, had laid down two
tracks upon which he operated trains of dump cars drawn
by small locomotive engines, to carry the dirt from the
northern portion of the work southerly, and these trains
passed to and fro under this foot bridge. The respondent was a timber cruiser and had lived in that neighborhood for about a year. On the first of September, 1908,
while walking down Columbia street he stepped upon this
bridge, and while going across it, one of the appellant's
engines carrying some empty dirt cars passed under the
bridge and, according to respondent's complaint, puffed
up or threw up on top of the bridge a cloud of cinders, one
of which wa thrown into respondent's eye, with the effect
that, after a long treatment, the eye was lost; and this action is brought for damages for said loss.

preparation of the trial for the appellant; tliat effort had

been made to obtain the names of the nurses at the hospital

at the time of respondent's sojourn there, which had fail-

ed; that tlie nurse Anna Bonen had testified that, in irri-

gating tlie eye of tlie respondent, a cinder, about a quarter

of an inch long, had been washed therefrom into the re-

ceiving basin, and that this cinder had been discovered

by, and examined by. Sister Crescent, who was the chief

nurse; that the existence of Sister Crescent was not known

to the appellant prior to the time of this testimony, and

that immediate steps were taken to obtain the testimony

of said Sister Crescent, who was found to be in Colfax,

Washington ; that an affidavit had been obtained from her

which, in effect, disputed the testimony of Miss Bonen in

relation to the cinder, and that on account of this newly

It is also assigned that the court erred in not granting
the appellant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The application for new trial was based on
the affidavit of John J. Jamison, a clerk in the office of tl1
attorneys for the appellant, who swears that, as such clerk,
he had sole charge of the investigation of the facts constituting a defense, and of the securing of witnesses and the
preparation of the trial for the appellant; that effort had
been made to obtain the names of the nurses at the hospital
at the time of respondent's sojourn there, which had failed; that the nurse Anna Bonen had testified that, in irrigatin th eye of th respondent, a cinder, about a quarter
of an inch Ion , had been washed therefrom into the receiving ba in and that this cinder had be n discovered
by, and examined by, Sist r Crescent, who was the chief
nurs ; that the xi t nee of Si ter Crescent was not known
to the app llant prior to the time of thi te timony, and
that i
diat teps were taken to obtain the testimony
of ajd 1 i t r res nt, who was found to b in Colfax,
Wa. hingion; that an affidavit had be n obtain d from her
w i h, in ff t, di. put d th t stimony of Mi s Bonen in
rel tion to the cinder, and that on account of this newly
1
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discovered evidence, a new trial should be granted. But

this testimony was adduced early in the case. Counsel

had notice on the 2nd of February, by the testimony of the

nurse Miss Bonen, that Sister Crescent was present when

the particle was washed from the eye into the basin, and

that Sister Crescent picked up the particle and examined

it, and afterwards lost it. It also appears from the testi-

mony of Dr. Burns, early in the case, that, while he was

attending the respondent at the hospital, he was advised

that this substance had been washed from the eye.

The granting of a new trial on the ground of newly dis-

covered evidence is a question necessarily so largely in the

discretion of the trial judge that it must appear with rea-

sonable certainty that such discretion has been abused to

the prejudice of the appellant, before the appellate court

will substitute its judgment for that of the presiding judge,

who has observed the proceeding throughout the trial. In

this case, the judge might reasonably have concluded that

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

due diligence had not been exercised by appellant's at-

torneys. The attending physician. Dr. Burns, indicated

by his testimony that he was at least friendly to the defense.

A consultation with him would, no doubt, have disclose*'

who the nurses were who attended on respondent while in

the hospital, and it would seem, in a case of this kind, that

due diligence would have required the ascertainment of

that fact. Nor did it seem to have been any secret, for it

readily developed in the trial, by the testimony of the nurse

Miss Bonen and Sister Arthur, that Sister Crescent was

the chief nurse during respondent's stay at the hospital.

These were circumstances which the court might reason-

ably take into consideration, in connection with the claim

of the clerk that he had been unable to ascertain who the

nurses were. In addition to this, the appellant was in-

formed of this transaction and of the fact that Sister Cres-

cent witnessed it, in the early stage of the trial, viz., on

February 2, and the trial was extended over February 4;

and notwithstanding the fact that the affidavit sets forth

"that the town of Colfax is about three hundred and fifty

miles or more from the city of Seattle, and that it was ut-

terly impossible to obtain an interview with, or the attend-

ance of, Sister Crescent at said trial," no motion was made

for a continuance and no suggestion of surprise. After
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discovered evidence, a new trial should be granted. But
this testimony wa adduced early in the case. Counsel
had notice on the 2nd of February, by the te timony of the
nurse Mis Bonen, that Si ter Ore cent was present when
the particle was washed from the eye into the ba in, and
that i ter Crescent licked up the particle and examined
it, and afterwards lo t it. It also appears from the testimony of Dr. Burns, early in the case, that, while he wa
attending the respondent at the hospital, he was advised
that this substance had been washed from the eye.
The granting of a new trial on the ground of newly di covered evidence is a question necessarily o largely in the
discretion of the trial judge that it must appear with reasonable certainty that such discretion has been abused to
the prejudice of the appellant, before the appellate court
will substitute its judgment for that of the presiding judge,
who has observed tbe proceeding throughout the trial. In
this case, the judge might reasonably have concluded that
due diligence had not been exercised by appellant's attorneys. The attending physician, Dr. Burns, indicated
by his te timony that he was at least friendly to the defense.
A con ultation with him would, no doubt, have disclo e<,
who the nurses were who attended on respondent while in
the ho pital, and it would eem, in a case of this kind, that
due diligence would have required the a certainment of
that fact. Nor did it eem to have been any secret, for it
readily developed in the trial, by the te timony of the nurse
Miss Bonen and i ter Arthur, that Si ter Ore cent was
the chief nurse during respondent's stay at the ho pital.
These were circum tance which the court mi ht reasonably take into con. id ration, in connection with the claim
of the clerk that he had been unable to ascertain who the
nurses were. In addition to thi , th appellant wa informed of thi tran a tion and of the fact that i ter Crescent witne ed it, in tb
arly tage of the trial viz., on
Februar 2 and th trial wa xt nded over F bruar 4;
and notwitb tan ino· the fact that the affida' it et f rth
''that the town of olfax i about three bun r d and fifty
miles or more from the ity of Seattle and that it was utt rly impo ible to o t in an int n iew with or the attendanc of, i t r r
nt at aid trial,'' no motion was made
for a continuance and no sugge ti on of surprise. After

726
726 Trial Practice [Chap. K

having knowledge of the facts comi^lained of, the appel-

lant offered his testimony and, at the close thereof, formal-

ly rested his case. He should not be permitted to submit

his case on one set of facts and, if a verdict is found against

him, obtain another trial on another set of facts which

were known to him at the time of such submission. Such

has been the uniform holding of this court where no con-

tinuance was asked for. Pinmis v. Puget Sound Brewing

Co., 18 Wash. 108, 50 Pac. 930 ; Woods v. Globe Nav. Co.,

40 Wash. 376, 82 Pac. 401; Reeder v. Traders' Nat. Bank

of Spokane, 28 Wash. 139, 68 Pac. 461.

Considering the whole case, we see no reason for disturb-

ing the judgment. It is therefore affirmed.

RuDKiN^ C. J., and Crow, J., concur. Morris, J., dis-

senting. Chadwick, J., concurs with Morris, J.

WHITTLESEY V. BURLINGTON, CEDAR RAPIDS &

NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

Supreme Court of loiva. 1903.
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121 loiva, 597.

McLain, J. * * *

**********

[Chap. 1:

TRIAL PRACTICE

having knowledge of the facts complained of, the appellant offered his testimony and, at the close thereof, formal ly re ted his case. He should not be permitted to submit
his case on one set of fact and, if a verdict is found again t
him, obtain another trial on another set of facts which
were known to him at the time of uch submission. Such
has been the uniform holding of this court where no continuance was asked for. Pinou v . Puget Sound Brewing
Co., 18 Wash. 108, 50 Pac. 930; TVood v. Globe N av. Co.,
40 Wash. 376, 82 Pac. 401; Reeder v . Traders' Nat. Bank
of Spokane, 28 Wash. 139, 68 Pac. 461.
Considering the whole case, we see no reason for disturbing the judgment. It is therefore affirmed.
RunKIN, C. J., and CRow, J., concur. MoRRis, J., dissenting. CHADwrc1c, J., concurs with MoRRis, J.

Complaint is made of refusal to grant a new trial on

account of newly discovered evidence, but it is enough

to say that such evidence related to matters of expert

knowledge in regard to railroading, and could have been

furnished by any expert witnesses, as well as by those

named in the application. The showing was not sufficient

to entitle plaintiff to a new trial in tliat respect.

The result is that judgment of the lower court is affirm-

ed.

WHIT11LESEY V. BURLINGTON, CEDAR RAPIDS &
NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Iowa.

1903.

121 Iowa, 597.

McLAIN, J. * * *

* * * • • • • • • •

Complaint is made of refusal to grant a new trial on
account of newly discovered evidence, but it is enough
to ay that uch evid nee r lated to matt rs of expert
knowledo-e in r ·ard to railroadino-, and could have been
furni h d by any xpert witne se , as well as by those
nam d in the appli ation. The showing wa not sufficient
t entitl laintiff to a n w trial in that r . ct.

* * * * • • • • • •

The result is that judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
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(d) Probability of Change in Result.

PARSONS V. LEWISTON, BRUNSWICK AND BATH

STRET RAILWAY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1902.

96 Maine, 503.

( d)

Probability of Change in Result.

PARSONS V. LEWISTON, BRUNSWICK AND BATH
STRET RAILWAY.

Sitting: Wiswell, C. J., Emery, Whitehouse, Strout,

Peabody, JJ.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

1902.

WiswELL, C. J. While the plaintiff was driving a horse

attached to a long covered vehicle on runners across the

bridge between the cities of Lewiston and Auburn, in the

96

Maine, 503.

direction of Auburn, he met the defendant's rotary snow-

plow coming towards him from Auburn ; his horse became

frightened at the appearance of the snow-plow and the

noise caused by it to such an extent as to become unman-

ageable; finally, the horse bolted towards one side of the

bridge, and, after striking that side, started diagonally

across the bridge to the other side, the plaintiff in the mean-

time was thrown out, dragged some distance and sustained

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

severe injuries.

' The plaintiff, claiming that the accident was attributable

to the negligence of the defendant's employees in the man-

agement of the snow-plow, brought this suit to recover the

damages sustained by him. The trial resulted in a ver-

dict for the defendant and the plaintiff brings the case

here upon two motions for a new trial, one, because the

verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the other

upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence. The plain-

tiff's counsel admits in argument that the jury was author-

ized in finding a verdict for the defendant upon the evi-

dence introduced at the trial, so that it only becomes neces-

sary to consider the second motion and the newly-discov-

ered testimony presented under it, in connection with the

case as submitted to the jury.

The contention of the plaintiff at the trial was that his

horse showed signs of fright when about one hundred feet

distant from the snow-plow as the two were slowly ap-

proaching each other; that the fact that his horse was

greatly frightened nud wn« becoming unmanageable was

so apparent that it should have been seen, and in fact was

SITTING: WISWELL, 0. J., EMERY, WHITEHOUSE, STROUT,
PEABODY, J J.
WISWELL, 0. J. While the plaintiff was driving a hor e
attached to a long covered vehicle on runners across the
bridge between the cities of Lewi ton and Auburn, in the
direction of Auburn, he met the defendant's rotary snowplow coming toward him from Auburn; his horse became
frightened at the appearance of the snow-plow and the
noise caused by it to uch an extent as to become unmanageable; finally, the hor e bolted towards one side of the
bridge, and, after striking that side, started diagonally
across the bridge to the other side, the plaintiff in the meantime was
out, dragged some distance and sustained
. .thrown
.
evere inJunes.
; The plaintiff, claiming that the accident was attributable
to the negligence of the defendant's employees in the management of the snow-plow, brought thi suit to recover the
damages sustained by him. The trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff bring the case
here upon two motions for a new trial, one, because the
verdict was again t the weight of the evidence, the other
upon the ground of newly-di covered evidence. Th plaintiff' coun el admit in arrum nt that the jury was authorized in :findino- a verdict for th defendant upon the evidence introduced at th trial so t at it only b come nece ary to con ider th
cond motion and th n wly-di covr d testimon. r
nt d und r it in connection with the
a as ubmitted t th jury.
Th
nt ntion of th plaintiff at the trial wa that hi
hor
how d io-n of fri ·ht wh n about on bundr fe t
di tant from th
now- low a th two w r
1 wly approaching a h oth r · that th fact that hi hor e wa
Te tl~· frighten d anrl wn . he o ino- unm nag· al le wa~
so a parent that it h ul haY b n
n an in f t wa
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seen, by the motorman a sufficient length of time before the

horse bolted, for him to have stopped his plow, and allow

the plaintiff to drive past; that by doing so the accident

would have been avoided, but that he failed to stop the

snow-plow and that this failure was the proximate cause

of the accident resulting in the injury to the plaintiff. The

defendant's answer to this proposition is, and was at ti '^

trial, that the motorman did stop his plow as soon as the

horse showed any signs of fright. Defendant's counsel in

their brief say, "coincident in point of time with the first

appearance of real fright on the part of the horse, the mo-

torman shut off the current, applied the brake, and stop-

ped the plow."

Upon this issue, the plaintiff testified that the snow-plow

did not stop until after the accident, and one witness call-

ed by him, whose means of observation on account of his

distance from the scene of the accident were not particular-

ly good, to some extent substantiated the plaintiff, stating
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it as his impression that the snow-plow did not stop. Up-

on the other hand, four witnesses called by the defense,

all of whom were on the snow-plow at the time, and in the

employ of the defendant corporation, and three of whom

were still in its employ at the time of the trial, all testified

in substance that the motorman stopped his plow as soon

as the horse appeared to be frightened. A jury certainly

would be authorized to find that it was negligence upon the

part of those managing the rotary snow-plow, such as this

one was described and shown by the photographs to be,

to continue its movement along the track, in such a situa-

tion as this, when an approaching horse displayed signs of

great fright and of becoming unmanageable. But, upon

the other hand, the jury was authorized to find from the

testimony in the case that the motorman seasonably stopped

his plow, and did all that he could do to prevent the acci-

dent. So that the important issue of fact at the trial was,

as to whether or not the plow was seasonably stopped, in

view of the situation.

Since the trial the plaintiff has discovered three addi-

tional witnesses who saw the accident and who will testify,

with varying degrees of positiveness, that the snow-plow

did not stop until after the accident. These witnesses are

entirely disinterested, they had no acquaintance with tho
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seen, by the motorman a sufficient length of time before the
horse bolted, for him to have stopped his plow, and allow
the plaintiff to drive pa t; that by doing so the accident
would have been avoided, but that he failed to stop the
snow-plow and that this failure was the proximate cause
of the accident resulting in the injury to the plaintiff. The
defendant's answer to this proposition is, and was at t1 °
trial, that the motorman did stop his plow as soon as the
horse showed any signs of fright. Defendant's counsel in
their brief say, ''coincident in point of time with the first
appearance of real fright on the part of the horse, the motorman hut off the current, applied the brake, and stopped the plow.''
Upon this issue, the plaintiff testified that the snow-plow
did not stop until after the accident, and one witness called by him, whose means of observation on account of his
distance from the scene of the accident were not particularly good, to some extent ubstantiated the plaintiff, stating
it as his impression that the snow-plow did not stop. Upon the other hand, four witnesses called by the defense,
all of whom were on the snow-plow at the time, and in the
employ of the defendant corporation, and thre e of whom
were still in its employ at the time of the trial, all testified
in sub tance that the motorman stopped his plow as s·oon
as the horse appeared to be frightened. A jury certainly
would be authorized to find that it was negligence upon the
part of those managing the rotary ~now-plow, such as this
one was d scribed and shown by the photographs to be,
to continue it movement along the track, in such a situation a thi , when an approaching horse displayed signs of
gr at fright and of becoming unmanao-eabl . But, upon
the other hand, the jury wa authoriz d to find from the
te timony in th case that the motorman easonably stopped
hi. plow, and did all that he could do to prev nt the accid nt.
o that th jm ortant issue of fact at the trial was,
as to w b th r or not the plow wa
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plaintiff, tlieir opportunities for seeing what happened were

good. The testimony of these tliree witnesses is newlj^-dis-

covered within the well established rnle in this state, its

discovery subsequent to the trial was accidental; and the

failure of the plaintiff or his counsel to be earlier aware

of its existence cannot be attributed to any negligence up-

on their part, because diligence upon their part would not

have been likely to have put them in possession of it.

The question then is, whether the court, in the exercise

of its sound discretion, but within the rules which have been

adopted relative to granting new trials upon this ground,

should grant a new trial in this case. But first, inasmuch

as there may be some confusion as to what the true doctrine

is governing the court in the exercise of its discretion is

cases of this kind, growing out of the language used in two

decisions of this court, it may be well to carefully state it.

The true doctrine is, that before the court will grant a

new trial upon this ground, the newly-discovered testimony
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must be of such character, weight and value, considered

in connection with the evidence already in the case, that it

seems to the court probable that on a new trial, with the

additional evidence, the result would be changed; or it

must be made to appear to the court that injustice is likely

to be done if the new trial is refused. It is not sufficient

that there may be a possibility or chance of a different re-

sult, or that a jury might be induced to give a different

verdict ; there must be a probability that the verdict would

be different upon a new trial. But it is not necessary that

the additional testimony should be such as to require a

different verdict.

The correct doctrine had been so repeatedly stated by

this court, that we quote the language used in numerous

earlier decisions relative to the character of the newly-dis-

covered evidence necessary and sufficient to justify the

court in granting a new trial upon this ground. "A new

trial to permit newly-discovered testimony to be introduced

should only be granted * * * when there is reason to be-

lieve that the verdict would have different if it had been

before the jury." Eaiidly v. Call, 30 Maine, 10. ''Unless

the court should think it probable the new evidence would

alter the verdict." Snowman v. Wardwell, 32 Maine, 275.

''A review will never be granted to let in additional testi-
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plaintiff, their opportunitie for eing what happened were
good. The te timony of the e three witne e is newly-discovered within the w ll . t bli hed ru 1e in thi
tate, its
discovery sub equent to the trial wa a idental; and the
failure of the plaintiff or hi oun el to be earlier aware
of its exi tence cannot be attributed to any negligence upon their part, becau e diligence upon their part would not
have been likely to have put them in I o e ion of it.
The que tion then i , whether the court, in the exerci e
of its sound di cretion, but witbin the rul which ha e been
adopted relative to granting new trials u1 on this ground,
hould grant a new trial in thi ca e. But first, inasmuch
as there ma be ome confu ion a to what the true doctrine
i governing the court in the exercise of it di cretion i
a es of thi kind growing out of the language used in two
decisions of this court, it ma be well to carefully state it.
The true doctrine i that before the court will grant a
new trial upon thi ground, the newly--di covered testimony
must be of uch character, weight and value, considered
in connection with the evidence already in the ca e, that it
. eems to the court probable that on a new trial with the
additional eYidence the re ult would be changed; or it
must be made to appear to the court that inju tice i likely
to be done if the n w trial i refu ed. It i not sufficient
that there ma be a po. ibilit~T or chance of a different result, or that a jur mi ·ht be induced to gi e a different
verdict; there mu t be a probability that the verdict would
b different upon a new trial. But it i not neces ary that
the additional te timony should be such as to require a
different verdict.
The correct doctrine had e n so repeatedly tated by
this court that we quote th lanruage u ed in numerou
arlier d cision relati\ e to th character of the newly-di vered evid n e n
ary- and sufficient to ju tify th
court in grantinO' a n w trial u on thi O'r und. 'A new
trial to permit n wl. -di cover d t timony to be introduced
should only be grant
* * · when there i rea on to beli e that the ver ]ict would have diff rent if it had be n
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th court hould tbi k it pr ha l th n w vi n would
alter th v rdi t."
n01cma11 . TV ardwell ~ 1\1ain 275.
' ' A review will ne er be granted to let in additional testi-
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mony, when such testimony would not be likely to change

the result." Todd v. Chipman, 62 Maine, 189. ''Nor un-

less there be reason to believe that it would change the re-

sult." Trash v. Unity, 74 Maine, 208. In Linscott v.

Orient Insurance Co., 88 Maine, 497, 51 Am. St. Rep. 435,

the court stated the rule, citing various earlier cases, in

these words: "It has long been the settled doctrine of

this court that a new trial will not be granted on the

ground of newly-discovered evidence, unless it seems to

the court probable that it might alter the verdict." In

Stackpole v. Perkins, 85 Maine, 298, nothing is said in the

opinion in regard to the new evidence being of such a char-

acter as to require a different verdict. The court does

say in that case: "If believed (the newly-discovered wit-

ness) his testimony must substantially destroy the evidence

of a witness at the trial, whose testimony may have been

considered of controlling weight." A new trial was grant-

ed in this case, although the effect of the newly-discovered
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testimony was stated by the court to depend upon the

weight given to it by the jury.

It is true that in Linscott v. Orient Insurance Company,

supra, where the correct doctrine of this state was very

distinctly stated as above quoted, and in accordance with

the previous authorities, the court, at the conclusion of the

opinion said that the question was, "whether the legitimate

effect of such evidence would require a different verdict."

The case of State v. Stain, 82 Maine, 472, was cited in sup-

port of this doctrine. But we do not find the rule so stated

in any case, other than in these two, in this state. If it

were true that such new evidence must be of such a char-

acter as to require a different verdict upon a new trial,

then it would follow as a logical sequence that none but a

different verdict would be allowed by the court to stand.

The rule thus stated in these two cases is too strict, it

would deprive a party of the privilege of having his new

evidence passed upon by a jury, whose peculiar province

it is to decide controverted issues of fact, even in cases

whore the court is of opinion that the new evidence would

proba))ly change the result, or that injustice would be like-

ly to be done if a new trial was not granted.

In tills case we can not say that the new evidence, in

connection with the former evidence, would require a dif-

[Chap. 17
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mony, when such testimony would not be likely to change
the result." Todd v. Chipman, 62 Maine, 189. "Nor unless there be reason to believe that it would change the result." Trask v. Unity, 74 Maine, 208. In Linscott v.
Orient Insurance Co., 88 Maine, 497, 51 Am. St. Rep. 435,
the court stated the rule, citing various earlier cases, in
these words : ''It has long been the settled doctrine of
this court that a new trial will not be granted on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence, unless it seems to
the court probable that it might alter the verdict." In
Stackpole v. Perkins, 85 Maine, 298, nothing is said in the
opinion in regard to the new evidence being of such a character as to require a different verdict. The court does
say in that case: "If believed (the newly-discovered witness) his testimony must substantially destroy the evidence
of a witness at the trial, whose testimony may have been
considered of controlling weight.'' A new trial was granted in this case, although the effect of the newly-dis~overed
testimony was stated by the court to depend upon the
weight given to it by the jury.
It is true that in Linscott v. Orien,t Insurance Company,
upra, where the correct do ctrine of this state was very
distinctly stated as above quoted, and in accordance with
the previous authorities, the court, at the conclusion of the
opinion said that the question was, "whe ther the legitimate
effect of such evidence would require a diff rent verdict.''
The case of State v. Stain, 82 J\1aine, 472, was cited in support of th'is doctrine. But we do not find the rule so stated
in any ca e, other than in these two, in this state. If it
were true that such new evidence must be of such a charact r as to reqiiire a differ nt verdict upon a new trial,
th n it would follow a a loO'ical sequence that none but a
iff r nt v rdi t would be allow d by the court to stand.
Th rul thus tated in th
two cases is too strict, it
would d priv a party of the privil O'e of having bis new
r v1 nr
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i i. to
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n tl1i s ca w can not ay that the new evidence, in
c nn ti n with th e form r evid nee, would require a dif.
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ferent verdict. After this evidence is submitted it then

becomes a question for the jury to pass upon. But it does

seem probable to the court that the verdict will be different

when the case is submitted anew with the additional evi-

dence.

It is true that this evidence is cumulative, but it is not an

absolute and unqualified rule that a new trial will not be

granted under any circumstances upon newly-discovered

(Cumulative testimony. Snowman v. Wardwell, 32 Maine,

275. When the newly-discovered evidence is additional to

some already in the case in support of the same proposi-

tion, the probability that such new evidence would change

the result is generally very much lessened, so that much

more evidence, or evidence of much more value, will gen-

erally be required when such evidence is cumulative ; but if

the newly-discovered testimony, although merely cumula-

tive, is of such a character as to make it seem probable

to the conrt that, notwithstanding the same question has
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already been passed upon by the jury, a different result

would be reached upon another trial with the new evidence,

then such new trial should be granted.

The provision of the statute, R. S. c. 89, § 4, applicable to

petitions for review, that "newly-discovered cumulative

evidence is admissible and shall have the same effect as

other newly-discovered evidence," should have some effect

upon the value of such testimony upon a motion for a new

trial; otherwise, a party who had lost a verdict would

liave greater rights upon a petition for review after judg-

ment than upon a motion for a new trial before.

And after all, while it is important to have general rules

in regard to the granting of new trials upon this ground,

which may be known to the profession, and by which the

court will be governed so far as practicable, each case dif-

fers so materially from every other, that the decision of

the question as to whether or not a new trial should be

granted in any particular case must necessarily depend, to

a very large extent, but of course within the limits of such

general rules, upon the sound discretion of the court, which

will always be actuated by a desire, upon the one hand, to

])ut an end to litigation when tlie parties have fairly had

tlieir day in court, and, upon the other, to prevent the like-

lihood of any injustice being done.
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fer nt v rdict. After thi
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But it doe
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eem probable to the court that the verdict will be different
when the ca e is ubmitted anew with the additional evidence.
It is true that thi evidence is umulative, ut it i not an
ab olute and unqualified rul that a n w trial will not be
0 -ranted under any circum tance
upon n wly-di covered
eumulative testimony. Snowman v. W ardu·ell, 3...., Maine
:275. When the newly-discovered evidence i additional to
·ome already in the case in support of the ame propo ition, the probability that such new evidence would change
the result is generally very much le ened, o that much
more evidence, or evidence of much more value, will generally be required when such evidence is cumulative; but if
the newly-di co ered testimony, although merely cumulative, is of such a character as to m_ake it seem probable
to the court that, notwith tan.ding the same que rtion has
already been passed upon by the jury, a different re ult
would be reached upon another trial with the new evidence,
then such new trial hould be granted.
The provision of the statute, R. S. c. 89, § 4 applicable to
l etitions for review, that ''newly-di covered cumulative
vidence is admi sible and shall have the same effect a
other newly-discovered evidence,'' hould have some effect
upon the value of uch testimony upon a motion for a new
trial; otherwi e, a party who had lo t a verdict would
have greater rights upon a petition for re iew after judgment than upon a motion for a new trial before.
And after all while it i important to have general rule
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In the exercise of this discretion, and within the rules

as above laid down, the court is of the opinion that this

plaintiff should have the opportunity to again submit his

case, with the additional testimony, to the determination of

a jury.

New trial granted.

OBERLANDEE V. FIXEN & CO.

Supreme Court of California. 1900.

[Chap. 17
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In the exercise of this discretion, and with.i n the rules
as above laid down, the court is of the opinion that this
plaintiff should have the opportunity to again submit his
ca e, with the additional testimony, to the determination of
a JUry.
New trial granted.

129 California, 690.

The Court. — The appellant recovered judgment in the

court below for damages (seventeen hundred and fifty dol-

lars), resulting from her falling down a negligently con-

structed staircase leading from the defendant's storeroom,

where she had just been employed by the defendant, to the

basement. The court granted a new trial on the ground

OBERLANDER V. FIXEN & CO.

of newly-discovered evidence; and the grounds urged for

reversal are: 1. That the affidavits were not served or

filed in time; 2. Want of diligence on the part of de-

Supreme Court of California.

1900.
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fendant in preparation for trial; and 3. That the newly-

discovered evidence was merely cumulative.

129 California, 690.

The first point presents no difficulty. The time allowed

for defendant for filing affidavits was extended by order of

court, and the affidavits were in fact filed more than thirty

days beyond the statutory time; but an extension beyond

thirty days is forbidden by the section 1054 of the Code of

Civil Procedure only with reference to the cases therein

enumerated ; among which the filing of affidavits on motion

for new trial is not included, with reference to which the

power of the court to extend is given by section 659, sub-

division 1. The case of Smith v. Jordan, 122 Cal. 68, cited

by appellant's counsel, bears no analogy to the case at bar;

and the rule therein referred to — established in Flagg v.

Puferhaugh, 98 Cal. 134 — has no application.

The other points may be conveniently considered to-

gether. Under the provisions of section 657 of the Code

of Civil Procedure the requisites for a new trial on the

THE CouRT.-The appellant recovered judgment in the
court below for damages (seventeen hundred and fifty dollars), resulting from her falling down a negligently constructed staircase leading from the defendant's storeroom,
where she had just been employed by the defendant, to the
basement. The court granted a new trial on the ground
of newly-discovered evidence; and the grounds urged for
reversal are: 1. That the affidavits were not served or
filed in time ; 2. Want of diligence on the part of defendant in preparation for trial; and 3. That the newlydi covered evidence was merely cumulative.
The fir t point presents no difficulty. The time allowed
for defendant for filing affidavits was extended by order of
court, and the affidavits were in fact filed more than thirty
days beyond the statutory . time; but an extension beyond
thfrty da. s i forbidden by the section 1054 of the Code of
Civil I r oe dure only with ref rence to the case therein
num rat d; amon()' which the filing of affidavits on motion
for n w trial i not includ d, with r f ren to which the
p
r f th
ourt to ext nd i O'iven by s tion 659, ubi vi . i n 1. Th a e of Smith v . Jordan, 122 Cal. 68, cited
by pp Jlant '. oun 1 b ar no analog_ to th ca e at bar;
a:ncl th rul th r in ref rred to-establi bed in Flagg v.
11f Prb aitgh, 9
al. 134- h no appli ation.
Th oth r point. may b
onveni ntly on id red tog th r. Un r th provi. 10:n . f section 657 of th Code
of ivi1 Procedur tb r qui it for a new trial on the
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gTOimd of newly discovered evidence are that the evidence

could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discov-

ered and produced at the trial, and that it shall be "ma-

terial for the party making the application" (subdivision

4) — or, as previously expressed, shall be of a character

"materially affecting the substantial rights of such party."

The last requisite would seem to imply that the newly dis-

covered evidence should be of such a character as to render

a different result probable on a new trial ; and accordingly

such is held by the courts to be the established rule. (Hayne

on New Trial and Appeal, 91.) Where these requisites oc-

cur they constitute sufficient grounds for new trial, and no

others can be required.

Hence the rule, so often reiterated by the courts, that a

new trial should not be granted where the evidence is

merely cumulative, must be regarded (in this state) not as

an independent rule, additional to those established by the

provisions of section 657 of the code, but as a mere appli-
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cation of those rules, or, as it has been expressed, as "a

corollary of the requirement that the newly discovered evi-

dence must be such as to render a different result probable

on a retrial of the case." (Hayne on New Trial and A])

peal, sec. 90, pp. 255, 256.) For (continuing the citation)

"it is evident that new evidence, although cumulative,

might be of so overwhelming a character as to render a dif-

ferent result certain" (or probable) ; and in such case un-

der the express provisions of the code a new trial should

be granted. The rule should therefore be construed as

simply holding that cumulative evidence is insufficient "un-

less it is clear such evidence would change the result."

{Levifsky v. Johnson, 35 Cal. 41.) Hence, "a new trial

should not be refused merely because the evidence is cumu-

lative in a case where the cumulation is sufficiently strong

to render a different result probable." That this is the

true statement of the rule is established in the case last

cited, and in Von Glahn v. Brennan, 81 Cal. 264, and in

O'Bourke v. Vennekohl, 104 Cal. 256 — from which the above

language is quoted; and it is so in effect held in People v.

Standford, 64 Cal. 27.

Whether the evidence is of this character is not a ques-

tion of law but for the judgment of the trial judge, whose

discretion will not be interfered with by this court except

NEW TRIALS

733

ground of newly di covered evidence are that the evidence
could not, with rea onable diligence, have been di covered and I roduced at the trial, and that it shall be ' material for the party making the application" ( ubdivision
±)-or, a previously expre sed, ball be of a character
materially affecting the ub tantial rights of such party.''
The la t r quisite would eem to imply that the newly di co ered evid nee should be of such a character as to render
a different re ult probable on a new trial; and accordingly
ucb is held by the court to be thee tabli bed rule. (Hayne
on New Trial and Appeal, 91.) Where the e requi ites occur they constitute sufficient grounds for new trial, and no
others can be required.
Hence the rule, so often reiterated by the courts, that a
new trial hould not be granted where the evidence is
merely cumulahve, must be regarded (in thi state) not a.
an independent rule, additional to tho e e tablished by the
provi ions of ection 657 of the code, but as a mere application of tho e rules, or, a it ha been expres ed, as ''a
corollary of the requirement that the newly di covered evidence mu t be uch as to render a different result probab]0
on a retrial of the ca e." (Hayne on New Trial and Ai peal, sec. 90, pp. 255 256.) For (continuing the citation)
' it is evident that new evidence, although cumulative,
might be of o overwhelming a character a to render a different result certain" (or probable) ; and in uch case under the ex1 ress provi ions of the code a new trial should
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in cases of manifest abuse. Hence, where the motion is

denied, the fact that the newly discovered evidence is mere-

ly cumulative will in general be a sufficient ground for

affirmance; but where the motion is granted, the contrary

will hold. For, in either case, it is for the trial judge to

determine whether the evidence is of character probably

to affect the result on a new trial ; and unless the evidence

be of such a character as to make it manifest and certain

to this court that in the one case it would, or in the other

that it would not, result differently on a retrial, the order

will not be disturbed. The present case, we think, comes

within the principles above laid down, and it will, therefore,

in the view we take of the case, be unnecessary to determine

whether the newly discovered evidence was in fact cumula-

tive or otherwise.

Whether in this case the evidence could with reasonable

diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial

was also a question upon which the judgment of the court

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

below must be regarded as conclusive, unless it appear that

his discretion has been abused; and on this point we think

the moving party made a sufficient case. {Jones v. Single-

ton, 45 Cal. 92.)

Counsel for appellant, on the construction they put on the

affidavit of A. H. Fixen, make a very strong case, and

could we agree in that construction our conclusion might

be different; but our view of the terms of the affidavit is

different. It reads: * 'I am the treasurer of the defendant

corporation and as such had particular charge of arrang-

ing defendant's defense to this action subsequent to the

trial of said cause, to-wit, on or about the first day of

June, 1896, and for some time thereafter, I have discovered

evidence," etc. This is construed by the counsel as saying

that affiant had charge of the defense ''subsequent to the

trial" only. But, obviously, this construction cannot be

entertained, and we must construe the affidavit as though

"subsequent" were written with a capital initial, and a

period inserted after "action." (Bouvier's Law Diction-

ary, word "Punctuation.") Thus construed, the affidavit

clearly states that the affiant had charge of the defense and

shows that he used reasonable diligence in preparing for

it. Nor does it appear that the newly discovered evidence

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 1;

in cases of manifest abuse. Hence, where the motion is
denied, the fact that the newly discovered evidence is merely cumulative will in general be a sufficient ground for
affirmance; but where the motion is granted, the contrary
will hold. For, in either case, it is for the trial judge to
determine whether the evidence is of character probably
to affect the result on a new trial; and unless the evidence
be of such a character as to make it manifest and certain
to this court that in the one case it would, or in the other
that it would not, result differently on a retrial, the order
will not be disturbed. The present case, we think, comes
within the principles above laid down, and it will, therefore,
in the view we take of the case, be unnecessary to determine
whether the newly discovered evidence was in fact cumulative or otherwise.
Whether in this case the evidence could with reasonable
diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial
was also a question upon which the judgment of the court
below must be regarded as conclu ive, unless it appear that
his discretion has been abused; and on this point we think
the moving party made a sufficient case. (Jones v. Singleton, 45 Cal. 92.)
Counsel for appellant, on the construction they put on the
affidavit of A. H. Fixen, make a very s.trong case, and
could we agree in that construction our conclusion might
be different; but our view of the terms of the affidavit is
different. It reads: ''I am the treasurer of the defendant
corpora ti on and as such had particular charge of arranging defendant's defense to this action subsequent to the
trial of said cause, to-wit, on or about the first day of
June, 1896, and for ome time thereafter, I have di covered
vidence, '' etc. Thi is construed by the coun el as saying
that affiant had barge of the d fense '' ubsequent to the
trial'' only.
ut, obviously, this construction cannot be
nt rtain d, an we mu t construe the affidavit as though
'' ub u nt'' were writt n with a capital initial, and a
rio in rt
aft r "action." (Bouvier' Law Dictionar , word "Punctuation.") Thu constru d, the affidavit
·l arly tat s that the affiant bad haro- of th def nse and
:h ws that he u ed rea onahl diligenc in preparinO' for
it. Nor does it app ar that the newly di covered evidence
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was of a character ''to put defendant upon inquiry."

(Heintz v. Cooper, 104 Cal. 671.)

The order granting a new trial must therefore be affirm-

ed, and it is so ordered.

Hearing in Bank denied.

ELLIS Y. MARTIN AUTOMOBILE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of New Jersey. 1909.
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wa. of a character ''to put defendant upon inquiry.''
(Heintz v. Cooper, 104 Cal. 671.)
The order granting a new trial must therefore be affirmed, and it i so ordered.
Hearing in Bank denied.

77 New Jersey Law, 339.

On rule to show cause.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Trenchard, J. The plaintiff, Alfred L. Ellis, was the

owner of an automobile. The defendant ran a garage,

with a repair department, at Plainfield. On June 18th,

1907, the plaintiff left his automobile at the defendant's

ELLIS V. MARTIN AUTOMOBILE C01'1:PANY.

garage for repairs. Certain repairs, hereinafter more par-

ticularly stated, were made. Later, when the plaintiff call-

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

1909.

I 'd for the machine, the company declined to let him have

it unless he would pay the bill for the repairs, which he

77 New Jersey Law, 339.
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declined to do. Thereupon the plaintiff caused to be is-

sued a writ of replevin. The defendant company gave bond

and held the car, and this suit resulted. The jury found

a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon the defendant ob-

tained this rule to show cause why a new trial should not

be granted upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence.

According to the plaintiff's testimony at the trial the

automobile was left with the defendant company only for

the purpose of having an old tire retreaded. According

to the testimony on behalf of the defendant company it

was there for general repairs.

It was undisputed that in fact the car was repaired gen-

erally by the defendant company, including repairs to, and

new parts for, the eng-ine. But it was contended by the

plaintiff that the machine was in good condition when left

with the defendant, and that no repairs were necessary

and none were ordered excepting that to the tire, and that

the repairs to, and new parts for, the engine were rendered

ncessary only by the negligence of the defendant company

On rule to show cause.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
TREN HA.RD, J. The plaintiff, Alfred L. Ellis, was the
owner of an automobile. The defendant ran a garage,
with a repair department, at Plainfield.
n June 18th,
1907 the plaintiff left bis automobile at the defendant's
gara e for repair .
ertain repairs, hereinafter more particularl tated were made. Later, when th plaintiff call' \d for the machine, the company declined to let him have
it unless he would pay the bill for the repair , which he
declined to do. Thereupon the plaintiff cau ed to be issued a writ of replevin. The defendant company gave bond
and held the car, and thi suit re ulted. The jury f ouncl
a verdict for the plaintiff wh reupon the defendant obtained tbi rule to how cause why a n w trial hould not
be granted upon the groun of newly-di covered evidence.
According to the plaintiff' te timony at the trial the
automobile wa left with th d f ndant company only for
the purpose of having an old tire retread d. According
to the t timony on behalf of the def ndant company it
wa there for neral repair .
It wa undi puted that in fact the car wa repaired g nerally . tL d f ndant om an. includino- repair to, and
n w part f r the npi
ut it wa
nt n
. the
plaintiff that tbe ma bin w . in O'Ood onditi n wh n 1 ft
with th d f ndant and that no re airs wer n
ary
and non w r rd r d x
tino- that t tb tir , an th t
th r pair to, an new art. for th engin w r r n r
ncessary on y by the ne li nee of the def dant company
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in handling the machine while in their care.

It will thus be seen that the condition of the plaintiff's

car when it was left with the defendant was material to

the issue, not only as bearing upon the value of the car, but

as tending to show for what purpose it was left with the

defendant and what repairs were ordered by the plaintiff.

In order to support his contention that it was in good

condition the plaintiff testified that he was a physician in

active practice; that he had purchased the car in April,

1907, and had used it continuously in his practice from that

time until June 18th, 1907, when he took it to the defendant

to have the tire retreaded ; that he never had any difficulty

with it ; that it was in good condition when he bought it and

was in good condition when he left it with the defendant.

On the other hand, the witnesses called by the defendant

company testified in effect that the car was badly in need

of repair when it was brought to them, and that the repairs

to the engine were rendered necessary by its condition

part.
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when they received it and not to any negligence upon their

At the trial the plaintiff, after testifying that he had

owned and driven the car since April, 1907, further stated

that he had purchased it of the Manhattan Storage Com-

pany of New York.

The newly-discovered evidence is to the effect that in

fact the car was bought by the plaintiff on June 14th, 1907

(but four days before it was left at the garage), and that

it had never been in his possession before that time; that

it was then four years old and was sold as it stood on the

floor, without demonstration and without guarantee, and

that its value was much less than that stated by the plain-

tiff on trial.

With respect to this evidence it is sufficient to say that it

lias in fact been discovered since the former trial ; that, by

the use of reasonable diligence, it could not have been then

obtained; that much if not all of it is material to the issue

and goes to the merits of the case and is not cumulative.

Under these circumstances, the motion for a new trial

ought not to be denied. Dundee Manufacuring Co. v. Van

Riper, 4 Vroom 152; Kursheedt v. Standard Bleacher^ Co.,

ante p. 99.

Let the rule to show cause b^ made absolute.
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in handling the machine while in their care.
It will thus be seen that the condition of the plaintiff's
car when it was left with the defendant was material to
the issue, not only as bearing upon the value of the car, but
as tending to show for what purpose it was left with the
defendant and what repairs were ordered by the plaintiff.
In order to support his contention that it was in good
condition the plaintiff testified that he was a physician in
active practice; that he had purchased the car in April,
1907, and had used it continuously in his practice from that
time until June 18th, 1907, when he took it to the defendant
to have the tire retreaded; that he never had any difficulty
with it; that it was in good condition when he bought it and
was in good condition when he left it with the defendant.
On the other hand, the witnesses called by the defendant
company te tified in effect that the car was badly in need
of repair when it was brought to them, and that the repairs
to the engine were rendered necessa ry by its condition
when they received it and not to any negligence upon their
part.
At the trial the plaintiff, after testifying that he had
owned and driven the car since April, 1907, further stated
that he had purchased it of the Manhattan Storage Company of New York.
The newly-discovered evidence is to the effect that in
fact the car was bought by the plaintiff on June 14th, 1907
(but four days before it was left at the garage), and that
it had never been in his possession before that time; that
it wa th n four years old and was sold as it stood on the
floor, without demonstration and without guarantee, and
that it value was much le s than that stated by the plaintiff on trial.
With r p ct to this evidence it is sufficient to s~y that j t
ha. in fa t b n discov r d since the former trial; that, by
the u e of reasonable dilio- nee, it could not have been then
obtain d; tbat much if not all of it is material to the issue
an
o to the merit of the case and i not cumulative.
nd r th e ircum tan s, the motion for a new trial
ught not t b d ni d. Dilndee Manitfaciuing Co. v. Van
Rip r, 4 Vro m 152; !Cur he dt v. Standard Bleachery Co.,
ant
.. 0.
L t th rule to show ca _e b P'.lade absolute.
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Section 8. Effect of Statutes Enumerating Grounds.

ST. LOUIS & SAN FEANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY

SECTION 8.

EFFECT OF STATUTES ENUMERATING GROUNDS.

V. WERNER.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1904.

70 Kansas, 190.

The opinon of the court was delivered by

ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY
V. WERNER.

Johnston, C. J. : An action was brought by Emil Wer-

ner against the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Com-

Supreme Court of Kansas.

1904.

pany to recover damages for an alleged diminution in the

value of his property, caused by the construction of a

70 Kansas, 190.

railroad on a city street in front of the property. The

railroad company answered that the building of the road

in the street was legallj^ and properly done, and that it

did not interfere with ingress to, or egress from, the prop-

erty, and occasioned the plaintitf no injury. A trial was

had, in which the court charged the jury as to the measure

of recovery, and, among other things, suggested that if

the value of the property was enhanced by the building of
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the railroad, the increased value might be set off against

any injury sustained by reason of the obstruction to the

entrance to the property. The jury found that the value

of the property was not affected by the building of the rail-

road, and a general verdict was given in favor of the de-

fendant.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial, assigning all the stat-

utory grounds, including the one last mentioned in section

306 of the code (Gen. Stat. 1901, § 4754), to-wit: "Error

of law occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the partv

making the application." The motion was overruled as

to all the grounds stated, but because of the instruction

authorizing the jury to counterbalance damages suffered

with benefits received the court granted a new trial. In

disposing of the motion the trial court remarked that there

was evidence in the case justifying the giving of the in-

struction, if it had been a correct statement of the law,

but held that the instruction was not a correct declaration

of the law, and granted a new trial for that reason alone.

It appears from the record, however, that the instruction

T. p.— 47 -

The opinon of the court was delivered by
JOHNSTON, C. J.: An action was brought by Emil Werner against the St. Louis & San Franci co Railroad Company to recover damages for an alleged diminution in the
'alue of bis property, caused by the con truction of a
railroad on a city street in front of the property. The
railroad company answered that the building of the road
in the street was legally and properly done, and that it
did not interfere with ingre s to, or egress from, the property, and occasioned the plaintiff no injury. A trial wa
bad, in which the court charged the jury as to the mea ure
of recovery, and, among other things, suggested that if
the value of the property was enhanced b. the building of
the railroad, the increased value might be et off again t
any injury sustained by rea on of the obstruction to th
entrance to the property. The jury found that the value
of the property was not affected by the building of the railroad, and a general verdict was given in favor of the defendant.
..
Plaintiff moved for a new trial a sirning all the tatutory grounds, includjng the one last mentioned in ection
306 of the code (Gen. Stat. 1901, ~ 4754) to-wit: "Error
of law occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the partY
makinCT the application." The motion wa overrul d a,
to all the ground tated but because of the in truction
authorizing the jury to counterbalance damag
uff r rl
with benefits received the court o-ranted a n w trial. In
i po ing of th motion th trial court remark d that ther
wa ,iden e in th a
ju tif. ino- the ivin
f th in truction if it had be n a corr ct . tat moot of h law,
but h ld that th in. tru tion wa . not a corr ct d claration
of th law, and (Trant d a n w trial for that rea on alon .
It appears from the record, however, that the instru tion
T. P.-47 -
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in question, as weL ^s tlie entire charge, was sjiven to the

jury vvithout objection or exception. Can a party sit by

and hcTLen to the giving of an instruction without objection

or exception, and, after the case has been fully submitted

and an adverse verdict returned, obtain a new trial because

of the giving of such instruction? We think not. A new

trial m«y be allowed only on the grounds specified in the

statutes. The giving of an erroneous instruction is an

error of law occurring at the trial ; but such error gives no

ground for setting aside a verdict unless an exception has

been taken to the giving of it. The grounds for a new trial

provided for in the code are specific and exclusive. The

only ground having any application to the question before

us is the eighth one mentioned in section 306 of the code,

to wit: "Error of law occurring at the trial, and excepted

to by the party making the application." To make such an

error available there must be an exception. It has been

said that "a party has no abstract, inherent right to a new
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trial. He has a right because and so far only as the stat-

ute gives it to him * * *. If he fails to pursue this mode

he loses the benefit of any errors on the trial, and is con-

cluded as to all matters occurring at the trial." {Nesbit

V. Hines, 17 Kan. 316.)

It was held in Sovereign Camp v. Thiehaud, 65 Kan.

332, 69 Pac. 348, that a trial court cannot set aside a ver-

dict and grant a new trial arbitrarily and without reason;

and, it may be added, it can never be done except for a

statutory reason. In PuhlisJiing House v. Heyl, 61 Kan.

634, 60 Pac. 317, it was held that statutory remedies and

methods supersede previously existing ones, and, the legis-

lature having provided a method for obtaining a new trial,

a party desiring one must conform to the prescribed re-

quirements. Since the plaintiff took no exception to the

instruction given, he is deemed to have acquiesced in it;

and, assuming that it was erroneous, the lack of exception

made the error unavailable and afforded no ground for set-

ting aside the verdict and granting a new trial. {Dar-

rance v. Preston, 18 Iowa, 396; Valerius v. Richard, 57

Minn. 443, 59 N. W. 534; Hayne, New Trial & App. <§ § 7,

127.)

To overcome this omission jjlaintiff calls attention to a

recital in the case made that it contains all the pleadings

TRIAL PRACTICE
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the entire charge, was given to the
jury #ithout ObJect10n or exception. Can a party sit by
and lii:n,en to the giving of a.n in truction without objection
0r exception, and, afte.r the case has been fully submitted
anrl an adverse verdict returned, obtain a new trial because
of tbe givin~ of such instruction~ We think not. A new
trial rn~y be allowed only on the grounds specified in the
statutes. The giving of an erroneous instruction is an
en·or of law occurring at the trial; but such error gives no
ground for setting aside a verdict unless an exception has
been taken to the giving of it. The grounds for a new trial
provided for in the code are specific and exclusive. The
only ground having any application to the question before
u is the eighth one mentioned in ection 306 of the code,
to wit: "Error of law occurring at the trial, and excepted
to by the party making the application.'' To make such an
error available there must be an exception. It has been
aid that ''a party has no abstract, inherent right to a new
trial. He has a right because and so far only as the statute gives it to him * * *. If he fails to pursue this mode
he loses the benefit of any errors on the trial, and is concluded as to all matters occurring at the trial.'' (Nesbit
v. Hines, 17 l{an. 316.)
It was held in Sovereign Camp v. Thiebaud, 65 Kan.
332, 69 Pac. 348, that a trial court cannot set aside a verdict and grant a new trial arbitrarily and wjthout reason;
and, it may be added, it can never be done except for a
tatutory rea on. In Pitblishing House v. Heyl, 61 Kan.
634, 60 Pac. 317, it was held that statutory remedies and
method supersede previou ly exi ting one , and, the leo-islature havinO' provided a method for obtaining a new trial
a party de iring one must conform to the pr scribed reuir ment .
in e the plaintiff took no exc ption to the
instru tion O'iven, b i de med to have acqui seed in it;
and, a. umin · that it was erron ou th la k of ex eption
ma the rr r un vailabl and afforded no ground for settino- a i
th
rdi t and O'ran tin a new trial. (Darrmnce v. Pre ton 18 Iowa, 3 6; Valerius v. Richard, 57
Minn. 443, 59 N. W. 5 4; Hayne, N w Trial & App. § § 7,
a.S

] 27.)

T
ver me this omi ion plaintiff call attention to a
re ital in the case made that it contains all the pleadings

Sec. 8]
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and preceedings, ''together with all the instructions given

by the court and the objections made by either party, to-

gether with all rulings of the court and all papers filed

in said case necessary to present the question raised and

enable the supreme court to pass upon one question raised

in the record, to wit: The giving by the court of the in-

struction complained of by the plaintiff, and for the giving

of which a new trial was granted." The recital does not

affect the question under consideration. The question

whether the giving of the instruction was a ground for a

new trial is presented, and assuming that the record con-

tains all that it is said to contain, the question remains :

Did the giving of an erroneous instruction, without objec-

tion or exception, warrant the granting of a new trial ?

We think not; and, therefore, the order granting a new

trial must be reversed, and the cause remanded with in-

structions to enter judgment for the plaintiff in error.

All the justices concurring.
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VALERIUS V. RICHARD.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. 1894.

57 Minnesota, 443.

Collins, J. At the trial of this cause, at the request of

defendants' counsel, the court plainly charged the jury

that, if they found a certain fact from the evidence, the

defendants could not be held liable upon the note in suit.

739

NEW TRIALS

and preceedings, ' tog th r with all the in tructions given
by the court and the objection made b either party, together with all rulin;s of the court and all papers fil
in said case neces ary to present the que tion rai ed and
enable the supreme court to pa s upon one que tion raised
in the record, to wit: The gi' ing by the court of the instruction complained of by the plaintiff, and for the giving
of which a new trial was granted." The recital does not
affect the question under con ideration. The question
whether the giving of the instruction was a ground for a
new trial is presented, and a suming that the record contains all that it is said to contain, the que tion remains:
Did the giving. of an erroneous in truction, without objection or exception, warrant the granting of a new trial.
We think not; and, therefore, the order granting a new
trial must be reversed, and the cau e remande_d with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff in error.
All the justices concurring.
-

To this, counsel for plaintiff took no exception, nor was

there even a suggestion that it was erroneous. The ver-

dict being for defendants, a motion to set it aside, and for

a new trial, was made by plaintiff's attorneys, on two

grounds, — those specified in 1878, G. ch. 66, § 253, subd.

5th and 7th. Subsequently, and, as stated by the court in

VALERIUS V. RICHARD.

its order, solely because there was no evidence which war-

ranted that part of the charge referred to above, plaintiff's

motion was granted.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

**********

1894.

The majority are of the opinion that, in civil actions, the

57 "!Jt!innesota, 443.
COLLINS,

J. At the trial of this cause, at the reque t of

defendants' counsel, the court plainly charged the jury
that, if they found a certain fact from the evidence the
defendants could not be held liable upon the note in uit.
To thi , counsel for plaintiff took no ex e tion nor was
there even a sugge tion that it was erroneou . The verand for
dict beinO' for defendant , a motion to et it a i
a n w trial, wa ma
by plaintiff' attorne.
on two
rounds -tho e p ifi
in 1 78 G. h.
~ 253 subd.
5th and 7th.
ub equ ntl. and, a tat d by the court in
it rd r olely becau there wa no e id nc which warrant d that part of t
har e referred to above plaintiff'
motion wa granted.

• • • • • • • • • •

The majority are of the opinion that in civil action

the
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power of the court to grant new trials is limited to the

grounds prescribed in section 253, and that new trials for

errors of law can only be granted when an exception has

been taken. The statutory grounds for new trials are ex-

clusive. Practically, this has oftentimes been held in this

court, especially when considering motions made upon

the ground that errors of law had occurred upon the trial,

as witness the Minnesota cases before referred to. To

permit a defeated party to have the benefit of an error of

law not excepted to would be giving him a great advantage ;

and here we are asked to go further, and allow to a party

who made no objection to the giving of the erroneous in-

struction, and thereby actually acquiesced in its pertinency

and correctness, the benefit of the error. Manifest in-

justice would be the result, for, had even a suggestion been

made that the court was not justified in this part of the

charge, we have no doubt prompt correction would have

followed. Our construction of the statute has been placed
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upon others substantialy the same. See Hayne, New

Trials, ch. 1, §7; Id. ch. 16.

Order reversed.

Buck, J., absent, sick, took no part.

Canty, J. I dissent. Where the trial court has mis-

stated the law in his charge, or charged propositions of

law not applicable to the case, and he is of the opinion that

in fact the jury was misled thereby, it is in his discretion

to grant a new trial though no exception was taken, if, in

his opinion, the taking of an exception would not have

caused him to change his mind in time to obviate the mis-

take. In such a case the losing party has no standing at

all, as a matter of right. It is merely an application for

equitable relief, addressed peculiarly to the discretion of

the trial court.

In New York this is carried so far as to hold that, on

review at the general term of the rulings of the judge at

the trial, the want of an exception is not necessarily fatal,

but the general term may, in its discretion, reverse for er-

ror not saved by exception, on the ground that it is not,

strictly speaking, exercising appellate jurisdiction, but has

all the discretionary powers of the trial court. Baylies.

New Trials & App, 125; Standard Oil Co. v. Amazon Ins.

Co., 79 N. Y. 506; Mandeville v. Marvin, 30 Hun. 282;
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power of the court to grant new trials is limited to the
grounds prescribed in section 253, and that new trials for
errors of law can only be granted when an exception has
been taken. The statutory grounds for new trials are exclusive. Practically, this has oftentimes been held in this
court, especially when considering motions made upoI!
the ground that errors of law had occurred upon the trial,
as witness the Minnesota cases before referred to. To
permit a defeated party to have the benefit of an error of
law not excepted to would be giving him a great advantage;
and here we are asked to go further, and allow to a party
who made no objection to the giving of the erroneous instruction, and thereby actually acquiesced in its pertinency
and correctness, the benefit of the error. Manifest injustice would be the result, for, had even a suggestion been
made that the court was not justified in this part of the
charge, we have no doubt prompt correction would have
followed. Our construction of the statute has been placed
upon others substantialy the same. See Hayne, New
Trials, ch. 1, §7; Id. ch. 16.
Order reversed.
BucK, J., absent, sick, took no part.
CANTY, J.
I dissent. Where the trial court has misstated the law in his charge, or charged propositions of
law not applicable to the case, and he is of the opinion that
in fact the jury was misled thereby, it is in his discretion
to grant a new trial though no exception was taken, if, in
hi opinion, the taking of an exception would not have
cau d him to change his mind in time to obviate the mistake. In such a case the losing party has no standing at
all, a a matter of right. It is merely an application for
e uitabl relief, addressed peculiarly to the discretion of
the trial court.
In New York this is carried so far as to hold that, on
r i w at th g neral term of th rulino-s of the judo-e at
th trial, the want of an exception is not nee ssarily fatal,
ut th cr n ral t rm may, in it di cretion, revers for erby exc ption, on the ground that it is not,
r r n t av
tri tl p akin , x r isincr a p llate juri diction, but has
all th
i. r ti nary pow r of th trial court.
aylies.
N w r rials & App. 125; Standard Oil Co. v. Amazon Ins.
Co., 7 N. Y. 506; Mandeville v. Marvin, 30 Hun. 282;
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Maier v. Eomen, 4 Daly, 168; Lattimer v. Hill, 8 Hun. 171 ;

Ackart v. Lansing, 6 Hun. 476.

It is also in tlie discretion of the trial court to allow an

exception after the jury has retired. St. John v. Kidfl,

26 Cal. 267. If he has power to allow an exception after

the proper time to take it, he has power to consider it taken

for the jourpose of a new trial.

This ground for new trial does not come under 1878, G. S.

ch. 66, § 253, subd. 7, "Error in law occurring at the trial

and excepted to by the party making the application, ' ' but

under the first subdivision of that section, ''Irregularity

in the proceedings of the court, jury, referee or prevailing

party or any order of the court or referee or abuse of dis-

cretion by which the moving party was prevented from

having a fair trial."

The discretionary power exercised by the court below

in this case is one which a trial court, having due regard

for the rights of the prevailing party will seldom exercise.
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It is only when he is satisfied that in fact the particular

mistake produced a wrong result and that the failure to

except did not prejudice the prevailing party and where

he is satisfied that his rulings would have been the same

and that nothing would have been done by him or the pre-

vailing party in time to obviate the mistake even if an ex-

ception had been taken. Even viewed by this strict rule I

cannot see that the order granting a new trial was an abuse

of discretion, and hold that the order appealed from

should be affirmed.

Since the above was written the majority opinion has

been re-written. It is now admitted that at common law

it was in the discretion of the trial court to grant a new

trial for errors to which no exception was taken, but it

is insisted that by the adoption of the Code this discre-

tionary power has been cut off. It has seldom before

been held that the discretionary power of a trial court of

general jurisdiction has been cut off by the Code. The

Code is a mere skeleton, and much of it merely declaratory

of the common law. Especially is this true as to its pro-

visions regulating practice. We do not look to it for the

discretionary powers of the District Court, as we do to

the justice of the peace practice act for the discretionary

power of that court. On the contrary, it is not unusual to
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Maier v. Homen, 4 Daly, 168; Lattimer v . Hill, 8 Hun. 171;
.Ackart v . Lansing, 6 Hun. 476.
It is also in the discretion of the trial court to allow an
exception after the jury bas retired. St. John v. Kidd.
26 Cal. 267. If he bas power to allow an :s:ception after
the proper time to take it, he has power to consider it taken
for the purpo e of a new trial.
This ground for new trial does not come under 1878, G. .
ch. 66, § ... 53, subd. 7, 'Error in law occurring at the trial
and excepted to by the party making the application," but
under the first subdivi ion of that section, "Irregularity
in the proceedings of the court, jury, referee or prevailing
party or any order of the court or referee or abuse of di .cretion b whi h the moving party was prevented from
having a fair trial."
The discretionary power exerci ed by the court below
in this ca e is one which a trial court, having due regard
for the rights of the prevailing party -will seldom exercise.
It is onl when he is ati fied that in fact the particular
mistake produced a wrong result and that the failure to
except did not prejudice the prevailing party and where
be is sati fied that hi ruling would have been the same.
and that nothing would have been done by him or the prevailing part,, in time to obviate the mi take even if an exception had been taken. Even viewed by this strict rule I
cannot see that the order granting a new trial was an abuse
of dj .cretion, and hold that the order appealed from
sho11ld be affirmed.
Since the above was written the majority opinion ha
been re-written. It is now admitted that at common law
it WRS in tbe di cretion of the trial court to grant a new
trial for error to which no exception wa taken but it
is jn ~i te that by the adoption of the ode thi di cretj onary power has been cut off. It ha
eldom before
bPcn held that the di cretionary power of a trial court of
general juri di tion ha
n cut off by the od . The
Code is a mer . keleton an much of it merel
e 1 ratory
of the common law. E p ially i this true a to ·t pro' j ion r o-ulatino- p ·a.ctic . W do not look to it for the
di. retion ry power of th
i tri t ourt a we do to
the ju tictl f th I a T racti act for the i retionary
pewer of that ourt.
n th ontrary, it i not unu ua] to
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look to the great sources of authority on common law and

equity practice to ascertain what the discretionary powers

of our District Court are.

The point is also now made for the first time that the

motion for a new trial was not made on the grounds stated

in the first sub-division of section 253, but on those stated

in the fifth and seventh subdivisions. As to this I will say

many able judges, in times past, have often set aside ver-

dicts on their own motion, even before the ink was dry

on them, and without any motion or grounds of motion be-

ing made or stated by the party at all; and the right to do

so has hardly been questioned. At common law the trial

court had the ])ower to grant a new trial, no matter how in-

formal the application for it might be, or how much the

moving party had waived his technical rights by failing to

take the proper exception, or to put the proper grounds, or

any grounds at all, in his motion. When, as in the present

case, a formal motion for a new trial is made, stating the
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grounds, it will not be presumed that it was granted on

any grounds except those stated. It must affirmatively

appear that it was granted on some other grounds which

it does in this case. It is a new doctrine that a trial court

of general jurisdiction has no discretion to brush aside

technical informalities, and prevent injustice, by granting

a new trial. It has always been held that it is in the dis-

cretion of the trial court to see that injustice was not done

during the progress of a trial, or afterwards, before the

entry of judgment, either through its own mistakes or the

technical laches of the attorney. To sustain the position of

the majority, Ilayne, New Trial, is cited several times.

This work is devoted exclusively to the practice as estab-

lished by the California Code and decisions, rarely citing

any other cases. He cites no case which sustains their

position. They cite none, and I am able to find none. On

the contrary, the authorities in the Code states agree with

the common law on this question. Thus, in Farr v. Fuller,

8 Iowa, 347, the trial court granted a new trial for errors

in i'^R charge, not excepted to. The supreme court held it

was discretionary. As in this case, the evidence was not

returned on appeal, and the appellant claimed that no error

appeared in the charge; but the supreme court held that, in

favor of the order granting a new trial, it would be pre-
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look to the great sources of authority on common law and
equity practice to ascertain what the discretionary powers
of our District Court are.
'rhe point is also now made for the first time that the
motion for a new trial was not made on the grounds _stated
in the fir st sub-division of section 253, but on those stated
in the fifth and seventh subdivisions. As to this I will say
many able judges, in times past, have often set aside verdicts on their own motion, even before the ink was dry
on them, and without any motion or grounds of motion bein6 made or st(:lted hy the party at all; and the right to do
. o has hardly been questioned. At common law the trial
court had the po·w er to grant a ne\v trial, no matter how informal the application for it might be, or how much the
moving party had waived his technical rights by failing to
take the proper exception, or to put the proper grounds, or
any grounds at all, in his motion. When, as in the present
case, a formal motion for a new trial is made, stating the
grounds, it will not be presumed that it was granted o.n
any grounds except those stated. It must affirmatively
appear that it was granted on some other grounds which
it does in this case. It is a new doctrine that a trial court
of general jurisdiction has no discretion to brush aside
technical informalities, and prevent injustice, by granting
a new trial. It has always been held that it is in the discretion of the trial court to see that inju tice was not done
during the progress of a trial, or afterwards, before the
entry of judgment, either through its own mistakes or the
technical laches of the attorney. To sustain the position of
the majority, Hayne, New Trial, is cited several times.
This work is devoted exclusively to the practice as established by the California Code and decisions, rarely citing
any other ·cas s. He cites no ca e which sustains their
position. They cite none, and I am able to find none. On
th contrary, th authorities in the Code tat agree with
the . . ommon law o thi que tion. Thus, in Farr v. Fiiller,
Iowa, . 47, th trial court grant d a new trial for errors
in its b ra-e, not except d to. The supreme ourt held it
was di r tionary. A in thi a , th vid nee wa not
return d on appeal, and th ap ellant laim. d that no error
app ar in th harg ; ut the upr me ourt held that, in
favor of the order granting a new trial, it would be prp, ..

ec. 8]
Sec. 8] New Teials 743

sumed that, as applied to the evidence, the charge was er-

roneous. It is also held in Cheatham v. Roberts, 23 Ark.

651, that it is in the discretion of the trial court to grant

a new trial for error not excepted to.

The point is also now made that section 254 provides

that when the motion for a new trial is made on the fourth,

fifth, and seventh subdivisions of section 253, " it is made

either on a bill of exceptions or a statement of the case

prepared as prescribed in the next section, for any other

cause it is made on affidavit," and that, therefore, this by

necessary implication cuts off the common-law practice,

under which the court often acted on its own knowledge of

what took place in its presence during the trial, and granted

or denied a new trial without regard to whether or not such

knowledge was either supported or contradicted by any

such affidavits. If this was purely a statutory proceeding,

the position of the majority would be correct, but it is not

a mere statutory proceeding. The provision that in some
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cases a motion for a new trial shall be made on a case or

bill of exceptions and in others on affidavit, is simply de-

claratory of the common law. Such statutes do not cut off

^ther common-law remedies, unless such other remedies

are expressly prohibited. Thus, on the principles laid

down by the majority, title 11 of chapter 66, prescribing

the practice on application for injunction, and providing

only for the temporary writ and the permanent writ, would,

by necessary implication, cut off the old equity power to

issue a restraining order pending the motion, but the con-

trary practice is well established in this state. On the same

principle, on an appeal from the clerk on taxation of costs

under 1878 G. S. ch. 67, <^ 8, the judge who tried the case

could not look into the proceedings on the trial, or beyond

the affidavits used on the taxation. But the contrary prac-

tice is well established. The judge practically disregards

the affidavits on the question of materiality when the wit-

nesses were sworn, and acts on his own knowledge of the

proceedings had and testimony given on the trial, just as

he did at common law. It is unnecessary to multiply illus-

trations. The judge who tried the case is not bound, by

virtue of the statute, to know as little about the case after

trial as the average juror is required to know before it.

He is not obliged to stultify himself, and know nothing of

NEW TRIALS

.' Urned that, as applied to the evidence, the charge was erroneous. It is also held in Cheatharn v. Roberts, 23 Ark.
G51, that it is in the discretion of the trial •Court to grant
a new trial for error not excepted to.
The point is also now made that ection 254 provide
that when the motion for a new trial is made on the fourth,
fifth, and seventh subdivisions of s ction 253, '' it i made
either on a bill of exceptions or a stat ment of the case
prepared as pr cribed in the next section, for any other
a use it is made on affidavit,'' and that, therefore, this by
necessary implication cut off the common-law practice,
under which the -court often acted on it own knowledg of
what took place in it pre ence during the trial, and granted
or denied a new trial without regard to whether or not such
knowledge was either upported or contradicted by any
such affidavits. If this wa purely a statutory proceeding,
the position of the majority would be corr ct, but it is not
a mere statutory proc ding. The provi ion that in some
cases a motion for a new trial shall be made on a case or
bill of exception and in other on affidavit, is imply delaratory of the common law. unh statutes do not cut off
1ther common-law remedies, unle s such other remedies
are expressly prohibited. Thus, on the principles laid
down by the majority, title 11 of chapter 66, pre cribing
the practice on application for injunction, and providing
only for the t emporary writ and the perman nt writ would,
by necessary implication ut off the old equity power to
issue a re training ord r pendinO' the motion but the contrary practi+ce is well e tablished in thi tate. On the same
principle, on an appeal from the clerk on taxation of cost
under 1878 G. S. h. 67 § , the judge who tried the case
ould not look into the proceeding on the trial, or be ond
the affida it u d on tb taxation. But the contrar ~ practice i well e t bli hed. The judg pra ti ally di r gard.
the affidavits on the qu tion of materiality wh n th witne es were sworn and act on hi own knowl dge of the
proceedino- had and t timon. O'i n on the trial ju t a
he did at mmon law. It i unn
ar. to multiply illu tration . Th judge ho tri d th ca i not bound by
irtue of the tatute to lmow a. little a out the ca after
trial a th a' erage j ror i r quired to know bef or it.
He is not obliged to tultify him elf, an know nothing of
1
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what he saw or heard on the trial, except what the parties

see fit to state to him in affidavits.

But the judge's powers and the applicant's rights are,

in this respect, very different questions. The moving party

not only fails to save his rights for review in the appel-

late court, by failing to make them appear of record, and

to cover them in his grounds of motion, but he also runs

the risk of having his motion denied on technical grounds,

merely, by the trial court, which it usually will and ought

to do. But notwithstanding this, in furtherance of justice,

the trial court may relieve him from his laches, by giving

him something which he asked for, but was not in a posi-

tion to demand as of right. And when it affirmatively ap-

pears that the court, in granting him a new trial, has, in

furtherance of justice, intentionally relieved him from his

technical laches and omissions, it is merely a question

whether or not, on common-law principles, it has abused

its discretion. In this case it seems to me that it has not.
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BOTTINEAU LAND & LOAN COMPANY V. HINTZE.

Supreme Court of loiva. 1911.

150 Iowa, 646.

Action at law on a promissory note. After both parties

had offered their evidence and rested plaintiff moved for

a directed verdict on the ground that there was a failure

of proof of the matters pleaded in defense to the note. This

[Chap. 17
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what he saw or heard on the trial, except what the parties
see fit to state to him in affidavits.
But the judge's powers and the applicant's rights are,
in this re pect, very different questions. The moving party
not only fails to ave his rights for review in the appellate court, by failing to make them appear of record, and
to cover them in his grounds of motion, but he also runs
the risk of having his motion denied on technical grounds,
merely, by the trial court, which it usually will and ought
to do. But notwithstanding this, in furtherance of justice,
the trial court may relieve him from his la,ches, by giving
him something which he asked for, but was not in a position to d mand as of right. And when it affirmatively appears that the court, in granting him a new trial, has, in
furtherance of justice, intentionally relieved him from his
technical lache and omi sions, it is merely a question
whether or not, on common-law principles, it has abused
its discretion. In this case it seems to me that it has not.

motion was sustained, and a directed verdict returned for

plaintiff for the amount of its demand. Thereafter and

within three days defendant filed a motion for a new trial,

assigning as reasons therefor errors of the court in hold-

ing there was no evidence to sustain the defense pleaded,

as well as in numerous other rulings with reference to the

pleadings and the admission and rejection of evidence.

BOTTINEAU LAND & LOAN COMPANY V. HINTZE.

The trial court, after due consideration, sustained the mo-

tion, set aside the verdict, and ordered a new trial, ac-

companying tlio ruling by a written statement that some

Supreme Court of Iowa.

1911.

of the material evidence had escaped its attention until

150 Iowa, 646.

Action at law on a promissory note. After both parties
h d offered their evidence and re ted plaintiff moved for
a dir ted verdict on the ground that there was a failure
of proof of the matter pleaded jn defen e to the note. This
motion was sustained, and a dire.cted verdict returned for
plaintiff for the amount of it demand. Th reafter and
within thr e days defendant fil d a motion for a new trial,
a .. iO'nin a reasons therefor errors of th court in holdin O' th r wa no evidence to su tain th d fen e pleaded,
· . w 11 a. in numerous other rulinO's with r f r nc to the
1 ad in O', an th admi ion and r j ti n of evidence.
Th trial ourt, aft r d11 on id ration, u. tain d the motion, s t a. id th v rdj t, and ord r d a n w trial, acmr> nying thr rnling hy a writt n , tat m nt that ome
of th mat rial v1 nr bad es a ed its attention until
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the same had been transcribed after the verdict was re-

turned, and that, upon a re-examination of the testimony, it

was of the opinion that the issues should have been sub-

mitted to the jury. From this ruling, the plaintiff appeals.

— Ajjirmed.

Weaver, J. * * *

1. Counsel for plaintiff make the point that a motion

for a new trial will not lie after a directed verdict of the

jury has been received, and that to sustain such a motion

is reversible error, even though the order directing the

verdict was erroneously made. A ''new trial" is defined

by Code, section 3755, to be a re-examination in the same

court of an issue of fact or some part or portion thereof

after a verdict by the jury, report of referee, or a decis-

ion of the court. The objection raised by the appellant

seems to be grounded in the thought that a directed verdict

is not a ''verdict of a jury" within the meaning of this

statute, and that "decisions by the court" which may be
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questioned in motions for a new trial include only such as

are made by a court in the trial of issues without a jury.

In other words it is argued that an error in directing a

verdict can be corrected only upon appeal. We think this

contention requires an altogether too narrow construction

of the statute, and tliat the establishment of such a rule

would tend to prolong litigation, and increase its hazard

and uncertainty. There is nothing inhering in our system

of procedure and practice which forbids the exercise by a

trial court of power to correct its own error where the mis-

take is discovered and the correction made at the same

term, and while the parties and the subject-matter of con-

troversy are still within its jurisdiction. Chapman v.

Allen, Morris, 23; Railroad Co. v. Estes, 71 Iowa, 605;

Brace v. Grady, 36 Iowa, 352. The statute pro^^des for

new trials after a verdict by a jury. It does not attempt to

classify verdicts or draw any distinction between those

returned by direction of the court and those which are not,

and we see nothing in the nature of the case to compel

the court to ingraft such an exception upon the rule as

laid do\\Ti by the Legislature. Wlien the court submits

an issue to a jury with erroneous instructions that as a

m fitter of law plaintiff has failed to make a case or that

defendant has failed to sustain his defense, thereby com-
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the same had been transcribed after the verdict was returned, and that, upon a re-examination of the te timony, it
was of the opinion that the issues hould have been submitted to the jury. From this ruling, the plaintiff appeals.
-Affirmed.
WEAVER, J .•••
1. Counsel for plaintiff make the point that a motion
for a new trial will not lie after a directed verdict of the
jury has been received, and that to sustain such a motion
is reversible error, even though the order directing the
verdict was erroneously made. A ''new trial'' is defined
by Code, section 3755, to be a re-examination in the same
court of an issue of fact or some part or portion thereof
after a verdict by the jury, report of referee, or a decision of the court. The objection raised by the appellant
seems to be grounded in the thought that a directed verdict
is not a "verdict of a jury" within the meaning of this
statute, and that '' deci ions by the court'' which may be
questioned in motions for a new trial include only such as
are made by a court in the trial of issues without a jury.
In other words it is argued that an error in directing a
verdict can be corrected only upon appeal. We think this
contention requires an altogether too narrow con truction
of the statute, and that the establi hment of such a rule
would tend to prolong litigation, and increa e its hazard
and uncertainty. There is nothing inhering in our system
of procedure and practice whi.ch forbid the exercise by a
trial court of power to correct its own error where the mistake is di covered and the correction made at the same
term, and while the partie and the ubject-matter of controver y are still within its jurisdiction.
Chapman v.
Allen, Morri , 23; R ailroad Co. v . Estes, 71 Iowa, 605;
Brace v. Grady, 36 Iowa, 35_. The statute provides for
new trials after a verdict b. a jury. It doe not attempt to
cla sify verdicts or draw any di tin tion between those
returned by direction of the court and thos which are not,
and we see nothing in the nature of the ase to compel
the court to ingraf t uch an ex eption u on the rule a
laid down b. the Leo-i latur . Wh n the court ubmits
an L ue to a jur. with rron ou in tru tions that as a
matter of law plaintiff ha failed to make a ca e or that
defendant has failed to ustain his defense, thereby com-
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pelling a particular verdict, no good reason exists why that

error may not be taken advantage of on motion for a new

trial precisely the same as if the verdict had been actually

or presumably affected by the erroneous exclusion of ma-

terial evidence properly offered on the trial. The cases

cited by appellant might be considered in point were we

to recognize the distinction which counsel draw between

verdicts generally and directed verdicts, but this we can

not do, and we need not stop to consider what would be the

proper practice in the absence of statutory regulation. It

has frequently been held that power to grant new trials

is inherent in the court, and that statutes such as ours do

not abrogate or limit judicial authority in that respect.

See cases collected in 29 Cyc. 722. Were it necessary to

look beyond the provisions of our own statute and consult

precedents from other states, they appear to be in sub-

stantial accord with the conclusion here announced. Bear-

ing in that direction, see Railroad Co. v. Goodrich, 38 Kan.
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224 (16 Pac. 439) ; Chambers v. Granfzon, 7 Bosw. (N. Y.)

414; Hinote v. Simpson, 17 Fla. 444; 29 Cyc. 752.

There was no reversible error in setting aside the di-

rected verdict, and the order appealed from is affirmed.

Section 9. On Court's Own Motion.

FORT WAYNE & BELLE ISLE RAILWAY COMPANY

V. WAYNE CIRCUIT JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Michigan. 1896.

110 Michigan, 173.

Montgomery, J. One Emma L. Long brought an action

against the relator for personal injury, and, on a trial

~.11RIAL
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pelling a particular verdict, no good reason exists why that
error may not be taken advantage of on motion for a new
trial preieisely the same as if the verdict had been actually
or presum·a bly affected by the erroneous exclusion of material evidence properly offered on the trial. The cases
cited by appellant might be considered in point were we
to recognize the distinction which counsel draw between
verdicts generally and directed verdicts, but this we can
not do, and we need not stop to consider what would be the
proper practiice in the absence of ·statutory regulation. It
has frequently been held that power to grant new trials
is inherent in the court: and that statutes such as ours do
not abrogate or limit judicial authority in that respect.
See cases collected in 29 Cyc. 7·22. vVere it necessary to
look beyond the provisions of our own statute and consult
precedents from other states, they appear to be in substantial accord with the conclusion here announced. Bearing in that direction, see Railroad Co. v. Goodrich, 38 Kan.
224 (16 Pac. 439); Chamvers v. Grantzon, 7 Bosw. (N. Y.)
414; Hinote v. Simpson, 17 Fla. 444; 29 Cyc. 752.

* * * * * • • • * •

before a jury, recovered a verdict of $800. The respondent,

deeming this award insufficient, set aside the verdict, and

ordered a new trial. The relator asks for a writ of man-

damus directing that this order be set aside.

There was no reversible error in setting aside the directed verdict, and the order appealed from is affirmed.

The counsel for relator concede that the court might, for

SEOTION 9. ON CouRT's OwN MoTION.
FORT WAYNE & BELLE ISLE RAILWAY COMPANY
V. WAYNE CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Supreme Court of M·ichigan.

1896.

110 Michigan, 173.

MoNTGOMERY, J. On Emma L. Long brou()"ht an action
again t the relator for er onal injury, and, on a trial
h for a jury, recov r d a v rdict of $800. The respondent,
ming this award in uffici nt, s t aside the verdict, and
rder d a new trial. Th r lator ask for a writ of mandamus dir ting that this ord r be et aside.
Th
unsel for relator concede that the court might, for
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an error of its own commission on the trial, order a new

trial on its own motion, but contend that the court has no

such control over verdicts of juries, and can only vacate

such verdicts on application of one of the parties. We

747
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an error of its own commission on the trial, order a new
trial on its own motion, but contend that the court has no
such control over verdicts of juries, and can only vacate
such verdicts on appli cation of one of the parties. We
think the practice in this State has been otherwise, from
its earliest history, and although the exercise of this power
has been very rare, there have been instances of it. That
these instances must, of necessity, be infrequent, naturally
re ults from the recognized impropriety of a trial judge
interposing his own judgment, as against that of a jury,
except in a clear case. But in such case the court possesses
the power, at common law, to grant a new trial on its own
motion; and in our opinion the power is not limited to
cases where the error is that of the court, or where there
is misconduct of the jury, as contended by relator's counsel, and as appears to have been held by the supreme court
of Texas in Lloyd v . Brinck, 35 Tex. l. _ As sustaining the
broader power, as a common-law power, see 2. Thomp.
Trials, § 2711, and cases cited,-particularly, State v .
Adams, 84 Mo. 313.
Having determined that Judge Donovan had the power
to set aside this verdict, it follows that his discretion must
control his action, except in a oase of clear abuse of such
discretion, which we do not find in this case.
The writ will be denied.
HooKER and MooRE, J J., concurred. LoNG, C. J., did not
sit. GRANT, J., took no part.
1

think the practice in this State has been otherwise, from

its earliest history, and although the exercise of this power

has been very rare, there have been instances of it. That

these instances must, of necessity, be infrequent, naturally

results from the recognized impropriety of a trial judge

interposing his own judgment, as against that of a jury,

except in a clear case. But in such case the court possesses

the power, at common law, to grant a new trial on its own

motion; and in our opinion the power is not limited to

cases where the error is that of the court, or where there

is misconduct of the jury, as contended by relator's coun-

sel, and as appears to have been held by the supreme court

of Texas in Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex. 1. As sustaining the

broader power, as a common-law power, see 2 Thomp.
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Trials, § 2711, and cases cited, — particularly. State v.

Adams, 84 Mo. 313.

Having determined that Judge Donovan had the power

to set aside this verdict, it follows that his discretion must

control his action, except in a case of clear abuse of such

discretion, which we do not find in this case.

The writ will be denied.

Hooker and Moore, JJ., concurred. Long, C. J., did not

sit. Grant, J., took no part.

HENSLEY V. DAVIDSON BROTHERS COMPANY.

Supreme Court of loiva. 1907.

135 Iowa, 106.

Ladd, J. The law of the case was settled on the former

appeal (103 N. W. 975) ; and, whether right or wrong, that

ruling in so far as applicable to this case is a part of the

irrevocable past. That adjudication is binding on the

parties, and it was the imperative duty of the district

court to follow it. The evidence was substantiallv the

HENSLEY V. DAVIDSON BROTHERS COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Iowa.

1907.

135 Iowa, 106.

LADD, J. The law of th case was settled on the former
appeal ( 103 N. W. 975) · and, whether right or wrong, that
rulinO' in o far as a-pplicable to thi ca e is a part of the
irrevocabl pa t.
That adjudi ation is binding on the
parties, and it wa th imp rati
duty of the di. trict
rourt to follow it.
The vidence was substantially the
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same as that introduced on the former trial; the only dif-

ference being that jDlaintiff testified that she saw the de-

fendant's team before getting out of the wagon to go to

the depot, concerning which no inquiry had been made

before, and some variance in McDaniel's testimony bear-

ing on his credibility as a witness. The records differ in

no important particulars, such as might be persuasive that

a different conclusion with reference to the submission of

the cause to the jury should be reached.

No objections or rulings of any kind prior to the sub-

mission of the cause to the jury are to be found in the rec-

ord, and no exceptions to the instructions were saved.

Nevertheless, when the jury returned into court with

a verdict for the plaintiff, the court ''immediately

upon reading said verdict, on its own motion," set

it aside. Plad this been done to correct some ruling in the

course of the trial not necessary to challenge by motion in

order to be renewed, a different question would be pre-
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sented; but nothing previous had occurred to which the

able counsel on either side had thought it worth while to

save an exception. The ruling must have been owing to

some supposed error lurking in the verdict which might

have furnished the basis of a motion for new trial by the

party aggrieved. An omission to so raise it would have

been a waiver. For all that appears from the record, such

might have been defendant's purpose. Our statute enum-

erates the grounds on which new trials shall be granted on

application of the aggrieved party. Section 3755, Code.

But there is no provision in the Code relating to orders of

this kind on the court's own motion. That such right ex-

ists, however, is indisputable. It is one of the inherent

powers of the court essential to the administration of jus-

tice. In Rex V. Goiigli, 2 Doug. 791, Lord Mansfield de-

clared that, even though too late for a motion, if enough

appeared, the court could grant a new trial, and in Rex v.

Atkinson, 5 Term R. 437, note, is quoted as saying that,

though too late for a motion, "if the court conceive a doubt

that justice is not done, it is never too late to grant a new

trial." In Rex v. Bolt, 5 Term R. 436, Lord Kenyon, said

he well remembered Rex v. Gough, "where the objection

to the verdict was taken by the court themselves," and

Buller J., observed, in concurring, that "after four days
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same as that introduced on the former trial; the only difference being that plaintiff testified that she saw the def end ant's team before getting out of the wagon to go to
the depot, concerning which no inquiry had been made
before, and some variance in McDaniel's testimony bearing on his credibility as a witness. The records differ in
no important particulars, such as might be persuasive that
a different conclusion with reference to the submission of
the qause to the jury should be reached.
No objections or rulings of any kind prior to the submission of the cause to the jury are to be found in the record, and no ex.ceptions to the instructions were saved.
Nevertheless, when the jury returned into court with
a verdict for the plaintiff, the court ''immediately
upon reading said verdict, on its own motion,'' set
it aside. Had this been done to correct some ruling in the
course of the trial not necessary to challenge by motion in
order to be renewed, a different question would be presented; but nothing previous had occurred to which the
able counsel on either side had thought it worth while to
save an exception.
The ruling must have been owing to
some supposed error lurking in the verdict which might
have furnished the basis of a motion for new trial by the
party aggrieved. An omission to so raise it would have
been a waiver. For all that appears from the record, such
might have been defendant's purpose. Our statute enumerates the grounds on which new trials shall be granted on
application of the aggrieved party.
Section 3755, Code.
But there is no provision in the Code relating to orders of
this kind on the court's own motion. That such right exists, however, is indisputable.
It is one of the inherent
powers of the court e sential to the admini tration of justice.
In Rex v . Gough, 2 Doug. 791, Lord Mansneld declared that, even though too late for a motion, if enough
app ared, the ourt could O'rant a new trial, and in Rex v.
Atkin. on, 5 T rm R. 437, note, i quot d a aying that,
thouo-h too lat for a motion, ''if the court conceive a doubt
that ju ti is ot don , it i nev r too late to grant a new
trial.'' In Rex v . Holt, 5 Term R. 436, Lord Kenyon, said
he w 11 rememb red Rex v. Gough, "where the objection
to the v rdi t was taken y the court th m. elv , " and
Buller J., observed, in concurring, that ''after four days
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the party could not be heard on motion for new trial, but

only in arrest of judgment; but if, in the course of that ad-

dress, it incidentally appear that justice has not been

done, the court will interpose of themselves." In Weber

V. Kirkendall, 44 Neb. 766 (63 N. W. 35), it is said that the

power of courts of general jurisdiction, in the correction

of errors committed by them, '*is exercised, not alone on

account of their solicitude for the rights of litigants but

also in justice to themselves as instruments provided for

the impartial administration of the law." And such is

the view generally entertained by the courts in this coun-

try. Allen V. Wheeler, 54 Iowa, 628; Ellis v. Gmshurg,

163 Mass. 143 (39 N. E. 800); Standard Milling Co. v.

White Line Central Transit Co., 122 Mo. 258 (26 S. W.

704) ; State ex rel. Henderson v. McCrea, 40 La. Ann. 20

(3 South. 380) ; Bank of Willmer v. Laivler, 78 Minn. 135

(80 N. W. 868) ; Com. v. Gabor, 209 Pa. 201 (58 Atl. 278) ;

Thompson, Trials, 2411; State ex rel. Brainerd v. Adams,
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84 Mo. 310.

In the last case the court, in upholding the power, per-

tinently inquired: "If the court commits a palpable error

in an instruction to the jury, or witnesses misconduct of

members of the jury, which, on motion, would authorize

it to set aside the verdict, shall it on account of the ignor-

ance or timidity of the aggrieved party which prevents him

from moving in the matter, render an unjust judgment on

the verdict If the jury find a verdict palpably against the

law as declared by the court, is it powerless to maintain its

own dignity and self-respect, unless some one who feels

aggrieved shall move in the matter?

In several of the States the grounds on which the courts

may act on their own motion in granting a trial are speci-

fied by statute construed by the courts to exclude all

others!! Townley v. Adams] 118 Cal. 382 (50 Pac. 550) ;

Clement v. Barnes, 6 S. D. 483 (61 N. W. 1126) ; State ex

rel. Brainerd v. Adams, supra. Wliere the authority is

found in the statutes the consensus of opinion seems to be

that the ruling must be entered promptly upon the return

of the verdict. Clements v. Barnes, supra; Gould v. Ele-

vator Co., 2 N. D. 216 (50 N. W. 969). See Long v. King-

fisher Co., 5 Old. 128 (47 Pac. 1063) ; 14 Ency. P. & P. 932.

And several courts have indicated without deciding that
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the party could not be heard on motion for new trial but
only in arrest of judgment; but if, in the our of that' address, it incidentally appear that ju tice has not be n
In Wever
done, the court will interpose of them ·elve . "
v. K irkendall, 44 Neb. 766 (63 N. W. 35), it i aid that th
pow r of courts of general jurisdiction, in the correction
of errors committed by them, ''is exercised, not alone on
aiccount of their solicitude for the right of litigants but
also in justice to themselves as instruments provided for
the impartial administration of the law.''
And such i
the view generally entertained by the courts in this country.
Allen v. Wheeler, 54 Iowa, 628; Ellis v. Ginsburg,
163 Mas . 143 (39 N. E. 800); Standard Milling Co . ·.
White Line Central Transit Co., 122 lYio. 25 (26 S. W.
704); State ex rel. Henderson v . JI,{ cCrea, 40 La. Ann. 20
(3 South. 380); Bank of Willnier v . Lawler, 78 Minn. 135
(80 N. W. 868); Com. v. Gabor, 209 Pa:. 201 (58 Atl. 278);
Thompson, Trials, 2411; Stat e ex rel. Brainerd v. Adams,
84 Mo. 310.
In the last case the court, in upholding the power, pertinently inquired: ''If the court commits a palpable error
in an instruction to the jury, or witnesses misconduct of
members of the jury, which, on motion, would authorize
it to set aside the verdict, shall it on account of the ignorance or timidity of the aggrieved party which prevents him
from moving in the matter, render an unjust judgment on
the verdict If the jury find a verdict palpably against the
law as declared by the court, is it powerless to maintain its
own dignity and self-re pect, unless some one who feels
aggrieYed shall move in the matter.
In se eral of the States the grounds on which the court"
may act on their own motion in granting a trial are speciall
fied by tatute construed by the court to xclu
other .
Townley v. Adam, , 118 Cal. 382 (50 Pac. 550);
Clenient . Barne ,
. D. 4 ° (61 N. W. 11_6) · tat x
Where the auth rit. i
rel. Brainerd v . 1dams, supra.
found in th t tut the con en u of opinion
rn to b
that the rulinO' mu , t b nt r d ro ptly u on th return
of th Y rdjct.
lem nt 'l. Barne
upra; Gould . Elevator Co., 2 N. D. 216 (5 N. \V. 69).
e Long . Kingfisher Co. 5 kl. 12 ( 47 Pa . 10 ) · 14 Ency. P. & P. 932.
And e eral courts have indicated without deciding that
T
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the order must be entered within the time within which a

motion for new trial must be filed. That a motion there-

for is pending will not deprive the court of the power to

order a new trial on grounds not raised therein. This

must necessarily be so, for one of the controlling reasons

for the existence of the power is to enable the court to

guard the rights of parties, who, for some cause, have

proven unable to jDrotect themselves, and another to en-

able the court to correct its errors rather than wait for

this to be done by the Appellate Court. But resort to

this power will rarely be required, and it should be exer-

cised with great caution and in aggravated cases only.

Ample provisions are to be found in the Code of Pro-

cedure for the protection of litigants on their own appli-

cation, and for the court to interpose, without affording

the defeated party an opportunity to elect, whether he will

accept the result, lays it open to the suspicion of partisan-

ship. It is preferable to leave something to the attor-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

neys engaged in the litigation.

Especially was this true in the case at bar, as judgment

therein for the defendant on a directed verdict had been

reversed by this court, and the evidence held to be such as

to require that the issues be submitted to the jury. Of

what force is the opinion of this court that a case is made

out for the jury if the district court can evade the ruling

by setting aside the verdict when returned, and even then

with the scant consideration evidenced by not waiting for

objection by the losing party? If this can be done once,

it may be repeated, and through orders granting new trials

the effect of the decision entirely obviated. The rule

which precludes this court from reviewing, revising, or re-

versing a decision on a former appeal is equally binding

on the district court. McFall v. Raihvay, 104 Iowa, 50;

Bahcoch v. Railway, 72 Iowa, 199; Garretson v. Ins. Co.,

92 Iowa, 295 ; Burlington, Cedar Rapids (& N. R. Co. v. Dey,

89 Iowa, 24.

If, then, a new trial was granted on the same ground on

which a verdict for defendant was directed on the former

trial, tlie ruling cannot be sustained. Upon great consid-

eration this court held in Meyer v. Houch, 85 Iowa, 319,

that the trial judge should direct a verdict whenever, con-

sidering all the evidence, it would be his duty to set aside
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the order must be entered within the time within which a
motion for new trial must be filed. That a motion therefor is pending will not deprive the court of the p ower to
order a new trial on grounds not raised therein.
This
must necessarily be so, for one of the controlling reasons
for the existence of the power is to enable the court t o
guard the rights of parties, who, for some cause, have
proven unable to protect themselves, and another to enable the .court to correct its errors rather than wait for
this to be done by the Appellate Court.
But resort to
this power will rarely be required, and it should be exercised with great caution and in aggravated cases only.
Ample provisions are to be found in the Code of Procedure for the protection of litigants on their own application, and for the court to interpose, without affording
the defeated party an opportunity to elect, whether he will
accept the result, lays it open to the suspicion of partisanship.
It is preferable to leave something to the attorneys engaged in the litigation.
Especially was this true in the case at bar, as judgment
therein for the defendant on a directed verdict had been
reversed by this court, and the evidence held to be such as
to require that the issues be submitted to the jury.
Of
what force is the opinion of this court that a case is made
out for the jury if the district court can evade the ruling
by setting aside the verdict when returned, and even then
with the scant consideration evidenced by not waiting for
objection by tbe losing party~ If this can be done once,
it may be repeated, and through order granting new trials
the eff ct of the decision entirely obviated.
The rule
whi ch preclude. this court from reviewinO', revising, or rever in{)' a decision on a former appeal is equally binding
on the district court.
McFall v. Ra-ilway, 104 Iowa, 50;
Babcock v. Railway, 72 Iowa, 199; Garretson v. Ins. Co.,
92 Iowa, 295; Burlington, Cedar Rapids & N. R. Co. v. Dey,
9 Iowa, 24.
If, th n, a new trial wa grant d on th am ground on
which a v rdict for defendant was dir cted on the former
trial, th ruling annot be sustained. Upon O'r at considrati n thi ourt held in Meyer v. Houck, 85 Iowa, 319,
th t th trial judg , h nlrl dir t a v rdi t wh n ver, con•i
ring all th vid nc , it would be his duty to set aside
1
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the verdict if returned in favor of the party upon whom

the burden of proof rested. The converse of this prop-

osition necessarily follows ; that is, a new trial ought not

to be granted when the evidence in favor of the party hav-

ing the burden of proof is such that the cause should be

submitted to the jury. On the former appeal we held

that the cause should have been submitted to the jury, and

this in effect was an adjudication that a verdict, if re-

turned for plaintiff, would have such support in the evi-

dence as to preclude the granting of a new trial on that

ground alone. Any question of presumption ordinarily

indulged in favor of the ruling of the trial judge or discre-

tion in the matter of granting new trials is obviated by

the record. The record is conclusively presumed to con-

tain everything essential to the determination of all points

raised in argument. McGilUvary Bros. v. Case, 107 Iowa,

17 ; King v. Hart, 110 Iowa, 618.

The order is reversed and the cause remanded for judg-
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ment on the verdict. — Reversed.

Section 10. Discretion of Court.

LOFTUS V. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1909.

220 Missouri, 470.

Graves, J. * * *

**********

* * * After verdict was returned the defendant filed
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the verdict if returned in favor of the party upon whom
the burden of proof rested.
The converse of this proposition nece arily follows; that i a new trial ought not
to be grant d when the eviden e in favor of the party having the burden of proof i su h that the cause hould be
ubmitted to the jury.
On the former appeal we held
that the cau e hould haYe been submitted to the jury, and
this in effect was an adjudication that a verdict if returned for plaintiff, would have such support in the evidence as to preclude the granting of a new trial on that
ground alone.
Any question of presumption ordinarily
indulged in favor of the ruling of the trial judge or discretion in the matter of granting new trials is obviated by
the record. The record is conclusively presumed to contain ever; thing es ential to the determination of all points
rai ed in argument. M cGillivary Bros. v. Case, 107 Iowa,
17; King v . Hart, 110 Iowa, 618.
The order is reversed and the cause remanded for judgment on the verdict.-Reversed.

its motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment, which

motions were by the court sustained by an order of record

in this language: ''Now on this day it is ordered by the

court that the motion for a new trial and motion in arrest

of judgment be and the same are hereby sustained because

the court erred in giving instruction *No. One P.' to which

the plaintiff excepts."

SECTION

10.

DISCRETION OF COURT.

LOFTUS V. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY
COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

1909.

220 Missouri, 470.
GRAVES,

J. *

:I
*
* * * * * • • * • •

* * * After verdict was returned the defendant filed
its motion for new trial and in arre t of judgment which
motion were by the court su tained by an ord r of re ord
in thi lan uag : ''Now on thi day it i ordered by the
court that the motio for a new trial and motion in arrest
of ju g-m nt be and the ame ar h reb u tained becau e
th c urt erred in giving in tru tion 'No. One P.' to which
the plaintiff ex cepts."
1

• • • • • • • • • •
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11. The further contention is made that this court

sliould not disturb the discretion exercised by the trial

court in granting the new trial. In other words, that the

granting of a new trial rests within the sound discretion

of the trial court. In the broad sense, the granting of a

new trial does rest within the sound discretion of the trial

judge, and this discretion, like all judicial discretions,

should not be disturbed when properly exercised. We are

cited to the recent cases of Rodan v. Railroad, 207 Mo. 1.

c. 407, and Seeger v. Silver Co., 193 Mo. 1. c. 407, as stating

correct rules upon the question.

In the latter case. Judge Marshall said: "The rule is

now well settled in this State that this court will not re-

verse the action of a trial court in granting one new trial,

unless the .case is such that no verdict in favor of the party

to whom the new trial is thus granted, could, under any

circumstances, be permitted to stand."

And in the former. Judge Lamm said: "In the first
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place, in limine, it must be assumed as a commonplace of

the law, arising to the level of an axiom, that the granting

of a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial

court; and its action in that behalf will not be disturbed

on appeal unless it appears that its discretionary power

was abused, i, e., exercised in an arbitrary or improvident

manner. (R. S. 1899, sec. 800; and see first note under

that section, Ann. Stat. 1906, 761, where the authorities

are gathered.) "

These announcements must be taken in the light of the

facts of the cases. In the Seeger case the trial court had

sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's testimony and thereby

forced a nonsuit. Motion was made to set aside the non-

suit and that motion sustained by the court nisi, from

which order the defendant appealed. Upon such an ap-

peal Judge Marshall used the language above quoted. It

must be noted tliat the sole question before the trial court

and this court was the sufficiency of the evidence to make

a case for plaintiff. At first blush, the trial court thought

not, but upon considering the motion to set aside the non-

suit reached a different conclusion. The discretion exer-

cised then was one as to the facts, and not one purely and

simply of law. So, too, in the Rodan case. The trial

court concluded, upon motion for new trial filed by defend-
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II. The further contention is made that this court
should not disturb the discretion exercised by the trial
court in granting the new trial. In other words, that the
granting of a new trial rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court. In the broad sense, the granting of a
new trial does rest within the sound discretion of the trial
judge, and this discretion, like all judicial disic retions,
should not be disturbed when properly exercised. We are
cited to the recent cases of Rodan v . Railroad, 207 Mo. 1.
c. 407, and Seeger v. Silver Co., 193 Mo. 1. c. 407, as stating
correct rules upon the question.
In the latter case, Judge Marshall said: "The rule is
now well settled in this State that this court will not reverse the action of a trial court in granting one new trial,
unless the .case is such that no verdict in favor of the party
to whom the new trial is thus granted, could, under any
circumstances, be permitted to stand.''
And in the former, Judge Lamm said: "In the first
place, in limine, it must be assumed as a commonplace of
the law, ar~ing to the level of an axiom, that the granting
of a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court; and its action in that behalf will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it appears that its discretionary power
was abused, i. e., exercised in an arbitrary or improvident
manner.
(R. S. 1899, sec. 800; and see first note under
that section, Ann. Stat. 1906, 761, where the authorities
are gathered.) ''
These announcements must be taken in the light of the
facts of the cases. In the Seeger case the trial court had
ustained a demurrer to plaintiff's testimony and thereby
forced a non uit. Motion was made to set aside the non. uit and that motion sustained by the court nisi, from
which order the defendant appealed.
Upon such an ap1 e 1 Jud<>' Marshan used the lan<>'uage above quoted. It
mu. t b noted that the ol qu stion before the trial court
an thi court wa the ufficiency of the evid nee to make
a. for I Jai tiff.
t first blush, the trial court thought
not ut upo on id ring the motion to set aside the nonuit r ach
a diff rent con lu ion.
The dis.cretion exeri. d th n wa one as to the fa ts, and not one purely and
simply of law.
o, too, in the Rodan case. The trial
court concluded, upon motion for new trial filed by defend-

1

1
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ant, that it had erred in giving a certain instruction, which

instruction should not have been given in view of certain

facts shown in the trial. In other words, the court had in-'

structed the jury that in the absence of evidence that the

deceased did not look and listen for an approaching car,

then the jury were at liberty to presume that he did look

and listen. A witness for plaintiff, and the only eye-wit-

ness, had testified in effect that he saw deceased leave the

sidewalk and go on across to the railroad track, paying

no attention to the approaching car. Judge Lamm's re-

marks were induced by this state of affairs. The ques-

tion before the trial court, and upon which the judicial dis-

cretion was exercised, was a mixed question of law and

fact. The trial court concluded that in view of the facts

testified to by this witness there was positive testimou}^

that deceased did not look or listen before going upon the

railroad track, and therefore there was no place for an in-

struction upon the ground of presumption. So that in
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this case the discretion was really exercised as to the facts

of the case. Both of those cases announce the proper

rule in cases where judicial discretion has been exercised

as to the facts and the weighing of the evidence as to the

facts. In such cases we will not disturb such discretion

in a case wherein there is sufficient evidence to sustain a

verdict in favor of the party for whom such discretion has

been exercised. But these cases are not this case. Upon

the facts of the case at bar a verdict for either party could

be sustained, but the discretion of the trial judge was not

directed to the facts, so far as the question now before us

is concerned. He was passing judgment upon a clear ques-

tion of law, and we have concluded that his judgment on

that question was erroneous. Wlien the judicial act is direct-

ed solely to a question of law and the act is erroneous, it

does not fall within the rule of the exercise of sound, judicial

discretion. There is no discretion as to the law of a case. Nor

can there be an exercise of a sound discretion as to the law

of a case. So that when we speak of the granting of a

new trial being within the sound discretion of the trial

judge, we have no reference to a case where the new trial

is granted solely upon the ground that the law has been

erroneously given, when in fact it has been properly given.

»******♦»♦
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ant, that it had erred in giving a certain in truction, which
instruction should not have been given in view of certain
facts shown in the trial. In other word , the court had in-'
structed the jury that in the absence of evidence that the
deceased djd not look and listen for an approaching car,
then the jury were at liberty to presume that he did look
and listen. A witness for plaintiff, and the only eye-witness, had testified in effect that he saw deceased leave the
sidewalk and go on across to the railroad track, paying
no attention to the approaching car. Judge Lamm' remarks were induced by this state of affairs.
The question before the trial court, and upon which the judicial discretion was exercised, was a mixed question of law and
fact.
The trial .court concluded that in view of the fa ts
testified to by this witness there was positive testimony
that deceased did not look or listen before going upon the
railroad track, and therefore there was· no place for an instTuction upon the ground of presumption.
So that in
this case the discretion was really exercised as to the facts
of the case.
Both of those cases announce the proper
rule in cases where judicial discretion has been exercised
as to the f aicts and the weighing of the evidence as to the
facts.
In such cases we will not disturb such di cretion
in a case wherein there is sufficient evidence to sustain a
'erdict in favor of the party for whom such discretion has
been exercised. But these cases are not thi ca e. Upon
the fact of the case at bar a verdid for either part. could
be sustained, but the discretion of the trial judge wa n not
directed to the facts, so far as the question now before us
is concerned. He was passing judgment upon a clear question of law, and we have concluded that hi judgment on
that question was erroneous. When the judicial act i directed solely to a question of law and the act i erroneou it
doe not fall within the rule of the exerci of onnd.judicial
di retion. There is no di er tion as to the law of a ca . Nor
can there be an exerci e of a ound di .cretion a to the law
of a case.
So that wh n we
ak of th grantincr of a
new trial being within the ound di er tion of th trial
jud e w ha no refer n to a ca e wher the nff\\ trial
i granted sol ly up n th O'round that th law ha b en
erroneo11 . l. gi'' n, wh n in fa t it ha been rop rly given.
T

y
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YORK V. STILES.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 1899.

YORK V. STILES.

21 Rhode Island, 225.

Assumpsit on book account. The facts are fully stated

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

in the opinion. Heard on petition of defendant for a new

trial. New trial denied.

1899.

Tillinghast, J. We think the ancient maximn ^^de

21 Rhode Island, 225.

minimis non curat Ze.<c" may well be applied to this case.

The amount involved is only four dollars. The action

was commenced in the District Court, where upon trial a

decision was rendered for the defendant. It was then

certified to the Common Pleas Division upon plaintiff's

claim for a jury trial. When the case came on for trial

the defendant did not appear, and a default was entered,

and subsequently the court assessed the plaintiff's dam-

ages at the sum aforesaid. The case is now before us on

the defendant's petition for a new trial, on the ground

that the Common Pleas Division erred in certain rulings
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regarding the admission of evidence in connection with the

assessment of damages on default. We think the peti-

tion should be denied. The amount involved is too trifling

to warrant the court in sending the case back for another

trial. Moreover, whatever the result of a new trial might

be, if one should be had, it is manifest that it would be to

the detriment of both parties to have one. And as re-

marked by Ames C J. in Svonner v. Leland, 5 R. I. 352, in

speaking of new trials; ''Neither courts of law or equity

when exercising, as in such cases, a discretion, exercise

it except to some good and useful end." No vital ques-

tion of principle is involved. The only dispute in the

case is as to whether the defendant had the right to de-

duct from the plaintiff's wages, which were seven dollars

per week, certain damages alleged to have been caused by

her in running the "extractor" in the defendant's laun-

dry. Such a dispute about such an insignificant matter

does not strongly appeal to the judicial discretion of the

court.

In Buddington v. Knowles^ 30 Conn. 26, which was a pe-

AssuMPSIT ON BOOK ACCOUNT. The facts are fully stated
in the opinion. Heard on petition of defendant for a new
trial.
New trial denied.
TILLINGHAST, J.
We think the ancient maxium ''de
minirnis non curat lex" may well be applied to this case.
The amount involved is only four dollars.
The action
was commenced in the District Court, where upon trial a
It was then
decision was rendered for the defendant.
certified to the Common Pleas Division upon plaintiff's
laim for a jury trial.
When the case came on for trial
the defendant did not appear, and a default was entered,
and subsequently the court assessed the plaintiff's damages at the sum aforesaid.
The case is now before us on
the defendant's petition for a new trial, on the ground
that the Common Pleas Division erred in certain rulings
regarding the admission of evidence in connection with the
assessment of damages on def a ult.
We think the petition should be denied. The amount involved is too trifling
to warrant the court in sending the case back for another
trial. Moreover, whatever the result of a new trial miO'ht
h , if one should be bad it i manife. t that it would be to
the detriment of both parties to hav one.
And as remarked by Ame 0. J. in 8rJO()ner v. Leland, 5 R. I. 352, in
speaking of new trial ; "N ith r courts of law or equity
when exerci ino-, as in such ca e , a di cretion. exercise
it xcept to some good and u ful end.''
No vital qu sti n of prin ipl i involv d.
Th onl. di pute in th
ra j a to wh ther the d f ndant had the riO'ht to dedu t from th plaintiff' wag , whi h w re seven dollar
per w k, rtain damages all O' d to hav b en caused by
h r in runnino- th "extra tor" in the d fendant's launry.
Such a i ut about such an insio-nifiicant matter
cl . )t strongly a
al to th judi ial discretion of th
urt.
n Buddington v. Knowles, 30 onn. 26 1 which was ape-

1
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tition for new trial on the ground that the damages, which

the jury had assessed at $66, were excessive, Ellsworth, J.,

in delivering the opinion of the court said: *'It is a suf-

ficient objection to granting a new trial for excessive dam-

ages, that the verdict is onl}^ for $66, an amount too trivial

to warrant the renewal of the controversy, unless courts of

justice are kept open to gratify the evil passions of man-

kind. To grant the defendant's request will be to punish

the defendant himself, were it certain that the damages

would be reduced on another trial, which, however, it is

Tiot, either as a matter of law on the evidence before us,

or as a matter of fact. Such a practice we cannot en-

courage, and we take this opportunity to say that a new

trial in such cases should not be asked for, unless the case

be one which involves something more than a trifling sum

of money."

In Hyatt v. Wood, 3 Johns, 237, the court said: ''It has

frequently been decided in this court, that in cases where

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the damages are trifling, a new trial will not be granted

after a verdict for the defendant, merely to give the plain-

tiff an opportunity to recover nominal damages, and when

no end of justice is to be attained by it, though there may

have been a misdirection of the judge. The principle stated

by the judge in this case was incorrect, but the action is of

too little importance to grant a new trial merely for that

reason." See also to the same general effect, Macroiv v.

Hull, 1 Burr. 11; Burton v. Thompson, 2 Burr. 664; Flem-

ing V. Gilbert, 3 Johns, 520; Hill. N. Tr. 2 ed. 483-4; Rob-

erts V. Karr, 1 Taunt. 493.

A motion for a new trial is practically an appeal to the

sound discretion of the court to prevent a material and

palpable wrong. And it is never to be granted if the

court can see that substantial justice has been done, not-

withstanding irregularities may have occurred. Nor is

it to be granted when the failure of justice has not been

palpable; nor where the wrong done, however palpable it

may be, is trivial in extent. 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. 503.

The maxium above quoted, however, is not to be applied

in case of the positive and wrongful invasion of another's

property or personal rights. Seneca Road Co. v. Rail-

road Co., 5 Hill, 170.

Petition for new trial denied, and case remitted to the
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tition for new trial on the ground that the damages, which
the jury had as e ed at 66, were exce si e, Ell worth, J.,
in deli ering th o inion of the ourt aid : "It is a sufficient objection to granting a new trial for exces ive damages, that the v rdict is only for $66, an amount too trivial
to warrant the renewal of the controversy, unless courts of
justice are kept open to a-ratify the evil passions of mankind. To grant the def ndant reque t will be to punish
the defendant him elf were it .certain that the damages
would be redu ed on another trial whi h, however it i
not ither a a matter of law on the evidence before us,
or as a matter of fact.
Such a pra tice we cannot enourage, and we take thi opportunity to say that a new
trial in such a es hould not be a ked for, unle s the case
be one which in ol es omething more than a trifling sum
of money."
In Hyatt v . W ood 1 3 John , 237, the court said: "It has
frequently been d ided in thi ourt that in cases where
the damage are trifling, a new trial will not be granted
after a erdict for the defendant merely to ive the plain tiff an opportunit. to r cover nominal damages, and when
no end of justice i to be attained by it though there may
have been a mi direction of the judge. The principle tated
by the ju ge in thi ca e was incorrect, but the action is of
too little importance to grant a new trial merely for that
rea on.'' See al o to the same general effect, M acrow v .
Hull 1 1 Burr. 11; Burton v . Thompson, 2 Burr. 664; Fleming v. Gilbert 1 3 John 5_0; Hill. N. Tr. 2 ed. 483-4; Roberts v. K arr1 1 Taunt. 49 .
A motion for a new trial is practically an appeal to the
ound di er tion of the court to pre ent a material and
palpable wrong.
And it i never to be granted if the
court can ee that ub tantial ju tice ha b en done notwith tanding irregularitie may ba e occurred.
Nor i
it to be granted wh n th failur of ju ti e ha not b n
pal a le· nor wher th ' ronO' one how v r palpable it
mav b i trivial in xt nt. 16 m . & n . Ency. L. 503.
Th~ maxi um above qu
d however, is not to be appli d
in ca e of the po itiY and wr no-ful inva ion of another s
pro rt. or p r onal ri O'ht .
eneca Road Co. v. Railro ad o., 5 Hill 170.
Petition for new trial denied, and case remitted to the
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Common Pleas Division with direction to enter judgment

rommon Pleas Division with direction to enter judgment

on the decision.

on the decision.

NORTH CENTER CREEK MINING & SMELTING

COMPANY V. EAKINS.

Supreme Court of Kansas. 1880.

23 Kansas, 317.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Brewer, J.: This was an action appealed from a jus-

tice of the peace, for labor done in and about certain zinc

smelting works. The question was as to the liability of

the defendant, no question being made as to the fact of the

NORTH CENTER CREEK MINING & SMELTING
COMP ANY V. EAKINS.

work or its value. The verdict was against the defend-

ant. Upon a motion for a new trial, the court ruled that

Supreme Court of Kansas.

1880.

it should be granted, upon the payment within thirty days

of all costs in the district court, and in default of such pay-

ment, that it should be overruled, and judgment entered

23 Kansas, 317.

on the verdict. The defendant alleges error.

The grounds of the motion for a new trial were, that
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the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, that

the court erred in admitting testimony, and in other rul-

ings. No claim was made on account of accident, sur-

prise, or newly-discovered evidence. The claim of the

defendant therefore was, that there was error on the part

of the court or jury to its prejudice. The court, by sus-

taining the motion, even conditionally, in effect found that

such claim was correct ; and yet it refused any relief to de-

fendant, except upon payment of costs. Now when the

claim for a new trial is based upon accident, or newly-dis-

covered testimony, grounds which concede the correctness

of the trial already had, there is often fairness and justice

in requiring a payment of the costs of such trial as a con-

dition of a new one. For if the victorious party is with-

out fault and the proceedings without error, it is a hard-

ship on him to be compelled to relinquish what he has ob-

tained and venture upon a new trial, simply on account

of the intervention of some new fact in behalf of his op-

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREWER, J.:
This was an action appealed from a justice of the peace, for labor done in and about certain zinc
smelting works.
The question was as to the liability of
the defendant, no question being made as to the fact of the
work or its value. The verdict was against the defendant. Upon a motion for a new trial, the court ruled that
it should be granted, upon the payment within thirty days
of all co ts in the district court, and in def a ult of such payment, that it should be overruled, and judgment entered
on the verdict.
The defendant alleges error.
The grounds of the motion for a new trial were, that
the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, that
the court erred in admitting testimony, and in other rulings.
No claim was made on account of accident, sur·
prise, or newly-discovered evidence.
The claim of the
defendant therefore was, that there was error on the part
of the court or jury to its prejudice.
The court, by sustaining th motion, even conditional1y, in effect found that
such claim wa. corre. t; and yet it refused any relief to defendant, xcept u1 on payment of costs.
Now when the
claim for a new trial i ba ed upon ac id nt, or newly-discovered t timony, ground which concede the corre tness
of th trj 1 alr ady had, tb re is often f airne and justice
in r quiring a payment of the co t of such trial a a condition of a n w one. For if the vi torious party i without fa ult nd the pr ce ding with ut error, it is a hard. hi
n him to b
mpell d to r linquish what he has obtain d and v ntur upon a new trial, imply on account
of th int rv nti n f om n w fa t in behalf of his op-
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ponent. It is often just to make tlie party who has thus

obtained an opportunity to relitigate his case, pay the

fruitlessly expended costs of the first trial. But a differ-

ent rule prevails where the new trial is claimed and

awarded, not on account of the intervention of some new

fact, but because of wrong conduct on the part of the suc-

cessful party, or because the court or jury has at his in-

stance and upon his solicitation committed error. In such

case, if the error is a material one, the moving party has a

clear, legal right to a second trial. He is the party with-

out fault, and his adversary the wrongdoer; and the new

trial should as a rule go without costs. We are aware of

the statute which provides that the "costs of motions and

the like shall be taxed and paid as the court in its discretion

may direct." (Comp. Laws 1879, p. 682, § 588.) We

also know that often in trials both parties are in fact in

some fault and the motions for new trials cover all

grounds, so that it is not always possible to determine
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upon what grounds the motion is sustained. But what

we have suggested is, as to the rules which should control

the discretion of the court in the matter of costs upon

motions for new trials. Now as we have stated, the rul-

ing of the court was an exj)ression of its opinion that there

had been error prejudicial to the rights of defendant, an

opinion with which, after examining the record, we fully

concur. The essential facts are, that a tripartite written

agreement was entered into between L. D. Boone, the

owner of certain zinc works, the defendant, and Louis

Vogle, and Louis Goes, doing business under the name of

the Consolidated Zinc Mining & Smelting ComjDany, by the

terms of which Boone was to put his works in repair and

lease them. The defendant was to furnish zinc ore for

smelting and the C. Z. M. & S. Co. were to hire all needed

employes and run the works, smelting the ore furnished by

the defendant, and after paying one stipulated portion of

the product to Boone for the rent of the works and another

stipulated portion to the defendant for ore, take the bal-

ance for its compensation. Evidently from the terms of

this agreement, no partnership was contemplated between

these parties, but simply an arrangement for the rent of

buildings and machinery and the reduction of ore to min-

eral. So the court .instructed the jury, and the instruc-
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ponent. It is often just to make the party who has thus
obtained an opportunity to relitigate his case, pay the
fruitle sly expended costs of the first trial. But a different rule prevails where the new trial is claimed and
awarded, not on account of the intervention of some new
fact, but becau e of wrong conduct on the part of the successful arty, or because the court or jury has at his instance and upon hi solicitation committed error. In such
case, if the error is a material one, the moving party has a
clear, legal right to a second trial. He is the party without fault, and his adver ary the wrongdoer; and the new
trial hould as a rule go without costs. We are aware of
the statute which provide that the "co ts of motions and
the like hall be taxed and paid a the court in its discretion
may direct.''
(Comp. Laws 1879, p. 682, ~ 588.)
vVe
also know that often in trials both parties are in fact in
some fault and the motions for -new trials cover all
ground , so that it is not alway pos ible to determine
upon what ground the motion is su tained.
But what
we have uggested is, as to the rules which should control
the discretion of the court in the matter of costs upon
motions for new trial . Now as we have stated, the ruling of the court was an expre sion of its opinion that there
had been error prejudicial to the rights of defendant, an
opinion with which, after examining the record, we fully
concur. The es ential facts are, that a tripartite written
agreement wa entered into between L. D. Boone, the
owner of certain zinc works, the defendant, and Louis
Vogle, and Loui Goe , doing busine s under the name of
the on olidated Zinc 1fining & Smelting ompany, by the
terms of wbi h Boone wa to I ut his work in repair and
lea e them.
The def ndant wa to furnish zinc ore for
smelting and the C. Z. M. & S. o. were to hire all needed
employe and run the work , melting the ore furni bed by
the def ndant, and aft r paying one tipulated portion of
the product to oone for the rent of the work and another
stipulat d I ortion to the defendant for ore take the balance for it compen ation.
Evid ntly from the terms of
thi ao-r em nt no partner hip wa ontemplated between
th s
arti , but simply an arrangem nt for the rent of
buildin · and machinery an th r duction of ore to mineral.
So the court ..in tructed the jury, and the instruc-
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tion was correct. The court also .correctly instru-cted as

to the circumstances under which one not in fact a partner

might become liable as partner to third parties by reason

of his conduct in respect to the partnership affairs, and

charged that if the plaintiff did not at the time of doing

the work understand that defendant was a partner or re-

sponsible for the work, he could not hold the defendant un-

less it was in fact a partner. Turning now to the testi-

mony, we find the plaintiff, after testifying that he hired

to the Consolidated Zinc Mining & Smelting Company,

stating, "I did not know at the time I hired with Mr. Vogle

that he was in partnership with the North Center Creek

Mining & Smelting Company, nor did I know it at the

time I brought this action." Indeed, the defendant was

not a party at the commencement of the action, but made

one subsequently by amendment. As the defendant was

not in fact a partner and as the plaintiff did not suppose

it was a partner, it is difficult to see upon what ground a
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recovery against it can be sustained. The court was

right in ruling that it was entitled to a new trial, and the

error was in making the payment of costs a condition

precedent. It should have been granted without condi-

tion. Without fault on its part the defendant had been

brought into court and compelled to litigate an unjust de-

mand, and should not have been required to pay any costs

the plaintiff had made as a condition of protection in its

defense.

The judgment in the district court will be reversed, and

the case remanded with instructions to grant a new trial.

All the Justices concurring.

BROOKS V. SAN FRANCISCO & NORTH PACIFIC

RAILWAY COMPANY.

Supreme Court of California. 1895.

110 California, 173.

Searls, C. — This was nn action to recover damages sus-

tained by tlie infant plaintiff for personal injuries received

[Chap. 17
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tion was correct.
The court al o ,correctly instructed as
to the circumstan ce under which one not in fact a partner
might become liable as partner to third parties by reason
of hi conduct in re pect to the partnership affairs, and
charged that if the plaintiff did not at the time of doing
the work understand that defendant wa a partner or respon ible for the work, he could not bold the defendant unless it was in fa ct a partner.
Turning now to the testimony, we find the plaintiff after testifying that he hired
to the Con solidated Zinc Mining & Smelting Company,
. tatinO' "I did not know at the time I hired with Mr. Vogle
that he was in partnership with the North Center Creek
Mining & Smelting Company, nor did I know it at the
time I brought this action.''
Indeed, the defendant was
not a party at the commencement of the action, but made
one sub equently by amendment. As the defendant was
not in fact a partner and as the plaintiff did not suppose
it was a partner, it is difficult to see upon what ground a
recovery against it can be sustained.
The court was
right in ruling that it was entitled to a new trial, and the
error was in making the payment of costs a condition
preced€nt.
It should have been granted without condiWithout fault on its part the defendant had been
tion.
brou~ht into court and compelled to litigate an unjust demand, and should not have been required to pay any costs
the plaintiff had made as a condition of protection in its
defense.
The judO'ment in the district court will be reversed, and
th ca remanded with in tructions to grant a new trial.
All the Ju tices on urring.

BROOKS V. SAN FRAN ISCO & NORTH PACIFIC
RAIL W Y OMP AN r.

Supreme Court of California.
110

Calfornia 17. .

C.-Thi . , . Ctn a ti n t r
t rn cl 1 y tl1 inf·1nt i laintiff f r p r. o
8EARL.

1895.

v r damages sus1 injuri r ceived
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while a passenger upon the railway train of the corpora-

tion defendant.

The cause was tried before a jury and a verdict rendered

in favor of plaintiff for five thousand dollars. Judgment

was entered thereon February 26, 1894.

Defendant in due time moved for a new trial, which was

granted "upon the payment by defendant to plaintiff of

the sum of three hundred dollars for counsel fees and ex-

penses necessarily incurred in said motion." This order

was made June 25, 1894.

On July 2^, 1894, defendant gave notice of an appeal

to this court from the order of the court below granting a

new trial upon the condition specified in the order, and,

on the same day, gave notice of an appeal from final judg-

ment entered in the cause February 26, 1894.

That a nisi pritis court has the power to impose terms

as a condition of making an order for a new trial is too

well settled to need argument in its support.
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In Rice v. GasMrie, 13 Cal. 54, which in view of the fact

'hat the motion was founded upon errors of law occurring

^ it the trial, and hence at first blush would seem not to have

been a case involving turpitude on the part of the losing

party, the court below granted a new trial upon condition

that the moving party should pay the costs.

Upon an appeal by the moWng party this court, speak-

ing through Baldwin, J., said: ''The terms upon which a

court will grant a new trial are peculiarly a matter within

its discretion. This must necessarily be so, for so many

reasons relating to the conduct, management, and peculiar

circumstances of the trial may exist that it would be im-

possible to prescribe any general rules on the subject. If

error at law intervenes, a party may take his exceptions

and prosecute his appeal without motion for a new trial;

but if he makes his motim and relies upon that for redress

against an improper verdict, he must subject himself to

the equitable power of the court.

''The verdict may have gone against him in some degree

or wholly, by his own neglect or default, or even the rulings

of law be chargeable to his own laches or want of diligence.

In sucli cases it may bo proper to grant him a new trial,

yet only upon equitable terms. We cannot interfere with
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while a pa enger upon the railway train of the corporation defendant.
The cau e was tried before a jury and a verdict rendered
in favor of plaintiff for five thou and dollars. Judgment
was entered thereon February 26, 1894.
Defendant in due time mo ed for a new trial, which was
granted "upon the payment b defendant to plaintiff of
the sum of three hundred dollar for counsel fees and expen es necessarily incurred in said motion.'' This order
was made June 25, ~894.
On July 23', 1894, defendant gave notice of an appeal
to this court from the order of the court below granting a
new trial upon the condition specified in the order and,
on the ame day gave noti e of an appeal from final judgment entered in the cause February 26, 1894.
* * * * * * * * * *
That a nisi prius court has the power to impose terms
a a condition of making an order for a new trial is too
well ettled to need argument in its support.
In Rice v. Ga hirie 1 Cal. 54, which in view of the fact
'hat tbe motion wa founded upon errors of law occurring
it the trial and hence at fir t blush would seem not to ha e
been a ca e involving turpitude on the part of the losing
party the court below granted a new trial upon con di ti on
that the moving party hould pay the costs.
Upon an appeal by the moving party this court, speaking throuo-h Baldwin, J. aid: ''The terms upon which a
court will grant a new trial are peculiarly a matter within
it di retion.
This mu t neces arily be so for so many
rea on relating to the conduct, management and peculiar
circum tance of the trial may exi t that it would be impos ible to pre cri e any general rules on th ubject. If
error at law intervenes a party may take his exceptions
and prosecute his ap eal without motion for a new trial;
but if he makes his moti 7'n and relies upon that for redress
against an improper verdi t, he mu t ubject himself to
the qui table power of t
court.
"Th verdict may hav g e ao-ain t him in ome degree
or wholly y hi wn n glect r default or even the ruling
of law h charg a le t hi own la h
r want of dilio-ence.
U('h a. , it
ay 1 I r I r t
r nt im a n w trial,
I
yet only u on equita le t rms. We cannot interfere with

I
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this exercise of discretion unless upon a clear showing that

it has been abused, or that the terms were grossly unrea-

sonable."

In the present case the motion for a new trial was based,

among others, upon the ground of the ** insufficiency of the

evidence to justify the verdict."

This is a ground appealing peculiarly to the discretion

of the trial court. And wherever the conditions are such

that the court below is authorized in its discretion to im-

pose terms as a condition to granting a new trial, this

court will interfere only in those cases where it mani-

festly appears that there has been an abuse of such discre-

tion.

The following cases in this court recognize and uphold

the right of the trial court in one form and another to im-

pose terms and conditions in granting and refusing mo-

tions for new trials: Sherman v. Mitchell, 46 Cal. 578;

Gillespie v. Jones, 47 Cal. 264; Chapin v. Bourne, 8 Cal.
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294; Harrison v. Peahody, 34 Cal. 178; Dreyfous v. Adams,

48 Cal. 131; Benedict v. Cozzens, 4 Cal. 381; Corher v.

Morse, 57 Cal. 301; Gregg v. San Francisco etc.. By. Co.,

59 Cal. 312; Davis v. Southern Pac. Co., 98 Cal. 13.

In the case last cited the iury had found a verdict in

favor of plaintiff for fifteen thousand three hundred dol-

lars. Defendant moved for a new trial.

The trial court made an order that, if plaintiff should

consent that the judgment be reduced to nine thousand

dollars, the new trial would be denied, and that otherwise

it would be granted. Plaintiff consented to the reduction,

and the motion was thereupon denied. Defendant ay>

pealed from the order.

Counsel for appellant attacked the power of the court to

make such an order, and contended that if the court

thought the verdict excessive its duty was to grant a new

trial.

This court, speaking through McFarland, J., after ad-

mitting that the position of appellant was a strong one,

added: ''But whatever might be considered the weight

of reason and foreign authority on the question above

stated, if it were it .9 integra here, the right of a court to

do what is complained of in the case at bar is too firmly es-
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this exercise of discretion unless upon a clear showing that
it has been abused, or that the terms were grossly unreasonable.''
In the present case the motion for a new trial was based,
among others, upon the ground of the ''insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict.''
This is a ground appealing peculiarly to the discretion
of the trial court. And wherever the conditions are such
that the court below is authorized in its discretion to impose terms as a condition to granting a new trial, this
court will interfere only in those cas'es where it manifestly appears that there has been an abuse of such discre- .
ti on.
The following cases in this court recognize and uphold
the right of the trial court in one form and another to impose terms and conditions in granting and refusing motions for new trials: Sherman v. Mitchell, 46 Cal. 578;
Gille pie v. Jones, 47 Cal. 264; Chapin v. Bourne, 8 Cal.
294; Harrison v. P ea body, 34 Cal. 178; Dreyfous v . Adams,
4-8 Cal. 131; Benedict v. Cozzens, 4 Cal. 381; Garber v.
"lt1orse, 57 Cal. 301; Gregg v. San Francisco etc., Ry. Co.,
59 Cal. 312; Davis v. Southern Pac. Co., 98 Cal. 13.
In the case last cited the jury had found a verdict in
favor of plaintiff for :fifteen thousand three hundred dollars. Defendant moved for a new trial.
The trial court made an order that, if plaintiff should
consent that the judgment be reduced to nine tbousan<l
dollars, the new tdal would be denied, and that otherwise
it would be ()'ranted. Plaintiff consented to the reduction.
and the motion wa thereupon denied.
Defendant appealed from th order.
Counsel for ap1 llant attacked the power of the court to
make such an order, and ontended that if the court
thought the verdict xc ive its duty was to grant a new
trial.
'rhis court, speaking through M Farland, J., after admittinO' that th po. ition of app llant was a strong one,
add d: '' ut what ver mi ·ht b C'onsider d the weight
f r as n and f r ign auth rity on th qu tion above
tat d, if it w r r s inf Pgra her , th riO'ht of a court to
d.o what is corny Jain d of in the ·Case at bar is too firmly es-
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tablished in this state by a long line of decisions to be now

questioned."

The principle involved in that case is the same as that

underlying the present one, and goes to the power of the

court to impose terms in granting and refusing motions

for new trials.

A review of the record fails to disclose any basis for con-

cluding that there was an abuse of discretion in imposing

terms as a condition to granting the motion for a new trial.

It follows that the order appealed from by defendant

should be upheld.

COHEN V. KRULEWITCH.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of

Neiv York. 1902.

77 Appellate Division, 126.

NEW TRIALS
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tablished in this state by a long line of decisions to be now
questioned."
The principle invol ed in that case is the same as that
underlying the present one, and goes to the power of the
court to impose terms in granting and refu ing motions
for new trials.
A review of the record fail " to disclo e any basis for concluding that there wa an abuse of di cretion in imposing
terms as a condition to granting the motion for a new trial.
It follows that the order appealed from by defendant
should be upheld.

* * * * * * * * * •

Ingraham, J.:

The action was brought to recover commissions for pro-

curing a purchaser of certain property belonging to the
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defendant. The plaintiff testified that he was employed

by the defendant to procure a purchaser of this property;

that he procured a purchaser therefor upon terms satis-

factory to the defendant; that the defendant subsequently

refused to complete the purchase and thereby the plain-

COHEN V. KRULEWITCH.

tiff became entitled to his commissions. The defendant

denied the emplo}Tnent ; denied that the plaintiff ever pro-

cured a purchaser of the property, or that he ever prom-

ised to pay him any commissions. The case was sub-

mitted to the jury who found a verdict for the plaintiff,

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York. 1902.

whereupon the court, on motion, set aside the verdict and

77 Appellate Division, 126.

ordered a new trial upon the ground that there was no evi-

dence that the purchaser was ever ready to sign the con-

tract to purchase the defendant's property and no evidence

that the contract between the defendant and the purchaser

was ever in fact prepared, and, therefore, no evidence that

the plaintiff had done what he contracted to do — obtain a

INGRAHAM,

J.:

The action was brought to recover commissions for procuring a pur.cha er of certain property belonging to the
defendant.
The plaintiff testified that he was employed
by the defendant to procure a purchaser of this property;
that he procured a purchaser therefor upon terms satisfactory to the defendant; that the defendant ub equently
refused to complete the purcha e and thereby the plaintiff became entitled to his commission . The defendant
denied the employm nt · denied that the plaintiff ever procured a purcha er of the property, or that he ever promised to pay him an.
mm1 ion .
The ca e was submitted to the jury who found a verdict for the plaintiff,
whereupon th court n motion et a ide the verdict and
ordered a new trial up n th ground that there was no evid nee that th pur ha r wa ever ready to ign the contract to ur ha th d fen ant's property and no evid nee
that the contra t tw n th def ndant and the purcha er
wa ever in fact pr par d an th r f r n e id nee that
the plaintiff had done what he contracted to do-obtain a
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person who was ready and willing to make an exchange

with the defendant for the property that was satisfactory

to the defendant, and also upon the ground that the weight

of evidence was against the plaintiff, and as the plaintiff

had the burden of proof the jury should have found for the

defendant in the case and not for the plaintiff.

We think the court was entirely justified in setting aside

the verdict for the reason assigned by the trial judge, and

that the jury were not justified upon the evidence in find-

ing a verdict for the plaintiff. The plaintiff insists, how-

ever, that the court should have imposed costs upon the

defendant as a condition for granting the motion to set

aside the verdict. Where a motion is made to set aside a

verdict upon the ground that the plaintiff has failed to

prove his case, there is no rule that requires that costs

should be imposed as a condition for granting a new trial.

In such a case a new trial is not granted as a matter of

discretion, but as a matter of right, and we do not think
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the court would then be justified in imposing costs as a

condition for granting a new trial. Wliile it is proper for

the court to impose costs upon granting a new trial where

there was a proper case for the submission of the question

to the jury, but where for some reason the court is satis-

fied that the verdict was not a fair determination of the

question submitted to them or that justice requires that

the case should be submitted to another jury, this is not

such a case. Upon this record we think the court below

was required to grant a new trial without the imposition of

any costs upon the defendant.

It follows that the order appealed from should be af-

firmed, with costs.

Van Brunt, P. J., O'Brien and McLaughlin, JJ., con-

curred; Hatch, J., dissented.

Order affirmed, with costs.
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]Jerson who was ready and willing to make an exchange
with the defendant for the property that was satisfactory
to the defendant, and also upon the ground that the weight
of evidence was against the plaintiff, and as the plaintiff
had the burden of proof the jury should have found for the
defendant in the case and not for the plaintiff.
We think the court was entirely justified in setting aside
the verdict for the reason assigned by the trial judge, and
that the jury were not justified upon the evidence in finding a verdict for the plaintiff. The plaintiff insists, however, that the court should have imposed costs upon the
defendant as a condition for granting the motion to set
aside the verdict. Where a motion is made to set aside a
verdict upon the ground that the plaintiff has failed to
prove his case, there is no rule that requires that costs
should be imposed as a condition for granting a new trial.
In such a case a new trial is not granted as a matter of
di cretion, but as a matter of right, and we do not think
the court would then be justified in impo ing costs as a
condition for granting a new trial. While it is proper for
the court to impose •Costs upon granting a new trial where
there was a proper ca e for the submission of the question
to the jury, but where for some rea on the court is satisfied that the verdict was not a fair determination of the
question submitted to them or that justice requires that
the case should be submitted to another jury, this is not
such a case. Upon this record we think the court below
was required to grant a new trial without the imposition of
any costs upon the defendant.
It follows that the order appealed from should be affirmed, with co ts.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., O'BRIEN and McLAUGHLIN, JJ., concurr d; HATCH, J., di sented.

Order affir?ned, with costs.
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STAUFFER V. READING.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 1903.

206 Pennsylvania State, 479.

STAUFFER V. READING.

Appeal from jury of view. Before Endlich, J.

From the record it appeared that the city of Reading ap-

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

1903.

propriated one and one-half acres of plaintiff's land for

the purpose of a boulevard. The boulevard was so lo-

cated as to cut off three acres of plaintiff's land to the

206

Pennsyl ania State,

479.

north, leaving about seven acres to the south of the boule-

vard.

Verdict for plaintiff for $3,295.83.

On a rule for a new trial the court made the following

order:

November 10, 1902. The rule to show cause is dis-

charged, on condition that the plaintiff within thirty days

from the date of entry of this order convey to the defend-

ant, for park purposes, the tract h^ng north of the boule-

^'ard; otherwise, upon the expiration of said period, the
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rule to become absolute.

Plaintiff appealed.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Mitchell, July 9, 1903:

The granting or refusing of a new trial except for causes

like errors of law by the judge or misconduct of the jury,

where it may be matter of right, is an exercise of judicial

discretion by the court in furtherance of right and justice

according to the circumstances of the case. Hence it is

well settled that the court may impose terms upon either

or both of the parties as conditions of the grant or refusal,

and the latitude allowed to the discretion of the court to

this end is very great. As each case must be determined

on its own circumstances the causes cannot all be specified

or enumerated before hand, but in general as is said by

the most prominent writer on the subject, "it may be safely

asserted that no case can occur presenting circumstances

Appeal from jury of view. Before ENDLICH, J.
From the record it appeared that the .city of Reading appropriated one and one-half acre of plaintiff's land for
the purpose of a boulevard.
The boulevard was so located as to cut off three acres of plaintiff's land to the
north leaving about seven acres to the south of the boulevard.
Verdict for plaintiff for $3,295.83.
On a rule for a new trial the court made the following
order:
November 10 1902.
The rule to show cause is discharged, on condition that the plaintiff within thirty days
from the date of en.tr. of this order convey to the defendnnt, for park purposes, the tract lying north of the boule' ard; otherwise upon the expiration of said period, the
rule to become absolute.
Plain tiff appealed.

timely addressed to the discretion of the court, in which

the rights of the parties may not be fully protected by the

Opinion by 11n. JUSTICE MITCHELL, July 9, 1903:
The granting or refusing of a new trial except for causes
like error of law by the judge or mi conduct of the jury,
where it mav b matter of right, i an exerci e of judicial
di cretion by the court in furtheranc of right and justice
according to the circum tances of the ca e.
Hence it is
well ettled that the court may impo e terms upon either
or both of the ar ie a ondition of the grant or refu al,
and the latitude allowed to the di cretion of the court to
thi end i very great.
each a mu t be determined
on its own cir um tance the au
can ot aU be pecified
r enumerat d before hand, but in er n ral as i said by
th mo t prominent writ r on the ubj ct, "it ma. be afely
.·. rt d that no ca
an o ur pr nting circum tances
d to th di er ti n of th court in which
timel. ad r
the right of th arti may not be fully protected by the
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imposition of conditions meeting the exigency:" Graham

on New Trials, 610.

Large as the discretion is, however, it is a judicial discre-

tion and must be used with reference to the rights involved

in the controversy. The conditions imposed therefore

must have some direct relation to the issue between the

parties in the case.

The condition complained of in the present proceeding

transgresses this limit. The conveyance of the three

acres was not asked for by the city nor offered by the ap-

pellant. Whatever its merits as a just or wise settlement

between the parties, it was not apparently desired by

either, and was certainly no part of the issue which they

brought into court to have decided. In imposing it as a

condition of the refusal of a new trial therefore, the court

exceeded its discretionary authority.

The condition was erroneous also from another point of

view as tending to deprive appellant of his property in
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violation of his right to have a jury pass upon its value.

In this respect the case goes further than LeJir v. Brod-

heck, 192 Pa. 535, where the jury having found a verdict

for defendant contrary to the instructions of the judge, as

to part of the goods sued for, the court directed the ac-

ceptance of an offer by the defendant to pay a sum less

than plaintiff claimed, and on refusal of plaintiff to accept,

refused a new trial. It was held that this was error. In

the opinion our Brother Dean said: ''The ])laintiff

claimed that the value of her goods wrongfully seized and

sold was $335. And whether this was the value or not,

she had offered evidence tending to establish it as the

value. As a suitor under the law she had a right to the

opinion of the jury on the evidence; and the court at the

trial thought so too. It however now directs her arbi-

trarily to strike from her claim $85.00 and as a penalty for

refusal in effect says she shall have nothing." See also

Bradwdl v. Pittsburg, etc., By. Co., 139 Pa. 404.

Judgment reversed, and record remitted with directions

to reinstate the rule for new trial and proceed to dispose

of it according to law.
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imposition of conditions meeting the exigency:'' Graham
on New Trials, 610.
Large as the discretion is, however, it is a judicial discretion and must be used with reference to the rights involved
in the controversy. The conditions imposed therefore
must have some direct relation to the issue between the
parties in the case.
The condition complained of in the present proceeding
transgresses this limit.
The conveyance of the three
acres was not asked for by the city nor offered by the appellant. Whatever its merits as a just or wise settlement
between the parties, it was not apparently desired by
either, and was certainly no part of the issue which they
brought into court to have decided. In imposing it as a
condition of the refusal of a new trial there£ ore, the court
exceeded its discretionary authority.
The condition wa erroneous also from another point of
view as tending to deprive appellant of his property in
violation of his right to have a jury pass upon its value.
In this respect the case goes further than Lehr v. Brodbeck, 192 Pa. 535, where the jury having found a verdict
for defendant contrary to the instructions of the judge, as
to part of the goods sued for, the court directed the acceptance of an offer by the defendant to pay a sum less
than plaintiff claimed, and on refusal of plaintiff to aiccept,
refused a new trial. It was held that this was error. In
the opinion our Brother Dean said: "The plaintiff
claimed that the value of her goods wrongfully seized and
sold was $335.
And whether this was the value or not,
she had offered evidence .tending to establish it as the
value. As a uitor under the law she had a rjght to the
opinion of the jury on the evidence; and the court at the
trial tho11 ·l1t o too.
It however now dire ts her arbitrarily to trik from her claim $85.00 and as a p~nalty for
r fu. al in eff t says she shall have nothing.''
See also
Bradu ell v . Pitt burg etc., Ry. Co., 139 Pa. 404.
Judgm nt r v r ed, a
r cord remitted with directions
to r in t t th rul for new trial and proceed to dispose
of it a ording to law.

Sec. 10]

NEW TRIALS

765

Sec. lOJ New Tkials 765

GILA VALLEY, GLOBE & NORTHERN RAILWAY

COMPANY V. HALL.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona. 1911.

13 Arizona, 270.

GILA VALLEY, GLOBE & NORTHERN RAILWAY
COMP ANY V. HALL.

Campbell, J. Appellee was in the employ of appel-

lant as chainman. On April 23, 1907, he was engaged with

Supreme Court of the T erritory of Arizona.

1911.

another emploj^ee, named Ryan, in measuring distances,

locating mile-posts on appellant's line of railway. For

that purpose they used a three-wheeled velocipede fur-

13 Arizona, 270 .

nished by appellant. This velocipede was of the kind or-

dinarily used in work of this character, with a gasoline

engine for motive power. It had two wheels on the right-

hand side, over which was the engine, and a seat for the

use of the operator, and a seat in front for another per-

son. The third wheel was a small wheel on the left-hand

side, nearly opposite the front wheel on the right-hand

side, and fastened to the machine by a bar extending

across the track. On the day mentioned, Hall and Ryan
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were upon this velocipede on plaintiff's line of railway,

Rvan operating the mahcine and Hall sitting in front.

While the velocipede was going at a speed of from eight

to twelve miles an hour, it suddenly left the track, going

to the left, the side on which was situated the one small

wheel. Hall was thrown in front of it and run over, sus-

taining severe in.iuries. This action was brought against

the railroad company to recover damages for the injuries

so received, it being alleged that the flange on the third 6r

small wliool was worn and cracked, and that by reason of

such condition the machine left the track, and that the

company was neg]i2"ent in furnishing such velocipede. Ap-

pellant answered, denying the negligence alleged, pleading

contributory negligence, and that Hall knew^ or might have

known the condition of the velocipede and assumed the

risk of the in.iuries resulting from the alleged defect. The

jury returned a verdict for $10,000. A motion for a new-

trial was made, and prior to its determination Hall volun-

tarily remitted $5,000 from the amount of the verdict.

Thereafter, the court denied the motion for a new trial

CAMPBELL, J.
Appellee was in the employ of appellant as chainman. On April 23, 1907, he wa engaged with
another employee, named Ryan in measuring di tances,
For
locating mile-po ts on appellant's line of railway.
that purpose they used a three-wheeled velocipede furnished by appellant. Thi velocipede was of the kind ordinarily u ed in work of this character with a gasoline
engine for motive power. It had two wheel on the righthand sid , over which was the engine, and a seat for the
use of the operator, and a eat in front for another person. The third wheel wa a small wheel on the left-hand
side, nearly opposite the front wheel on the right-hand
side, and fastened to the machine by a bar extending
aero s the track. On the day mentioned Hall and R an
were upon thi velocipede on plaintiff' line of railway,
R\ an operating the mahcine and Hall itting in front.
While the velocipede was going at a peed of from eight
to twelve miles an hour, it uddenly left the track, goin~
to the left, the side on which was situated the one small
wbeel. Hall was thrown in front of it and run over sustaining evere injuri . This action was brought against
the railroad company to re over damage for the injuries
so r eceiv d, it being all ged that the flange on the third or
mall wlw0l was worn and cracked, and that b. rea on of
such condition the machin 1 ft the track and that the
companv wa . negljgent in fnrni . hing uch v loci1 d . A pellant an ~w r <l, denying th e negli .e;en all o- d pleading
contribut ry n !tlig n e, an that Hall kn w or mio-ht have
kn wn th con ition f th v lociped and a um d the
ri k of th injuries r ultinO' fr m th all ged defect. The
jury r turned a erdict for $10 000. A motion for a new
trial wa mad and ri r t it d termination Hall voluntarily remitt
$5 000 from the amount of the v rdict.
Thereafter, the court denied the motion for a new trial
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and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiif for $5,000

and costs. From this judgment and from the order deny-

ing the motion for new trial, the railway company appeals.

**********

The remaining important question in the case is whether

the court erred in rendering judgment for the amount of

the verdict less the sum remitted by the appellee. It is

insisted by appellant that the court should have granted

a new trial for the reason that it is beyond the power of a

court to permit a remittitur where the damages are un-

liquidated and the verdict excessive. The question has

heretofore been before this court in two cases. Southern

racific Co. V. Tomlinson, 4 Ariz. 126, 33 Pac. 710, was an

action to recover damages for death by wrongful act, un-

der a statute permitting the jury "to give such damages

as they may think proportioned to the injuries resulting

from said death." A verdict for $50,000 was returned,

from the which the plaintiff remitted $31,998, and judg-
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ment was entered for the remainder. The power of the

trial court to permit the remittitur was questioned, but it

was held: ''A trial court has the power, where excessive

damages have been allowed by the jury, and where the mo-

tion to set aside the verdict is based upon this ground, to

make a remission a condition precedent to overruling the

motion. The exercise of this power rests in the sound

discretion of the court. This doctrine is affirmed in the

case of Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 74, 9 Sup. Ct. 458,

32 L. Ed. 854; also in Railroad Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S.

642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755. Of course, if it is ap-

parent to the trial court that the verdict was the result of

passion of prejudice, a remittitur should not be allowed,

but the verdict should be set aside. In passing upon this

question, the court should not look alone to the amount of

damages awarded, but to the whole case, to determine the

existence of passion or prejudice, and to determine how

far such passion or prejudice may have operated in in-

fluencing the finding of any verdict against the defendant.

AVlicn the circumstances, as they may appear to the trial

court, indicate that the jury deliberately disregarded the

instructions of the court, or the facts of the case, a re-

mittitur should not be allowed, but a new trial should be

granted. If they do not so indicate, and the plaintiff vol
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and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $5,000
and costs. From this judgment and from the order denying the motion for new trial, the railway company appeals.
* * * * * * * * ~ •
The remaining important question in the case is whether
the court erred in rendering judgment for the amount of
the verdict less the sum remitted by the appellee. It is
insisted 'by appellant that the court should have granted
a new trial for the reason that it is beyond the power of a
court to permit a remittitur where the damages are unliquidated and the verdict excessive.
The question has
heretofore been before this court in two .cases.
Southern
Pacific Co. v. Tomlinson, 4 Ariz. 1.26, 33 Pac. 710, was an
action to recover damages for death by wrongful act, under a statute permitting the jury "to give such damages
as they may think proportioned to the injuries resulting
from said death.''
A verdict for $50,000 was returned,
from the which the plaintiff remitted $31,998, and judgment was entered for the remainder.
The power of the
trial court to permit the remittiti~r was questioned, but it
was held: ''A trial court has the power, where excessive
damages have been allowed by the jury, and where the motion to set aside the verdict is based upon this ground, to
make a remission a condition precedent to overruling the
motion.
The exer.cise of this power rests in the sound
discretion of the court.
This doctrine is affirmed in the
case of Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 74, 9 Sup. Ct. 458,
32 L. Ed. 854; also in Railroad Co . v. Herbert, 116 U. S.
642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755. Of course, if it is apar nt to the trial court that the verdict was the result of
passion of prejudice, a remittitur should not be allowed,
but the v rdict should be set aside. In pas ing upon this
f)uestion, the court should not look alone to th amount of
damages awarded, but to the whole case, to determine the
xi . t n e of pa sion or prejudice, and to determine how
far su h pa sion or prejudice may have operated in inftu n ing th findinO' of any v rdi ct again t the def ndant.
n th ircumstan s, as th y may app ar to the trial
urt, indicate that th jury d 1i erat ly di r O'arded the
instru ti n of the ourt, r tho fa ts of th
a e, a remittitur , b uld n t b allow d ut a n w trial should be
granted. If th y do n t so indi ate, and the plaintiff vol
1
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imtarily remits so much of the damages as may appear to

he excessive, the court, in its discretion, may allow the re-

mission and enter judgment accordingly." In Southern

Pacific Co. v. Fitchett, 9 Ariz. 128, 80 Pac. 359, the verdict

was for $1,000 for ''injuries to feelings," from which the

plaintiff, upon the suggestion of the trial court, remitted

$600. This court held that it was apparent that the jury

was influenced by passion or prejudice, and that therefore

a new trial should have been granted. We further sought

to distinguish the facts in that case from the Tomlinson

case, suggesting that in the latter the damages were sus-

ceptible of accurate computation from the evidence. We

are not now prepared to adhere to the views so expressed.

Both are cases of unliquidated damages. In the one case

not less than the other, the jury's verdict represents the

damages "proportioned to the injuries resulting" in the

opinion of the jury, based upon evidence that affords no

basis for exact computation. If there is a difference, it

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

is one of degree rather than one of kind. There is au-

thority for the position that in no case of unliquidated

^damages should the court permit a remission where the

verdict is excessive, without the consent of the defendant,

but as we now view it, the great weight of authority sup-

ports the practice. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Herbert,

116 U. S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755; Arkansas Cat-

tle Co. V. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, 9 Sup. Ct. 458, 32 L. Ed. 854;

Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 9 Sup. Ct. 696, 33 L. Ed.

110; 29 Cyc. 1022, 1023, and cases cited.

It is argued that to permit a remittitur, or to require it

as a condiiton of refusing a new trial, is to substitute the

court's judgment for that of a jury, to the latter of which

the defendant is entitled. But it is to the jury's judg-

ment that defendants object when they appeal to the court

for new trials on the ground of excessive verdicts. The

trial court has undoubted power to determine whether the

verdicts is or is not excessive, and in considering the ques-

tion usually determines in its o-wn mind the maximum

amount for which a verdict could with propriety be per-

mitted to stand. AVliere there has been no error of law

committed which would require a re-trial, and it ap-

pears that the excessive verdict has resulted from too lib-

eral views as to the damages sustained, rather than from
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untarily remits so much of the damages as may appea.r to
he excessive, the court, in its discretion, may allow the remi ion and enter judgment aooordingly."
In Southern
Pacific Co. v. Fitchett, 9 Ariz. 128, 80 Pac. 359, the verdict
"'\\as for $1,000 for ''injuries to feelings,'' from which the
plaintiff, upon the suggestion of the trial court, remitted
$600. This court held that it was apparent that the jury
was influenced by passion or prejudice, and that therefore
a new trial should have been granted. We further sought
to distinguish th fact in that case from the Tomlinson
case, suggesting that in the latter the damages were susceptible of aocurate computation from the evidence. We
are not now prepared to adhere to the views so expressed.
Both are cases of unliquidated damages. In the one case
not less than the other, the jury's verdict represents the
damages "proportioned to the injuries resulting" in the
opinion of the jury, ba ed upon evidence that affords no
basis for exact computation.
If there is a difference, it
is one of degree rather than one of kind.
There is authority for the po ition that in no case of unliquidated
<1amages should the court permit a remission where the
verdict is excessive, without the consent of the defendant,
but as we now view it, the great weight of authority supports the practice. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Herbert,
116 U. S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755; Arkansas Cattle Co. v. lelann, 130 U. S. 69, 9 Sup. Ct. 458, 32 L. Ed. 854;
K ennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 9 Sup. Ct. 696, 33 L. Ed.
110; 29 Cyc. 1022, 1023, and cases cited.
It is argued that to permit a remittitiir, or to require it
as a condiiton of refusing a new trial, is to substitute the
court's judgment for that of a jury, to the latter of which
the d f ndant i entitl d.
But it is to the jury's judgment that defendants obje t when they appeal to the court
for new trial on the O'round of exces ive verdict . The
trial court ha undoubt d power to determine whether the
v rdi ts i or i not exce ive, and in considerinO' the question 'u ually d termine in it own mind the maximum
a ount for whi c a v rdict ould with propri ty be permitt d to tand.
Wl1 r there ha b en no rror of law
committ d whi h w uld r quire a re-trial, and it appear that the ex
~i
'er i t ha re ulted from too liberal views as to the damages sustained, rather than from

1

1
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prejudice or passion, to permit a remission of tlie excess,

instead of putting the parties to the expense of a new trial,

promotes justice and puts an end to the litigation. Of

course, il it appears that the verdict is tainted by preju-

dice or passion, and does not represent the dispassionate

judgment of the jury upon the question of the right of the

plaintiff to recover, a new trial should be granted. But

we think that the trial court is in a better position to de-

termine whether the verdict is so tainted than is this court,

and that unless it clearly appears from the record that the

excessive verdict resulted from prejudice or passion,

rather than from that liberality which jurors sometimes

exercise in cases which appeal to men's sympathies, we

should accept the trial court's determination. The trial

court in this case has determined that the jury was not in-

fluenced bv passion or prejudice, and we see no reason for

not accepting its conclusion.

Other rulings of the court are assigned as error and have
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received our consideration, but thev are not of sufficient

importance to warrant discussion here. We find no re-

versible error in the record, and affirm the judgment of

the district court.

Kent, C. J., and Lewis and Doe, JJ., concur.

Section 11. Notice of Motion.

HANSEN V. FISH.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 1871,

27 Wisconsin, 535.

Lyon, J. * * *

The action was tried at the December term, 1869, of that

court, and the plaintiff had a verdict. The verdict was re-

turned on the 15th day of that montli, and immediately the

attorney for the defendants, in the absence of the attorney

for the plaintiff, made a motion orally for a new trial upon

[Chap. 17
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prejudice or passion, to permit a remission of the excess,
instead of putting the parties to the expense of a new trial,
promotes justice and puts an end to the litigation.
Of
course, it it appears that the verdict is tainted by prejudice or passion, and does not represent the dispassionate
judgment of the jury upon the question of the right of the
plaintiff to recover, a new trial should be granted.
But
we think that the trial court is in a better position to determine whether the verdict is so tainted than is this court,
and that unless it clearly appears from the record that the
px,cessive verdjct resulted from prejudice or passion,
rather than from that liberality which jurors sometimes
exercise in cases which appeal to men's sympathies, we
should accept tbe trial court's determination.
The trial
rourt in this case has determined that the jury was not influenced bv passion or prejudice, and we see no reason for
not accepting its conclusion.
Other rulings of the court are assigned as error and have
received our consideration, but tbev are not of sufficient
jmportance to warrant discussion here.
We find no reversible error in the record, and affirm the judgment of
tbe district court.
KENT, C. J., and LEwrs and DoE, J J., concur.

the minutes of the judge. This motion was not entered

in the minutes of the clerk at the time it was made. On

SECTION

11.

NOTICE OF MOTION.

HANSEN

V. FISH.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

1871.

27 Wisconsin, 535.

J. * • *
Th a ti n wa tried at the December term, 1869, of that
urt, and th plaintiff had a verdi t. The v rdict was reurn on the 15th ay of that month, and immediately the
, tt rn , r f r tbe
f n ~· nt , in the ab en e of the attorney
f r tJ
laintiff, mad a motion orally for a n w trial upon
th min t s f th judp'l'hi. mo ti on was not entered
i
the minut of the 1 k at the tim e it wa made. On
LYON,
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the return of the attorney for the plaintiff into court soon

after, the judge informed him that such motion had been

made. However, the attorney for the plaintiff, under-

standing that the motion was not to be entertained, remit-

ted a part of the verdict, and procured the judge to sign an

order for judgment for the residue thereof. The judge

did not understand that such motion was not to be pressed

or entertained, and signed the order for judgment inadver-

tently. The counsel for plaintiff proceeded to give notice of

the adjustment of tlie costs, had the same adjusted, and, on

the 22d day of December, perfected the judgment and left

the court. On the next day, December 23d, the court, in the

due course of business, heard the motion for a new trial

made on the 15th, no one appearing thereon for the plain-

tiff, and after due consideration and on the same day

granted the motion.

At the next term of the court the plaintiff moved the

court, on due notice, to set aside and vacate the order of
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December 23d, granting a new trial; and the court denied

the motion, and an order was duly entered to that effect.

From this last mentioned order the plaintiff appeals.

The principal question presented by this appeal is,

whether the opposite party is entitled to formal notice of

a motion made upon the minutes of the judge to set aside a

verdict, or a verdict and judgment, if judgment has been

entered, and for a new trial.

Such motions must be made at the same term at which

the cause is tried. R. S. ch. 132, sec. 16. "A trial is the

judicial examination of the issues between the parties,

whether they be issues of law or of fact." Sec. 5 of the

same chap. This judicial examination of the issues is not

by the jury alone. The judge has something to do with it.

Hence such examination is not complete when the jury have

returned a verdict.

It is then for the judge to say whether they have decided

correctly, and if he finds upon *'an examination of the is-

sues" that they have not, or if he finds that his rulings dur-

ing the trial have been wrong, on a motion for that purpose

founded on his minutes, and made at the same term, he

will set aside such erroneous verdict and grant a new trial.

It seems quite clear to my mind, that such motion and

the decision thereof is a part of the trial, and is covered by

T. P.— 49 '
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the return of the attorney for the plaintiff into court soon
after, the judge inform d him that such motion had been
made. Howe er, the attorney for the plaintiff, undertanding that the motion was not to be entertain d, remitted a part of the verdict, and procured the judge to sign an
order for judgment for the residue thereof. The judge
did not under tand that uch motion was not to be pressed
or entertained, and signed the order for judo·ment inadve1·tently. The counsel for plaintiff proceeded to give notice of
the adjustm nt of tJ1 ro t , had tbe same adju ted, and, on
the 22d day of December, perfected the judgment and left
the court. On the next day, December 23 , the court, in the
due course of bu ine , heard th motion for a n w trial
made on the 15th, no one appearing thereon for the plaintiff, and after due con ideration and on the same day
oTanted the motion.
At the next term of the court the plaintiff moved the
court, on due notice, to set a ide and vacate the order of
December 23d, granting a new trial; and the court denied
the motion, and an order was duly enter d to that effect.
From this last mentioned order the plaintiff appeal .
The principal question presented by this appeal is,
whether the opposite party is entitled to formal notice of
a motion made upon the minutes of the judge to et a ide a
verdict, or a verdict and judgment, if judgment has been
entered, and for a new trial.
Such motions mu t be made at the same term at which
the cause i tried. R. S. ch. 132, sec. 16. ''A trial is the
judicial examination of the issues between the parties,
whether they be issue of law or of fact." Sec. 5 of the
same chap. Thi judicial examination of the i ues is not
by the jury alone. The judge ha omething to o with it.
Hence such examination is not complete when the jury hav
returned a verdict.
It is then for the jud e to say whether they have decide l
correctly, and if he :find upon ''an examination of the i sue '' that th have not or if he fin that hi rulin durin th trial ha e b n wronO' on a motion for that purpo e
found d on hi minute and ad at th ame term h
will et a id u h rron ou v r i t an oTant a new trial.
It
m quite cl ar to my mind, that uch m tion and
the deci ion thereof is a part of the trial, and is covered b.
(1'

T. P.-49 -
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the notice of trial. This is so of all the usual motions

which may be made in progress of a trial intermediate the

verdict and the judgment, such as motions for stay of pro-

ceedings after verdict and motions for judgment, which

may involve to some extent an examination of the issues.

I do not understand that there is any law or rule of court

which requires notice to be given of such motions when

they are made at the same term at which the cause is tried.

And I think a motion for a new trial on the minutes of the

judge is of the same character. In practice I never knew

a formal written notice of such motion to be given. They

are usually made orally, decided by the court, and the mo-

tion and order granting or denying it entered in the min-

utes by the clerk. In the ninth circuit it is not the prac-

tice to hear argument upon such motions, except in special

cases the judge indicates a desire that they be argued. So

far as I know, this practice prevails to a greater or less ex-

tent throughout the state, and I think has its origin in the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

generally received opinion of the courts and the bar, that

these motions and the decision of them are parts of the

trial, and do not require any formal notice to the adverse

party, but are covered by the notice of trial. * * *

We find no error in the proceedings of the circuit court,

and are therefore of the opinion that the order appealed

from should be affirmed.

By the Court. — Order affirmed.

BOAEMAN V. HINCKLEY.

Supreme Court of Washington. 1897.

17 Washington, 126.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Reavis, J.— Action by plaintiff, respondent here, against

defendant for damages for breach of contract. Verdict of

jury for defendant. Within two days after rendition of

the verdict the plaintiff filed and served on the defendant

a motion for a new trial, specifying the grounds relied up-

on in the motion. The court, upon hearing the motion,

[Chap. 17
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the notice of trial. This is so of all the usual motions
which may be made in progress of a trial intermediate the
verdict and the judgment, such as motions for stay of proceedings after verdict and motions for judgment, which
may involve to some extent an examination of the issues.
I do not understand that there is any law or rule of court
which requires notice to be given of such motions when
they are made at the same term at which the cause is tried.
And I think a motion for a new trial on the minutes of the
judge is of the same character. In practice I never knew
a formal written notice of such motion to be given. They
are usually made orally, decided by the court, and the motion and order granting or denying it entered in the minutes by the clerk. In the ninth circuit it is not the practice to hear argument upon such motions, except in special
cases the judge indicates a desire that they be argued. So
far as I know, this practice prevails to a greater or less extent throughout the state, and I think has its origin in the
generally received opinion of the courts and the bar, that
these motions and the decision of them are parts of the
trial, and do not require any formal notice to the adverse
party, but are covered by the notice of trial. * * *
We find no error in the proceedings of the circuit court,
and are therefore of the opinion that the order appealed
from should be affirmed.
By the Court.-Order affirmed.

BOARMAN V. HINCI(LEY.
Supreme Court of Washington.

1897.

17 Washington, 126.

The opinion of the court ~as. delivered by
.
REAVIS, J .-Action by plaintiff, respondent here, a~amst
d f ndant for damage for breach of contract. Verdict of
jury f r def ndant. Within two days after rendition of
the verdict the plaintiff :filed and s rved on the defendant
a motion f r a new trial, specifyinO' the gr.ounds relied .upon in the motion. The court, upon hearing the motion,
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granted a new trial, from which order the defendant ap-

peals.

The first contention of appellant is that no notice of in-

tention to move for a new trial was filed within two days

after rendition of the verdict, as required by the statute

(Code, Proc, <§. 404), but the motion itself specifying the

grounds assigned for a new trial was filed and served on

the defendant within the time required by statute. The

cases cited by appellant from California and Montana are

inapplicable. In those cases, either no notice or motion

was filed within the time required by statute, or else the

specifications of the reasons relied on for asking a new

trial were not stated. The courts usually construe the

form of a notice fairly. The motion for a new trial filed

by plaintiff in this case fully advised the defendant of

plaintiff's intention to move for a new trial, and specified

the grounds. The motion itself here fulfills the function

of the notice required by the statute. The power to grant
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a new trial by the court hearing the cause is one of discre-

tion, and the statute making the order appealable has not

changed the established principles controlling the granting

or refusal of a new trial. Only abuse of such discretion

will be reviewed. We perceive no abuse of its discretion

by the superior court in the order made, and its order i»

affirmed.

Scott, C. J., and Anders, Dunbar and Gordon, JJ., con-

cur.

ANDEKSON V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GRAND

FORKS.

Supreme Court of North Dakota. 1895.

5 North Dakota, 80.

Corliss, J. *

**

*#

It was urged on the argument that the order denying

the motion for a new trial should be affirmed, for the rea-

son that it appears that the notice of intention to move for

771
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granted a new trial, from which order the defendant appeals.
The first contention of appellant is that no notice of intention to move for a new trial was filed within two days
after rendition of the verdict, as required by the statute
(Code, Proc., ~ 404), but the motion itself specifying the
grounds assigned for a new trial was filed and served on
the defendant within the time required by statute. The
cases cited by appellant from California and Montana are
inapplicable. In those cases, either no notice or motion
wa~ filed within the time required by statute, or else the
specifications of the reasons relied on for asking a new
trial were not stated. The courts usually construe the
form of a notice fairly. The motion for a new trial filed
by plaintiff in this case fully advised the defendant of
plaintiff's intention to move for a new trial, and pecified
the grounds. The motion itself here fulfills the function
of the notice required by the statute. The power to grant
a new trial by the court hearing the cause is one of discretion, and the statute making the order appealable has not
changed the established principles controlling the granting
or refusal of a new trial. Only abuse of such discretion
will be reviewed. We perceive no abuse of its discretion
by the superior court in the order made, and its order i•
affirmed.
ScoTT, C. J., and ANDERS, DuNBAR and GoRDON, JJ., concur.

ANDERSON V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GRAND
FORKS.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.

1895.

5 North Dakota, 80.
CORLISS,

J .•••

• • • • • • • • * •

It was urged on the ar um nt that t e order denying
the motion for a new trial hould be affirmed for the reason that it appears that the notice of intention to move for
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a new trial was not served within the statutory time. But

an examination of the record satisfies us that the time in

which to serve such motion was extended by the coart, and

that the notice was served within the time as so extended.

Nor do we think there is any force in the contention that

the paper so served was not a notice of intention. It is

true that it was in bad form, in that it embodied a notice,

not only that plaintiff intended to move for a new trial on

the grounds therein stated on a statement of the case, but

that he would bring his motion for such new trial on to a

hearing at a specified time and place. The notice of in-

tention and the notice of motion are two distinct and ut-

terly different notices, and it is not good practice to em-

brace both elements in one paper. Sections 5090, 5092,

Comp. Laws. The notice of intention should not state

when and where the motion for a new trial will be heard.

As a general rule, the person who desires to make such mo-

tion is not in position to notice his motion for a hearing at
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the time he serves his notice of intention, for it often hap-

pens that at that time the bill or statement has not been

settled.

The order is reversed, and a new trial is granted. All

concur.

KRAKOWER V. DAVIS.

Supreme Court of Neiv York, Appellate Term. 1897.

20 Miscellaneous, 350.

BiscHOFF, J. The plaintiff's claim was for commissions

earned in a transaction involving the sale of certain real

estate, owned by the defendants as tenants in common, and

tlie trial resulted in a verdict in his favor ''for one-eighth

of the commission claimed."

This verdict was set aside, at the time of its rendition,

and a now trial was ordered, from wliich order the defend-
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a new trial was not served within the statutory time. But
an examination of the record satisfies us that the time in
which to serve such motion was extended by the court,, and
that the notice was served within the time as so extended.
Nor do we think there is any force in the contention that
the paper so served was not a notice of intention. It is
true that it was in bad form, in that it embodied a notice,
not only that plaintiff intended to move for a new trial on
the grounds therein stated on a statement of the case, but
that he would bring his motion for such new trial on to a
hearing at a specified time and place. The notice of intention and the notice of motion are two distinct and utterly different notices, and it is not good practice to embrace both elements in one paper. Sections 5090, 5092,
Comp. Laws. The notice of intention should not state
when and where the motion for a new trial will be heard.
As a general rule, the person who desires to make such motion is not in position to notice his motion for a hearing at
the time he serves his notice of intention, for it often happens that at that time the bill or statement has not been
settled.
The order is reversed, and a new trial is granted. All
concur.

ant Levy, the sole litigating defendant, appeals.

The first objection which the appellant raises to the va-

KRAKOWER V. DAVIS.
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Term.

1897.

20 Miscellaneous, 350.

BrscHOFF, J. The plaintiff's claim was for commissions
arned in a tran action involvino- the sale of certain real
. tate, owned by the d f ndants a. t nants in common, and
th trial r ult d in a verdict in his favor ''for one-ei 0 ·hth
of the ommi ion claim d."
Thi s v rdi t was t a ide, at th time of its rendition,
an a n w trial was ord red, from which order the defendant L vy, th sole litigatino- defendant appeals.
• • * * • * • • * •
Tbe first objection whi b the appellant raises to the va-
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lidity of the order is based upon the fact that no notice of

the motion was given, the order having been made directly

upon the rendition of the verdict.

The statute provides (Laws 1896, chap. 748): ''Notice

of such motion of not less than five days nor more than

eight days shall be given to the adverse party or his attor-

ney, within five days after the rendition of the verdict, or

the entry of the judgment," and it is contended that the

justice was without power to make the order in question be-

cause such notice had not been given.

This statutory requirement of notice was for the adverse

party's benefit only, and so could be waived by him (Re

Cooper, 93 N. Y. 507), and his consent to the court's enter-

taining the motion at the time when it was made, in his

presence, "^as to be inferred from his failure to object upon

the ground that insufficient notice had been given (Mayor,

etc. V. Lyons, 24 How. Pr. 280), if, indeed, the statute is to

be construed as calling for such notice where the motion
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is made upon the return of the verdict.

**********

Order affirmed, with costs.

Daly, P. J., and McAdam, J., concur.

Order affirmed, with costs.

SIMPSON V. BUDD.

Supreme Court of California. 1891.

27 Pacific, 758.

De Havex, J. * * *

lidity of the order is based upon the fact that no notice of
the motion was given, the order having been made directly
upon the rendition of the verdict.
The statute provides (Laws 1896, chap. 748) : "Notice
of such motion of not less ~han five days nor more than
ight days shall be given to the adverse party or bis attorney, within five days after the rendition of the verdict, or
the entry of the judgment,'' and it is contended that the
justice was without power to make the order in question because such notice had not been given.
This statutory requirement of notice was for the adverse
party's benefit only, and so could be waived by him (Re
Cooper, 93 N. Y. 507) , and his consent to the court's entertaining the motion at the time when it was made, in hi
presence, was to be inferred from his failure to object upon
the ground that insufficient notice had been given (Mayor,
etc. v. Lyons, 24 How. Pr. 280), if, indeed, the statute is to
be construed as calling for such notice where the motion
i
made upon the return of the verdict.

* * * * * * * * * •

* * * The only question for decision is whether the

statutory,'' time for giving notice of intention to move for a

new trial and the preparation of bills of exception can be

extended by a stipulation of counsel not filed within the

statutory time, and of this we entertain no doubt. An at-

torney has authority to bind his client in any of the steps
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Order affirmed with costs.
DALY, P. J., and !1:cADAM, J., concur.
Order affirmed, with costs.

of an action or proceeding by his agreement in writing, filed

with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes of the court.

Section 283, Code Civil Proc. The service and filing of

SIMPSON V. BUDD.
Supreme Court of California.

1891.

27 Pacific, 758.
DE HAVEN,

J. * * *

* * * The only que tion for decision is whether the
statutory time for givin notice of intention to move for a
new trial and the pr paration of bills of exception can be
extended b a tipula ion of coun el not filed within the
statutor time and of this we ntertain no doubt. An attorney ba authority to bi d his client in any of the steps
of an action or proce din b. hi agreement in writing, filed
with the clerk or enter d upon the minutes of the court.
Section 283, Code Civil Proc. The service and filing of
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notices of motion for a new trial and proposed bills of ex-

ception are steps in an action within the meaning of this

section, and the stipulation is filed in time if it is on file,

with the consent of the adverse attorney, when the court

is called upon to act upon the matter affected by the stipu-

lation. Section 1054 of the Code of Civil Procedure does

not limit the authority of attorneys, as given by section 283

of the same Code, nor prescribe the exclusive mode by

which the time for giving notices or the service of proposed

statements or bills of exception may be extended, but it

only imposes a limitation upon the power of the court to

extend such time without the consent of the adverse party.

It is undoubtedly true, as has often been decided by this

court, that the right to move for a new trial is statutory,

and, unless the prescribed steps are taken within the time

allowed, the right does not exist as against a party who

stands upon the statute and insists upon strict compliance

with every provision of the law relating thereto, and in-
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tended for his benefit ; but it has never been held that such

provisions may not be waived by the party otherwise en-

titled to claim their benefit. On the contrary, it has been

assumed in many cases, if not directly decided, that the

time for giving notice of motion for a new trial, as well as

every other step to be taken in relation thereto, may be

waived or extended by consent. Hohhs v. Duff, 43 Cal.

485; Brichman v. Ross, 67 Cal. 602, 8 Pac. Rep. 316; Pa-

trick V. Morse, 64 Cal. 462, 2 Pac. Rep. 49; Gray v. Nunan,

63 Cal. 220; Schieffertj v. Tapia, 68 Cal. 184, 8 Pac. Rep.

878; Curtis v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 390, 11 Pac. Rep.

652. We are of the opinion that the parties may, within

the time allowed by law to give notice of intention to move

for a new trial, stipulate that the time for giving such no-

tice may be extended, and that such stipulation has effect

without any order of the court ratifying the same. The

question in such cases is one which most immediately con-

cerns the parties to the action, and attorneys may be safely

intrusted to look after the rights of their respective clients

in such matters. * * *

We concur: Beatty, C. J.; Sharpstein, J.; Harrison,

J. ; Patterson, J. ; Garoutte, J.
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notices of motion for a new trial and proposed bills of exception are steps in an action within the meaning of this
ection, and the stipulation is fil~d in time if it is on file,
with the consent of the adverse attorney, when the court
is called upon to act upon the matter affected by the stipulation. Section 1054 of the Code of Civil Procedure does
not limit the authority of attorneys, as given by section 283
of the same Code, nor prescribe the exclusive mode by
which the time for giving notices or the service of proposed
statements or bills of exception may be extended, but it
only imposes a limitation upon the power of the court to
extend such time without the consent of the adverse party.
It is undoubtedly true, as has often been decided by this
court, that the right to move for a new trial is statutory,
and, unless the prescribed steps are taken within the time
allowed, the right does not exist as against a party who
stands upon the statute and insists upon strict compliance
with every provision of the law relating thereto, and in- ·
tended for his benefit; but it has never been held that such
provisions may not be waived by the party otherwise entitled to claim their benefit. On the contrary, it has been
assumed in many cases, if not directly decided, that the
time for giving notice of motion for a new trial, as well as
~very other step to be taken in relation thereto, may be
waived or extended by consent. Hobbs v . Duff, 43 Cal.
485; Brichman v. Ross, 67 Cal. 602, 8 Pac. Rep. 316; Patrick v . Morse, 64 Cal. 46~, 2 Pac. Rep. 49; Gray v. Nunan,
63 Cal. 220; Schieff ery v. Ta.pia, 68 Cal. 184 8 Pac. Rep.
878; Curtis v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 390, 11 Pac. Rep.
652. We are of the opinio.n that the parties may, within
the time allowed by law to give notice of intention to move
for a new trial, stipulate that the time for o-iving such notice may be extended, and that uch stipulation has effect
without any order of the court ratifying th same. The
qu stion in uch case i one which mo t imm diately cone rns the parti to the action, and attorneys may be safely
intrust d to look aft r the rio-ht of their respective clients
in . u h matt r . . * * *
We on ur: BEATTY C. J. · SHARPSTEIN, J.; HARRISON
J.; PATTERSON, J.; GAROUTTE, J.
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Section 12. Time of Motion.

SECTION

CITY OF ST. JOSEPH V. KOBISON.

12.

TIME OF MOTION.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1894.

125 Missouri, 1.

CITY OF ST. JOSEPH V. ROBISON.

Burgess, J.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

This is ejectment for the recovery of the possession of a

small parcel of ground which plaintiff claims as a part of

1894.

a street, and to which defendant claims to have acquired

125 Missouri, 1.

title by limitation. There was a trial to a jury and judg-

ment rendered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

The verdict was rendered on the sixth day of November,

1891, and the motion for a new trial was filed on the six-

teenth day of November next thereafter. The motion was

filed out of time, and the bill of exceptions can not be con-

sidered by this court. It should have been filed within four

days after the verdict (R. S. 1889, sec. 2243), and could not

be filed thereafter. It was so held in Maloney v. Railroad,

122 Mo. 106. The judgment is affirmed. All of this divi-
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sion concur.^

1 This was the common law rule. Tidd says: "The motion for a new trial

must be made, in the King's Bench, within four days exclusive after the en-

try of a rule for judcrment (Doug. 171) ; and it cannot be made after the four

days, though by consent of the parties (1 Glut. 382, 3) " 2 Tidd 's Practice,

*912. In the United States the time is usually fixed by statute or rule of

court. When not so fixed it is a matter within the discretion of the court.

Thus, it was said in Conklin v. Hinds (1871) 16 Minn. 457: "At common

law and in the chancery, the time for making it [the motion for a new trial]

was matter of practice regulated by rule of court. It remains so unless

the statute has regulated the practice. And since it has not done so in this

instance, and the district court has adopted no general rule in this respect,

it must be for the judge, before whom such motion is made, to decide in each

instance, whether or not it was made too late, a decision which we should not

BURGESS,

J.

This is ejectment for the recovery of the pos es ion of a
mall parcel of ground which plaintiff claims a a part of
a street, and to which defendant claims to ha e acquired
title by limitation. There was a trial to a jury and judgment rendered for defendant, and plaintiff appeal .
The verdict was rendered on the sixth da r of ovember,
1891, and the motion for a new trial was filed on the sixteenth day of November next thereafter. The motion was
filed out of time, and the bill of exception can not be considered by this court. It should have been filed within four
days after the verdict (R. S. 1889, sec. 2243), and could not
be filed thereafter. It was so held in Jiil aloney v. Railroad,
122 Mo. 106. The judgment is affirmed. All of this division concur. 1

review, unless an abuse of discretion appeared."

Tidd says: ''The motion for a new trial
1 This was the common law rule.
must be made in the King's Bench, within four days exclusive after the entry of a rule for judgment (Doug. 171) · and it cannot be made after the four
day , thou h by conc::ent of the parties (1 Clut. 3 2 3)" 2 Tidd Practice,
*912.
In the nited tate the time is u ually fixed by statute or rule of
court.
When not o fixed it i a matter within the di cretion of the court.
Thus, it was aid in Conklin v. Hinds (1 71) 16 Minn. 457: ' At common
law and in the chancery, the time for making it [the motion for a new trial]
was matter of practice regulated by rule of court.
It remains o unle s
the statute bas regulated the practice.
And since it bas not done so in this
instance and the district court has adopted no general rule in thi re pect
it must be for the judge before whom such motion i made, to decide in each
instance, whether or not it wa made too late, a decision which we should not
review, unless an abuse of di&cretion appeared.''
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BAILEY V. DRAKE.

BAILEY V. DRAKE.

Supreme Court of Washington. 1895.

12 Washington, 99.

Supreme Court of Washington.

HOYT, C. J.

1895.

This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial.

12 Washington, 99.

The verdict which was set aside by said order was rendered

on the 1st day of December. The motion for a new trial

was not filed until the 4th day of December. On account

of the delay in its filing the appellant objected to its being

h«ard. Upon such objection being made the court, on mo-

tion of the respondent, made an order extending the time in

which the motion for a new trial might be filed so as to in-

clude the said 4th day of December, and, having done so,

proceeded to the consideration of the motion and, for rea-

sons satisfactory to it, set aside the verdict and ordered a

new trial.

Appellant relies upon two grounds to reverse the order:

(1) That it was beyond the power of the court to extend
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the time in whicli to file the motion for a new trial aftef^

the expiration of thejime fixed by the statute. * * *

The appellant cites numerous cases to support his first

contention, but none of them have any force under our

statute, which, unlike those of the states in which the deci-

sions relied upon were rendered, specially confers the pow-

er upon the court to enlarge the time for the making of any

motion or giving notice thereof, after the expiration of the

statutory time as well as before. The language of sec. 24,

of ch. 127 of the Laws of 1893 (p. 414), upon this subject

is as follows:

a* * * ^jj^ |-j^g court may enlarge or extend the time,

for good cause shown, within which by statute any act is to

be done, proceeding had or taken, notice of paper filed or

served, or may, on such terms as are just, permit the same

to be done or supplied after the time therefor has expired.

*****M

And there fan l)o no ('Sf';\]v^ from the conclusion that the

legisTaTi iic intciidcl ])y its ciiactincnt to confer authority

upon the coui'ls tu extend the time in which acts of the

C. J.
This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial.
The yerdict which was set aside by said order was rendered
on the 1st day of December. The motion for a new trial
was not filed until the 4th day of December. On account
of the delay in its filing the appellant objected to its being
heard. Upon such objection being made the court on motion of the respondent, made an order extending the time in
which the motion for a new trial might be filed so as to include the said 4th day of December, and, havino- done so,
proceeded to the consiaeration of the motion and, for reasons satisfactory to it, set aside the verdict and ordered a
new trial.
Appellant relies upon two grounds to reverse the order:
Ci) That it was beyond the power of the court to extend
the time in w icb to file the motion for a new rial after
the expiration of the time fixed by the statute. * * *
The appellant cites numerous cases to support his first
contention, but none of them have any force under our
statute, which, unlike those of the states in which the decisions relied upon were rendered, specially confers the power upon the court to enlarge the time for the making of any
motion or giving notice thereof, after the expiration of the
statutory time as well as before. The language of sec. 24,
of cb. 127 of the Laws of 1893 (p. 414), upon this subject
is a follows:
'' * * * And the court may enlarge or extend the time,
for ood cause shown, within which by tatute any act is to
b done proceeding had or taken, notice of paper filed or
. the same
s r d, 'or may, on such terms as are ju t, permit
to b on or supplied after the time ther'ef or has expired.
HOYT,

And th re can
no ca e from th conclusion that the
1 - 1Jatur int n e by its nactm nt to c nf r authority
u on the court to xtend the time in which acts of the
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.1dnd under con ideration could be done after the expiration
of the statutory time, as well as before.

777

Kind under consideration conld be done after the expiration

of the statutory time, as well as before.

**********

Affirmed.

•

* * * * * * * * *

Affirmed.
ScoTT, DuNBAR, ANDERS and GoRDON, JJ., concur.

Scott, Dunbae, Anders and Gordon, JJ., concur.

HAYES V. IONIA CIRCUIT JUDGE. ^ ' ^^

M#^

Supreme Court of Michigan. 1900, i i ,

125 Michigan, 277.

Mandamus by Mary A. Hayes to compel Frank D. M.

Davis, Circuit Judge of Ionia county, to strike a motion

HAYES V. IONIA CIRCUIT JUDGE

for a new trial from the files, and to vacate an order extend-

ing the time in which to settle a bill of exceptions or move

for a new trial. Submitted October 30, 1900. Writ denied

Supreme Court of Michigan.

1900. '

November 13, 1900.

Moore, J.

125 Michigan, 277.
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The provisions of law in relation to new trials in civil

^"^uses are to be found in 1 Comp. Laws 1897, sec. 205, and

Cir. Ct. Rule No. 21.^ It will be observed that there is no

such limitation of time as there is in the rule relatmg to the

settlement of bills Of exceptions. The provisions do not

interfere with the common-law discretion of the court.

They only fix a time beyond which no one could move for a

new f Hal as a matter of right. In People v. Wayne Circuit

Judge, 20 Mich. 220, it was said :

'*It is not clear that motions for a new trial based on

newly-discovered evidence would come within the rule fix-

ing a time, for the facts may not be ascertained until after-

Mandamus by Mary A. Haye to compel Frank D. M.
Davi , Circuit Judge of Ionia county, to trike a motion
for a new trial from the files and to vacate an order extending the time in which to ettle a bill of exceptions or move
for a new trial. Submitted October 30, 1900. Writ denied
No ember 13, 1900.
MooRE, J.

wards. It is not desirable to compel parties to resort to

courts of equity to obtain new trials, where it can be avoid-

ed ; and in such cases the courts of law should act on equit-

1 Circuit Court "Rule 21 reads as follows: "Motions for a new trial and

motions in arrest of judgment, with the reasons on which they are founded,

shall be filed and a codj thereof served on the opposite party within five days

after the rendition of "a verdict, in the case of a trial by jury, and within

a like time after the decision of the court, when the cause has been tried by

the court, or witlin f»uch further time as shall be allowed therefor by the

court or judge."

The provi ions of law in relation to new trials in civil
cau
ar to be found in 1 Comp. Laws 1897, sec. 205, and
ir. Ct. Rule No. 21. 1 It will be ob erved that there is no
. uch limitation of time as there is in the rule relating to the
ettl ment of bill of xceptions. The provision do not
interfere with the common-law di cretion of the court.
The onlv fiX a time bevond which no one could mov for a
new. ria1· a a matter of right. In P eople v . Wayne Circuit
Jitd.qe, 20 Mich. 220, it was said:
"It i not clear that motion for a new trial ba ed on
newly-di co er d vidence would come witbin the rule fixino- a tim f0r the facts may not be a certained until afterward . It is not de irabl to ompel parties to re ort to
court of equit. to obtain new trial where it can be avoided; and in such case the court of law houl act on equit1 CircuH Court Rul0 21 reads a!'! follows:
"Motions for a. new trial and
motions i11 arrest of judgment, with the rea on on whicb they are founded,
ball bf' fileil and a co y thereof rveil on the oppo ite party within five days
after th reni!Wou of a verdict, in the case of a trial by jury, and within
a lik tirn after th cl ci. ion of the court, ,,.h n the cau ha been tried by
tbe court, or wit} in 11uch further time as shall be allowed therefor by the
court or judge." _
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able principles, and do, if they can, what justice requires."

See, also, Van Rensela&r v. Whiting, 12 Mich. 449 ; Cam-

pau V. Coates, 17 Mich. 237.

In Manufacturers' Mut. tire Ins. Co. v. Gratiot Circuit

Judge, 79 Mich. 241 (44 N. W. 604), an ex parte order ex-

tending the time in which to move for a new trial was en-

tered. This court declined to interfere with the action of

the court. In the case of Reynolds v. Sweet, 104 Mich. 252

(62 N. W. 356), a judgment was entered in the circuit court

March 21, 1894. The case was brought to this court, and

decided February 26, 1895. The judgment of the court

below was affirmed, and a remittitur was sent to the clerk

of the circuit court. The judgment was paid in March.

December 20th following, a year and nine months after the

original judgment was entered, a motion was made for a

new trial, and the new trial was granted. Upon an appli-

cation for a mandamus, this court declined to interfere.

Reynolds v. Newaygo Circuit Judge, 109 Mich. 403 (67
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N. W. 529). In Fort Wayne, etc., R. Co. v. Wayne Circuit

Judge, 110 Mich. 173 (68 N. W. 115), the circuit judge upon

his own motion granted a new trial, and it was held he had

the right to do so. The counsel for the relator cite the

case of Frazer v. Judge of Recorder's Court, 112 Mich. 469

(70 N. W. 1042). That case was a criminal case. The

statute authorizing a new trial in criminal cases limited the

time in which the application must be made. The case is

not applicable here.

It is urged that, if the circuit judge may grant a new

trial after the time for settling a bill of exceptions has ex-

pired, unreasonable delays will be caused, abuses will

arise, and parties will obtain by indirection what they can-

not obtain directly. We are not at liberty to assume that

circuit judges will not do their full duty, or will grant a

new trial except where it ought to be granted in furtherance

of justice. Should such a case arise, a proper disposition

can be made of it.

The application for the writ is denied.

The other Justices concurred.
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able principles, and do, if they can~ what justice requires."
See, also, Van Reusela r v. Whiting, 12 Mich. 449; Campau v . Coate·, 17 Mich. 237.
In Manufacturers' Mut. Ffre Ins. Co. v. Gratiot Circuit
J itdge, 79 11:ich. 241 ( 44 N. W. 604), an ex parte order extending the time in which to move for a new trial was entered. This court declined to interfere with the action of
the court. In the case of Reynolds v . Sweet, 104 l\iich. 252
(62 N~ W. 356), a judgment was entered in the circuit court
March 21, 1894. The case was brought to this court, and
decided February 26, 1895. The judgment of the court
below was affirmed, and a remittitur was sent to the clerk
of the circuit court. The judgment was paid in March.
Decen1ber 20th following, a year and nine months after the
original judgment was entered, a motion was made for a
new trial, and the new trial was granted. Upon an application for a mandamus, this court declined to interfere.
Reynolds v. N ewaygo Circitit Jitdge, 109 Mich. 403 ( 67
N. W. 529). In Fort Wayne, etc., R. Co. v. Wayne Circuit
Judg e, 110 Mich. 173 (68 N. W. 115), the circuit judge upon
his own motion granted a new trial, and it was held he had
the right to do so. The counsel for the relator cite the
case of Frazer v . Judge of R ecorder's Court, 112 Mich. 469
(70 N. W. 1042). That case was a criminal case. The
statute authorizing a new trial in criminal cases limited the
time in which the application must be made. The case is
not applicable here.
It is urged that, if the circuit judge may grant a new
trial after the time for settling a biU of exceptions has expired, unrea onable delays will be caused, abuses will
ari e, and partie will obtain by indirection what they cannot obtain directly. We are not at liberty to assume that
cir uit judge will not do their full duty, or will grant a
new trial exc pt where it ou 0 ·ht to be granted in furtherance
of ju tice. 1 hould u h a a ari , a proper di po ition
can be ma e of it.
h a11 li ation for th writ i lenied.
The other Justices concurred.
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ROGGENCAMP V. DOBBS. ^ ' ^ H^^ V^^

ROGGENCAMP V. DOBBS.

Supreme Court of Nebraska. 1884. ^. "^"WU J

15 Nebraska, 620.

Maxwell, J.

This is an action of replevin brouo^ht by the plaintiff

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

1884.

:i gainst the defendant to recover certain hogs belonging to

15 Nebraska, 620.

the plaintiff, which the defendant as pound master of the

village of Bennett had taken up. On the trial of the cause,

the jury found for the defendant, and that he had a special

MAXWELL,
interest in the hogs in question for $10.50. The verdict was

rendered on the seventh of June, 1882, and judgment ren-

dered thereon on the twelfth of that month . On the eight-

een th, or six days after judgment was rendered, the plain-''^

tiff asked leave to file a motion for a npw trial Thm ap-

jolication was accompanied by affidavits setting forth neg-

lect of the plaintiff's attorney to file the motion, and that

the plaintiff placed reliance upon liim. etc. A motion for

"a new trial was also tendered. The application was over-
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ruled, and there being no motion for a new trial a motion is

now made to quash the bill of exceptions.

Unless equitable grounds exist for granting a new trial,

as where a parly' is pfeveiiTed from making his defense by

circumstances beyond his control, in which case equity may

m a proper case grant relief, a motion for a new trial m ust

be filed within the time fixed bv law . TInyji r. Quoru^ 4

Neb. 108; Leiby v. Heirs of Ludlow, 4 Ohio, 493; Vanner-

son V. Pendleton, 8 S. & M. 452; Peebles v. Ralls, 1 Little,

24. Unless equitable grounds exist, such as will warrant

a court of equity in granting relief, the motion for a new

trial must be made at the term the verdict or decision is

rendered, and, except for the cause of newly discovered

evidence, shall be within three days after the verdict or

decision is rendered, unless unavoidably prevented. Code,

sec. 316. The words ^'unavoidably prevented'' evidently

refer to circumstances beyond the control of the party de^

siring to file the motion. The law requires diligence on"

The part of clients and attorneys, and the Digj'e_neglect_of_

pjfhpr will not entitle a party to relief on that ground. It

J.

rrhis is an action of replevin brought by the plaintiff
:1°·ainst the defendant to recover certain hogs belonging to
the plaintiff, which the defendant a pound master of the
village of Bennett had taken up. On the trial of the cause,
the jury found for the defendant, and that h had a special
interest in the hog in que tion for $10.50. The verdict was
rendered on the seventh of June, 1882, and judgment rendered thereon on the twelfth of that month. On the eighteenth, or six days after jud ment was rend ered the plaintiff as'ked leave to file a motion for a new trial. Thi aplication was accompanied b affidavit setting forth ne lect of the plaintiff's attorney to file the motion, and that
the plaintiff placed reliance upon him etc. A motion for
a new trial was also tendered. The application was overruled, and there being no motion for a new trial a motion is
now made to quash the bill of exceptions.
Unless equitable grounds exi t for granting a new trial,
as w ere a party is prevented from mal{mg his defense by
circumstances beyond his control in which case equity may
m a roper ca e grant relief a motion for a new trial must
be filed within the time fixed b law. Horn v . Que en, 4
Neb. 108; Leiby v. H eirs of L1tdlow 4 Ohio 493; Vannerson v . Pendleton, 8 S. & M. 452; Peeble v. Ralls, 1 Little,
24. Unle equitable ground exi t uch as will warrant
a court of equity in granting relief, the motion for a new
trial must be made at the term the verdict or decision i
rendered, and except for the can. e of newly di. covered
evidenc , hall b within three day after the erdict or
d ci ion i r ndered unle unavoidabl pre nted.
ode
sec. 316. The word '' un 'oidabl prevented'' evidently
refer to circum. tanc ~ beyond the ontrol of the part deirinO' to fil the motion. The law require diliO'ence on
t e part of client an attorne , and the mere neglect of
eitlier w1 no en i e a party to r ief on that ground. It
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might be different in case of the deliberate betrayal of a

^l ient by an attorney. But such case probably will not

occur, and is not shown in this. There being no sufficient

cause shown for filing the motion for a new trial, there was

no error in denying the same. As none of the errors as-

signed in the petition in error can be considered, the judg-

ment of the court below must be affirmed.

Judgment accordingly.

The other judges cOHCur.

HELLMAN V. ABLER & SONS CLOTHING

COMPANY.

[Chap. 1

TRIAL PRACTICE

might be different in case of the deliberate betrayal of a
client by an attorne . But such case probably will not
occur, and is not shown in this. There being no sufficient
cause shown for filing the motion for a new trial, there wa.·
no error in denying the same. As none of the errors assigned in the petition in error can be considered, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.
The other judges ci.:rncur.

Supreme Court of Nebraska. 1900.

60 Nebraska, 580,

SULLXVAN, J.

This proceeding in error has for its object the reversal

of a judgment denying Maria liellman's application for a

new trial based upon an alleged discovery of material evi-

dence after the adjournment of the term at which the case
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of David Adler S Sons Clothing Co. v. Maria Hellman was

decided. The final decree in the case mentioned was ren-

HELLMAN V. ADLER & SONS CLOTHING
COMPANY.

dered in February, 1895. It was adverse to the defendant,

and she appealed to this court, where the decision of the

district court was affirmed June 9, 1898. It appears from

Suprerne Court of Nebraska.

1900.

the record that the petition for a new trial was dismissed

60 Nebraska, 580.

because it was not filed within the time limited by section

318 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was filed October

27, 1898; more than three years after the final judgment

was rendered in the district court, but within one year after

the judgment of affirmance was pronounced. Counsel for

the plaintiff in error contend that their application was sea-

sonably made, because the final judgment contemplated by

the limitation law is the ultimate decision rendered in the

case, whether such decision be given by the trial court or

by this court. We think counsel are wrong.

The policy of the legislature with respect to the re-ex-

amination of the issues of fact once tried and determined

SULLIVAN,

J.

This proceeding in error has for its object the reversal
of a judgment denying Maria I-Iellman 's application for a
new trial based upon an alleged discovery of material evidence after the adjournment of the term at which the case
of David Adler & Sons Clothing Co. v. Maria Hellrnan was
decided. The final decree in the case mentioned was rendered in February, 1895. It was adverse to the defendant,
and she appealed to this court, where the decision of the
district court was affirmed June 9, 1898. It appears from
the record that the petition for a new trial was dismissed
because it was not filed within the time limited by section
318 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was filed October
27, 1898; more than three years after the final judgment
was rendered in the di trict court, but within one year after
the judgm nt of affirmance wa pro ounced.
oun el for
the plaintiff in rror 1contend that their application was seasonab]y made, becau the :final judO'ment contem lated by
the limitation law i the ultimat d cision render d in the
a e, wh tb r urh d ci. ion b O'iv n by the trial court or
by thi. ourt.
think ounsel ar wronO'.
Th poJi y of the legi 1 ture ith r pe t to the r -examination of the issues f fa t once tri d and d t rmined
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is clearly indicated in article 6 of the Civil Code. A party

claiming a new trial must show diligence; he must move

promptly. Any needless delay, any inertness, on his part,

which hinders the court in bringing the litigation to a

speedy conclusion results in a forfeiture of the statutory

right. Section 316 is as follows: "The application for a

new trial must be made at the term the verdict, report or

decision is rendered, and, except for the cause of newly dis-

covered evidence material for the party applying, which

he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and

produced at the trial, shall be within three days after the

verdict or decision was rendered, unless unavoidably pre-

vented." Section 318 provides: ''T\niere the grounds for

a new trial could not, with reasonable diligence, have been

discovered before, but are discovered after tlie term

at which the verdict, report of referee, or decision

was rendered or made, the application may be

made by petition filed as in other cases | * * *
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but no such petition shall be tiled more than one year after

the tinal Judgment was rendered." It is quite clear from

the sections quoted that, if the new evidence is discovered

during the term at which the cause was decided, although

after the decision was rendered, the application for a new

trial must be made at that term. Under these circum-

stances the law exacts of the unsuccessful suitor a high de-

gree of diligence as the price of a new trial. Why should

it be less exacting after the adjournment of the term at

which the cause was decided ? If a defeated litigant elects

to abide by the .judgment of the district court, the time

within which he may move for a new trial is certainly lim-

ited to one year from the date of such judgment. Wliy

should he be given a longer period because he is disposed

to be litigious? Wliy should be he permitted to lengthen

the time by instituting an appellate proceeding and con-

ducting it leisurely to judgment? We can not believe that

the legislature would have required a party to be expe-

ditious and diligent in applying for a new trial at one stage

of the case if it intended to allow him to take his own

time at another stage. The period of limitation should,

it would seem, begin to run from the date of the decision

in the district court, for the trial there may, and frequently

does, suggest the possible existence of other material evi-

l~]
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is clearly indi ated in article 6 of the Civil Codt. A party
- claiming a new trial must show diligence; he mu t move
promptl:v.
n r needles delay any inertne. . . n hi part.
which bind r the court in bringing the litiO'ation to a
peedy conclu ion results in a forfeiture of the tatutor
right.
ection 316 i as follow : ''The a1 1 lication fo r a
new trial mu t be made at the term the verdi t report or
deci ion i. r ndered and except for the au e of n ew}>T di covered evidence material for the party applyin()' which
he could not with reasonable diligence have di covered and
produced at the trial, shall be within three day after the
verdict or decision wa rendered, unle unavoi 1ably prevented." Section 318 provides: "Where the round for
a new trial could not, with rea onable diligence have been
di covered before but are di covered aft r th term
at which the verdict, report of referee, or decision
was rendered or made
the application may be
made by petition filed as in other ca es; * * *
but no uch petition hall be filed more than one year after
the final judgment wa rendered.'' It is quite clear from
the ection quoted that if the new evidence i. di. covered
during the term at which the cau e was decid d although
after the deci ion wa r ndered, the application for a new
trial mu t be made at that term.
Under the e cir. umstances the law exact of the un ucce sful uitor a high degree of diligence a the pri e of a new trial. Why hould
it be le
xa ting after the adjournment of the term at
which th cau e was decided~ If a defeated liti<Yant elect
to abide by the judgment of the di trict court the time
within which h may move for a new trial i •C rtainly limited to one year from th date of uch jud()'m nt.
Why
bould he b ·iyen a longer period becau e h i di po ed
to be liti<Yiou ~ Why hould be he permitt d to leno·then
th tim by in. tituting an a ellate proc eding and conducting it lei urel to judgment. We can not b Ii ve that
the 1- i lature would have r quired a party to e expedition and diliO' nt in applyin()' for a new rial at n tage
of th ca if it int nd
to allow him to take hi own
time at anoth r ta e.
Th p riod of Ii i ta ti on , honld.
it woul
m
?in to run fr m th dat of th d ci i 11
in the di. tri t ourt, for th trial ther may and frequently
does, ug est t~ po ible exi t nc of oth r material evi-
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dence. The trial in this court, however, reveals nothing

with respect to the facts of the case that was not known

before.

The petition for a new trial, if presented in apt time,

may be entertained by the district court although the cause

be pending in this court for review. Such is the obvious

meaning of the statute, and such is the construction given

like statutes in other jurisdictions. Cook v. Smith, 58 la.

607 ; Gibson v. Manly, 15 111. 140. A party desiring to ob-

tain a new trial under the jnovisions of section 318 of the

Code has, therefore, the right in every case to make his

application within oneyear from the date of the judgment

in the district court, and that court has autliority to enter-

tain his petition and grant the relief demanded, although

the cause may be pending for review in this court. The

legislature did not intend to say that the remedy which it

provided should be available under all circumstances for

one year, and might, at the option of the complaining
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party, be made available for an indefinitely longer period.

This conclusion is in harmony with the dictum of Chief

Justice Maxwell in Bradshaw v. State, 19 Neb. 644.

The judgment is

Affirmed}

iln Henry v. Allen (1895) 147 N. Y. 347, 41 N. E. 694, the appellant

moved for an order that the case be remanded to the supreme court, where

the case had been tried, in order to enable him to move for a new trial.

It was denied on the ground that the pendency of the appeal was no

bar to a motion in the court below for a new trial. The court said: "If the

Supreme Court, in the exercise of its discretion, grants the motion for a new

trial, the legal effect will be the vacating of the judgment from which the

appeal has been taken to this court, and a motion to dismiss the appeal would

then be proper."

HERZ V. FRANK.

[Chap. 17
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dence.
The trial in this court, however, reveals nothing
with respect to the fads of the case that was not known
before.
The petition for a new trial, if presented in apt time,
may be entertained by tbe district court although the cause
be pending in this court for review.
Such is the obvious
meaning of the statute, and such is the construction given
like statutes in other jurisdictions. Cook v. Smith, 58 Ia.
607; Gibson v. ~Manly, 15 Ill. 140. A party desiring to obtain a new trial under the provisions of section 318 of the
ode has, therefore, tile right in every case to make his
application within one year from the date of the judgment
in the district court, and that .court has authority to entertain his petition and grant the relief demanded, although
the cause may be pending for_review in this court.
The
legislature did not intend to say that the remedy which it
provided should be available under all circumstances for
one year, and might, at the option of the complaining
party, be made available for an indefinitely longer period.
This .conclusion is in harmony with the dictum of Chief
Justice Maxwell in Bradshaw v. State, 19 Neb. 644.
The judgment is
.Affirmed. 1

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1898.

104 Georgia, 638.

Simmons, C. J.

***

* * * This court has in numerous cases decided, rz

effect, that where a motion for new trial is made in term

lln Henry v. Allen (1895) 147 N. Y. 347, 41 N. E. 694, the appellant
moved for an order that the case be remanded to the supreme court, where
the case had been tried, in order to enable him to move for a new trial.
It was denied on the ground that the pendency of the appeal was no
bar to a motion in the court below for a new trial.
The court said: ''If the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its discretion, grants the motion for a new
trial, the legal effect will be the vacating of the judgment from which the
appeal has been taken to this court, and a motion to dismiss the appeal would
then be proper.''

HERZ V. FRANK.
Supreme Court of Georgia.

189'8.

104 Georgia, 638.
SIMMONS,

C. J. * * •

* * * * * * * * * •

* * * This court ba in numerou · a e dP.t:'i~, :::.
ffect, that where a moti n for new trial is made in term

ec. 12]
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and an order taken for it to be heard in vacation, the term

of the court, for that particular case, has not adjourned but

is still open. In the case of Stone v. Taylor, 63 Ga. 309,

NEW TRIALS

and an order taken for it to b heard in vacation the terrn
of the court, for that parti ula r ca e ha not adjourned but
i still open. In the ca e of tone v . Taylor, 63 Ga. 309,
Bleckle J., in treating thi ubj e t, aid:
The order
taken in term to hear the motion in acation, put the judge
in full Io e ion of th ca e at the time appointed, and
ontinuan e from time to time wer e had o that ther
was no O'ar or break. · It was as if the fir t day had been
lengthened, or all the sittings had taken place at different
hour of the same day. * * * He had exactl the ame
power in that re pe.ct as if he had been itting in term; and
so had he in re pect to adjourning over from one da to
another. When a court is once on foot in a r gular, legitimate way it require no con ent of partie to run it. Th
law make it elf- up orting. The motion for a new trial
did not peri h on the judge's hand but kept it vitality
until he pa ed judgment refu ing to grant it.
To that
judgment a writ of error lie . '' In many other ca es the
court ha. held, that wher e an order i taken to hear a motion upon a certain da. in vacation, unle the judge continue it by another order on that day, he lo e jurisdiction
of the ca e. In the ca e of Arnold v . Hall, 70 Ga. 445 a
motion for new trial wa et for hearing on a particular
day and four day thereafter the judge approved the brief
of evidenl'le and granted a new trial. This court held that
the judO'e had no juri di.etion to pa the order approving
the brief of evidence or to O'rant the new trial. The reaon for these deci ion mu t have been that when the
judge failed to act upon the da et in the order, the term
of court expired as to the ca e et for that day. An ord r taken in term to hear in acation a motion for a new
trial, operates, in our opinion to keep the regular term of
the court open a to that particular ca e until it is passed
upon by the judge. * * *
7

Bleckley, J., in treating this subject, said: ''The order

taken in term, to hear the motion in vacation, put the judge

in full possession of the case at the time appointed, and

continuances from time to time were had, so that there

was no gap or break. It was as if the first day had been

lengthened, or all the sittings had taken place at different

hours of the same day. * * * He had exactly the same

power in that respect as if he had been sitting in term- and

so had he in respect to adjourning over from one day to

another. When a court is once on foot in a regular, legiti-

mate way, it requires no consent of parties to run it. The

law makes it self-supporting. The motion for a new trial

did not perish on the judge's hands, but kept its vitality

until he passed judgment refusing to grant it. To that

judgment a writ of error lies." In many other cases the
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court has held, that where an order is taken to hear a mo-

tion upon a certain day in vacation, unless the judge con-

tinues it by another order on that day, he loses jurisdiction

of the case. In the case of Arnold v. Hall, 70 Ga. 445, a

motion for new trial was set for hearing on a particular

day, and four days thereafter the judge approved the brief

of evidence and granted a new trial. This court held that

the judge had no jurisdiction to pass the order approving

the brief of evidence or to grant the new trial. The rea-

sons for these decisions must have been that, when the

judge failed to act upon the day set in the order, the term

of court expired as to the case set for that day. An or-

der, taken in term, to hear in vacation a motion for a new

trial, operates, in our opinion, to keep the regular term of

the court open as to that particular case until it is passed

upon by the judge. * * *
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PEOPLE V. BANK OF SAN LUIS OBISPO.

Supreme Court of California. 1910.

PEOPLE V. BANK OF SA.N LUIS OBISPO.

159 California, 65.

Henshaw, J.

Under the Banking Act of 1903, (Stats. 1903, c. 266).

Supreme Court of California.

1910.

action was begun in the name of the people of the state of

159 California, 65.

California by the attorney-general, as contemplated by the

provisions of the act, for a decree declaring the defendant

Bank of San Lnis Obispo insolvent, ordering it into invol-

HENSHAW,
untary liquidation and restraining it from the transaction

of a banking business. This action proceeded to judg-

ment in accordance with the complaint of the People and

a receiver was appointed by the court to administer its

affairs in liquidation. On appeal to this court the judg-

ment of the trial court was in all respects affirmed {People

V. Bank of San Luis Obispo, 154 Cal. 194, 97 Pac. 306), and

this judgment became final in September, 1908. On Juno

19, 1908, the trial court denied the defendant bank's mo-
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tion for a new trial and from this order an appeal was

taken to this court. Pending the decision on this appeal

from the trial court's order refusing to grant the motion

for a new trial, the Banking Act of 1903, (Stats. 1903, c.

266). under the authoritv of which this action was prose-

cuted and these proceedings had, was repealed by the

Banking Act of 1909, (Stats. 1909, c. 76), which latter act

made no provision for continuing in force any pending pro-

ceedinsrs or litigation under the repealed act.

The Bank of San Luis Obispo now moves this court to

vacate and set aside the judgment given against it, and

to direct the trial court to dismiss this action upon the

ground that the repeal of the Banking Act of 1903 put

an end to all litigation pending under it, and that within

the meaning of the law the action of the People of the

State of California against the Bank of San Luis Obispo

was litigation pending and undetermined. The principle

which appellant invokes has thus been stated: ''When a

cause of action is founded on a statute, a repeal of the

statute before final judgment destroys the right, and a

J.

Under the Banking Act of 1903, (Stats. 1903, c. 266).
action was begun in the name of the people of the state of
California by the attorney-general, as contemplated by the
provisions of the act, for a decree dedaring the defendant
Bank of San Luis Obispo insolvent, ordering it into involuntary liquidation and restraining it from the transaction
of a banking business.
This action proceeded to judgment in accordance with the complaint of the People and .
a receiver was appointed by the court to administer its
affairs in liquidation.
On appeal to this court the judgment of the trial court was in all respects affirmed ( PeoplP
v . Bank of San Luis Obispo, 154 Cal. 194, 97 Paic. 306), and
this judgment became final in September, 1908. On June
19, 1908, the trial court denied the defendant bank's motion for a new trial and from this order an appeal was
taken to this court. Pending the decision on this appeal
from the trial court's order refusing to grant the motion
for a new trial, the Banking Act of 1903, (Stats. 1903, c.
266). under the authoritv of which this action was prosecuted and these proceedings had, was repealed by the
Banking Act of 1909, (Stats. 1909, c. 76) which latter act
maiJe no provision for continuing in force any pending proree<ling-R or litig·ation under the repealed act.
Tbe Bank of San Luis Obispo now moves this court to
va at and R t aside the jud~ment given against it, and
to dir ct th trial court to dismiss this action upon the
ground that the repeal of th Banking Act of 1903 put
an end to an JitiO'ation pending under it, and that within
th meaning of the law the action of the People of the
Stat of California against the Bank of San Luis Obispo
wa liti ·ation p nding and undet rmined.
The principle
whi h app llant invokes has thus been stated: ''When a
cau, of a tion i founded on a statute, a repeal of the
tatute before final judgment destroys the right, and a

Sec. 12]
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judgment is not final in this sense so long as the right of

exception thereto remains." (1 Lewis' Southerland, Stat-

utory Construction, 2d ed., p. 285.) * * *

* * * * * * * * * *

* * * In case of a statute conferring civil rights or

such rights or powers which are at the time of the repeal

inchoate, incomplete and unperfected. In the case of

statutes conferring jurisdiction, the repeal operates by

causing all pending proceedings to cease and terminate at

the time and in the condition which existed when the repeal

became operative. In cases of judgment pending upon

appeal, the rule of decision is that the proceedings abate

and the judgment falls. But the general expressions to

this effect employed in the decisions, are to be read in

each case in the light of the facts w^hich are there disclosed.

Here the wise admonition of Chief Justice Marshall in

Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 399, (5 L. Ed. 257), applies
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with peculiar force: ''It is a maxim not to be disregarded,

that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken

in connection with the case in which those expressions are

used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected,

but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit,

when the very point is presented for decision. The rea-

son of this maxim is obvious. The question before the

court is investigated with care and considered in its full

extent, and other principles which may serve to illustrate

it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but

their possible bearing on all the other cases is seldom com-

pletely investigated." In every case where, after judg-

ment, the proceeding has been declared to be "pending"

there will be found a direct appeal from the judgment,

which direct appeal either suspended the judgment so that

it was not final and enforceable, or, as in Schooner General

Pinhiey v. United States, 9 U. S. 281, (3 L. Ed. 101), worked

a removal of the cause to the appellate court, where it was

to be tried de novo. The reason given why the proceed-

ing must abate under these circumstances is that, because

of the suspension of the judgment by appeal, it is without

finality; that to give it finality the court of appeals must

itself pronounce its judgment, and that in pronouncing its

judgment it must be governed by the existing law. There-

T. p.— 50
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judgment is not final in thi s nse o long as the right of
exception thereto remain . " ( 1 Lewis' Southerland, Statutory Con truction, 2d ed., p. 285.) * * *

**********

powers, the repeal operates to deprive the citizen of all
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* * * In case of a statute conferring civil rights or
powers, the repeal operates to deprive the citizen of all
such right or powers which are at the time of the repeal
inchoate, in omplete and unperfected.
In the 'case of
statutes conferring jurisdiction, the repeal operates by
ausing all pending proceedings to cease and terminate at
the time and in the condition which existed when the repeal
became operative.
In case of judgm nt pending upon
appeal, the rule of decision i that the proceedings abate
and the judgment falls.
But the general expressions to
this effect employed in the decisions, are to be read in
each case in the light of the facts which are there disclosed.
Here the wise admonition of hief Jn tice Marshall in
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 399, (5 L. Ed. 257), applies
with peculiar force: "It is a maxim not to be disregarded,
that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken
in connection with the ca e in which those expre ions are
used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected,
but ought not to control the judgment in a ub equent suit,
when the ery point i pre ented for deci ion.
The reason of this maxim is obvious.
The question before the
court i inYe tigated with care and con idered in it full
extent, and other I rinciples whi h may serye to illustrate
it are con idered in their relation to the case decided, but
their po ible bearing on all the other ca
i eldom comI letel., inv tigated. ''
In every a e wher after judgm nt the proceeding ha been d lared to b
endinO'''
there will be found a direct appeal from the judgment,
whi h dire t ap al either u
nd d the jud 0 ·ment o that
it wa not final and enfor able or a in chooner General
Pinkney v . United States, 9 U. . 281, (3 L. Ed. 101), worked
a rem al f th au e t th ar p llat ourt wh re it wa
to b tri d de nova . The r a n giv
why th proc eding mu t
at u d r th
ir u tan
i th t be ause
f th u p n ion of the ju
nt by a p al it i without
finality· that to gi
it finalit. th
ourt of ap eal mu t
0
its lf pronoun it jud m nt. and that in pron un ino- it
jndgm nt it u t be go rn d by th exi ting law. ThereT
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fore, when it finds that by the existing law the previous law,

under which alone validity could be given to the judg-

ment, has been repealed, the sole prop and foundation for

support of the judgment has been removed, and of neces-

sity it must be declared null and void. No case, however,

has been found, and we venture to say none can be found,

where a judgment which has been affirmed after direct ap-

peal, and has by such affirmance become final during the

existence of the statute supporting it, where the judgment

itself has been in the process of execution within the law,

and where rights have arisen by virtue of this legal execu-

tion of the judgment, has ever been held to be destroyed

by a repeal of the statute supporting it because the col-

lateral proceeding of an appeal from an order denying a

new trial is pending without supersedeas or stay-bond.

And to this consideration we now come.

* * * In Harris v.Banihart, 97 Cal 5^6, {32'PaG.5S9),

the matter is discussed and the conclusions of the court
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may be summarized as follows : A motion for a new trial,

in the absence of an order of the court to that effect, does

not stay or suspend the operation of a final judgment. An

action, under section 1049 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

is to be deemed pending while an appeal from the judgment

is pending, or until the time for such an appeal has ex-

pired, but when the judgment upon appeal has been deter-

mined by an affirmance of the judgment, or when the time

for appeal has expired, the judgment is admissible in evi-

dence as res adjudicata and to raise an estoppel in bar of

the action. The same ruling as to the effect of a pending

motion for a new trial upon the finality of a judgment is

declared in Young v. Brelie, 19 Nev. 379, (3 Am. St. Rep.

892, 12 Pac. 564), and the soundness of the rule is intimated

bv the supreme court of the United States in Euhhell v.

United States, 171 U. S. 203, (18 Sup. Ct. 828, 43 L. Ed..

136), where it is said: ''Indeed, it may well be doubted

whether the pendency of a motion for a new trial would in-

terfere in any way with the operation of the judgment as

an estoppel."

Tn Spnnagal v. Bellinger, 38 Cal. 284, it is said: ''Under

our system, from the entry of the verdict or filing of the

findings of the court, the motion for new trial is a kind of

episode, or in a certain sense, a collateral proceeding — a

TRIAL PRACTICE
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fore, when it finds that by the existing law the previous law,
under which alone validity could be given to the judgment, bas been repealed, the sole prop and foundation for
upport f the judgment has been removed, and of necesity it mu t be declared null and void. No case, however,
ha been found, and we venture to say none can be found,
h re a judgment which has been affirmed after direct ap1 eal, and has by such affirmance become final during the
exi tence of the statute supporting it, where the judgment
it elf ha been in the proce s of execution within the law,
and where rights have arisen by virtue of this legal execution of the judgment, has ever been held to be destroyed
by a repeal of the tatute supporting it because the 1collateral proceeding of an appeal from an order denying a
new trial is pending without super edeas or stay-bond.
And to this consideration we now come.
* * * In Harris v. Barnhart, 97 Cal. 546, (32 Pac. 589),
the matter is di cu sed and the conclusions of the court
may be ummarized as follows: A motion for a new trial,
in the ab ence of an order of the court to that effect, does
not stay or suspend the operation of a final judgment. An
a tion, under section 1049 of the Code of Civil Procedure
is to be deemed pending while an appeal from the judgment
i pending, or until the time for uch an appeal has expired, but when the judgment upon appeal ha been determined by an affirmance of the judgment, or when the time
for a.ppeal has expired, the judgment is admi sible in evid n e a res adjudicata and to rai e an e toppel in bar of
t e a ti on. The ame rulin cr a t the eff t of a pen din()'
r oti n for a new trial upon the :finality of a judgment i
d lar d in Yoi,,,ng v. Brehe, 19 N v. 79, ( Am. St. R p.
892 12 Pa . 564), and th oundne of the rul i intimat d
h:v th supreme ourt of the Unit 1 tat in Hitbbell v.
United tate , 171 U. . 20. (1 Sup. t. 2 , 43 L. Ed.
J. ) , wh r it i. said: "Ind d it may w 11 be doubted
wh th r th p nd ncy of a motion for n w trial would int rf r in an. way with t
o rati n of th judgment a
a . t p1."
In 8pnnagal v. D llinger
al. 2 4, it i aid: "Under
onr ... t m, fr
the ntr. f th v rdi t or filing of th
fincl1ng: f tl
nTt th motion for n ,w trial i. a kind of
r jn a , rr ain . n. a o11at r 1 r
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proceeding not in the direct line of the judgment; for the
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proceeding not in the direct line of the judgment; for the
judgm nt ma. be at once nt red and ev n ecuted while
a motion for a n w trial is pending in an independent line
of proc dino· which end in an ord r reviewable on an inependent a1 p al. The motion ma be heard and decided
and an ap1 al taken on it own independent record, while
the pro e dino· on and ub equent to the judgment may
be still r gularlT goino- on and e en an independent appeal taken in that line." And this language is quoted with
approval by thi ourt in the later ca e of Brison v. Brison,
90 Cal. 32
( ~7 Pac. 1 6); while to the same · effect is
Houser ct Hain es Co. v. Hargro ve, 129 al. 90, (61 Pac.
660), and Knoi le
. Thomp on, 133 Cal. 247 (65 Pac.
468).
A broad difference exi ts between the operation
and legal effect of a direct appeal from a judgment (which,
while the appeal i pendin , in the generalit of cases operates to stay the· judgment absolutely and in all ca es operates to destro for it any claim of finality), and the
''collateral proceedin ' of an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial taken after the judgment itelf ha be ome an enforceable finality by reason of it
affirmance upon direiet appeal.
In the farmer case the
· courts, when the law which alone will upport the judgment given ha been withdrawn have felt and expressed
them el e - a unable to proceed further with the litigation,
in e they themselves mu t pronounce a judgment and
ran pronounce it only under the authorit. of exi ting law.
In the ca e of ar peal from an order refu ing a new tria]
where no tay ha been granted and where as here the
iudgment ha become a finality the deci ion which the
ourt r nd r i not upon the judgment appealed from but
upon the order appealed from and while the effe t of it
rever al of the order will of ' our. , be n
arily the settinO' a id of th jud!ml nt thi after all i but an incid nt to the ruling whi h it make which rulinO' O'Oe not
at all to the uffici n y or finalit 7 of the judgm nt but only
a. to heth r within familiar rul
and li it tion , the
t wa fairly i-v n.
H r in our motion for a
n w trial iff r e e ti lly from the common-law moti n
whi h wa always heard and determined before entry of
T

judgment may be at once entered and even executed, while

a motion for a new trial is pending in an independent line

of proceeding, which ends in an order renewable on an in-

dependent appeal. The motion may be heard and decided

and an ap])eal taken on its own independent record, while

the proceedings on and subsequent to the judgment may

be still regularly going on, and even an independent ap-

peal taken in that line." And this language is quoted with

approval by this court in the later case of Brison v. Brison,

90 Cal. 323, (27 Pac. 186); while to the same effect is

Houser d Haines Co. v. Hargrove, 129 Cal. 90, (61 Pac.

660), and Knoivles v. Thompson, 133 Cal. 247, (65 Pac.

468). A broad difference exists between the operation

and legal effect of a direct appeal from a judgment (which,

while the appeal is pending, in the generality of cases oper-

ates to stay the- judgment absolutely, and in all cases oper-

ates to destroy for it any claim of finality), and the
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"collateral proceeding" of an appeal from an order deny-

ing a motion for a new trial taken after the judgment it-

self has become an enforceable finality by reason of its

affirmance upon direct appeal. In the former case the

courts, when the law which alone will support the judg-

ment given has been withdrawn, have felt and expressed

themselves as unable to proceed further with the litigation,

since they themselves must pronounce a judgment, and

can pronounce it only under the authority of existing law.

In the case of appeal from an order refusing a new trial

wliere no stay has been granted and where, as here, the

judgment has become a finality, the decision which the

court renders is not upon the judgment appealed from, but

upon the order appealed from, and while the effect of its

reversal of the order will, of course, be necessarily the set-

ting aside of the judgment, this, after all, is but an inci-

dent to the ruling which it makes, which ruling goes not

at all to the sufficiency or finality of the judgment, but only

as to whether, within familiar rules and limitations, the

judgment was fairly given. Herein our motion for a

new trial differs essentially from the common-law motion

which was always heard and determined before entrv of

787
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judgment,^ so that the appeal from the judgment embraced

all questions. Under our system, the appeal from an

order denying a new trial is a separate and independent

appeal, which, if prosecuted in time, may be taken after

the judgment has become final. Excepting when ordered

by supersedeas or permitted by stay-bond, it in no way sus-

pends the judgment nor interferes with its finality. It is

in this respect more in the nature of an equitable bill of

review which, while countenanced in proper cases, even

after a judgment of affirmance upon appeal, never oper-

ated in and of itself to suspend the decree. Indeed it has

1 The common law rule is in force in several jurisdictions in the United

States. Thus in Whitney v. Karner (1878) 44 Wis. 563, the court said:

"The learned circuit judge who heard and decided this motion, seems to have

entertained the opinion that the entry of judgment was no objection to enter-

taining a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial upon the merits;

and it is quite probable that such opinion prevails to some extent amongst the

circuit judges and members of the bar; but it is in direct conflict with the
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decision of this court.

"In the case of Hogan v. State, [36 Wis. 232], the present learned chief

justice says: 'It is certain that at common law, motions for a new trial must

be made after verdict and before judgment. It would be no greater ab-

surdity to move for a new trial at common law before verdict, than after

judgment.' And in the case of Scheer v. Keown, [34 Wis. 349], Chief Jus-

tice Dixon says: 'The practice, as indicated by several cases which have come

before this court, and so far as we understand, has always been, if the party

wishes to move at a subsequent term, on a case or bill of exceptions' made or

settled, to obtain a stay of proceedings, so as to prevent the entry of judg-

ment until after the motion could be heard and determined.'

"It would seem to be irregular to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict

and for a new trial after judgment entered, at the term at which the same was

entered, unless such motion was joined with a motion to vacate the judgment

also. ' '

But the better rule seems to be the contrary, permitting the motion to be

made regularly after judgment entered. Thus in Woodward Iron Co. v.

Brown (1910) 167 Ala. 316, 52 So. 829, the court said: "Common law courts

have inherent power to grant new trials, and at common law the judgment

was not rendered until the motion for new trial was disposed of (29 Cyc.

722, 727), but the usage in our courts and others is to enter the judgment

when the verdict is returned, and the party has during the term of the court

to make the motion for a new trial. The effect of the motion is to suspend

the judgment until the motion is disposed of, and if it is granted, it 'wipes

out the verdict; no judgment can be rendered on it.' Hilliard on New

Trials, p. 59."

In Conklin v. Hinds (1871) 16 Minn. 457, the court said: "But the statute

gives the right to move for a new trial upon the report of the referee or de-

cision of the judge, and allows no opportunity to make such motion before

judgment. The party aggrieved must therefore necessarily have the right

to make it after judgment."

In some jurisdictions, by reason of statutes, no proceeding for a new trial

can be instituted before judgment. Thus in McTntyre v. MacGinniss (1910)

41 Mont. 87, 108 Pac. 353, the court said: "Proceedings on the motion for a

new trial were first instituted by MacGinniss by serving his notice of inten-

tion after the decision was made, but before entry of judgment. These pro-

ceedings were premature. Under the statute, a i>arty intending to move for

a new trial may do so by serving his notice within ten days after the notice

of entry of judgment, but not before. (Revised Codes, sec, C796.) "
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judgment, 1 so that the appeal from the judgment embraced
all questions.
Under our system, the appeal from an
order denying a new trial is a separate and independent
appeal, which, if prosecuted in time, may be taken after
the judgment has become final.
Excepting when ordered
by supersedeas or permitted by stay-bond, it in no way suspends the judgment nor inteTf er es with its finality. It is
in this respect more in the natuTe of an equitable bill of
review which, while .countenanced in propeT cases, even
after a judgment of affirmance upon appeal, never operated in and of itself to suspend the decree. Indeed it has
1 The common law rule is in force in several jurisdiction in the United
States.
Thus in Whitney v. Karner (1878) 44 Wis. 563, the c0urt said:
''The learned circuit judge who beard and decided this motion, seems to have
entertained the opinion that the entry of judgment was no objection to enter·
taining a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial upon the merits;
and it is quite probable that such opinion prevails to some extent amongst the
circuit judges and members of the bar; but it is in direct conflict with the
decision of this court.
"In the case of Hogan v. State, [36 Wis. 232], the present learned chief
justice says: 'It is certain that at common law, motions for a new trial must
be made after verdict and before judgment.
It would be n~ greater ab·
surdity to mo-ve for a new trial at common law before verdict, than after
judgment.'
And in the case of Scheer v. Keown, [34 Wis. 349], Chief Jus·
tice Dixon says: 'The practice, as indicated by several cases which have come
before this court, and so far as we understand, has always been, if the party
wishes to move at a sub"equent term, on a case or bill of exception& made or
settled, to ohtain a stay of proceedings, so as to prevent the entry of judg·
ment until after the motion could be heard and determined.'
' 'It would seem to be irregular to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict
and for a new trial after judgment entered, at the term at which the same was
entered, unless such motion was joined with a motion to vacate the judgment
also.''
But the better rule seems to be the contrary, permitting the motion to be
made regularly after judgment entered.
Thus in \Vooc1warc1 Iron Co. v.
Brown (1910) 167 AJa. 316, 52 So. 829, the court said: ''Common law courts
have inherent power to grant new trials, and at common law the judgment
was not r enC!ered until the motion for new trial was disposed of (29 Cyc.
722, 727), but the usage in our courts and others is to enter the judgment
when the v rrli t is r turned, and the party has during the term of the court
to make th motivn for a new trial.
The effect of the motion is to uspend
the judgment until th motion is disno. ed of, and if it is granted, it 'wipes
out the verdict; no judgment can be rendered on it.'
Hilliard on New
Trials, p. 59. ''
In onklin v. Hind (1871) J6 Minn. 457, the court said: "But the statute
gives the right to move for a new trial upon the report of the referee or de·
cisi on of th jndge, and allow. no opportunity to make s11ch motion b fore
judgment.
Tbe party aggrieved must therefore neces arily have the right
to make it after judgment.''
In some jurisdictions, by reason of statute , no proceeding- for a new trial
can be instituted before judgm nt.
Thus in Mcintyre v. MacGinni s (1910)
41 Mont. 7, 108 Pac. 353, the court said: "Pro e dings on the motion for a
n w trial ·w r :first instituted y MacGinni s by erving bis notice of inten·
tion aft r th deci ion wa made, but before entry of judgment.
These pro·
ceedings VI r pr mature.
Uncl r the statut , a party intending to move for
a n w trial may clo Po by rving- bis notir within ten days after the notice
of entry of judgment, but not before.
(Revise :J. Codes, sec. 6796.)"

1
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been so expressly declared by tliis court in Foivden Admr.

r. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 149 Cal. 151, 154, (86 Pac. 178).

We conclude, therefore, that as the judgment had be-

^'ome final wliile the statute authorizing the action was in

force, its finality is not disturbed by a pending motion for

a new trial which does not operate in any way to stay the

execution of the judgment; that as the statute authorizes

the people upon the relation of the attorney-general to pro-

ceed in equity to have the bank declared insolvent, leaving

the proceedings governing the action those which gener-

ally obtain in the practice of this state, the repeal of the

statute did not destroy the right of the appellant to be

heard upon this motion for a new trial ; that if the appeal

from the motion for a new trial should be granted, it would

necessarily hav.e the effect of vacating the judgment, and

that by virtue of the repeal the action could then no longer

be prosecuted; that if, however, the appeal from the order

denying the motion for a new trial should be denied and
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the order affirmed, the repeal of the statute would not af-

fect any proceeding taken under it and under the judgment

heretofore affirmed.

**********

Wherefore the motion to vacate and annul the judgment

and dismiss the proceedings is denied, and the order deny-

ing defendant's motion for a new trial is affirmed.

Shaw, J., Lorigan, J.. Melvin, J., and Sloss, J., con-

curred.

Rehearing denied.

SEWAED V. CEASE.

Supreme Court of Illinois. 1869.

50 Illinois, 228.

Mr. Justice Lawrence delivered the opinion of the

Court :

It is very seldom that a court of chancery will interfere

to grant a new trial at law, though its jurisdiction to do so

is undoubted. In this case, a bill was filed for that pur-

ec. 12]
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been so expre ly declared by this court in Fowden Admr.
'l. Pacific Coast S. S . Co., 149 Cal. 151, 154, ( 6 Pal'. 178) .
We conclude therefore, that as the judgment had be<'ome final while the statute authorizing the action was in
f rce it finalit is not di turbed b a pending motion for
a new trial whi h does not operate in any way to tay the
exeir•ution of the judgment; that as the statute authorizes
the people upon the relation of the attorne -general to proeed in equity to have the bank declared insolvent, leaving
the proceeding governing the action tho e which generally obtain in the practice of thi tate the repeal of the
statute did not destroy the riO'ht of the appellant to be
heard upon this motion for a new trial; that if the appeal
from the motion for a new trial hould be granted, it would
necessarily hav.e the effect of vacating the judgment, and
that by virtue of the repeal the action could then no longer
be pro ecuted; that if howe er, the appeal from the order
denying the motion for a new trial hould be denied and
the order affirm d the repeal of the tatute would not affect any proceedin taken under it and under the judgment
heretofore affirmed.
* * * * * * * * * *
Wherefore the motion to vacate and annul the judgment
and di mi the proceedings is denied and the order denying defendant s motion for a new trial is affirmed.
SHAW, J. LoRIGAN, .J .. 11ELVIN, J., and SLoss, J., concurred.
Rehearing denied.

SEWARD V. CEASE.
Silpreme Court of Illinois.

1869.

50 Illinois 228.

1\fR. Ju TICE LAWRENCE
Court:
t i very el om that a
t gnmt a n w trial at law
is un oubted. In thi ca

delivered the op1n10n of the
court of chancery will interfere
thou...;h it juri di tion to do o
e, a bill wa filed for that pur-

790
790 Trial Peactice [Chap. 17

pose, and the case having been heard on a motion to dis

miss the bill, the relief prayed was refused. We are of

opinion, however, that the motion shonld have been over-

ruled, and if, after the canse is at issue and proofs taken,

the case made by the bill is sustained, a new trial should

be awarded. For the present, we must take the allega-

tions of the bill as true, and they show, not merely that

the only evidence upon which the judgment at law was ob-

tained was false, but that the witness who gave it has vol-

untarily made an affidavit of its falsity before a magistrate,

stating his desire to retract the same, and this affidavit is

made an exhibit with the bill. This, then, is not a case of

conflicting evidence. An unrighteous judgment has been

obtained upon perjured testimony, and the perjury is

shown, not by uncertain admissions of the perjurer, but by

his own oath voluntarily made for the purpose of repair-

ing his wrong. A stronger case could hardly arise. The

motion to dismiss should have been overruled, and the de-
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fendant required to answer. After the answer is filed and

the cause is at issue, it will be incumbent on the complain-

ant to take the testimony of the witness, when the defend

ant will have an opportunity of cross-examining, and if the

witness adheres to the statements of his affidavit, and there

is no evidence he has been subjected to corrupt influences,

the court will award a new trial.

The decree is reversed and the cause remanded.

Decree reversed}

1 ' ' Applications to courts of chancery, for the purpose of granting new

trials at law, and the interposition of the Chancellor, whenever a proper

case is made out, may be warranted as well upon the score of principle as of

precedent.

"An injunction to f-tny jtroceedings upon an unjust judgment, and for a

new trial, is a remedy recognized and approved by courts of equity. These

remedies are to l)e enforced under the operation of established forms and

rules of proceeding, instituted as they are for th- development of truth and

justice.

"Anciently, courts of equity exercised a familiar jurisdiction over trials at

law, and compelled the successful party to submit to a new trial, or to be

perpetually enjoined from proceeding on his verdict. (Floyd v. Jayne, 6

TRIAL PRACTICE
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pose, and the ca e having been heard on a motion to di:: ; miss the bill, the relief prayed was refused.
We are of
opinion, however, that the motion should have been overruled, and if, after the cause is at i._sue and proofs taken,
the ca, made by the bill is sustained, a new trial should
be awarded. For the present, we mu t take the allegations of the bill as true, and they show, not merely that
the only evidence upon which the judgment at law was obtained was false, but that the witn . who gave it has voluntarily made an affidavit of its falsity b fore a magistrate,
tating his de ire to retract the same, and this affidavit is
made an exhibit with the bill. Thi , then, is not a case of
conflicting evidence. An unrighteous judgment has been
obtained upon perjured testimony, and the perjury is
hown, not by uncertain admi sions of the perjurer, but by
his own oath voluntarily made for the purpose of repairing his wrong. A stronger case could hardly arise. The
motion to dismiss should have been overruled, and the defendant required to answer. After the an wer is filed and
the cau e is at i sue, it will be incumbent on the complain ant to take the testimony of the witness, when the defenfl
ant will have an opportunity of cross-examining, and if th e
witnes adheres to the statements of his affidavit, and ther ,.
is no evidence be has been subjected to corrupt influences,
the POurt will a ward a new trial.
The decree is rever ed and the cause remanded.

Decree reversed. 1

John. Ch. Eep. 479.)

"But this practice, except in cases the most extraordinary, has long since

gone out of use; because courts of law are now competent to grant new

trials, and are in the constant exercise of that right to a most liberal extent.

Anciently, courts of law did not grant new trials; and in those days, courts

of equity exercised that jurisdiction over trials at law, and compelled the suc-

cessful party to submit to a new trinl when justice required it. But, even

in that age, the Court of Chancery proceeded with great caution. A new

trinl was never rrrnnted. unless the application was founded upon some

clear case of fraud or injustice, or upon some newly discovered evidence,

1 "Applications to courts of chancery, for the purpose of granting new
trial at Jaw, and the interpo ition of the Chance1lor, whenever a proper
caRe i. mad ont, may he warranted as wen upon the score of principle as of
preced nt.
''An injunction to Fh1y proceedings upon an unju st judgment, and for a
'J'hese
new trial, is a r meily T rogn ized and approv d by ourt of equity.
reme ii
are to be nforcrrl under the operation of
tablished forms an<l
rul s of proce cling, institutecl as they are for th · levelopm nt of truth and
jnsti e.
'' Anci ntly, C'onrt. of equity ex r ised a familiar juris<li tfon over trials at
law, and ompell d the sue e ful party to submit to a n w trial, or to be
J) rp tually enjoined from proceeding on hi v rdi t.
(Floyd v. Jayne, 6
.John. h. Rep. 479.)
'' Rnt this practice, except in cases the most extraordinary, has long si nce
gone out of use; because courts of law are now competent to grant new
trials, and are in the constant ex rcise of that right to a mo t libe ral extent.
An ciently, courts of law did not grant new trial ; and in t ho e day , courts
of quity exercised that juri c1i tion over trials at law, and <'Omp l1ec1 the sncrf'flRfnl party to i::uhmit to n new trin1 when jui:;tfre r quhf'<l it.
Bot, ven
in that ag , the onrt of ,hnnr ry proce ilNl wi.th gr at cauti on.
A new
trinl wns TIPYPr rrrnntNl. 1mlrRR thP applir ntion wa fonnilec1 11pon some
cl ar ca e of frau l or injustice, or npon som newly cl is ov r d evidence,
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" hich the varty could not possibly, by any vigilance or industry of his, have
had the bnefit of, on the fir t trial.

*

\\ hich the party could not possibly, by any vigilance or industry of his, have

had the bnefit of, on the first trial.

' ' In general, where it would have been proper for a court of law to have

granted a new trial, if the application had been made while that court had

1 ower to do so, it is equally proper for a court of equity to grant a new

trial, if the application be made on grounds arising after the court of law

ceased to have power to act.

' ' The general rule is, that courts of chancery will not interfere after ver-

dict and judgment at law, except in cases of fraud, or in extraordinary cases

where manifest injustice would be done; nor where the party might have de-

fended himself fully at law and neglected it. Great abuse would be made

of a contrary doctrine, by drawing within the jurisdiction of equity, as by a

side wind, almost all causes decided at law. The high powers intrusted to

Chancery, to promote the purposes of justice, should not be abused to the

vexation of citizens, and the unsettling solemn decisions of other courts,

where it is always to be presumed that full justice has been done." 3 Gra-

ham & Waterman on New Trials, 1455 et seq.

For a further discussion of this subject see: Black on Judgments, $ 357;
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Freeman on Judgments, § 485; 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, $ 1365;

Yancy v. Downer (1824) 5 Littell (Ky.) 8, 15 Am. "Dec. 35; Wynne v. New-

man's Adm'r (1881') 75 Va. 811; Kansas & Arkansas Valley R. R. Co. v.
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*

* *

*

* *

*

*

*

''In general, where it would have been proper for a court of law to have
granted a new trial, if the application had been made while that court had
1 oITer t o do so, it is equally proper for a court of equity to grant a new
trial, if the application be made on grounds arising after the court of law
ceased to have power to act.
'' Th e general rule is, that courts of chancery will not interfere after verdict and judgment at law, except in cases of fraud, or in extraordinary ca es
where manifest inju tice would be done; nor where the party might have defended himself fully at law and neglected it.
Great abuse would be maae
of a contrary doctrine, by drawing within the jurisdiction of equity, as by a
side wind, almost all causes decided at law.
The high powers intrusted to
hancery, to promote the purpo es of justice, should not be abu ed to the
vexation of citizens, and the unsettling solemn decisions of other courts,
3 Grawhere it is always to be presumed that full justice has been done.''
ham & Waterman on New Trials, 1455 et seq.
F or a further discu ion of this subject see: Black on Judgments, § 357;
Freeman on Judgment , § 485; 3 Pomeroy s Equity Jurisprudence, § 1365;
Yancy v. Downer (1 24) 5 Littell (Ky.) , 15 Am. Dec. 35; Wynne v. Newman's Adm 'r (1881? 75 Va. 11 · Kansas & Arkansas Valley R. R. Co. v.
Fit zhugh ( 1895) 61 Ark. 341, 33 S. W. 960.

Fitzhugh (1895) 61 Ark. 341, 33 S. W. 960.

Section 13. Form of Motion.

MEMPHIS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY V.

JOHNSON.

Supreme Court of Tennessee. 1905.

114 Tennessee, 632.

SECTION 13.

Mr. Justice Shields delivered the opinion of the Court.

FORM OF MOTION.

This action is brought by W. B. Johnson against the

Memphis Street Railway Company to recover damages for

personal ini'iiries sustained by him, through the negligence

of the defendant, while plaintiff was a passenger on one of

MEMP HIS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY V.
JOHNSON.

its cars.

The case was submitted to a jury, and a verdict found

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

for the plaintiff. The motion of the defendant for a new

1905.

trial was overruled, and judgment entered. The defend-

114 Tennessee, 632.

ant tendered a bill of exceptions to this action of the court,

which was signed and filed, and the case is now before us

upon appeal in the nature of a writ of error.

The errors assigned are predicated upon the refusal of

the trial judge to set aside the verdict of the jury and grant

the defendant a new trial because of the admission of cer-

J usTrcE SHIELDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action is brouO'ht by W. B. John on ao-ainst the
Memphis Street Railway ompany to recover damao-es for
personal injuries sustained by him, through the neglig nee
of the defendant, while plaintiff was a pa enger on one of
its cars.
The ca e wa8 ubmitted to a jury, and a verdi t found
for the plaintiff. Th m tion of the def ndant for a n w
trial was overruled and jud,?'ment entered.
The defendant t ndered a bill of . r ption to this aicti n of th court,
'Yhi h wa ign d and fil . and the case i now before us
upon ap al in th natur of a writ of error.
rrh
rror. as. io-n
ar pr di at d upon the r fu al of
th trial ju o· to s ta . i th ,. r 1i t of th jury a a grant
th d f ndant a n w trial be au of th admi ion of cer·
MR.
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tain evidence offered by the plaintiff over the objection of

the defendant, and his refusal to give in charge to the

jury certain written instructions submitted by counsel for

the railway company at the conclusion of the charge in

chief.

For the defendant in error it is insisted that these as-

signments of error cannot be considered by this court be-

cause the errors complained of were not properly set out

and relied upon as grounds for a new trial in the motion

made by the plaintiff in error in the trial court for that

purpose, as required by a rule of that court, and passed

upon by the presiding judge.

The rule of the circuit court of Shelby county in relation

to motions for new trials, which is in the record, requires

all grounds upon which a new trial is asked to be stated

and set out separately in a written motion and entered

upon the minutes of the court; and all errors not so set

out are presumed to be waived, and will not be considered
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on the hearing of the motion.

The plaintiff in error attempted to comply with this rule,

and the grounds for a new trial upon which these assign-

ments are based are stated in its motion in these words :

''(1) For error in the admission and exclusion of evi-

dence.

''(2) The court erred in refusing the special instruc-

tions asked by the defendant."

The jurisdiction of this court is exclusively appellate,

and it can only pass upon matters which the record shows

have been considered and adjudged by the trial court from

which the case has been appealed. The errors reviewed

and .corrected by it are of two classes : Those which ap-

pear upon the face of the record proper, as erroneous rul-

ings in sustaining or overruling motions, and demurrers

challenging the sufficiency of pleadings; and errors com-

mitted in allowing or overruling motions for new trials upon

grounds brought into the record by bills of exceptions, as

for improperly refusing a continuance, the admission of

incompetent evidence, or the rejection of competent evi-

dence, error in instructing the jury, or refusing further in-

structions seasonably requested in proper form, for want

of evidence to sustain the verdict, or other similar ground.

It does not act directly upon errors of the latter class,
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tain evidence offered by the plaintiff over the objection of
the defendant, and his refusal to give in charge to the
jury certain written in tnlCtions submitted by coun 1 for
the railway company at the conclu ion of the charge in
chief.
For the defendant in error it i in isted that these assignments of error cannot be considered by this court becau e the errors complained of were not properly set out
and relied upon as grounds for a new trial in the motion
made by the plaintiff in error in the trial court for that
purpose, as required by a rule of that court, and passed
upon by the presiding judge.
The rule of the circuit court of Shelby county in relation
to motions for new trial , which is in the record, requires
all grounds upon which a new trial i asked to be stated
and set out separately in a written motion and entered
upon the minutes of the court; and all error not so set
out are presumed to be waived, and will not be considered
on the hearing of the motion.
The plaintiff in error attempted to .comply with this rule,
and the grounds for a new trial upon which these assignments are based are stated in its motion in these words:
"(1) For error in the admission and exclusion of evidence.
"(2) The court erred in refusing the special in truction a ked by the defendant.''
The juri diction of thi court is exclu ively appellate,
and it an only pass upon matter whi h the record hows
hav been con idered and adjudged b_v the trial court from
whi h the a e has be n appealed.
The errors reviewed
and •Corre ted by it are of two cla e : Those which app ar upon th face of th r cord prop r, as erroneous rulinO', in u tainin or overruling moti n , and demurrers
r11 11 nging th suffi ien . of pleading. ; and error committ din allowi n or ov rrulinO' motions for new trials upon
ground .· brought int the r ord y bill. of xception , a.
f r impr p rly r fu i o- a ontinuan
th admi ion of
inr mp t t vi 1 nc
r th r j ti n of co p t nt vi<l nc
in in. trurting th jury, or r fu , 'nO' furth r in, trnrtion . , a na 1. r cin . t d in pr l r f rm, for w nt
of 'icl nr to u. ta in th
rdi t r oth r imilar O'found.
It 1 s n t a t dir tly upon rr rs of the latter class,
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which are not a part of the record without a bill of excep-

tions, but upon the action of the trial judge for refusing a

new trial because of such errors committed by him, or oth-

er^vise occurring in the progress of the case, as they may

be waived or corrected before verdict. Therefore, before

the jurisdiction of this court can be invoked and refief had

on account of errors of the second class, they must be con-

sidered and acted upon by the trial judge in the disposi-

tion of a motion made by the losing party to set aside the

verdict of the jury and allow him a new trial. Another

reason why all errors which may affect the integrity of the

verdict should be brought to the attention of the trial

judge in a motion for a new trial is that he may have an

opportunity to correct them, if necessary, by granting a

new trial, and thus save the inconvenience, delay, and ex-

pense attending appellate proceedings.

**********

We are now to determine whether or not the grounds
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upon which these assignments of error are predicated are

sufficiently set out in the motion for a new trial. It seems

to be well settled that the statement of the grounds in the

motion must be sufficient to direct the attention of the court

and opposing counsel to the error or irregularity relied

upon to vitiate the verdict.

In the work on Pleading & Practice last quoted from, it

is further said: ^'The general rule is that the grounds (for

a new trial) must be stated so specifically as to direct the

attention of the court and opposing counsel to the precise

error complained of. A mere statement of the grounds,

without further specifications, will therefore be insufficient.

The purpose of the rule is to direct the attention of the

trial judge to the alleged erroneous rulings, and present to

tlie appellate court the precise question involved. The

safest course is to assign each error with the same particu-

larity of an assignment of error in appeal. * * * But

this is not the practice in most of the States; the courts

holding that it is sufficient merely to assign error in giv-

ing: a certain construction or admitting certain e\'idence,

without stating why such ruling was erroneous. If the

grounds for a new trial are not stated in the motion, it may

be overruled by the court, and disregarded on appeal. All

errors known at the time of filing the motion must be in-
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which are not a part of the re ord without a bill of exceptions, but upon the action of the trial ju ge for refu ing a
n ew trial becau e of such error committ l by him or other wise occurring in the progre s of the ca e a they may
be waived or corrected before verdict. Ther fore before
the juri diction of thi court can be invok d and r lief had
on account of error of the
ond cla
they mu t be considered and a ted upon by the trial jud()'e in the di position of a motion made by the lo ing I arty to et a ide the
verdict of the jury and allow him a new trial.
Another
reason why all error wli h may affect the integrit. of th
verdict hould be brought to the attention of the trial
judge in a motion for a new trial i that he may have an
opportunity to correct them if nece ary by ()'ranting a
new trial and thus ave the inconYenience delay, and expense attending appellate proceedings.
* * * * * * * * * *
We are now to determine whether or not the grounds
upon which the e a ignment of error are predicated are
sufficiently et out in the motion for a new trial. It seems
to be well ettled that the tatement of the ground in the
motion mu t be ufficient to direct the attention of the court
and oppo in conn el to the error or irregularity relied
upon to vitiate the verdict.
In the work on Pleading & Pra tice la t quoted from, it
is further aid: "The general rule i that the grounds (for
a new trial) must be stated o e ifically a to direct the
attention of th court and oppo ing coun el to the preci. e
error complained of. A mere tatement of th ()'round
without further ecification , will ther fore be in ufficient.
rrh purpo e of the rule i to direct the attention of the
trial jud()' to th alleg d erron ou rulings and pr ent to
the np llat court the r i e que tion invol ed.
The
. afe._ t cour i to a. i ·n ach error with the am parti u]Rrity f an a .. i:--.n m nt of rror in a peal. * * * But
thi. i not th practi e in o t of th
tate · th •Court
holding that it i. 1ffi ient m relv. to a "' i
err r in ()'iving a c rtain n. tru ti n or admittin<Y ertain vid nee
without tatin()' by . twh ruling wa. rron u . If the
µ:round f r an w trial ar not . tated in th m ti n, i may
ov rruled by th
urt, and di r r-ar
n app al.
11
errors known at t
ti
f filin()' the motion mu t be in~
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eluded therein, or the errors omitted will be deemed to have

been waived." Ency. of Plead. & Prac., vol. 14, pp. 882,

883.

Mr. Elliott, in his work above cited (volume 2, section

991),^ says: "The law presumes the verdict to be correct.

Hence on a motion for a new trial the party must set forth

the grounds upon which he intends to rely, or the objec-

tions will be considered as waived. The motion should be

in writing, and should specify with reasonable certainty

all the rulings deemed to be erroneous. It is to be kept in

mind that it is the objections specified in a motion, and

those only, that are brought up for review, for all others

properly arising on a motion for a new trial are deemed to

be waived. It is on a motion — as it is written — that the

appellate court acts, for, as to objections not properly pre-

sented, the presumption is in favor of the regularity and

legality of the rulings of the trial court. It is the business

of the party who takes exceptions to show that the decision
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is wrong. It is not sufficient that he succeeds in mystify-

ing it by adopting language which subjects the judge to the

suspicion that he did not understand the safest ground on

which to place it. In order to show that rulings are

wrong it must appear that they were probably injurious to

the party who makes complaint, since a mere harmless er-

ror will not warrant a reversal."

The text in both of these works, which are of the highest

authority, is supported by numerous decisions of other

States, many of which are predicated upon the general

rules of practice of courts of law.

"We are of the opinion that the grounds set out in the mo-

tion should be as specific and certain as the nature of the

error complained of will permit. Thus, if the error con-

sists in the admission or rejection of evidence, the evidence

admitted or rejected should be stated. If it be for affir-

mative error in the charge, or for failure to give an in-

struction properly and reasonably presented, it should set

out the portion of the charge complained of, or the instruc-

tion refused, or otherwise definitely identify the instruc-

tion. If it be for misconduct of the opposite party or that

of the jury, the facts constituting it should be stated. This

was not done in this case. The testimony admitted and

1 Elliott on General Practice.
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eluded therein, or the errors omitted will be deemed to have
been waived." Ency. of Plead. & Prac., vol. 14, pp. 882,
883.
Mr. Elliott, in his work above cited (volume 2, section
991) ,1 says: "The law presumes the verdict to be correct.
Hence on a motion for a new trial the party must set forth
the grounds upon which he intends to rely, or the objections will be ieonsidered as waived. The motion should be
in writing, and should specify with reasonable certainty
all the rulings deemed to be erroneous. It is to be kept in
mind that it is the objections specified in a motion, and
those only, that are brought up for review, for all others
properly arising on a motion for a new trial are deemed to
be waived. It is on a motion-as it is written-that the
appellate court acts, for, as to objections not properly presented, the presumption is in favor of the regularity and
legality of the rulings of the trial court. . It is the business
of the party who takes exceptions to show that the decision
is wrong. It is not sufficient that he succeeds in mystifying it by adopting language which subjects the judge to the
suspicion that he did not understand the safest ground on
whi1ch to place it.
In order to show that rulings are
wrong it must appear that they were probably injurious to
the party who makes complaint, since a mere harmless error will not warrant a reversal.''
The text in both of these works, which are of the highest
authority, is supported by numerous decisions of other
States, many of which are predicated upon the general
rules of practice of courts of law.
We are of the opinion that the grounds set out in the motion hould be as specific and certain as the nature of the
error complained of will permit.
Thus, if the error consi ts in the admis ion or r jection of evidence, the evidence
admitted or rej cted should be stated. If it be for affirmativ error in the charge, or for failure to gjve an intru tion roperly and rea onably pres nt d, it should set
o 1t th portion of the ieharo-e omplained of, or the instruction r fu . d or otherwis definit ly id ntify the instruction. If it b f r misconduct of the opposite party or that
of th jury the fa ts constituting it , hould be stated. This
wa. not don in thi case.
The testimony admitted and
1

Elliott on General Practice.
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that excluded is not stated — not even the name of the wit-

ness given — and the instructions requested are not set out

or sufficiently identified.

We do not think that it is necessary to state why the rul-

ing complained of is erroneous as fully and with all the

strictness required in assignments of error in this court,

hut a fair statement of the error complained of, sufficient

to direct the attention of the court and the prevailing pariy

to it, is all that is required.

Nor was it necessary for the successful party in the court

lielow to there object to the form of the motion, because

rules of this character are made in the interest of the pub-

lic, and for the purpose of enabling the courts to speedily

and correctly dispose of the cases pending in them, and

they cannot be waived by litigants.

We are of the opinion that no sufficient grounds for a

new trial because of the admission of incompetent or rejec-

tion of competent testimony, or a failure to give in charge
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to the jury instructions submitted by the defendant, were

stated in the motion made by it in the circuit court, and

that there is therefore nothing upon which these assign-

ments of error on the action of the trial judge in refusing

to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial can be predi-

cated ; and, under the practice of his court, in cases coming

from those courts having rules like that in this record, not

to consider the assignments of error upon any ground not

appearing in the motion for a new trial, these assignments

of error are insufficient, and must be overruled.

The other assignments of error filed by the plaintiff in

error were disposed of in an oral opinion.

KING V. GILSON.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1907,

206 Missouri, 264.

W()()l)S0^^ J. * * *

The motion for a new trial was filed on March 27, 1906,
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lhat ex luded i not ·tat d-not Y n th name f the witue · giv n-an<l the in tru ·tion r <J.U t <l ar n t t out
r uffidently identified.
We do not think that i i ne e ar~ to tat why the ruling complained of is erron ou a fully an 1 with all the
·trictness requir d in a ignm nt of error in thi court,
J ut a fair
tatement of the error complain d of ufficient
to direct the attention of the court and the prevailing pany
to it, is all that i required.
Nor was it nece ary for the ucce ful party in the court
h low to there object to the form of the motion becau e
rules of this char ter are made in the intere t of the public, and for the purpose of enabling the ourt to peedily
and correctly di po e of the ca es pending in them and
they cannot be wai ed by litigants.
We are of the opinion that no sufficient ground for a
new trial becau e of the admis ion of incompetent or rejection of competent testimony or a failure to give in charge
to the jury in truction ubmitted by the defendant, were
. tated in the motion made by it in the circuit court, and
that there i therefore nothin upon whi h th e a ignment of error on the action of the trial judge in refu ing
to set a ide the verdict and grant a new trial can be prediated; and under the practice of hi court in ca e coming
from tho e nrt having rules like that in thi re ord, not
to con ider tbe a ignments of error upon any ground not
appearing in tbe motion for a new trial the e a ignments
of rror are in uffici nt and mu t be overruled.
Th other a. ignm nt of error filed by the plaintiff in
error were di po ed of in an oral opinion.
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and one of the grounds assigned therefor is in words as

follows :

**11. Because, since the trial of this cause, the defend-

ants have discovered new and important evidence material

to the issues submitted to the jury, which evidence is not

cumulative in character and which evidence was unknown

to defendants at the time of the trial.''

On the same daj^ the court granted defendants ten days

in which to tile affidavits in support of motion for new

trial; and within that time they filed the affidavits of Dr.

Waterhouse, Arthur Marshall, Edward Unwin and J. H.

Orr, one of the attorneys for the defendants, the three lat-

ter stating what diligence they had used in trying to dis-

cover all the witnesses and evidence in the case.

The plaintitfs contend that the action of the court in

granting a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evi-

dence was erroneous.

The motion for new trial does not disclose or set out the
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newly-discovered evidence or its nature, nor does it give

the names or addresses of the witnesses by whom the new-

ly-discovered evidence was to be given, nor was there any

•affidavit filed with the motion.

' The motion simply states that, ''since the trial of this

cause, the defendants have discovered new and important

evidence material to the issues submitted to the jury, which

evidence is not cumulative in character, and which evi-

dence was unknown to the defendants at the time of the

trial."

This question has been before this court repeatedly, and

there is nothing new to be said upon it.

In the case of State v. David, 159 Mo. 1. c. 535, this court

said: ''A new trial was also asked upon the ground of

newly-discovered evidence, but the evidence was not set

out in the motion. The mere fact, asserted in the motion,

that the newly-discovered evidence was material, did not

prove it to be so. It should have been set out in order

that the court might pass upon its materiality. For these

reasons, besides others unnecessary to mention, this ques-

tion cannot be considered by this court."

And in the case of State v. Welsor, 117 Mo. 1. c. 582, the

laAV applicable to this question was stated in the following

language: "In the case of State v. Ray, 53 Mo. 349, Judge
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and one of the grounds assigned therefor is in words as
follows:
"11. Because, since the trial of this cause, the defendants have discovered new and important evidence material
to the issues submitted to the jury, which evidence is not
cumulative in character and which evidence was unknown ·
to defendants at the time of the tria 1. ''
On the same day the court granted defendants ten days
in which to file affidavits in support of motion for new
trial; and within that time they filed the affidavits of Dr.
Waterhouse, Arthur Marshall, Edward Unwin and J. H.
Orr, one of the attorneys for the defendants, the three latter stating what diligence they had used in trying to discover all the witnesses and evidence in the case.
The plaintiffs contend that the action of the court in
granting a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence was erroneous.
The motion for new trial does not disclose or set out the
newly-discovered evidence or its nature, nor does it give
the names or addresses of the witnesses by whom the newly-dis1covered evidence was to be given, nor was there any
'1 lfidavit filed with the motion.
I The motion simply states that, "since the trial of this
cause, the defendants have discover d new and important
evidence material to the issues submitted to the jury, which
evidence is not cumulative in character, and which evidence was unknown to the defendants at the time of the
trial.''
This question has been before this court repeatedly, and
there is nothing new to be said upon it.
In the case of State v. David, 159 Mo. 1. c. 535, this 1c ourt
aid: ''A new trial was also asked upon the ground of
n wlY-discovered evidence, but the evidence was not set
ut i'n the motjon. The mere fact, a serted in the motion,
that th n wly-di cov red evidence was material did not
pro
it to be o. It should have been s t out in order
th t th onrt m]O'ht pa s upon its materiality. For these
r a. ons, b sid . oth r unne sary to mention, this questi n rcinnot b onsiC!rred by thi. court.''
And in th ra. of State v. TV elsor, lJ 7 M . 1. . 582, the
]aw a1 plj ahl to this CJU0Rtion WaR stat d in the following
languacr : "In th ca of State v. Ray, 53 Mo. 349, Judge
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Sherwood, in delivering the opinion of the court, says :

*In the State v. McLaughlin, 27 Mo. Ill, this court adopts,

with most cordial approval, the rules as laid down in

Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, by Judge Lumpkin, in respect to

new trials, on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, as

follows: ''The application must show, first, that the evi-

dence has come to his knowledge since the trial; second,

that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it

did not come sooner; third, that it is so material that it

would probably produce a different result if the new trial

were granted; fourth, that it is not cumulative; fifth, that

the affidavit of the"witness, himself, should be produced, or

its absence accounted for; sixth, that the object of the tes-

timony is not merely to impeach the character or credit of

a witness." ' See, also, to the same eifect, State v. Rock-

ett, 87 Mo. 666 ; State v. Butler, 67 Mo. 63 ; State v. Carr,

1 Fost. (N. H.) 166."

In the case at bar, the affidavits were not filed in sup-
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port of and in proof of the newly-discovered evidence

stated in the motion for a new trial, because, for the very

obvious reason, there was no such evidence stated therein ;

but the object and purpose in filing them was to bring the

evidence itself and not the proof thereof to the attention of

the court. The law requires such evidence to be set out

in the motion; and the mere fact that it is so stated does

not prove it to be true, and for that reason its truthfulness

is required to be established by affidavits. But here the

defendants are trying to make the affidavits serve a two-

fold purpose; first, a ground for a new trial, and, second,

proof of the statements constituting that ground. This

cannot be done. The motion for a new trial must be filed

within four days after the trial, and the court has no power

to extend the time for filing it. If the evidence is set out

in the motion, then this court has repeatedly held that the

trial court may give the parties time in which to file affi-

davits in support thereof.

The defendants state in their motion that they have dis-

covered new evidence; that it was material to the issues;

that it was not cumulative, and that if admitted in evidence

probably a different result would be reached if a new trial

was granted. If tliey knew such evidence existed at the

time the motivon wfis written, why did they not incorporate

Sherwood, in delivering the opinion of the court, say :
'In the tate v . McLaughlin, 27 1'1:0. 111, this court adopt
with mo t cordial approval, the rule a laid down in
Berry v. State 10 Ga. 511, by Judge Lumpkin, in re pect to
new trial , on the ground of newly-di covered evidence, a.
follows: ''The application mu t how, first that the evidence has come to hi knowledge since the trial; second,
that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it
did not come sooner; third, that it is so material that it
would probably produce a different re ult if the new trial
were granted; fourth, that it is not cumulative; fifth, that
the affidavit of the ·witness, him elf, should be produced, or
its absence accounted for; ixth, that the object of the testimony is not merely to impeach the character or credit of
a witness.'' ' See, also, to the same effect, State v . Rockett, 87 Mo. 666; State v. B utler, 67 Mo. 63; State v . Carr,
1 Fost. (N. H.) 166."
In the ca e at bar, the affidavits were not filed in support of and in proof of the newly-discovered evidence
tated in the motion for a new trial, becau e, for the very
obvious rea on, there wa no u h evidence stated therein;
but the object and purpose in filing them wa to bring the
evidence itself and not the proof thereof to the attention of
the court.
The law requires uch evidence to be set out
in the motion; and the mere fact that it is o tated does
not prove it to be true, and for that reason its truthfulness
is required to be e tabli hed by affidavit . But here the
defendant ., are trying to make the affidavit er e a twofold pur o e; :5rst a ground for a new trial and, second
proof of ~he tatement con tituting that ground.
Thi
cannot be done. The motion for a new trial mu t be filed
within fonr cla. <:; after th trial and the court has no power
to extend the time for filing it. If the eYidence i et out
in the motion, tl1en tbi ourt ha repeated!. held that the
trial court may o·fre th parties time in which to :file affidaYit in "Ul I oTt ther of.
The defendant tat in th ir otion that th y haYe di over d n w e' iden e : that it wa. mat rial to the i ues;
that it wa.· not cumulative and that if admitted in evid nee
probably a iff0r nt r ult w uld be r a hed if a n w trial
wa granted.
If th y lmew . u h eYi nc xi. t d at the
time the motion w~. wri tt n, why did they not incorporate
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it into the motion and later file the affidavits in support

thereof?

If such a practice as is contended for in this case was

permissible, it would enable the parties to supplement and

add to their motion for a new trial after the expiration of

the four days allowed for filing it, and thereby open the

door to temptation and fraudulent conduct in bolstering

up motions for new trials.

[Affirmed on other grounds.]

RUTHERFORD V. TALENT.

Supreme Court of Montana Territory. 1887,

6 Montana, 112.

Wade, C. J.

TRIAL PRACTICE
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it into the motion and later file the affidavits in support
thereof?
If such a practice as is contended for in this case was
permissible, it would enable the parties to supplement and
add to their motion for a new trial after the expiration of
the four days allowed for filing it, and thereby open the
door to temptation and fraudulent conduct in bolstering
up motions for new trials.
* * * * * * * * * *
[Affirmed on other grounds.]

This is a motion to dismiss the appeal for the reason that

no sufficient notice of motion for a new trial was given, and

that no motion for a new trial was filed.

The Code, section 287, provides that the party intending

to move for a new trial must file with the clerk, and serve
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upon the adverse party, a notice of his intention, designat-

ing the grounds upon which the motion will be made, and

RUTHERFORD V. TALENT.

whether the same will be made upon affidavits, minutes of

the court, bill of exceptions, or a statement of the case.^

1 Various methods have been devised by which the data necessary for the

Supreme Court of Montana T erritory.

1887.

determination of a motion for a new trial may be presented to the court.

1. The minutes of the court may be ui^ed. These being deemed already in

6 Montana, 112.

existence and before the court, a party moving upon them is required to pre-

pare no abstract or statement of the proceedings in the case, upon which to

base his claim for relief.

"The term 'minutes of the court,' as used in subdivision 4, § 5090, Comp.

Laws, seems to have no well-defined legal meaning, but is evidently used in

that section a;i referring to such minutes as the judge may make of the evi-

dence, and to his recollection of the same, and is evidently intended to re-

lieve a partj from the expense and labor of preparing a statement or bill of

exceptions. To require the party moving for a new trial upon the minutes

of the court to procure a transcript of the stenographer's notes, and cause

the same to be filed, would, in effect, impose upon him a greater burden than

preparing a bill of exceptions or statement." Bistad v. Shanklin, 11 S. D. 1.

2. It muy he mnde upon a hill of (Xeeptions or statement of the case.

By this means a statement of the evidence and other proceedings had upon

the trial, bo far as material to the questions raised by the motion, is written

WADE,

c.

J.

This is a motion to dismiss the appeal for the reason that
no sufficient noti ce of motion for a new trial was given, and
that no motion for a new trial was filed.
The Code, section 287, provides that the party intending
to move for a new trial must file with the clerk, and serve
upon the adverse party, a notice of his intention, designating the grounds upon which the motion will be made, and
whether the same will be made upon affidavits, minutes of
the court, bill of exceptions, or a statement of the case. 1
1

1 Various methods have been devised by which the data necessary for the
determination of a motion for a new trial may be presented to the court.
1. The miniites of the court may be used. These being deemed already in
exi tence and before the court, a party moving upon them is required to prepare no abstract or statement of the proceedings in the case, upon which to
base bis claim for relief.
''The term 'minutes of the court,' as used in subdivision 4, § 5090, Comp.
Laws, seemb to have no well-defined legal meaning, but is evidently used in
that section a~ referring to such minutes as the judge may make of the evidence, and to his recollection of the same, and is evidently intended to relieve a part;y from the exreni::e and labor of preparing a statement or bill of
xc ptions.
To requ ire the party moving for a new trial 1pon the min.utes
of. the court to procure a transcript of the stenographer' notes, and cause
the ame to be filed, would, in effect, impoi:;e upon him a gr ateT burden than
pTeparing a bill of xceptions or stat ment. '' Di stad v. Shanklin, 11 S. D. 1.
2. It muy be made upon a bill of ex e71tior1s or statement of the case.
By this means a stat m nt of the evidence and other pro eedings had upon
the trial, 110 far as material to the qu stions raised by the motion, is written

:Sec. 13]
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The notice of motion was as follows :

''Said motion will be made and based upon the follow-

ing grounds:

"1. That the findings or decision of the court is against

the law and the evidence.

"2. Errors of law occurring at the trial, and then and

there duly excepted to by the defendant, to wit : The court

erred in sustaining plaintiff's motion to strike out the evi-

dence of Patrick Talent, the defendant, including the let-

ters of defendant to plaintiff, and plaintiff's letters to de-

fendant ; the court erred in refusing to allow defendant to

prove that he was the trustee of the property mentioned in

the deeds from Adam Rutherford to defendant and from

defendant to plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was the sole

beneficiary of said property. Said motion will be made

and based upon the minutes of the court, the statement of

the case, and bill of exceptions."

There was a statement of the case, and it was stipulated
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by the attorneys of the respective parties that the state-

ment might be used on the motion for a new trial.

If this notice was defective in not making known whether

the motion for a new trial would be made upon affidavits,

minutes of the court, bill of exceptions, or statement of the

'Case, as required by the statute, this stipulation that the

statement of the case might be used on the hearing of such

motion would cure the defect.

The office of the notice is to inform the adverse party of

the grounds of the motion, and the errors relied on for ob-

taining a new trial. The notice in question performs that

office. It sufficiently designates the errors complained

of, and the adverse party, by his own agreement, has stip-

ulated that the statement of the case might be used upon

the consideration of the questions raised by the motion for

a new trial. He is not, therefore, in a situation to com-

plain that the notice does not give him all the information

that the law provides that he shall have.

out at larpe, ami Fettled as correct by the attorneyp or the court, and there-

upon such statement becomes the exclusive source of information as to Tvhat

took place upon the trial, and the sole foundation for the motion so far as it

relates to the trial itself.

3. It may he made vpnn affidavits. This method is to be employed when

matters outside the proceedingrs at the trial are to be brought to the atten-

ion of the court as a basis for the relief asked. It is commonly used in cou-

paction with, and supplementary to, the other two methods.

NEW TRIALS
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The notice of motion was as follows:
''Said motion will be made and based upon the following grounds:
'1. That the :finding or decision of the court is against
the law and the evidence.
'' 2. Errors of law occurring at the trial, and then and
there duly excepted to by the defendant, to wit : The court
erred in su taininO' plaintiff's motion to strike out the evidence of Patrick Talent, the defendant including the letters of defendant to plaintiff, and plaintiff's letters to defendant; the court erred in refu ing to allow defendant to
prove that he was the tru tee of the property m ntioned in
the deeds from Adam Rutherford to defendant and from
defendant to plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was the sole
beneficiary of aid property.
Said motion will be made
and ba ed upon the minl1tes of the court, the tatement of
the case, and bill of exceptions. ''
There was a statement of the case, and it wa, tipulated
by the attorne
of the re pective parties that the statement might be used on the motion for a new trial.
If this notice was defective in not making known whether
the motion for a n w trial would be made upon affidavits
minutes of the court bill of exception or tatement of the
1ca e as required by the statute thi tipulation that the
statement of the ca e might be u ed on the hearing of such
motion would cure the defect.
The office of the notice is to inform the adv r e party of
the ()'rounds of the motion, and the error relied on for obtaining a new trial. The notice in question perform that
offi e.
It ufficiently designates the error complained
of, and the adverse party, by his own ao-r ment ha tipulated that the tat ment of the case might be u ed upon
the on ideration of the que tion rai ed by th motion for
a new trial.
H i not, ther fore in a ituation to complain that th noti
e not give him all the information
that the law pro\ ide that he hall have.
T

out at large, anil Fett] ii a correct . the attorneys or the court, and thereupon such tatement become the e. c1u ive sourc of information a to what
took place upon th trial and the . ole foundation for the motion o far a it
relates to the trial itFelf.
. It may be made 11pnn affida,vit, .
Thi m tbod i to e mpJo. tl when
matters out ide the pro ding. at th trial are to be brought to the attenion of the court a a basi for tbe relief aFkeil.
It i commonly u cl in con·
peetion with, and supplementary to, the other two methods.
·
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If the notice designates the grounds npon which tlie mo-

tion for a new trial can be based, it is not necessary to

make a formal, written motion, repeating the errors as-

signed in the notice.

A motion is an application for an order. If this notice

is what the law requires, and has been duly served on the

adverse party, no formal, written application, in addition

to the notice, is necessary in order to bring the motion for

a new trial to a hearing.

The notice is the only written motion required by the

statute, and we know of no rule of court requiring such

motion to be in writing.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.

Section 14. Affidavits.

VOSE V. MAYO.

United States Circuit Court for the District of

Maine. 1871.

3 Clifford, 484.

TRIAL PRACTICE
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If the notice designates the grounds upon whi.ch the motion for a new trial can be based, it is not necessary to
make a formal, written motion, repeating the errors assigned in the notice.
A motion is an application for an order. If this notice
is what the law requires, and has been duly served on the
adverse party, no formal, written application, in addition
to the notice, is necessary in order to bring the motion for
a new trial to a hearing.
The notice is the only written motion required by the
statute, and we know of no rule of court requiring such
motion to be in writing.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.
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Clifford, Circuit Justice.

Power to set aside a verdict before judgment and grant

a new trial is vested in the circuit courts "in cases where

there has been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new

trials have usually been granted in the courts of law," and

the correct mode of applying to the court for the exercise

of that power is by a motion for new trial, which, under the

rules of the circuit 'COurt in this circuit, must be made in

SECTION 14.

AFFIDAVITS.

writing, and must, unless the time is enlarged by leave of

the court, be filed within two days after the verdict. Such

VOSE V. MAYO.

a motion must assign the reasons for the application, and

when the motiou is grounded on facts not within the knowl-

edge of the providing justice, and not appearing in his min-

utes, it must be verified by affidavit, unless the requirement

United States Circuit Court for the District of
Maine.
1871.

is waivod by the opposite party. No affidavit of merits,

however, is required wlicn the motion is properly addressed

3 Clifford, 484.

to the minutes of the presiding justice, as wliere the mo-

tion is to set aside the verdict for error of ruling in admit-

CLIFFORD, Circuit J usti.ce.
Power to set aside a verdict before judgment and grant
a new trial is vested in the circuit courts ''in cases where
there has been a trial by jury, for r a ons for which new
trials have usually been granted in the courts of law,'' and
th correct mode of applying to the court for the exercise
of that power is by a motion for n w trial, which, under the
rul s of the circuit 1court in this circuit, must be made in
writino-, an must, unle the time is enlarged by leave of
th ourt,
filed within two d y aft r the verdict. Such
a motion mu. t a ign the r a on for th appli ation, and
wh the m tion i rounded on fact not within th knowledg of th pr . i ino- ju ti , and not a p arino- in his minut , it mu t
v rifi d by affidavit, 1nl
the requirement
i. waiv d hy th o
ite art. . No affidavit of merits,
h
v r, i. r uir 1 wh nth moti n is properl addressed
to th minut s f th pr . iding ju ti e, as wh re the moti is to t asid the v rdict f r rror of ruling in admit1

ec. 14]
Sec. 14] New Trials 801

ting or rejecting evidence, or for refusing to instruct the

jury as requested, or for misdirection, or because the ver-

dict is against law, or against the evidence or the weight

of the evidence, as the theory of the motion in all sucli

cases is, that all the matters of fact alleged in the motion

are within the knowledge of the presiding justice, or that

they may be verified by reference to his minutes taken at

the trial. Where the motion is for new trial on account

of newly discovered evidence, or where the motion is

grounded on the charge that tlie oj^posite party or the jury

jwere guilty of misconduct in respe^ct to the trial, the rule is

different, as the motion in such cases presents a prelimi-

nary question whether the facts and circumstances dis-

closed are such as to make it the duty of the court to order

notice to the opposite party, and to direct the mode in

which the proofs shall be taken, and in all such 'Cases the

motion must be in writing, and must, unless the require-

ment is waived, be supported bv affidavit. Johnson v.
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Root (Case No. 7, 409); Hill. New Trials, 393, sec. 35;

Macy V. De Wolf (Case No. 8, 933).

DEAPEE V. TAYLOE.

Supreme Court of Nebraska. 1899.

58 Nebraska, 787.

Sullivan, J.

**********

Immediately after the court announced its findings and

rendered its decree Draper and King, each for himself,

filed a motion for a new trial based in part on a claim of

s1

NEW 'rRIALS

ting or rejecting evidence, or for refusing to instruct the
jury as reque ted, or for misdirection, or because the verdiict is again t law, or against the evidence or the weight
of the evidence, as the theory of the motion in all such
cases is, that all the matters of fact alleged in the motion
are within the knowledge of the presiding ju ·tice, or that
they may be verified by reference to his minutes taken at
the trial.
Where the motion is for new trial on account
of newly di covered evidence, or where the motion i
oTounded on the charge that the op Jo ite arty or the jury
were guilty of mi. conduct in respe>Ct to the trial, the rule is
different, as the motion in such cases presents a preliminary question whether the facts and circumstances di closed are such as to make it the duty of the court to order
notice to the opposite part. , and to direct the mode in
which the proofs sha 11 be taken and in all such •Cases the
motion must be in writing, and mu t unless the requirement is waived, be supported by affidavit.
Johnson v.
Root (Case No. 7, 409); Hill. New Trials, 393, sec. 35;
Macy v. De Wolf (Case No. 8, 933).

* * * * * * * * * •

newly-discovered evidence. Each motion was supported

by the affidavit of the attorney representing the parties

and was in substance the same as the affidavit previously

filed in support of the motion to re-open the 'Cause. Both

motions were overruled, and Draper assigns this action of

the court for error. His contention is that he made a

showing of newly-discovered evidence which ought to have

T. p.— 51"

DRAPER V. TAYLOR.
Supreme Court of Nebraska.

1899.

58 Nebraska, 787.
SULLIVAN,

J.

* * * * * * • * * *
Immediately after the court announced it findinO' and
rendered its d cree Draper and King, each for him elf
filed a motion for a new trial ba ed in part on a claim of
newly-di covered e idence.
Ea h motion wa upporte
by th affidavit of th attorney repre ntin · the arti
and wa in ub tance the am a th affida it previou ly
filed in upport of the motion to r -op n th •Cau e. Both
motion w re ov rrul d and Dra er a io·n thi a tion of
th court for rr r.
Hi
nt ntion i._ that h made a
howinO' of newly-discovered eviden e which ought to have
T. P.-51 -
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procured for him a new trial of the issue. Without de-

ciding whether there was a sufficient showing of diligence,

and without discussing the character of the new evidence

and its probable influence as a factor in another trial, we

think the district court made no mistake in refusing to va-

cate its decree. It^is our understanding of the rule that

not only must counsel_uot have kuown of the evidence upon

which the application is based, but the applicant himself

must have been ignorant of its existence. To be sure the

affidavit states that ''neither defendants nor their counsel,

by reason of the nature of the evidence, * * * were

able sooner to discover said evidence," and "because

knowledge of the existence thereof could be but very in-

definitely known to any of the parties to the action except

the plaintiff." No affidavit was filed by Draper or King,

and how their attorney could know that they were ignorant

of the facts set out in his affidavit is something we are not

quite able to comprehend. At best his statement in re-

gard to the matter is the merest hearsay. (14 Ency. PI.
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procured for him a new trial of the issue.
Without deciding whether there was a sufficient showing of diligence,
and without discussing the character of the new evidence
and its probable influence as a f aietor in another trial, we
think the district court made no mistake in refusing to vacate its decree. It is our understanding of the rule that
not only must counsel not ave known of the evidence upon
which the application is based, but the applicant himself
must have been ignorant of its existence. To be sure the
affidavit states that ''neither def end ants nor their counsel,
by reason of the nature of the evidence, * * * were
able sooner to discover said evidence," and "because
knowledge of the existence thereof could be but very indefinitely known to any of the partie to the action except
the plaintiff.'' No affidavit was filed by Draper or King,
and how their attorney could know that they were ignorant
of the facts set out in his affidavit is something we are not
quite able to comprehend.
At best his statement in regard to the matter is the merest hearsay.
(14 Ency. Pl.
& Pr. 823; Hilliard, New Trials (2d ed.) 499; State v. J(ellennan, 14 Kan. 135; Broat v . Moor, 44 Minn. 468; State v.
Campbell, 115 Mo. 391.) There should also have been preent~d in support of the motion the affidavit of the new witness stQ;,ting the facts to which he would testify, or there
should nave been a satisfactory reason given for not obtaining such affidavit. (Hand v . Langland, 67 Ia. 185;
Quinn v . State, 123 Ind. 59; McL eod v. Shelly Mfg. Co.,
108 Ala. 81; 14 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 825).

802 Trial Peactice ' [Chap. 17

& Pr. 823; Hilliard, New Trials (2d ed.) 499; State v. Kel-

lerman, 14 Kan. 135 ; Broat v. Moor, 4:4: Minn. 468 ; State v.

Campbell, 115 Mo. 391.) There should also have been pre-

sented in support of the motion the affidavit of the new wit-

ness stilting the facts to which he would testify, or there

should liave been a satisfactory reason given for not ob-

.taining such affidavit. {Hand v. Langland, 67 la. 185;

Quinn v. State, 123 Ind. 59 ; McLeod v. Shelly Mfg. Co.,

108 Ala. 81; 14 Ency. PI. & Pr. 825).
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s - r PHILLIPS V. ETIODE ISLAND COMPANY.

JL ^Q Aij^/Vc Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 1910.

^ V\^\ 32 Rhode Island, 16.

JOHNSOI^, J.

This is an action of the case, brought by Samuel Phil-

lips against The Rhode Island Company, to recover dam-

ages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained

* * * * * * * * * *

QJ' Jl_

~~
~

,~°'·'

PHILLIPS V. RHODE ISLAND COMPANY.
Supr eme Court of Rhode Island.

1910.

32 Rhode Island, 16.

JOHNSON, J.

This is an a tjon of tbe case, brought by Samuel Phillips ag in. t The Rho e I , land Company, to recover damg s for per. onal injuri s alleged to have been sustained

Sec. 14]
Sec. 14] New Teials 803

through the negligence of the defendant company in the

operation of one of its street cars.

On April 21st, 1905, the plaintiff was driving a heavy

wagon, loaded with oats, drawn by one horse, and was pro-

ceeding in an easterly direction from Promenade street

across Canal street into Steeple street, in the city of Provi-

dence. Canal street running north and south intersects

Steeple street running east and west, and Promenade street

runs into Canal street nearly opposite Steeple street. The

defendant company had a single track running through

Steeple street into Canal street, which track, just before

reaching the intersection with Canal street, curved in a

southerly direction towards the corner of Steeple and

Canal streets and extended across Canal street. At the

time in question the plaintiff's wagon, going in an easterly

direction, had just crossed the tracks in Canal street — fif-

teen or twenty feet westerly from the crosswalk at the foot

of Steeple street — in order to proceed easterly on the
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^,outherly side of Steeple street. Near the crosswalk on

Steeple street his wagon came in contact with a car of the

defendant company which came down Steeple street to-

wards Canal street, and the plaintiff was thrown to the

ground and sustained the injuries complained of. The

case was tried in the Superior Court with a jury on th€

21st, 24th, and 25th days of January, 1910, and a verdict

was rendered for the plaintiff in the sum of twenty-five

hundred dollars. Thereupon the defendant moved for a

new trial, alleging as grounds therefor:

Fourth : That certain members of the jury before whom

said cause was tried were guilty of misconduct in this, that

during the progress of said trial, and without the consent

of the court, without the knowledge and consent of the at-

torneys for the defendant, did take an unauthorized view

of the premises where the accident occurred, concerning

which said action was brought and prosecuted.

Fifth : That certain members of said jury during the

progress of said trial did take an unauthorized view of the

premises where the accident occurred, concerning which

said action was brought and prosecuted, without the knowl-

edge and consent of the defendant, and under such circum-

NEW TRIALS
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through the negligence of the defendant company in the
operation of one of its street cars.
On April 21st, 1905, the plaintiff was driving a heavy
wagon, loaded with oats, drawn by one horse, and was proeeding in an easterly direction from Promenade street
across Canal street into Steeple street, in the city of Providence.
Canal street running north and south intersects
Steeple street running east and west, and Promenade street
runs into Canal street nearly opposite Steeple street. The
defendant company had a single track running through
Steeple street into Canal street, whi.ch track, just before
reaching the intersection with Canal street, curved in a
southerly direction towards the corner of Steeple and
Canal streets and extended across Canal street.
At the
time in que tion the plaintiff's wagon, going in an easterly
direction, had just crossed the tracks in Canal street-fifteen or twenty feet westerly from the crosswalk at the foot
of Steeple street-in order to proceed easterly on the
. outherly side of Steeple street.
Near the crosswalk on
Steeple street his wagon came in contact with a •Car of the
defendant company which came down Steeple street towards Canal street, and the plaintiff was thrown to the
Tound and sustained the injuries complained of.
The
case was tried in the Superior Court with a jury on th<!
21st, 24th, and 25th days of January, 1910, and a verdict
was rendered for the plaintiff in the sum of twenty-five
hundred dollars.
Thereupon the defendant moved for a
new trial, alleging as grounds therefor:

* * * * * * * * * *
Fourth : That certain members of the jury before whom
aid cau e wa tried were guilty of misconduct in this, that
during the proO'ress of said trial, and without the consent
of the court, without the knowledge and consent of the attornevs for the defendant did take an unauthorized view
of th~ premi e wb r the accident occurred concerning
whi h aid action wa brought and pro uted.
Fifth:
That certain member of aid jury during the
progre of id trial did tak an unauthorized vi w of the
prem1
wh r th a id nt o urr d
ncernino· which
without the knowl. aid action wa rouO'ht and I ro cut
dge and cons nt of the d fendant, and under uch circum-
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stances as to be calculated to lead a jury into error in the

determination of said case.

Certain affidavits were filed by the defendant in sup-

port of said motion. The defendant's motion for a new

trial was denied by the justice who presided at the trial,

and the case is now before this court on the defendant's

bill of exceptions.

The exceptions pressed by the defendant are to the de-

nial of its motion for a new trial upon the several grounds

stated therein, the other exceptions stated in the bill being

waived.

From an examination of the evidence, which was con-

flicting:, we are not able to say that the jury was not jus-

tified in returning a verdict for the plaintiff, or that the

damages are excessive.

Upon the question of unauthorised views alleged to have

been taken by two of the jurors, the affidavit of one juror

was introduced stating that in coming from the restaurant
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where he had been to dinner, he paced the distance from the

'•estaurant to the corner of Canal street, and measured in

liis mind the distance from the south ^curbing on Steeple

street to the car track and thought it was not enough for a

car and team to pass. An affidavit was also introduced

stating that another juror had told the affiant that he, said

jnror, on Monday, January 24th, went alone to the place

of the accident, to see how near his eye measurement would

come to that stated in court; that he walked down Steeple

street, on the south side of the street, and as he was walk-

ing along he thought in his own mind that the distance

from Allen & Northup's restaurant to the corner of Canal

street was about what was stated in court ; that as he was

walking towards the corner of Canal street he had a good

view of the space from Steeple street south curbing to the

car track, and thought in his own mind that the distance

was less than that stated in court; that he thought it would

be a close squeeze for a car and team to pass each other

when tlie car was on the curve; that he thought in his own

mind tiiat if the car was on the straight track on Steeple

street that the team could have passed all right. This

juror, by his affidavit on file, denied making the statements

attributed to him by said affiant, and stated that the only

TRIAL PRACTICE
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tances as to be calculated to lead a jury into error in the
determination of said case.
Certain affidavits were filed by the defendant in support of said motion.
The defendant's motion for a new
trial was denied by the justice who presided at the trial,
and the ·Ca i now before this court on the defendant's
bill of exceptions.
The exceptions pressed by t~1e defendant are to the denial of its motion for a new trial upon the several grounds
stated therein, the other exceptions stated in the bill being
waived.
From an examination of the evid nee, which was conflictin rr we are not able to say that the jury was not justified in returning a verdict for the plaintiff, or that the
damao·e are excessive.
Upon the question of unauthorized views alleged to have
1een taken by two of the jurors, the affidavit of one juror
was introduced stating that in coming from the restaurant
\\bere he had been to dinner, he paced the distance from the
·e taurant to the corner of Canal street, and measured in
hi . mind the distance from the south •Curbing on Steeple
street to the car track and thought it was not enough for a
rar and team to pass.
An affidavit was also introduced
statincr that another juror had told the affiant that he, said
.i nror, on Monday, January 24th, went alone to the place
of the accident, to see how near his eye measurement would
rom to that stated in court; that he walked down Steeple
.·tre t, on the south side of the street, and as he was walking al TIO' he thou ht in his own mind that the di tance
from ll n & Northup 's restau~ant to the corner of Canal
. tre t was about what wa stated in court; that as he wa
wa lking toward the corner of anal street he had a good
'i w f the pace from t eple street south .curbin<Y to the
car tra ·k, nd thou ht in bi own mind that the di tan e
wa. 1 . than that tat din ourt; that he thought it would
]o. . ue z for a ar and team to pa ea h other
h
whrn th ar was on the urv ; that h thou ·ht in hi own
in l th ~ t if th ar wa n the trai ·ht tra k n t ple
tr t h t th t a
quld have pa sed all right.
Thi
jur r, by his ffidavit on l , d ni d making the tatement
attri ut d to him by said af.fiant, and stated that the only
1

1
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view he had of the place of the accident was when the jury

took a view, January 21, 1910.

It is well settled in this State that the affidavits of jury-

men as to what takes place in the juryroom are inadmis-

sible to impeach their verdict. In TticAer v. Town Coun-

cil of South Kingstoivn, 5 E. I. 558, 560, the court, speaking

by Ames, C. J., said: ''The affidavits of the jury-men as to

what took place in the jury-room, or as to the grounds upon

which they found their verdict, and which were read de

bene at the hearing,. must be rejected; a rule of policy, well

settled both in England and in this country, excluding, for

the security of verdicts, this mode of impeaching them. ' '

The general rule that the affidavits of jurors as to their

own misconduct during the trial are inadmissible to im-

peach their verdict is, we think, supported by the great

weight of authority both in this country and in England.

In Owen v. Warhiirton, 4 Bos. & Pull. 326, where the affi-

davit of a jur^Tnan, that the verdict was decided by lot,
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was offered, Mansfield, Ch. J. (pp. 329-330), said: "We

have conversed with the other judges upon this subject,

and we are all of the opinion that the affidavit of a juryman

cannot be received. It is singular that almost the only

evidence of which the case admits should be shut out ; but,

considering the arts which might be used if a contrary rule

were to prevail, we think it necessary to exclude such evi-

dence. If it were understood to be the law that a jur^Tnan

might set aside a verdict by such evidence, it might some-

times happen that a juryman, being a friend of one of the

parties, and not being able to bring over his companions

to his opinion, might propose a decision by lot, with a view

afterwards to set aside the verdict by his own affidavit, if

the decision should be against him." In State v. Free-

man, 5 Conn. 348, the court, by Hosmer, C. J. (p. 351),

said: "In this state, it has been the practice to admit such

testimony; but, said Ch. J. Swift (1 Dig. 775.), 'In Eng-

land, and in the courts of the United States, jurors are not

permitted to be witnesses respecting the misconduct of the

jury; for it is a great misdemeanor; and this is most un-

questionably the correct principle; for otherwise, a juror,

who should be disposed to set aside a verdict, would give

information to the party for that purpose; if not so dis-
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view he had of the place of the aocident was when the jury
took a view, January 21, 1910.

* * * * * * * * * *
It i well settled in this tate that the affidavit of jur. m n as to what takes place in the juryroom are inadmi. . ible to impeach their verdict. In Titcker v. Toi n . Cowncil of South Kingstoi n. 5 R. I. 558 560, the court peaking
hy Ames, C. J., aid : ''The affidavits of the jury-m n as to
what took place in the jury-room, or as to the ground upon
whi h they found their verdict, and which were read de
bene at the hearing,. mu t be rejected; a rule of polic well
. ettled both in England and in this country, e:s:.cluding, for
the securi t3 of verdicts this mode of impeaching them.''
The eneral rule that the affidavits of juror a to their
own mi conduct during the trial are inadmi ible to impeach their verdict is, we think, supported by the great
weight of authority both in this countr. and in England.
In Oi en v. W arbiLrton 4 Bos. & Pull. 326, where the affidavit of a juryman, that the verdict wa decided by lot,
was offered Thfan field, Ch. J. (pp. 329-330), said: '' W
have conYer. ed with the other judges upon thi subject,
and we ar all of the opinion that the affidavit of a juryman
annot be re eived.
It i ingular that almo t the only
evidence of which the ca e admit hould be shut out· but
ron iderino- the art which might be used if a contrary rul
were to pr vail we think it nece ary to exclude uch evi"
dence. If it were understood to be the law that a juryman
might et a ide a verdict by uch evidence it mi ·ht ometime happen that a juryman beino· a fri nd of one of th
partie. and not being able to bring ov r hi comr anion
to bi opinion might propo e a deci, ion 1 y lot with a view
afterward to t a id th verdict by hi own affida' it if
the deci. ion hould be aO'ain t him."
In +ate . Freernan, 5 Conn. 34
th court, . Hom r C. J. (p. 3 1),
aid: ''In thi tat , it ha b en th I ra ti t admi uch
te timony; but ai
h. J. Rwift (1 io-. 77-.) 'In Eno-land, and in the urt of th Tnit d tat
juror ar not
permitl d to l e "~itn
r -- 1 tin · t mi onduct of th
jury· for it i~ a gr at L 1e ea or· an1 thi i mot unqu ti<Jnal l>- th e r rr ct prin iI 1 ; f r th rwi e a juror
who , h0uld h li o d to . t a. id a Y rdi t, would O'i e
inform~tion to the party f r that I urpo ; if not so di 1
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posed, he could suppress the information ; and, in that way,

any of the jury could command the verdict. '

"The question before us regards a point of practice;

and as this cannot have any consequences antecedent to

this case, it is competent for the court to decide, un-

shackled by precedent, and change the rule, if justice re-

quires it." * * *

"If the question depended merely on equitable grounds,

as relative to the immediate parties to the suit, the testi-

mony in question, perhaps, ought to be received. But

there are higher considerations to be resorted to. On a

principle of policy, to give stability to the verdicts of

jurors, and preserve the purity of trials by jury, the evi-

dence ought not to be admitted. The reasons assigned

by Sir James Mansfield, in Owen v. Warhurton and by Ch.

J. Swift, in his digest, are of great weight. The sanction-

ing of the testimony of one juror, relative to the misbe-

haviour of the rest, would open a door to the exercise of
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the most pernicious arts, and hold before the friends of one

of the parties, the most dangerous temptation. By this

capacity of penetrating into the secrets of the jury-room,

an inquisition over the jury, inconsistent with sound pol-

icy, as to the manner of their conduct, and even as to the

grounds and reasons of their opinions, maght ultimately be

established, to the injury and dishonour of this mode of

trial; imperfect, undoubtedly, but the best that can be de-

vised. And under the guise of producing equity, there

might be generated iniquity, in the conduct of the jurors,

more to be depored than the aberration from law, which,

undoubtedly, sometimes takes place.

"The opinion of almost the whole legal world is adverse

to the reception of the testimony in question; and, in my

opinion, on invincible foundations."

In the cases cited supra, the affidavits of the jurors were

offered as to their misconduct in the juryroom. Wliere

the affidavits of jurors have been offered as to their mis-

conduct outside of the juryroom to impeach their verdict,

the same rule of public policy has generally been applied

by the courts. Thus in Chadbourn v. Franklin, 5 Gray

312, where defendant moved for a new trial, and in sup-

port of the motion offered one of the jurors as a witness to

show that on the Sunday intervening, while the trial was
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posed, he could suppress the information; and, in that way,
any of the jury could command the verdict.'
"The question before us regards a point of practice;
and as this cannot have any .consequences antecedent to
this case, it is competent for the court to decide, unshackled by precedent, and change the rule, if justice requires it." * * *
''If the question depended merely on equitable grounds,
as relative to the immediate parties to the suit, the testimony in question, perhaps, ought to be received.
But
there are higher considerations to be resorted to.
On a
principle of policy, to give stability to the verdicts of
jurors, and preserve the purity of trials by jury, the eviThe reasons assigned
dence ought not to be admitted.
by Sir James ~1:ansfield, in Owen v . vV arburton and by Ch.
J. Swift, in his digest, are of great weight. The sanctioning of the testimony of one juror, relative to the misbehaviour of the rest, would open a door to the exercise of
the most pernicious arts, and hold before the friends of one
By this
of the parties, the most dangerous temptation.
capacity of penetrating into the secrets of the jury-room,
an inquisition over the jury, inconsistent with sound policy, as to the manner of their conduct, and even as to the
grounds and reasons of their opinions, might ultimately be
established, to the injury and dishonour of this mode of
trial; imperfect, undoubtedl;, but the best that can be devi ed.
And under the guise of producing equity, there
might be generated iniquity, in the conduct of the jurors,
more to be depored than the aberration from law, which,
undoubtedly, sometimes ta~es pla.ce.
''The opinion of almo t the whole legal world is adverse
to the reception of the testimony in question; and, in my
o inion, on invincible foundations.''
In the ca es cited s1tpra, the affidavits of the jurors were
off r
a to their mi conduct in the jur; room.
Where
th affida it. of jurors baY been offered a to th ir misondu t out ide of th juryroom to impeach their verdi t,
th am rule of publi p li ,y ha O"enerally be n ap lied
by tb
urt . Thus in Chadbourn v. Franklin, 5 Gray
312 wh er d f ndant mov d for a new trial, and in sup'
.
port of th m tion off r d on of the jurors as a w1tne s to
sh w that on the Sunday int rv ning, while the trial was
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i i progress, said juror went to the place where the collision
Sec. 14] New Tkials 807

curred, and examined it for the purpo e of informing
him elf upon the subject-matter of the trial, and the judge
below ruled that the juror could not be permitted to testify, in support of this motion, to these acts tending to
how his own misconduct, and the defendant excepted, the
court, Shaw, 0. J. said: ''The modern practice has been I'
uniform, not to entertain a motion to et a ide a 'erdict
on the ground of error, mistake, irregularity or mi conduct
of the jury, or of any of them, on the te timony of one or
more jurors; and it rests, we think, on ound consideraIn Rowe v. Canney, 139 Mas .
tions of public polic . . ''
41, 42, the court, by Morton, 0 . J. aid: ''The ame con iderations of public polic_r protect the communi ations of
jurors with each other whether in or out of the jury-room,
during the pendency of the ca e on hearing before them.''
See also Common/l ealth . White, 147 Mas . 76, 80.
In San,i tary District v . Citllerton, 147 Ill. 385 the affidavits of three of the juror were offered touching the conduct of others of the jur and the bailiff in charge, tending
to impeach the -verdict. It wa complained that after they
had :finished viewing the premises some of the jurors drank
intoxicating liquor. The court, p. 390 aid: "This court,
in an unbroken line of deci ion from the case of F arrester
'l' . Guard Bree e, 44 i committed to the doctrine that the
affidavits of jurors can not be received for the purpo e of
ho wing cause for setting aside the verdict.
There may
be dicta in ome of the ca e intimating a contrary rule
but in e ery ca e where the que tion has been before the
court and determined, the principJe has been adh red to·''
and again p. 391: ''In trial in the court of ju tice not
only hould there be ab olutely nothing improp r permitted, but, to the end that re pect for the admini tr a ti on of
tbe law may be maintained the very appearance of evil
Rhould b avoi ed and the court are cloth d with ample
power to puni h appropriatel. the misconduct of juror
and of other, in their re ence and no court ou ht to hesitate to imI o e adequate pe altie and et a ide verdicts
where th re has b n con net by whi h the jury ma. have
een improp rl. influ n ed or th verdi t has been the reult of improper conduct on th part of jurors.
But to
permit the affidavits of jurors to be heard, showing that
1

i ii progress, said juror went to the place where the collision

Dccurred, and examined it for the purpose of informing

himself upon the subject-matter of the trial, and the judge

below ruled that the juror could not be permitted to tes-

tify, in support of this motion, to these acts tending to

show his own misconduct, and the defendant excepted, the

court, Shaw, C. J. said: ''The modern practice has been

uniform, not to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict

on the ground of error, mistake, irregularity or misconduct

of the jury, or of any of them, on the testimony of one or

more jurors; and it- rests, we think, on sound considera-

tions of public policy." In Rowe v. Canney, 139 Mass.

41, 42, the court, by Morton, C. J. said: ''The same consid-

erations of public policy protect the communications of

jurors with each other, whether in or out of the jury-room,

during the pendency of the case on hearing before them."

See also Commonivealth v. White, 147 Mass. 76, 80.

In Saniiary District v. Cullerton, 147 111. 385, the affi-
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davits of three of the jurors were offered touching tlie con-

duct of others of the jury, and the bailiff in charge, tending

to impeach the verdict. It was complained that after they

had finished viewing the premises some of the jurors drank

intoxicating liquor. The court, p. 390, said : ' ' This court,

in an unbroken line of decisions from the case of Forrester

V. Guard, Breese, 44, is committed to the doctrine that the

affidavits of jurors can not be received for the purpose of

showing cause for setting aside the verdict. There may

be dicta in some of the cases intimating a contrary rule,

but in every case where the question has been before the

court, and determined, the principle has been adhered to;"

and again, p. 391: "In trials in the courts of justice not

only should there be absolutely nothing improper permit-

ted, but, to the end that respect for the administration of

the law may be maintained, the very appearance of evil

should be avoided, and the courts are clothed with ample

power to punish, appropriately, the misconduct of jurors,

and of others in their presence, and no court ought to hesi-

tate to impose adequate penalties and set aside verdicts

where there has been conduct by which the jury may have

been improperly influenced, or the verdict has been the re-

sult of improper conduct on the part of jurors. But to

permit the affidavits of jurors to be heard, showing that

OB
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the verdict to which they, on tlieir oaths, consented, was

the result of improper influence or corrupt practice, 4s

condemned by the clearest principles of justice and public

policy.' But few verdicts in important cases would be

permitted to stand. Litigants, in whose favor verdicts

might be rendered, would be placed at the mercy of cor-

rupt jurors. Litigation would be increased, the widest

door thrown open to fraud and perjury, and the adminis-

tration of the law brought into contempt. ' '

In Eeldmaier v. Relior, 90 111. App. 96, the court, at p. 98,

said: "Upon motion for a new trial, affidavits were pre-

sented, stating that two of the jurors admitted after the

trial, that, during its progress, they examined a stone-

wagon to ascertain whether the boy could have been rolled

under such a wagon as appellee's testimony tended to show

he had been. This was a controverted point. The wagon

said to have been so examined was not that by which the in-

jury was inflicted. It is claimed that by reason of such al-
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leged misconduct of the jurors the verdict should have been

set aside. The affidavits purport to show that the jurors ex-

pressed themselves after the verdict, as satisfied, from

such examination, that there was ample room for the

boy's body under the platform of such a wagon. These

affidavits are not by the jurors themselves, but by the de-

fendant and others. It is settled law in this state that the

affidavits of jurors can not be received for the purpose of

showing cause for setting aside a verdict. Sanitary Dis-

tract V. Cullerton, 147 111. 385, and cases there cited. If

affidavits of jurors themselves can not be so received, it

is apparent that affidavits setting forth statements made

by jurors after the close of a trial, must be equally inad-

missible. If these affidavits could be considered and were

to be accepted as stating facts, the judgment of the two

jurors in question would appear to have been influenced

by incompetent evidence which could not have been ad-

mitted at the trial. The jury are required to rely on the

evidence introduced in court and are not permitted to ob-

tain it outside. But to permit the introduction of affi-

davits to impeach the conduct of jurors upon hearsay state-

ments said to have been made by them, or even upon their

own affidavits, after their connection with the case has ter-

minated and they have been discharged, would open the
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the verdict to whi h they, on their oath , consented, was
the result of improper influence or corrupt practice, 'is
condemned by the clearest principles of justice and public
policy.'
But few verdicts in important cases would be
permitted to stand.
Litigants, in who e favor verdict
might be rendered, would be placed at the mercy of corrupt jurors.
Litigation would be in reased, the widest
cloor thrown open to fraud and perjury, and the admini tration of the law brought into contempt."
In H eldrnaier v . Rehor, 90 Ill. App. 96, the court, at p. 98,
said: "Upon motion for a new trial., affidavits were pre. ented, stating that two of the jurors admitted after the
trial, that, during its progre s, they examined a stonewacron to ascertain whether the boy could have been rolled
under such a wagon as appellee 's te timony tended to show
he had been. This was a controverted point. The wagon
said to have been o examined was not that by which the injury was inflicted. It i · claimed that by reason of such alleged misconduct of th jurors the verrlict should have been
et a ide. The affidavit. purport to sl ow that the jurors expressed themselve. after the verdict, as satisfied, from
uch examination, that there was ample room for the
boy's body under the platform of such a wagon.
These
affidavit are not by the jurors them, lve , but by the defendant and others. It is settled law in this state that the
affidavits of jurors can not be received for the purpose of
showing cau e for setting aside a verdict. Sanitary Distract v . Cull rton, 147 Ill. 385, and cases there cited. If
affidavits of juror themselves can not be so received, it
is ap arent that affidavits ettin()' forth statements made
by juror after the dose of a trial, mu t be equally inadmL ible. If these affidavit could be con idered and were
to
a cepted a stating facts, the judgment of the two
juror. in que tion would appear to have be n influenced
by in ompet nt evidence which could not have been admi t Cl at the trial. The jury are r quir d to rely on the
i n introduced in court and ar not p rmitted to obtain it out. id .
But to permit th introduction of affidavits to impea h b
nduct of juror upon h nrsay statement. sajd to hav b n mad by th m, or even upon their
o ·n arfid vii. , aft r th ir ronne tion with the ca e has t rm inat d and th y hav b n discharg d, would open the
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door to endless attacks upon verdicts, invite fraud, and

place litigants at the mercy of jurors dissatisfied, or open

to corrupting influences."

In Clark v. Famous Shoe Etc. Co., 16 Mo. App. 463, the

court, p. 467, said: ''We have also examined the defend-

ant's complaint founded on the alleged misconduct of a

juror. That misconduct consisted, as the record shows,

of the juror going to the building where the accident oc-

curred, after the trial began, inspecting it and making

some measurements, for the purpose, as he says, of verify-

ing the correctness o'f the plats offered in evidence, and of

seeing whether the place was dangerous. The general

rule undoubtedly is that the triers of the fact should derive

their information from the evidence offered on the trial of

the cause and the law as given to them by the court. They

are sworn to do so and are guilty of misconduct if they vio-

late their oaths in that regard. If the misconduct of the

juror in this case would have been substantiated by any-
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thing beyond his own testimony, we would have felt at lib-

erty to consider it, and determine whether it was such as to

deprives the plaintiffs who were wholly innocent of the ben-

efit of their verdict. But the only evidence found in the

record of the alleged misconduct of the juror, is his own

testimony given in court upon the hearing of the motion

for a new trial. This testimony we are not at liberty to

consider, nor should the trial court have considered it, be-

cause under the rule now prevailing in this state, the testi-

mony of a juror tending to impeach his verdict, can not be

received, and it seems to make no difference in that regard,

whether the alleged misconduct took place in or out of the

jury-room."

**********

In Deacon v. Shreve, 22 N. J. L. 176, the court said, at

page 182: "The principle is now well settled, that gener-

ally the affidavits of jurors shall not be received as to what

took place in the jury-room, or elsewhere, to show misbe-

haviour, or on the delivery of the verdict to show mistake,

for the purpose of correcting or destroying the verdict,

though it seems their affidavits are admissible for the pur-

pose of exculpation. The rule stands on the ground of

public policy, courts being unwilling to permit a dissatis-
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door to endless attacks upon verdicts, invite fraud, and
place litigants at the mercy of jurors dissatisfied, or open
to corrupting influences.''
In Clark v. Fa11ious Shoe Etc. Co., 16 Mo. App. 463, the
court, p. 467, said: 'We have also examined the defendant's complaint founded on the alleged misconduct of a
juror.
That misconduct consisted, as the record hows,
of the juror going to the building where the accident occurred, after the trial began, inspecting it and making
some measurements, for the purpose, as he says, of verifying the correctness o"f the plats offered in evidence, and of
The general
seeing whether the place was dangerou .
rule undoubtedly is that the trier of the fact should derive
their information from the evidence offered on the trial of
the cause and the law a. given to them by the court. The
are sworn to do so and are guilty of mi conduct if they violate their oaths in that regard.
If the mi conduct of the
juror in this case would have been substantiated by anythinO' beyond his own te timony, we would have felt at liberty to consider it, and determine whether it was such as to
deprives the plaintiff who were wholly innocent of the benefit of their verdict. But the only evidence found in the
record of the alleged misconduct of the juror, is hi own
testimony given in court upon the hearing of the motion
for a new trial.
This testimony we are not at liberty to
consider, nor should the trial court have con idered it, becau e under the rule now prevailing in this tate, the testimon. of a juror tending to impea h hi verdict, can not be
received, and it seems to make no differen e in that regard,
whether the alleged mis onduct took place in or out of the
jury-room."

• * * * * * * * * *
In Deacon v. Shreve, 22 N. J. L. 176, the court said, at
page 182: ''The prin iple i now w 11 ettled that O'enerally the affidavit of jurors hall not be rec iv d a to what
took place in the jury-room, or el ewh r to s ow mi behaviour or on the deliv ry of th verdi t to how mistake
for the purpose of
rreieting or de troyinO' the verdict,
thouO'h it s ms th ir affidavit ar admi ibl f r the purpo of ~ ul ation.
T e rul tand n the ITound of
public policy, courts being unwilling to permit a dissatis-
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fled juror by such means to destroy a verdict to which he

liad given a public assent."

^ In Doivner v. Baxter, 30 Vt. 467, after the case had beer

given to the jury, the officer in charge allowed the jury t^

separate, and they went to their respective boarding-houses

for dinner, returning thence to the juryroom and resuming

the consideration of the case. The affidavits of all the

jurors were read, stating that after they were impanelled

to try the cause they had no conversation with any one

touching it, except among themselves. The court, p. 475,

said: ''An objection was taken to the competency of the

affidavits of the jurors and their admissibility raises a

legal question which we are called upon to decide. We

think the true rule is, that the affidavits of jurors may be

readto^^culpate themselves' and sustain their verdict, but

not t O-impeach it. In this case they were offered to show

that the jurors had no conversation with others, nor heard

any in relation to the cause."
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In Siemsen v. Oakland, etc., Electric R. Co., 134 Cal. 494,

where an unauthorized view was alleged, the court said, p.

497; ''However the rule may be in other states, it is set-

tled in this beyond controversy that a juror may impeach

his own verdict upon no other ground than that designated

by the code (citing cases). It is sought by respondent,

upon this motion, to make a distinction between the mis-

conduct of a juror before retiring, and the misconduct of a

juror during retirement ; but to this it may be said, in the

language of Boyce v. California Stage Co., 25 Cal. 463: 'In

conclusion, upon this branch of the case we may add that a

line of judicial decisions which struggles to multiply ex-

ceptions to a plain and simple rule founded on considera-

tions of the wisest policy, is not to be favored ; on the con-

trary, the struggle should be to bring every case within the

rule, lest the rule itself become shadowy, and in time wholly

disappear in a multitude of exceptions.' " See also Pick-

ens V. Boom Co., 58 W. Va. 19; 29 Cyc. 982, 983, and cases

cited: Thompson and Merriam on Juries, sec. 440 and

cases cited.

In some States affidavits of jurors as to their own mis-

conduct outside the juryroom during the trial are ad-

mitted to impeach their verdict. Pierce v. Brennan, 83

Minn. 422; Peppercorn v. Black River Falls, 89 Wis. 38;
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fied j uror by such mean to destroy a verdict to which h t·
had given a public assent. ''
In Downer v . Baxter, 30 Vt. 467, after the case had been
given to the jury, the officer in charge allowed the jury t •
separate, and they went to their respective boarding-house8
for dinner, returning thence to the juryroom and r esuming
the consideration of the case.
The affidavits of all the
jur ors were read, stating that after they were imp anelled
to try the cause they had no conversation with any one
touching it, except among themselves.
The court, p. 475,
aid : "An obj ection was taken to the competency of the
affidavits of the jurors and their admissibility raises a
legal question which we are called upon t o decide.
We
think t he tr ue r ule is, that the affidavits of jurors may be
read t o exculpate themselves and sustain their verdict, but
not t impeach it. In this case they were offered to show
that the jurors had no conversation with others, nor heard
any in relation to the cause.''
I n Siernsen v. Oakland, etc., Electric R. Co., 134 Cal. 494;
\vhere an unauthorized view was alleged, the court said, p.
497; ''However the rule may be in other st at es, it is settled in this beyond controversy that a juror may impeach
his own verdict upon no other ground than that designated
by the code (citing cases).
It is sought by respondent,
upon this motion, ·to make a distinction between the misconduct of a juror before retiring, and the misconduct of a
juror during retirement; but to this it may be said, in the
language of Boyce v . California Stage Co ., 25 Cal. 463: 'In
conclusion, upon this branch of the case we may add that a
line of judicial decision which struggles to multiply exceptions to a plain and · simple rule founded on consideration of the wise t policy, i not to be favored; on the contrary, the truggle hould be to bring every case within the
rule, 1 st th rul it. elf l corn shadow , and in time wholly
e al o P ickli. app ar in a multitud of ,·ccption . ' ''
rn s . Booni Co., 58 W. Va. 19; 29 Cyc. 982, 983, and cases
ite]: Th m on and M rriam on Jurie , ec. 440 and
ited.
In , om
t tes affidavits of jurors as to their own misron i t out. id th juryroom during the trial are adrnitt r d t imp a h th ir v r ict.
Pierce v. Brennan, 83
~Ii nn. 4 ....... ; P ppercorn v. Black Riv r Fall , 9 Wi . 38;
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Roller V. Bachman, 5 Lea. 153. In Iowa it has been held

that affidavits of jurors may be received, for the purpose

^{ avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during

he trial, or in the juryroom, which does not essentially

inhere in the verdict itself. Wright v. I. £ M. Tel. Co., 20

Iowa, 195. This was a case of misconduct in the juryroom.

This rule has been followed in Kansas, — Perry v. Bailey,

12 Kan. 539. We are not, however, convinced by the rea-

soning of these cases. We are of the opinion that the

affidavits of jurors as to their own misconduct in or out of

the juryroom during the trial are inadmissible to impeach

tlieir verdict. The objection on the ground of public pol-

icy is just as strong in the one case as in the other. The

affidavit of the juror in this case was inadmissible as

to his own misconduct in taking an unauthorized view, to

impeach the verdict, and therefore can not be considered.

An affidavit to the declaration of a juror impeaching the

verdict, besides contravening the same rule of policy, is
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condemned by the ordinary rule of evidence, excluding

hearsay testimony.

The defendant's exceptions are overruled, and the case

is remitted to the Superior Court with direction to enter

judgment upon the verdict.

-^^

MATTOX Y. UNITED STATES. Jal)

Supreme Court of the United States. 1892.

146 United States, 140.

This was an indictment charging Clyde Mattox with the

murder of one John Mullen, about December 12, 1889, in

that part of the Indian Territory made part of the United

States judicial district of Kansas by section two of the act

of Congress of January 6, 1883, (22 Stat. 400, c. 13,) en-

titled "An act to provide for holding a term of the Dis-
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Roller v. Bachman} 5 L ea. 153. In Iowa it has been held
that affidavit of jurors may be received, for the purpose
'1 f avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during
he trial, or in the juryroom which does not essentially
inhere in the verdiict it elf. Wright v . I. ct kl. T el. Co., 20
Iowa, 195. This wa a case of mi conduct in the juryroom.
This rule has been followed in Kansas,-Perry v . B ailey ,
12 Kan. 539. We are not, however, convinced by the r ea:-; ning of the e ca e . We are of the opinion that the
affi<lavits of jurors as to their own mi conduct in or out of
the juryroom during the trial are inadmi sible to impeach
their verdict. The objection on the ground of public policy is just as strong in the one ca e as in the other. The
affida-\ it of the juror in this case was inadmi sibl~ as
to his own misconduct in taking an unauthorized view to
impeach the verdict, and therefore can not be con idered.
An affidavit to the declaration of a juror impeaching the
,-erdict, be ides contravening the same rule of policy is
condemned b the ordinar rule of evidence, excluding
hearsa. te timony.
The defendant's exceptions are overruled, and the case
i remitted to the Superior Court with direction to enter
judgment upon the verdict.

trict Court of the United States at Wichita, Kansas, and

for other purposes."

Defendant pleaded not guilty, was put upon his trial,

October 5, 1891, and on the eighth of that month was found

MATTOX V. U:NJTED STATES.
Sitpreme Vourt of the Unit ed States.

1892.

146 United State , 140.

Thi was an indictment char ing lyde Mattox with the
murder of one J ohn Mullen about December 12 1 9 in
that part of the Indian Territory made part of the nited
tate judicial di tri t of Kan a b. ection tw of the act
f Congre of J anuar. 6, 1 3 (:L tat. 400 c. 1 ) entitled " n a t to rovide f r holding a term of th Di trict C nrt f the nited tat at Wi hita Kan a and
f r ther l urpo e . "
f ndant plead
n t o·uilt. '". \V
put upon hi trial,
ctober 5, 1 91 _and on the eighth of that month wa foum1
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guilty as charged, the jury having retired on the seventh

to consider their verdict. Motions for a new trial and in

arrest of judgment were severally made and overruled, and

Mattox sentenced to death. This writ of error was there-

upon sued out.

In support of his motion for new trial the defendant of-

fered the affidavits of two of the jurors that the bailiff

who had charge of the jury in the case after the cause had

been heard and submitted, "and while they were deliberat-

ing of their verdict," "in the presence and hearing of the

jurors or a part of them, speaking of the case, said 'After

you fellows get through with this case it will be tried again

down there. Thompson has poison in a bottle that them

fellows tried to give him.' And at another time, in the

presence and hearing of said jury or a part of them, refer-

ring to the defendant, Clyde Mattox said: 'This is the

third fellow he has killed.' " The affidavit of another

juror to the same effect in respect of the remark of the
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bailiff as to Thompson was also offered, and in addition,

the affidavits of eight of the jurors, including the three just

mentioned, "that after said cause had been submitted to the

jury, and while the jury were deliberating of their verdict,

and before they had agreed upon a verdict in the case, a

certain newspaper printed and published in the city of

Wichita, Kansas, known as The Wichita Daily Eagle, of

the date of Thursday morning, October 8, 1891, was in-

troduced into the jury room ; that said paper contained a

comment upon the case under consideration by said jury,

and that said comment upon said case so under considera-

tion by said jury, was read to the jury in their presence and

hearing; that the comment so read to said jury is found

upon the fifth page of said paper, and in the third column

of said page, and is as follows :

**********

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the case, deliv-

ered the opinion of the court.

The allowance or refusal of a new trial rests in the sound

discretion of the court to which the application is ad-

dressed, and the result cannot be made the subject of re-

view by writ of error, Bciulerf^on v. Moore, 5 Cranch, 11;

Newcomh v. Wood, 97 TJ. S. 581 ; but in the case at bar the
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guilty as charged, the jury having retired on the seventh
to consider their verdict. Motions for a new trial and in
arrest of judgment were severally made and overruled, and
Mattox sentenced to death. This writ of error was thereupon sued out.
* * * * * * * * * *
In support of his motion for new trial the defendant offered the affidavits of two of the jurors that the bailiff
who had charge of the jury in the case after the cause had
been heard and submitted, ''and while they were deliberating of their verdict,'' ''in the presence and hearing of the
jurors or a part of them, speaking of the case, said 'After
you fellows get through with this case it will be tried again
down there.
Thompson has poi on in a bottle that them
fellows tried to give him.'
And at another time, in the
presence and hearing of said jury or a part of them, referring to the defendant, Clyde Mattox said : 'This is the
third fellow he has killed.' "
The affidavit of another
juror to the same effect in respect of the remark of the
bailiff as to Thompson was also offered, and in addition,
the affidavits of eight of the jurors, including the three just
mentioned, "that after said cause had been submitted to the
jury, and while the jury were deliberating of their verdict,
and before they had agreed upon a verdict in the case, a
certain newspaper printed and published in the city of
Wichita, l{ansas, known as The Wichita Daily Eagle, of
the date of Thursday morning, 0.ctober 8, 1891, was introduced into tlie jury room; that said paper contained a
comment upon the case under consideration by said jury,
and that said comment upon said case so under consideration by said jury, was read to the jury in their presence and
hearing; that the comment so read to aid jury is found
upon the fifth page of said paper, and in the third column
of aid pag , and is a follows:
* * • * * * * * • *
MR.
IEF J rsTICE F LLER 1 aft r statin°· the case, deliver d th opinion of th ourt.
Th allowanc or r fu al of an w trial rests in the sound
i. r ti n of th
court to whi.ch the application is addr . d and th result cannot b mad the subject of revi w y writ of rror, Hender on v. Moore, 5 Cran 11, 11;
Newcomb v. W ood 1 97 U. . 5 1; but in the a , t bar the
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District Court excluded the affidavits, and, in passing upon

the motion, did not exercise any discretion in respect of

the matters stated therein. Due exception was taken and

the question of admissibility thereby preserved.

It will be perceived that the jurors did not state what

influence, if any, the communication of the bailiff and the

reading of the newspaper had upon them but confined

their statements to what was said by the one and read from

the other.

In United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 366, affidavits of

two jurors were offered in evidence to establish the read-

ing of a newspaper report of the evidence which had been

given in the case under trial, but both deposed that it had no

influence on their verdict. Mr, Chief Justice Taney, de-

livering the opinion of the court, said: ''The first branch

of the second point presents the question whether the affi-

davits of jurors impeaching their verdict ought to be re-

ceived. It would, perhaps, hardly be safe to lay down any
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general rule upon this subject. Unquestionably such evi-

dence ought always to be received with great caution. But

cases might arise in which it would be impossible to re-

fuse them without violating the plainest principles of jus-

tice. It is, however, unnecessary to lay down any rule in

this case, or examine the decisions referred to in the argu-

ment. Because we are of opinion that the facts proved

by the jurors, if proved by unquestioned testimony, would

be no ground for a new trial. There was nothing in the

newspapers calculated to influence their decision, and both

of them swear that these papers had not the slightest in-

fluence on their verdict." The opinion thus indicates that

public policy which forbids the reception of the affidavits,

depositions or sworn statements of jurors to impeach their

verdicts, may in the interest of justice create an exception

to its own rule, while, at the same time, the necessity of

great caution in the use of such evidence is enforced.

There is, however, a recognized distinction between what

may and what may not be established by the testimony of

jurors to set aside a verdict.

This distinction is thus put by Mr. Justice Brewer,

speaking for the Supreme Court of Kansas in Perry v.

Bailey, 12 Kans. 539, 545: ''Public policy forbids that a

matter resting in the personal consciousness of one juror

813

NEW TRIALS

District Court excluded the affidavits, and, in pa sing upon
the motion, did not exercise any discretion in re pect of
the matters tated therein. Due exception was taken and
the que tion of admissibility thereby pre erved.
It will be percei ed that the jurors did not tate what
influence, if any, the ·Communication of the bailiff and the
reading of the newspaper had upon them but confined
their statements to what was said by the one and read from
the other.
In United States v . Reid, 12 How. 361, 366, affidavits of
two jurors were offered in evidence to establish the reading of a newspaper report of the evidence which had been
given in the case under trial, but both depo ed that it had no
influence on their verdict. l\.fr. Chief Ju tice Taney, delivering the opinion of the court said: ''The fir t branch
of the second point presents the que tion whether the affidavits of juror impeaching their verdict ou()'ht to be received. It would, perhaps, hardly be afe to la. down any
eneral rule upon thi subject. Unquestionabl such evidence ought always to be receiYed with great caution. But
ca es might ari e in which it would be impos ible to refuse them without violating the plainest principles of ju tice. It is, however, unnece sary to lay down any rule in
this case or examine the deci ions referred to in the argument.
Becau e we are of opinion that the fact proYed
bv the juror if proved b unque tioned te timony, would
be no ground for a new trial. There was nothing in the
new papers ·cal ulated to influence their deci ion and both
of them wear that the e papers had not the lightest influence on their -verdi t." The opinion thus indicates that
ubli polic~ which forbid the reception of the affidavit ,
depo ition or worn statements of jurors to impeach th ir
Yerdict , may in the intere t of ju tice create an exception
to it own rule while, at the ame time the n ce it. of
gr at cauti n in the u e of uch evi en e i nf re d.
Th re i howev r, a recognized di tin tion betwe n what
mav and what mav not be tabli h d bv th t . timon of
juror to t a id a v rdi t.
Thi. i. tinction is thu
ut b.
1r. Ju ti e Br wer
peaking for th
upr m
ourt of Kan ·a in Perry
Bailey, 12 an . 5 9, 54 : 'Publi I olicy for id that a
maHer r ting_ in the per onal con iou ne of one juror
•
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should be received to overthrow the verdict, because being

personal it is not accessible to other testimony; it gives

to the secret thought of one the power to disturb the ex-

pressed conclusions of twelve; its tendency is to produce

bad faith on the part of a minority, to induce an apparent

acquiescence with the purpose of subsequent dissent; to

induce tampering with individual jurors subsequent to the

verdict. But as to overt acts, they are accessible to the

knowledge of all the jurors ; if one affirms misconduct, the

remaining eleven can deny; one cannot disturb the action

of the twelve; it is useless to tamper with one, for the

eleven may be heard. Under this view of the law the

affidavits were properly received. They tended to prove

something which did not essentially inhere in the verdict,

an overt act, open to the knowledge of all the jury, and not

alone within the personal consciousness of one."

The subject was much considered by Mr. Justice Gray,

then a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

chusetts, in Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, where

numerous authorities were referred to and applied, and

the conclusions announced, "that on a motion for a new

rial on the ground of bias on the part of one of the jurors,

'he evidence of jurors as to the motives and influences

which affected their deliberations, is inadmissible either

to impeach or to support the verdict. But a juryman may

testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the exist-

ence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how

far that influence operated upon his mind. So a juryman

may testify in denial or explanation of acts or declarations

outside of the jury room, where evidence of such acts has

been given as ground for a new trial." See, also, Ritchie

V. Holhrook, 7 S. & R. 458; Chews v. Driver, 1 Cox (N. J.),

166; Nelms v. Mississippi, 13 Sm. & Marsh. 500; Hawkins

V. Netv Orleans Printing Co., 29 La. Ann. 134, 140; Whit-

ney V. Whitman, 5 Mass. 405 ; Hix v. Drury, 5 Pick. 296.

We regard the rule thus laid down as conformable to

right reason and sustained by the weight of authority.

These affidavits were within the rule, and being material

their exclusion constitutes reversible error. A brief ex-

amination will demonstrate their materiality.

**********

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to
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should be received to overthrow the verdict, because being
personal it is not accessible to other testimony; it gives
to the secret thought of one the power to disturb the expressed conclusions of twelve; its tendency is to produce
bad faith on the part of a minority, to induce an apparent
acquiescence with the purpose of subsequer.t dissent; to
induce tampering with individual jurors subsequent to the
verdict. But as to overt acts, they are accessible to the
knowledge of all the jurors; if one affirms misconduct, the
remaining eleven can deny; one cannot disturb the action
of the twelve; it is useless to tamper with one, for the
eleven may be heard.
Under this view of the law the
affidavits were properly received.
They tended to prove
something which did not essentially inhere in the verdict,
an overt act, open to the knowledge of all the jury, and not
alone within the personal consciousness of one.''
The subject was much considered by Mr. Justi.ce Gray,
then a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Woodward v . L eavitt, 107 Mass. 453, where
numerous authorities were referred to and applied, and
the conclusions announced, ''that on a motion for a new
lrial on the ground of bias on the part of one of the jurors,
J1e evidence of jurors as to the motives and influences
which affected their deliberations, is inadmissible either
to impeach or to support the verdict. But a juryman may
testify to any fads bearing upon· the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how
far that influence operated upon his mind. So a juryman
may testify in. denial or explanation of acts or declarations
outside of the jury room, where evidence of such acts has
been given a ground for a new trial." See, also, Ritchie
v . H olbrook, 7 S. & R. 458; Chews v . Driv er, 1 Cox (N. J.),
166; Nelms v. Mi sis sip pi, 13 Sm. & Mar h. 500; Hau kins
v . New Orleans Printing Co., 29 La. Ann. 134, 140; Whit ney v . Whitman, 5 Mass. 405; Hi. v. Driwy, 5 Pick. 296.
We re ard the rule thus laid down as conformable to
right r a. on and sn tained by the weight of authority.
Th s affidavits w re within the rule, and being material
th ir exclu ion on titutes reversible error.
A brief examination will demon trate th ir materiality.
1

• • • • • • • • • •

The jitdgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to

1
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the District Court of the United States for the District of

Kansas, with a direction to grant a new trial.

ec. 14]
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the District Court of the United States for the District of
Kansas, with a direction to grant a new trial.

WOLFGRAM V. TOWN OF SCHOEPKE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1904.

•123 Wisconsin, 19.

Action for personal injuries from a hole in a country

highway, left by the town authorities in original construc-

tion by merely covering the same with poles. Special ver-

dict of twenty questions returned by jury, finding all ma-

WOLFGRAM V. TOWN OF SCHOEPKE.

terial facts in favor of the plaintiff except that question

No. 16, ''Was plaintiff guilty of any want of ordinary care

which .contributed to injury he received?" was answered

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

1904.

"Yes." Plaintiff produced affidavits of all twelve jurors

to the effect that all the jurors agreed that plaintiff was

· 123 Wisconsin, 19.

not guilty of any want of ordinary care, and that the in-

sertion of the answer ''Yes" instead of the word "No"

was a mistake. The foreman, agreeing with these facts,

states that he intended to write answer to the sixteenth
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question so as to find that said plaintiff was not guilty of

any want of ordinary care which contributed to his in-

jury. Upon these affidavits the plaintiff moved, first, that

the answer "Yes" to the sixteenth question be stricken

out, and the answer "No" be inserted in lieu thereof, and

for judgment upon the verdict as so amended, basing the

request also on the contention that there was no evidence

to sustain the affirmative answer to that question. That

mo+ion was denied, from which denial the plaintiff appeals.

Thereupon plaintiff moved on minutes and said affi-

davits for a new trial. Defendant moved to strike out

jurors' affidavits. The court entered its order reciting

that the motion was based on a mistake in the verdict and

on the lack of support from evidence, whereby it denied de-

fendant's motion to strike out said affidavits, "excepting

that said affidavits be received and considered only as tend-

ina- to show that there was a mistrial by reason of a mis-

take by the jury in writing the answer to question No. 16,"

Action for personal injuries from a hole in a country
highway, left by the town authorities in original construction by merely covering the same with poles. Special verdict of twenty questions returned by jury, finding all material fact s in favor of the plaintiff except that question
No. 16, "Was plaintiff guilty of any want of ordinary care
which •Contributed to injury he received~'' wa answered
''Yes." Plaintiff produced affidavit of all twelve jurors
to the effect that all the jurors agreed that plaintiff was
not guilty of any want of ordinary care, and that the insertion of the answer ''Yes'' in tead of the word ''No''
was a mistake. The foreman agreeing with these facts,
states that he intended to write answer to the sixteenth
question so as to find that said plaintiff was not guilty of
any want of ordinary care which contributed to his injury. Upon these affidavits the plaintiff moved, first, that
the answer ''Yes'' to the sixteenth question be stricken
out and the an wer "No" be in erted in lieu thereof, and
for judgment upon the verdict a so amended, basing the
reque t al o on the contention that there wa no evidence
to su tain the affirmative an wer to that que tion. That
mn+ion was denied from which denial the plaintiff appeals.
Thereupon plaintiff mo-ved on minute and said affidavits for a new trial.
Defendant moved to strike out
juror ' affidavit .
The court entered its order reciting
tbat the moti n wa ba ed on a mi tak in t verdict a d
on the lack of upport from evide e, wher b. it denied defendant' motion to trike out aid affi avit "excepting
that ai affida its be received and con idered onl a tending: to . how t at there wa a mi trial by r a on of a mistake y the jury in writing the an wer to question No. 16, '
1

816
816 Tbial Peactice [Ciiap. 17

but rejecting said affidavits in as far as they "tend, gen-

erally, to impeach or contradict said special verdict." The

court entered further order granting plaintiff's motion to

set aside the verdict and awarding a new trial, no costs be-

ing imposed on either party. From that order the de-

fendant appeals.

Dodge, J. * * *

**

It is, however, probably true that the new trial was

granted because the court was convinced by the jurors'

affidavits that the written verdict did not express the con-

clusion of the jury, and that the peril of injustice from en-

try of judgment for defendant was so great that, in exer-

cise of the discretion vested in him, a new trial ought to be

had. This view presents the question whether the affi-

davits of jurors could be received as evidence of the facts

they state. The general rule is very ancient, and often

reiterated, that the statements of the jurors will not be
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received to establish their own misconduct or to impeach

their verdict. Edmister v. Garrison, 18 Wis. 594, 603.

An excellent collection and analysis of decided cases will

be found in Woodivard v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453. From

this it appears that the early idea was that of secrecy in

their deliberations, and, further, the impropriety of receiv-

ing jurors' statements as to their mental processes, wheth-

er to impeach or support their verdict. This rule, in its

application, has been subjected to much of refinement and

qualification by different courts, involving conflict of dicta

and of actual decision which it would not be profitable to

review in detail nor possible to harmonize. The neces-

sity of some limitation to the general rule against receiv-

ing statements of the jurors is declared in McBean v. State,

83 Wis. 206, 209, 53 N. W. 497. In some cases the rule is

limited to things which transpire in the jury room or in

court, but it will be found in most of those cases also lim-

ited to matters involved in reaching the verdict. This lim-

itation was recognized and applied in Hempton v. State,

111 Wis. 127, 145, 86 N. W. 596; Roman v. State, 41 Wis.

312; Schissler v. State, 122 Wis. 365, 99 N. W. 593; Pep-

percorn V. Black River Falls, 89 Wis. 38, 41, 61 N. W. 79;

Mattox V. V. S., 146 U. S. 140, 13 Sup. Ct. 50. _ In line with

the same idea are a number of decisions drawing a distin^c-
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but rejecting said affidavits in as far as they ''tend, generally, to impeach or contradict said special verdict." The
court entered further order granting plaintiff's motion to
set aside the verdict and a warding a new trial, no costs being imposed on either party.
From that order the defendant appeals.
DODGE, J. * • •
* * • * * * * • * •
It is, however, probably true that the new trial was
granted because the court was convinced by the jurors'
affidavits that the written verdict did not express the conclusion of the jury, and that the peril of injustice from entry of judgment for defendant was so great that, in exercise of the discretion vested in him, a new trial ought to be
had.
This view presents the question whether the affidavits of jurors could be reiceived as evidence of the facts
they state.
The general rule is very ancient, and often
reiterated, that the statements of the jurors will not be
received to establish their own misconduct or to impeach
their verdict.
Edmister v. Garrison, 18 Wis. 594, 603.
An excellent collection and analysis of decided cases will
be found in Woodward v. L eavitt, 107 Mass. 453. From
this it appears that the early idea was that of secreicy in
their deliberations, and, further, the impropriety of receiving jurors' statements as to their mental processes, whether to impeach or support their verdict. This rule, in its
application, has been subjected to much of refinement and
qualification by different courts, involving conflict of dicta
and of actual decision which it would not be profitable to
review in detail nor possible to harmonize.
The necessity of some limitation to the general rule against receiving statements of the jurors is declared in McBean v. State,
83 Wis. 206, 209, 53 N. W. 497. In some cases the rule is
limited to thing which transpire in the jury room or in
court, but it will be found in most of those cases also limited to matt rs involved in reaching the verdict. This limitatio wa recoo-nized and applied in Hempton v. State,
111 "\Vi . 127, 145, 86 N. W. 596; Roman v. State, 41 Wis.
312; Schis ler v. State, 122 Wi . 365, 99 N. W. 593; Peppercorn v. Black River Falls, 89 Wis. 38, 41, 61 N. W. 79;
Mattox v. U.S., 146 U.S. 140, 13 Sup. Ct. 50. In line with
the same idea are a number of decisions drawing a distinc-
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tion between the proceedings involved in reaching and

agreeing upon the verdict and the mere act of expressing

it, either orally or in writing. The following cases recog

nize such distinction, and hold that the reasons excludin.L'

jurors' testimon}^ as to their conduct in the former stage

do not exclude their evidence as to what really was the ver-

dict agreed on in order to prove that it has not been cor-

rectly expressed, through mistake or otherwise: Cogan v.

Ebden, 1 Burrows, 383; Roberts v. Hughes, 7 Mees. & W.

399; Little v. Larrahee, 2 Greenl. 37; Weston v. Gilmore,

63 Me. 493; Peters v. Fogarty, 55 N. J. Law, 386, 26 Atl.

855; Jackson v. Dickenson, 15 Johns. 309; Dalrymple v.

Williams, 63 N. Y. 361; Hodgkins v. Mead, 119 N. Y. 166,

23 N. E. 559; Capen v. Stoughton, 16 Gray, 364; Pelzer

Mfg. Co. V. Hamburg-B. F. his. Co., 71 Fed. 830. Several

of these cases were cited with approval of this very dis-

tinction in McBean v. State, snpra. Against their doc-

trine we find Polhemus v. Heiman, 50 Cal. 438 ; Murphy v.
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Murphy, 1 S. Dak. 316, 47 N. W. 142, and McKinley v. First

Nat. Ba7ik, 118 Ind. 375, 21 N. E. 36. Of these, the first two

seem to be controlled by local statutes, and are therefore

not persuasive. The Indiana case, however, squarely de-

nies the admissibility of jurors' testimony to prove that the

written answer to a special question was the reverse of the

agreement in fact reached. This view is based on the rule

that jurors cannot "impeach their own verdict." But is

it an attempt to impeach their own verdict? That de-

pends on the sense in which that word is used. Is the

written paper filed, or the agreement which the jury reach,

the verdict? We think the latter is what is intended

when we say the jurors cannot impeach it. The former,

like most records or writings, is but the expression or evi-

dence of some mental conception. Hence it may well be

said that a showing that such writing is not correct is not

impeachment of the verdict itself. The repudiation of

written expressions, when, by mistake, they fail to ex-

press the intention or mental concept, is familiar in the

law. A writing is not a contract when it fails to express

that on which tlie minds of the parties met, and courts

freely exercise power to correct mistakes when the proof

leaves no doubt that the real contract was something else.

That which derides the rights of parties litigant is the

T. p.— 52

tion between the proceeding invoh ed in reaching and
agreeing upon the verdict and the mere act of expre sing
it either orally or in writing. The following cases recog
nize such distinction, and hold that the rea on excluding
jurors' te timony as to their conduct in the former staoT
do not exclude their evidence as to what really wa the verdict agreed on in order to prove that it ha not been .correctly expre sed through mi take or otherwi e : Cogan v.
Ebden, 1 Burrows, 383; Roberts v. Hug-hes, 7 Mee . & W.
399; Little v. Larrabee, 2 Greenl. 37; liVeston v. Gilniore,
63 Me. 493; Peters v. Fogarty, 55 N. J. Law, 386, 26 Atl.
855; Jackson v. Dickenson, 15 Johns. 309; Dalrymple '&.
Williams, 63 N. Y. 361; Hodgkins v . Mead, 119 N. Y. 166,
23 N. E. 559; Capen v . Stoughton 16 Gray, 364; Pelzer
1l1fg. Co. v. Hamburg-B. F. Ins. Co., 71 Fed. 830. Several
of these cases were cited with approval of this very di tinction in McBean v. State, sitpra.
Again t their doctrine we find Polhemu,s v . Heiman, 50 Cal. 438; Mitrphy v .
"ft1itrphy, 1 S. Dak. 316, 47 N. W. 142, and f.lcKinley v . Fir t
~at. Bank, 118 Ind. 375, 21 N. E. 36. Of these, the first two
seem to be controlled b local statutes and are therefore
not persua ive. The Indiana case, however squarely denies the admi sibili ty of juror ' testimony to prove that the
written answer to a special question was the reverse of the
agreement in faict reached. Thi view i ba ed on the rule
that jurors cannot "impeach their own verdict." But i
it an attempt to impeach their own verdict.
That depend on the en in which that word is u ed. I th
written paper filed, or the agreement whi h the jur reach.
th verdict 1 We think the latter i. what i intende
when we ay the jurors cannot impeach it.
The former
like mo t records or writings i but the expre. ion or evidence of ome mental cone ption. I ence it may w 11 b
, aid that a howino- that uch writin · i not corr ct is not
imp achment of the verdi t it lf.
The repu iation of
"ritten expr ion when by mi tak th y fail to expre th int ntion or mental one pt, i. familiar in th
law. A writinO' i · not a ntra t wh n it fail to x1 re
that on whi h th min
of th · artie m t and . ourt.
fr el. x r i. I ow r to corr t mi tak . wh n th
·oof
l a\· . no donbt that th r al ontra t wa om thino- el .
That whi h de<>ide the right of parties litigant is the
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unanimous agreement of the jurors. Each party is en-

titled to such judgment as results from that agreement.

Any other is presumptively unjust, and any rule that ne-

cessitates it is unreasonable, unless supported by consid-

erations of public policy, or of such danger from opening

the door to investigation that wrong is likely to be done

oftener than the right promoted. We are persuaded that

the reasons which should exclude a juror from showing

that he made a mistake in reaching his conclusion (see

Murdoch v. Sumner, 22 Pick. 156) do not extend to a show-

ing that the words used in conveying it to the court, or

enrolling it on the records, by mistake of the person uttering

or writing them, fail to express the conclusions reached by

all the jurymen. Of course, the showing of the latter fact

must be clear beyond peradventure ; at least to warrant a

change in the written verdict and final judgment thereon.

If the slightest doubt lurks in the mind of the court, he

should confine relief to the granting of a new trial, which,
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of course, he may always order when there is reasonable

cause to believe that the judgment will do injustice. Some

courts incline to the view that a new trial is the only relief

after the jury have separated. Little v. Larrahee, supra;

Weston V. Gilmore, 63 Me. 493. But the clear weight of

authority is that, upon sufficiently clear showing of the

mistake, and of what was the verdict agreed on and in-

tended to be expressed, the court may substitute a true

expression for the incorrect one, and enter judgment ac-

cordingly. See Cogan v. Ehden, supra; Peters v, Fogar-

ty, supra; Dalrymple v. Williams, supra; Hodgkins v.

Mead, supra; Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Eamhurg-B. F. Ins. Co.,

supra.

We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly re-

ceived and considered the affidavits of the jurors in this

case ; that they at least sufficed to satisfy the court of great

danger of injustice being done by entry of judgment in ac-

cordance with the written verdict, and therefore justified

him in exercising his discretion to relieve plaintiff from

the predicament in which he stood by awarding him an-

other trial. Wliothor such affidavits made so plain a case

as to entitle plaintiff to correction of the verdict and

judgment in his favor is a question not open to plaintiff on

this appeal. Plaintiff might probably have raised it had
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unanimous agreement of the jurors.
Each party is entitled to such judgment as results from that agreement.
Any other is presumptively unjust, and any rule that necessitate it is unreasonable, unless supported by considerations of public policy, or of such danger from opening
the door to investigation that wrong is likely to be done
oftener than the right promoted. We are persuaded that
the reasons which should exclude a juror from showing
that he made a mistake in reaching his conclusion (see
Murdock v. Sumner, 22 Pick. 156) do not extend to a showing that the words used in conveying it to the court, or
enrolling it on the records, by mistake of the person uttering
or writing them, fail to express the conclusions reached by
all the jurymen. Of course, the showing of the latter fact
must be clear beyond peradventure; at least to warrant a
change in the written verdict and final judgment thereon.
If the slightest doubt lurks in the mind of the court, he
should confine relief to the granting of a new trial, which,
of course, he may always order when there is reasonable
cause to believe that the judgment will do injustice. Some
courts incline to the view that a new trial is the only relief
after the jury have separated. Little v . Larrabee, supra;
Weston v. Gilmore, 63 Me. 493. But the clear weight of
authority is that, upon sufficiently clear showing of the
mistake, and of what was the verdict agreed on and intended to be expressed, the court may substitute a true
expression for the incorrect one, and enter judgment accordingly. See Cogan v. Ehden, supra,; Peters v. Fogarty, supra; Dalrymple v. JVilliams, supra; Hodgkins v.
Mead, supra; Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Hamburg-B . F. Ins. Co.,
supra.
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly rer ived and considered the affidavit of the jurors in this
case; that they at least sufficed to satisfy the court of great
dang r of inju tice b ing done by ntry of judgment in acordan with the written verdict, and th r for justified
him in xercising hi di. r tion to relieve plaintiff from
tb predicam nt in which he stood by awarding him anoth r trial. Wheth r su h affidavHs made so plain a case
a. t
ntitl plaintiff to orrection of the verdict and
ju lcr rnt in his fav r i a qu tion not op n to plaintiff on
thi appeal. Plaintiff might probably have raised it had
1
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he refrained from motion for new trial and appealed from

a judgment in defendant's favor. When, however, he

made the latter motion, he appealed to the court's discre-

tion to relieve him from the adverse situation which, while

lot due to his fault or mistake, was due neither to any mis-

conduct of the jury nor error of the court. He had no

absolute right to such relief, but merely to have the court

exercise a judicial discretion whether it ought to be ac-

corded him. The situation does not fall within any of

those where it is held proper to grant the relief without

terms, under the authorities on the subject above cited.

We are brought to the conclusion, therefore, that the court

committed no error in awarding new trial; but, whether it

was granted because the verdict, as filed, was against the

weight of evidence or was impugned by the affidavits of the

jurors, error was committed in failing to imj^ose reasonable

terms as a condition. What those terms should be is a

subject for consideration primarily by the trial court.
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B^ the Court. — Plaintiff's appeal is dismissed. Upon

defendant's appeal the order is reversed, and cause re-

manded with directions to embody in the order granting

new trial the payment of reasonable terms by plaintiff as

a condition.
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he refrained from motion for new trial and appealed from
a judgment in defendant's favor.
Wben, however, he
made the latter motion, he appealed to the court' di ,cretion to relieve him from the adverse situation which, while
,·10t due to his fault or mi take, was due neither to any misconduct of the jury nor error of the court.
He had no
absolute right to such relief, but merely to have the court
exercise a judicial discretion whether it oucrht to be accorded him.
The situation does not fall within any of
those where it is hel<l proper to grant the relief without
terms, under the authorities on the ubject above cited.
We are brought to the conclusion, therefore, that the court
ommitted no error in awarding new trial; but, whether it
was granted because the 'erdict, a filed was against the
weight of evidence or was impugned by tbe affidavits of the
jurors, error was committed in failing to impose reasonable
terms as a condition.
What those terms should be is a
, ubject for consideration primarily by the trial court.
B~ the Court.-Plaintiff 's appeal is dismissed.
Upon
efendant 's appeal the order is reversed, and cause remanded with directions to embody in the order granting
new trial the payment of rea ·onable terms by plaintiff as
a condition.
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FOWLER V. TOWLE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Neiv Hampshire. 1870.

CHAPTER XVIII.

49 New Hampshire, 507.

This was a writ of error, brought by Cyrus Fowler and

TRIAL AND FINDINGS BY THE COURT.

others against Elias Towle. The writ of error is dated

October 1, 1869.

FOWLER V. TOWLE.

The original action was replevin, for a meeting-house

bell, in favor of Towle, against Fowler and others. The

Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.

plea was non cepit, with a brief statement, giving notice of

title to the bell in the defendants and others. By consent

of the parties, the action was tried by the court at Free-

1870.

49 New Hampshire, 507.

dom, after the adjournment of the May term, 1868. Neither

r»arty requested the court to report the facts found, nor

'he conclusions of law upon them. At the close of the

'rial, the cause was reserved for consideration upon writ-

ten arguments, and the finding of the court was subse-

quently filed in the clerk's office. The finding, after giv-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:57 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ing a description of the action, concludes as follows :

"The case was well tried, and the evidence and law were

well argued by the respective counsel engaged, in writing.

The court, after a mature examination and consideration

of the facts and evidence, and the law applicable thereto,

has 'Come to the conclusion, that the said Elias Towle re-

cover of said defendants one dollar, for his alleged dam-

ages for the alleged caption and detention of said bell men-

tioned in his declaration; and also that plaintiff be re-

stricted to the recovery of one dollar in full of all costs

whatsoever in this suit. Gr. W. N., Jus. &c.

''The finding of the court is also upon the further limi-

tation and condition, that if the defendants shall under-

take either by transfer of the action to the full court or

otherwise, to delay immediate judgment according to the

aforesaid finding of the court, then the plaintiff by way of

820

This was a writ of error, brought by Cyrus Fowler and
others against Elias Towle.
The writ of error is dated
October 1, 1869.
The original aiction was replevin, for a meeting-house
bell, in favor of Towle, against Fowler and others.
The
plea was non cepit, with a brief statement, giving notice of
title to the bell in the defendants and others. By consent
of the parties, the action was tried by the court at Freedom, after the adjournment of the May term, 1868. Neither
narty requested the court to report the facts found, nor
i-he conclusions of law upon them.
At the close of the
·ial, the cause was reserved for consideration upon written arguments, and the finding of the court was subsequently filed in the clerk's office.
The finding, after giving a description of the action, concludes as follows:
''The case was well tried, and the evidence and law were
well argued by the respective coun el engaged, in writing.
The court, after a mature examination and consideration
of the fact and evidence, and the law applicable thereto,
has •Come to the conclusion, that the said Elias Towle recover of said def end ants one dollar, for his alleged damages for th e allecred caption and detention of said bell mentioned in hi declaration; and also that plaintiff be restricted to the recovery of one dollar in full of all costs
what oever in this suit.
G. W. N., J us. &c.
''The :findino· of the court is also upon the further limitation and condition, that if the defendants hall undertake eith r by tr n fer of the action to the full court or
otherwi
to d lay immediate judgment a cording to the
aforesaid :finding of the court, then the plaintiff by way of

1
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penalty, shall be allowed to recover the whole amount of

his legal costs from the beginning, and also if the plaintiff

shall attempt to transfer this action as aforesaid or other-

wise disturb the aforesaid finding of the court, then, in

such case, the court orders that, by way of penalty, the

aforesaid finding shall be wholly reversed and annulled,

and that the said defendants recover as damages against

said plaintiff the value of the bell, being three hundred dol-

lars, with interest from the 5tli day of July, A. D. 1867,

and full costs of court.

G. W. N., Jus. &c.

"The action on the docket having been continued nisi

judgment is therefore ordered as of the last term for plain-

tiff for one dollar debt, and one dollar costs, and the clerk

will enter it up accordingly. G. W. N., Jus. &c."

**********

In the assignment of errors in this case the plaintiffs in

error pray that "the judgments aforesaid may be reversed
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and held for nothing, and that they may be restored to all

things they have lost by reason thereof."

**********

The defendant in error moved to quash the writ of error

upon its return into court, and the parties agreed that

"pleas may be filed and argued without prejudice to de-

fendant's motion to quash in the same brief in which said

motion is argued." No plea has been furnished, and the

defendant in error relies solely upon his motion to quash.

Sargent, J. The first ground taken by defendant in

error, on his motion to quash is, that in this class of cases,

error does not lie. That the proceeding being entirely

by force of special statute, is not a proceeding according

to the course of the common law, and therefore that cer-

tiorari should have been the form of proceeding instead of

error.

Wliat are the statute provisions applicable to this case?

Sees. 1 and 2 of chap. 189, (lenl. Stats., prescribe the juris-

diction of this court at the law terms, while sec. 3 does the

same at the trial terms, as follows: "At the trial terms

they shall take cognizance of civil actions and pleas, real,

personal and mixed, according to the course of the com-

mon law," etc. Sec. 4 then provides that "in civil actions
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penalty, hall be allowed to re.cover the whole amount of
his legal co ts from the beginning, and al o if th plaintiff
hall attempt to tran fer thi action as afor aid or otherwi e di turb the afore aid .finding of the court then, in
such ca e, the ourt order that by way of penalt , the
afore aid finding hall be wholly rever
and annulled,
and that the aid def ndant re OYer as da ao· ao·ain t
aid plaintiff tlie Yalu of the bell, being tllTee hundred dollars, with interest from the 5th day of July, A. D. 1867,
and full costs of c9urt.
G. W. N., Ju . &c.
''The action on the docket havin · been continued nisi
judgment is therefore ordered as of the la t term for plaintiff for one dollar debt and one dollar co t and the ·clerk
G. W. N. J us. &c. ''
will enter it up accordin ly.
* * * * * * * * * *
In the a ignm nt of error in thi case the plaintiffs in
error pray- that ''the judgment afore aid may be reversed
and held for nothincr, and that they may be restored to all
thing they have lo t by reason thereof.''
* * * * * * * * * *
The defendant in error moYed to qua h the writ of error
upon its return into c urt and the partie a gre d that
''plea may be filed and arcrued without prejudi e to defendant's motion to qua h in the ame hr ief in "hieh aid
motion i argued." No plea ha been furni. hed and the
defendant in error r eli
olely upon hi motion to qua h.

* * * * * * * * * *
SARGE T, J.
The fir t ground taken by d f ndant in
error on hi m tion t qua h j , that in thi la, of ca es,
error doe not lie.
That the proceedin°· being- enHrelv
by force of p ial tatute i not a proceedin · a.n ordin
to the cour e of the ommon law and th refor that certiorari hould ha e be n the form of proceedincr in tead of
error.
What are the tatut r vi. ion applica
8 c . 1 nd 2 of h p. 1 ~. G nl. Stat . pr
dicti n f thj , c urt at th ]a\\ t rm whil
ame at th rial term , a foll w : '' t the trial term
th , hall tak •ocrniza
of civil action and 1 a real
p r. onal and mixed a cord in er to th co r e f the common law," etc. Sec. 4 th n provid that "in civil actions
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the court shall try the facts in controversy and assess the

damages, if the parties so elect, and judgment rendered on

such trial shall be conclusive as if rendered on the verdict

of a jury;" and sec. 5 provides that "the decision of the

court in such case, shall be in writing, if either party so

requests, stating the facts found and the conclusions of

law upon them, which shall be filed and recorded, and

either party may except to any ruling or decision of the

court in matters of law in the same manner and with like

effect, as upon a trial by jury. ' '

Now the question is, whether the substitution of the

court for the jury, to settle the questions of facts, by agree-

ment of parties, so far changes the nature of the whole pro-

ceeding, that it is no longer ''a civil action or plea" prose-

cuted "according to the course of the common law?" The

writ is the same; the service the same; the entry in the

court the same; the defendant's appearance the same; the

pleadings the same; the issue joined is the same; and, af-
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ter verdict, the judgment must be the same; and shall have

the same effect, as though rendered upon a verdict of the

jury; and provision is made, that either party requesting

it, shall have the decision in writing, and may except to any

ruling or decision of the court in matters of law, in the

same manner, and with the same effect, as upon a trial by

jury.

When all these facts are considered, and also the fact

that it is only by agreement of the parties, that this change

can be made, and that all the proceedings, both before and

after trial, are to be the same in both cases, we are satis-

fied that this arrangement of the parties as to the trier of

the facts, does not change the nature of the proceeding any

more than it does the form, and was not designed to

change either.

It is a sufficient answer to this suggestion, that if by

this agreement of the parties, and this trial of the facts

by the court instead of a jury, the proceeding is changed

so as to be no longer a "civil action or plea according to

the course of the common law," then the court at the trial

term would no longer have jurisdiction of the case, be-

cause it clearly does not come under any of the other heads

enumerated in sec. 3, and unless it continues to be what it

was when it was commenced, viz., a civil action or plea ac-
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the court shall try the facts in controversy and assess tlw
damages, if the parties so elect, and judgment rendered 011
, uch trial shall be conclusiYe as if rendered on the verdict
of a jury;'' and sec. 5 provides that ''the decision of the
court in such case, shall be in writing, if either party so
requests, stating the facts found and the conclusions of
law upon them, which shall be filed and re.corded, and
either party may except to any ruling or decision of the
court in matters of law in the same manner and with like
effect, as upon a trial by jury.''
Now the question is, whether the substitution of the
court for the jury, to settle the questions of facts, by agreement of parties, so far changes the nature of the whole pro ceeding, that it is no longer "a civil action or plea" prosecuted "according to the course of the common law~" ·The
writ is the same; the service the same ; the entry in the
court the same; the defendant's appearance the same; the
pleadings the same; the issue joined is the same; and, after verdict, the judgment must be the same; and shall have
the same effect, as though rendered upon a verdict of thr
jury; and provision is made, that either party requestinp·
it, shall have the decision in writing, and may except to an.\·
ruling or decision of the court in matters of law, in the
same manner, and with the same effect, as upon a trial by
JUry.
When all these faicts are considered, and also the fact
that it is only by agreement of the parties, that this change
can be made, and that all the proceedings, both before and
after trial, are to be the same in both cases, we are satisfied that this arrangement · of the parties as to the trier of
the facts. does not change the nature of the proceeding any
more than it does the form, and was not designed to
change eith r.
It is a sufficient answer to this suggestion, that if by
' thi. aO'reement of the partie , and this trial of the facts
by the court instead of a jury, the proceeding is changed
so as to be no longer a ''civil a<Ction or plea according to
the course of the common law," then the court at the trial
term would no lonO'er have jnriRdiction of the case, berau. e jt cl arlv fo R not rome und r any of the other head.
rm1m0rc1terl i~ Rer. :1, anrl nn I RR it rontinueR to be what it
a. wb n it wa · mmenred, viz., a civil adion or plea ac-
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cording to the course of the common law, the court would

cease to have jurisdiction of the same at the trial term, be-

cause it is only as such an action or plea, that the court at

that term has any jurisdiction of the case. This position

of the defendant in error is not well taken.

A writ of error would be the proper remedy in a case

tried by the court, under sees. 4 and 5 in all cases, where

it would be the remedy if the same case had been tried by

the jury, instead of the court. The court was substituted

for the jury in this case, to try the facts, by express agree-

ment of the parties; but while the court thus settles the

questions of fact, in the capacity of a jury, still the judge

retains all his powers as judge in questions of law, and

may exercise the same discretion in allowing or limiting

costs, that he might before, so that while acting as a jury,

to try the facts, he has no power over the costs, either

to allow or disallow, or limit, yet as judge, he may pass

upon the question of costs.
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And while the judge who thus acts in the double capacity

of judge and jury has, and may exercise all the powers

both of the judge and jury, still he has no powers in addi-

tion to those which the court and jury have in any ordin-

ary case. Having premised thus much, in relation to the

powers and duties of the judge, who acts as judge and

jury both, in the trial of a cause, let us look at the verdict

in this case, and see how much of it is a finding upon ques-

tions of fact, and what part of it is simply a ruling upon

questions of law, or the exercise of the discretion vested

in the court.

So far, as the limiting of the original plaintiff's costs

is concerned, that was a matter within the discretion of

the court, as a court, and had nothing to do with the find-

ing of the facts, and no exception would lie to the ruling

of the court, upon a matter like this, which is placed by law

in the discretion of the court, and it seems equally well set-

tled, that a writ of error will not lie in such a case.

Rochester v. Roberts, 29 N. H. 360, 368.

To this part of the verdict, then, there could be no ex-

ception, and there was no error. And if there had been

error in this, the plaintiffs in review being the original

defendants, would liardly insist upon having that cor-

rected, and being compelled to pay full costs, instead of
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cording to the course of the common law, the court would
cease to have jurisdiction of the same at the trial term, because it is only as such an action or plea, that the court at
that term has any jurisdiction of the ·case. This position
of th e defendant in error is not well taken.
A writ of error would be the proper remedy in a case
tried by the court, under secs. 4 and 5 in all cases, where
it would be the remedy if the ame case had been tried by
the jury, instead of the court. The court was sub tituted
for the jury in this case, to try the facts, by express agreement of the parties; but whil the court thus settle the
qu estions of fact, in the capacity of a jury, still the judge
r etains all his powers as judge in que tions of law, and
may exer.cise the same discretion in allowing or limiting
cost s, that he might before, o that while acting as a jury,
to try the fact , he ha no power oyer the costs either
to allow or di" allow, or limit, yet as judge, he may pass
upon the question of costs.
And while the judge who thus acts in the double capacity
of judge and jury has, and may exercise all the powers
both of the judge and jury, still he has no powers in addition t o those which the court and jury have in any ordinary ca e. Ha ing premi ed thus much, in relation to the
powers and duties of the judge, who acts as judge and
jury both, in the trial of a cause, let us look at the verdict
in this case, and see how much of it is a finding upon question of fact, and what part of it is imply a ruling upon
que tions of law, or the exerci e of the discretion vested
in the court.
So far, as the limiting of the original plaintiff's co ts
is concerned that was a matter within the discretion of
the court, as a court, and had nothing to do with the finding of the fact and no exception would li to the ruling
of the court, upon a matter like thi whi hi placed b. law
in the di .cretion of the court, and it seem equally well ttled that a writ of error will not lie in uch a ca e.
Roche t er v . Roberts, .;.;9 N. H. 60 68.
To thi part of the v rdict th n th re could be no e ception and th r wa no rror. And if there had been
error in thi , th r Iaintiff in r vi w b in°· the ori inal
def n ant , w nl liar 1] .\~ iu. i. t upon h Yin er that corre ted and b ing om1 ellcd to pa) full c st in t
of
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the limited amount fixed by the judge who tried this cause.

That is not one of the errors assigned in this case.

The other part of the verdict (omitting now the condi-

tional portions of it) is "that said Towle recover of said

Fowler & als. one dollar as damages for the caption and

detention of said bell mentioned in his declaration." As

there was no request to state in writing either the facts

found, or the conclusions of law upn the facts in the case,

by either side, we think this finding is plain, intelligible

and explicit enough, to answer the requirements of the

law.

In order to reach that conclusion, the facts found must

have been, that the bell in question belonged to Towle,

and as he had taken the bell into his possession upon

the replevin writ, all he could recover would be the dam-

ages for the wrongful taking and detention of it, and

that is, what he does recover by this verdict and judgment.

This is such a finding that judgment may be properly
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rendered upon it.

**********

Let us next consider the remaining or conditional por-

tion of the verdict in this case. It will be observed, that the

finding of the court is in three separate and distinct parts ;

the first and third relate to the same subject-matter; the

first, the finding of one dollar damages and the limiting

the costs to one dollar; the third, ordering a judgment on

that finding, according to its terms. These, too, are con-

sistent with each other, and are perfect in themselves, and

each is signed separately, and neither of them contains

anything, as matter of fact, which the presiding judge

might not properly find, acting in place of a jury, or as

matter of law, which the same judge acting as court, might

not properly do and order.

But the second or conditional part of the verdict is all

inconsistent with the other findings, it is all conditional,

not upon the law or facts of the case, but upon the future

conduct of the parties, and was intended to be held over

both parties, as it would seem, in ierrorem, in order to in-

duce them to abide by the first award, and submit to the

judgment, which was ordered thereon. This portion of

the verdict is entirely separate from all the rest, and is

signed separately.
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the limited amount fixed by the judge who tried this cause.
That is not one of the errors assigned in this case.
The other part of the verdict (omitting now the conditional portions of it) is "that said Towle recover of said
Fowler & als. one dollar as damages for the caption and
detention of said bell mentioned in his dedaration. '' As
there was no request to state in writing either the facts
found, or the conclusions of law upn the f acts in the case,
by either side, we think this finding is plain, intelligible
and explicit enough, to answer the requirements of the
law.
In order to reach that conclusion, the facts found must
have been, that the bell in question belonged to Towle,
and as he had taken the bell into his possession upon
the replevin writ, all he could recover would be the damages for the wrongful taking and detention of it, and
that is, what he does recover by this verdict and judgment.
This is such a finding that judgment may be properly
rendered upon it.

* * * * * * * * * *
Let us next consider the remaining or conditional por·
tion of the verdict in this case. It will be observed, that the
finding of the court is in three separate and distinct parts;
the first and third relate to the same subject-matter; the
first, the finding of one dollar damages and the limiting
the costs to one dollar; the third, ordering a judgment on
that finding, according to its terms. These, too, are consistent with each other, and are perfect in themselves, and
each is signed separately, . and neither of them contains
anything, as matter of fact, which the presiding judge
might not properly find, acting in place of a jury, or as
matter of law, which the same judge acting as court, might
not properly do and order.
But the second or conditional part of the verdict is all
incon, istent with the other findings, it is all conditional,
not u on the law or facts of the case, but upon the future
onduct of the parties, and was intended to be held over
b th partie , as it would seem, in terrorem, in ord.er to indu e th m to abid by the first award, and submit to the
judgment, which was ordered thereon. This portion ~f
the verdict is entirely separate from all the rest, and is
igned separately.
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Whence did the presiding judge, who tried this cause,

derive his power to make orders as to the future conduct

of these parties? The power to deprive them of rights

which the law had given them, the power to punish them

for resorting to those remedies which the law has pro-

vided for all good citizens ? He could not derive this power

from the agreement of the parties, because this agreement

was simply, that the court should act in the place of the

jury in finding the facts in the case, and gave the court no

additional powers as a court. After that agreement, the

presiding judge, had just the powers he had before as

presiding judge, and in addition, the power and authority

to find the facts in the case, upon legal testimony, and

that was all.

A jury may mistake their province, and undertake to

find something, that was not in issue, but such part or

parts of their verdict would be rejected as surplusage, and

only such part as was confined to the issue raised by the
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pleadings, could stand as a verdict. Tucker v. Cochran,

47 N. H. 54. So far, then, as he acted as a jury, the pre-

siding judge, had no authority or power to undertake to

regulate the future conduct of these parties, and so far

the verdict can have no force or effect. While acting as

judge, he had the power to limit costs, in his discretion,

and to order judgment upon the verdict he had rendered,

still he had no more power than he would have had if

the jury had found the verdict upon the evidence. In such

case, he would have the power to set aside the verdict

if a proper case was made, or to order judgment upon it,

or to continue the cause, but he had no power or jurisdic-

tion to put the parties under bonds for good behavior,

without the proper complaint on oath, nor had he the

power to say that they should not avail themselves of all

their legal rights and remedies, after the judgment which

he might properly render, was entered up.

As a part of the verdict, upon the facts, this portion

would be merely surplusage, and would all be rejected,

and as an order of the court, or a part of the judgment, it

was extra-judicial, was without authority, and without

legal effect, a mere nullity, not voidable merely but abso-

lutely void.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the second judgment

18]
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Whence did the presiding judge, who tried this ,cause
derive his power to make orders as to the future conduct
of these parties~ The power to deprive them of rights
which the law had given them, the power to punish them
for resorting to those remedies which the law has provided for all good citizen ~ He could not derive this power
from the agreement of the partie , b cau e this agreement
was simply, that the court should act in the place of the
jury in finding the facts in the ca e, and gave the court no
additional power as a court. After that agreement, the
presiding judge, had ju t the powers he had before a
pre iding judge, and in addition, the power and authority
to find the facts in the •Case, upon legal testimony, and
that was all.
A jury may mi take their province, and undertake to
find something, that was not in is µe, but such part or
parts of their verdict would be rejected a surplu age, and
only such part as wa confined to the i ue rai ed by the
pleadings, could stand as a verdict. T 1ucker v. Cochran 1
47 N. H. 54. So far, then, as he acted as a jury, the preiding judge, had no authorit or power to undertake to
r egulate the future conduct of these partie , and so far
the verdict 0an have no force or effect. While acting as
judge, he had the power to limit costs in his di cretion,
and to order judgment upon the verdict he had rendered
still he had no more power than he would have had if
the jury had found the \erdict upon the evidence. In uch
case, he would haYe the power to et a ide the verdict
if a proper case was made, or to order judgment upon it,
or to continue the cau e but he had no power or juri diction to put t e parties under bond for good behavior
without the proper .complaint on oath, nor had he the
power to say that they hould not avail themselves of all
their legal rig t and remedie , after the judgment whi h
he might properly r ncl r, wa ntered u .
As a part of the verdi t, upon the fa t , thi portion
would be merely urplu ag and would all be rej cted
and a an ord of the court, or a part of t e jud ment it
was extra-judicial was with ut authority and without
Jeo-al effe t ' a mere nulli v,
not oidable mer ly but ab o.
lutely void.
,
There is no doubt, therefore, that the second judgment
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';vould be reversed, ll' the question were brought before

the court at the proper time and in the proper way. But

tlie question here is, whether a writ of error is the proper

way to bring the matter before the court at this time. When

this case was brought forward, and the new judgment was

rendered, it was at a regular term of the court, when

counsel were present, as it was their duty to be, and had

every opportunity to take exceptions. All the objections

existed then that exist now, and if the proper exceptions

had been taken to the rulings and orders of the court at

that time, the judgment must inevitably have been reversed.

No reason or excuse is given or offered, or pretended to

exist, why objection was not then made, and exception

taken. * * *

Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's in error, hav-

ing had ample opportunity to take any and all exceptions,

seasonably, and have them considered just the same as

upon a writ of error, and having neglected to take any such
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exceptions at the proper time, they cannot now * * * be

heard to raise exception * * *

We find no ground, therefore, upon which this writ of

error can be sustained, and are of opinion that the motion

to quash the writ should be granted.

Writ quashed.

UTAH NATIONAL BANK OF SALT LAKE CITY V.

NELSON.

Supr^eme Court of Utah. 1910.

Utah, ; 111 Pacific, 907.

Action by the Utah National Bank of Salt Lake City,

Utah, against Joseph Nelson. From a judgment for plain-

tiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Plaintiff, a corporation organized and existing under

the laws of Congress, brought this action to recover from

defendant upon a promissory note. The complaint alleges,

in substance: That the defendant, on January 22, 1908,

[Chap. 18
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would be reversed, lf Ll1e question were brought before
the court at the proper time and in the proper way. But
the question here is, whether a writ of error is the proper
way to bring the matter before the court at this time. When
this case was brought forward, and the new judgment wa
rendered, it was at a regular term of the court, when
counsel were present, as it was their duty to be, and had
every opportunity to take exceptions. All the objections
existed then that exist now, and if the proper exceptions
had been taken to the rulings and orders of the .court at
that time, the judgment must inevitably have been reversed.
No reason or excuse is given or offered, or pretended to
exist, why objection was not then made, and exception
taken. * * *
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's in error, having had ample opportunity to take any arid all exceptions,
seasonably, and have them considered just the same as
upon a writ of error, and having neglected to take any such
exceptions at the proper time, they cannot now * * * be
heard to raise exception * * *
We find no ground, therefore, upon which this writ of
error can be sustained, and are of opinion that the motion
to quash the writ should be granted.
Writ quashed.

at Salt Lake City, Utah, for value received, executed and

UTAH NATIONAL BANIZ OF SALT LAKE CITY V.
NELSON.
Supreme Court of Utah.

1910.

- - Utah,--; 111 Pacific, 907.
A ti on by the Utah National Bank of Salt Lake City,
Utah again t Jo eph Nel on. From a judgment for plaintjff, d f ndant appeals. AffiTmed.
Plaintiff, a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of Cono-ress, brouo·ht this action to recover from
]cf ndant upon a promissory not . The omplaint alleges,
in sub. tanre: That the defendant, on January 22, 1908,
at Salt Lake City, Utah, for value received, executed and

Chap. 18]
Chap. 18] Trial and Findings by the Court 827

delivered to plaintiff his certain promissory note, and

thereby promised, on 30 days' demand after date, to pay

to the order of plaintiff $13,250, with interest at 6 per cent,

per annum from date until paid, and to pay 10 per cent,

additional as attorney's fee if the note slionld be placed

in the hands of an attorney for collection; that payment

of the note was demanded September 11, 1908, bnt the de-

fendant refused to pay the same, or any part thereof; that

the note was placed in the hands of attorneys for collec-

tion. The answer, admitted each alleia^ation in the com-

plaint, with the exception that it denied that the note was

G^iven ''for value received." The answer also contained

the following affirmative allegation, namely; ''That the

nromissory note signed by the defendant and delivered

^y him to the plaintiff, as alleged in said complaint, was

without consideration, and that no consideration what-

"ver passed or was given for the said promissory note;

* * that neither the plaintitf nor any other person ever
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')aid any sum of money or any other thing, or ever suffered

->r received any detriment as a consideration for the sign-

■ns^ and delivery of the said promissory note; and that

-^aid note was whoTv without consideration." The case

was tried to the court without a jury. * * *

The court, among other things, found, so far as material

liere: "That, for a valuable consideration received by de-

fendant, he executed and delivered his promissory note

(the note in question) to plaintiff; * * * that all of the alle-

gations contained in plaintiff's complaint filed herein are

true, and all the denials and allegations of said defendant

in his answer are untrue, except as to the admissions there-

in contained." As a conclusion of law the court found

that plaintiff was entitled to judo-ment against defendant

for the principal of the note. $13,250, and interest thereon

amounting to $1,104.1^, and for attorney's fee amounting

+0 $1,325, and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for

the sum of $15,679.16 and costs of suit. To reverse the

iudgment defendant has brought the case to this court on

appeal.

McCarty, J. (after stating the facts as above). Appel-

lant, in his assignment of errors, alleges "that the court

erred in that it failed to find the facts, if any there were,

constituting, or which could constitute, any consideration

TRIAL AND FINDINGS BY THE CouRT

delivered to plaintiff hi certain promi, ry note an
thereby romi , , on 30 day. ' d mand aft r fate, to pay
to t he order of plaintiff $1:3,250, with inter t at 6 per c nt.
1 er annum from date until paid, and to pa> 10 per cent.
additional as attorn y's fee if the note hould be placed
in the hands of an attorne~1 for roll , tion · that payment
of the n ote wa demanded ~ pt mber 11 1908, but the defendant refu ed to pay th ame or any part th re f; that
the note was placed in the hand of attorn y for collection. T he an wer . admitted each allegation in the complaint, with the exception that it denied that the note was
given "for value receiv d." The answer al o contained
th e f ollowing affirmative alleO'at] on, nam ly; "That the
nromi sory note signed by the defendant and deliver ed
\Y him to the plaintiff a alleged in . aid omplaint, was
';Vithout consideration and that no con. ideration whatnv r passed or was given for the aid romi ory note;
" * * that neither the plaintiff nor any other per on ever
)aid any sum of money or any other thing, or ever suffered
r received ~ny rfotriment as a ron ideration for the ign:ng and delivery of the aid promi. s ry note; and that
"-aid note was wholl_v without comrideration." The case
was tried to the court without a jury. * * *
The conrt, among 0ther thing . found, o far a material
her e : " Tb at, f r a valuable con idPration received by defendant, he e.reruted and deliv~rerl his promi ory note
(th note in <Jue. tion) to plaintiff; * * * that all of the allee:ations contained in plaintiff' complaint filed herein ar e
true, and alJ th
eniaJs and allegation of aid d f ndant
in hi an wer are untrue, :xcept as to the admis ion ther ein
ntained." A'i?. a <' n lu ion of Jaw th
ourt found
that plaintiff WaS entit}Pd to jucl!!IDCDt aO'ain t a fendant
for the l rinripal of tJ1 note, $1 250, nd inter . t ther eon
amountin 0 to $1104. Jr;, ~nrl for attoru . ', f
amountinO'
to $], 25, and rend r <l iud O'fil nt in fa, or of plaintiff for
th
um of $15 679.111 and costs of nit. To rev r e the
indgrn nt def ndant ha brought the a. t thi court on
m1n al.
1f ARTY, .J. (aft r sfa f ing the fad. a a ove).
ppellant, in hi a , ignment of rror. , all ge "that th court
erred in that it failed t find th fart . , if any th r were,
ul con titut , any con ideration
n tituting _or whi 11
1
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for tlie contract or promissory note," and insists that the

finding made by the court, namely, "that for a valuable

consideration received by said defendant he (the defend-

ant) executed the promissory note mentioned," was a

mere conclusion of law and not a finding of fact at all * * *

TRIAL PRACTICE

for the contract or promissory note,'' and insists that the
finding made by the court, namely, ''that for a valuable
consideration received by said defendant he (the defendant) executed the promissory note mentioned," was a
mere conclusion of law and not a :finding of fact at all * *
In Spelling, New Tr. & App. Pro. ~ 593, the author says;
''If an issue be tendered in general terms and met by a
denial in the same form, a finding in the same general form
will be sufficient; but, where the pleadings are so framed
that the controversy turns upon a particular fact, the :finding should conform to the issue thus presented and be specific. Accordingly, when only general facts are averred, and
the controversy related to the settlement of a long standing
account consisting of numerous items, it was held that a
O'eneral finding of a balance in favor of plaintiff was suffi,cient' '-citing with approval the case of Pratalongo v.
Larco, 47 Cal. 378. The action in that case was, as stated
in the opinion, ''for money lent and advanced and paid,
laid out, and expended by the plaintiff to and for the use
of the def.endant and for money had and received by the
defendant for the use of the plaintiff. The answer is a
general denial and a counterclaim in which the defendant
l_i,vers that the plaintiff is indebted to him for money had
and received, lent and advanced, and paid, laid out, and expended." So in this case it i alleged in the answer, in
general terms, that the note in question ''was without consideration, and that no consideration whatever passed or
was given for the promissory note.'' The general :finding that the note was executed ''for a valuable consideration received by said defendant" negatives the affirmative
allegation of th answer and is therefore sufficient. Moreover, the authoritie seem to hold that :findings are sufficient
when the facts found are stated in the same way as they
ar all g d in the pleadin<Ys.
In Hayne on New Tria], sec. 243, the rule is stated as
follow s : "Fact may .be tated in the :findings in the same
wa th v are stat d in the pleadings. It i not necessary
th~t th. :findin<Y, h uld follow th preci
language of
th e p] adin<Ys; but th only purpose of finding is to an,·w r the qu stion s I ut by th p] ading , and it seems to
h thr, T r iv d id a that it L , nffi ient if th an wers are
iv n in the same language as the question, and that the
b
:!(<

In Spelling, New Tr. & App. Pro. <^ 593, the author says ;

"If an issue be tendered in general terms and met by a

denial in the same form, a finding in the same general form

will be sufficient; but, where the pleadings are so framed

that the controversy turns upon a particular fact, the find-

ing should conform to the issue thus presented and be speci-

fic. Accordingly, when only general facts are averred, and

the controversy related to the settlement of a long standing

account consisting of numerous items, it was held that a

general finding of a balance in favor of plaintiff was suf-

ficient" — citing with approval the case of Pratalongo v.

Larco, 47 Cal. 378. The action in that case was, as stated

in the opinion, "for money lent and advanced and paid,
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laid out, and expended by the plaintiff to and for the use

of the defendant and for money had and received by the

defendant for the use of the plaintiff. The answer is a

general denial and a counterclaim in which the defendant

Livers that the plaintiff is indebted to him for money had

and received, lent and advanced, and paid, laid out, and ex-

pended." So in this case it is alleged in the answer, in

general terms, that the note in question "was without con-

sideration, and that no consideration whatever passed or

was given for the promissory note." The general find-

ing that the note was executed "for a valuable considera-

tion received by said defendant" negatives the affirmative

allegation of the answer and is therefore sufficient. More-

over, the authorities seem to hold that findings are sufficient

when the facts found are stated in the same way as they

are alleged in the pleadings.

In Hayne on New Trial, sec. 243, the rule is stated as

follows: "Facts may be stated in the findings in the same

way they are stated in the pleadings. It is not necessary

that the findings should follow the precise language of

the pleadings; but the only purpose of findings is to an-

swer the questions put by the pleadings, and it seems to

be tho received idea that it is sufficient if the answers are

^-'•iven in the same language as the question, and that the

hap 18]
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two njodes of statement are governed by the same general

rules."

In 8 Eney. PI. & Pr. 939, it is said: ''It is not necessary

that the findings should be in the exact language of the

pleadings or in any particular form." The finding com-

plained of in this case, while of course not in the exact

language of that part of the answer in which want of con-

sideration is alleged, nevertheless is directly responsive

thereto. And, furthermore, the doctrine is elementary that

the findings should, be a statement of the ultimate facts

in controversy and not of the evidentiary matters from

which the ultimate facts are to be deduced or found. In

8 Ency. PL & Pr. 941, it is said: ''The findings of the

court should be statements of the ultimate facts only, and

not probative facts * * * The findings should contain a

concise statement of the several facts found by the court

from the evidence and not the evidence from which they

are found."
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Murphy v. Bennett, 68 Cal. 528, 9 Pac. 738, was an action

to recover damages for the tearing down of a barn and

converting the materials thereof. It was alleged in the

complaint that the plaintiff was the owner of the barn

at the time of the alleged conversion. The answer denied

the ownership of the plaintiff and set up two affirmative

defenses in justification of the taking. The court found

that the plaintiff was not, and that the defendant was, the

owner of the building, but omitted to find on the affirmative

defenses. It was contended that the finding was a con-

clusion of law. On appeal the Supreme Court held that

the finding on the issue of ownership was sufficient, and

that the failure to find on the affirmative defenses did not

prejudice the plaintiff. In the course of the opinion the

court said: "Here the allegation in the complaint is that

the plaintiff 'was the owner of a certain frame building,

situate,' etc. The answer denied that plaintiff was the

owner of the building. "Wliether plaintiff did own the

building or not was then the ultimate fact to be determined,

and upon the issue thus raised the court found against

the plaintiff. We think it clear that the findings referred

to are findings of fact, and not conclusions of law."

In the case of Kahn v. Central Smelting Co., 2 Utah, 371,

it is said in the syllabus: "A finding 'that there was no
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two Tuodes of statement are governed by the ame general
rule . "
In En y. PL & Pr. 9 9, it is said: "It i not necessary
that the finding should be in the exact language of the
i leading or in any particular form.'' The finding complained of in this ca e, while of cour e not in the exact
language of that part of the an wer in which want of consideration i alleged, neverthele
i directly re pon ive
thereto. And, furthermore, the doctrine i elementary that
the finding
hould. be a tatement of the ultimate facts
in controver y and not of the evidentiar matter from
"-hich the ultimate facts are to be deduced or found. In
Ency. PL & Pr. 941 it i aid: "The finding of the
ourt hould be statement of the ultimate fa t only, and
not probative facts * * * The finding
hould contain a
conci e statement of the everal fact found by the court
from the evidence and not the evidence from which they
are found.''
Murphy v. Bennett, 68 Cal. 528, 9 Pac. 738, was an action
to recover damages for the tearing down of a barn and
onverting the material thereof. It wa allerred in the
complaint that the plaintiff wa the owner of the barn
at the time of the all ged conver ion. Th answer denied
the ownership of the plaintiff and set up two affirmative
defen es in ju tification of the taking. The court found
that the plaintiff wa not, and that the defendant was, the
owner of the building, but omitted to find on th affirmative
defen e . It was ontended that the finding was a conlu ion of law. On appeal the Supreme ourt held that
the finding on the i ue of owner hip wa ufficient and
that the failure to find n the affirm a ti e def en
did not
prejudi.ce the plaintiff. In the cour e of the o inion the
ourt aid: ''Here th all gation in the complaint i that
the plaintiff wa the own r of a certain fra
uildin
ituat ' et . The an w r d nied that lain.tiff wa the
owner of the buildincr. Wh th r plaintiff di own the
building or not wa th n th ultimate fa t to b det rmin d,
and upon the i u thu rai d the ourt found a ain t
the plaintiff. W think it 1 ar that the findino- r f rred
to ar finding of fact, a d not on lu ion of ] w.
In the case of Kahn v. Central Smelting
tab 71,
it i said in the sylla bu "
finding 'that there -was no
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partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant, is not

a conclusion of law, but is a finding of fact." And in the

course of the opinion Mr. Justice Emerson, speaking for

the court, says: ''The fact that there was a partnership

TRIAL PRACTICE

partnership between tht; plaintiff and the defendant, is not
a conclusion of law, but is a finding of fact.'' And in the
course of the opinion Mr. Justice Emerson, speaking for
the court, says: ''The fact that there was a partnership
is the ultimate fact alleged in the complaint. There are
certain facts and conditions and circum tances set out in
the complaint from which this ultimate fact is deduced;
that is, there is in the complaint much detail of mere evidentiary facts. The material issue of fact is, however:
Was there a partnership~ And the finding responds to this
issue. This was the ultimate fa.ct to be ascertained, and
it is none the less a finding of fact because drawn as a ·
conclusion from other facts .' ' This case is cited with
approval and the doctrine therein announced reaffirmed
by this court in the case of Snyder v. Emerson, Auditor,
19 Utah, 319, 57 Pac. 300, wherein it is held that "~he finding that W. F. Critchlow was duly appointed as night jailer
is not a conclusion of law, but a finding of an ultimate
fact whi.ch was an issue."
As a test for determining whether the finding in question is a conclusion of law or a finding of an ultimate fa ct,
let us suppose, for example, that the court had, in th e
language of the defendant's answer, found "that the prom- ·
issory note signed by defendant and delivered by him to
the plaintiff, as alleged in said complaint, was without
consideration, and that no consideration whatever ever
passed or was given for the said promissory note.'' Could
such a finding be successfully assailed on the ground that
it is a conclusion of law and not a statement of an ultimate
fact~ Certainly not, because it is the only finding that
the court ·Could have made had it found on this issue in
favor of the defendant, and that, too, notwithstanding this
i sue was pre ented by the affirmative allegations of def ndant's answer and the burden was upon him to prove
that the note was executed without consideration. Now,
if a findino- that the note was executed without consideration would b a sufficient finding to support a judgment in
favor of defendant, it necessarily follows that a finding
that the note was made and delivered "for a valuable consid ration'' i a sufficient finding to upport a judgment for
vlaintiff. W ar cl arly of th opinion that th finding
mad by the court is a finding of an ultimate fact, and,
1

is the ultimate fact alleged in the complaint. There are

certain facts and conditions and circumstances set out in

the complaint from which this ultimate fact is deduced;

that is, there is in the complaint much detail of mere evi-

dentiary facts. The material issue of fact is, however:

Was there a partnership? And the finding responds to this

issue. This was the ultimate fact to be ascertained, and

it is none the less a finding of fact because drawn as a

conclusion from other facts." This case is cited with

approval and the doctrine therein announced reaffirmed

by this court in the case of Snyder v. Emerson, Auditor,

19 Utah, 319, 57 Pac. 300, wherein it is held that ''the find-

ing that W. F. Critchlow was duly appointed as night jailer

is not a conclusion of law, but a finding of an ultimate
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fact which was an issue."

As a test for determining whether the finding in ques-

tion is a conclusion of law or a finding of an ultimate fact,

let us suppose, for example, that the court had, in the

language of the defendant's answer, found "that the prom-

issory note signed by defendant and delivered by him to

the plaintiff, as alleged in said complaint, was without

consideration, and that no consideration whatever ever

passed or was given for the said promissory note." Could

such a finding be successfully assailed on the ground that

it is a conclusion of law and not a statement of an ultimate

fact? Certainly not, because it is the only finding that

the court could have made had it found on this issue in

favor of the defendant, and that, too, notwithstanding this

issue was presented by the affirmative allegations of de-

fendant's answer and the burden was upon him to prove

that the note was executed without consideration. Now,

if a finding that the note was executed without considera-

tion would be a sufficient finding to support a judgment in

favor of defendant, it necessarily follows that a finding

that the note was made and delivered "for a valuable con-

sideration" is a sufficient finding to support a judgment for

])laintiff. We are clearly of the opinion that tlie finding

made by the court is a finding of an ultimate fact, and,

[Chap. 1
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as we have stated, it is directly responsive to the affirma-

tive allegations contained in the defendant's answer.

**********

Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent.

DARLING V. MILES.
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we have stated, it is directly responsive to the affirmative allegations contained in the defendant's an wer.
* * * * * * * * * *
Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent.

·t

Supreme Court of Oregon. 1911.

57 Oregon, 593.

This is an action by Thomas Darling against S. A. Miles

to recover damages suffered by reason of the fraudulent

representation made by defendant in the sale of certain

lots.

The complaint alleges that on "the 20th day of July,

1906, the defendant herein did, with intent to cheat and

defraud the plaintiff, falsely and fraudulently represent to

DARLING V. MILES. ·

the plaintiff that he was the absolute owner in fee, free

from incumbrance, of lots six (6) and seven (7) in block five

Supreme Gou.rt of Oregon.

1911.

(5), in Pleasant View addition, * * * in the city of Portland,

and that lot six (6) was 46.9 feet by 100 feet, * * * when
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in truth and in fact the defendant at that time was not,

57

Oregon, 593.

and well knew that he was not, the owner of the south

fifteen (15) feet of said lot six (6) free from incumbrance,

and plaintiff alleges that the public then had a right to

use the said 15 feet as a highway, and the defendant then

knew it; that plaintiff herein relied upon the truth of the

statement of the defendant and believed the same, and on

July 20, 1906, he did, by reason of such reliance and belief,

purchase * * * and received from the defendant his war-

ranty deed, wherein and whereby the grantors certified

that the said premises were free from all encumbrances

***)>

All these allegations are denied by the answer, except

that defendant admits the execution and delivery of the

deed, with covenants and warranty, as alleged in the com-

plaint.

The action' was tried by the court without a jury. At

This is an action by Thomas Darling against S. A. Miles
to recover damages suffered by reason of the fraudulent
repres entation made by defendant in the sale of certain
lots.
The complaint alleges that on "the 20th day of July,
1906, the defendant herein did, with intent to cheat and
defraud the plaintiff, falsely and fraudulently represent to
the plaintiff that he was the absolute owner in fee, free
from incumbrance, of lots six (6) and seven (7) in block :five
(5), in Pleasant View addition,** * in the cit of Portland,
and that lot six (6) was 46.9 feet by 100 feet, * * * when
in truth and in fact the defendant at that time was not,
and well knew that he wa not, the owner of the south
:fifteen ( 15) feet of said lot six ( 6) free from in umbrance,
and plaintiff alleges that the public then had a right to
use the said 15 feet as a highway, and the def ndant then
knew it; that plaintiff herein relied upon the truth of the
statement of the defendant and believed the sa e, and on
July 20, 1906, he did, by rea on of such reliance and belief
purcha e * * * and recei ed from the defendant hi warranty deed wherein and whereby the grantor certified
that the said I remi es were free from all encumbrances
* ** "
All these allegations are denied by the an w r except
that def ndant admit the execution and 3.eliv r. of the
deed, with cov nants and warranty, as alleged i the complaint.
The action- was tried b. the court without a jury. At

832
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the close of the testimony the court made the following

finding of facts:

''The court finds that on or about the 20th day of July,

1906, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant lots 6 and

7 in block 5, Pleasant View addition, Multnomah County,

Oregon, for a valuable consideration, and received from

the defendant a general warranty deed therefor. That

the south 15 feet of said lot 6 is subject to a right of way

of the public to use the same for a highway, and said sale

was made without any fraud on the part of the defendant^f

and without any fraudulent representations in regard

thereto."

Judgment was rendered thereon in defendant's favor,

from which plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Me. Justice Eakin delivered the opinion of the court.

1. Plaintiff contends that the findings of fact do not

support the judgment, and to this we agree. Section 158,
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B. & C. Comp., provides that when an action is tried by

the court, without the intervention of a jury, the decision

[Chap. 18
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the close of the testimony the court made the following
finding of facts:
''The court finds that on or about the 20th day of July,
1906, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant lots 6 and
7 in block 5, Pleasant View addition, Multnomah County,
Oregon, for a valuable consideration, and received from
the defendant a general warranty deed therefor. That
the south 15 feet of said lot 6 is subject to a right of way
of the public to use the same for a highway, and said sale
was made without any fraud on the part of the defendant,
and without any fraudulent representations in regard
thereto.''
Judgment was rendered thereon in defendant's favor,
from which plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

shall state the facts found, and such decision shall be en-

tered in the journal, and judgment entered thereon accord-

ingly. The finding that ''the sale was made without * * *

any fraudulent representations" only states a conclusion

of law. To justify a conclusion to that effect it was neces-

sary for the court to find whether or not defendant repre-

sented that he was the owner of the lot, free from incum-

brance, and that its dimensions were as stated, with knowl-

edge on defendant's part that the representations were

false or were made recklessly as of his own knowledge,

without any knowledge of their truth; and if the court

finds that the representations were so made it must also

find whether plaintiff relied thereon to his injury : Caivston

V. HUiTfiis, 29 Or. 331 (43 Pac. 656). Finding adverse to

plaintiff on at least one of these matters is necessary to

support the conclusion that there were no fraudulent repre

sentation, or to support a judgment to that effect.

2. This court has held in many cases that findings of

fact must be made on all material issues necessary to sup-

port the judgment. See Wright v. Ramp. 41 Or. 285 (68

Pac. 731); Henderson v. Reynolds, 57 Or. 186 (110 Pac.

979), and cases therein cited.

MR. J usTICE EAKIN delivered the opinion of the court.
1. Plaintiff contends that the findings of fact do not
support the judgment, and to this we agree. Section 158,
B. & C. Comp., provides that when an action is tried by
the court, without the intervention of a jury, the decision
shall state the facts found, and such decision shall be entered in the journal, and judgment entered thereon accordingly . The finding that ''the sale was made without * * *
any fraudulent representations'' only states a conclusion
of law. To justify a conclusion to that effe ct it was necessary for the court to find whether or not defendant represented that he was the owner of the lot, free from incumbrance, and that its dimensions were as stated, with knowledge on defendant's part that the representations were
false or were made recklessly as of bis own knowledge,
without any knowledge of their truth; and if the court
find that the representations were o made it must also
find whether plaintiff relied thereon to his injury: Cawston
v. turqis, 29 Or. 331 ( 43 Pac. 656). Finding adverse to
plaintiff on at least one. of these matters is necessary to
support the conclusion that there were no fraudulent repre ·
sentation, or to upport a judgment to that effect.
2.
Thi court bas held in many cases that findings of
fact must be mad on all material issues nece ary to support the judgment.
e Wright v. Ramp. 41 Or. 285 (68
P<i· . 731); Henderson v . Reynolds, 57 Or. 186 (110 Pac.
979), and cases therein cited.
1

Chap. 18]
Cliap. 18] Trial and Findings by the Court 83.')

3. Counsel for defendant urges that the proof fails

to establish the elements of fraudulent representations al-

leged, but the case is not before us upon the evidence. The

only means we have of knowing what was proved is from

the findings of fact which are silent as to the elements

urged here.

4. It is said in Drainage Dist. No. 4 v. Crow. 20 Or. 536

(26 Pac. 846), after quoting from said Section 158, B. & C.

Comp:

"The object of this statute was to enable the parties to

have placed upon the record the facts upon which the right

litigated depends as well as the conclusion of law. * * *

The facts found are conclusive upon the appellate court,

but the conclusions of law are reviewable here on appeal."

The facts found must justify the conclusions of law.

Otherwise, they are abstract statements and not con-

clusions.

The judgment is reversed and remanded for a new
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trial.

Reversed.

Me. Chief Justice Moore did not sit in this case.

SLAYTON V. FELT.

Supreme Court of Washington. 1905,

40 Washington, 1.

Crow, J. — This action was commenced by appellant,

Charles J. Slayton, against respondent, D. W. Felt, to re-

cover a broker's commission on the sale of real estate in

the city of Seattle. Upon the trial before the court without

a jury, appellant presented findings of fact in his favor,

which the court declined to make. Judgment was entered

dismissing the action. * * *

TRIAL AND FINDINGS
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3.
Coun el for def ndant urges that the proof fail
to establi h the elements of fraudulent representations alleged, but the a e is not before us upon the evidence. The
only means we have of knowing what was proved is from
the findings of fact which are ilent a to the elements
urged here.
4. It is said in Drainage Dist. No. 4 v . Crow. 20 Or. 536
( 26 Pac. 846), after quoting from said Section 158, B. & C.
Comp:
"The object of this statute was to enable the parties to
have placed upon the record the facts upon which the right
litigated depends as well a the conclu ion of law. * * *
'The facts found are 1conclu ive upon the appellate court,
but the conclu ions of law are reviewable here on appeal."
The facts found mu t ju tify the conclusions of law.
Otherwise, they are abstract statements and not conclusions. ·
* * * * * * * * * •
The judgment is reversed and remanded for a new
trial.
Reversed.
MR. CHIEF J us TICE MooRE did not sit in this case.

**********

(2) Appellant also contends that the trial court erred

in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law,

separately stated, or at all, and asks that the judgment be

T. p.— 53 -

SLAYTON V. FELT.

Supreme Court of Washington.

1905.

40 Washington, 1.

CRow, J.-This action was commenced by appellant,
Charles J. Slayton, against respondent, D. W. Felt to recover a broker's commi ion on the sale of real tate in
the city of Seattle. Upon the trial before the court without
a jury appellant pre nted :finding of fa t in hi favor,
which the court declined to make. Judgment was entered
. . ing
.
t e ac t ion.
'
* * *
dism1

* * • • • * * * * •

(2) App Hant al o conten
that the trial court erred
in faili g to make :findinO' of fa t and con lu ion of law
separately stated, or at all, and asks that the judgment be
T. P.-53

-
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reversed by reason thereof. Appellant urges that under

Bal. Code, Sec. 5029, it was the duty of the trial court to

make findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately

stated. Respondent contends that, as the final judgment

was one of dismissal, findings of fact were unnecessary,

citing, Thome v. Joy, 15 Wash. 83, 45 Pac. 642, and Noijes

V. King County, 18 Wash. 417, 51 Pac. 1052. Both of said

cases were actions in equity. This court has heretofore

announced the rule that findings of fact and conclusions!

of law are not necessary in equitable actions, but we are not

aware of any such announcement being made as to actions

at law. We see no reason why findings of fact and con-

clusions of law are not just as essential, if properly re-

quested, in an action at law when the same is dismissed,

as where an affirmative judgment is entered. This being

an action at law, the cases cited by respondent do not sus-

tain his contention. The question then arises whether the

action of the trial court in failing to make findings of fact
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and conclusions of law amounted to such prejudicial error

as would entitle appellant to a reversal. In Wilson v.

Aberdeen, 25 Wash. 614, 66 Pac. 95, this court said:

"We come now to the consideration of the appellants'

contention that the judgment must be reversed because of

the failure of the trial court to make findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Our statute provides that 'upon the

trial of an issue of fact by the court, its decisions shall be

given in writing and filed with the clerk. In giving the

decision, the facts found and the conclusions of law shall

be separately stated. Judgment upon the decision shall

be entered accordingly.' Bal. Code § 5029; 2 Hill's Code,

§ 379. This provision of the code is in form mandatory,

and this court has several times held, in effect, that in

actions at law tried by the court without a jury, findings

of fact and conclusions of law are necessary to support the

judgment. See, Bard v. Kleeh, 1 Wash. 370, 25 Pac. 467:

Kilroy v. Mitchell, 2 Wash. 407, 26 Pac. 865 ; King County

V. Hill, 1 Wash. 404, 25 Pac. 451; Sadler v. Niesz, 5 Wash.

182, 31 Pac. 630. 1030; Potivin v. Blasher, 9 Wash. 460, 37

Pac. 712. But in more recent cases it has been decided ;

that a judgment will not be reversed on appeal for want of

findings of fact and conclusions of law, where it is not

made to appear by the record that there was any request

TRIAL PRACTICE
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reYersed by reason thereof. Appellant urges that under
Bal. Code, Sec. 5029, it was the duty of the trial court to
make :findings of fact and conclu ions of law, separately
stated. Respondent contends that, as the final judgment
was one of dismissal, finding of fact were unnecessary,
riting, Thorne v. Joy , 15 Wash. 83, 45 Pac. 642, and Noyes
v. King County) 18 Wash. 417, 51 Pac. 1052. Both of said
cases were actions in equity. This court has heretofore
announced the rule that finding of fact and conclusion
of law are not necessary in equitable a.ctions, but we are not
aware of any such announcement being made as to actions
at law. We see no reason why :findings of fact and conclnsions of law are not just as essential, if properly requested, in an action at law when the same is dismissed,
as where an affirmative judgment is entered. This being
an action at law, the ca es cited by respondent do not sustain his contention. The que tion then arises whether the
action of the trial court in failing to make :findings of fact
and conclusions of law amounted to such prejudicial error
as would entitle appellant to a reversal. In Wilson v.
Aberdeen, 25 Wash. 614, 66 Pac. 95, this court said:
"We come now to the consideration of the appellants'
contention that the judgment must be reversed because of
the failure of the trial court to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Our statute provides that 'upon the
trial of an issue of fact by the court, its decisions shall be
given in writing and filed with the clerk. In giving the
decision, the facts found and the conclusions of law shall
be separately stated. Judgment upon the decision shall
be entered accordingly.' Bal. Code ~ 5029; 2 Hill's Code,
~ 379. This provision of the code is in form mandatory,
and this court has several times held, in effect, that in
actions at law tried by the court without a jury, :findings
of fact and conclusions of law are necessary to support the
judgm nt. S e, Bard v . Kleeb, 1 Wash. 370, 2~ Pac. 467:
Kilroy v . JJfitchell, 2 Wash. 407, 26 Pac. 865; King County
v . Hill 1 Wash. 404, 25 Pac. 451; Sadler v. Niesz, 5 Wash.
1 2, 31 Pac. 630. 1030; Potwin v. Blas her, 9 Wash. 460, 37
Pa . 712. But in more recent ca es it has been decided
that a judgment will not be rever ed n appeal for want of
finding of fact and conclusio s of law, where it is not
made to appear by the record that there was any request

Chap. 18]
Chap. 18] Tkial and Findings by the Couet 835

for such findings and conclusions, or any objection raised i

upon that account. Washington Rock Plaster Co. v. John- *

yon, 10 Wash. 445, 39 Pac. 115; Remington v. Price, 13

\Vash. 76, 42 Pac. 527."

It is true that appellant did request the trial court to

make findings of fact in favor of himself, upon the issues

raised by the pleadings, the same being claimed by him

to be warranted by the evidence admitted. The court, not

thinking the evidence warranted such findings, refused to

sign the same. It do«s not appear, however, that appellant

at any time requested the court to make such findings of

fact and conclusions of law as it might determine to be

proper or warranted by the evidence. We think this re-

(piest should have been made, before appellant would be

entitled to base a successful assignment of error upon the

refusal of the court to make any findings whatever. The

findings requested by appellant are shown in the record,

and afford him an opportunity, of which he has availed

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 13:58 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t47p93w7n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

himself, to assign error upon the refusal of the trial court

to make the same. He has been deprived of no legal or

valuable right in that direction. This court in Bard v.

Kleeh, 1 Wash. 370, 25 Pac. 467, 27 Pac. 273, construing

said Bal. Code, § 5029, there mentioned as § 246, said:

**As we regard it, § 246 is for the protection of court

and parties. To the court it gives an opportunity to place

upon record its view of the facts and the law in definite

written form, sufficiently at large that there may be no

mistake. To parties it furnishes the means of having their

causes reviewed, in many instances, without great ex-

pense. ' '

The only privilege of which the appellant has been de- j

prived, if any, has been to bring an appeal to this court [

without a statement of facts based upon such findings as I

the court would have signed if requested, but which, neces- <

sarily, would have been against appellant upon the issues S

joined. Such an appeal could not have benefited appellant i ,

in any manner whatever. In view of this fact, and, also, j;

the further fact that appellant failed to request the court \

to make findings in accordance with its view of the evi- 1

dence, we think no error prejudicial to appellant has been A

committed. In an action at law, either party has the right T

to request a .trial court to make such findings of fact as
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for such findings and conclu ions, or any objection raised
,1pon that account. Tr ashington Rock Plast er Co. v. John._·on, 10 Wash. 445, 39 Pac. 115; Reniington v. Price, 13
\Vash. 76, 42 Pac. 527."
It is true that appellant did request the trial court to
make findings of fact in favor of himself, upon the issues
raised by the pleading , the ame being claimed by him
to be warranted by the evidence admitted. The court, not
thinking the evidence warranted such findings, refu ed to
. ign the same. It do s not appear, howe er, that appellant
at an time requested the court to make such findings of
fact and conclusions of law as it might determine to be
1 roper or warranted by the evidence. We think thi request should have been made before appellant would be
Gntitled to base a succes ful a ignment of error upon the
refusal of the court to make any findings whatever. The
findings requested by appellant are shown in the record,
and afford him an opportunity, of which he has availed
himself, to assign error upon the refusal of the trial court
to make the same. He has been deprived of no legal or
valuable right in that direction. Thi court in Bard v.
Kleeb, 1 Wash. 370, 25 Pac. 467, 27 Pac. 273 con truing
aid Bal. Code, § 5029, there mentioned as § 246 aid:
''As we regard it, § 246 i for the protection of court
and parties. To the court it gives an opportunity to place
upon record it view of the facts and the law in definite
written form, sufficiently at large that there may be no
mistake. To parties it furni he the means of having their
causes reviewed in many in tances, without great ex·
I ense. ''
The only privilege of which the appellant has be n deprived if any ha been to bring an appeal to thi court
without a statement of fact ba ed upon uch findinO' a
the court would ha e i ned if reque ted but whi h nece sarily would have b n aO'ain t a1 pellant u1 on the i ue
join~d.
uch an app al ould not have b n fit d appellant
in anv manner what ver. In vi w of thi fact and al o
the f~rther fact that a p llant failed to r qu t the court
to make findinO' in a or lance with it
i w of the evidence we think no rr r pr judi ial to ap1 ellant ha b n
committ d. In an a tion t law eith r part. b th riO'bt
to request a _trial court to make such find in O' of fact a

836
: it may deem proper, upon all the issues involved, or upon

I any particular issue, which such party may deem mater-

I ial or important, and such findings should then be made.

I A mere request, however, to make certain findings in favor

" of such party only, is not in itself sufficient. Of course,

it is the proper and correct practice for a party to request

findings in his own favor, to which he may think himself

entitled, so that he may make proper exceptions to their

refusal. But such findings in his favor having been re-

-fused and excepted to, he must, if he desires to assign error

on a failure to make any findings or conclusions whatever,

also request the court to make such findings as it thinks

the evidence warrants. This was not done by appellant in

this action.

We find no prejudicial error in the record. The judgment

is affirmed.

Mount, C. J., Eoot and Hadley, JJ., concur.

FuLLEKTON and DuNBAK, JJ., concur in the result.

I
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it may deem proper, upon all the issues involved, or upon
any particular issue, which such party may deem mater··
ial or important, and such findings should then be made.
A mere request, however, to make certain findings in favor
of such party only, is not in itself sufficient. Of course,
it is the proper and correct practice for a party to request
findings in his own favor, to which he may think himself
entitled, so that he may make proper exceptions to their
refusal. But such findings in his favor having been refused and excepted to, he must, if he desires to assign error
on a failure to make any :findings or conclusions whatever,
also request the court to make such findings as it thinks
the evidence warrants. This was not done by appellant in
this action.
We find no prejudicial error in the record. The judgment
js affirmed.
MouNT, C. J., RooT and HADLEY, J J., concur.
FuLLERTON and DuNBAR, JJ., concur in the result.
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GRAHAM V. STATE, EX REL. BOARD OF COMMIS-

L^^WdU (P^l SIGNERS.

^jjJ^J^^^^"^^ Supreme Court of Indiana. 1879.

^ u.< 66 Indiana, 386.

^. ^^

TRIAL PRACTICE

WoRDEN, C. J. — This was an action by the appellee,

against the appellant, which resulted in a trial by the court,

and a finding and judgment for the plaintiff, for the sura

of two thousand dollars.

The action was brought against Graham, as a surety on

tlie official bond of Rufus Gale, as the auditor of Jefferson

county. The bond was in the usual form of such bonds, but

was in the penalty of five thousand dollars. Breaches of

the bond were assigned, alleging, among other things, that

Gale, during his term of office, had, as such auditor, drawn

numerous warrants or orders upon the county treasury,

payable to himself, for large amounts, and had presented

them to the treasurer for redemption, who had paid the

amount thereof to said Gale in redemption thereof; that

'GRAHAM V. STATE, EX REL. BOARD OF COMMIS;{ ~ i\iWUA. ~Wtdtdq
SIONERS.

~,~
')S ,
~- ' ~ ~~

Supreme Cou,rt of Indiana.

Ii\

~·

66

Indiana,

1879.

386.

\VoRDEN, C. J.-This was an action by the appellee,
again t the appellant, which resulted in a trial by the court,
and a :finding and judgment for the plaintiff, for the sum
of two thousand dollars.
The action was brought against Graham, as a surety on
the official bond of Rufus Gale, as the auditor of Jefferson
·ounty. The bond was in the usual form of such bonds, but
was in the penalty of five thousand dollars. Breaches of
th bond w re assigned all ging, among other things, that
Gal durinO' his term of office, had, as such auditor, drawn
numerou warrants or orders upon the county treasury,
payabl to himself, for larO'e amount , and had presented
th m to the treasurer for redemption, who had paid the
amount thereof to said Gale in redemption thereof; that

Chap.
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the orders were drawn without any order of the board of

commissioners of the county, or authority of law.

********* *^*

The defendant filed a motion for a venire de novo, be-

cause the facts were not sufificiently found. And it is said

in the brief of counsel for the appellant, that ''The failure

of the court to find one way or the other, upon the facts,

as to two of the breaches alleged in the complaint, leaves

the issues as to those breaches untried, just as the verdict

of a jury on one paragraph of a complaint consisting of

several paragraphs leaves the issues on the other para-

graphs untried, and in such a case a venire de novo is

awarded."

This makes it necessary to consider to some extent the

nature and office of a special verdict or finding.

The statute provides that ''A special verdict is that by

which the jury find the facts only, leaving the judgment

thereon to the court." 2 R. S. 1876, p. 171, sec. 335. The
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next following section provides that ''the court shall, at

the request of either party, direct them" (the jury) "to

give a special verdict in writing upon all or any of the

issues." ,

JBy section 341, 2 E. S. 1876, p. 174, it is provided that

upon trials of questions of fact by the court, if one of the

parties request it, "the court shall first state the facts in

writing, and then the conclusions of the law upon them."

There is no difference between a special verdict and a

special finding by the court, except that the special ver-

dict finds the facts only, and the court afterward pro-

nounces, or rather applies the law to the facts found, and

renders judgment accordingly; while, in a special finding,

the court states the conclusions of law upon the facts

found, so that the parties can except to the conclusions.

Neither a special verdict nor a special finding can do more

in relation to facts than to find or state them. But what

facts are to be thus found or stated? Clearly tJiose that

are p roved upon the trial, and none ot her. When the

speciaTvei-'dict has found the facts proved on the trial, it

has performed its entire office; and when the special find-

ing has stated the facts proved on the trial, it has per-

formed its entire office, so far as the facts are concerned.

18]
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the orders were drawn without any order of the board of
commissioners of the county, or authority of law.
* * * * * * * * * *
The defendant filed a motion for a venire de nova, becau e the facts were not sufficiently found. And it is said
in the brief of counsel for the appellant, that "The failure
of the court to find one way or the other, upon the fact ,
as to two of the breaches alleged in the complaint leave
the issues as to those breache untried, just a the verdict
of a jury on one paragraph of a complaint con isting of
several paragraphs leaves the issues on the other paragraphs untried, and in such a case a venire de nova i
awarded.''
This make it nece ary to con ider to some extent the
nature and office of a pecial verdict or finding.
The statute provides that "A spe.cial verdict is that by
which the jury find the fact only, leaving the judgment
thereon to the court.'' 2 R. S. 1876, p. 171, sec. 335. The
next following ection provides that "the court shall, at
the request of either party, direct them" (the jury) "to
give a pecial verdict in writing upon all or any of the
issues.''
By section 341, 2 R. S. 1876, p. 174, it is proviued that
upon trials of questions of fact by the court, if one of the
partie. request it, ''the court shall first state the fa ts in
writing, and then the conclusions of the law upon them."
There is no difference between a l ecial verdict and a
pecial :finding by the court, except that the pecial erdict finds the facts only, and the court afterward pronounces, or rather applies the law to the facts found, and
r enders judgment accordingl ; while, in a l ecial :finding
the court tates the on lu ions of law u1 on the fact
found, so that the parties •Can except to the conclu ion .
Neither a special verdi t nor a special finding an do more
in relation to facts than to find or tate th m. But what
fact s are to be thu found or tated ·
l arl ., tho e that
are pro ed u on th trial and non other. \\hen th
specia ver i t ha :foun t11 fa t l rov d on th trial it
has performed it ntir ffi · and h n t
ial findin ha tat d the fa t
rov d on th trial it ha per-·
form d it entire office
far a the fact are concerned.
(J'
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Of course the facts may be proved by circumstances or

otherwise, as in any other mode of trial.

But suppose there are issues in the cause concerning

which no evidence is given. There is nothing in such case

in relation to those issues for the court or jur}^, in finding

specially, to pass upon. No fact in relation to them has

been proved, and, hence, no fact in relation to them is to

1^ , be found or stated, because, as we have seen^ the special

t<^^4«tverdict or finding is confined to the facts proved.

*dC ^ In the case sui:)posed, it would seem that, in rendering

judgment, the issues concerning which no facts are found

should be regarded as not proved by the party on whom the

burden of the issue or issues lies.

The judgment below is affirmed, with costs.

CITY OF OWNESBORO V. WEIR.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 1893.

95 Kentucky, 158.

Judge Hazelrigg delivered the opinion of the court.
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The question involved in this appeal is the liability of

the appellant, City of Owensboro, for the fee of the appel-

lees — attorneys at law — for services rendered by them at

[Ubap.
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Of course the facts may Le proved by circumstances or
otherwise, as in any other mode of trial.
But suppose there are is ues in the cause concerning
which no evidence is given. There is nothing in such case
in relation to those is ues for the court or jury, in finding
specially, to pass upon. No fact in relation to them has
been proved, and, hence, no fact in relation to them 'i s to
'f,
be found or stated, because, as we have seen the special
tHt~erdict or :finding is confined to the f a-cts prove .
'Jf
In the case supposed, it would seem that, in rendering
judgment, the issue concerning which no facts are found
should be regarded as not proved by the party on whom the
burden of the issue or issues lies.

5•

* * * * * * * * * *
The judgment below is affirmed, with costs.

the employment of the mayor of the appellant acting with-

out the authority of the city council.

The circumstances of the employment are set forth in

an ''agreed case" and in the record in which the services

were rendered.

**********

But, say the appellees with earnestness, there was no

CITY OF OWNESBORO V. WEIR.

statement by the court of its conclusions of fact found, sep-

arately from its conclusions of law.

Section 332 of the Civil Code provides that ''upon trials

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

1893.

of questions of fact by the court, it shall not be necessary

95 KentiJ.Jcky, 158.

for the court to state its findings, except generally for the

plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties request it,

with a view of excepting to the decision of the court upon

delivered the opinion of the court.
The question involved in this appeal is the liability of
the appellant, City of Owensboro, for the f ee of the appellees-attorneys at law-for services r ender d by them at
the employment of the mayor of the appellant acting without the authority of the city council.
The .circumstances of the employment are set forth in
an ''agreed case'' and in the record in which the services
were rendered.
• * • • * * • * • •
But, ay the appellee, 'vith arnestn ss, there was no
. tat m nt by the court of it oncln ion of fact found, Parat 1 from it ron lu ion of law.
tjon . 2 of th
ivil Cod rovid that "upon trials
of qu tions f fa t by th
urt, it shall not be ne
ary
for the ourt to stat it findino- , x pt g nerally for the
lajntiff or d f ndant, unl
one of the parties request it,
with a view of X• ptino- to the decision of the court upon
JUDGE HAZELRIGG

1
-
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the questions of law involved in the trial; in which case,

the court shall state in writing the conclusions of fact

found, separately from the conclusions of law."

Now upon an agreed state of fact, what could the court

do in the way of stating "in writing the conclusions of

fact found separately from the conclusions of law?"

Simply copy or re-state the agreed state of fact! Clearly

the court's judgment on the law only was asked. There

was no trial of questions of fact. The case of Harris v.

Ray, 15 B. M. 629, cited by counsel, simply determined

that the provisions' of the Code regulating applications for

a new trial applied to judgments by default. It has no

bearing on the section quoted.

GAINES & COMPANY V. WHYTE GROCERY «

COMPANY.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. 1904.

107 Missouri Appeal, 507,

Smith, P. J. — The plaintiff and defendant are both busi-
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ness corporations, the former organized under the statute
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the questions of law involved in the trial; in which case,
the court shall state in writing the conclu ions of fact
found, separately from the conclusions of law."
Now upon an agreed state of fact what could the court
do in the way of stating "in writing the onclu ions of
fact found separately from the onclu ions of law~''
Simply copy or re-state the agreed tate of fact! Clearly
the court's judgment on the law onl was asked. There
was no trial of questions of fact. The case of Harris v.
Ray, 15 B. M. 629, cited by counsel, simply determined
that the provisions· of the Code regulating applications for
a new trial applied to judgments by default. It has no
bearing on the section quoted.
•

*

* * * * * *

~

~

of this State and the latter under that of the State of Ken-

tucky. The plaintiff in its petition alleged, (1), that it was

and is the owner of a special trade-mark for "Old Crow"

whiskey, which defendant had infringed and was infring-

ing; and (2), that by the use of the words "Old Crow"

upon bottles containing whiskey other than the genuine

"Old Crow" whiskey produced by plaintiff which it offered

to the trade, defendant thereby carried on such unfair

trade and competition as entitled plaintiff to the injunctive

GAINES & COMP ANY V. WHYTE GROCERY
COMPANY.

process of the court. The defendant's answer, in addition

to a general denial, interposed the defenses of laches and

the statute of limitation. There was a trial and decree

Kansas City Court of Appeals.

1904.

for plaintiff and defendant appealed.

The defendant's final contention is, that the trial court

107 Missouri Appeal, 507.

erred in its refusal to make special finding of the facts

SMITH, P. J.-The plaintiff and defendant are both business corporation the former organized under the tatute
of this State and the latter under that of the tate of Kentucky. The plaintiff in it petition alleged (1), that it wa
and i the owner of a pecial trade-mark for '' Id row''
whi key which defendant had infringed and wa infrin ing; and (2), that by the use of the word " ld row"
upon bottles contajning whi key other than the · nuine
"Old Crow" whi. key produced by plaintiff whi h it off r d
to the trade defendant ther by carri d on u h unf ir
trade and .comp tition a ntitl d plaintiff to th injunrti' e
process of the ourt. The f ndant' an w r, in ad ition
to a eneral d nial int rpo d t e d f n
of 1 h and
the statute of limitati n. Th r was a trial and decree
for plaintiff and d f n ant appealed.

• * * * * * * • •
The defendant's :final c t ntion i that th trial ourt
erred in its refusal to make special :finding of the facts
~

840
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and conclusions of law thereon. The statnte (section 695)

doubtless applies to both legal and equitable actions, but

while this is so, we do not think the failure to make a

special finding in an action of the latter kind constitutes

a reversible error, because the supervisory courts are au-

thorized on appeal to try and determine such actions upon

the pleadings and evidence de novo. The findings of the

trial court, if any, may be entirely disregarded by the

former tribunal and such findings and decree entered

therein as seems to it to be meet and proper. The Legisla-

ture did not, by the enactment of the statute already re-

j ferred to, intend to abrogate the well and long-established

practice of the appellate courts in supervising the findings

of trial courts in equity cases, or to deprive the former of

the jurisdiction to determine for themselves the correct-

ness of the findings of the latter. Blount v. Spratt, 113

Mo. 48 ; McElroy v. Maxiuell, 101 Mo, 294 ; Benne v. Schnec-

ko, 100 Mo. 250. If the supervisory courts are not bound
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by the findings of the trial courts, or their conclusions of

law in equity cases, but may review the whole evidence

and determine for themselves what the findings of fact

and conclusions of law should be, it is difficult to see how

a party could be prejudiced by the failure of the trial

court to make special findings of fact, in such cases.

The failure, therefore, of the court in the present case

to make special finding of facts was not such an error as

requires a reversal of the decree; and especially so since

it was, as we think, clearly for the right party and the

only one that could have been given in the cause.

Accordingly, our conclusion is that the decree should be

affirmed. All concur.

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 1'

and conclusions of law thereon. The tatute (section 695)
doubtless applies to both legal and equitable actions, but
while this is so, we do not think the failure to make a
pecial finding in an action of the latter kind constitutes
a reversible error, because the upervi ory ourts are authorized on appeal to try and determine u ch actions upon
the pleadings and evidence de nova . The findings of the
trial court, if any, may be entirely di regarded by the
former tribunal and such finding and decree entered
therein as seems to it to b meet and proper. The Legislature did not, by the enactment of the statute already referred to, intend to abrogate the well and long-establi lied
practice of the appellate court in supervi ing the finding
of trial courts in equity case , or to deprive the former of
the juri diction to determine for themselves the correctness of the findings of the latter. Blount v . Spratt, 113
Mo. 48; klcElroy v . 111axwell, 1011\10. 294; Benne v. Schnecko, 100 Mo. 250. If the supervi ory courts are not bound
by the findings of the trial courts, or their conclu ions of
law in equity cases but may review the whole evidence
and determine for themselves what the findings of fact
and conclusions of law should be, it is difficult to see how
a party could be prejudiced by the failure of the trial
court to make special finding of fact, in such cases.
The failure, therefore, of the court in the present case
to make special finding of facts was not such an error as
requires a reversal of the decree ; and especially so since
it was, as we think, clearly for the right party and the
only one that could have been given in the cause.
Aocordino·ly, our conclusion is that the decree should be
affirmed. All concur.
·
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CITY OF BUFFALO V. DELAWAKE, LACKAWANNA

& WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of New York. 1907,

190 New York, 84.

CITY OF BUFFALO V. DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA
& WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY.

The object of this action was to secure a judicial determ-

ination that a portion of the river front in the city of

Court of .Appeals of New York. 1907.

Buffalo is a public street and to compel the defendant to

remove certain obstructions therefrom. The main issue

raised by the answer was whether the locus in quo, called

190

New York,

84.

Front street, was a public street when the action was com-

menced. * * *

The trial justice found the following facts, among

others: * * *

"Eighteenth. That said dock and wharf from the time

of its erection down to the commencement of this action,

and since, has been open to travel by vehicles and pedes-

trians, except when such travel was temporarily obstructed

by freight stored upon said dock or wharf, and the said
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dock or wharf has been used during the said times by

vehicles and pedestrians, more largely by the latter than

the former; that the greater number of persons using said

dock or wharf for foot or vehicle traffic did so for the,

purpose of reaching the stores and warehouses abutting

on said wharf, and for the purpose of delivering supplies

to the vessels lying thereat, or receiving passengers from

such vessels, or transacting other business with said

vessels. But it is equally true that many of the people

using said dock and wharf, both for foot and vehicle traf-

fic, used the same as a way of communication between

Main street and points east of Washington street, and

that many pedestrains constantly used said dock and wharf

who had no business with the abutting stores and ware-

houses, or the vessels lying at said dock."

After finding the facts as thus stated the trial court

found the following, which were designated as ''conclusions

of law:"

"Third: That for a period of six years and more prior

to the commencement of this action the said premises

The object of this action was to secure a judicial determination that a portion of the river front in the city of
Buffalo is a public street and to compel the defendant to
remove certain obstructions therefrom. The main issue
raised by the answer was whether the locus in quo, called
Front street, was a public street when the action was commenced.•**
The trial justice found the following facts, among
others: • • •
"Eighteenth. That said dock and wharf from the time
of its erection down to the commsncement of this action,
and since, has been open to travel by vehicles and pedestrians, except when such travel was temporarily obstructed
by freight stored upon said dock or wharf, and the said
dock or wharf has been used during the said times by
vehicles and pedestrians, more largely by the latter than
the former; that the greater number of persons using said
dock or wharf for foot or vehicle traffic did so for the,
purpose of reaching the stores and warehouses abutting
on said wharf, and for the purpose of delivering supplies
to the vessels lying thereat, or receiving passengers from
such vessels, or transacting other business with said
vessels. But it is equally true that many of the people
using said dock and wharf, both for foot and vehicle traffic, used the same as a way of communication between
Main street and points east of Washington street, and
that many pedestrains constantly used said dock and wharf
who had no business with the abutting stores and warehouses, or the vessels lying at said do.ck.''
After finding the facts as thus stated the trial court
found the following which were designated as ''conclusions
of law:"

• • • • • • • • • •

"Third: That for a period of six years and more prior
to the comm~ncement of this action the said premises

842
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herein designated as 'Front street,' ceased to be traveled

or used as a public highway, and ceased to be a highway

for any purpose.

**********

Vann, J. The trial court rendered judgment against

the plaintiff on the theory that, although Front street be-

came a public highway as early as 1826 through tender of

dedication by the owners and acceptance by the municipal

authorities, still it had ceased to be a public highway be-

cause it had not been traveled or used as such for a per-

iod of more than six years prior to the commencement of

the action. While facts were found which sustain the con-

clusion of law that Front street became a public highway

through offer and acceptance, no finding of fact, classified

as such, was made that the street had not been traveled

or used as a public highway for the statutory period re-

quired to effect an abandonment. {City of CoJioes v. Dela-

ware (& Hudson Canal Co., 134 N. Y. 397 ; Matter of Hunter,
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163 N. Y. 542, 548; L. 1861, ch. 311; L. 1890, ch. 568, § 99.)

It is claimed that the third conclusion of law contains

the finding of fact needed to support the judgment and

that, although it is classified as a conclusion of law, since

it is really a finding of fact the same effect should be given

to it as if it had been so designated in the decision.

The finding in question is one of fact or law. If it is

the latter, the facts found do not support the judgment,

because a street once in existence is presumed to continue

until it ceases to be such owing to abandonment or some

other lawful cause. {Cohoes Case, supra.) We think,

however, that the finding, except the last clause thereof, is

not one of law but of fact. The cessation of user and

travel upon a street for the period prescribed involves

a question of fact. Traveling upon a street is an act or a

series of acts which can be seen and described. The use

of a street for traveling purposes requires that something

should be done thereon which is apparent to ordinary ob-

servation. One may travel on a street by walking, riding

or driving. Each method involves action and an act is a

fact, as that word is known to jurisprudence.

An error in the classification of findings by the trial

court does not prevent an appellate court from classifying

them for itself in accordance with their actual character.

TRIAL PRACTICE

[ Lap. 18

herein designated as 'Front street,' ceased to be traveled
or used as a public highway, and ceased t o be a highway
fo r any purpose.
* * * • * * * * * *
V ANN, J.
The trial court rendered judgment against
the plaintiff on the theory that, although Front street became a publi,c highway as early as 1826 through t en der of ·
dedication by the owners and acceptance by the municipal
authorities, still it had ceased to be a public highway because it had not been traveled or used as such f or a period of more than six years prior to the commencement of
the action. While facts were found which sustain the conclusion of law that Front street became a public highway
through offer and acceptance, no finding of fact, classified
as such, was made that the street had not been traveled
or used as a public highway for the statutory period required to effect an abandonment. (City of Cohoes v . Dela- ware & Hudson Canal Co ., 134 N. Y. 397; Matter of H unter,
163 N. Y. 542, 548; L. 1861, ch. 311; L. 1890, ch. 568, § 99.)
It is claimed that the third conclusion of law contains
the finding of fact needed to support the judgment and
that, although it is classified as a 1conclusion of law, since
it is really a finding of fact the same effect should be given
to it as if it had been so designated in the decision.
The finding in question is one of fact or law. If it is
the latter, the facts found do not support the judgment,
because a street once in existence is presumed to continue
until it ceases to be such owing to abandonment or some
other lawful cause. (Cohoes Case, supra.)
We think,
however, that the finding, . except the last clause thereof, is
not one of law but of fact. The cessation of us er and
travel upon a street for the period prescribed involves
a question of fact. Traveling upon a street is an act or a
. eries of acts which can be s en and described. The use
of a street for traveling purpo es requires that something
. hould be done thereon which is apparent to ordinary ob. ervation. One may travel on a street by walking, r iding
or driving. Each method involv a tion and an act is a
fart, as that word is known to jurisprudence.
An error in the cla sification of findings by the trial
,ronrt do R not prevent an appellate court from lassifyh1g
tlPm f r itself in accordance with their actual chan t ter.

Chap. 18]
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Giving a wrong name to a finding does not change its na-

ture and if it is placed under the head of ''conclusions of

law," when it is a finding of fact, it will be treated on

appeal as what it really is, at least for the purpose of up-

holding a judgment. {Berger v. Varrelmann, 127 N. Y. 281,

288; Christopher & Tenth Street R. R. Co. v. Tiventy -third

Street R. R. Co., 149 N. Y. 51, 57.) As we have already

seen, the judgment appealed from cannot stand unless the

finding under consideration is a finding of fact, and it

now remains to be seen whether it can stand even on that

theory, since it is claimed that such finding of fact is in-

consistent with other findings of fact, and hence must

yield thereto at the election of the appellant in aid of his

exceptions. It was upon this ground that one of the

learned justices below based his dissent.

What is the situation according to the findings when

properly classified? About 1826 a public highway existed

on the river front between Washington and Main streets.
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It still existed in 1838, when a dock was built by the abut-

ting owners over and upon the land owned by them consti-

tuting said highway, covering it for its entire width and

length. From that time to this the abutting owners have

used the dock for dock purposes and the general public

have used it for highway purposes, neither use excluding

the other altogether, although doubtless interfering with it

to some extent. Under these circumstances what became

of the street when the dock was built? Can abutting own-

ers destroy a street in this way? Did the construction of

the dock annihilate the highway? There is no statute

which gives it that effect, and according to the common

law the street leaped from the ground to the do«k and

staid there. It is there now unless it has been abandoned

by nonuser as we read the authorities. * * *

When a private dock is built over a public street upon

the shore of navigable waters, the dock becomes part of the

street and the public has a right to travel over it. Owner-

ship of the dock is not inconsistent with the existence of

the street any more than ownership of the land over which

the street extended. Assimiing that the defendant or its

predecessors could lawfully build a dock over their own

land in order to reach the river, still, as their land was
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Giving a wrong name to a finding does not change its nature and if it is placed under the head of '' conclu ions of
law," when it is a :finding of fact, it will be treated on
appeal as what it really is, at lea t for the purpose of upholding a judgment. (Berg er v. Varrelmann, 127 N. Y. 281,
288; Christopher & Tenth Street R.R. Co. v. Twenty-third
Street R. R. Co., 149 N. Y. 51, 57.) As we have already
een, the judgment appealed from cannot stand unless the
finding under consideration is a :finding of fact, and it
now remains to be seen whether it can stand even on that
theory, since it is claimed that such finding of fact is inconsistent with other :findings of fact, and hence must
yield thereto at the election of the appellant in aid of his
exceptions. It was upon this ground that one of the
learned justices below based his dissent.
What is the situation according to the findings when
properly classified 1 About 1826 a public highway existed
on the river front between Washington and Main streets.
It still existed in 1838, when a dock was built by the abutting owners over and upon the land owned by them constituting said highway, covering it for its entire width and
length. From that time to this the abutting owners have
used the dock for dock purposes and the general public
have used it for highway purposes, neither use excluding
the other altogether, although doubtless interfering with it
to some extent. Under these circumstances what became
of the street when the dock was built 1 Can abutting owners destroy a street in this way ? Did the construction of
the dock annihilate the highway 1 There is no statute
which gives it that effe t and according to the common
law the street leaped from the ground to the <look and
. taid there. It is there now unless it has been abandoned
by nonuser as we read the authoritie . * • •

.. . . . . . . .
~

When a private dock is built over a public street upon
the shore of navi able water the dock becomes part of the
treet and the public ha a right to travel over it. Owner. hip of the dock is not inconsi tent with the exist nee of
the street any more than owner hip of the land over which
th treet extended. A uming that th d f ndant or its
predecessors could lawfully build a dock over their own
land in orde"!" to r ach the river, still as their land was
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subject to the right of the public to travel upon it, they

could not unreasonably interfere with that right nor witli

the existence of the street which was the foundation there-

of. Two rights co-existed. The defendant, as owner of

the river front, had the right to reach the water. As there

was a street along the river front over the defendant's land

the public had the right to use the street. The building

of the dock changed neither right. Both continued to exist,

although under changed conditions. They met but did not

merge, nor did either destroy the other. The defendant

had the right to use its dock, as a private dock, subject to

the right of the public to travel over it, as they had pre\d-

ously traveled upon the land over which it^ was built. The

city had no right to use the dock for dock purposes, but

its citizens had the right to use it for street purposes. While

the street followed the dock, and covered the whole of it,

that did not authorize the city to collect wharfage; and

although the dock was private property the same as the
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land beneath it, that did not authorize the defendant to

prevent the public from using it for the same purpose that

they had previously used the land. The easement for

travel still existed, but it was over the dock which took

the place of the land constituting the street. The public

had the right to travel in the same place and in the same

direction that they had before, but instead of traveling

upon the surface of the land, they were obliged to travel

and had the right to travel upon the structure that the de-

fendant had placed on the land. That structure became a

street for the purpose of travel and a private dock for

use as such, with a superior right in the public in case of

conflict through reasonable use of the respective rights.

**********

We have thus laid down the law applicable to the facts

as found independent of the fact appearing in the third

conclusion of law. It is clear that the latter, treated as a

finding of fact that Front street had not been traveled or

used as a public highway for more than six years, is in-

consistent with the eighteenth finding of fact that the pub-

lic used the dock continuously from the time it was built,

both for foot and vehicle traffic, as a way of communication

between Main street and points east of Washington street.

The learned trial justice evidently regarded the street as

TRIAL PRACTICE

[Chap. 1

subject to the right of the public to travel upon it, they
could not unreasonably interfere with that right nor with
the existence of the street which was the foundation there')f. Two rights co-existed. The defendant, as owner of
the river front, had the right to reach the water. As there
was a street along the river front over the defendant's land
the public had the right to use the street. The building
of the dock changed neither right. Both continued to exist,
although under changed conditions. They met but did not
merge, nor did either destroy the other. The defendant
had the right to use its dock, as a private dock, subject to
the right of the public to travel over it, as they had previously traveled upon the land over which it was built. The
city had no right to use the dock for do~k purposes, but
its citizens had the right to use it for street purposes. While
the street followed the dock, and covered the whole of it,
that did not authorize the city to collect wharf age; and
although the dock was private property the same as the
land beneath it that did not authorize the defendant to
prevent the public from using it for the same purpose that
they had previously used the land.
The easement for
travel still exi ted, but it was over the dock which took
'the place of the land constituting the street. The public
had the right to travel in the same place and in the same
direction that they had before, but instead of traveling
upon the surface of the land, they were obliged to travel
and had the right to travel upon the structure that the defendant had placed on the land. That structure became a
street for the purpose of travel and a private dock for
use as such, with a superior right in the public in case of
conflict through reasonable use of the respective rights.
• * ~ • • • • • • *
We have thus laid down the law applicable to the fact~
as found independent of the fact appearing in the third
conclusion of law. It is dear that the latter, treated as a
:finding of fact that Front street had not been traveled or
used a a public highway for more than six years, is incon i t nt with the eighteenth finding of fact that the public u ed the do k continuously from the time it was bui1t, .
both for foot and vehicle traffic, as a way of communication
betw n Main street and points east of Washington street.
The learned trial justice evidently regarded the Rtreet as
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no longer in existence after the dock was built, and hence

found that travel had ceased upon the street, although he

found that it continued upon the dock which took the place

of the street. He may thus have been misled into making

the inconsistent findings.

** While an appellate court should harmonize inconsistent

findings when it is possible to do so, if they prove irrecon-

cilable it is the duty of the court to accept those most fav-

orable to the appellant, and he is entitled to rely upon

them in aid of his exceptions." {Israel v. Manhattan Ry. \\

Co., 158 N. Y. 624, 631 ; Nickell v. Tracy, 184 N. Y. 386.

390.) The finding that the street has been abandoned can-

not be reconciled, according to our view of the law, with

the finding that the dock has been used and traveled upon

continuously as a street. We are, therefore, compelled to

reject the former and to accept the latter, with the same

force and effect as if it was the only finding upon the sub-

ject appearing in the decision. This leaves the conclusion
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of law that the defendant is entitled to the exclusive use,

possession and occupancy of Front street, and that the

plaintiff is not possessed of any right, title or interest

therein, without any finding to support it. The exception

to this conclusion of law, as well as to the direction for

judgment against the plaintiff, raised reversible error and

requires us to reverse the judgment appealed from and to

order a new trial, with costs to abide the event.

CuLLEN, Ch. J., Gray, O'Brien, Werxee. Wh.lard Bart-

LETT and Chase, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed, Etc,
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no longer in existence after the dock was built, and hence
found that travel had ceased upon the street, although he
found that it continued upon the dock which took the pla e
of the street. He may thus have been misled into making
the incon i tent :findings.
"While an appellate court should harmonize incon. jstent
:findings when it i po ible to do so, if they prove irreconcilable it is the dut of the court to accept tho e most fav. orable to the appellant and he is entitled to rely upon
them in aid of his exceptions." (Israel v. ·.Manhattan Ry.
Co., 158 N. Y. 624, 631; Nickell v. Tracy, 184 N. ·y. 3 6.
390.) The finding that the street has been abandoned cannot be reconciled, according to our view of the law with
the finding that the dock has been u ed and traveled upon
continuously as a street. We are, therefore, compelled tu
reject the former and to accept the latter, with the ame
force and effect as if it was the only finding upon the ubject appearing in the decision. Thi leaves the conclu ion
of law that the defendant is entitled to the exclu ive u" e,
~ possession and occupancy of Front street, and that the
plaintiff i not po sessed of any right, title or interest
therein, without an finding to support it. The exception
to this conclusion of law a well as to the direction for
j adgment again t the plaintiff rai ed rever ible error and
requires us to rever e the judgment appealed from and to
order a new trial, with costs to abide the e ent.
CULLEN, Ch. J., GRAY, O'BRIEN, WER~RR . \YIT,LARD BARTLETT and CHASE, J J., concur.
Judgm ent reversed, Etc.
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